FACULTY OF EDUCATION AND BUSINESS STUDIES Department of Humanities Is it Islamic ideology that leads to radicalism, or is radicalism motivated by Islam? A qualitative analysis of Taimour Abdulwahab’s and Rakhmat Akilov’s radicalization Kajsa Tillman 2020 Master thesis, Advanced level, 30 credits Master Programme in Religious Studies RVA800 Supervisor: Torkel Lindquist Examiner: Peder Thalén ABSTRACT This study includes a comparative analysis of the two jihadists, Taimour Abdulwahab's and Rakhmat Akilov's radical uprising. The objective is to analyze their radicalization process based on two different theoretical approaches. The first theory of Oliver Roy embraces the social conditions under which Muslims think and act, and believes that radicalization leads to an increased radical religiosity. In contrast, the second theory of Gilles Kepel seeks to understand the intellectual history of Islam, and believes that it is the political developments that have led to radicalization. The study shows that the radicalization of Taimour Abdulwahab and Rakhmat Akilov is a complicated matter that shares aspects from both theoretical approaches. However, some factors of the theories apply better than others. These factors are often linked to a triggering event that causes an individual to turn to a violent ideology. Also, strong group affiliation is considered an essential emotional bond, where identification with other like-minded people is an important factor. Influences from different emotions are essential to the radical process, where feelings of significance and threatened identity is a factor for increased violence. It is proven through the analysis how the interpretation of an individual's background results in how the religious and political perspectives regarding radicalization are defined and understood. As a result, one can neither ignore Kepel's historical aspects or Roy's modern conditions. After all, our life is often affected by both old and contemporary experiences. CONTENT ABSTRACT 2 PART 1: THE FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY 1. INTRODUCTION 8 1.1 RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN 8 THE ATTACK IN 2010 9 THE ATTACK IN 2017 10 1.2 AIM AND PURPOSE 11 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 11 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 11 2. METHODOLOGY 12 2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 12 2.2 RESEARCH METHOD 13 RESEARCH DIFFICULTIES 14 3. BACKGROUND 16 3.1 THE LINK BETWEEN RELIGION AND CONFLICT 16 DEFINE RELIGION 16 COLLECTIVE FRUSTRATION 17 3.2 RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 18 THREE LEVELS OF IDENTITY 19 4. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 21 4.1 ON RADICALIZATION 21 A PROCESS WITH MANY DEFINITIONS 22 4.2 ON ROY AND KEPEL 26 FRIENDS OR FOES? 26 4.3 ON ABDULWAHAB AND AKILOV 28 AN INADEQUATE AREA 28 PART 2: THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH 5. THEORETICAL BASIS 30 5.1 ROY VERSUS KEPEL 30 OLIVIER ROY 30 GILLES KEPEL 33 6. THE CASES 36 6.1 THE JIHADISTS 36 WHO WAS TAIMOUR ABDULWAHAB? 36 WHO WAS RAKHMAT AKILOV? 38 6.2 WHAT IS JIHAD 40 7. ANALYSIS 43 7.1 THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS 43 OTHER FACTORS 45 8. CONCLUSION 47 8.1 RESULT 47 DISCUSSION 48 REFERENCES 52 PART 1: THE FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY 7 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN People have always questioned the origin of human evil and what makes individuals and groups resort to violence. Today we live in a world defined by conflicts and insecurities. Many of these conflicts tend to be religiously motivated or have religious elements of some sort. Acts of violence on the part of non-governmental groups have long been used to destabilize societies and create social tension and fear, to damage nations' and individuals' social developments and democratic decisions (Regeringskansliet 2014a:3). Global events and developments have witnessed a significant association between the adherents of Islam and violence. We know today that these associations increased dramatically after the 9/11 terror attacks and has brought about substantial changes in our political worldview. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. In the last two decades, have terroristic, and jihadistic motivated violence increased forcefully (Roy 2018:7). Several conflicts are operating in Europe and are generating extreme ideologies and terroristic violence. As the Islamic political activism has advanced its positions in Europe, Sweden has not been spared from its rampaging (Göndör 2018:10). This condition has caused many difficult situations for Sweden, such as the ongoing recruitment of Swedes to the Islamic State and the increasing number of returnees from various conflicts. Violent Islamic extremism in Sweden is part of a global ideology whose purpose is to confront those who are considered unfaithful to Islam (Regeringskansliet 2014b:15). The increasing amount of people who travel to and, above all, returning from areas of conflict, where they have participated in terrorist training or committed acts of violence, means that the number of people in Sweden with the capability to carry out attacks is expanding (Regeringskansliet 2014a:4). Despite this, many of those who return to Sweden, or other countries, will not develop the intent to commit violent crimes. Based on the Islamic terrorist attacks Sweden has been exposed to during the past decade, one may observe that the threats often come from perpetrators acting alone. Such lone attackers may have different ideological motives, but what they have in common is that they do not belong to established groups or networks. These perpetrators are rarely acting on the specific instructions of anyone else, although statements made by political leaders abroad may be viewed as a means to legitimizing the attack (Regeringskansliet 2014a:5). In recent years, several attacks in the West have been carried out by this type of lone attacker. According to the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), they closely monitor developments abroad and analyze the threats that are directed at 8 Sweden and Swedish interests. In order to protect Sweden and the democracy, threats and vulnerabilities must be identified and assessed. On October 1, 2010, the Security Service increased the threat level regarding terrorism directed against Sweden. The decision was based on evidence from the National Center for Terror Threat Assessment (NCT) (Säkerhetspolisens 2010:20). Despite the development, the threat level in Sweden in 2010 was still considered to be low compared to other countries in Europe (Säkerhetspolisens 2010:20). However, the first suicide bombing in Sweden happened just two months after this decision. THE ATTACK IN 2010 It all started in the middle of Christmas shopping on December 11, 2010, when a car was set on fire in central Stockholm. Few understood what was about to happen until another explosion occurred nearby (Säkerhetspolisen 2010:34). Two people got away with minor wounds from the blast, except the suicide bomber Taimour Abdulwahab, who died on the spot from injuries. This came to be regarded as Sweden's first, although unsuccessful, terrorist attack with Islamic motives. Taimour Abdulwahab spent the time until the attack in Tranås with his family (Säkerhetspolisen 2011:55). In the morning on December 11, Abdulwahab leaves his parents' home and starts to drive towards Stockholm. Testimony indicates that he, at that time, does not wear any explosives. However, when he stops at a gas station in Herrbeta, it shows on the surveillance video, how he wears a bomb attached to his body and backpack (Säkerhetspolisen 2011:55). Despite many searches, the police never found the place where he made and hid the explosives. At 15.30, he arrives in Stockholm according to recovered information from a fire-damaged GPS. Shortly after 16.00, he makes a call to his mother, and just before 17.00, the first call to the police about a burning car on Drottninggatan is made (Säkerhetspolisen 2011:55). Taimour Abdulwahab appeared to have started by igniting an arrangement of gas canisters in his car, which was packed with gasoline containers, fireworks, nails, and other objects that could have contributed to a massive explosion. The car started to burn in big flames but did not explode as Abdulwahab intended. The fire caused many people to stop in their Christmas shopping and gather around in big crowds. According to witnesses and surveillance video, Abdulwahab wanders back and forth from Drottninggatan, where the car was burning, and the side street Bryggargatan. He was turning into the side street where he appeared to have detonated at least one of the pipe bombs strapped to his waist. Shortly after 17.30, further calls to the police were made about an injured man on Bryggargatan (Säkerhetspolisen 2011:55). The police believed that he might have been 9 heading to the city's central subway station when he accidentally triggered the bomb. The reason he wandered between Drottningatan and Bryggargatan may have been due to problems with the explosive device. He wanted to detonate one of the bombs into the crowd that had gathered because of the commotion, but Abdulwahab probably had problems with the detonation and had to turn to the side street to try to fix the bomb. The theory of an accidental detonation appeared to be the leading hypothesis from the police. Chief prosecutor Tomas Lindstrand says in a conference that “It's not unreasonable to think that he could have made a mistake so that a portion of the bomb detonated and caused his death”. Lindstrand also stated, “There is speculation that he was on his way to a place where there were a lot of people. This was in the middle of Stockholm, in the middle of Christmas; it's not a daring guess.” (The New York Times 2010). If the attack had happened in the way Taimour Abdulwahab planned, many would have died and been injured. Although this came to be regarded as Sweden's first Islamist terrorist attack, it will mean very little to what would follow. THE ATTACK IN 2017 It was just before 15.00 in the afternoon on April 7, 2017, when Rakhmat Akilov hijacked a truck and drove it down Drottninggatan in Stockholm.