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An Overview of the European Tax Havens
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Maftei, Loredana Article An Overview of the European Tax Havens CES Working Papers Provided in Cooperation with: Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University Suggested Citation: Maftei, Loredana (2013) : An Overview of the European Tax Havens, CES Working Papers, ISSN 2067-7693, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Centre for European Studies, Iasi, Vol. 5, Iss. 1, pp. 41-50 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/198228 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ www.econstor.eu AN OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN TAX HAVENS Loredana Maftei* Abstract: In the actual context of economic globalization, tax havens represent a significant obstacle for global governments seeking to increase their fiscal incomes and a source of polarization of income and wealth. -
The Russia You Never Met
The Russia You Never Met MATT BIVENS AND JONAS BERNSTEIN fter staggering to reelection in summer 1996, President Boris Yeltsin A announced what had long been obvious: that he had a bad heart and needed surgery. Then he disappeared from view, leaving his prime minister, Viktor Cher- nomyrdin, and his chief of staff, Anatoly Chubais, to mind the Kremlin. For the next few months, Russians would tune in the morning news to learn if the presi- dent was still alive. Evenings they would tune in Chubais and Chernomyrdin to hear about a national emergency—no one was paying their taxes. Summer turned to autumn, but as Yeltsin’s by-pass operation approached, strange things began to happen. Chubais and Chernomyrdin suddenly announced the creation of a new body, the Cheka, to help the government collect taxes. In Lenin’s day, the Cheka was the secret police force—the forerunner of the KGB— that, among other things, forcibly wrested food and money from the peasantry and drove some of them into collective farms or concentration camps. Chubais made no apologies, saying that he had chosen such a historically weighted name to communicate the seriousness of the tax emergency.1 Western governments nod- ded their collective heads in solemn agreement. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank both confirmed that Russia was experiencing a tax collec- tion emergency and insisted that serious steps be taken.2 Never mind that the Russian government had been granting enormous tax breaks to the politically connected, including billions to Chernomyrdin’s favorite, Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly,3 and around $1 billion to Chubais’s favorite, Uneximbank,4 never mind the horrendous corruption that had been bleeding the treasury dry for years, or the nihilistic and pointless (and expensive) destruction of Chechnya. -
MR BONAVENTURA MONACO VIENNA MAY 14Th
MONACO ECONOMIC OUTLINE A Unique Economic Model > Tuesday, May 14th 2019 MONEGASQUES’ SINGULARITIES 2 KM2 > 37 308 Second smallest INHABITANTS country +5% 1297 POLITICAL STABILITY 139 > 8 378 NATIONALITIES CITIZENSHIPS 22% MONEGASQUES’ SINGULARITIES MONACO ECONOMIC MODEL ENGAGEMENT 1 International strategic partnerships 2 Develop expertise / Maintain Diversity / Liberal Approach to Business 3 Sustainable development the economy’s core ENVIRONNEMENT ECONOMIC GOWTHMODELECONOMIC Carbon Neutrality 0% by 2050 PILAR # 1: INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIG PARTNERSHIPS INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2 988 M € 52% GDP INT. REPRESENTATION GLOBAL PRESENCE ONU / € / OECD > 130 Intergovernmental agreements > 120 diplomatic relations A sovereignty linked to the world A strategic location with great commercial potential European Union 510 million consumers Mediterranean Basin 272 million consumers Africa Monaco st 1 commercial partner apart from Europe FOREIGN TRADE: 2000 EXPORTS 1500 1436,3 EXPORTATIONS 1355,5 • 73,7% Europe 1208,2 • 13,5% Africa 921,5 • 7,3% Asia 1000 872,2 842,2 866,2 753,2 • 4% America IMPORTATIONS • 1,6% Near & Far 500 East 119 IMPORTS 0 TRADE BALANCE 2014 2015 2016 2017 • 80% Europe • 9,4% Asia -366 • -500 -434 6,6% America -570,1 • 3,4% Africa • 0.5% Near &Far East -1000 Foreign trade- balance of trade in M € - Period 2014-2017 Sources: IMSEE – edition 2018 / Directorate-General of Customs and Indirect Taxes (France) PILAR # 2: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE • Rising knowhow in niche markets • Fostering diversification • Maintaining Balance INNOVATION Sectors of the Monegasque economy (as % of GDP) A diversified and balanced model within a liberal environment ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOWARD INNOVATION IT +12% and still the best to come… STARTUP PROGRAM SMART PRINICPALITY INNOVATION AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION • Promote innovation, • Promote quality of life, • Create jobs and catalyze economic growth, • Deliver a new cycle of economic prosperity, • Strengthen local competitiveness. -
No. 1 Demography and Health in Eastern Europe and Eurasia
Working Paper Series on the Transition Countries No. 1 DEMOGRAPHY AND HEALTH IN EASTERN EUROPE AND EURASIA Ayo Heinegg Robyn Melzig James Pickett and Ron Sprout June 2005 Program Office Bureau for Europe & Eurasia U.S. Agency for International Development 1 Demography and Health in Eastern Europe and Eurasia Ayo Heinegg Academy for Educational Development Email: [email protected] Robyn Melzig U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington DC Email: [email protected] James Pickett U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington DC Email: [email protected] Ron Sprout U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington DC Email: [email protected] Abstract: Eastern Europe and Eurasia is the only region worldwide experiencing a contraction in population, which stems from both a natural decrease in the population (i.e., crude death rates exceeding crude birth rates) and emigration. The highest crude death rates in the world are found among the transition countries; so too the lowest fertility rates. This study analyzes these trends and attempts to assess some of the underlying health factors behind them. The report also examines the evidence regarding migration patterns, both political aspects (including trends in refugees and internally displaced persons) and economic aspects (including remittances, urbanization, and brain drain). 2 USAID/E&E/PO Working Paper Series on the Transition Countries September 2006 No.1 Demography and Health (June 2005) No.2 Education (October 2005) No.3 Economic Reforms, Democracy, and Growth (November 2005) No.4 Monitoring Country Progress in 2006 (September 2006) No.5 Domestic Disparities (forthcoming) No.6 Labor Markets (forthcoming) No.7 Global Economic Integration (forthcoming) The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in these working papers are entirely those of the authors. -
The Russian Default and the Contagion to Brazil
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Baig, Taimur; Goldfajn, Ilan Working Paper The Russian default and the contagion to Brazil Texto para discussão, No. 420 Provided in Cooperation with: Departamento de Economia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro Suggested Citation: Baig, Taimur; Goldfajn, Ilan (2000) : The Russian default and the contagion to Brazil, Texto para discussão, No. 420, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia, Rio de Janeiro This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/186664 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der -
Automatic Exchange of Information: Status of Commitments
As of 27 September 2021 AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (AEOI): STATUS OF COMMITMENTS1 JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES IN 2017 (49) Anguilla, Argentina, Belgium, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus2, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Kingdom JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2018 (51) Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan3, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominica4, Greenland, Grenada, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Macau (China), Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue4, Pakistan3, Panama, Qatar, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sint Maarten4, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago4, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2019 (2) Ghana3, Kuwait5 JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2020 (3) Nigeria3, Oman5, Peru3 JURISDICTIONS UNDERTAKING FIRST EXCHANGES BY 2021 (3) Albania3, 7, Ecuador3, Kazakhstan6 -
The Permanent Neutrality Treaties
THE PERMANENTNEUTRALITY TREATIES The present European war has thrown into sharp relief the status of those smaller governments which, although in nowise shorn of attributes of sovereignty within their own borders, have nevertheless been placed by virtue of most solemn inter- national guarantees in a position of perpetual neutrality towards all other Powers. They are not to wage offensive warfare, nor, if the obligations resulting from these guarantees are faithfully observed, may their territories be in any degree the theatre of hostilities. While the chief examples of this peculiar status,- Belgium, Luxemburg and Switzerland,-are plainly, by reason of restricted area and population, in no condition to cope with the greater powers surrounding them, it is not alone their lack of size or strength that has marked them out for permanent neutrality or neutralization, but rather their essential relation to the map of Europe and the many conflicting interests innate in its geographical outlines which have seemed to make neces- sary their fixed withdrawal from plans of rivalry or territorial ambition and the creation in this manner of certain inter-spaces destined for peace whatever may be the fate of their more powerful neighbors. The precise conditions of such a neutrality are to be found in a long line of treaties and agreements comprising within their horizon a great variety of objects. For the purpose of the present examination, however, we shall lay out of detailed view all aspects of permanent neutrality save those attaching to the three governments just named since to consider the various phases of the subject would require much more space than that at the disposal of a single article. -
MONICA MONACO Founder
EUROPEAN REGULATORY CHANGES IN PAYMENTS: HOW IS THE “SAME • As for credit transfers, when a currency conversion CHARGES” RULE CHANGING IN EUROPE AND HOW WILL DYNAMIC CURRENCY service is offered by the payer’s payment service provider CONVERSION SERVICES BE OFFERED? in relation to a credit transfer that is initiated online directly at the website or at the application of the The European Parliament and the Council reached Building up on PSD2’s requirements in article 45 payment service provider, the payment service a political agreement on 19 December 2018 on (1c and 1d) for the transparency of charges and of provider shall inform the payer, in a clear, neutral and a Commission proposal to review and amend exchange rates prior to the transaction – on the side comprehensible manner, of the estimated charges for Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 covering charges on of Payment Services Providers (PSPs) – and on article currency conversion services applicable to the credit cross-border payments in the Union and currency 59 (2) for information from DCC providers at Point transfer prior to the initiation of the transaction. Moreover, conversion charges. The proposal was published by of Sale and ATMs, the new regulation allows for the payment service provider shall disclose the estimated the European Commission as recently as 28 March comparability between DCC and non-DCC for total amount of the credit transfer in the currency of 2018, which makes the agreement reached on the the payment service user. This is achieved through the payer’s account, including any transaction fee text in December the result of a fairly quick, nine- the following measures: and any currency conversion charges. -
Travail, Brussels, for a Preliminary Ruling in the Action Pending Before That Court Between
JUDGMENT OF 22.6.1972 — CASE 1/72 wage-earners or assimilated workers rocal agreement with the Member State who have worked for periods of time of which that worker is a national since in that State and are entitled to a pen such a condition is incompatible with sion there. the rule of equality of treatment which The grant of such a benefit to a foreign is one of the fundamental principles of worker who fulfils these conditions can Community law. not depend on the existence of a recip- In Case 1/72 Reference to the Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty by the Tribunal du Travail, Brussels, for a preliminary ruling in the action pending before that court between Rita Frilli, residing at Brussels, and Belgian State on the interpretation of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community and Article 2(1) and (3) of Regulation No 3 of the Council of 25 September 1958 concerning social security for migrant workers, in relation to the Belgian Law of 1 April 1969 establishing a guaranteed income for old people, THE COURT composed of: R. Lecourt, President, J. Mertens de Wilmars, President of Chamber, A. M. Donner, R. Monaco and P. Pescatore (Rapporteur), Judges, Advocate-General: H. Mayras Registrar: A. Van Houtte gives the following 458 FRILLI v BELGIUM JUDGMENT Issues of fact and of law I — Facts and procedure On 16 December 1971, further to the ar guments put forward at the hearing on 18 Mrs Rita Frilli, an Italian national, born November 1971, the Tribunal du Travail, on 29 March 1908, was employed in Bel Brussels, Eleventh Chamber, decided to gium in 1966 and 1967 and has continued request the Court of Justice for a prelimi to reside there. -
Rytas Vilnius Partizan Nis Belgrade Alba Berlin As
ROUND 1 GROUP E RYTAS VILNIUS PARTIZAN NIS BELGRADE ALBA BERLIN AS MONACO GROUP F RATIOPHARM ULM FRAPORT SKYLINERS FRANKFURT LOKOMOTIV KUBAN KRASNODAR LDLC ASVEL VILLEURBANNE GROUP G VALENCIA BASKET UNICAJA MALAGA CRVENA ZVEZDA MTS BELGRADE LIMOGES CSP GROUP H UNICS KAZAN ZENIT ST PETERSBURG CEDEVITA ZAGREB MORABANC ANDORRA ROUND 2 GROUP E AS MONACO RYTAS VILNIUS PARTIZAN NIS BELGRADE ALBA BERLIN GROUP F LDLC ASVEL VILLEURBANNE RATIOPHARM ULM FRAPORT SKYLINERS FRANKFURT LOKOMOTIV KUBAN KRASNODAR GROUP G LIMOGES CSP VALENCIA BASKET UNICAJA MALAGA CRVENA ZVEZDA MTS BELGRADE GROUP H MORABANC ANDORRA UNICS KAZAN ZENIT ST PETERSBURG CEDEVITA ZAGREB ROUND 3 GROUP E PARTIZAN NIS BELGRADE AS MONACO RYTAS VILNIUS ALBA BERLIN GROUP F FRAPORT SKYLINERS FRANKFURT LDLC ASVEL VILLEURBANNE RATIOPHARM ULM LOKOMOTIV KUBAN KRASNODAR GROUP G UNICAJA MALAGA LIMOGES CSP VALENCIA BASKET CRVENA ZVEZDA MTS BELGRADE GROUP H ZENIT ST PETERSBURG MORABANC ANDORRA UNICS KAZAN CEDEVITA ZAGREB ROUND 4 GROUP E AS MONACO PARTIZAN NIS BELGRADE ALBA BERLIN RYTAS VILNIUS GROUP F LDLC ASVEL VILLEURBANNE FRAPORT SKYLINERS FRANKFURT LOKOMOTIV KUBAN KRASNODAR RATIOPHARM ULM GROUP G LIMOGES CSP UNICAJA MALAGA CRVENA ZVEZDA MTS BELGRADE VALENCIA BASKET GROUP H MORABANC ANDORRA ZENIT ST PETERSBURG CEDEVITA ZAGREB UNICS KAZAN ROUND 5 GROUP E PARTIZAN NIS BELGRADE RYTAS VILNIUS AS MONACO ALBA BERLIN GROUP F FRAPORT SKYLINERS FRANKFURT RATIOPHARM ULM LDLC ASVEL VILLEURBANNE LOKOMOTIV KUBAN KRASNODAR GROUP G UNICAJA MALAGA VALENCIA BASKET LIMOGES CSP CRVENA ZVEZDA MTS BELGRADE GROUP H ZENIT ST PETERSBURG UNICS KAZAN MORABANC ANDORRA CEDEVITA ZAGREB ROUND 6 GROUP E RYTAS VILNIUS AS MONACO ALBA BERLIN PARTIZAN NIS BELGRADE GROUP F RATIOPHARM ULM LDLC ASVEL VILLEURBANNE LOKOMOTIV KUBAN KRASNODAR FRAPORT SKYLINERS FRANKFURT GROUP G VALENCIA BASKET LIMOGES CSP CRVENA ZVEZDA MTS BELGRADE UNICAJA MALAGA GROUP H UNICS KAZAN MORABANC ANDORRA CEDEVITA ZAGREB ZENIT ST PETERSBURG. -
Extremist Threats to Fragile Democracies: a Proposal for an East European Marshall Plan
Michigan Journal of International Law Volume 15 Issue 3 1994 Extremist Threats to Fragile Democracies: A Proposal for an East European Marshall Plan Victor Williams John Jay College of the City University of New York Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Victor Williams, Extremist Threats to Fragile Democracies: A Proposal for an East European Marshall Plan, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 863 (1994). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol15/iss3/11 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. EXTREMIST THREATS TO FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: A PROPOSAL FOR AN EAST EUROPEAN MARSHALL PLAN WALTER LAQUEUR, BLACK HUNDRED: THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN RUSSIA. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993. xvii + 317 pp. PAUL HOCKENOS, FREE TO HATE: THE RISE OF THE RIGHT IN POST-COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE. New York: Routledge, 1993. x + 332 pp. Reviewed by Victor Williams* INTRODUCTION "[I]t is by restoring the economic life of a country, and by this alone, that we can meet the threat of dictatorship from a Fascist Right or a Communist Left."' In this vast struggle which is raging throughout the world for the minds and loyalties of men, the weakness of the foreign policies of the democracies lies in the fact that such policy is mostly nega- tive-it is against something. -
2 Russia and Democracy
RUSSIA AND 2 DEMOCRACY By Jeremy Kinsman, 2013 INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE he Russian struggle to transform from a totalitarian system to a homegrown T democracy has been fraught with challenges. Today, steps backward succeed and compete with those going forward. Democratic voices mingle with the boorish claims of presidential spokesmen that the democratic phase in Russia is done with, in favour of a patriotic authoritarian hybrid regime under the strong thumb of a charismatic egotist. Meanwhile, excluded by Russian government fat from further direct engagement in support of democratic development, Western democracies back away, though they are unwilling to abandon solidarity with Russia’s democrats and members of civil society seeking to widen democratic space in their country. Russia’s halting democratic transition has now spanned more than a quarter of a century. The Russian experience can teach much about the diffculties of transition to democratic governance, illuminating the perils of overconfdence surrounding the way developed democracies operated with regard to other countries’ experiences 20 years ago. This Russian case study is more about the policies of democratic governments than about the feld practice of diplomats. It is a study whose amendment in coming years and decades will be constant. RUSSIAN EXCEPTIONALISM As the Handbook insists, each national trajectory is unique. Russia’s towering exceptionalism is not, as US scholar Daniel Treisman (2012) reminds us, because the country has a particularly