FACULTY OF EDUCATION AND BUSINESS STUDIES Department of Humanities

Is it Islamic ideology that leads to radicalism, or is radicalism motivated by Islam?

A qualitative analysis of Taimour Abdulwahab’s and Rakhmat Akilov’s radicalization

Kajsa Tillman

2020

Master thesis, Advanced level, 30 credits Master Programme in Religious Studies RVA800

Supervisor: Torkel Lindquist Examiner: Peder Thalén ABSTRACT

This study includes a comparative analysis of the two jihadists, Taimour Abdulwahab's and Rakhmat Akilov's radical uprising. The objective is to analyze their radicalization process based on two different theoretical approaches. The first theory of Oliver Roy embraces the social conditions under which Muslims think and act, and believes that radicalization leads to an increased radical religiosity. In contrast, the second theory of Gilles Kepel seeks to understand the intellectual history of Islam, and believes that it is the political developments that have led to radicalization.

The study shows that the radicalization of Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov is a complicated matter that shares aspects from both theoretical approaches. However, some factors of the theories apply better than others. These factors are often linked to a triggering event that causes an individual to turn to a violent ideology. Also, strong group affiliation is considered an essential emotional bond, where identification with other like-minded people is an important factor. Influences from different emotions are essential to the radical process, where feelings of significance and threatened identity is a factor for increased violence. It is proven through the analysis how the interpretation of an individual's background results in how the religious and political perspectives regarding radicalization are defined and understood. As a result, one can neither ignore Kepel's historical aspects or Roy's modern conditions. After all, our life is often affected by both old and contemporary experiences.

CONTENT

ABSTRACT 2

PART 1: THE FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY

1. INTRODUCTION 8

1.1 RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN 8

THE ATTACK IN 2010 9

THE ATTACK IN 2017 10

1.2 AIM AND PURPOSE 11

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 11

RESEARCH QUESTIONS 11

2. METHODOLOGY 12

2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 12

2.2 RESEARCH METHOD 13

RESEARCH DIFFICULTIES 14

3. BACKGROUND 16

3.1 THE LINK BETWEEN RELIGION AND CONFLICT 16

DEFINE RELIGION 16

COLLECTIVE FRUSTRATION 17

3.2 RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 18

THREE LEVELS OF IDENTITY 19

4. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 21

4.1 ON RADICALIZATION 21

A PROCESS WITH MANY DEFINITIONS 22 4.2 ON ROY AND KEPEL 26

FRIENDS OR FOES? 26

4.3 ON ABDULWAHAB AND AKILOV 28

AN INADEQUATE AREA 28

PART 2: THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH

5. THEORETICAL BASIS 30

5.1 ROY VERSUS KEPEL 30

OLIVIER ROY 30

GILLES KEPEL 33

6. THE CASES 36

6.1 THE JIHADISTS 36

WHO WAS TAIMOUR ABDULWAHAB? 36

WHO WAS RAKHMAT AKILOV? 38

6.2 WHAT IS JIHAD 40

7. ANALYSIS 43

7.1 THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS 43

OTHER FACTORS 45

8. CONCLUSION 47

8.1 RESULT 47

DISCUSSION 48

REFERENCES 52

PART 1: THE FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY

7 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN People have always questioned the origin of human evil and what makes individuals and groups resort to violence. Today we live in a world defined by conflicts and insecurities. Many of these conflicts tend to be religiously motivated or have religious elements of some sort. Acts of violence on the part of non-governmental groups have long been used to destabilize societies and create social tension and fear, to damage nations' and individuals' social developments and democratic decisions (Regeringskansliet 2014a:3). Global events and developments have witnessed a significant association between the adherents of Islam and violence. We know today that these associations increased dramatically after the 9/11 terror attacks and has brought about substantial changes in our political worldview. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. In the last two decades, have terroristic, and jihadistic motivated violence increased forcefully (Roy 2018:7). Several conflicts are operating in Europe and are generating extreme ideologies and terroristic violence.

As the Islamic political activism has advanced its positions in Europe, Sweden has not been spared from its rampaging (Göndör 2018:10). This condition has caused many difficult situations for Sweden, such as the ongoing recruitment of Swedes to the Islamic State and the increasing number of returnees from various conflicts. Violent Islamic extremism in Sweden is part of a global ideology whose purpose is to confront those who are considered unfaithful to Islam (Regeringskansliet 2014b:15). The increasing amount of people who travel to and, above all, returning from areas of conflict, where they have participated in terrorist training or committed acts of violence, means that the number of people in Sweden with the capability to carry out attacks is expanding (Regeringskansliet 2014a:4). Despite this, many of those who return to Sweden, or other countries, will not develop the intent to commit violent crimes. Based on the Islamic terrorist attacks Sweden has been exposed to during the past decade, one may observe that the threats often come from perpetrators acting alone. Such lone attackers may have different ideological motives, but what they have in common is that they do not belong to established groups or networks. These perpetrators are rarely acting on the specific instructions of anyone else, although statements made by political leaders abroad may be viewed as a means to legitimizing the attack (Regeringskansliet 2014a:5). In recent years, several attacks in the West have been carried out by this type of lone attacker. According to the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), they closely monitor developments abroad and analyze the threats that are directed at

8 Sweden and Swedish interests. In order to protect Sweden and the democracy, threats and vulnerabilities must be identified and assessed. On October 1, 2010, the Security Service increased the threat level regarding terrorism directed against Sweden. The decision was based on evidence from the National Center for Terror Threat Assessment (NCT) (Säkerhetspolisens 2010:20). Despite the development, the threat level in Sweden in 2010 was still considered to be low compared to other countries in Europe (Säkerhetspolisens 2010:20). However, the first suicide bombing in Sweden happened just two months after this decision.

THE ATTACK IN 2010 It all started in the middle of Christmas shopping on December 11, 2010, when a car was set on fire in central Stockholm. Few understood what was about to happen until another explosion occurred nearby (Säkerhetspolisen 2010:34). Two people got away with minor wounds from the blast, except the suicide bomber Taimour Abdulwahab, who died on the spot from injuries. This came to be regarded as Sweden's first, although unsuccessful, terrorist attack with Islamic motives.

Taimour Abdulwahab spent the time until the attack in Tranås with his family (Säkerhetspolisen 2011:55). In the morning on December 11, Abdulwahab leaves his parents' home and starts to drive towards Stockholm. Testimony indicates that he, at that time, does not wear any explosives. However, when he stops at a gas station in Herrbeta, it shows on the surveillance video, how he wears a bomb attached to his body and backpack (Säkerhetspolisen 2011:55). Despite many searches, the police never found the place where he made and hid the explosives. At 15.30, he arrives in Stockholm according to recovered information from a fire-damaged GPS. Shortly after 16.00, he makes a call to his mother, and just before 17.00, the first call to the police about a burning car on Drottninggatan is made (Säkerhetspolisen 2011:55). Taimour Abdulwahab appeared to have started by igniting an arrangement of gas canisters in his car, which was packed with gasoline containers, fireworks, nails, and other objects that could have contributed to a massive explosion. The car started to burn in big flames but did not explode as Abdulwahab intended. The fire caused many people to stop in their Christmas shopping and gather around in big crowds. According to witnesses and surveillance video, Abdulwahab wanders back and forth from Drottninggatan, where the car was burning, and the side street Bryggargatan. He was turning into the side street where he appeared to have detonated at least one of the pipe bombs strapped to his waist. Shortly after 17.30, further calls to the police were made about an injured man on Bryggargatan (Säkerhetspolisen 2011:55). The police believed that he might have been

9 heading to the city's central subway station when he accidentally triggered the bomb. The reason he wandered between Drottningatan and Bryggargatan may have been due to problems with the explosive device. He wanted to detonate one of the bombs into the crowd that had gathered because of the commotion, but Abdulwahab probably had problems with the detonation and had to turn to the side street to try to fix the bomb. The theory of an accidental detonation appeared to be the leading hypothesis from the police. Chief prosecutor Tomas Lindstrand says in a conference that “It's not unreasonable to think that he could have made a mistake so that a portion of the bomb detonated and caused his death”. Lindstrand also stated, “There is speculation that he was on his way to a place where there were a lot of people. This was in the middle of Stockholm, in the middle of Christmas; it's not a daring guess.” (The New York Times 2010). If the attack had happened in the way Taimour Abdulwahab planned, many would have died and been injured. Although this came to be regarded as Sweden's first Islamist terrorist attack, it will mean very little to what would follow.

THE ATTACK IN 2017 It was just before 15.00 in the afternoon on April 7, 2017, when Rakhmat Akilov hijacked a truck and drove it down Drottninggatan in Stockholm. During his reckless driving, he killed five people, injured ten, and exposed a large number of people to direct life-threatening outcomes. The drive down Drottninggatan ended with Rakhmat Akilov crashing the truck into Åhlén's department store. Akilov then ignited a home-built explosive device in the car, which did not detonate in the way he had intended, but still caused material destruction. He later escaped from the scene but was arrested later that evening (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:7).

Rakhmat Akilov spent the night before the attack in an apartment in Skärholmen. It is clear from the telephone analysis that he left the apartment in the morning. Around lunchtime, he talked with two of his contacts, ”togut shikan” and” muovia44,” and sent them pictures of the explosive device, which consisted of five gas cans. Akilov arrived in the center of Vårby Gård shortly after 12.30, where he stepped on a subway (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:10). Akilov got off at Odenplan shortly after 13.20 and then left the subway to wander around, seemingly in Vasastan. It seems that Akilov was already looking for a truck at this time. Rakhmat Akilov himself has told that it was close that he seized another vehicle at Odenplan, to carry out the attack there, but that the driver interrupted him (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:10). Akilov, therefore, proceeded towards Drottninggatan, where he was caught on a surveillance film at 14.40 on Adolf Fredriks Kyrkogata, a street crossing Drottninggatan. Here Akilov took pictures of the truck, which he

10 later stole and sent the photos to ”togut shikan.” Just before 14.50, the car was seized (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:11). Rakhmat Akilov then drove the truck down Drottninggatan, which caused the death of five people and exposed many individuals to life-threatening injuries. The truck eventually crashed into Åhlén's department store. Then Akilov ignited the explosive device in the vehicle. Although the device did not detonate in an intended manner, it still caused a violent fire and further material destruction (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:17).

1.2 AIM AND PURPOSE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE Why do particular individuals and groups become committed to violence as a means to achieve their goals? How and when does the process of radicalization move a person from non-violent actions to violence and terror? Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy are two French scholars of radical Islam whom both have a long list of books and articles behind them. Both present a different theory on radicalization, where Kepel seeks to understand the intellectual history of political Islam and Roy the social conditions under which Muslims think and act.

The objective is to create an understanding from two different perspectives, to see whether if it is Islamic ideology that leads to radicalism, or if radicalism is motivated by Islam. The first perspective is to analyze the cases of Rakhmat Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab, with reality- based facts from their pasts in the light of the two radicalization theories. The second perspective is to analyze the radicalization theories in relation to these two primary examples of terrorism, which creates a double perspective which this thesis will commute between. The aim is neither a defense nor an attempt to increase acceptance of religiously motivated violence, but rather an analysis of how religion can be adapted under political and social conditions to be shaped into violent acts.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS • Which of the theories, Gilles Kepel’s or Olivier Roy’s, can best be applied to the radicalization of Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov? • What factors and motivations drove Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov to their actions?

11 2. METHODOLOGY 2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN The study is designed in such a way that it is divided into two parts. The first part will provide an overview of the perspectives and areas this thesis will cover, as the second part presents the basis for the analytical approach. The first part begins with chapter 1, which introduces the landscape of the study. The foundation is based on the Islamic extremist violence in Sweden, and how it has operated during the past decade. The two terror attacks from 2010 and 2017 are presented in more detail, as they are the two cases this study will examine. Chapter 1 also presents the thesis's objective, which is to study the perpetrators of these two attacks against two different theories of radicalization. Chapter 2 presents the methodology, which explains how the thesis has been conducted and designed. It also displays some of the difficulties that have been discovered during the writing process. Chapter 3 introduces a background on the primary elements and previous research for the objective. At the beginning of the chapter, the relationship between religion and conflict is presented, and how religious ideologies have been used to motivate violence. It also shows the religious demarcation that the study will relate to regarding Islam. Given the size of this thesis, this research will focus solely on the religious aspects of Islam that are associated with the study's objective. Further, chapter 2 also discusses religious identity, which is an essential feature in radicalization and the understanding of radicals. Many factors and situations influence our identity, where different institutions have their distinct definitions and theories. These various aspects of religious identity may help to analyze the radicalization processes. However, this study will mainly relate to the cultural, social, and personal factors that influence a person's identity. Chapter 4 presents previous research regarding the objective. The first section of this chapter presents different models of radicalization. As this study primarily focuses on radicalism, the topic is explained from different definitions. This section is intended to provide insight into the research position and increase the understanding of radicalization and how different explanations affect how radicalism is handled and defined. It will also give insights on how the phenomenon in this study can vary and behave differently depending on which theoretical perspective it is observed from. Later on, previous research regarding Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel is presented, and how their theories can be regarded as opposites or complementary. The chapter also describes the research conducted on Rakhmat Akilov and Tamour Abdulwahab, to give the reader a more coherent picture of what lies behind the research objective and analysis.

12 The second part presents the study's analytical basis and concretize the problem and the perspectives the research is to be based upon. Chapter 5 provides a more in-depth description of the two definitions of radicalization the thesis will analyze. Chapter 6 presents a background of the two perpetrators from the terrorist attacks in 2010 and 2017. In Chapter 7, the analysis is conducted upon the previous chapters. First, the two leading theories are studied in the light of the two attackers, followed by an analysis of other factors and elements that have been presented earlier in the thesis. Chapter 8 then makes the final evaluation based on the research questions. The result is later given, supported by a closing discussion. All demarcations that have been made in this study have been based on the objective and focus of the thesis, which is primarily to analyze and compare two radicalization theories and two jihadists.

2.2 RESEARCH METHOD The chosen method for this thesis is a qualitative one. A literary comparative and analytical method has been selected to describe and analyze differences and similarities between the study objective. A comparative method offers opportunities to test, develop, and explain theories and situations (Denk 2013: 19). The purpose of testing theories in this way is to understand how they relate to empirical cases. The goal is to determine whether the theory has the opportunity to explain actual cases or needs to be improved. As for the scope of this study, the aim is to explain which theory best can be applied to the radicalization of Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov.

The objective of this study was at the beginning focusing on a broad problem area, but was later on defined and designed for a more precise aim. Based on the study's research problems, the purpose was developed to indicate what is desired and what will be achieved with the study. In order to answer the research questions, it is necessary that analytical categories are applied and developed, which specify which objects and properties are to be studied (Denk 2013: 31). The overall research question not only indicates the question that the analysis will answer, but it also indicates the concepts that should be used as analytical categories in the analysis. (Denk 2013:99). For this study's overall research question, the analytical categories mainly relate to the radicalization factors that are assigned to provide clarity in views and the result of radicalization, to distinguish if it is Islamic ideology that leads to radicalism, or if radicalism is motivated by Islam for the study cases.

13 Data has also been collected on the objective and its properties and previous facts. In the analysis, the collected material is then related to the analytical categories. This process creates opportunities to deliver a conclusion that hopefully answers the study's overall research question (Denk 2013: 31). When it comes to the collection of data, the material primarily relates to the research objective, which is radicalization, but also facts about religious identity, conflicts, and definitions have been evaluated. In order to present the state of the research field, the collected data varies in their definitions and interpretations of the topic. As will be presented later, a variety of different scholars have devoted themselves to study radicalization under different perspectives. By presenting material with different definitions of radicalization and the elements that can contribute to the process, this study provides an insight into how complicated and extensive a person's radical conversion can be. The different sources have the task of explaining and placing the research objective into a context, to create an understanding of the basics and the surrounding elements of radicalism. However, much of the analysis is based on how one chooses to interpret the material. Hence, the results of this study cannot avoid reflecting a specific type of interpretation of the data, which means that one cannot regard the result as the absolute truth.

Since this study places a high focus on comparing both the different theories and the radicalized individuals in question, a comparative level must be established in the analysis. Otherwise, the study will lack comparative validity (Denk 2013: 94). Therefore, the study is compared with the help of the theories and cases of terrorism in different stages. In the first step, the two cases are compared with the theories to determine which factors can be related to the backgrounds and radicalization of the radicalized. In step two, the similarities and differences of the two theories are compared to evaluate how they can best be adapted to the thesis objectives and radicalization cases. Based on the analysis, a result is developed that is discussed based on the relationships and patterns that arise about the purpose of the study, in order to answer the research questions.

RESEARCH DIFFICULTIES When writing a thesis to this extent, the research data is assigned specific characteristics under the study perspective. Based on these conditions, the information has been assessed and re- evaluated, which has resulted in some sources are more trustworthy than others. Hence, during the writing and research process, it arose some difficulties associated with the collection of data.

14 To fully understanding radicalization, one must not only focus on the essential characteristics and emotions of a group or individual. One must also recognize the approach where radicalization is observed as a result of interaction between the individual, social environment, cultural history, and political actors. This means, it is not only the individual’s background that is of importance but also the detailed level of the environment that can have a contributing factor to radicalization. In the case of Rakhmat Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab, finding sources of these types of detailed situations has been challenging. Especially concerning material about Abdulwahab’s background, which has been extra problematic to collect, as there is very little documented about him. Therefore, this study had to use news media and other similar sources to create an understanding of him. Consequently, one must have in mind, while reading this study, that the description of Abdulwahab and Akilov rests on a source-critical basis. Because Taimour Abdulwahab passed away after the attack, no trial or hearing could be held, which could have contributed to the limited amount of material to read about him and his motives. Apart from this deficiency, the purpose of the study has nevertheless been achievable and accomplished.

15 3. BACKGROUND 3.1 THE LINK BETWEEN RELIGION AND CONFLICT Religion has played a significant role in the more substantial wars and conflicts that have taken place over the past decades. Today's discussion about the confrontation between different cultures and societies puts the issue of the future of humanity at its forefront. This has contributed to several questions concerning the relationship between religion and conflict. We know that religion includes much more than just our own beliefs and personal experiences (Kimball 2002:27). We see daily signs of religious presence around us, but at the same time, religion is a phenomenon that is difficult to define. One could argue that religion should provide tranquility and peace and not terror. Still, in many conflicts and wars has religion supplied not only the ideology but also the motivation and the organizational structures for the terrorists (Jugensmeyer 2003:5). Despite ideological differences between extremist groups, there is a common feature that unites them in the sense of weakening democratic principles and objectives, which is a threat to fundamental constitutional values. These groups target individuals because of their political or religious beliefs, ethnic affiliation, sexual orientation, or gender identity, and constitutes an attack on the principle of equal value of all people. In most parts of the world, different religions live side by side in relatively harmonious conditions, which shows that religious beliefs are not all a conflict-generating ideology that prefers violent solutions to problems. However, religious ideas can be components of conflict ideologies and systems of conceptions, as well as representative norms and values that explain why a particular conflict is necessary and morally justified.

DEFINE RELIGION Religion has been interpreted and defined in many ways within different academic disciplines throughout the last centuries. Many of the definitions seem to fall into one of two categories; functional or substantive. Functionalist definitions focus on what religion does. These types of approaches seek to explain how religion functions within the life of an individual or society (Schilbrack 2013:293). Functional approaches are common in most academic definitions of religion, especially within the psychological or sociological disciplines. Substantive definitions focus on what religion is. They seek to isolate the nature or substance of religion and attempt to define certain beliefs, practices, and institutions as religious in terms of their objective (Schilbrack 2013:294). Many argue that the best definition for the study of religions across

16 cultures needs to be a functional one (Schilbrack 2013:294). This is because functional strategies are not overwhelmed with the idea that cultural phenomena and religion must include a belief in God or some other entity. Functionalist definitions are more flexible, and they allow one to study religions in whatever forms they take from one culture to another. They also permit one to recognize the development of new ways of beliefs. For these reasons, many think that the study of religion as a multicultural phenomenon needs a functional definition (Schilbrack 2013:294). However, one of the problems with functionalist approaches is that it can be applied to almost any belief system, no matter how secular. Even sports, politics, business, and music can be considered religious. Substantive definitions, in comparison, let us sort religion from non- religion. Nevertheless, the problem with the substantive definitions is that they can become too narrow. Beliefs that do not contain any supernatural characteristics run the risk of not being included as a religion.

However, there are some religions where both definitions are included. The beliefs, practices, and institutions of Islam, for example, have served both the functionalist and substantive approaches. Islam serves the sociological function of uniting a community, the psychological function of making helplessness tolerable, and the existential function of providing an answer to the meaning of life (Schilbrack 2013:295). Islam can, therefore, meet those functionalist definitions of religion and also involves submission to a spiritual being, to achieve the substantive approach (Schilbrack 2013:295). Islam, like many other religions, is a faith of global spread. Islam has become more and more multifaceted as it has evolved into a cultural and social system with political, economic, and military dimensions (Kimball 2002:30). It would, therefore, require considerable space of exposition to cover only the essential features of Islam. Hence, this study will mainly relate to Islam in terms of issues such as the meaning of jihad, radicalization, Muslim political endeavor, and religious violence.

COLLECTIVE FRUSTRATION The hope of a more promising future is linked to one of the fundamental insights of religion: that our earthly existence is on the way toward destruction (Kimball 2002:131). This has resulted in groups that interpret this as a struggle for the ”true belief”. An insight into Islamic history is sufficient to find many examples of conflicts and divisions that testify to the pursuit of a righteous Islamic society (Kimball 2002:135). Many religious traditions provide social order, with moral views and ethical principles that define what is right and true, and what is secret and reprehensible (Kimball 2002:35). Religion also offers an outline of a person’s vulnerable

17 situation and points out the path that leads to the desired goal. Many Muslims are convinced that Islam is the foundation on which the future of the Arab world will be built on (Kimball 2002:135). Like other religions, Islam has undergone a process of renewal and change. In times of downfall, people have prayed for the return of the old teachings and a retelling of fundamental norms and values (Kimball 2002:220). In many places, people react with resentment towards a lack of political, economic, and social improvements. The collective anger is increasing in many countries where citizens suffer severely due to economic injustice and reckless exploitation. Human rights are violated, the cultural norms are neglected, and groups stand without a voice in a political system where self-surrendering elite rules (Kimball 2002:221). It is under these circumstances that radical Islamist groups are gaining more followers. Some of these groups try to work within the current political system, while others openly advocate methods of violence to achieve their revolutionary aims.

Belief systems have shown to have an ability to create groups characterized by strong social cohesion, where members are bound together by different processes. This type of solidarity requires that there are people who stand outside the group, which indicates that religious identity is created and maintained in contrast to other groups and beliefs. These positions often result that group members begin to favor their own belief systems and disfavor outsiders’ views (Lindgren 2014:13). In these situations, the dichotomies between ‘us and them’ are strengthened and do often lead to conflicts. The separation between ‘us and them’ seems to fit into many of the problematic disputes. It is not difficult to find examples of conflicts where religious ideas and symbols have been used systematically to draw boundaries and create hostility between people. However, the fact that religion can have a vast role in a conflict doesn’t mean that religion is the definitive reason for the conflict to arise. Still, religion is involved in almost all violent conflicts, this due to an overwhelming majority of the people involved in disputes identify themselves with a religion or belief (Lindgren 2014:16).

3.2 RELIGIOUS IDENTITY Religion is today a vast part of the creation of identity for many people and is continuously reshaped within processes where different social factors are relevant (Peste 2003:7). Identity is a factor in many conflicts and consists of the characteristics and experiences that make an individual unique. Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman have written the article Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective in which they outline the role of identity in religiously and ethnically motivated terrorism (Schwartz et al. 2009:537). The article outlines its 18 analysis to two types of terrorism: (1) Terrorism carried out by native radical groups as part of a religious or ethnic conflict within a nation, and (2) terrorism carried out by international groups seeking to influence the outcome of disputes or to pursue their terror campaigns to change geopolitical conditions. It is essential to try to understand the terrorists’ actions from their perspective. Only in that way can one form of knowledge that addresses the origins of terrorism (Schwartz et al. 2009:539).

THREE LEVELS OF IDENTITY The term “identity” refers to a complex theoretical construct involving elements originating at three levels: (1) Cultural identity represents the cultural values a person carries throughout life as guiding systems for behavior, such as collectivism and absolutism. Such values are obtained from multiple sources, including involvement with national, ethnic, religious, cultural, and educational societies (Schwartz et al. 2009:539). Individuals who have a strong cultural identity are more likely to sacrifice themselves for their group and beliefs. People who value themselves more than the cultural and social aspects of a group are unlikely to sacrifice themselves to promote the agendas of their organization (Schwartz et al. 2009:541). Therefore, it is no coincidence that the vast majority of, for example, suicide attackers are strongly connected to the collective or based in countries characterized as deeply collectivistic. Conflicts require having divided people into two categories, those whose interests are to be advanced through terrorist actions (us), and those against whom the terrorist activities are to be directed (them) (Schwartz et al. 2009:541). One of the dominant cultural forces contributing to’ us versus them’ is the presence of an absolute religious system. In this regard, religions become absolute when they advance the view of a correct and complete understanding of truth, and therefore all other religions are false. Such absolutism promotes reasoning that the world is divided into believers and non-believers (Schwartz et al. 2009:541). In countries where belief has an important place in people’s lives, religion often becomes a link between the individual and the group. The belief clarifies the outlines of one’s own identity, but can also reinforce the importance of one’s cultural heritage (Göndör 2018:38). (2) Social identity holds several important meanings for the study of terrorism (Schwartz et al. 2009:542). Terrorism is most likely to occur in groups and societies that draw clear distinctions between the “in-group” and the “out-group.” Coexistence between different ethnic and religious groups is usually complicated. The psychological dynamics that create and maintain identities indicate, among other things, that people tend to perceive differences between their own group and outside groups (Lindgren 2014:80). The personal organization is almost always recognized as more attractive, increasing the risk of violence and conflicts. It is important

19 to be observant to that ethnic and religious identity only becomes a source of violence when they are politicized and transformed into crucial identification markers. For example, when identities linked to gender, profession, political views are subordinated or displaced in favor of ethnical or religious identity (Lindgren 2014:80). It is this transformation of identity that can cause people who have lived side by side for decades to practice extreme violence against each other. Social identity can be maintained, modified, or even transformed through different social relationships (Berger & Luckmann 1998: 201). (3) Personal identity represents both one’s chosen goals, values, beliefs, and the perspectives one uses to understand life (Schwartz et al. 2009:40). The development of personal identity is done through identification with significant others and typically results in the adoption of normative standards and expectations held within the community (Schwartz et al. 2009:544) Individual identity can shift over time, due to personal experiences and social changes. Identity theory attempts to link the individual conception of self and the broader social structure in which the individual thinks and acts. Lori Peel writes, in her article Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity, that identity is more often considered an evolving process of “becoming” rather than simply “being” (Peel 2005:217). She presents three stages of religious personal identity development: (1) religion as ascribed identity, (2) religion as chosen identity, and (3) religion as declared identity (Peel 2005:223). The development of a strong religious identity involves increased reflection and self-awareness, individual choices, and the acknowledgment of others. Religious boundaries and meanings are constructed in response to internal conflicts, choices, and external pressures (Peel 2005:236).

War and violence tend to lead to increased loyalty with one’s group and increased xenophobia towards outside groups. It can be challenging to determine the actual role of religions in many conflicts. When people have the same religious identities, religion is usually toned down in favor of other essential identity markers to separate the parties, such as language and ethnicity (Lindgren 2014: 34). Group membership is fundamental to people, which means that threats to one’s group can have a significant effect on individuals’ behavior (Tajfel & Turner 1986: 277). Individuals who feel a vast national connection have a great need to defend their traditions and values and feel pride for, in any means necessary, protect them (Bäck 2017: 187).

20 4. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 4.1 ON RADICALIZATION Radicalism has many interpretations and definitions, and behavioral scientists have shown a longstanding interest in understanding and describing individuals who become involved in terrorism. The pathways to, and motives for, terrorism are quite varied and diverse. Different people connect with violent ideologies and groups for different reasons at different times. Even though Islamist groups have been defeated in various ways by the militarily and police, radicalization still is an ongoing process in many societies (Ayanian et al. 2018:1). Western nations have to deal with a broad circle of returnees from the Middle East, some with close contacts to radical propaganda, some with personal grievances, and some potentially suffering from psychological disorders. Although terrorism can be considered one of the most pressing challenges for Western societies today, we are a long way from understanding radicalization (Ayanian et al. 2018:1).

Those who carry out ideologically motivated acts of violence for political or religious reasons have gone through a process where they gradually come to embrace a violent ideology or come to accept acts of violence as a legitimate method within a political or religious belief (Regeringskansliet 2014b:16). Many extremist groups are adept at presenting their ideology messages on the internet and social media. Through these channels, they can disseminate material and propaganda, find new recruits, and maintain and strengthen the existing group (Regeringskansliet 2014b:17). The political and radical significance of Swedish cities is growing as a result of intense urbanization, increased concentration of assets, and the strengthening of other national identities (Regeringskansliet 2017:123). It is also in the cities where inequalities are most pronounced and growing the most. Increased social polarization and fragmentation have been linked to the emergence of alternative social identities and memberships. Under such a context, can gang violence and other organizations become an identity-creating resource. Criminal groups are examples of cultures in which violence has a prominent role in relation to their members and place in society. It can also lead to violence being normalized and concentrated, or that particular areas or groups are stigmatized (Regeringskansliet 2017:125). According to the Swedish government communication 2014/15:146, the aim must be to ” identify radicalization processes as early as possible in order to counteract further radicalization” of groups or individuals to prevent them from committing terrorist acts (Regeringskansliet 2014a:5).

21 A PROCESS WITH MANY DEFINITIONS Arie W. Kruglanski and David Webber describe radicalization in their article The Psychology of Radicalization as a process in which an individual changes support or adopt radical means to address a specific problem or goal (Kruglanski & Webber 2014:379). Kruglanski and Webber present a radicalization model that consists of three crucial components: (1) Motivational: The Quest for Significance, which addresses the individual’s goal or reason for radicalizing. This may include perceived injustice or risk of losing social status and the opportunity to achieve status. This component represents the fundamental human need to be someone, to be significant, to be respected, valuable, and to have self-confidence. This does not have to be directed at the individual personally but rather as a member of various social groups, where the group identity can be subjected to degradation or loss of social status as well, which activates the search for meaningfulness (Kruglanski & Webber 2014:381). (2) Group Ideology: Narratives that identify the means to significance, after significance is activated, an individual can choose different paths to achieve a sense of meaningfulness again. The paths chosen are those that exist in the individual’s cultural context. This means that violent extremism is a conceivable way to go if it is presented as a socially acceptable alternative to achieve meaningfulness in the social context of the individual. When a group is under threat, a real or perceived one, a violent ideology defines the group’s defense as the primary task (Kruglanski & Webber 2014:382). (3) The Social Process: Group Dynamics of Radicalization, this component identifies the group dynamics through which an individual comes to relate to the group ideology (Kruglanski & Webber 2014:379). Ideology is a shared reality that is confirmed by social consensus. People embrace the ideologies that are rooted in shared group beliefs. Obligations to ideology are nurtured through peer pressure by the others who embraced the ideology. This means that individuals who are sensitive to social pressure are likely to be easier to adapt to a radical group (Kruglanski & Webber 2014:384).

Another radicalization model is presented by Bertjan Doosje et al. in the article Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. Accordingly, to the authors, radicalization is a process through which people become increasingly motivated to use violent means to achieve behavioral change and political goals (Doosje et al. 2016:79). The model distinguishes three phases in radicalization, which each specify factors on micro-, meso- and macro-levels (Doosje et al. 2016:79). (1) Sensitivity phase: Micro: In the sensitivity phase, an important driving factor at the micro-level concerns the quest for significance. Feelings of insignificance can be caused by a strong sense of humiliation or poor career prospects, such as personal failure, criminal activities,

22 or drug abuse (Doosje et al. 2016:81). Radical groups such as ISIS are well-equipped to foster or restore feelings of significance by providing recruits with a sense of belonging, respect, status and, the notion to fight for a holy cause (Doosje et al. 2016:81). A second important driving factor at the micro-level is personal uncertainty. When people feel uncertain, they become motivated to identify strongly with a group that reduces their uncertainty by providing them with clear norms and values (Doosje et al. 2016:81). Meso: At the meso-level, the radicalization process is likely to depend on the social environment, such as friends, family, and other groups. An important factor at this level is the feeling of injustice that people experience when they identify with their group and perceive that their group has been threatened. People are social beings, which makes them vulnerable to social influence from people close to them and with whom they have frequent contact (Doosje et al. 2016:81). Macro: At this level, the radicalization process is influenced by the substantial societal factors. For example, accelerating globalization and the world-wide threat due to the political, economic, and cultural dominance of the West form an important driving factor for radical Muslims (Doosje et al. 2016:81). (2) Group membership phase: Micro: in the second phase, at a micro-level, the individual joins a radical group. The person starts as a marginal member and is motivated to show loyalty to the group. Individuals are likely to follow the norms and values of the group, for example, to downgrading an out-group in public contexts (Doosje et al. 2016:81). Meso: At the meso-level, ties between the individual and the group are strengthened. This can be achieved via initiation rituals. In addition, physical and psychological isolation can cut people loose from their old social environment. Group members can be encouraged to cut ties with friends and family who do not belong to the group (Doosje et al. 2016:81). Macro: at the macro-level, the declaration of the group, ISIS in Syria and Iraq, for example, has increased perceived efficacy. ISIS has demonstrated that it is possible for Muslims to challenge Western influence and create a Caliphate in the Middle East (Doosje et al. 2016:81). (3) Action phase: Micro: In this phase, people turn to use violence against other groups. At the micro-level often, the confrontation with the death of a relative or friend is evident (Doosje et al. 2016:82). Meso: At this level, a person is to prepare for the use of violence and often writes or videotape a testament. Once a person has made this step, it makes it harder for them to withdraw. Macro: People justify their violence toward the out-group. At the macro-level, appeals by authorities to use violence play an important role (Doosje et al. 2016:82).

Randy Borum describes another process in Understanding terrorist psychology, through four characteristics he believes are common to various extreme ideologies: (1) Polarized, the essence of an us versus them mindset, or what some would regard as in-group versus out-group conflict.

23 (2) Absolutist, the beliefs are regarded as truth in the absolute sense. This suppresses moral authority to framing us versus them as a competition between good and evil. (3) Threat-Oriented, external threats create unity within the group and leaders, therefore, constantly remind their followers that ’we’ are exposed to risk and under threat of ’them’. Because ’we’ are seen as good and right in an absolute sense. This does not only lead to internal adaptation to the norms of the group, and unity within the group, but also to opposition outward. (4) Hateful, hatred gives energy to acts of violence and makes it easier to transcend some of the moral boundaries that people naturally have. An example of this is dehumanization, which causes other groups to be seen as non-human. This separates the social and psychological barriers to engaging in violence that one believes is ”justified” (Borum 2011:25).

Another definition is given by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko in their article Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism, in which they define radicalization, not only in terms of behavior but also in terms of beliefs and emotions. The radicalization of behaviors is an important thing to study from a practical point of view, but the behavior is often preceded by beliefs and feelings, although this is not always the case (Bäck 2017:178). In relation to this, it has been found that activists who are more active are also those who are likely to have stronger beliefs and feelings (Bäck 2017: 178). McCauley and Moskalenko present a model that they call the ”pyramid model”, in where they distinguish three different types of radicalization: (1) Individual radicalization: This type of process has personal grievance as a motive, which implies a personal history of victimization that might explain their actions (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008:418). Of course, there are people with victimization history who never will move to violence. Still, there are many cases where an individual is moved to radical action and violence in response to political trends or events. It is rare that an individual move from sympathizer to activist by suddenly undertaking some significant risk or sacrifice (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008:419). Typically, an individual’s progress into a terrorist group is slow and gradual, with many smaller tests before being trusted in more important missions and with many non-violent tasks before being asked to use violent methods. However, there are rare examples of an individual moving from sympathy to extreme violence in a single giant step. An important part of individual radicalization is arguably terrorism recruitment, where people are recruited to a group via personal connections with existing terrorists (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008:421). No terrorist wants to recruit someone who might betray them; therefore, recruiting often occur within the network of friends, lovers, and family. (2) Group radicalization: The group radicalization often occurs when all individuals in a group are like-minded and feel a

24 common goal and agreement. This kind of process is often the cohesion that develops in small combat groups (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008:423). As both soldiers and terrorists depend on one another for their lives in fighting the enemy, extreme interdependence produces extreme group cohesion. Material goals include the obvious rewards of group membership, such as progress toward common goals, congeniality, status, and security. Groups can become ’too radical’ and lose their base of support. It is a fine line between higher status from more radicalization and lower status from too much radicalization (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008:424). (3) Mass radicalization: This form of radicalization can be understood as a generalization of the group dynamics. In larger groups, a reference to cohesion is often replaced with patriotism or nationalism (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008:426). Communities in conflict, especially if disputes involve prolonged violence, become more extreme in their negative perceptions of one another. This tendency can become so intense that the enemy is no longer seen as human. The idea that the enemy shares a wrong essence can make sense of the impulse to attack all of them, without regard for age, gender, or civilian status (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008:428).

Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij have written the book The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism, in which they combine criminological theory with empirical and ethnographic research to map the pathways of lone-wolf radicalization. They believe that almost all lone-wolf terrorists involve in a combination of personal and political grievances (Hamm & Spaaij 2017:150). This state of feeling is a signature trademark of the lone wolf’s radicalization. Unlike members of terrorist groups who share a collective grievance, lone wolves integrate with various ideologies with highly personal vendettas. The result is the same, however. For both lone wolves and organized terrorists, violence is considered the only alternative to an unjust system (Hamm & Spaaij 2017:150). Lone wolf terrorists’ beliefs in ideologies of validation generated and transmitted by extremist movements. According to Hamm and Spaaij, the main factor in the radicalization process is the “triggering event.” This factor can see many parallels between the lone wolves’ attacker and larger terrorist organizations. European and Middle Eastern terrorist have told their life stories to numerous media and researchers over the years, documenting a specific event that serves as catalysts for political movements (Hamm & Spaaij 2017:155). Osama bin Laden once said that he began thinking of attacking the West following the American-supported Israeli assault on Lebanon in 1982 (Hamm & Spaaij 2017:156). With the advent of chat rooms, websites, Facebook, and Twitter, radical people and terrorist have been able to connect with other likeminded people and violent propaganda. When it comes to the lone wolf attacker, online

25 sympathizers are essential because they provide personal and ideological support to individuals while allowing them to operate anonymously within their chosen community (Hamm & Spaaij 2017:158). The media and internet make it possible for an individual to become radicalized in the solitude of his or her bedroom though linking and interacting with virtual “friends.”

The search for explanations for the motives, dynamics, and processes underlying radicalization has generated an intense field of research to which numerous disciplines contribute. There are multiple and diverse pathways leading individuals and groups to radicalization and terrorism, and with regard to the unique shape of one's identity and background, no radicalization process is similar to the other. There are many factors, often complex in their combination, which entails it to be difficult to fully understand a person's radical turn. Today, we have witnessed increasing radicalization, repeated terror attacks, and violent extremism around the world. Radical actions are therefore discussed from different perspectives regarding both individual and social factors, including different types of group-related processes. Anyone risks being radicalized under specific circumstances.

4.2 ON ROY AND KEPEL FRIENDS OR FOES? Before the 9/11 attacks, subjects such as foreign policy, the Islamic world, and the nature of terrorism were generally viewed as separate topics but have been bound together over the years. Now they are inextricably linked, and the two French scholars Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel are both on the top of the field regarding political Islam and offer insights into these relationships. What distinguishes Roy and Kepel is that their theoretical approach can be regarded as each other's opposites. Roy believes that radicalization leads to increased religiosity, while Kepel believes that it is the historical and political positions within a religion that leads to radicalization. If the dilemma lies, as Kepel explains, in the radicalization of Islam, one can argue that parts of Islam have become the root of the problem. If, as Roy contends, that the issue is the Islamization of radicalism, then radicalization is the problem. These statements have generated numerous debates about which scholar who holds the key to understand the phenomenon.

Perhaps one source of the divergence in opinion between the two is that while both have broadly dealt with issues of Islam and radicalization and address the same problem, their conclusions and research is based on different perspectives on how historical and contemporary events of Islam

26 has interacted with political development in the Arab world. These differences may begin to explain the roots of the divergence between Kepel and Roy, and also allow us to regard their quarrels as essential forces for reflecting on the origins of jihadist terrorism. The debate can assist our reflection in whether radicalism finds its sustenance in the soil of a politicized form of Islam or the secularized forms of society in the West? Or if religion is the source of these awful events, or if it is merely a justification for acting on impulses that have little to do with faith?

Apart from how Kepel and Roy have criticized each other's positions over the years, some find their theories complementary. Robert Zaretsky has written the article Radicalized Islam, or Islamicized Radicalism? in which he observed the dispute between Kepel and Roy. He believes that the debate is not about a choice between these two theories, but rather a conflict that has escalated by the sound and rage hidden by the shared characteristics of equally compelling analyzes (Zaretsky 2016:3). Zaretsky says that we may compare Roy and Kepel's approaches to a theoretical double helix, which demonstrates that each of these thinkers offers a discrete strand of interpretation, which in turn coils around a shared axis (Zaretsky 2016:3). However, there are indications that these theories represent different positions, but at times the two frameworks also overlap. Both Kepel and Roy can shed light on the jihadist traits, but as Zaretsky concludes, they will do well to listen patiently to each other, and we will do well to listen to both of them (Zaretsky 2016:3).

Another scholar who believes that the debate between Roy and Kepel is somewhat divided is Mahmood Mamdani. Mamdani has written the article Whither Political Islam? Understanding the Modern Jihad in which he discusses how the scholars share a common failing where Kepel's history ignores to relate Islam to non-Islam, and how Roy avoids studying encounters between Muslims and non-Muslims. Nevertheless, Mamdani states that the origin of jihadist Islam, which embraces violence as political actions, cannot be fully explained without reference to jihad and the Western influences that shaped it, which include both Roy's and Kepel's theories (Mamdani 2005:155). Liat Radcliffe Ross also follows the idea that Roy and Kepel oppose each other. She states that these two scholars of Islam agree on something: both argue that political Islam, or Islamism, failed sometime back in the early to mid-1990s, but Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy part ways after that (Radcliffe Ross: 2005:120). Radcliffe Ross believes that the differences between these two analyses and that the divergence of opinion in the two scholars' understandings of

27 Muslims in the West are fundamental. According to Kepel, today's Islamist terrorism is associated with existing conflicts in the Middle East. Roy's analysis, on the other hand, suggests that the ideology advocated by the radical fundamentalist has no political goal in the Middle East or elsewhere (Radcliffe Ross: 2005:122). Radcliffe Ross, therefore, sees their theories to have too significant differences, and just as the authors' conclusions diverge, so are the styles of their approaches.

4.3 ON ABDULWAHAB AND AKILOV AN INADEQUATE AREA As previously mentioned in the methodology, has the research regarding Rakhmat Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab been minimal. During the writing process of this study, no previous research on these two jihadists emerged, apart from the reality-based background information which was collected. This means that this study will be a new addition to the research field on terrorism and radicalization based on the study's objectives. As the conditions for the material have given the study some problematic and thought-provoking situations, where study cases could have been exchanged for a simpler terms for the analysis, the result of this thesis will hopefully be an important and rewarding addition. As future chapters will embrace, there is no unimportant or unnecessary research when it comes to radicalization. As for the selected theories and jihadists for this study, is the idea behind the analysis to be adaptable to other terrorist situations and further research.

28

PART 2: THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH

29 5. THEORETICAL BASIS

5.1 ROY VERSUS KEPEL As described in the background, a lot can be said about radicalization models and processes. Still, this study relates, first and foremost, to the academic debate between the two scholars, Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel. As already explained, these scholars can be regarded as each other's opposites. These contradictions show that Roy believes that radicalization leads to an increased violent religiosity. In contrast, Kepel believes that it is the historical and political approaches to religion that lead to radicalization.

OLIVIER ROY Roy has written the book Jihad och döden, in which he presents a detailed picture of his theories of Islamic radicalization, mostly from a western perspective. According to Roy, the elementary factor of radicalization today is that it represents a youth movement that has evolved independently of previous generations' religion and culture (Roy 2018:9). Extremist groups, such as ISIS, have revived a hatred of past generations, and they are not only killing people because of it, but also destroying statues, temples, and books. The concept of the ”generation” factor is a fundamental dimension of the revolution against, not just a class, but also against an age of Islamic history. One can argue that today's jihadists are trying to erase the memory of past generations, or at least change the ideology to surpass them. Roy explains that destroying objects, which represent a time in history, is a feature that extremist groups have in common (Roy 2018:10). Until the 1990s, international jihadists consisted primarily of individuals from the Middle East (Roy 2018:32). It is during this time that the first wave of ”globalized” attacks is created. According to Roy, this is the first generation of jihadists with bin-Ladin, Ramzi Yousef, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in the front (Roy 2018: 32). Roy is careful to clarify that many terrorists have used jihad, but that not all jihadists are necessarily terrorists (Roy 2018:34).

So who are the radicals? Roy claims that they are often second-generation immigrants, which have been devoted to petty crime and are often radicalized in prison. The radicals are people who suddenly find their way back to religious practice after a pronounced profane life, either on their own or through smaller groups (Roy 2018: 39).

30 ”The typical radical is a young second-generation immigrant or convert, very often involved in episodes of petty crime, with practically no religious education, but having a rapid and recent trajectory of conversion/reconversion, more often in the framework of a group of friends or over the internet than in the context of a mosque; the embrace of religion is seldom kept secret (no taqiyya, or dissimulation), but rather is exhibited, but it does not necessarily correspond to immersion in religious practice” (Roy 2017:32).

Most radicals are deeply rooted in contemporary youth culture, not only in the way they communicate but also in other dimensions, such as choice of clothing, music and they do not live their lives in a, particularly religious environment (Roy 2018:48). Roy argues that the jihadists' transition to religion takes place outside the usual social context; it is late and relatively sudden (Roy 20018: 54). Violent radicalization is not the result of any religious radicalization, although it often lends its methods and paradigm (Roy 2018:18). No religion is an instrument of radicalization; it has its dignity in itself, and it develops its own space, which is neither social nor territorial, but spiritual (Roy 20018: 156). Roy implies, that we far too often forget that terrorism and organisations, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, are new in the history of the Muslim world, and cannot be explained solely by increasing fundamentalism (Roy 2018: 14). Based on this, Roy argues that terrorism originates ”not from radicalization of Islam, but from Islamization of radicalism” (Roy 2018: 15).

In Roy's definition, the systematic link to death is one of the keys to the ongoing radicalization (Roy 2018: 13). The violence is not a means; it is the purpose. Roy believes that ISIS or similar groups have not created today's terrorism, but rather feeds from an already existing reservoir (Roy 201814). However, he clarifies that religious fundamentalism exists, and creates significant societal problems by denying such values based on the individual's meaning and freedom (Roy 2018: 18). But fundamentalism does not necessarily lead to political violence. There are theories that the radicals are motivated by their ”suffering” as Muslims, formerly colonized, or as victims of racism, for various kinds of discrimination, for American bombings, for Orientalism, and that the revolt against the West and previous generations would be a ”victim's revolt” (Roy 2018:19). However, Roy argues that the relationship between radical victims is somewhat imaginary. By this, Roy indicates that those who carry out the attacks in Europe are not necessarily poor, abusive, or less integrated. The fact is that over 25% of jihadists are converted, clearly shows that

31 revolutionaries do not always come from the affected classes (Roy 2018: 20). Roy states that very few jihadists point out their personal fate. Instead, they talk about what they have seen and experienced from the suffering of others.

In the last 20 years, radicalization has mainly affected the second generation because they have lost their parents' culturally-rooted religion (Roy 20018:102). The jihadists basically create a belief without social and cultural roots. This opens up to religious fundamentalism and seeks a global goal for the 'struggle'. It is not only immigration and globalization that brings about these religious reconstructions, but also secularization (Roy 20018:105). The religiousness in European societies is no longer perceived as sacred in public life and is generally accepted as an identity (Roy 20018:105). Roy believes that this situation creates conflicts between different religious cultures. For example, the debates regarding the veil or other religious garments. Roy argues that it is not about immigration hostility, even if it exists, but the expulsion of the religiosity from the public space, which automatically places Islam in the hands of radicals (Roy 20018:108). These radicals are joining organizations that want to establish an Islamic system and, as ISIS, for example, to build a Caliphate. What kind of Islam are we talking about in these cases? Roy believes that a majority of all ISIS recruits have only a rudimentary knowledge of Islam, even though the general level of education is high.

” But as we have seen, jihadis do not descend into violence after poring over the sacred texts. They do not have the necessary religious culture - and, above all, care little about having one. They do not become radicals because they misread the text or because they have been manipulated. They are radicals because they choose to be, because only radicalism appeals to them. ” (Roy 2017:68).

According to the radicals, there are no innocents. The Western people are guilty of their governments' actions, and the Muslim who does not revolt is a traitor whose life there is no reason to save (Roy 20018:78). What the new radicals have that is more radical than the old revolutionaries and Islamists, is the hatred of existing societies, Western or Muslim (Roy 20018: 115). Radicalization has a variety of complex causes, but it is, after all, a choice. It's a personal choice that becomes a political one, and it's necessary to regard it as a kind of brainwashing, according to Roy (Roy 20018:156). Like the al-Qaeda's project for a global jihad, the ISIS caliphate project makes it impossible for political solutions, negotiations, or stabilization of

32 society within recognized borders (Roy 2018:11). The caliphate is a dream image of an ideological unit in perpetual territorial expansion.

GILLES KEPEL Gilles Kepel has a different approach to radicalization. He adopts a historical-analytical method, which traces the development of the Salafists and jihadists' thoughts that have come to define itself in contrast to the West. In his books jihad: the trail of political Islam and Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West, Kepel presents three phases of the jihadist generations Islam has passed through during a quarter-century of intellectual and militant activities.

The first generation, from 1979 to 1997, was centered around the Islamist Revolution in Iran and the development of the jihad against the Soviet in Afghanistan, whose goal was to bring down governments and make regional advances (Kepel 2003:6). The Afghan jihad against the Soviets became the grate cause which Islamist worldwide identified themselves with. In the minds of many Arabs, jihad symbolized the shift from nationalism to Islamism (Kepel 2003:8). When the Soviet army finally evacuated Afghanistan in 1989, the triumph of jihad was sealed. The second generation, from 1997 to 2005, was that of al-Qaeda. The attack on the U.S. embassies in the Horn of Africa in 1998 marks the beginning of the second phase of jihad against the far-away enemy. Al-Qaeda was instrumental in the development of this phase, which led to the 9/11 attacks in 2001. In December 2001, a manifesto writing in Arabic circulated on the internet. It contained the political motivation for the September 11 attacks and had the headline Knights under the Prophet's Banner. The manifesto explained why jihad's followers had opposed the U.S. and what consequences one could expect to follow (Kepel 2006:7). The manifesto began with a gloomy diagnosis that compared the hope that had been born after jihad's success in Afghanistan and the 1990s failures (Kepel 2006:7). It was believed that the failure of the 1990s was because Muslims no longer had anything important to gather around. However, at the turn of the century, Palestine suddenly became that important purpose. The development of the conflicts in Palestine gave the opening that the men behind the September 11 attacks had been waiting for (Kepel 2006:8). However, Kepel believes that the third generation of jihadists is far more efficient.

” Contrary to Osama Bin Laden’s topdown organization of the attacks on New York and Washington, thirdwave jihadism is network-based and organized from the bottom up. Third-wave jihadism also takes advantage

33 of the spectacular growth of social media, which began in 2005 with the birth of YouTube.” (Kepel 2017:xi).

The third-generation, from 2005 to 2016, has its primary focus toward combat on European soil and aim to find recruits among the millions of first and second-generation immigrants from the Muslim world (Kepel 2017:xi). According to Kepel, two phenomena have assisted the third- generation jihad: (1) social-networking sites that quickly and widely distribute Islamist propaganda, and (2) the so-called Arab Spring, which led to state collapse in Syria and Libya.

” In January 2005, the Syrian-Spaniard Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, alias Abu Musab al-Suri, published online The Global Islamic Resistance Call (Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah). This 1,600-page manifesto conceived terrorism in Europe as the main vector of the battle against the West and identified the ”poorly integrated” younger generation of Muslims as its preferred instrument.” (Kepel 2017:10)

Kepel believes that the Muslim communities have been pulled between two contradictions over the past 1400 years that have ruled the course of Islamic civilization. These contradictions are jihad, and fitna (Kepel 2006: 275). Jihad, which will be presented later on, is a concept that is, According to Kepel, well-known in traditional Muslim culture with a positive meaning. It symbolizes the struggles that all believers should strive to spread the influence of the Muslim faith (Kepel 2006: 275). The drive to the extreme religious struggle is expressed in holy wars and can inspire to follow radical ideological motivated violence. The word fitna is less well known outside Muslim societies. Its meaning is negative as it is associated with rebellion and separation of Islam. It is a force that threatens the faith of the faithful through fragmentation, disintegration, and destruction (Kepel 2006: 275). Kepel believes that jihad involves internal tensions that are projected outward towards the unfaithful societies, while fitna means to undermine Muslim society from within (Kepel 2006: 275).

Kepel argues that jihad ideology, economic disparity and social prejudices are the root causes of today’s situation of Islamic terror in the West. The attacks against the U.S on September 11, 2001, were the ultimate expression of jihad that struck at the heart of the godless Western enemy (Kepel 2006:276). It was the first kind of battle that would conquer Europe and America and eventually lead to the entire world's submission under the one true faith. It would be the turning point in a

34 process that has, for centuries, hindered Islamic civilization. However, this time of greatness never came. The holy war that would bring greatness only brought destruction in the Middle East (Kepel 2006: 277). The uprising that would reverse the negative development of the 1990s never came and modern Islam lost control over the proclamation of jihad and could no longer warn believers of fitna. Kepel believes that fitna is the condition we find today in the Middle East, where Islamic jihad runs out of resources in the form of a battle for suicide attacks and terror (Kepel 2006: 277).

35 6. THE CASES 6.1 THE JIHADISTS WHO WAS TAIMOUR ABDULWAHAB? Taimour Abdulwahab was born in 1981 in Iraq and came to Sweden with his family in 1992 due to the war and conflicts in Iraq. They settled down in Tranås, and young Taimour Abdulwahab quickly integrated into the Swedish society. According to a teacher from high school, Abdulwahab was an ambitious and caring person (Sveriges Radio 2019). However, even though he did well in school, there was also much trouble around him. Old school friends say that Taimour Abdulwahab was the type who ”struck first and asked questions later” (Swedish Radio 2019). As Abdulwahab grows up in the 1990s, a wave of racism sweeps through Sweden. Nazi groups grew increasingly, and attacks were made on refugee camps. Nevertheless, also during this time, a new movement was emerging: a group that wants to eliminate the Western powers in Middle Eastern countries and create a caliphate for the Islamic world. This group will later be called al-Qaeda. After high school, Taimour Abdulwahab entered the science program at Holaveds gymnasium and completed his studies in 2001. Nothing in the police investigation indicates that Abdulwahab was radicalized during his childhood in Tranås. When he attacked Stockholm in 2010, he was utterly unknown to the police and other Swedish authorities, this is because he had left Sweden many years earlier.

In 2001 Taimour Abdulwahab moved to Luton in the UK to study at the University of Bedfordshire (Burns & Somaiva 2010). Just a few weeks after Taimour Abdulwahab moved, the world changed due to the 9/11 terror attacks, and the war on terror took its starting point. Many paths to terrorism lead through Luton, and the city is well known within the British intelligence service for being a breeding ground for Islamic terrorists (Holbeck Jensen, et al. 2014: 151). It is during the years in Luton that the radical transition for Abdulwahab is taken place. In 2003, the US invaded Taimour Abdulwahab's old hometown in Iraq, as part of the war on terrorism (Swedish Radio 2019). During this time, according to police, Abdulwahab is beginning to spend more time in front of the computer along with radical propaganda. The years before the attack, he made many trips to Iraq and Syria, something Taimour himself says in his farewell letter. On the day of the terror attack 2010, Taimour Abdulwahab sent an email to the Security Police explaining his actions:

36 “[On Arabic] In the name of the merciful God. Prayer and peace to Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. In the name of the merciful God: [on Swedish] Very short and comprehensive for Sweden and the Swedish people: Thanks to Lars Vilks and his paintings of Prophet Muhammad [on Arabic] peace be upon him [On Swedish] and your soldiers in Afghanistan and your silence regarding all this, your children, daughters, brothers and sisters will die just as our brothers and sisters and children died.

The Islamic State has now fulfilled what they have promised you. We are now here in Europe and in Sweden, we are a reality, no fiction, I do not want to say more about this. Our actions will speak for themselves. As long as you do not end your war on Islam and humiliation against the Prophet [on Arabic] peace be upon him [On Swedish] and your stupid support to the pig Vilks. And to all Muslims in Sweden, I say: quit suck up to and humiliate yourselves for a humiliating life far from Islam. Help your brothers and sisters and fear no one and nothing, only God as you worship.

And to my family, try to forgive me. I couldn't sit and watch when all the injustice happens to Islam and Prophet Muhammad [on Arabic] peace be upon him [on Swedish] when the pig Vilks did what he did. Forgive me for my lies. I never went to the Middle East to work or make money, I went there for jihad. I hope you can understand me sometime. I could never have told you all this or anyone else. My dear wife and children, I love you. I love you my wife. My love for you was never a lie. Forgive me when I didn't tell you anything. Kiss the kids from me. Tell them that dad loves them, will always love them. Finally, I say goodbye to all the mujahedin, do not forget me in your prayers. Pray for me. Pray for me because here in Sweden, the Muslims are so humiliating that they pray for non-Muslims in their mosques.

And finally, to all the mujahedin in Europe and Sweden: now is the time to strike, wait no longer. Step forward with whatever you have even if it is

37 a knife and I know you have more than one knife to come with. Fear no one, fear no prison, fear no death.

[On Arabic] I say my word and I ask God to forgive me and forgive you. Brothers. The faithful. ” (My translation from Dagens Nyheter 2010).

In Luton, Taimour Abdulwahab began to move in circles around the militant Al-Muhajiroun network, where he listened to Omar Bakri's lectures and ideology opinions (Holbeck Jensen, et al. 2014: 165). As investigators in Sweden and England tried to piece together the details of the failed terrorism plot, a portrait began to emerge of Taimour Abdulwahab. Qadeer Baksh, a leader at the Luton Islamic Center, a small mosque in Bedfordshire, said that Taimour Abdulwahab attended the mosque during the festival of Ramadan in 2007 (Somaiya 2010). On the fifth day of the celebration, one of the imams found out that Abdulwahab was preaching about “rebellion against Muslim rulers, and talking about the oppression of Muslims.” (Somaiya 2010). The next day, when the congregation gathered for prayers, the imam gave a lecture on the dangers of such extremist views. “He got up and stormed out halfway through,” said Qadeer Baksh, “and we never saw him again. He seemed very emotional, very confused, very frustrated. Normally when someone is challenged, they can present arguments from the Koran, but he did not have the knowledge or the understanding to communicate, so he just left.” (Somaiya 2010). On Taimour Abdulwahab's Facebook page, there were hints of that apparent conflict. He posted several videos dedicated to Islamic fighters around the world, and his profile picture showed hooded figures waving the black flag of al-Qaeda (Somaiya 2010).

WHO WAS RAKHMAT AKILOV? Rakhmat Akilov was born in 1978 in Uzbekistan as the youngest of four siblings. His father was a welder, a profession that Rakhmat also trained for, and his mother was a nurse. Accordingly, to Stockholm District Court, Akilov is a believing Muslim and has expressed sympathy with the Islamic State (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:8). He was married to a wife with whom he had four children. Rakhmat Akilov came to Sweden on October 1, 2014, and applied for asylum. In November 2014, he traveled to Turkey for the purpose of getting to Syria. However, he remained in Turkey for a couple of months, before returning to Sweden in February 2015. In Sweden, he provided for himself with different jobs, not all illegal, and did also received a daily allowance from the Swedish Migration Board. The police also found evidence that he was abusing drugs. In

38 June 2015, the Migration Board rejected his asylum application, which resulted in Akilov living illegally in the country until the attack (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:9).

Through interviews with Rakhmat Akilov and, above all, analysis of his mobile phone, it has emerged that Akilov began preparing a terror attack in the spring of 2017 (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:9). He then made many internet searches on various chemical topics with his phone to build an explosive device. He also made searches for possible attack objects, ”Gay club in Stockholm,” where one of them. In the phone's web history, there were websites containing ISIS propaganda and large numbers of conversations between Rakhmat Akilov and other ISIS sympathizers. In these conversations, Rakhmat Akilov sought permission and support to carry out an attack in Stockholm (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:9). During the trial, prosecutors cite a dialogue from his telephone: ”If God wants; for the time being I read a lot and now understand better the meaning of the Quran, I will perform a martyr operation if God wants.” (Sveriges Radio 2018). Rakhmat Akilov himself told the district court that he wanted to create problems for Sweden and that the attack intended to kill Swedes (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2010:9). According to him, Sweden participates in prevention against ISIS, and he hoped that Sweden would stop sponsoring the war against the caliphate. From the recordings from the trial, Rakhmat Akilov is heard personally saying:

”I wanted Sweden to cancel its participation in the battle against the caliphate, I wanted Sweden to stop sending its soldiers to war zones where they fight against participants in the Islamic State”

”After the Islamic State came into being, before that I was an al-Qaeda supporter, but when the Islamic State started I became happy and in the soul I have already joined, but my bayat I gave in April” (Sveriges Radio 2018).

During the trial it is revealed that Rakhmat Akilov has shown an interest in ISIS and other radical jihadist groups for a long time, which is consider to be an important piece, as it proves that his radical views is not something that has arisen in recent months before the attack. The day of the attack he recorded his allegiance to ISIS on his phone, stating:

39 [On Arabic] Oath of allegiance: I swear allegiance to the believer’s ruler - the caliph of the Muslims, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of Quraish, may God protect him (TV4 Nyheterna 2018).

Due to Rakhmat Akilov's attitude in court and his statements, the district court considers it clear that Akilov has acted with direct intention to kill as many people as possible on Drottninggatan (Stockholms Tingsrätt 2018:10).

6.2 WHAT IS JIHAD We see and hear all too often on the television, radio and various media about jihadists, such as Rakhmat Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab, who calls for jihad against the western world and the ”unfaithful”. When talking about violence and conflict, especially violence related to religious motives in Muslim contexts, it is difficult not to discuss Jihad. Jihad, like other words taken from a religious context, has a long history and a complex set of meanings. Conventionally it is translated as ”holy war”, but in Arabic, the word means ”striving” or ”to fight”. To gain a sense of the word's true meaning, one must begin by looking at its usage in classical Muslim literature, as well as at its function in Muslim history (Cook 2015:1). In its Islamic context, it can refer to everything from trying to be a better person to pursuing fear on behalf of God (Silverman 2002:78). According to Roxanne L. Euben in the article Killing (for) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action are the shifting understandings of the meaning of jihad evident in both the Qur'an and the various responses in Islamic jurisprudence to the early Arab conquests. Events, such as, the invasion of the Muslim heartlands by foreigners, and the experiences of colonialism and imperialism does also suggest that jihad is less an established set of rules for violent action, than a category that reflects changing understandings about meaning of worldly action given radical political and social change (Euben 2002:21). The Qur'an makes clear that war is certainly wrong, but sometimes it is necessary to take up arms:

Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory.

[They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right - only because they say, ”Our Lord is Allah .” And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been 40 demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned. And Allah will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in Might. (Sura 22:39-40)

Since the Prophet's time, a large and learned literature has been added to regulate jihad, with the purpose of ensure that jihad does not give rise to revolts (Roy 2018: 24). The regulation of jihad also aims to give the rulers the power to control wars against external enemies and avoid dangerous escalations. In the opinion of the majority of scholars, jihad is not one of the five pillars of Islam (Roy 2018:25). However, there are those who think the opposite. One of al- Qaeda's recruits, Anwar al-Awlaki, summed jihad as:

”Jihad is the greatest deed in Ismal and the salvation of the ummah is in practicing it. In times like these, when Muslim lands are occupied by the kuffa [unbelievers], when the jails of tyrants are full of Muslim POW’s, when the rule of the law of Allah is absent from this world and when Islam is being attacked in order to uproot it, Jihad becomes obligatory on every Muslim. Jihad must be practiced by the child even if the parents refuse, by the wife if the husband objects and by the one in debt even if the lender disagrees” (Roy 2017:27).

Here, jihad is defined as an individual obligation. Jihad is seen in the aspects of ”holy war” as a school of religious education for the fight against the unfaithful (Roy 2018: 27). In these circumstances, jihad is interpreted as a sixth pillar, where the goal is not always to prevail in the field, but to form Muslims of a new type that is disconnected from ethnic and national identity and from the homeland of tribes or families (Roy 2018: 28).

During the trial of Rakhmat Akilov, the lawyer Mari Schaub, begins to go through his religious beliefs, and what a Muslim, according to the Quran, can and can’t do. Rakhmat Akilov replies that jihad is one of the pillars of Islam, which Schaub pointed out is wrong. Here we get an example, that jihad is interpreted as a sixth pillar. From recordings from the trial (Sveriges Radio 2018) Mari Schaub asks questions to Rakhmat Akilov:

Mari Schaub: Does Islam give you the right to attack civilians?

41 Rakhmat Akilov: During a war, you are allowed to attack anyone who is fighting Muslims. Mari Schaub: Aren't you worried you've committed ”haram”? Rakhmat Akilov: No.

Mari Schaub: Have you studied the Quran since you were arrested? Rakhmat Akilov: Yes. Mari Schaub: The oath you swore, does it still apply to you? Rakhmat Akilov: Yes. Mari Schaub: Are you still convinced that the action you did was right? Rakhmat Akilov: Yes.

When devoted radicals exalt the beliefs that they themselves embrace to absolute truth, the door has been opened to a development that can turn one's own belief into an instrument of evil (Kimball 2002:59). Each religion adheres to a number of basic truths. The interpretation of these truths can be a source of conflict and internal disintegration. When a certain view is accepted as an unconditional truth, can otherwise well-meaning people end up in a defensive position where, they see no other way but to fight back (Kimball 2002:61).

42 7. ANALYSIS 7.1 THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS BASED ON ROY’S AND KEPEL’S THEORIES According to previous research, radicalization is a process where individuals or groups gradually come to embrace a violent ideology as a legitimate method within a political or religious system. It is evident that both Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov has undergone such a process. When it comes to their radicalization according to Olivier Roy’s and Gilles Kepel’s theories, many factors agree with both Akilov’s and Abdulwahab’s radical process.

To clarify Roy's theory of the radicals, they are often young men of the second-generation immigrants who are involved in everyday crime, who have almost no religious education, but who have recently undergone a rapid conversion, usually with a friend or on the internet (Roy 20018:54). In the case of Taimour Abdulwahab one can argue that he began his radicalization, when he moved to the UK, around 9 years before the attack. According to the research, he started move towards extremist ideologies and was in possession of violent propaganda. The fact that he went to the mosques to attend sermons, shows that he had some type of religious lifestyle. It is difficult to say exactly what his religiosity looked like during his upbringing and how it escalated, but based on the material, his religious attitude shifted to a more extreme and radical view. However, Roy argues that violent radicalization is not the result of any religious radicalization, although it often lends its methods and paradigm (Roy 2018: 18). Therefore, one can argue that, whatever how Abdulwahab religious participation looked like over the years in Luton, it is more important to study what opinions he supported rather than the is frequent use and participation of religion. According to Roy, radicalization has mainly affected second-generation immigrants in the West, because of their loss of parents' culturally-rooted religion (Roy 20018:102). The jihadists basically creates a new religious interpretation, without social and cultural roots. It opens up to religious fundamentalism and seeks a global goal for the ’struggle’ of the true and absolute belief. Regarding the aspect of the ”second generation” of radicals, it does not apply to Abdulwahab because he came with his family to Sweden as first-generation immigrants. Despite that, he grew up in Sweden and integrated with Swedish society from a young age. As the research about Abdulwahab has been difficult to access, there is no indication that he was engaged in any form of crime or other illegal activity during his childhood in Sweden. He seemed good and focused in school, although his radical ideologies at some point along the road began to

43 escalate. But as Roy argues, those who carry out the attacks in Europe are not necessarily poor, abusive or less integrated (Roy 2018: 20).

There are theories that the radicals are motivated by their ”suffering” as Muslims. Roy states that very few terrorists or jihadists point out their own fate, they rather talk about what they have seen from the suffering of others. Taimour Abdulwahab speaks from association with a larger group of like-minded people, and that they have suffered due to, Lars Vilk’s painting of prophet Muhammed and Sweden's actions in the wars in the Middle East. It is under these terms that he seems to act on behalf of a group ideology and radicalization, and not a personal one. Radicalization has a variety of complex causes, but it is, after all, a choice. A personal choice that becomes a political choice.

In the case of Rakhmat Akilov, he seems to be increasingly distant from the religious aspect of life, and lacks the “right” knowledge about Islam. During his trial, Akilov talks about his relation to jihad, and how the concept has a very prominent role in his religious views. He states that jihad is one of the pillars of Islam. It is almost as he allows the circumstances surrounding this concept to represent many aspects of his religious interpretations. Apart from his religious position, Akilov provides for himself with small jobs and other criminal means. This fits with Roy’s definitions that radicals often are involved in petty crimes and illegal means. When it comes to the aspect of ”generations”, there is much that proves that Akilov's case is not a generational conflict and it appears that Akilov also belongs to the first generation of immigrants. Unlike Taimour, Akilov did not integrate with the Swedish society to the same extent. Not only does he come to Sweden alone, he also gets rejection on his asylum application and lives the time before attacks illegally in Sweden.

Many articles on jihadist-related topics in the West too often focus solely on the jihadist themselves. Gilles Kepel goes beyond these scopes to explore contextual data and contemporary social and political history from different generations. Kepel argues that the turning point in radical Islam's fortunes became evident in the 1990s, with al-Qaida and other similar organization in the front. At first glance of Kepel’s arguments of jihad, one may find it hard to understand his theories on radicalization. But if one sees to the historical background in the light of Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij theory of ”triggering events” one may understand Kepel’s definitions with different eyes. His historical approach to radicalization can, therefore, relate to Roy’s argument that jihadists often talk about their suffering in relation to other “true” Muslims with the

44 same ideological view. In times of downfall, people have prayed for the return of the old teachings and a retelling of fundamental norms and values. Kepel talks a lot about these factors in his arguments and how jihadism has become a means of creating change over the past decades.

To clarify Kepel’s theory of the radicals, they are radicalized due to historical and political events that prevented or advanced the radical Islamic progression. These issues are considered to be the triggering events in a more mass-radicalization manner, although one can argue that the triggering factors also affect people on an individual level. In the case of both Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov they both supported other extremist groups before ISIS and one can therefor argue that they acted on their sense of belonging to a larger organization and ideology. If one chooses to consider the attacks as an act of a group ideological behavior, the historical perspectives become very important for the analysis. It has been proven that both Akilov and Abdulwahab had contacts with sympathizers. It cannot be proven if these contacts were involved in planning of the attacks, however, it states that influences from likeminded people could have radicalized them.

OTHER FACTORS Besides Olivier Roy’s and Gilles Kepel’s theories on radicalism, there are other definitions from the previous research that also fits the case of Rakhmat Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab. For example, Arie W. Kruglanski and David Webber describe radicalization as process which reflect the fundamental human need to be someone significant and respected (Kruglanski & Webber 2014:381). The feeling of losing social status is an essential factor in the process of becoming radical. They also claim that the paths to radicalization exist in the individual's cultural context. This means that violent extremism is a conceivable way to go if it is presented as a socially acceptable alternative to achieve meaningfulness in the social context of the individual. When it comes to Abdulwahab and Akilov their cultural context looks very different, but both seems to advocate that they and the organization they belong to are under threats from the West. These threats are motivated by the use violent means against members of an out-group, Swedich society in this case, to achieve behavioral change and political goals. Since it is proven that we humans are affected by our cultural origins, one can also say that Akilov and Adbulwahab also represent various cultural values as guiding systems for behavior. These values are obtained from different national, ethnic, religious, and educational sources. According to Schwart et. al., individuals who have a strong cultural identity are more likely to sacrifice themselves for their group and beliefs.

45 Identity can shift over time due to personal experiences and social changes, which is what happened to Akilov and Abdulwahab.

Randy Borum discusses the aspect of us versus them mindset, which is a significant characteristic of radicals and extremist groups (Borum 2011:25). Both Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov regard their beliefs as truth in the absolute sense, framing us versus them as a competition between good and evil. The religious identity only becomes a source of violence when it is transformed into crucial identification markers. In the case of Abdulwahab and Akilov, one can argue that their religious identity is represented as more or less contributing. Feelings of insignificance can be caused by a strong sense of humiliation or poor career prospects, such as, personal failure, criminal activities, or drug abuse (Doosje et al. 2016:81). In the case of Akilov, he had been closed from Sweden under various circumstances and decisions. He also has a background of drug use and theft. This has probably created mixed feelings of anger and personal uncertainty. When people feel uncertain, they become motivated to identify strongly with a group that reduces their uncertainty by providing them with clear norms and values (Doosje et al. 2016:81).

Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij focus on lone wolf terrorists, which involves a combination of personal and political grievance. The signature trademark of the lone wolf’s radicalization involves ideologies with highly personal vendettas and ”triggering events” (Hamm & Spaaij 2017:150). The triggering event serves as catalyst for the religious and political movements. Although both Rakhmat Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab appear to be acting in the sense of lone-wolf attackers, one cannot prove whether they acted based on personal decisions or if other people's where involved. Both Abdulwahab and Akilov acknowledge that they belong to extremist groups and that they are fighting for jihad. Abdulwahab attacks Sweden because of Lars Vilk’s painting of prophet Muhammed and Swedish soldiers in Afghanistan. Akilov also attacks Sweden because of their involvement in the creation of a caliphate. They both do this based on acknowledged by their group and belief affiliation.

46 8. CONCLUSION 8.1 RESULT This thesis had the purpose of analyzing Rakhmat Akilov’s and Taimour Abdulwahab’s radicalization and the two theoretical approaches with the help of the following two research questions:

• Which of the theories, Gilles Kepel’s or Olivier Roy’s, can best be applied to the radicalization of Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov?

The analysis indicates that both Rakhmat Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab has undergone a radical process. The process includes a course of self-radicalization, at the same time as it also shows an influence of other groups and individuals that have affected their path to violence. Olivier Roy points out several arguments that apply to self-radicalization, where he mainly looks at the contemporary use of jihad and overlooks many of the historical events that Gilles Kepel’s theory revolves around. Roy is evident in his arguments and presents a theory that can extensively be linked to Akilov and Abdulwahab. Still, there are parts of Kepel’s arguments that also can be applied to their background. Although both Akilov and Abdulwahab may have lived a religious lifestyle to some extent, there still was a change in their religious view as a result of radicalization. Therefore, one could assume that the theory of Olivier Roy is more relevant for their radical process. However, one may consider that Akilov and Abdulwahab identified themselves as part of a bigger group and saw their deeds as the best of the group's interest. Hence, one cannot ignore the historical and political events of Islam and may see the theory of Gilles Kepel equally relevant for their radicalization.

• What factors and motivations drove Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov to their actions?

For cases like Rakhmat Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab it is very uncertain to know for sure how the radicalization has operated. However, based on the analysis, it seems that their radicalization involved a process in which their feelings of significands and cultural identity have been influenced. In times of downfall, people have prayed for the return of the old teachings and a retelling of fundamental norms and values, which Kepel addresses in his arguments. Although Kepel’s theories relate to larger groups and cultural aspects, it is possible to find in his arguments that feelings of frustration and failure can lead to violence and jihad on a personal level. Rakhmat 47 Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab appear to have been frustrated over the risk of losing social status and the sins of those who betrayed them, both as individuals and as members of a more prominent group. They both used their radical ideologies to address a specific problem or goal. For Abdulwahab’s, the triggering event was Lars Vilks’s painting of prophet Muhammed and Swedish soldiers in Afghanistan. Akilov’s triggering event was Sweden’s involvement and prevention of the creation of a caliphate. These triggers are intertwined with emotional and psychological processes that have resulted in a radicalization of violence, such as religious and social identity, economic and political circumstances, and theological interpretations.

This study has been focused on finding differences between Olivier Roy's and Gilles Kepel's theories, when, in fact, they are complementary. Some of Akilov's and Abdulwahab's profiles correspond to Kepler's analytical reasonings, while other parts of their background relate to Roy's arguments. Still, at the same time, the two frameworks simply overlap. Believing in and fighting for jihad, which both Akilov and Abdulwahab claim to do, also means that one cannot ignore the cultural, political, or religious conditions that jihad represents. They fight for a greater cause than themselves, which means they also represent a more comprehensive historical scope along with a contemporary struggle for Islam. In the end, it all comes down to how one chooses to interpret Akilov’s and Abdulwahab’s backgrounds. Is it a background of self-radicalization in which they were lone-wolf attackers, or is it a background of mass-radicalization in which they represented a more significant historical Islamic motive?

DISCUSSION It is evident that some religious ideas and practices tend to create and strengthen boundaries between people. However, it is important to understand that religions are not the cause of violence. Religious conceptions can be problematic, not because they are religious, but because they are designed in such a way that it supports processes that can lead to violent conflicts. Because religion and conflict have strong bonds, is it perhaps more important than ever, in today's multicultural society, to have insight and understanding of, not only our own culture but also other people's religion and views of life.

As for Rakhmat Akilov and Taimour Abdulwahab, it is interesting to see how two different backgrounds can result in the same decision, to attack Sweden. This proves how important it is to understand radicalization and to create solutions to identify radical processes before it is too late.

48 Sweden is a relatively secular society that has, more or less, freed itself from religion. One can argue whether this has resulted in a growing distance to the understanding of religious expressions. Unquestionably, Sweden is not unaffected when it comes to terrorist acts and radicalization, and the nation will continue to be affected by terrorism, both within and outside the Swedish borders.

No matter how radicalized a person is, they have gone through a process where they gradually come to embrace a violent ideology. Hence, one must examine a person very well in order to understand radicalization. It is not merely about personal experiences, but it also concerns cultural dimensions. As we have seen from the analysis, the historical conditions and developments are an essential factor to take into account in the study of radicalization, especially regarding larger groups. Within the extent of this thesis, one may consider that Gilles Kepel's theories have not been analyzed to its full potential. For future studies, there is an opportunity to analyze Kepel's arguments more thoroughly. To see how historical developments and events have affected the modern Jihad and the struggle for Islam. In additional studies, one could go from examining specific individuals to a perspective on mass radicalization and see how radical processes affect organizations and societies. However, one must keep in mind that even the present influences are important in the understanding of radicalized individuals and the process they undergo. This means that there still are areas in today's conflict-generating world that can be explored and studied in relation to radicalism.

SUMMARY Studying radicalization today involves examining a field that extends through many different disciplines and areas. Many researchers have long sought to understand this process through different perspectives, and many definitions and theories have emerged. This study, therefore, concerns only a small part of a larger field of research. However, this thesis does not become less important, as it shows that two radicalization theories, which have been regarded as each other's opposites for a long time, can complement each other under specific interpretations.

Another beneficial feature of this type of analysis is that it can be adapted to various other conflicts and attacks with religious motives. Providing there exists within the disputes, individuals, or groups whose background can be analyzed. In the introduction of this thesis, violent Islamic extremism is presented as a global ideology. This suggests that there is universal

49 suffering between different nations due to religious violence and radical events. Studying radicalization from a specific geographical area, as this study has done, does not mean that the result is representative for only one country, but can be adapted to other nations. In the fight against terrorism, no one stands alone, as many of us are seen as a threat and unfaithful by the radical jihadists. This study does not only answers questions about radicalization but also raises new ones. As long as there are people who commit to terrorism and violent acts, there will be a need to understand them. Understanding radicalization is only a small part of it all, and hopefully, this study can contribute to some extent to that understanding.

So, for the final conclusion, is Islamic ideology leading to radicalism, or is radicalism motivated by Islam? In the case of Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov, it is proven through the analysis that it is a combination of these two theories. It has become evident that one cannot ignore the historical or modern aspects of religion and politics that we, as individuals or groups, are affected by. Politics and religion, the secular and the sacred, are unable to be completely separated, but they are also unable to be intertwined. The important thing that Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel have shown regarding radicalization is that one's personal history is equally important as the history of the culture in which one lives, regardless of one's religious experience.

50 51 REFERENCES

Ayanian, Arin, Böckler Nils, Doosje Bertjan, Zick, Andreas (2018). Processes of Radicalization and Polarization in the Context of Trandnational Islamist Terrorism. Internatiolan Journal of Conflict and Violence. Vol 12. Berger, Peter L. & Luckmann, Thomas (1998). Kunskaps sociologi: Hur individen uppfattar och formar sin sociala verklighet. Second Edition. Wahlström & Windstrand Borum, R. (2010). Understanding terrorist psychology. In Andrew Silke (Ed.) The psychology of counter-terrorism. England: Oxon. 19–33 Burns, John F & Somaiva, Ravi (2010). Police Say Early Detonation of Bomb Averted Disaster in Sweden. The New York Times, Dec. 13. Bäck, Emma A. & Bäck, Hanna (2017). Radikaliseringens politiska psykologi – betydelsen av hot och polarisering. In Statens offentliga utredningar, SOU 2017:67. Kulturdepartementet. 175– 196 Cavanaugh, William T. (2009). The myth of religious violence: secular ideology and the roots of modern conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. Cook, David (2015) Understanding Jihad. Second edition. University of California Press. Dagens Nyheter (2010). Utskrift av hotmejlet till TT. 2010-12-12. Available at: https://www.dn.se/ nyheter/sverige/utskrift-av-hotmejlet-till-tt/. Denk, Thomas (2013). Komparativ metod: förståelse genom jämförelse. Studentlitteratur Göndör, Eli (2018). I Guds namn: om våld och politik i islam. Lidingö: Fri anke. Doosje, Bertjan, Moghaddam, Fathali M., Kruglanski, Arie W., Wolf, Arjan, Mann, Liesbeth, Feddes, Allard R. (2016). Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. Current Opinion in Psychology, 11:79–84. Euben, Roxanne L. (2002). Killing (for) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action. Political Theory, Vol. 30 No. 1, February 2002, Sage Publications. 4-35 Hamm, Mark S. & Spaaij, Ramon (2017). The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism. La Vergne: Columbia University Press. Hjärpe, Jan (2010). Islamismer. Malmö: Gleerups Utbildning AB. Holbeck Jensen, Mickael, Borg, Oral, Ellegaard Christensen, Carsten (2014). Storm: en dansk agent i Al-Qaida. Ica Bokförlag Jugensmeyer, Mark (2003). Terror in the mind of God: the global rise of religious violence. Third edition. Berkeley: University of California Press.

52 Kepel, Gilles (2003) Jihad: the rail of political Islam. London: Tauris. Kepel, Gilles (2006) Kampen om Islam. Stockholm: Atlas Kepel, Gilles (2017) Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West. Princetion University Press Kimball, Charles (2002). När religionen blir ond. Stockholm: Natur och kultur. Kruglanski, W. Arie, & Webber, David (2014). The Psychology of radicalization. Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik. Liljefors Persson, Bodil & Tidman, Nils-Åke (2016). Våld i Guds namn: politisk aktivism inom världsreligionerna. Föreningen Lärare i religionskunskap Lindgren, Tomas (2014). Religion och konflikt: komplexa samband, komplexa orsaker. Skellefteå: Artos & Norman. Mamdani, Mahmood (2005). Whither Political Islam? Understanding the Modern Jihad. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 148-155. McCauley, Clark. & Moskalenko, Sophia (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:3, 415–433. Pals, Daniel L. (1996). Seven Theories of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press. Park, C. L. & Paloutzian, R. F. (2013). Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, Second Edition. New York, NY: The Guilford Press. Peel, Lori (2005) Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity. Sociology of Religion. 66(3): 215-242 Peste, Jonathan (2003) Religion och terrorism: mellan samvaro och radikalism. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Radcliffe Ross, Lita (2005). Review. St Antony's International Review , Vol. 1, No. 2, Human Security, pp. 120-123 Regeringskansliet (2014a) Förebygga, förhindra och försvåra – den svenska strategin mot terrorism. Regeringens skrivelse 2014/15:146. Available at: https://www.regeringen.se/ 4a4d2a/contentassets/d4fdc4bc1c314fdfb9aa6c7a3da9bc93/141514600webb.pdf Regeringskansliet (2014b) Åtgärder för att göra samhället mer motståndskraftigt mot våldsbejakande extremism. Regeringens skrivelse 2014/15:144. Roy, Olivier (2018). Jihad och döden. Göteborg: Daidalos AB Roy, Olivier (2017). Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of the Islamic State. Hurst Schilbrack, Kevin (2013). What Isn’t Religion?. Journal of Religion, Jul 2013, Vol. 93 Issue 3, p291-318.

53 Schwartz, Seth J., Dunkel, Curtis S., Waterman, Alan S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:537–559. Taylor & Francis Group. Silverman, Adam L. (2002). Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and Islamic Norms for the Use of Political Violence. Journal of Church & State. Winter 2002, Vol. 44 Issue 1, p.73-92 Somaiya, Ravi (2010). Swedish Bombing Suspect’s Drift to Extremism. The New York Times. Dec. 13. Statens offentliga Utredningar (2017) Våldsbejakande extremism: En forskarantologi. SOU 2017:67 Stockholms Tingsrätts DOM i mål nr B 4708-17. 2018-06-07 Sveriges Radio (2018). Drottninggatan I rätten. Avsnitt 1-8. Available at: https://poddtoppen.se/ podcast/1347880430/drottninggatan-i-ratten Sveriges Radio (2019). P3 Dokumentär - Självmordsbombaren på Bryggargatan. Available at: https://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/1416868?programid=2519 Säkerhetspolisen (2010). Årsbok 2010. Available at: https://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/ 18.635d23c2141933256ea1b4b/1381154798101/Arsbok2010.pdf. Säkerhetspolisen (2011). Årsbok 2011. Available at: https://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/ 18.635d23c2141933256ea1b30/1381154797991/Arsbok2011.pdf Säkerhetspolisen (2014). Årsbok 2014. Available at: https://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/ 18.4c7cab6d1465fb27b01f1a/1426682274489/Arsbok2014.pdf Tajfel, Henri & Turner, John C. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In John T. Jost & Jim Sidanius (ed.) Political Psychology: Key Readings. 276-293 The New York Times (2010). Police Says Early Detonation of Bomb Averted Disaster in Sweden. 13 dec 2010. TV4 Nyheterna (2018). Akilovs trohetsed i rättegång - ”Jag svär trohet”. Nyheterna i TV4 från 2018-02-13. Zaretsky, Robert (2016). Radicalized Islam, or Islamicized Radicalism? Chronicle of Higher Education, 00095982, 5/27/2016, Vol. 62, Issue 37

54