Virtue Ethics for Relational Beings
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Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 3-6-2017 12:00 AM Virtue Ethics for Relational Beings Mathieu Roy The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Tracy Isaacs The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy © Mathieu Roy 2017 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Roy, Mathieu, "Virtue Ethics for Relational Beings" (2017). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 4447. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4447 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abstract In On Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse outlines an account of virtue ethics and human flourishing grounded in an understanding of human beings as emotionally complex, social, and rational animals. These attributes give rise to a set of ends against which the goodness of our behavioural, affective, and intellectual dispositions are measured, namely, 1) survival of the individual, 2) continuance of the species, 3) characteristic enjoyment of pleasures (and avoidance of pain), and 4) the good functioning of the social group. I contend, however, that this picture is incomplete. More specifically, I outline the psychological effects of prolonged solitary confinement to make the case that Hursthouse’s model excludes an important and morally salient human attribute: relationality. Moreover, as a result of this exclusion, Hursthouse’s model also leaves out an important end against which to measure the goodness of character traits, namely, the granting of recognition. Taking seriously the role of recognition in evaluations of goodness gives rise to a number of virtues that are not normally foregrounded by virtue ethicists. I identify and discuss six of these virtues of recognition. The first three are reflexivity, reflectivity, and attentiveness. I characterize these three as “virtues of cognizing” insofar as they play a role in apprehending (with reasonable accuracy) the ways others experience the world. The other three character traits I offer as examples of virtues of recognition are epistemic temperance, deference guided by humility, and a moralized notion of etiquette. I characterize these as virtues of recognizing since they are involved in communicating to others our recognition of the character of their experiences. Keywords Natural Goodness, Rosalind Hursthouse, neo-Aristotelian ethics, virtue ethics, natural normativity, relationality, recognition, contemplation, solitary confinement, epistemic injustice. i Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................ i Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ ii Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1 1 The Natural Goodness Model: Twenty-first Century Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Foot’s Ethical Naturalism ....................................................................................... 2 1.2 Hursthouse’s Ethical Naturalism ............................................................................ 9 1.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 21 Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 22 2 Revisiting Rationality: Sandler’s Challenge to Hursthouse ......................................... 22 2.1 The First Challenge: Varieties of Naturalism ....................................................... 23 2.2 The Second Challenge: Transhumanism .............................................................. 26 2.3 The Third Challenge: Three Proposals for Ends Corresponding to Rationality ... 28 2.4 Revisiting Hursthouse’s Candidates for Ends Corresponding to Rationality ....... 36 2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 47 Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 48 3 Relationality ................................................................................................................. 49 3.1 Social Animality ................................................................................................... 50 3.2 Solitary Confinement ............................................................................................ 65 3.3 Solitary Confinement and Minimal Sensory Stimulation ..................................... 81 3.4 Solitary Confinement and Forced Incarceration ................................................... 84 3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 85 Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................... 88 4 Recognition I: From Relationality to Recognition ....................................................... 88 4.1 Recognition ........................................................................................................... 89 ii 4.2 Recognition and Relational Harms ....................................................................... 92 4.3 Apprehending, Cognizing, and Recognizing ...................................................... 101 4.4 Heading Some Objections Off at the Pass .......................................................... 107 Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................... 114 5 Recognition II: The Virtues of Cognizing ................................................................. 114 5.1 Testimony ........................................................................................................... 115 5.2 The Social Imaginary .......................................................................................... 120 5.3 Differentiating the Virtues of Epistemic Justice ................................................. 125 5.4 Summary of the Virtues of Cognizing ................................................................ 127 Chapter 6 ......................................................................................................................... 129 6 Recognition III: The Virtues of Recognizing............................................................. 129 6.1 Simple Ignorance and Epistemophilia ................................................................ 130 6.2 Etiquette as Virtue............................................................................................... 144 6.3 Summary of the Virtues of Recognizing ............................................................ 148 6.4 Conclusion: The Virtues of Recognition and a New Model for the Old Structure ............................................................................................................................. 149 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 152 Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 158 iii 1 Chapter 1 1 The Natural Goodness Model: Twenty-first Century Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism In this chapter, I lay the theoretical groundwork for my project of formulating a relational account of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics based on the natural goodness model of virtue. I begin, in Section 1, by considering the first explicit formulation of this theory, found in the late works of Philippa Foot, especially its final articulation in 2001’s Natural Goodness. One distinctive feature of Foot's account of natural goodness is that, following Elizabeth Anscombe, she makes the concepts of basic human needs and practical rationality central to her moral theory. I will attempt to shed light on the rationale for her appeal to basic needs rather than a more comprehensive picture of human nature, as Aristotelian naturalism would seem to warrant. In Section 2, I summarize and defend the adoption of Hursthouse's account of natural goodness in On Virtue Ethics. Hursthouse's model is an elaboration on Foot's and departs from hers mainly in grounding our evaluation of the virtues in a more elaborate conception of human nature.1 Defending Hursthouse's elaboration of natural goodness will open up space to further complicate it, as I will in subsequent chapters. Beginning in Chapter Two, I will argue that there are certain ends against which we can evaluate the goodness of individual character traits that can be derived from the fact that humans are rational beings. In Chapter Three, I argue that there is an important aspect of human nature that isn’t represented in Hursthouse’s focus on human