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Phenomenal Ways of Thinking* teorema Vol. XXVII/3, 2008, pp. 149-166 ISSN: 0210 - 1602 Phenomenal Ways of Thinking* Luca Malatesti RESUMEN Los argumentos a favor de la tesis de que las experiencias conscientes tienen propiedades no-físicas o qualia incluyen ciertas situaciones concebibles. El argumento del conocimiento de Frank Jackson toma en consideración a la hipotética científica Mary, quien a pesar de tener conocimiento científico completo de la visión del color, supuestamente carece de conocimiento de los qualia. Los argumentos mo- dales de Saul Kripke y David Chalmers incluyen zombis, criaturas concebibles que son físicamente idénticas a nosotros, pero carecen de qualia. Algunos fisicistas han respondido a estos argumentos mediante la réplica de los conceptos fenoménicos. Aunque sin tratar de socavar esta réplica en general, voy a argumentar que algunas versiones recientes de la misma, las propuestas por John Perry y David Papineau, no son satisfactorias. ABSTRACT Certain conceivable situations figure as premises in arguments for the conclu- sion that conscious experiences have non-physical properties or qualia. Frank Jack- son’s Knowledge Argument considers the hypothetical scientist Mary, who despite having complete scientific knowledge of colour vision, supposedly lacks knowledge of qualia. Both Saul Kripke’s and David Chalmers’ modal arguments involve zom- bies, conceivable creatures physically identical to us who lack qualia. Several physi- calists have replied to all these objections by endorsing the phenomenal concept reply. Without trying to undermine this reply in general, I argue that recent versions of it proposed by John Perry and David Papineau are unsatisfactory. I INTRODUCTION Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument aims to prove that scientific knowledge leaves out something about conscious experiences and, thus, that conscious experiences cannot have only physical properties.1 Saul Kripke (1971) and David Chalmers (1996) reach the same conclusion by means of modal arguments concerning the conceivability of creatures physically iden- tical to us who lack consciousness. 149 150 Luca Malatesti Some physicalists respond to these objections by embracing what can be called the phenomenal concept strategy. The central tenet of this response is that, although we can think about conscious mental states in two different ways, the ordinary first-personal and the scientific, conscious experiences are physical states and have only physical properties. In particular, the anti- physicalist objections stem from “illusions” or “equivocations” generated by phenomenal concepts. These concepts enter in our ordinary first-personal way of thinking about conscious experiences or their properties. According to these physicalists, the intuitions that underlie the anti-physicalist objections are undermined by clarifying certain features of phenomenal concepts. In this paper I criticise three recent versions of the phenomenal con- cepts strategy. First, I attack John Perry’s (2001) demonstrative account of phenomenal concepts. I maintain that it fails to account for the epistemic ac- cess to phenomenal properties of experiences required for the possession of phenomenal concepts. Then, I criticise David Papineau’s (2002) quotational account of phenomenal concepts. Though this account might overcome the difficulties of the demonstrative model, I argue that it requires an untenable view on introspection. Finally, I consider Papineau’s (2007) recent revision of his quotational model. Although this theory is consistent with a more plau- sible account of introspection, it has to face another difficulty. In fact, I argue that Papineau’s new account cannot be endorsed by the physicalist, given that it involves a physicalistically unexplainable cognitive relation between the subject and her conscious experiences. The overall conclusion is not a dis- missal of the phenomenal concepts strategy. Instead, the paper aims at point- ing out certain explanatory requirements for a correct formulation of this defence of physicalism. However, here I shall not investigate whether these requirements can be satisfied. II. CONSTRAINTS ON PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS This paper will focus on the notion of consciousness that covers those features of our mental life that have to do with the ways in which experience the world and our body. For instance, the way in which a pain is given to us when we are aware of it or the way in which a coloured object appears to us involve aspects of our conscious life. Accordingly, the term qualia will be used to characterise these aspects. Moreover I will take qualia to characterise the types of conscious experiences we have. Thus, two token experiences are of the same type when they involve the instantiation of the same quale. In having these two experiences something appears in the same way to a subject. Some physicalists maintain that qualia are identical to natural proper- ties, such as physical properties of the brain [Smart (1959)]. Others argue that qualia are identical to functional properties variously specified in terms of Phenomenal Ways of Thinking 151 causal roles. These roles are given by conditions defining each mental state as whatever is caused by certain types of stimuli, that causes certain types of behaviour, and that has certain causal relations with other mental states [Put- nam (1967)]. However, these identifications advanced by physicalists have been criticised. Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument (KA) against physicalism goes as follows. The vision scientist Mary possesses a complete physical knowledge of colour and colour vision without having ever seen a colour. In fact, Mary has been held captive in a monochromatic environment where she has acquired her scientific knowledge by seeing white, black and shades of grey. According to Jackson, Mary’s scientific knowledge is of the type that physicalists assume will eventually accommodate colour and colour vision within the natural world. However, Jackson continues, when Mary is released from her monochromatic environment and sees a colour for the first time she acquires new knowledge. In particular, she comes to know that the type of colour experience she is having has a quale. Jackson concludes that this prop- erty and its instantiation are not physical. Some physicalists reply to the KA by endorsing the phenomenal con- cept strategy [see Loar (1990)]. They maintain that the KA reveals the exis- tence of phenomenal concepts. In fact, they embrace the intuition that Mary, by seeing colours, learns something about colour experiences. Moreover, they think that this intuition supports the assumption that she acquires new beliefs concerning colour experiences, which are not included amongst the scientific beliefs she had before her release. The supporters of this reply as- sume that the identity of beliefs in general or, more specifically, of Mary’s new beliefs is a function of the identity of the concepts that are required to express their contents. Moreover, they assume some criteria for distinguish- ing concepts that imply that distinct concepts can refer to the same property. Finally, they claim that phenomenal concepts refer to physical properties. Therefore, the conclusion of the KA does not follow. This physicalist reply to the KA relies on some features of phenomenal concepts. First, phenomenal concepts refer to certain physical properties. Second, when Mary acquires these concepts by having colour experiences, she comes to have new beliefs. Third, phenomenal concepts must be a priori inferentially detached from scientific concepts. In particular, phenomenal concepts cannot be specified by means of relational descriptions. This re- quirement excludes functional analyses of phenomenal concepts in terms of causal roles and of relational descriptions. In fact, Mary might possess these descriptions before her release. Fourth, acquiring a phenomenal concept re- quires having the right type of experience. This is the type of experience specified by the quale, understood as a physical property, to which the phe- nomenal concept refers. Let us now consider further features of phenomenal concepts used to reply to the anti-physicalist modal objections. 152 Luca Malatesti Saul Kripke’s modal objection to physicalism is based on modal con- siderations. Consider the physicalist’s identification Q = N, where Q is a quale and N a natural or physical property. Now, according to Kripke the terms “Q” and “N” refer rigidly to their referents. This means that they have the same referent in every possible world. We might also say that the concept [Q] refers rigidly to the quale of the experience; similarly the concept [N] refers rigidly to the natural property N.2 This means that both concepts refer to their referents in all possible worlds. Therefore, the identity Q = N is necessary. Kripke observes that the identity between Q and N appears to be con- tingent. In fact, it is conceivable that there might be creatures that, despite sharing with us the same physical, functional and natural make-up, do not feel anything when they are in pain and, in general, they lack the qualia that characterise conscious experiences. In recent philosophy of mind, these hypo- thetical creatures are called zombies. However, according to Kripke, there is no way to explain away the intuition of zombies and thus the appearance of contingency of the identity Q = N. According to Kripke, the only case in which a necessary identity ap- pears to be contingent is when at least one of the terms in the identity picks out its referent by means of a description, which involves some of the contin- gent properties of the referent. For instance, consider the case of H2O and wa- ter. Although we can conceive that water is not H2O, what we conceive is the situation in which something else from H2O, the substance XYZ, satisfies the cluster of superficial and contingent properties (drinkable, available in lakes and seas etc.) employed to fix the reference of the term “water”. However, Kripke thinks that we cannot explain in the same way the ap- pearance of contingency of the identity of Q with N. In fact, the reference of the term “Q” is not fixed by means of a contingent property of its referent.
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