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War in Syria: UN Peacekeeping Mission and Deal www.ssoar.info War in Syria: UN peacekeeping mission and deal with Russia are imperative Meininghaus, Esther Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Stellungnahme / comment Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Meininghaus, E. (2018). War in Syria: UN peacekeeping mission and deal with Russia are imperative. (BICC Policy Brief, 2/2018). Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168- ssoar-62319-5 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.de \ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2018 War in Syria UN peacekeeping mission and deal with Russia are imperative Esther Meininghaus \ BICC Recommendations \ NATO member states should force \ Deradicalization as a means of terror Turkey to withdraw from northern Syria prevention requires cooperation be- NATO member states should expel Turkey from tween Russia and the United Nations membership unless, it withdraws its troops from Syria. The strategic forced relocation of radical fighters by the To secure the northern border, the UN could offer the regime alliances to areas controlled by the Free Syrian immediate deployment of troops to Afrin, which could Army (FSA), for instance, leads to local populations being be extended to a Grand Bargain for other opposition- terrorized. Growing poverty and financial incentives controlled areas. This deal would have to include Russia. draw fighters towards extremist groups. Expertise by Russia and the United Nations must be combined to \ Grand Bargain: Develop a Joint Mech- develop and implement de-radicalization programmes anism for the deployment of UN blue if further escalation of terror is to be stopped locally and globally. helmets and negotiations with Russia for a political solution to the war \ Donors should continue and coordi- Provided that major alliances among the armed opposition nate support for the moderate Syrian consent, shared responsibility for protection by the UN and Russia provides an opportunity for ceasefires, opposition on the diplomatic level the deployment of UN blue helmets, a reformed state The moderate civil-political opposition, e. g. Higher system without Assad and deradicalization programmes. Negotiation Committee should be a key actor to shape It could be achieved through a Grand Bargain. political reform in the Grand Bargain and to create an internationally acceptable democratic and inclusive framework. Donors should, therefore, continue the \ If Russia were to act as a mediator, it financial and ideational support of the opposition. This must stop current systematic attacks support, however, ought to be coordinated and allow for on civilians immediately self-determined prioritisation of needs (e.g. legal advice, If Russia is to change its role from an aggressor to negotiation training). that of a mediator, the attacks in eastern Ghouta, Idlib, Hama countryside and elsewhere must stop with immediate effect. \ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2018 WAR IN SYRIA \ ESTHER MEININGHAUS UN peacekeeping mission and deal with Russia are imperative War trends: International security observers, and travel bans and a lack of security con- interests are prioritized tinue to impede independent journalism. The war is rendered almost invisible. In the Syrian war, which began in 2011 with protest for democratic participation and against the auto- Weekly analyses of fighting, limited media reports cratic regime, original grievances continued to be and data on the humanitarian situation, however, sidelined over the past year. The media focused on the show a different trend. The de-escalation zones, fight against Daesh (the Islamic State, IS), which in which allegedly contributed to appeasement, remained Syria is being carried out by the US-led international without effect. In the course of the Astana-negotia- coalition as well as the regime alliance (Syria, Russia, tions initiated by Russia from May 2017 onwards, Iran, and Hezbollah). An estimated several hundred Russia, Iran and Turkey declared their intention of opposition groups, which are highly heterogeneous, implementing four de-escalation zones in Syria with continued to face the challenge of having to fight on various guaranteeing powers. Their stated goals were two fronts against the regime and Daesh. With the to reduce fighting, ensure access to humanitarian aid exception of the US, member states of the interna- and to isolate fighters of Daesh and Hayat Tahrir tional alliance have not been willing to deploy troops al-Sham (HTS, formerly the Nusra Front)—both cate- on the ground. Instead, they expected Syrian opposi- gorized as terrorist organizations—from other armed tion groups to withdraw their troops fighting against groups in order to fight these networks. De-escalation the regime alliance to fight Daesh, yet without offer- zones were announced for parts of the governorates ing them support for their cause in return. In the of Daraa and Qunaytra (July 2017), eastern Ghouta in fight against Daesh, international security interests rural Damascus (July), northern rural parts of the are being prioritized, while local populations remain governorate of Homs (August) and Idlib as well as exposed to attacks without protection, and original parts of Lattakia, Hama and Aleppo (September). grievances continue to be ignored. These have only been implemented partially. Eastern Ghouta is still in its third year under siege and, like Failing de-escalation zones and forced Idlib, has been subjected to heavy aerial bombard- relocation ment by the regime alliance since the beginning of the year. De-confliction zones were introduced e.g. for The impression that fighting decreased over the past Afrin in the governorate of Aleppo—now seeing the year is a misconception that results from a lack of invasion of Turkish troops facing Syrian Armed Forces— media attention and data. In February 2018, the United and eastern Qalamoun in rural Damascus. These Nations warned that the war has become extreme— zones served to avoid direct clashes between the worse than Kosovo ever was (Barnard, 2018). Progress United States and Russia. Nonetheless, they could not allegedly made with the introduction of de-escalation prevent the most recent Russian casualties caused by zones was largely on paper only and diverted atten- US attacks in Deir al-Zur (Feb. 2018). Especially the tion from escalating violence elsewhere. Even the offensive launched by the regime alliance in Idlib— de-escalation zones are now being attacked continu- alleged de-escalation zone—since late last year, the ally as is the case with. eastern Ghouta, causing the Turkish invasion in northern Syria, and current aerial deaths of scores of civilians on a daily basis. Standard attacks on eastern Ghouta show a new climax in the measures of conflict do not exist. Given that casual- escalation of violence which had built up over the ties have not been counted since 2014 and hospitals past year. are targeted, only partially functional, understaffed and out of reach in many locations, no figures on The overall humanitarian situation has deteriorated direct or indirect victims of war are available. The further. Even after attempts of implementing de- Syrian regime continues to refuse permission for UN escalation zones, UN access to people in need, of 2 \ \ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2018 WAR IN SYRIA \ ESTHER MEININGHAUS whom 13.5 million depend on humanitarian aid, re- international community remains helplessly paralyzed mains severely restricted. Only about five per cent of in spite of relentless aerial and ground attacks on targeted recipients were reached in hard-to-reach civilian targets such as residential areas, hospitals, areas. In areas under siege, access decreased from 13 schools and basic infrastructure by the regime alliance; to six per cent. Among 6.3 million internally displaced the sarin gas attack on Khan Shaykhoun, proven to persons, 1.8 million were newly displaced in 2017 have been launched by the regime and other chemi- (2016: 2.0 million). This is a further indication of the cal attacks, recently also with napalm; satellite im- fact that levels of violence have hardly changed. In agery on mass executions in Sednayya prison and addition to people fleeing from fighting, the number forced disappearances of an estimated 85,000 men, of people who became victims of organized and sys- women and children. Although war crimes have also tematic displacement increased drastically. The regime been proven for other belligerents, the majority of alliance forcefully relocated about 33,000 people alone cases have been committed by the regime alliance.1 from al-Wa’er and through the so-called Four Town Agreement (Fu’ah, Kefrayya, Zabadani und Madayya). Consequently, de-escalation and de-confliction zones have not improved the situation of civilians at large. The United Nations is no party to these relocations, Instead, they allowed for the regime alliance to shift officially considered evacuations, “which do not troops to strategically relevant fronts. Despite their appear to meet international legal standards or adhere to humanitarian principles (UNSC, 2017). Given the 1 \ For example, 90 per cent of sieges are still being carried out by pro- blockade of the Security Council by Russia and China, regime forces. These are estimated to be responsible for the same share of cases of enforced disappearances. Cf. e.g. Syrian Network for Human however, this critique is without consequences. The Rights (2017). \ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2018 3 \ WAR IN SYRIA \ ESTHER MEININGHAUS disagreement on the future of the country, the regime period, the moderate opposition was further margin- alliance and the US-led international alliance against alized by the suspension of the CIA train-and-equip Daesh (including NATO) seemingly share the goal of programme, which had supported the FSA with sala- defeating Daesh.
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