Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?

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Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice? Michigan Journal of International Law Volume 32 Issue 3 2011 Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice? Charles Chernor Jalloh University of Pittsburgh School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Organizations Law Commons Recommended Citation Charles C. Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 395 (2011). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol32/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: ACHIEVING JUSTICE? Charles Chernor Jalloh* INTRODUCTION ......................................... ...... 396 1. THE INTENDED ROLE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE ........................................ 398 A. Sierra Leone's Request for U.N. Supportfor a Special Tribunal .................... ........ 398 B. The Security Council Endorses Sierra Leone's Request... 399 C. U.N. -Sierra Leone Agreement and Key Features of SCSL Jurisdiction .......................... 401 II. BACKGROUND TO THE CASES PROSECUTED BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE .................. 404 A. The Revolutionary United Front Case............................... 405 B. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Case................ 406 C. The Civil Defense Forces Case................. 407 D. The Charles Taylor Case........... ................ 410 Ill. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE.. ....................................... 412 A. Excessively Narrow Interpretationof "Greatest Responsibility" ............... ....... 413 B. Selective Prosecutions:Commanders, but What of the Profiteers .................... ..... 418 C. Shoestring Justice: Trials and Tribulations..... ..... 428 D. Limited Supportfor the Defense Office.............................437 E. Inequality ofArms Between the Prosecution and Defense ......................... ....... 440 B.A. (Guelph), LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill), M.St. and Chevening Scholar (Oxford); Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Pennsylvania, United States of America; former Legal Advisor to the Office of the Principal Defender, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Associate Legal Officer, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Legal Counsel, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Section, Canadian Department of Justice. E-mail: [email protected]. This Article was prepared for a debate between former Special Court for Sierra Leone Prosecutor David Crane and this author on the above question. It was hosted by the Human Rights Center and the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School on February 17, 2010. Vincent del Buono, a fine human rights advo- cate, moderated. He has since passed away. I dedicate this Article to his memory. I thank Tara Melish for organizing and inviting me to the above student-focused event, which prompted the drafting of this paper. I am grateful to Erika de Wet and Joseph Rikhof for kindly reviewing an earlier draft of this Article and giving excellent suggestions. Amy DiBella provided outstanding research assistance. I appreciate Jennifer Allen and the editors of the Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw for their thoughtful edits. The usual disclaimer applies. 395 396 Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw [Vol. 32:395 IV. DID THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE BRING JUSTICE, PEACE, AND RECONCILIATION TO SIERRA LEONE?........ .. .. .. 444 A. Justice and Overall Fairness of the Trials..... ........ 445 B. FailedExpectations of Efficiency and Expeditious Trials... 446 C. Lasting Peace and the Deterrence Value of the SCSL....... 451 D. National Reconciliation?................ ....... 453 CONCLUSION ................................................. 456 INTRODUCTION The creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL or the Court) in early 2002 generated high expectations within the international community.' The SCSL was generally deemed to herald a new model or benchmark for the assessment of future ad hoc international criminal courts.! As the Court completes the trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor in The Hague-its last-nine years later, this Article of- fers an early and broad assessment of whether it has fulfilled its promise. More specifically, this Article examines whether the SCSL has achieved, or more accurately-because its trials are still ongoing- whether it is achieving justice. I use the term justice in the ordinary sense, referring to whether the Court has justly or fairly treated the ac- cused during the proceedings it has carried out. This approach is justified for three main reasons. First, dispensing credible justice on behalf of Sierra Leonean victims of conflict is a noble goal that was the raison I. See, e.g., Stuart Beresford & A.S. Muller, The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: An Initial Comment, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 635 (2001) (maintaining optimism regarding the Court despite the numerous hurdles facing it); Robert Cryer, A "Special Court" for Sierra Leone, 50 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 435 (2001) (comparing the origins of the Court relative to other attempts at creating similar institutions); Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391 (2001) (claiming that the Court, by virtue of its relationship with the United Nations, will be perceived as more legitimate than purely domestic courts); Micaela Frulli, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments, 11 E.J.I.L. 857, 869 (2000) ("[T]he establishment of the Special Court represents another positive step in the struggle against impunity."); Melron C. Nicol-Wilson, Accountability for Human Rights Abuses: The United Nations'SpecialCourt for Sierra Leone, AUSTL. INT'L L.J. 159, 175 (2001) ("The importance of establishing the Special Court is unquestionable and Sierra Leoneans and the international community are anxious to see a viable and effective court functioning as soon as possible."); Celina Schocken, The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 436 (2002) (expressing optimism in the Court when compared to the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY)). 2. See Independent Expert, Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 134 (Dec. 12, 2006) (Antonio Cassese) ("[Tlhe Special Court has in some respects made much headway, establishing a new benchmark for international criminal justice. On the other hand, the Court has also experienced a number of challenges and setbacks . ."). Spring 20111 Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice? 397 d'etre for the SCSL's creation. Second, since the Court is an interna- tional tribunal entrusted with such a sacred mandate and whose creation and functioning was supported by many states from around the world, it seems only fair to hold it to the high international fair trial standards that its statute claims to espouse. Third, the SCSL's success was, from its founding, predicated on the idea that it would not only dispense justice but that it would be seen to do so and contribute to laying a firm struc- tural foundation for lasting peace and national reconciliation in post- conflict Sierra Leone. An inevitable question then is whether it has met that expectation. The Article is divided into four parts. Part I examines the travaux prdparatoires,or documentary history, of the Court to discern the tribu- nal's intended role in order to set the stage for the subsequent analysis. I focus on the views of Sierra Leone and the United Nations during the formal discussions and negotiations preceding the SCSL's establishment. Part H1 provides some necessary background. Towards that end, I briefly highlight the three main trials that the Court has completed as well as the current status of its fourth and, by all indications, last trial, that of former Liberian President Charles Taylor. In Part III, I examine some limitations relating to the SCSL from a Sierra Leonean perspective, starting with the Prosecutor's selection of cases. I question the excessively narrow manner in which he framed and applied the Court's greatest responsibility personal jurisdiction. In this regard, I ask who was prosecuted, who was not prosecuted, and why or why not. Though I do not purport to have all the answers, my analysis does reveal a curious, inverse, and unexpected result: over-inclusiveness with respect to those who were actually prosecuted and under- inclusiveness in relation to those who were not. In seeking to understand this outcome, I suggest that the SCSL's volatile donations-based funding structure severely limited the number of cases brought by the Prosecu- tion. Perhaps worse, it also negatively impacted the funding and other types of support provided for the accused and their defense. Part IV of the Article critically assesses how well the Court has done in achieving the tripartite goals of its founders to help bring justice, re- store peace, and promote national reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Finally, in the Conclusion,
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