Justification, Community and Judgment in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter

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Justification, Community and Judgment in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter MAKING SENSE OF WHO WE ARE: JUSTIFICATION, COMMUNITY AND JUDGMENT IN SECTION 7 OF THE CANADIAN CHARTER by Geoffrey Baines Conrad Faculty of Law McGill University February 2019 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of DOCTOR OF CIVIL LAW ã Geoffrey Baines Conrad, 2019 McGill University ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ The principle of proportionality dominates Le principe de proportionnalité domine la the theory and practice of constitutional théorie et la pratique du contrôle judiciaire de rights adjudication around the world. Many l’action étatique qui porte atteinte aux droits authors seek to explain and defend constitutionnels. Plusieurs auteurs expliquent proportionality review for the obligation it et défendent ce modèle de contrôle judiciaire imposes on the state to substantively justify en insistant sur l’obligation qu’il impose à every constitutional rights limitation. On this l’état de justifier toute atteinte à un droit view, the requirement of substantive constitutionnel eu égard à des raisons justification is the essence of proportionality substantielles. Cette perspective fait du review and the source of its normative appeal. critère de justification substantielle l’essence However, the academic literature that lauds même du modèle judiciaire fondé sur la proportionality analysis for promoting a so- proportionnalité et son principal attrait called “culture of justification” suffers from a normatif. Or, la doctrine qui louange le shortcoming. It does not pay sufficient modèle de la proportionnalité en raison de la attention to the importance of local practices « culture de justification » qu’il promeut of legal argument and disagreement over souffre d’une lacune. Elle ne tient pas compte what constitutes a persuasive justification. suffisamment de l’importance des pratiques These omissions are especially striking given locales d’argumentation juridique, nie de la that contemporary justice debates are beset possibilité de désaccord sur ce qui constitue by uncertainty about who counts, what values une justification convaincante. Ces omissions matter, and how disagreements ought to be sont d’autant plus frappantes étant donné les resolved. Mindful of those shortcomings, the nombreuses incertitudes qui pèsent sur les author examines the practices of justification débats contemporains sur la justice. Celles-ci associated with one concrete manifestation of concernent les personnes et les valeurs constitutional rights adjudication: the substantielles dont on devrait tenir compte, et interpretation and application of the la manière de résoudre ces différends. principles of fundamental justice enshrined in Conscient de ces lacunes, l’auteur examine section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights les pratiques justificatives caractéristiques and Freedoms. The author argues that the d’un contexte concret de l’exercice du ostensibly rational and objective standard of contrôle judiciaire : celui de l’interprétation justification currently associated with the et l’application des principes de justice principles against arbitrariness, overbreadth fondamentale reconnues par l’article 7 de la and gross disproportionality, which mimics a Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. logic of proportionality, is shaped by L’auteur argumente que la norme de contingent historical and jurisprudential justification supposément objective et factors, and is linked closely with judicial rationnelle que l’on associe désormais aux understandings of community. principes de justice fondamentale s’opposant au caractère arbitraire, à la portée excessive et à la disproportion totale de l’action étatique, qui correspond à une logique de proportionnalité, est influencée par des facteurs historiques et jurisprudentielles fortuits. Au surplus, cette norme est étroitement liée à l’appréciation par les juges de l’identité de la collectivité. ii Those factors lead judges hearing cases Compte tenu de ces facteurs, les juges qui involving principles against arbitrariness, tranchent des différends reliés aux principes overbreadth and gross disproportionality to ci-dessus ont tendance à retenir des privilege justifications that meet a justifications qui répondent à une norme de decontextualized standard of rationalism, rationalité décontextualisée, qui reposent sur rely on empirical evidence, and emphasize des preuves empiriques, et qui mettent measurable impacts on individuals. Although l’accent sur les conséquences mesurables de this approach is compatible with l’atteinte sur les individus. Bien que cette justifications that all citizens might approche soit compatible avec des reasonably accept, it offers no principled justifications que tous citoyens jugeraient basis on which to distinguish persuasive from raisonnablement acceptables, elles unpersuasive justifications for constitutional n’établissent aucun principe pour distinguer rights limitations. Moreover, it tends to les justifications d’atteintes aux droits conceal and normalize the understandings of constitutionnels qui sont convaincantes de community that underpin fundamental justice celles qui ne le sont pas. Par ailleurs, elle judgments. Drawing notably on Hannah contribue à dissimuler et à normaliser les Arendt’s writings, the author proposes an visions de la collectivité qui sous-tendent les alternative, aesthetic, account of judgments jugements en matière de justice that invoke the principles of fundamental fondamentale. Faisant appel aux écrits de justice against arbitrariness, overbreadth and Hannah Arendt, l’auteur propose une gross disproportionality. That account, which conception alternative, esthétique, des would view the validity of such judgments jugements constitutionnels liés aux principes intersubjectively, is consistent with greater de justice fondamentale s’opposant au judicial modesty and candour about the caractère arbitraire, à la portée excessive et à contingent foundations of persuasive la disproportion totale. Cette conception, qui justifications. It would accordingly foster an analyserait la validité de ces jugements sous environment in which courts could respond une perspective intersubjective, est conforme more thoughtfully to the challenges that à un comportement judiciaire qui fait preuve plural understandings of justice and de davantage de modestie et de franchise vis- community pose to constitutional rights à-vis des fondements fortuits des adjudication. justifications convaincantes. Elle favoriserait donc l’essor d’un milieu qui permettrait aux tribunaux de répondre d’une manière plus réfléchie aux défis que posent l’existence de conceptions plurielles de la justice et de l’identité de la collectivité au contrôle judiciaire de l’action étatique qui porte atteinte aux droits constitutionnels. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would not have been able complete this doctoral thesis were it not the support and encouragement I received from so many. My supervisor, Alana Klein, has accompanied me every step of the way, and I am thankful to her for her encouragement, emotional support and the thoughtful feedback she gave me on every single aspect of the thesis. I am also extremely grateful to the two other members of my supervisory committee, Daniel Jutras and Robert Leckey. Not many doctoral students can claim to have the Dean on their supervisory committee, let alone two! Their high standards, insightful comments and unremitting demands for simpler, clearer prose have left an indelible mark on my work. It was a privilege to have them on my committee. Many other faculty members at McGill have left a lasting impression on my approach to legal scholarship and on this project. Mark Antaki’s course on theoretical approaches has been an endless source of inspiration and continues to shape my intellectual engagement with law. René Provost, Shauna Van Praagh, Hoi Kong and Nandini Ramanujam provided superb teaching mentorship. Angela Campbell was a wonderful Associate Dean during my middle years as a doctoral student; her dedication and commitment led me to academic opportunities that were of enormous benefit. Lara Khoury was kind enough to invite me to participate in several French language health law conferences, which helped me to engage with research from a novel perspective. I should also thank the supervisor of my Master’s thesis at the University of Victoria, Benjamin Berger, who played a key role setting me on my academic path 8 years ago and who continues to be a wonderful source of inspiration and support. I am also incredibly thankful to my DCL colleagues at McGill. The law faculty is blessed to have such a brilliant, committed, and supportive group of doctoral students. I have been continually inspired, impressed and frankly humbled by my DCL peers: always ready with a helping hand, a kind word, a sympathetic ear or a keen insight. And always ready for lunch at Thomson House too! My experience as a doctoral student was incredibly enriched by sharing it with such wonderful people and scholars. I am especially appreciative to Blair Major, Laura Dehaibi, Francis Lord, Marika Samson, Jeff Kennedy, Sarah Richardson, Jodi Lazare and Stef Carsley for being such good intellectual and social company. Thanks also goes to my family and friends outside the walls of the faculty. Though I suspect they often wondered what precisely I was doing all these years, and why I was doing it, their encouragement, patience and understanding never wavered. More generally, I also owe a debt of gratitude to the law faculty at McGill and to the Social Sciences Humanities
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