Justification, Community and Judgment in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter
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Canada's Different Criminal and Constitutional Standards of Fault
Kent Roach* MIND THE GAP: CANADA’S DIFFERENT CRIMINAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS OF FAULT† This paper critically assesses the gap between Canada’s criminal law standards of fault articulated in the 1950s and 1970s and its constitutional standards of criminal fault articulated in the 1980s and 1990s. This gap is explained in terms of the Court’s ambivalence about subjective fault principles as manifested by its acceptance of criminal negligence. It is also explained by the Court’s unique treatment of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a right that, unlike any other right in the Charter, is only subject to reasonable limitation under section 1 of the Charter in extraordinary emergency situations. The paper then suggests that the gap between crim- inal and constitutional fault standards is not sustainable and can only be closed if the Court rethinks its approach to the limitation of section 7 rights. Maintenance of the gap may erode respect for common-law presumptions of subjective fault. If this occurs, Canada’s apparently robust approach to the constitutionalization of fault will have actually diminished respect for and protection of subjective fault principles. Keywords: criminal law/Canada/fault/common law/constitutional/ fundamental justice i Introduction The Canadian experience with constitutionalization of criminal law fault principles seems at first glance to be positive and robust. Unlike in the United States, the Canadian courts have struck down felony murder and various absolute-liability provisions as inconsistent with constitutional requirements of fault.1 The Court has also gone farther than courts in Israel and Germany in constitutionalizing fault requirements,2 as well as principles that would prohibit convictions for physically3 or morally * Faculty of Law, University of Toronto † I thank the participants of the Criminal Law and Constitutionalism conference held at the University of Toronto and especially Hamish Stewart for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. -
How the Supreme Court of Canada “Modifies” Objective Mens Rea Offences in R V Javanmardi
November 26, 2019 A Lesson in First Year Criminal Law Principles: How The Supreme Court of Canada “Modifies” Objective Mens Rea Offences in R v Javanmardi By: Lisa Silver Case Commented On: R v Javanmardi, 2019 SCC 54 (CanLII) As I come to the close of the first half of teaching 1Ls criminal law principles, I review the course syllabus for the second half of the course to revise, delete, and add relevant case readings. Next term, I will discuss those crimes, which require the objective form of liability or objective mens rea. Although this area was once rife with disagreement and fractured alliances at the Supreme Court of Canada level, at the time of formulating last year’s syllabus, objective mens rea offences, such as unlawful act manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death, were well-defined both in terms of actus reus (prohibited act) and mens rea (fault element). However, the law can and does change; either through clarification or modification of accepted legal rules and principles or through the creation of completely new ones. In R v Javanmardi, 2019 SCC 54, the most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision on objective mens rea offences, it appears the Court has done more than clarify and modify what was a settled area of law but has, arguably, radically re-defined the legal tests and principles for objective mens rea offences in the Criminal Code. This article will attempt to deconstruct the majority decision, authored by Justice Rosalie Abella, in an effort to understand the significance of this decision and the future impact it will have to this area of law. -
Nuancing Feminist Perspectives on the Voluntary Intoxication Defence
Nuancing Feminist Perspectives on the Voluntary Intoxication Defence FLORENCE ASHLEY* ABSTRACT The defence of voluntary intoxication, which has been back in the news as a result of the recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Sullivan, is frequently decried as antifeminist. Pursuant to the defence, defendants who acted while intoxicated to the point of automatism or severe psychosis may be acquitted. This article seeks to complicate feminist perspectives on the voluntary intoxication defence, showing that the issue of voluntary intoxication is far more nuanced than some suggest. After summarizing the state of the law of the voluntary intoxication defence and reviewing its prevalence in the jurisprudence, this article critically reflects on the voluntary intoxication defence and highlights how its removal contributes to the criminalization of mental illness and weakens crucial criminal law standards used to protect the most vulnerable — both problems from a feminist standpoint. The article concludes that a feminist analysis of the voluntary intoxication defence requires more nuanced policy discussions than those that have prevailed in the public sphere. Keywords: voluntary intoxication defence; automatism; criminalization of mental illness; principles of fundamental justice; carceralism; feminism * S.J.D. Student, University of Toronto Faculty of Law. B.C.L./LL.B., LL.M. (Bioeth.). I would like to thank Souhila Baba for her helpful comments and for encouraging me to write a full article from my early thoughts on R v Sullivan; Angela Chaisson for her crucial feedback that assisted me in polishing parts of the article; Margot Paquette- Greenbaum for helping me frame my arguments in a way that is more understandable to non-lawyers; Kerry Sun for his helpful feedback; and Caroline Trottier-Gascon for her aid in making my writing more clear and accessible. -
SELECTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: IS TRUDEAU’S SUNNY WAY a BETTER WAY? Peter H
VOLUME 68 2017 TOME 68 EDITORIAL BOARD – COMITÉ DE RÉDACTION 2017 Editors-in-Chief Associate Editors BRIANNA CARMICHAEL NATACHA CONNELLY BOSSÉ ASHLEY GODFREY CATHERINE HUTCHENS 2017 CanLIIDocs 175 KELCIE WHITE Rédactrices en chef SONNY XUE Rédactrices et rédacteur adjointes Honourary Editor-in-Chief Faculty Advisors THE HON. G. V. LA FOREST ANNE WARNER LA FOREST JANE THOMSON Rédacteur en chef honoraire Conseillères academiques Business Manager Translator CHELSEA BRAKE NATACHA CONNELLY BOSSÉ Gestionnaire Traductrice TO BE CITED AS: (2017) 68 UNBLJ MODE DE RÉFÉRENCE: (2017) 68 RD UN-B ISSN: 0077-8141 Copyright 2017 Droits d’auteur University of New Brunswick Law Journal © Revue de droit de l’Université du Nouveau-Brunswick Printed in Canada – Imprimé au Canada Since 1947, the University of New Depuis 1947, la Revue de droit de Brunswick Law Journal has published l’Université du Nouveau-Brunswick a articles, comments, and reviews in wide- publié des articles, des commentaires, et ranging areas of law. The Journal is des avis juridiques dans plusieurs produced by students from the Faculty of domaines du droit. La Revue est publiée Law at the University of New Brunswick par les étudiants de la Faculté de Droit de with the advice of one or more faculy l’Université du Nouveau-Brunswick sous members. The objective of the Journal is la direction d’un ou plusieurs membres du to promote academic discussion of current corps professoral. L’objectif de la Revue legal issues, problems, and philosophies. est de promouvoir les discussions académiques concernant les The Journal expresses its gratitude to the préoccupations, problèmes et philosophies Law Society of New Brunswick, the New juridiques actuels.