The Content/Object Equivocation: Shepherd's Neglected Contribution
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The Content/Object Equivocation: Shepherd’s Neglected Contribution MONIQUE WHITAKER University of the Witwatersrand Overview • Between Shepherd and Searle • The ‘Bad Argument’ Wi! Sal A"icum corn’d, Wi! Paper-Spice pepper’d • Searle’s critique of Berkeley Wi! B#k-Garnish adorn’d— Enter Lady Mary Shepheard— • Shepherd on Berkeley’s error Imbued wi! a Taste— • Comparing Shepherd and Searle Imblued wi! a Colour • Shepherd on external objects Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1833 • Philosophical neglect of Shepherd Overview • Between Shepherd and Searle • The ‘Bad Argument’ • Searle’s critique of Berkeley • Shepherd on Berkeley’s error • Comparing Shepherd and Searle • Shepherd on external objects • Philosophical neglect of Shepherd Between Shepherd and Searle • Kazimierz Twardowski ‘s On the Content and Object of Presentations • Influence on Meinong’s ontology • Husserl’s theory of intentionality • GEM Anscombe’s ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’ Esther Stocker, Geometric Rooms The ‘Bad Argument’ [T]here are different versions of !e Bad Argument, but !e co&on feature !at runs !rough !em is !e confusion between !e inten'onal sense of “aware of,” and o!er su( expressions, and !e constitu've sense of !e same expressions. The essence of !e Bad Argument is to treat !e experience itself as !e object, or possible object, of perceptual awareness in !e sense in )i( real objects in !e world )en perceived are !e objects of awareness. Searle, 2015 The ‘Bad Argument’ • Mistaken scepticism about our knowledge of the nature of the external world • Crucial error of the ‘Bad Argument’ is the claim that we perceive sense data—failure to distinguish content (sense data) and object (external, mind-independent entity) The Bad Argument is an instance of a very general fallacy about inten'onality, and it results from confusion about !e very nature of inten'onality. It is confusion between !e content of an inten'onal state and !e object of !e inten'onal state. Searle, 2015 Searle’s critique of Berkeley “[S]ensible !ings are !ose only )i( are i&ediately perceived by sense”. Philonus: Upon pu"ing your hand near !e fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensa'on or two distinct sensa'ons? Hylas: But one simple sensa'on. Philonous: Is not !e heat i&ediately perceived? Hylas: It is. Philonus: And !e pain? Hylas: True. Philonous: Seeing !erefore !ey are bo! i&ediately perceived at !e same 'me, and !e fire affects you only wi! one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows !at !is same simple idea is bo! !e intense heat i&ediately perceived and !e pain; and, consequently, !at !e intense heat i&ediately perceived is no!ing distinct from a pa*icular so* of pain. Berkeley, 1713 Searle’s critique of Berkeley • Ambiguity of the term “immediately perceived”: 1. Object of the perception; intentional sense; objective state of the world 2. Content of the perception: constitutive sense; subjective experience • We may still be brains-in-vats, but we aren’t subject to scepticism about the true nature of the external world Searle’s critique of Berkeley • Ambiguity of the term “immediately perceived”: 1. Object of the perception; intentional sense; objective state of the world 2. Content of the perception: constitutive sense; subjective experience • We may still be brains-in-vats, but we aren’t subject to scepticism about the true nature of the external world Searle’s critique of Berkeley The scep'cal argument says all you can ever perceive are your own experiences, so how do you know !ere is a reality on !e o!er side of !ose experiences? On !e account of percep'on !at I have been presen'ng […], !e rela'on of percep'on is one of direct presenta'on. We do not have evidence or make an inference, we directly see objects and states of affairs around us. Searle, 2015 Mark Dorf, Perception of the World Searle’s critique of Berkeley • Wittgenstein’’s distinction between: - Inferences from evidence - Identification of criteria satisfaction Violinist Wilner Baptiste Shepherd on Berkeley’s error For !at are "e foremen#oned Objects but "e "ings we perceive by Sense, and !at do we perceive besides our own Ideas or Sensa#ons? Berkeley, 1710 Ambiguity of “ideas being imprinted on the senses” / “perceiving [by sense] our own ideas and sensations” Shepherd on Berkeley’s error [F]or in !is sentence “!at are objects but !e !ings we perceive by sense?” and “)at do we perceive but our ideas and sensa'ons?” !ere is an offence against one of !e plainest and most useful of logical rules; for !e argument if placed in a regular syllogism, will be seen to contain a middle term of two different and pa*icular significa'ons from )i(, !erefore, no!ing can be concluded. Shepherd, 1827 Shepherd on Berkeley’s error Let !e question be, “Are objects, ideas and sensa#ons only?” and !e middle term, “The "ings we perceive”—be united wi! !e predicate for !e major proposi'on, and !en be altered: to “!e !ings we perceive by sense,” )en joined to !e subject, for !e minor; it will be seen !at an inconclusive syllogism is !ence formed. For if !e major proposi'on stands, “Our ideas and sensa'ons, are !e only !ings we perceive,” and !e minor, “Objects are !e !ings we perceive by sense,” !e conclusion, viz. “Therefore objects are only our ideas and sensa'ons,” does not logically follow, because !e middle term would !en consist of “two different pa%s, or kinds, of !e same universal idea,” i.e. !e idea of percep'on in general; “and "is will never serve to show )e!er !e subject and predicate agree, or disagree. Shepherd, 1827 Shepherd on Berkeley’s error 1. Our ideas and sensations are the only things we perceive. 2. Objects are the things we perceive by sense. • Therefore, 3. Objects are only our ideas and sensations. Shepherd on Berkeley’s error 1. Our ideas and sensations are the only things we perceive. 2. Objects are the things we perceive by sense. • Therefore, 3. Objects are only our ideas and sensations. Paraphrase: 1. Our perceptions are composed of nothing but ideas and sensations. 2. We perceive objects by means of our senses. Therefore, 3. Objects consist of nothing but our ideas and sensations. Comparing Shepherd and Searle Shepherd objects • Knowledge of the external, mind- independent world • Known through reasoning from the relative proportions and variety of sensations, which reveal the corresponding relative proportions and variety amongst external Comparing Shepherd and Searle Shepherd objects • Knowledge of the external, mind- independent world • Known through reasoning from the relative proportions and variety of sensations, which reveal the corresponding relative proportions and variety amongst external The objects of sense, !erefore, […] are known […] to be "e con#nued, exterior, and independant existences of external nature, exci'ng ideas, and determining sensa'ons in !e mind of a sen'ent being; but not ONLY to be ideas and sensa#ons. Shepherd, 1827 Comparing Shepherd and Searle Shepherd objects Searle • Knowledge of the external, mind- independent world • Knowledge of the external, mind- • Known through reasoning from the relative independent world proportions and variety of sensations, which • Known through direct perception reveal the corresponding relative proportions and variety amongst external The objects of sense, !erefore, […] are known […] to be "e con#nued, exterior, and independant existences of external nature, exci'ng ideas, and determining sensa'ons in !e mind of a sen'ent being; but not ONLY to be ideas and sensa#ons. Shepherd, 1827 Comparing Shepherd and Searle [T]he soul does truly in a sense perceive outward !ings, as !ey are )en existing outwardly, for after reason shews !at !e quali'es of !ings, in a state of percep#on, cannot be like !em out of a state of percep'on, yet being conscious !at sensa'on is only a simple act, (a power, a quality,) it perceives by !e understanding !at !e varie#es of !ings are in rela'on to ea( o!er outwardly in !e same propo%ion as are !e inward sensa'ons. Shepherd, 1827 Shepherd on external objects I observe !at reason discovering !ese objects to be in !eir rela'on to ea( o!er, as various as !e impressions !ey convey; also perceives !em to be in one respect like !e ideas !ey create; i.e. in !e same propo*ions and bearings to ea( o!er, outwardly as !ey are inwardly. Therefore among !e observa'ons we have of “our ideas and sensa'ons” of sensible quali'es, we do perceive some"ing else !an !ese mere “ideas or sensa#ons” for we perceive by reason, !at !ose !ings )i( must needs be present in order as causes to affect !e sense, may on account of "eir variety, !eir similar distinctness, and propo%ions, be named, ()en considered as existing exterior to !e instruments of sense,) by !e names !ey bear )en inwardly taken no'ce of. Shepherd, 1827 The logical error, !erefore, of Bishop Berkeley on !is pa* of !e subject, is an incomplete defini#on; for no defini'on is g#d )i( does not take no'ce of all !e ideas, under !e term; and in every object of sense )i( !e mind perceives, !e knowledge of its genus, as a general effect arising from a general cause independant of mind, is mixed wi" "e sensa#ons or ideas resul#ng from its special quali#es affec#ng "e same. The no'on of !is genus is omi"ed in Dr. Berkeley's defini'on of an OBJECT. Shepherd, 1827 Shepherd on external objects I observe !at reason discovering !ese objects to be in !eir rela'on to ea( o!er, as various as !e impressions !ey convey; also perceives !em to be in one respect like !e ideas !ey create; i.e.