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Nashi Versus Nazi:Anti-Fascist Activity As a Means of Mass Youth Mobiliza 48 Anthropology of East Europe Review NASHI VERSUS NAZI: ANTI-FASCIST ACTIVITY AS A MEANS OF MASS YOUTH MOBILIZA- TION IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA Oleg Belov, Tver' State University translated by Dmitry Borodin Russian youth movements nowadays consti- National-Bolshevik party has been presented as a one tute a real political force, which can be used by politi- hundred per cent fascist. According to Nashi activists, cal parties and individual politicians to achieve their all these people of different political backgrounds share goals. The most remarkable example in this respect is at least one characteristic – they are overtly anti- the pro-Putin movement Nashi (Ours), which was Putinist. By the same token, the leaders of various op- founded in the spring of 2005 with Kremlin backing. position political forces have insisted that the Nashi Initially it was planned that the movement would com- movement itself is fascist; the word “Nashisty” is used prise a new political force; quite amazingly, some to refer to Nashi members, which in Russian sounds movement activists expressed the belief that by the end similar to “natsisty” (Nazis). Although these mutual of Putin’s second presidential term they would form a accusations seem to be poorly justified from a schol- new “party of power”. Movement organizers planned arly point of view, they are not futile in terms of politi- to recruit as many as 200,000-250,000 followers. cal tactics: in Russia being marked as a “fascist” is Nashi undertook a large number of high profile mass tantamount to being eliminated from the political events during 2005-2007, and attracted a great deal of scene. domestic and international media attention. Currently This article seeks to analyze the anti-fascist however, the movement’s growth has slowed down and activities of the Tver’ city branch of the Nashi move- public interest in its activities is gradually wearing off. ment. I rely mostly on data collected during my field The initial goals of the Nashi movement were research in Tver’ (February-March 2008), under the the following: (1) to promote Russia’s global leader- auspices of the collaborative project, “Youth organiza- ship in the 21st century, (2) to prepare a ‘revolution of tions, voluntary service and the restructuring of social cadres’ in Russia, (3), to educate a new generation of welfare in Russia.”3 In the first stage I conducted ten state officials, and (4) to oppose the threat of an “or- semi-structured focused interviews with participants in ange revolution” in Russia.2 However, another key the Nashi movement, using the snowball strategy to domain of activity claimed by the movement is its anti- locate interviewees. I faced two types of challenges at fascist campaigning. Indeed, the full name of the or- this point. First of all, the current status of the Nashi ganization is the “youth Democratic Anti-Fascist movement in Tver’ is unclear to an outsider, that is, it Movement, Nashi.” The founder and former leader of is not exactly clear whether the movement still exists. Nashi, Vasiliy Yakemenko was often heard denouncing Research took place at a sensitive moment in the prominent Russian politicians as fascists. Thus, Nashi movement’s history and the alleged movement activists activists labeled Vladimir Ryzhkov, Irina Khakamada, could not (or were not willing) to give me a straight- Garry Kasparov and some other leaders of Russian forward answer to the question whether the movement liberal parties as fascists, claiming that all these politi- still existed in Russia in general and in Tver’ in par- cians were fascist sympathizers. On the other hand, ticular. The second challenge was to convince Nashi Nashi accused Grigoriy Yavlinski, of the moderate left- activists (current as well as former) to allow me to in- centrist party Yabloko, of fascist sentiments. Finally, terview them. Their unwillingness to answer my ques- Eduard Limonov, the ill-reputed leader of the radical tions was to a great extent caused by the uncertainty of 2 The so-called “orange” revolution was a series of protests and demonstrations that took place in Ukraine during 2004-5 in response to allegations of corruption and voter intimidation during the presidential elections. It ultimately brought down the Moscow-supported government and caused a great deal of consternation in Russia [JH]. 3 A collaborative research project conducted by Dr. Julie Hemment of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Dr. Valentina Uspenskaya and Mr. Dmitry Borodin of the Center for Women's History and Gender Studies at Tver' State University, and undergraduate students of the departments of Sociology and Political Science at Tver' State Univer- sity, Russia. Volume 26, No. 2 Page 48 49 Anthropology of East Europe Review the movement’s status in Tver’ described above. To It should also be taken into account that because it was compensate for my respondents’ taciturnity, at the sec- created from above, Nashi always depended on the ond stage of my research I had to resort to the analysis Presidential Administration rather than on mass sup- of published materials on Nashi as well as some mate- port. Therefore, as the administration cut back its sup- rials (brochures, pamphlets) published by the move- port and changed its attitude towards the movement, ment itself. Nashi was not able to retain all its regional branches. According to an anonymous official, the administration was no longer planning to use the Nashi to achieve its The uncertain status of Nashi today political goals: “During this election campaign no one would resort to Nashi’s services. Under the new politi- Analysis of the mass media helped me shed cal circumstances, given the anticipated election out- some light on this problem. For instance, on January comes, no one needs these exuberant rowdies.” As the 29 2008, shortly before the presidential elections, the political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky suggests, the national daily newspaper Kommersant published an reorganization of the movement was caused by Putin’s article entitled “Nashi became alienated”.4 According growing annoyance with Nashi activists’ belligerent actions (especially the ones directed at the British and to the article, which quoted the newly appointed leader Estonian embassies), which had still aggravated Mos- of the Nashi movement Nikita Borovikov, the move- 6 ment was to undergo a radical re-organization. To start cow’s relations with the “West”. with, the number of regional branches was to be re- duced; out of nearly 50 regional branches that had ex- isted, the new management was planning to keep only Analysis of materials 5 – those in Vladimir, Ivanovo, Tula, Voronezh and Yaroslavl. Activists from other regions were encour- I based my analysis on two Nashi brochures, aged to participate in independent public projects asso- “Anti-fascism” and “Fascists: Yesterday, today, tomor- ciated with the movement. The list of these projects row?” It is necessary to briefly describe these bro- included but was not limited to “Our Army”, “Volun- chures and the method of analysis. As the brochures teer Youth Public Order Patrol”, “Orthodox Corps”, belong to a very specific genre of literature – the “Lessons of Friendship”, etc. propaganda pamphlet, and are aimed at promoting the Besides, the Nashi movement was established anti-fascist cause and the Nashi movement as a posi- as an overtly counterrevolutionary force, which was to tive youth political movement fighting fascism, they be used for neutralizing the so-called “orange threat”, did not interest me much in terms of their content. that is, the possibility of youth engaging in opposition What primarily interested me was what the anonymous movements as in Ukraine. Nashi was originally envi- authors wanted to accomplish via their pamphlets and sioned as a political organization capable of carrying how they tried to achieve these desired results. The out mass youth public actions under anti-western slo- first question could be answered even after a superfi- gans. Using the same tactics that had proven so suc- cial analysis of the brochures, since it was obvious that cessful during a dozen so-called velvet revolutions they were supposed to arouse certain feelings and emo- over the last 15 years, Nashi activists were expected to tions in their readers; they were intended to foster a ‘seize the main square’, as it were, after the elections negative attitude towards fascism and a positive atti- and to prevent revolution. Now [in the aftermath of tude towards the Nashi movement. However, the sec- the December 2007 Parliamentary and March 2008 ond question required more attention. The authors used Presidential elections, JH] that the “orange threat” many visual representations, such as photographs and seems to be gone, there is no need for the Nashi color contrast to illustrate their main theses. First, they movement. Commenting on the forthcoming rear- reminded the readers that fascism (or Nazism to be rangements, Borovikov observed that “as the threat exact) was the ultimate evil. Second, they warned the once posed by the ‘orange revolution’ no longer exists, public that fascism was not dead, that fascists remain we can focus on other things.” 5 even in contemporary Russia, the country that had de- feated fascism. Third, and most importantly, photo- graphs of World War II German concentration camps 4 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=846635 5 Ibid. 6 Nashi activists have harassed British Ambassador Brenton for his alleged support for 'fascist-sympathizing' opposi- tional groups since he met with leaders of The Other Russia group; meanwhile, the movement has undertaken an intense campaign against the Estonian embassy after a Soviet war memorial was dismantled in Tallin. Both cam- paigns have attracted a great deal of attention in the international media [JH]. Volume 26, No. 2 Page 49 50 Anthropology of East Europe Review juxtaposed with pictures of meetings of the National- Be that as it may, there is actually no informa- Bolshevik Party (NBP) and some other contemporary tion in the brochure about fascism as such: the authors political groups left no doubt who the heirs of fascism never specify what kind of ideology it is, or what ideas were.
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