ISHM: AUGUST 19 – 25, 2016 August 25, 2016 EPIC Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, Monitoring the Crisis

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ISHM: AUGUST 19 – 25, 2016 August 25, 2016 EPIC Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, Monitoring the Crisis ASSIGNMENT WRITING SERVICES UK BEST ESSAY STRUCTURE Press Blog Podcast WHO WILL DO MY HOMEWORK FOR ME SOCIOLOGY PAPER SERVICE BEST ADMISSuSbIsOcrNib Ee StoS oAuYr SNewsletter WHO WE ARE WHAT WE DO GET INVOLVED DONATE CHAIKHANA Serving all the latest news from EPIC ISHM: AUGUST 19 – 25, 2016 August 25, 2016 EPIC Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, Monitoring the Crisis Key Takeaways: On August 25, following an investigation into allegations of corruption, the Iraqi Parliament passed a vote of no confidence and ousted Minister of Defense Khaled al-Obeidi, 142 to 105 with 16 abstentions. Al-Obeidi has served in the role since October 2014. The vote follows several weeks of delayed votes and a secondary investigation into Speaker of Parliament Salim al-Jabouri, who was oddly accused of corruption by the ousted Defense Minister during questioning. Al-Jabouri was cleared of any wrongdoing. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has previously said that he will assume the Defense Minister’s duties until a replacement can be confirmed. The Defense Minister’s ouster comes at an especially inconvenient time as Iraqi Security Forces and their allies prepare operations to clear Mosul of ISIS militants. The UNHCR and humanitarian agencies are pressing ahead with preparations for a massive wave of displaced persons during and after military operations to clear Mosul of ISIS militants. Preparations for the estimated 1.3 million IDPs include camp enlargement and construction, negotiations for land allocation to build new camps, and the strategic placement of emergency relief supplies and shelter kits around Mosul proper. According to UNHCR Representative in Iraq, Bruno Geddo, despite “the best-laid plans, there will be insufficient camps for all families needing shelter.” As previously reported in ISHM, military advancements south of Mosul, particularly in Qayyarah and Sharqat, continue to outpace relief efforts to those displaced. Iraqi Security Forces assisted by the U.S.-led international coalition successfully cleared ISIS militants from the strategically important city of Qayyarah, 60 kilometers south of Mosul in Ninewa Province. Qayyarah and its nearby air base are critical staging areas for the impending progression of forces toward Mosul itself. Meanwhile, in Anbar Province, Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) were assigned to control and secure Khalidiyah, between Fallujah and Ramadi, after forces encountered pockets of ISIS militants. Commander of Anbar Operations Major General Ismail al-Mahlawi said that after clearing Khalidiya, forces will return to Ramadi to secure that city which has seen the return of 70% of its citizens. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones said on August 22 that the U.S. will continue to support PMUs only if they coordinate with the ISF. On August 23, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi confirmed that President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Mahmoud Barzani said that Iraqi Peshmerga Forces have “no ambitions” of holding territory in Ninewa Province after it is cleared of ISIS militants. The confirmation came the day after U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones announced the allocation of US$ 415 million in aid to the Peshmerga to pay salaries, buy supplies, and continue their joint military operations against ISIS near Mosul. 36 individuals convicted for their involvement in the Speicher Massacre of June 2014 were hanged at the Nasriyah Prison in Dhi Qar Province as hundreds of family members of victims watched and rejoiced on August 21. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have called on Iraqi authorities to halt executions and reinforce rights to due process and fair trials. Based on credible accounts of the mass trials which lasted no longer than a day, those rights were denied to those executed this week. A final draft of the Government of Iraq’s 2017 fiscal year budget includes few changes from 2016, according to Mohammad Saleh, financial advisor to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. Despite continuing outsized security and humanitarian needs, the budget represents, in Saleh’s words, a transition from a “war economy to a peace economy.” The budget draft will be introduced to Parliament in mid-September. Parliament Declares ‘No Confidence’ in Defense Minister On August 19, Head of Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defense and Member of Parliament, Saghloon Abdallah, spoke of the need to come up with replacements in the event that Minister of Defense Khaled al-Obeidi is voted out of office. The Iraqi Parliament is planned to vote on the minister’s ouster and Abdallah hopes they can resolve the leadership issue before efforts to clear Mosul of ISIS militants advances. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said he would take over the responsibilities of the minister temporarily if al-Obeidi is removed from the office he has held since October 2014. On August 19, representative of the Alliance of Iraqi Forces, Member of Parliament Ahmed al-Jabra, speculated that most Members of Parliament will likely vote to keep the Minister of Defense Khaled al-Obeidi because of the impending Mosul Operation and the ongoing operation to clear the Ninewa Province. Another reason al-Jabra mentioned for voting to keep the minister is due to the lack of consensus on an alternative candidate which will force Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to run the ministry for the foreseeable future. On August 19, hundreds of protesters congregated in Horreya Square in the city of Hila to demand continued political reform. Civil rights activist Kazem Mohammad explained that the new technocratic ministerial appointments are a step in the right direction, but that the entire cabinet must be replaced with the same effective professionals. Protesters in the Babil Province also called for a reform of the judiciary, investigations into financial corruption, reduction of parliamentary representatives, the resignation of the Babel governor, an end to the quota system, and increased job opportunities for young people. On August 19, dozens of people protested in Haboubi Square in the city of Nasriya to demand continued political reform. Civil rights activists Sahran Masir explained that people in the Dhi Qar Province are seeking to reform the three branches of government and that the recent ministerial appointments signal a comprehensive change in the legislative branch. On August 21, Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, stated that the approval of the five technocrat ministerial candidates by Parliament was a major step in the right direction for political reform. The candidates were experts and specialists in their fields, rather than politicians, and that this technocratic approach to politics has proven to be successful. On August 21, Chairman of the Integrity Commission, Hassan al-Yasri, appealed to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to accept the resignation request he submitted in early July. The Office of the Integrity Commission explained that al-Abadi’s choice not to accept the chairman’s resignation was due to the timing of the corruption investigation of Minister of Defense Khaled al-Obeidi and the release of the National Anti-Corruption Strategic Plan put forth by the commission. On August 21, representative for the National Alliance, Member of Parliament Nayef al-Shamari, confirmed that the coalition has not put forward candidates to fill the Minister of Commerce or Minister of Trade positions to the Prime Minister. Al-Shamari did say that his coalition is ready to discuss filling this post and have numerous candidates in mind. On August 22, an anonymous senior source in government revealed that the National Alliance bloc will meet today to discuss the vacant ministerial seats. The source confirmed that Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi will nominate Hussein Tahan to be the Minister of Interior. Previous candidates either rejected their nominations or were ruled out due to their political allegiances. According to the same source, in return for consensus from the Turkmen political group for this position, Prime Minister al-Abadi is prepared to nominate Turkmen official Torhan Mufti, to be Minister of Commerce. Mufti was formerly a Member of the Kirkuk Provincial Council, acting Minister of Communication, and Minister of State for Provincial Affairs. On August 23, the Parliament convened their 13th session under the leadership of Speaker of Parliament, Salim al-Jabouri, with 256 members in attendance. The session lasted only 30 minutes after Members of Parliament walked out of the session in protest of a no confidence vote on Minister of Defense Khaled al-Obeidi. On August 23, Speaker of Parliament Salim al-Jabouri was forced to postpone a no confidence vote on Minister of Defense Khaled al-Obeidi after representatives walked out of the session and the Parliament failed to reach a quorum. 57 representatives voted to postpone the vote to withdraw confidence from al-Obeidi and eventually walked out of the session when the postponement was not agreed upon. On August 24, Minister of Finance Hoshair Zeibari expressed his willingness to be questioned in Parliament over corruption allegations made by Member of Parliament Haitham al-Jabouri. Zeibari warned that during his session he will reveal documents proving his innocence and al-Jabouri’s own involvement in corrupt dealings with other Gulf states. Zeibari said earlier that the investigation into his actions does not serve the public interest and only seeks to damage his reputation. On August 24, Deputy for the Kurdish Alliance Ahmed al-Badri and Member of the Kurdish Alliance Majid al-Shenkali expressed their support for the process of parliamentary interrogations of state officials and institutions. Both believe that public questioning is not only the right of the Parliament but integral to keeping individuals and institutions accountable to the public and the political apparatus. Al-Badri added that the process allows for transparent proceedings and limits the ability of politicians to make back door agreements. On August 25, during the 14th session of parliament, Minister of Finance Hoshair Zeibari, was questioned over corruption allegations made by Member of Parliament Haitham al-Jabouri.
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