BitTorrent is an Auction: Analyzing and Improving BitTorrent’s Incentives Dave Levin Katrina LaCurts Neil Spring Bobby Bhattacharjee University of Maryland University of Maryland University of Maryland University of Maryland
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT 1. INTRODUCTION Incentives play a crucial role in BitTorrent, motivating users to up- BitTorrent [2] is a remarkably successful decentralized system load to others to achieve fast download times for all peers. Though that allows many users to download a file from an otherwise under- long believed to be robust to strategic manipulation, recent work provisioned server. To ensure quick download times and scalabil- has empirically shown that BitTorrent does not provide its users ity, BitTorrent relies upon those downloading a file to cooperatively incentive to follow the protocol. We propose an auction-based trade portions, or pieces, of the file with one another [5]. Incentives model to study and improve upon BitTorrent’s incentives. The play an inherently crucial role in such a system; users generally insight behind our model is that BitTorrent uses, not tit-for-tat as wish to download their files as quickly as possible, and since Bit- widely believed, but an auction to decide which peers to serve. Our Torrent is decentralized, there is no global “BitTorrent police” to model not only captures known, performance-improving strategies, govern their actions. Users are therefore free to attempt to strate- it shapes our thinking toward new, effective strategies. For exam- gically manipulate others into helping them download faster. The ple, our analysis demonstrates, counter-intuitively, that BitTorrent role of incentives in BitTorrent is to motivate users to contribute peers have incentive to intelligently under-report what pieces of their resources to others so as to achieve desirable global system the file they have to their neighbors.