N°22 -December 6 2007 Published every two weeks / International Edition

CONTENTS KYRGYZSTAN P. 1 KYRGYZSTAN c Wariness Reigns Ahead of December 16 Election c Wariness Reigns Ahead of December 16 Election Can President Kurmanbek Bakiev and his entourage refrain from taking all the seats in the P. 2&3 Jogorku Kenesh when snap parliamentary elections are held on December 16? Will they be able to re- c Election Campaign and frain from taking advantage of administrative resources after having set up exceptionally restrictive ru- Political Maneuvering in les for the game? Given that his position is hardly as solid as that of and Nursultan Na- Georgia zarbaev, will Bakiev be capable of sharing power ? DEFENSE P. 4 c Kazakhstan Builds its Caspian Sea Fleet The possible misuse of power is what is feared by most of the twelve parties vying for the 90 seats at stake, on a party list system, even though the potential is there to make this election one of the ALERT c Kazakhstan to Preside most contested that the young republic has ever known. The parliamentary election could usher in ei- OSCE in 2010 ther a renewal of political turmoil, or the end of the chaos that has reigned since the fall of President Akaev in March 2005. There is nothing to encourage an optimistic outlook. On November 28, Prime Mi- nister Almaz Atambaev, head of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK), resigned from his READ ALSO… government post. According to the party’s secretary, Edil Baisalov, the Prime Minister threw in the INTELLIGENCE towel because he “told President Bakiev to his face that Ak Jol (his party, “the bright path”) and go- www.russia-intelligence.fr vernment officials were interfering in the election process.” Many members of political parties and KREMLIN NGOs condemn the ruling coalition’s use of administrative resources and of the media. The state tele- c Half-tinted election vision channel, KTR, headed by Melis Eshimkanov, a man devoted body and soul to the President af- triumph ter having been, until last April, his fiercest opponent, refuses to grant “publicity” slots to Ak Jol’s ele- ALERT ven rivals. He also refuses to hold a live debate. c Yevgeny Shkolov, or the "Dresden connection" in the On December 3, six important parties, speaking through Kubatbek Baibolov, n°2 on the list Interior ministry of Ata Meken, “questioned the credibility of the Central Electoral Commission” (CEC), threatening FOCUS legal proceedings against its members and its chairwoman, Klara Kabilova, former press secretary to c The strange confession by the President and a native, like himself, of Dzhalalabad. A simple letter from the Interior Ministry as- Oleg Shwartzman king for more information concerning the citizenship of 16 of the 84 candidates on the list of Watan BEHIND THE SCENE (“Nation”) was, in the eyes of the CEC, sufficient reason to eliminate this “Uzbek” party from the race. c Vladimir Zhirinovsky : the little secrets behind an elec- It was a convenient way for the authorities to sideline Kadirzhan Batirov and Davran Sabirov - their tion list rivals within the Uzbek community – and to take their votes, since minorities often vote for the ruling METALS, MINES party. Meanwhile, the CEC does not penalize Ak Jol for the blatant irregularities it commits. But what c Norilsk Nickel in the eye of has led to the most criticism and even prompted threats of an election boycott is the CEC’s interpreta- the cyclone tion of what constitutes the threshold for winning seats in the Jogorku Kenesh. On November 19, it de- TELECOMS cided that the 0.5% threshold that the parties must obtain in each oblast (region) of the country is not c Fridman and Reyman bury to be based on the number of registered voters in each region, but on voters nationwide. This sets the the hatchet bar very high and will prevent several of the parties from entering Parliament, even if they do obtain the 5% required on the national level. UKRAINE INTELLIGENCE www.ukraine-intelligence.fr Former Secretary of State Adakhan Madumarov, n°2 on the list of Ak Jol has no qualms “If GOVERNMENT any party fears that it will not obtain the necessary number of votes to bypass this half a percentage c Towards a Yatsenyuk- barrier, then it does not have the right to call itself a national political party and to form a council Timoshenko « Ticket » ? of ministers.” The rule has prompted the parties to form coalitions. Two of the main opposition par- ENERGY ties, Ata Meken, led by Omurbek Tekebaev and Ak-Shoumkar, led by Kubatbek Baibolov, merged to- c Ukraine Faces Gas gether for the occasion. It was no easy task establishing the list, with the “powerful” wishing to enter Dilemma Once Again parliament to protect their businesses. The job was made even more difficult because quotas have been established for women, the young and ethnic minorities. However, in the end, money was the main cri- SUBSCRIPTION teria for establishing the lists. Thus Jenichbek Nazaraliev, the rich and famous doctor specializing in Electronic Edition the treatment of drug addiction and alcoholism, practically bought Asaba from Azimbek Beknazarov, (PDF, published every two weeks, who was relegated to second place on the list of his own party which includes very few of its members. 23 issues per year) And despite his popularity, Edil Baisalov is relegated to 13th place on the list of the PSDK. Those run- SPECIAL OFFER ning for parliament are very worried. Apart from Ak Jol, only Ata Meken and the PSDK have a slight Discount 15 % chance of sitting on the Jogorku Kenesh. Former Prime Minister Felix Kulov, n°1 on the list of Ar Na- €600 mys, has hardly any illusions. It is likely that many will be discontent if Kurmanbek Bakiev is not wil- €510 per year ling to share power. d

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GEORGIA c Election Campaign and Political Maneuvering in

After a nine-day state of emergency, Georgia has now entered In the backdrop, difficult relation with Russia an election campaign period. The coming weeks will be decisive in determining the country’s developments, its geopolitical posi- The Georgian government continues to denounce bitterly tion as well as the balance of power between the spheres of influ- what it sees as “the hand of ” and accuses the Kremlin ence vying for control. of orchestrating these attempts at political destabilization in order to hold up Georgian membership to NATO (Georgia hopes A turbulent election campaign to join the Membership Action Plan at the summit in Bucharest in April 2008) and prevent it from regaining control over the On November 8, President Mikhail Saakashvili announced separatist republics of and . It is com- that a presidential election is to take place on January 5, 2008. mon knowledge that Russian-Georgian relations have deterio- Along with the election, there will be a referendum asking each rated since 2006. Russia’s ban on Georgian wine and produce, citizen to chose a date for the legislative election (spring or au- its postal and road blockade, its deportation of thousands of tumn 2008) and to decide on whether Georgia should join NATO. Georgians from Russia and the many reciprocal accusations of In accordance with the country’s legislation, the outgoing Presi- espionage have inflamed an already complex situation. dent resigned from his post in order to stand as a candidate for a second mandate. Parliament Speaker Nino Burdzhanadze has On November 13, Moscow vacated the Batumi military base taken over as acting Head of State. In a bid to tone down criticism and handed it back to Georgia before schedule - an agreement from the opposition, Prime Minister , who had signed in 2005 stipulated the closing of the base justified the use of force against demonstrators, was dismissed in 2008. The situation remains uncertain for the and replaced by , Chairman of the Board of the Gudauta military base - one of the centers of the Bank of Georgia. As a businessman who is loyal to the ruling power, Abkhaz-Georgian conflict in the 1990s - as the Gurgenidze is meant to serve as a counterexample to oligarch 10th airborne peace keeping unit has still not been by proving that that “business” can work given orders to evacuate. Despite the visible with- Mikhail in favor of the central government and not in competition with it. Saakashvili drawal of the Russian military from Georgia, the Georgian Minister for Conflict Resolution, David Bakradze, The fact that early elections are being organized, a demand re- President accused Moscow of stockpiling military equip- peatedly expressed by the opposition for months, is interpreted ment in Abkhazia over recent weeks. He claims as a political concession showing that the President is willing to that hundreds of men, in particular Chechens working for Russ- compromise. However, the fact is that the short time span for ian military intelligence, had entered the country through the preparing the election plays in favor of Saakashvili, since it allows port of Ochamchira. him to limit the duration of the campaign and therefore to limit the extent to which the opposition can organize itself. Moreover, It is obvious that Moscow takes advantage of Georgia’s polit- thanks to the early election, the outgoing President avoids com- ical and economic weakness to apply pressure on it. Georgia’s petition from his main opponent, former Defense Minister Irakli membership to NATO would be a first for a CIS nation and would Okruashvili, one of the leaders of the opposition, who cannot run weaken Russia’s geopolitical status in the post-Soviet arena. for office as he will not reach the legal age required (35 years) Nevertheless, Georgia’s allegations that Russia is implicated in until the end of 2008. Okruashvili’s legal situation has gone through forming the opposition seem to be exaggerated. Tbilisi appears many twists and turns and remains complicated. Arrested in late to prefer putting forward the theory of a “fifth column” working September, he left Georgia on November 1st after retracting his in Moscow’s interests than to acknowledge that there is a polit- accusations against the President and being obliged to pay a par- ical crisis in the country. The majority of leaders in the opposi- ticularly steep fine of $6.5 million (CACI n°20). Once settled in tion are as anti-Russian as the government. They even criticize Germany, he went back on this last statement, claiming once again what they consider to be President Saakashvili’s weakness in hat he had proof of Saakashvili’s direct implication in the murder the face of pressure from the Russian Federation. of several political figures. Meanwhile, Okruashvili’s trial in ab- sentia has begun in Tbilisi. The Georgian state accuses him of In the meantime, the Georgian government turned the inter- money laundering, extortion and abuse of office. On November national community against it when it made public audio and 27, Okruashvili was arrested in Berlin, through Interpol, on a re- video conversations between officials at the Russian embassy quest made by the Georgian government. Georgia now has 40 days in Georgia and members of the opposition. The non-respect of in which to prove the legitimacy of its accusations and have him individual rights and privacy, in the name of national security, extradited from Germany, where he could be given refugee status has compromised Georgia’s efforts to portray itself as a demo- if there is insufficient proof against him. German police also ar- cratic nation, and produced the opposite effect to the one the rested Yason Shikhladze, former head of the Georgian Defense government expected. Ministry’s procurement department, and a close associate of Okru- ashvili The Interior Minister had hoped to prove that Russia was di- rectly involved in the demonstrations and to accuse the politi- Meanwhile, the Imedi opposition television channel, which the cal opposition of instigating anti-constitutional trouble. Those government considers to be a political tool, has been shut down directly targeted include Republican Party deputy, Levan Berdzen- since the November 7 demonstration and is still banned from ishvili, the former Minister for Conflict Resolution, Giorgi Khain- broadcasting. On November 25, thousands of people returned to drava, the leader of the Labor Party, Shalva Natelashvili as the streets demanding the station be reopened and denouncing well as Tsotne Gamsakhurdia, whose brother, Konstantin Gam- 2 the government’s grip on the main press organs in the country. sakhurdia, heads the Liberty Party. Central Asia & Caspian Intelligence N°22 December 6 2007 CENTRAL ASIA & CASPIAN INTELLIGENCE

Candidates and power games within Georgia’s political class gia. The National Council prefers its own candidate and hopes Patarkatsishvili will stand down in favor of Levan d d d Within just a few days, twenty-one people registered as Gachechiladze. candidates for the presidential election. Few of them will succeed in obtaining the 50,000 signatures of support required before the Incapable of agreeing on a single candidate, the oppo- December 6 deadline. Only a few figures have what it takes to op- sition saw divisions intensify when the Labor Party decided pose Saakashvili and are backed by parties capable of surpassing to withdraw from the National Council and back the can- the 5% threshold at the next legislative election. didacy of its leader, Shalva Natelashvili. Natelashvili pro- motes radical measures, including renationalizing some Levan Gachechiladze is the most well known candidate as he companies in the private sector, targeting an electorate has been chosen by the National Council, which groups nine of the with more socialist tendencies than does the National Coun- main opposition parties. Gachechiladze, a businessman whose for- cil. According to local sources, the government gave its dis- tune has been estimated at over $10 million, has been at the head creet backing to Shalva Natelashvili’s candidacy in a bid to of the Georgian Wines and Spirits Company since 1994. He portrays divide the opposition. Indeed, the government’s accusation himself as the personification of the Georgian businessman who against Natelashvili of espionage and attempting to over- cares about the economic well-being of the people. He was one of throw the government during the large-scale demonstra- the founders of the New Rights Party but left it in 2003 when its tions in November was abruptly withdrawn by the General other leaders refused to back the “”. Levan Gachechi- Prosecutor, leading some to believe that the Labor Party ladze was chosen as the candidate of the National Council for the was “bought off” politically. very reason that he has stayed away from the political limelight un- til the September demonstrations, that he does not formally be- Most of the opposition figures running against Saakashvili long to any one party and that he made no show of any presiden- played a major role in the “Rose Revolution” of 2003 and were tial ambition, which conforms to the National Council’s credo, which allies of the President in his struggle against Eduard She- is to abolish the presidency and give more powers to parliament.

He is backed by Salome Zurabishvili, who cannot run since she has not been living in Georgia for over 15 years, but she has been approached about being his prime minister in case of victory. De- spite standing unanimously behind its candidate, the National Coun- cil is divided by a certain amount of friction. For example, ultrana- tionalist leader, Jondi Baghaturia, has called for companies owned by foreigners to be nationalized, whereas other figures in the coali- tion not only have a less radical position, but on the contrary, are trying to win over the country’s ethnic minorities. vardnadze. The rift in the “revolutionaries” camp is not new. Levan Gachechiladze supports businessmen and the middle It dates back to the mysterious death of Prime Minister Zurab classes, which benefited from economic reforms and privatization. Zhvania in February 2005, followed by the dismissal of For- In his drive for the votes of the urban middle class, he is up against eign Minister Salome Zurabishvili in October of that year. , leader of the New Rights Party. The two men had worked together within the same party for a long time but There are several reasons for these power struggles within Gamkrelidze is considered to be more moderate than Gachechi- Georgia’s political sphere. First of all, Saakashvili’s refusal ladze. He has obtained the backing of the Industry Party, founded to share some of his presidential powers with parliament and led by the beer magnate, Gogi Topadze, head of the Kazbegi has led the opposition to campaign for the abolition of the company, which groups older businessmen who have on several oc- presidency. Then there is the President’s inability to put casions sought reconciliation with Saakashvili. The New Rights an end to the country’s recurring economic problems as Party and the Industry Party did not join the National Council coali- well as to corruption, and his inflexible attitude when it tion, which they consider too radical. They had hoped to obtain fi- comes to resolving the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and nancial backing from Badri Patarkatsishvili, but he finally opted South Ossetia – problems which have paralyzed the coun- in favor of the National Council, then decided to run for the pres- try – while the entire political class aspires to membership idency himself. of the European Union and wants to take a distance from Russia. There is also strong competition between those in- Badri Patarkatsishvili has set himself up as one of the main fig- dividuals affiliated with the Liberty Institute - an NGO that ures in the limelight of the campaign, although polls say he will get groups many politicians in government posts such as Giga less votes than Levan Gachechiladze. During the 1990s he managed Bokeria, one of the leaders of the United National Move- several Russian media outlets such as the ORT and TV6 television ment, Interior Minister and Education channels belonging to his friend Boris Berezovski. In 2006 he cre- Minister Kakha Lomaia - and their opponents, often for- ated quite a stir when he sold 100% of his shares in the newspaper mer associates of . Kommersant to the Uzbek-born Russian oligarch . Meanwhile the opposition is also divided over its polit- The Georgian government now accuses him of having instigated ical aims, torn by power struggles and split by powerful eco- a coup d’etat during the November demonstrations, with the back- nomic rivalry between Badri Patarkatsishvili and his per- ing of the Russian secret services. This accusation seems erroneous, sonal empire, the entrepreneurial milieu that backs David however, as he is sought by Moscow for criminal activities relating Gamkrelidze and Gogi Topadze, and those that back Levan to several cases implicating the Russian oligarch in exile in Lon- Gachechiladze. The die has not yet been cast when it comes don. Badri Patarkatsishvili has not received wide support in Geor- to Georgia’s election. d 3 Central Asia & Caspian Intelligence N°22 December 6 2007 CENTRAL ASIA & CASPIAN INTELLIGENCE

DEFENSE c Kazakhstan Builds its Caspian Sea Fleet With a 50% increase in their military budgets between 2006 and Kazakhstan is also eager to work with those further away, 2007, Central Asian states have entered a new phase in their mil- especially with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO itary history. Leading this drive, and boosted by its oil windfall, has been offering Kazakh soldiers maritime training on the Kazakhstan has reaffirmed, through its president Nursultan bases of southern Europe for several years now. Meanwhile, Nazarbaev, that it wants to become “an advanced military power” the recent visit to Astana of Robert Simmons, NATO’s repre- by 2012. Of the main areas to be developed, Kaza- sentative for the South Caucasus and Central khstan believes that a fleet in the Caspian Sea is Asia, reaffirmed the United States’ interest in the most crucial in order to protect its offshore oil the formation of a Kazakh military fleet. and gas sites, which were protected during the 1990s by Russian patrol boats, and to secure the energy This visit was followed by a meeting in No- corridor used by Kazakh tankers going to Baku. vember between Bolat Sembinov, Deputy De- fense Minister of Kazakhstan and French gen- Officially set up in 1996 on the naval legacy left eral Emmanuel Beth, Director of the Defense over from the , the Kazakh fleet did not Ministry’s International Cooperation Agency, really start growing in size until the military reforms who had come to negotiate Franco-Kazakh col- begun in 2005-2006. In Kazakhstan’s oil capital, laboration in the framework of NATO’s Individ- Atyrau, there is only a motorized brigade, a few pa- ual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Moscow trol ships and a navy airfield, while Aktau, the cap- is very worried over the rapid growth of Kaza- ital of the Mangystau region, has the prestigious Military Maritime khstan’s military fleet, and has protested against the change Institute linked to the Defense Ministry. The largest part of the in the balance of powers. Yet Russia will have almost com- Kazakh military fleet is based in the small deep-water port of pletely renewed its Caspian fleet by 2016, while Azerbaijan, Bautino, located to the north of Aktau. In 2007, the new Defense and, to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan, are following the trend Minister, former Prime Minister Danial Akhmetov, the first civil- set by Astana and have begun efforts to develop their own ian to take up this post, launched a new training program for navy Caspian Sea fleet in order to secure their offshore fields. The officers, which was badly lacking in the country. militarization of the Caspian Sea seems therefore inevitable, with as yet unknown consequences for the medium and long He also recentralized military-maritime management with the term. d creation of a Department of Maritime Forces within the Defense Ministry, to take effect as of January 1st 2008. One of the princi- ple challenges of this program concerns naval construction. This ALERT includes building the infrastructure necessary for accommodat- ing ships in the country’s various ports. 3 Kazakhstan to Preside OSCE in 2010 Foreign Affairs Ministers from the OSCE, meeting in Spain on Indeed, the only ship building plant in the country, Zenit, lo- November 29 and 30, have chosen to assign the rotating presi- cated in the western region of Uralsk, has the capacity to build dency of the organization to Kazakhstan in 2010. This was a relief ships of less than 500 tons, which patrol the region of Atyrau. for President Nursultan Nazarbaev, for whom it was a matter of Heavier ones, which ensure security in deeper waters, must be personal honor. The Kazakh presidency was expected for 2009, imported. By the end of 2007, the Kazakh government will chose but was delayed by one year in order to allow the country to set the foreign partner that will provide it with ships weighing from in place new reforms, such as changing the electoral laws, the 500 to 1,000 tons (a decision by the five littoral states stipulates conditions for registering political parties and legislation concern- that no ship weighing more than 1,000 tons is authorized in the ing the media, which are far from adhering to OSCE criteria. De- Caspian Sea). Several companies are in the running: France’s spite the fact that Kazakhstan’s legislative elections of last August CMN (Compagnie Méridionale de Navigation) and Armaris DCNS, were harshly criticized as undemocratic, the country’s intense some Ukrainian state-owned companies, as well as Russian firms campaign, stressing its economic success and its strategic advan- incorporated in Rosoboronexport. In April 2007, Danial Akhme- tage for the European Union, was fruitful in the end. To obtain tov held talks with the Prime Minister of Tatarstan, Rustam Min- Washington’s backing, Kazakhstan had to drop its support of nikhanov, and then with Russia’s Defense Minister, Anatoly Russia on the question of reforms within the OSCE. This turn- Serdyukov, and mentioned the possibility that Tatarstan, which around was bitterly felt by Sergey Lavrov, who had backed As- has several plants in the military- industrial complex field on its tana’s bid for 2009 on many occasions. d territory, become Zenit’s main partner.

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