The Content/Object Equivocation: Shepherd's Neglected Contribution

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The Content/Object Equivocation: Shepherd’s Neglected Contribution MONIQUE WHITAKER University of the Witwatersrand Overview

• Between Shepherd and Searle • The ‘Bad Argument’ Wi! Sal A"icum corn’d, Wi! Paper-Spice pepper’d • Searle’s critique of Berkeley Wi! B#k-Garnish adorn’d— Enter Lady Mary Shepheard— • Shepherd on Berkeley’s error Imbued wi! a Taﬆe— • Comparing Shepherd and Searle Imblued wi! a Colour

• Shepherd on external objects Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1833

• Philosophical neglect of Shepherd Overview

• Between Shepherd and Searle • The ‘Bad Argument’ • Searle’s critique of Berkeley • Shepherd on Berkeley’s error • Comparing Shepherd and Searle • Shepherd on external objects • Philosophical neglect of Shepherd Between Shepherd and Searle

• Kazimierz Twardowski ‘s On the Content and Object of Presentations • Influence on Meinong’s ontology • Husserl’s theory of intentionality

• GEM Anscombe’s ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’

Esther Stocker, Geometric Rooms The ‘Bad Argument’

[T]here are diﬀerent versions of !e Bad Argument, but !e co&on feature !at runs !rough !em is !e confusion between !e inten'onal sense of “aware of,” and o!er su( expressions, and !e conﬆitu've sense of !e same expressions. The essence of !e Bad Argument is to treat !e experience itself as !e object, or possible object, of perceptual awareness in !e sense in )i( real objects in !e world )en perceived are !e objects of awareness. Searle, 2015 The ‘Bad Argument’

• Mistaken scepticism about our knowledge of the nature of the external world • Crucial error of the ‘Bad Argument’ is the claim that we perceive sense data—failure to distinguish content (sense data) and object (external, mind-independent entity)

The Bad Argument is an inﬆance of a very general fallacy about inten'onality, and it results from confusion about !e very nature of inten'onality. It is confusion between !e content of an inten'onal ﬆate and !e object of !e inten'onal ﬆate. Searle, 2015 Searle’s critique of Berkeley

“[S]ensible !ings are !ose only )i( are i&ediately perceived by sense”.

Philonus: Upon pu"ing your hand near !e fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensa'on or two diﬆinct sensa'ons? Hylas: But one simple sensa'on. Philonous: Is not !e heat i&ediately perceived? Hylas: It is. Philonus: And !e pain? Hylas: True. Philonous: Seeing !erefore !ey are bo! i&ediately perceived at !e same 'me, and !e fire affects you only wi! one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows !at !is same simple idea is bo! !e intense heat i&ediately perceived and !e pain; and, consequently, !at !e intense heat i&ediately perceived is no!ing diﬆinct from a pa*icular so* of pain. Berkeley, 1713

Searle’s critique of Berkeley

• Ambiguity of the term “immediately perceived”: 1. Object of the perception; intentional sense; objective state of the world 2. Content of the perception: constitutive sense; subjective experience

• We may still be brains-in-vats, but we aren’t subject to scepticism about the true nature of the external world Searle’s critique of Berkeley

• We may still be brains-in-vats, but we aren’t subject to scepticism about the true nature of the external world Searle’s critique of Berkeley The scep'cal argument says all you can ever perceive are your own experiences, so how do you know !ere is a reality on !e o!er side of !ose experiences? On !e account of percep'on !at I have been presen'ng […], !e rela'on of percep'on is one of direct presenta'on. We do not have evidence or make an inference, we directly see objects and ﬆates of aﬀairs around us. Searle, 2015 Mark Dorf, Perception of the World Searle’s critique of Berkeley

• Wittgenstein’’s distinction between: - Inferences from evidence - Identification of criteria satisfaction

Violinist Wilner Baptiste Shepherd on Berkeley’s error

For !at are "e foremen#oned Objects but "e "ings we perceive by Sense, and !at do we perceive besides our own Ideas or Sensa#ons? Berkeley, 1710

Ambiguity of “ideas being imprinted on the senses” / “perceiving [by sense] our own ideas and sensations” Shepherd on Berkeley’s error

[F]or in !is sentence “!at are objects but !e !ings we perceive by sense?” and “)at do we perceive but our ideas and sensa'ons?” !ere is an offence againﬆ one of !e plaineﬆ and moﬆ useful of logical rules; for !e argument if placed in a regular syllogism, will be seen to contain a middle term of two different and pa*icular significa'ons from )i(, !erefore, no!ing can be concluded. Shepherd, 1827

Shepherd on Berkeley’s error

Let !e queﬆion be, “Are objects, ideas and sensa#ons only?” and !e middle term, “The "ings we perceive”—be united wi! !e predicate for !e major proposi'on, and !en be altered: to “!e !ings we perceive by sense,” )en joined to !e subject, for !e minor; it will be seen !at an inconclusive syllogism is !ence formed. For if !e major proposi'on ﬆands, “Our ideas and sensa'ons, are !e only !ings we perceive,” and !e minor, “Objects are !e !ings we perceive by sense,” !e conclusion, viz. “Therefore objects are only our ideas and sensa'ons,” does not logically follow, because !e middle term would !en consiﬆ of “two diﬀerent pa%s, or kinds, of !e same universal idea,” i.e. !e idea of percep'on in general; “and "is will never serve to show )e!er !e subject and predicate agree, or disagree. Shepherd, 1827 Shepherd on Berkeley’s error

1. Our ideas and sensations are the only things we perceive. 2. Objects are the things we perceive by sense.

• Therefore, 3. Objects are only our ideas and sensations. Shepherd on Berkeley’s error

1. Our ideas and sensations are the only things we perceive. 2. Objects are the things we perceive by sense.

• Therefore, 3. Objects are only our ideas and sensations.

Paraphrase: 1. Our perceptions are composed of nothing but ideas and sensations. 2. We perceive objects by means of our senses.

Therefore, 3. Objects consist of nothing but our ideas and sensations. Comparing Shepherd and Searle

Shepherd objects

• Knowledge of the external, mind- independent world • Known through reasoning from the relative proportions and variety of sensations, which reveal the corresponding relative proportions and variety amongst external Comparing Shepherd and Searle

Shepherd objects

The objects of sense, !erefore, […] are known […] to be "e con#nued, exterior, and independant exiﬆences of external nature, exci'ng ideas, and determining sensa'ons in !e mind of a sen'ent being; but not ONLY to be ideas and sensa#ons. Shepherd, 1827 Comparing Shepherd and Searle

Shepherd objects Searle • Knowledge of the external, mind- independent world • Knowledge of the external, mind- • Known through reasoning from the relative independent world proportions and variety of sensations, which • Known through direct perception reveal the corresponding relative proportions and variety amongst external

[T]he soul does truly in a sense perceive outward !ings, as !ey are )en exiﬆing outwardly, for after reason shews !at !e quali'es of !ings, in a ﬆate of percep#on, cannot be like !em out of a ﬆate of percep'on, yet being conscious !at sensa'on is only a simple act, (a power, a quality,) it perceives by !e underﬆanding !at !e varie#es of !ings are in rela'on to ea( o!er outwardly in !e same propo%ion as are !e inward sensa'ons. Shepherd, 1827 Shepherd on external objects

I observe !at reason discovering !ese objects to be in !eir rela'on to ea( o!er, as various as !e impressions !ey convey; also perceives !em to be in one respect like !e ideas !ey create; i.e. in !e same propo*ions and bearings to ea( o!er, outwardly as !ey are inwardly. Therefore among !e observa'ons we have of “our ideas and sensa'ons” of sensible quali'es, we do perceive some"ing else !an !ese mere “ideas or sensa#ons” for we perceive by reason, !at !ose !ings )i( muﬆ needs be present in order as causes to aﬀect !e sense, may on account of "eir variety, !eir similar diﬆinctness, and propo%ions, be named, ()en considered as exiﬆing exterior to !e inﬆruments of sense,) by !e names !ey bear )en inwardly taken no'ce of. Shepherd, 1827

The logical error, !erefore, of Bishop Berkeley on !is pa* of !e subject, is an incomplete defini#on; for no defini'on is g#d )i( does not take no'ce of all !e ideas, under !e term; and in every object of sense )i( !e mind perceives, !e knowledge of its genus, as a general effect arising from a general cause independant of mind, is mixed wi" "e sensa#ons or ideas resul#ng from its special quali#es affec#ng "e same. The no'on of !is genus is omi"ed in Dr. Berkeley's defini'on of an OBJECT. Shepherd, 1827 Shepherd on external objects

• Atherton critiques Shepherd’s material conception of the senses • But Berkeley establishes the nature of objects as collections of sensible qualities using the equivocation Shepherd has rejected. Shepherd on external objects

• Atherton critiques Shepherd’s material Philonous: [… S]ensible "ings are conception of the senses "ose only !i' are i(ediately perceived by sense. […] Sensible • But Berkeley establishes the nature of !ings !erefore are no!ing else objects as collections of sensible qualities but so many sensible quali'es, or using the equivocation Shepherd has combina'ons of sensible quali'es? rejected. Berkely, 1713 Shepherd on external objects

+en, for inﬆance, !ey [“(ildren or peasants”, by )i( she means to refer to ordinary, non-philosophical !inkers] perceive a fire in !eir (amber, !ey know !at !e cause of !is percep'on possesses also !e capacity of se"ing fire to !e house, but none of se"ing fire to !e idea of a house; !ey consequently place a guard againﬆ !e ac'on of !at cause, but none over !eir !oughts of it. Shepherd, 1827

Andrius Aleksandravičius, Traffic | Kaunas | GlassBallProject #50/365 Shepherd on external objects

• The variety and difference amongst them is left over after we strip away all their sensible characteristics • Mind-independent external objects serve as the causal origin of our sensations and ideas of them • Berkeley’s argument for other minds serves as an example of how we can gain knowledge of things outside our own minds by observing their effects Shepherd on external objects

[A]object perceived by !e mind is a compound being, consiﬆing of a ce*ain collec'on of sensible quali'es, “mixed wi! an idea !e result of reasoning” of su( quali'es being formed by a “con'nually exiﬆing outward and independant [sic] set of as various and appropriate causes;” !erefore […] !ere muﬆ be “an outward object,” exiﬆing as a cause to excite !e inward feeling. Shepherd, 1827 Shepherd on external objects

• Atherton objects that Shepherd hasn’t adequately grasped Berkeley’s claim of direct experience of non- material causation • But Atherton may be argued not to fully appreciate the significance of Shepherd’s rejection of the content/ object equivocation

Studio Carreras, Dualism Philosophical neglect of Shepherd

Alibone, 1897 Philosophical neglect of Shepherd

+en she unde*#k a public refuta'on of !ese erroneous no'ons on cause and effect, it muﬆ be remembered it was a 'me )en !ey were moﬆ rampant, and widely spread over !e no*hern pa*s of Britain in pa*icular. Every young man )o came from !e Universi'es of Scotland, a"empted to show off his sub'lity [sic] and academic lore, by denying !ere was any real causa'on in !e world; all was mere imagina'on, and a piece of gross vulgar credulity. Her Ladyship’s effo*s were, !erefore, well- 'med; and !ere is no doubt but !eir influence was decided in giving a considerable (e, to !ese illogical and dangerous opinions.”

Blakey, 1850 Philosophical neglect of Shepherd

Of !e writers since Hume, )o have wri"en on metaphysics wi! !e severity proper to !e subject, are Mr. Fearne, !e au!or of !e Essay on ‘Consciousness,’ and Lady Mary Shepherd, )ose works on ‘Cause and Effect’ are amongﬆ !e moﬆ remarkable produc'ons of !e age. Bea"ie, Dugald -ewa*, Dr. Brown, and his imitators, turned )at should have been abﬆract reasoning “to favor and to pre"iness.” Mr. Hazli" obscured it by !i,ly-cluﬆered associa'ons; and Coleridge presented it in !e masquerade of a gorgeous fancy. Lady Mary Shepherd, on !e o!er hand, is a !inker of as mu( honeﬆy as courage; her specula'ons are colorless, and leave no!ing on !e mind but !e fine-drawn lines of !ought. Coleridge, addressing !e Du(ess of Devonshire, on a spirited verse she had wri"en on !e heroism of Tell, asks— “Oh, lady, nursed in pomp and pleasure, +ere got ye !at heroic measure?” The poet might have found in !e reasonings of Lady Mary Shepherd a wo*hier object of admira'on !an in !e li"le ﬆanza )i( seemed so extraordinary an effo* for a lady of fashion. Talfourd, 1836 References

Albertazzi, Liliana, Massimo Libardi, Roberto Poli (eds.). 1996. The School of Present Time, Volume IV. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans. Franz Brentano. Dordrecht: Springer Science and Business Media. Bulwer, EL, and Sergeant Talfourd. 1836. ‘Some Thoughts on the Genius of William Allibone, Samuel Austin, 1897. A Critical Dictionary of English Literature and Hazlitt, in Literary Remains of the Late William Hazlitt, With a Notice of His Life British and American Authors, Living and Deceased, From the Earliest Accounts by His Son, and Thoughts on His Genius and Writings. New York; London: to Tte Latter Half of the Nineteenth Century. Containing over Forty-Six Saunders and Otley. Thousand Articles (Authors), With Forty Indexes of Subjects, Volume II. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. 2001. The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, J. C. C. Mays (ed.). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Anscombe, GEM. 1965/2002. ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’, in Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception, Jacquette, Dale. 2015. Alexius Meinong, The Shepherd of Non-Being. Alva Noë and Evan Thompson (eds.). Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. Armstrong, Josh. 2015. ‘Vision Science’. Los Angeles Review of Books, June 7, Marek, Johann. ‘Alexius Meinong’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015. 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/ entries/ meinong/. Atherton, Margaret. 1996. ‘Lady Mary shepherd's case against George Berkeley’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 4(2): 347–366. McRobert, Jennifer. 2002 (revised 2014). ‘Mary Shepherd and the Causal Relation’. Manuscript. http://philpapers.org/archive/MCRMSA.pdf. Berkeley, George. 1710/1881. ‘Of the Principles of Human Knowlegde’, in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Charles Porterfield Searle, John. 2015. Seeing Things as They Are. Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford Krauth (ed.). Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. University Press. Berkely, George. 1713/1909. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous in Shepherd, Mary. 1827. Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists. Vol. XXXVII, Part 2, The Harvard Classics. Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation. London: John New York, NY: P.F. Collier & Son. Hathchard and Son. Betti, Arianna. 2016. ‘Kazimierz Twardowski’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of ______1832. ‘Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics’, Fraser’s Magazine Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). http:// for Town and Country. 5(30), July 1832: 697–708. plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2016 /entries/twardowski/. Maclsaac, Amanda. 2013. ‘Synchronicity and Sensation: the causal theory of Lady Blackburn, Simon. 2008. ‘Shepherd, Mary’, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Mary Shepherd’. MA Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/ Stroud, Barry. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: acref/ 9780199541430.001.0001/acref-9780199541430-e-2856. Oxford University Press. Blakey, Robert, 1850. History of the Philosophy Of Mind; Embracing the Twardowski, Kasimir. 1894/1977. On the Content and Object of Presentations: A Opinions of all Writers on Mental Science from the Earliest Period to the Psychological Investigation, Reinhardt Grossman (transl. and intro.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.