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Reference Material Reference Material This section provides supplementary information about the features and administration of the Expressway. • About Event Log Levels, on page 1 • CPL Reference, on page 14 • LDAP Server Configuration for Device Authentication, on page 24 • Using the Collaboration Solutions Analyzer Tool, on page 29 • Changing the Default SSH Key, on page 30 • Restoring the Default Configuration (Factory Reset), on page 30 • Pattern Matching Variables, on page 33 • Port Reference, on page 34 • Regular Expressions, on page 35 • Supported Characters, on page 37 • Product Identifiers and Corresponding Keys, on page 37 • Allow List Rules File Reference, on page 42 • Allow List Tests File Reference, on page 44 • Expressway Multitenancy Overview, on page 45 • Multitenant Expressway Sizing, on page 46 • Alarms Reference, on page 48 • Command Reference — xConfiguration, on page 113 • Command Reference — xCommand, on page 195 • Command Reference — xStatus, on page 232 • External Policy Overview, on page 234 • Flash Status Word Reference Table, on page 237 • Supported RFCs, on page 238 • Software Version History, on page 240 • Legal Notices, on page 250 About Event Log Levels All events have an associated level in the range 1-4, with Level 1 Events considered the most important. The table below gives an overview of the levels assigned to different events. Reference Material 1 Reference Material Event Log Format Level Assigned events 1 High-level events such as registration requests and call attempts. Easily human readable. For example: • call attempt/connected/disconnected • registration attempt accepted/rejected 2 All Level 1 events, plus: logs of protocol messages sent and received (SIP, H.323, LDAP and so on) excluding noisy messages such as H.460.18 keepalives and H.245 video fast-updates 3 All Level 1 and Level 2 events, plus: • protocol keepalives • call-related SIP signaling messages 4 The most verbose level: all Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 events, plus: • network level SIP messages See the Events and Levels section for a complete list of all events that are logged by the Expressway, and the level at which they are logged. Event Log Format The Event Log is displayed in an extension of the UNIX syslog format: date time process_name: message_details where: Field Description date The local date on which the message was logged. time The local time at which the message was logged. process_name The name of the program generating the log message. This could include: • tvcs for all messages originating from Expressway processes • web for all web login and configuration events • licensemanager for messages originating from the call license manager • b2bua for B2BUA events • portforwarding for internal communications between the Expressway-C and the Expressway-E • ssh for ssh tunnels between the Expressway-C and the Expressway-E but will differ for messages from other applications running on the Expressway. Reference Material 2 Reference Material Administrator Events Field Description message_details The body of the message (see the Message Details Field section for further information). Administrator Events Administrator session related events are: • Admin Session Start • Admin Session Finish • Admin Session Login Failure The Message Details Field includes: • the name of the administrator user to whom the session relates, and their IP address • the date and time that the login was attempted, started, or ended Message Details Field For all messages logged from the tvcs process, the message_details field, which contains the body of the message, consists of a number of human-readable name=value pairs, separated by a space. The first name element within the message_details field is always Event and the last name element is always Level. The table below shows all the possible name elements within the message_details field, in the order that they would normally appear, along with a description of each. Note In addition to the events described below, a syslog.info event containing the string MARK is logged after each hour of inactivity to provide confirmation that logging is still active. Name Description Event The event which caused the log message to be generated. See Events and Levels for a list of all events that are logged by the Expressway, and the level at which they are logged. User The username that was entered when a login attempt was made. ipaddr The source IP address of the user who has logged in. Reference Material 3 Reference Material Message Details Field Name Description Protocol Specifies which protocol was used for the communication. Valid values are: • TCP • UDP • TLS Reason Textual string containing any reason information associated with the event. Service Specifies which protocol was used for the communication. Will be one of: • H.323 • SIP • H.225 • H.245 • LDAP • Q.931 • NeighbourGatekeeper • Clustering • ConferenceFactory Message Type Specifies the type of the message. Response-code SIP response code or, for H.323 and interworked calls, a SIP equivalent response code. Src-ip Source IP address (the IP address of the device attempting to establish communications). This can be an IPv4 address or an IPv6 address. Dst-ip Destination IP address (the IP address of the destination for a communication attempt). The destination IP is recorded in the same format as Src-ip. Src-port Source port: the IP port of the device attempting to establish communications. Dst-port Destination port: the IP port of the destination for a communication attempt. Reference Material 4 Reference Material Message Details Field Name Description Src-alias If present, the first H.323 alias associated with the originator of the message. If present, the first E.164 alias associated with the originator of the message. Dst-alias If present, the first H.323 alias associated with the recipient of the message. If present, the first E.164 alias associated with the recipient of the message. Detail Descriptive detail of the Event. Auth Whether the call attempt has been authenticated successfully. Method SIP method (INVITE, BYE, UPDATE, REGISTER, SUBSCRIBE, etc). Contact Contact: header from REGISTER. AOR Address of record. Call-id The Call-ID header field uniquely identifies a particular invitation or all registrations of a particular client. Call-serial-number The local Call Serial Number that is common to all protocol messages for a particular call. Tag The Tag is common to all searches and protocol messages across an Expressway network for all forks of a call. Call-routed Indicates if the Expressway took the signaling for the call. To • for REGISTER requests: the AOR for the REGISTER request • for INVITEs: the original alias that was dialed • for all other SIP messages: the AOR of the destination. Request-URI The SIP or SIPS URI indicating the user or service to which this request is being addressed. Num-bytes The number of bytes sent/received in the message. Protocol-buffer Shows the data contained in the buffer when a message could not be decoded. Reference Material 5 Reference Material Events and Levels Name Description Duration Request/granted registration expiry duration. Time A full UTC timestamp in YYYY/MM/DD-HH:MM:SS format. Using this format permits simple ASCII text sorting/ordering to naturally sort by time. This is included due to the limitations of standard syslog timestamps. Level The level of the event as defined in the About Event Log Levels section. UTC Time Time the event occurred, shown in UTC format. Events and Levels The following table lists the events that can appear in the Event Log: Event Description Level Alarm acknowledged An administrator has acknowledged 1 an alarm. The Detail event parameter provides information about the nature of the issue. Alarm lowered The issue that caused an alarm to 1 be raised has been resolved. The Detail event parameter provides information about the nature of the issue. Alarm raised The Expressway has detected an 1 issue and raised an alarm. The Detail event parameter provides information about the nature of the issue. Admin Session CBA Authorization An unsuccessful attempt has been 1 Failure made to log in when the Expressway is configured to use certificate-based authentication. Admin Session Finish An administrator has logged off the 1 system. Admin Session Login Failure An unsuccessful attempt has been 1 made to log in as an administrator. This could be because an incorrect username or password (or both) was entered. Reference Material 6 Reference Material Events and Levels Event Description Level Admin Session Start An administrator has logged onto 1 the system. Application Exit The Expressway application has 1 been exited. Further information may be provided in the Detail event parameter. Application Failed The Expressway application is out 1 of service due to an unexpected failure. Application Start The Expressway has started. 1 Further detail may be provided in the Detail event parameter. Application Warning The Expressway application is still 1 running but has experienced a recoverable problem. Further detail may be provided in the Detail event parameter. Authorization Failure The user has either entered invalid 1 credentials, does not belong to an access group, or belongs to a group that has an access level of “None”. Applies when remote authentication is enabled. Beginning System Backup A system backup has started. 1 Beginning System Restore A system restore has started. 1 Call Answer Attempted An attempt to answer a call has 1 been made. Call Attempted A call has been attempted. 1 Call Bandwidth Changed The endpoints in a call have 1 renegotiated call bandwidth. Call Connected A call has been connected. 1 Call Diverted A call has been diverted. 1 Call Disconnected A call has been disconnected. 1 Call Inactivity Timer A call has been disconnected due 1 to inactivity. Reference Material 7 Reference Material Events and Levels Event Description Level Call Rejected A call has been rejected. The 1 Reason event parameter contains a textual representation of the H.225 additional cause code.
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