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swiftly and decisively, while its informal structure gave it the !exibility needed to navigate crises and adapt to changing developments on the ground. Yet, despite the high expectations that accompanied its formation, and some modest success early on, the Quartet has little to show for its decade long in- volvement in the peace process. Israelis and Palestinians are no closer to resolv- ing the con!ict, and in the few instances in which political negotiations did take place, the Quartet’s role was usually rel- egated to that of a political bystander. Meanwhile, the Quartet has failed to keep pace with the dramatic changes that have occurred in the con!ict and the region in recent years, particularly since the advent of the Arab Awakening. Having spent most of the last three years in a state of near paralysis, and having failed to dissuade the Palestinians from seeking UN membership and recognition in September 2011, the Quartet has "- nally reached the limits of its utility. The Quartet’s Track Record Of all its interventions, none are C. KHALED ELGINDY, “THE MIDDLE EAST more illustrative of the Quartet’s per- QUARTET: A POST-MORTEM,” WASHINGTON, formance and modus operandi than the D.C., FEBRUARY 2012 (EXCERPTS) Roadmap and the Quartet Principles, This 75-page paper was published by the two most important and consequen- the Saban Center for Middle East Policy tial actions taken by the group to date. at the Brookings Institution. The paper The publication of the Roadmap in April was authored by Khaled Elgindy, a visit- 2003 sought to correct three funda- ing fellow at Brookings who served as an mental shortcomings in the Oslo peace advisor to the PLO negotiating unit in Ra- process of the 1990s. In addition to mallah for !ve years. The footnotes have calling for parallel (rather than sequen- been omitted for space. The full document tial or conditional) implementation of can be obtained at http://www.brookings. each side’s obligations and insisting on edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/02_ monitoring and accountability for both middle_east_elgindy/02_middle_east_ sides, the Roadmap sought to articulate elgindy_b.pdf. a more clearly de"ned end game. What- ever theoretical or potential bene"ts the It has been ten years since the four Roadmap might have offered, however, most powerful players in the Middle were negated by the fact that it was for East peace process—the United States, all intents and purposes a dead letter. the , Russia, and the The Israeli government, already —came together under highly suspicious of the Quartet, re- the diplomatic umbrella known as the jected the entire Roadmap exercise Quartet. Formed in response to the out- precisely because of its emphasis on break of the second intifada in late 2000 parallelism and monitoring. As a re- and the collapse of peace negotiations a sult, despite ostensibly agreeing with few months later, the Quartet appeared the Quartet consensus regarding both ideally suited for dealing with the seem- of these principles, the George W. Bush ingly intractable con!ict between Is- administration worked systematically to raelis and Palestinians. Its small but block or hinder them. Having enthusias- powerful membership allowed it to act tically backed the Sharon government’s

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“security "rst” doctrine, key elements consensus among all four of the group’s within the Bush administration agreed members, major divisions surfaced al- to make ’s implementation of the most from the start and have persisted Roadmap conditional on the Palestin- ever since. ians meeting their obligations "rst. Sim- Despite attempts by Alvaro de Soto, ilarly, despite the strenuous efforts by the UN envoy at the time, to argue that various actors to set up an of"cial moni- the principles were never intended as toring structure, no Quartet monitoring conditions on international donor assis- mechanism was ever established. tance to the PA, the Bush White House Instead, in keeping with Israel’s ob- made sure they would be implemented jections to international or indepen- as precisely that. The U.S. and EU deci- dent monitoring, only the United States sions in 2006 to withhold international was allowed to monitor implementation aid, which virtually all donors including and compliance. And even then, such Arab states complied with, amounted to missions were given low priority and an international sanctions regime. This, were sporadic and highly constrained combined with Israel’s nearly simultane- in their operation—for example by not ous decision to withhold valued added publicizing their "ndings or even shar- tax (VAT) revenues collected on Pales- ing them with the other three Quartet tinian imports that accounted for some members. 60 to 70 percent of all PA revenue, trig- The Roadmap was eventually gered a severe economic and humani- discarded altogether by the Bush tarian crisis throughout the West Bank administration’s—and later the and Gaza Strip. Quartet’s—support for Israel’s Gaza Once again, despite the apparent Disengagement Plan, a primary ob- consensus among the four powers, jective of which was to neutralize the it soon became clear that the Quar- Quartet plan. The fact that it was the tet members each had a very differ- United States rather than the Quartet ent understanding of what the new that ultimately subverted the Roadmap policy meant, or how to put it into ef- meant little in light of EU, UN, and Rus- fect. These differences spanned the en- sian acquiescence at each stage of the tire spectrum, from the U.S. insistence process. The subversion of the Roadmap on a “no aid/no contact” policy to the later proved to be the Quartet’s “origi- Russian call for engaging Hamas in a nal sin,” with far-reaching consequences dialogue in the hope of moderating its that are still felt today. The consensus positions, with the EU position leaning that had been so painstakingly forged more toward the American one and the around the Roadmap was exposed as a UN position more toward the Russian farce. Any bene"ts the plan may have one. Despite the apparent similarity offered were nulli"ed by the divergent in the U.S. and EU positions, in prac- goals of the United States and the other tice the goals of the United States and three Quartet members, along with the European Union diverged sharply: their desire to maintain the unity of the whereas the Europeans have sought group at all costs. compromises by which to continue Within months of Israel’s withdrawal channeling aid into Palestinian hands, from the Gaza Strip, the Quartet faced the United States has been far less !ex- an even greater challenge after the ible. The intense disagreement over the surprise election victory of the Pales- Quartet Principles, which almost caused tinian Islamist faction Hamas gave it the group to break up, only added to control over the Palestinian Authority the sense of confusion regarding its (PA) in January 2006. In response, the mission and further undercut its stand- United States, the European Union, the ing. Ironically, Hamas’s takeover of United Nations, and Russia called for Gaza in July 2007 may well have saved three criteria to be met—nonviolence, the Quartet by removing the single most recognition of Israel, and acceptance potent source of internal con!ict it had of previous agreements—for the new ever had to face. Hamas-led government to receive rec- Two other experiences offer addi- ognition and support. While on the sur- tional insights into the Quartet’s han- face the Quartet Principles re!ected a dling of crisis situations and its overall

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approach to con!ict management: the Why the Quartet Does Not Work May 2010 !otilla tragedy and the role The Quartet’s failings stem mainly of the Quartet representative. For many from three factors: its loose, informal of its proponents, the Quartet’s true structure; the imbalance of power and value was demonstrated in the wake of interests in its composition; and a lack the deadly May 2010 Israeli raid on an of genuine consensus among its mem- international aid !otilla attempting to bers. The group’s highly malleable reach Gaza, which subsequently led to structure and lopsided membership has an easing of Israel’s blockade of Gaza. A hobbled its ability to function as an in- UN-led initiative propelled by American dependent actor. While these structural power and in!uence and put into effect constraints have not been the primary by the of"cial Quartet representative source of its ineffectiveness, they have was seen as a clear case of “the Quartet provided an enabling environment for at its best.” This perspective, however, a far more damaging and entirely self- ignores the central role of the Quartet in!icted defect: the willingness of its in creating the conditions that led to the members to paper over genuine and blockade and that gave rise to the !o- often far-reaching disagreements in tilla in the "rst place, namely the adop- the interest of maintaining group co- tion of the Quartet Principles followed hesion. The fact that the Quartet could by years of Quartet inaction in the face be all things to all people allowed its of worsening conditions in Gaza. The most powerful and vested member, the !otilla crisis also highlighted another of United States, not only to dominate the the Quartet’s major failings: its inability institution itself but to effectively trans- to shape events rather than merely re- form it into something other than what spond to them. it was originally intended to be. Then there is the anomaly known as the of"ce of the Quartet represen- All Things to All People tative, currently held by former Brit- As with other contact groups, the in- ish prime minister Tony Blair. The post formal and ad hoc nature of the Quar- was "rst held by former World Bank tet was intended to bypass some of the president James Wolfensohn, who was structural constraints imposed by for- appointed by Secretary of State Condo- mal international mechanisms like the leezza Rice in April 2005 to oversee the UN Security Council. The absence of an Gaza disengagement process. Although organic, institutional structure was also both Wolfensohn and Blair were given seen as essential to the Quartet’s proper relatively narrow mandates focused on functioning, maximizing the collective assisting Palestinians in areas of eco- impact of its members while maintain- nomics and institution-building, the ing their individual freedom of action. two missions could not have been more The Quartet’s loose, informal structure different. has been a double-edged sword, how- Whereas Wolfensohn sought to play ever. While it is true that there have a very political role throughout his ten- been no formal constraints on indi- ure, Blair has been content mostly to vidual Quartet members, their freedom remain inside his “tight box.” Despite of action can be, and often has been, the differences between the two envoys, impeded by their involvement in the the two missions have one important group. This is partly due to the fact that thing in common: both were initially Quartet positions necessarily re!ect the conceived not as integral components lowest common denominator, usually of the Quartet’s mission but as alterna- represented by the United States, and tives to it. Overall, the role of Quartet to the group’s diminished credibility as representative, particularly under Tony a result of the other three members’ ac- Blair, has helped to reinforce American quiescence to U.S. demands. dominance of the process while mak- ing the Quartet more palatable to Israel Imbalanced Membership by channeling EU, UN, and Russian in- The Quartet’s composition is rather volvement away from the diplomatic unique among contact groups. Its mem- process and by depoliticizing the role of bership includes two permanent mem- the Quartet generally. bers of the UN Security Council (the

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United States and Russia) and two su- priorities in the region, including its pranational organizations (the United bilateral relationship with Israel. While Nations and the European Union), but the United States typically has worked no regional actors or other direct stake- closely with Israel, it has been less holders in the Israeli-Palestinian con- bound by the need to coordinate with !ict. In addition, two of its members, its Quartet partners. This was particu- the United States and the European larly true under the Bush administration Union, are also the largest donors to the but has persisted under the Obama ad- peace process. This unusually top-heavy ministration as well, as demonstrated by arrangement was a direct response to the latter’s decision to exclude the other the conditions under which the group Quartet members from the launching of emerged, namely the intense violence of direct negotiations in September 2010. the second intifada and the need to as- American dominance of the Quartet semble the most powerful actors in the would not be possible, however, with- most ef"cient con"guration in the short- out the parallel tendency of the Euro- est amount of time. The Quartet was pean Union, the United Nations, and also a way for the European Union, the Russia to acquiesce to the United States, United Nations, and Russia to lobby the even when serious disagreements ex- United States to reengage in the process isted and when the stakes were high. and to try to in!uence U.S. positions This, combined with the unwillingness once it did. of the United Nations, Russia, and espe- Despite the apparent complemen- cially the European Union to use their tariness of the group’s membership— substantial leverage as a counterbal- former UN envoy Terje Rød-Larsen ance to U.S. unilateralism, earned the famously described it as the perfect group the un!attering nickname of the marriage of American power, European “Quartet sans trois.” Even if they could money, and UN legitimacy—the Quartet not compete with American power and suffers from a fundamental imbalance in!uence, there was little to lose and that directly affects how it operates, ir- much to gain from being part of even respective of its stated or normative an ineffective group, particularly for the positions. The asymmetry has been European Union. most evident in the unmitigated domi- As the largest single donor to the Pal- nance of the Quartet by the United estinian Authority and Israel’s second States, which is both its most powerful largest trading partner, the European member and the one with the highest Union had long sought to translate its concentration of interests in the con- substantial economic clout into a mean- !ict. The absence of any regional pow- ingful political role, if not on par with ers that might offset this imbalance that of the United States than at least has only compounded this imbalance. signi"cantly greater than it had played Thus, while the United States, the Eu- in the past. The United Nations, which ropean Union, the United Nations, and had not played a serious political role Russia were, on the surface, bound by in the Arab-Israeli con!ict since 1968 a common desire to end the con!ict, and whose involvement in the region they each had their own motivations for was largely con"ned to peacekeep- joining the effort that were not neces- ing and other operational matters, also sarily tied to a resolution of the Israeli- hoped for an entrée into the diplomatic Palestinian con!ict. process. Finally, Russia’s involvement For the United States, the Quartet has stemmed from a desire to enhance its served several distinct but overlapping regional stature as well as its leverage purposes. In addition to channeling the with its traditional European and Ameri- interventions of the major international can rivals on a range of regional and in- powers, the Quartet was also used to ternational issues. Ironically, it was this advance other regional objectives like wish to be “relevant” that has helped the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The fact that consolidate American dominance of the the United States had both the ability Quartet. and the will to act unilaterally has also Though there were obvious advan- made the Quartet’s role, to a great ex- tages in having other international tent, a function of broader U.S. policy powers like the European Union and

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the United Nations sign on to its posi- members more evident—or more tions, the United States could afford to damaging—than in the cases of the act on its own when that backing was Roadmap and the Quartet Principles, not there. The three weaker members, and in the disparate treatment of the by contrast, have rarely been in a posi- two. Even as the Quartet allowed im- tion to shape the peace process inde- plementation of the Roadmap to fall by pendently of the United States, not just the wayside, it has held scrupulously because they lack its power and in!u- to the letter of the Quartet Principles. ence, but because doing so risks freez- Although only the former was of"- ing them out of the process. Instead of cially enshrined in a Security Council leveling the diplomatic playing "eld as resolution (UNSCR 1515), it was the lat- expected, the Quartet has actually re- ter that assumed quasi-legal status. In inforced American dominance by giv- both cases, a consensus was negotiated ing greater weight and legitimacy to among all four actors and established as U.S. positions, while simultaneously of"cial Quartet policy. downgrading the value of individual And yet, in both cases, differences in EU, UN, and Russian positions in com- how Quartet members understood that parison to those of the Quartet. A sim- consensus were substantial enough that ilar dynamic exists between the parties they nearly caused the group to break to the con!ict. Whereas Israel has the up. In the case of the Roadmap, dis- ability to shape developments on the agreements over implementation were ground unilaterally, such as through papered over and eventually overtaken settlement expansion or military ac- by a new “consensus” around the need tion, the Palestinians by and large do to get behind the Gaza disengagement. not. Thus, the two actors that seem When it came to the far more formi- to have derived the most bene"t from dable divisions over the Quartet Prin- the Quartet—the United States and ciples, however, the lack of genuine Israel—are also the ones that are the consensus was simply subordinated to least bound by it. the desire to maintain unity at all costs. Indeed, since the split between Hamas Consensus for Its Own Sake and Fatah and the siege of Gaza in the The Quartet’s greatest strength—and summer of 2007, both outgrowths in no the one most frequently cited by its pro- small measure of the Quartet Principles, ponents—is its ability to speak to the the Quartet has become increasingly in- parties with a single, authoritative voice. active, if not irrelevant. In addition to minimizing the possibil- What Quartet of"cials often failed ity of competing interventions, it also to realize, however, is that such reduces the ability of the parties to play hollow—and in some cases illusory— one actor against another. consensuses were often more harm- This assumes, of course, that its ful than not reaching a consensus at members are genuinely of one mind all. Likewise, contrary to the Quartet’s with regard to the goals of the group, credo, collective action can be less ef- which was usually not the case with fective, and in some cases more damag- the Quartet. Beyond the super"cial “vi- ing than individual members acting on sion” articulated in the Roadmap, there their own. Instead, the goal became a is very little common understanding “consensus” for its own sake. among Quartet members regarding its The Palestinian UN membership bid objectives, means of operation, or over- of September 2011 "nally exposed the all role in the peace process. Indeed, myth that a Quartet “consensus” was the group has been deeply divided on synonymous with strength, as well as nearly every crucial issue it has taken the fallacy that the Quartet enhances up since its creation. As a result, what rather than dilutes EU and UN in!uence should have been the Quartet’s great- in the peace process. Despite months of est asset in reality has been a serious deep divisions across the Atlantic and liability. within the European Union, the lack of Although deep divisions were pres- consensus did not produce the apoca- ent from the very start, nowhere was lyptic outcomes that Quartet enthusiasts the lack of alignment among Quartet in the EU and elsewhere had feared. On

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the contrary, there may be strength in of becoming all things to all people, the disunity that could lead to a more hon- Quartet has ceased to be anything at all. est debate and create new opportunities The current mechanism is too out- for moving the process forward. dated, dysfunctional, and discredited If the Quartet’s greatest strength was to be reformed. Instead of undertak- its ability to marshal the collective re- ing another vain attempt to “reactivate” sources of its members and speak with the Quartet, the United States, the Euro- one authoritative voice, its principal pean Union, United Nations, and Russia weaknesses was its tendency to be all should simply allow the existing mecha- things to all people. The malleability of nism to go quietly into the night. In the the Quartet allowed its most powerful short term, this means the of"ce of the member, the United States, to dominate Quartet representative will need to be the mechanism so completely as to ef- folded into the existing donor/aid struc- fectively transform it in virtually every ture. In the medium to long term, how- way. Once conceived as a multilateral ever, it will require the United States and framework for resolving the con!ict, the its international partners, both inside group was now little more than a tool of and outside the region, to work together American foreign policy. to forge a new international consensus The Quartet’s original mission as a around the requirements for a just, last- vehicle for mediating between two par- ing, and comprehensive peace between ties has been replaced by one focused Palestinians and Israelis, as well as de- mainly on managing the affairs of one vise a new peace process “architecture” of them—the Palestinians. In the pro- that is more coherent, strategic, and bal- cess, it also shifted from a more com- anced than the current arrangement. prehensive and integrated vision aimed One possible way forward would be at con!ict resolution to one that is more to convene an international peace con- reactive and disjointed even in its at- ference (modeled on the 1991 Madrid tempts at con!ict management. Conference), perhaps during the "rst half of 2012, bringing together its for- The Bottom Line mer Quartet partners, key regional al- In the end, the Quartet’s greatest sin lies (particularly Egypt, Jordan, and was not that it failed to achieve what it Saudi Arabia, and possibly others like had set out to accomplish but that it in- Qatar and Morocco), along with other sisted on maintaining the pretense that relevant stakeholders (i.e., Norway, it would or even could. In the process Turkey, World Bank, etc.).

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