88th IKFANTRY DIVISION TEAR DIARY From 1 January 1918 to 10 December 1918
Extracted: War Diary from July 15 to August 3, 1918.
Translation from the German bys
GUSTAV J. BRAUN, Major, Infantry, Assistant Librarian*
The Command and General Staff School Port LeaTOmsorth, Kansas. 1937 88th INFAOTRY DIVISION MR DIARY FROM 1 JANUARY 1918 to 10 DECEMBER 1918
Extracted: War Diary from July 15 to August 3, 1918,
Source a); Combat report of the 88th Infantry Division, relative
to the fighting in the Champagne during the period of
15 July to 1 August 1918.
Index
1* Introduction (orientation)•
2» The attack terrain*
3* The hostile positions*
4« The hostile distribution of troops*
5« Our own. order of battle (distribution of troops)
6. The deployment of our own. troops*
7« The day of the attack*
8« The combat results*
9« The fighting in the outpost zone.
Appendix
(a) Personal -writings of the German Crown. Prince.
(b) Our own losses* (c) Booty of the division (captured material).
(d) Combat experiences.
(e) Map 1J25,OOO.
-1 I* Introduction (orientation)«
At the end of June a^ter the division had been moved into the
Ripont Sector immediately following the close of the "Great Battle
in France", it was taken out of this sector and moved into the vicinity
around Ballay east of Vouziers. Here it was to complete the training
of those necessary replacements that had lately arrived in preparation
for the contemplated offensive. The division was selected in cooperation
with the XVI Corps for the decisive position in the attack in a 2 knu
(1.2 miles) wide zone (Division - Sector 5) via the road Tahure—Souain
to Perthes and thence in a southeasterly direction to the Tourbe*
The 88th Division was not to engage in the preparatory phase of
this offensive as a front line division except in slight measure in that
its minenwerfer company and some of the communications troops and trains
were moved up to support the front line division (228th Infantry Division).
The remaining troops, e specially the infantry and the artillery, were
not informed of their attack sector until they made their reconnaissance
when they both reconnoitered their assembly areas.
The terrain was especially wall suited for the approach march of
large forces of assault troops into the assembly areas. The assembly
areas on the north were entirely masked from enemy observation by the
ridges which run from west to east, namely, Butte de Souain—Kir schberg—
Uassauer Hill—Hummerschere. Horse and wagon traffic was possible to
just in rear of the front lines. Our own position -which was organized in
depth, permitted the forward assault battalions ample billeting possibilities,
for those battalions in rear, the combat train and echelons, there -were excellent assembly spaces in the -well kept conifer -woods and the numerous ravines well hidden from aerial observation.
II. The combat terrain.
Nassauer Hill which is located in the old front line, offers an excellent panoramic view into the combat terrain. The far reaching, pine
•wooded range of hills with its deeply out ravines and protruding ridge noses gives the entire terrain feature of the Champagne a distinctive picture,,
-2 Initially the assault zone -wJiich is 7 km* (4.5 miles) deep runs beyond the Roman Road in a north and south direction, going from the northerly heights of Arbre Hohe via Hill 197, Waldhohe, Tfllblfsberg, and
Baumberg to the range reaching to Pietz. The only place -where this range is cut is bet-ween Arbre-Hohe and Hill 197, -where three ravines cut through from east to west, namely, the Arbre ravine, Manstein ravine and Courbiere ravine. The Pietz with its 207 meter hill is -without question the most outstanding elevation in the entire sector.
It joins -with the previously mentioned ridge coming from the protruding lettereoke in a south-westerly direction over Muhlenhohe 190 -which is southeast of Perthes.
The five basin-like valleys of Perthes are surrounded by both these ridges and the angle formed by Klitzing-Massiv.
Generally the terrain dominates and provides visibility far into the rear area. The we stern slope of the range of hills running to the south of Arbre Hill -with its protruding noses and depressions is covered by a continuous scrub forest, except for a few scattered and sparsely covered fir groves, the sector is generally barren*
The road net is not dense, various roads leading from the north join at Perthes, from -which in turn several roads go into a southerly direction.
In addition to this, during the dry season, the chalky terrain off the roads is traversable for heavy truck trains. The crossing of the area immediately north and north-roe st of Perthes, -which is covered -with shell craters from previous fightings -will be difficult even though t-wo roads -which are now being used by the French lead across it, one coming from the Waldhohe and the other from the east edge of the artillery woods.
III. The hostile positions.
The hostile trench system is disposed in numerous positions.
-5 The first position runs through numerous trenches one behind the other on the slopes of northernmost Arbre heights, and running in and bet-ween the Arbre, Manstein and Courbiere ravines. The main line of resistance of this position, Tranchee Lafargue, runs along the ridge betTween
Arbre and Manstein ravine; it -was the reverse slope position and possessed the necessary position equipment.
The support line -whose trace ran on the heights immediately south of the Courbiere valley through the communicating trenches, Lamar and Eberfeld Woods ms connected up with the first position by seven serviceable communications trenches* According to previous observations it "was assumed that this line -would be strongly garrisoned and manned by the advanced units of the support battalion* The bulk of the heavy machine guns -were also formerly emplaced in this line -whereas in the forward lines only light machine guns had been observed*
Four communications trenches 2 l/2 km. (lo5 miles) long connected this support line with the second position system -which reached in front of Berthes and Wolfsberg* The second position was organized in depth, and it ms made up from the front line trenches of both sides from the time of the Champagne battles* The numerous large mine craters are traces of the former vigorous mine warfare. It was doubtful if the enemy contem plated a stubborn resistance here. At any rate, ifc must be reckoned that the progress of the attack over the crater field, even though it met with only moderate opposition, would encounter considerable purely material difficulties*
Two kilometers (1*3 miles) in rear of the second position was the third position, a thonoughly modern construction of large strong points completely interconnected with communication trenches. It could be assumed that this position which was considerably in advance of the billets of the reserve battalions, was prepared for a delaying defense.
-4 The zone south of the third position -was also traversed for about
2 kms. (1.3 miles) by old trenches. Behind this position, as far as Tourbe in Sector 5 there -mere no more fortifications. Beyond the Tourbe -was located the great fourth position with the Mont Yvron switch position in construction.
IV. The hostile order of battle.
At the beginning of July an additional French division was inserted in front of the left flank of the First Army and consequently the boundaries of the right adjoining divisions -mere shifted one regimental breadth to the east. It was not definitely known which divisions -were opposite Sector
5. Three weeks ago the 6th Infantry Division was identified through
captured prisoners but in the meantime it could be estimated that it had been replaced. It is believed that it was replaced by the 43d Infantry
Division. This division was rated high as an assault division but during the recent fighting in the Chemin des Dames it had lost 45% of its personnel
so that at present it could be referred to as a division needing rest. Its
sector extends from Arbre Hill to Betterocke.
Three regimental sectors were verified to be in this sector by means of the listening in equipment. From previous experience it could be assumed that each of the three regiments had one battalion in the front line, one battalion in support and one battalion in reserve* From this it could be concluded that opposite the entire Sector 5 at the moment there was at most,
1 French front line battalion with possibly 2 companies in the front line and the third company in the rear trenches of the first position. Also based on previous experience it could be assumed that the support battalion was located in the above mentioned support line and that the reserve battalion was located in billets behind the second or surely the third positions.
-5 That the garrison of the advanced combat zone had recently been augmented rather than diminished could be assumed, since more traffic had been observed during the last few days in the first position, also more energetic machine gun fire was noticeable and a greater number of smoke columns from dugouts -were visible than heretofore.
Daring the past few -weeks the enemy had prepared t-wenty-four artillery positions in Sector 5 which he used only at intervals. At the same time there were never more than ten batteries active against Sector 5 , apparently the enemy made ample use of roving guns. The hostile artillery was defensively organized well in depth; the distance of its firing positions varied from 3 to 7 kms« (1.9 to 4.3 miles).
V* Our own combat dispositions«
To the right of the 88th Infantry Division was the I Bavarian tony Corps -which had been moved in for the attack. The 1st Bavarian Infantry Division was the 88th Division1 s immediate right neighbor. The left neighbor of the 88th Division was the 7th Infantry Division. Both neighboring divisions had missions similar to that of the 88th Division, namely, to serve as a wedge against the dominating high terrain utilizing the first impulse of the attack to drive deep into the hostile positions. Within the division the main effort of the attack was to be made by the right flank, for that purpose the right flank regiment (426th Inf. Regiment) was assigned a narrow combat sector (800 meters wide), -whereas the lef*t flank regiment (353d Inf» Regiment) was assigned a combat sector of 1200 meters breadth. According to the division attack order, both regiments were to utilize tiwo battalions echeloned in depth in the front line and one battalion in reserve each. The 352d Infantry Division -which was the division reserve was to followiin the sector of the right flank regiment, echeloned in depth with its three battalions, one behind the other, the foremost wave to follow Closely upon the last elements of the 426th Infantry Regiment*
-6 To help it carry out its mission the 426th Infantry -was amply
augmented by special shock troop units. T-wo shock troop detachments from the 2d Shock Troop Battalion -were attached to the regiment to be employed by division orders in the event of difficult going, by giving additional
impulse to the front line units at that point. In addition to the infantry
accompanying gun batteries of the 88th F.A. -which -were attached to each
infantry regiment fcnd to the infantry gun battery of the shock troop
detachment, the 426th Infantry Regiment had attached to it the 21st Infantry
Gun Battery*
Also, the 12th Aimored Car Detachment (light tank) under Captain
von Prankenberg was ordered to augment the attack impulse of the regiment.
The armored cars -were instructed to advance against the range of hills
sloping to the south, the capture of -which -would make the penetration of
the second and third hostile positions easier.
The 201st Mountain Machine Gun Battalion whichms assigned to the
division -was used as divisional reserve and brought up behind the 352d
Infantry Regiment.
The artillery distribution was the same as in the previous German
attacks of 1918.
Prior to the attack various batteries -were designated for the "direct
support" artillery group for the division sector under the orders of the
respective artillery commanders with missions to combat hostile infantry
facilities.
The counterbattery artillery for the entire corps sector -was selected for service against the hostile batteries and placed under the immediate
control of Corps Headquarters.
The long range artillery for the entire^ corps sector was selected for firing on long range targets and it also came under the immediate control of the Corps HeadquarterSo The heavy artillery which will be used for firing on billets, railroads, interdiction of roads etc. in the extreme hostile rear areas will be under orders of Army Headquarters.
The 5th Direct Support Artillery Group which was attached to the
88th Division had 36 batteries, the total batteries in the XVI Corps (in additionito the heavy artillery) was 217. In order to increase the fire power of the F.A. batteries these were increased to 6 guns from the army re serve•
After the assault started the following distribution of the divisional artillery was ordered: in addition to the three infantry accompanying batteries the artillery was divided into two groups for combating infantry targets (direct support) and one group to combat infantry targets (direct
support) and one group for counterbattery missions. The first two groups, each composed of several F.A. batteries and one heavy field howitzer were placed under the command of two battalion commanders of the 88th F.A. and attached to the respective assault infantry regiment.. The counterbattery group which was made up of the heavy and t-wo light field howitzer batteries and commanded by the headquarters of the 123d Foot Artillery was attached under the immediate control of the artillery commander. The Artillery
Regimental Commander in compliance with orders established his command post with the Infantry Brigade Commander as his artillery advisor, having the privilege within the brigade to give artillery instructions to the artillary attached to the infantry regiments. He also regulated the support of the counterbattery group whenever communications to division was disrupted and immediate action was required.
The withdrawal of the individual batteries from the barrage and the exact moment of its displacement forward ms accurately regulated.
The divisional engineer units were distributed by platoons to the front line infantry for the negotiating of the shell crater terrain and for the destruction of obstacles, to the infantry accompanying batteries and the trains of the close range weapons.
-8 The 2d Aviation Detachment, 41st Balloon Platoon and the 153d Flash
Ranging Detachment -were attached to the ground reconnaissance organization of the division. The aviation unit received instructions to take over the infantry mission in the attack zone of the division mth half of its ships.
The 275th (A) Aviation unit under the immediate control of the Corps
Headquarters had the artillery aviation mission in the sectors of the 88th
and 7th Infantry Divisions. Army Headquarters regulated the employment of
&hd combat and pursuit aviation. In order to get the maximum and continuous benefit from balloon observation the division provided additional personnel
and horses and special communication connection -with the heavy batteries.
The flash ranging unit -mas kept prepared to move out within a few hours
•when the new line -w^s reached.
"7T. The concentration of our own forces.
Due to the short summer nights and the excellent weather conditions
for air observation, exceptional precautioning regulations had to be
observed and the strictest road discipline enforced in order to make the
concentration of the assault divisions possible*
TUhereas the 33d Reserve Division -which was on the left flank of the
XVT Corps remained generally in its former combat zone, the 228th Infantry
Division -which was on the right flank had to be relieved by the 7th and
88th Infantry Divisions. The 228th Infantry Division then moved into the
second line. Similarly the 30th Infantry Division -which -was the -west neighbor in position had to be relieved by the 1st and 2d Bavarian Infantry
Divisions and as part of the I Bavarian Corps -was moved in the second line.
Behind this the 20th Infantry Division was alerted as Army Reserve.
The relief by the 88th Division was made materially more difficult
since it was necessary to take over and relieve one company frontage from the 30th Infantry Division. Also the relief of the troops of the 228th
Qad 30th Infantry Divisions involved various technicalities -which had to be observed.
-9 The division concentration was completed in three nights. During the night of 12-13 July the division evacuated its rest area in the
vicinity of Ballay and in the same night before dawn, arrived at its new
billeting area, Brieres—St.Morel—Monthors. In order to avoid crossing
and massing during the inarch the division prepared special inarch graphs
and regulations. The billets in the rear area were very cro-wded but
since the troops had been -well rested and the -weather was fair they -were
able to easily bear the inconvenience.
The follomng night the march -was resumed and the advanced infantry
battalions of the division reached the vicinity of Bulgaren Hill—Kolner
ridge and with the rear battalions, trains and echelons, reached the
vicinity of Aure. Simultaneously with this shift of the division, those
elements of the support of the 228th Infantry Division which were located
within the combat zone of the 88th Division -were relieved and moved to the
rear.
A fog which prevailed during the morning hours aided the movement
into the assembly area, TMhen the fog lifted the troops found themselves
in an excellent assembly area in a fir woods and ravines. To make things
better the hostile air activity was neglible.
During the following night the last before the attack, the concentration
in the assembly area was completed. In order to avoid unnecessary marching
by those battalions which on the previous night had advanced the farthest
the battalions in rear passed through them, allowing them to remain in
their areas, and moved into their final assembly positions in the former
German front line positions. The combat troops of the 228th Infantry
Division were not relieved but-remained for the time being in their positions.
By definite coordination and local instructions, steps were taken to prevent
the intermingling and confusing of position and assault troops.
Independent from the remaining troops of the division, especially the
infantry, the field pieces were moved forward; these batteries were divided into three time groups; that is,
-10 the batteries of the 1st time group "were assigned positions -which -were already prepared and provided mth protection against air observation? the batteries of the 2d time group moved into only partially prepared positions but Twhich could find cover in the immediate vicinity of their
firing positions; the batteries of the 3d time group moved into unprepared positions -without the opportunity btf cover from air observation -within its vicinity.
In order to avoid road congestion during the last nights* efforts
•were made to have as many batteries as possible in groups one and t-wo move
into their positions several days prior to the attack and that those in the third group be maintained at a minimum. As a matter of fact the various batteries of the division belonged to groups one and t-vro and none to group three.
VII. The day of the attack.
The 15th of July -was designated as Y-Day (the day for the attack).
1:10 A.M. -was designated as X-hour (for the beginning of the artillery preparation)
4:50 A.M. -was designated as S-hour (for the beginning of the infantry attack and beginning of the rolling barrage)
The assembly of the infantry was to have been completed one hour prior to X-hour, a delay occurred but -was immaterial. Exactly to the second, at
1:10 A.M. the overi/i/helming fire of the artillery and minenwerfers commenced.
As far as the eyes and ears could reach, the horizon quivered and the darkness turned to a blood red glow due to the continuous drum of the dis charged -weapons and the explosion of their projectiles. There -was no further need for fear of surprise from the enemy and vice versa. This fire in definite language expressed our intentions. Any preparations for defense or bringing up of reserves by the enamy, not already completed, -were too late now.
-11 Had the attack been a surprise to the enemy? This question -mas uppermost in the minds of everybody at the moment the attack -was to begin.
Had the enemy been able to secretly complete the construction of the numerous facilities of the Roland position directly behind the front line, increased the railroad service in the rear area, strengthen the villages and billets, accelerate the munitions supply to the hundreds of firing positions at nights by numerous truck trains and establishing dumps over the terrain. Was he able to secretly establish advance parties from his advanced observation posts that -were familiar -with the. hostile terrain?
Without question this could only partially be so* The recent noticeably increase of the nightly hostile harassing fire -which seriously impaired our munitions distribution and caused several small munitions fires indicated that surprise -was not complete• It -was also noticeable during the last few days that south of the second line under observation new hostile batteries appeared whereby the echelonment in depth "was increased indicating a preparation for defense. The listening-in equipment of the buzzer phone service disclosed the use of new code calls, which had not been deciphered. These were directed to certain attack units. The ascent of a new balloon in the direction of la Croix en Champagne was observed.
In addition to the foregoing, the divisions in line had suffered numerous men captured in enemy raids.
In spite of all of this it was not noticeable that great defensive preparations had been made indicating that the enemy was not amre of the great extent of the German offensive. This thought is cooborated in the army directive for the "Reims" attack on 15 July 1918 (Army Headquarters
3Ia No. 7565 op. rs. mob. of 13 July 1918) ifljiich stated, ttThe enemy had not expected an attack on a large scale in the eastern Champagne. His front lines have not been materially reinforced, his artillery is weak even though organized in depth, at present his reserves consist of units untried in battle - Americans, Poles, Italians ..... fl
-12 It oould be as sinned that even though the surprise was not as great
as desired that success was certain because of the intensity and strength
of our attack.
The three hours and forty minutes of artillery preparation for the
attack passed as per schedule, "While the hostile front line trenches -mere
subjected to a bombardment of medium and heavy minenwerfers, the rearward
trenches of the first position, intermediate terrain, strong points, machine
gun nests, support position areas, approach trenches and approach roads and
especially battery positions -were amply subjected to alternating blue cross
gas (sneezing gas) and high explosive fire by our batteries. Heavy flat
trajectory fire was simultaneously directed into the extreme rear areas.
At the outset of our fire preparation the hostile counterbattery fire -was
fairly strong and probably inflicted fair losses in the support positions
but this gradually died i down.
At 4:30 A.M. the infantry on the entire front started their attack.
At the same time the rolling barrage T&tarted moving and the accompanying
guns and the tanks started their forward movement. The wind was not
especially good for a gas attack because soon drifts of gas fumes spread
over our own positions and greatly irritated the eyes, nose and throat.
Also, a fairly strong fog in the early morning hours pre-vented any distant
vision.
Close behind the dense barrage our assault waves moved through the
shell torn terrain of the forward French trenches which were in shambles;
there was no hostile resistance, the trenches were all vacant.
At 5:30 A.M. the Manstein Ravine was crossed and later the troops
reached the main highway Tahure— Souain, Up to this time the hostile
artillery fire was still quite neglible. Even the strong points la Baraque-
Lammerwald (woods), which were supposed to be strongly held, offered but
weak defense. Little resistance was offered by the individual machine gun nests which were easily overcome. As the French had but one thought, that was to get to the rear. According to reports received at
-13 5:45 A.M. the Courbiere Ravine -was crossed -while still following
closely to our rolling barrage.
At this time those batteries of the direct infantry support (Jka)
of the infantry regiments started out their displacement forvvard as per
orders. During this period -when our barrage became materially less dense
the hostile resistance visibly increased* French security elements utilizing
machine guns cleverly distributed over the terrain endeavored to prevent
our riflemen from crossing the intermediate terrain. The poor observation
of the artillery -woods -was advantageous to the enemy. The attack still
progressed and one after the other of the machine gun nests -were eliminated
by our shock troops.
At 6:30 A.M. Hill 197 -was in our possession and shortly thereafter
at
?:00 A.M. Waldhohe was also contested.
The hostile artillery -which up to the present time had fired only
weakly on our advancing infantry now started an energetic fire with medium
and heavy caliber guns. With every step forward by us the hostile artillery
defense became stronger, Soon it was apparent that a strong, entirely
untouched and hitherto unknown artillery presumably behind the third position
opposed us. Our own accompanying guns especially the minenwerfers and
field cannon detachments had not reached their new positions at this time,
while the infantry which had heretofore made uninterrupted progress now
prepared the crossings of the shell hole area for the vehicles which entailed
great difficulties and required hours to accomplish. This resulted in
slowing down the infantry advance considerably and contact with the rolling
barrage was soon lost.
The attack progressed despite the tenacious fighting, costly in lives
against an enemy making excellent use of terrain increased in effectiveness. On the right flank the southern edge of the artillery woods had been crossed, in the center, \mlts of the 353d Regiment, after exhaustive fighting, succeeded in getting ground astride the Waldhohe— Perthes road, penetrating the second position and after a successful thrust -44 gaining a foothold in the village of Perthes itself. During this advance the units of the 353d Infantry Regiment had lost contact -with the units on their left and right. A great amount of booty fell into the hands of these brave units* These troops -mere not quite equal to the task of re pelling the counterattack •which the enemy immediately launched. They vjere entirely surrounded and after heroic fighting -were compelled to surrender. The left flank of the division, in the meantime, advancing abreast of the right flank of the 7th Division over Dynamite Ravine to the second position, ran into heavy infantry and especially heavy artillery resistance. Information -mas received at 8:45 A.M. that the enemy -was launching strong counterattacks from the second position so that the southern portion of the Artillery TJSbods as far as the Tr. de Hambourg had to be relinquished. A somewhat favorable line in front of the center and left flank of the division in front of the second hostile position could be held. A con tinuously increasing hostile artillery fire lay on our front line. Our attack came to a halt close to the second position -which -was heavily occupied by the enemy. During the heavy fighting in the -woods and around the concealed hostile machine guns and due to the intense artillery fire the infantry troops became scattered and suffered heavily. The 352d Infantry Regiment "which -was the division reserve regiment, acted as a puffer and consequently had part of its units take part in the fighting. An immediate rene-wal of the assault against the hostile second position under these circumstances -would have been hopeless. Before such an attempb could take place the units must be reorganized, await the arrival of the artillery, reconnoiter and definitely locate and silence the deeply echeloned and until now unknown strong hostile artillery positions* The division ordered such a systematic attack at 3:00 P.M. and directed that at 2:40 P.M. a surprise fire be placed on the penetration position. This position -was designated by the 353d Regiment as being the eastern slope of Wolfsberg, the area beti/seen this hill and Perthes. -15 Aviation Unit No. 2 -was ordered to reconnoiter both the hostile and our positions and the hostile artillery* To assure success for this attack the 103d Foot Artillery Battalion was placed at their disposal by Corps Headquarters. The 352d Infantry Reginent which had been moved into the front line -mas withdrawn by division orders and moved to the north side of ISaldhohe to be in readiness at the disposal of the division. Corps Headquarters ordered that one infantry regiment with one accompanying battery of the 228th Infantry Division be moved up to the eastern edge of the "Waldhohe to remain there in readiness to repel an eventual counter attack. It was necessary to set back the designated time of attack three hours just before the attack was to begin because of the time required to bring up the artillery and to coordinate the infantry attack with that of the neighboring units. At the same time the artillery preparation was increased to 30 minutes. The Corps Headquarters ordered that the attack be reinforced by counterbattery firing against the hostile batteries by corps artillery and moved one additional artillery regiment plus the brigade headquarters and in all one Field Artillery battalion of the 228th Division into the Lammerwoods. Promptly at the designated hour the systematic attack against the second position was energetically started especially on the left flank. It collapsed due to the especially vigorous hostile artillery frontier fire presumably from guns of heavy caliber* According to estimates by eye witnesses the hostile barrage was at least as strong as our own rolling barrage during the morning. The neighboring divisions on the right and left had the same luck, no where in the hostile second position -were they able to set foot. The German attack had definitely come to a halt. -16 Orders were issued that the regiments dig in along the line that they had reached. The 352d Infantry Regiment moved one battalion behind each of the front line regiments. The 3d Battalion remained behind Waldhohe. Under cover of darkness the batteries which had remained behind -were moved up and a box barrage was organized in front of the outpost line. Orders •were given that all arms echelon as much in depth as possible during the night and reestablish good contact with the neighboring units. A corps order with similar instructions arrived at midnightj in addition to the 103d Foot Artillery Battalion the division had the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 247th Field Artillery attached for its disposal. VIII. Combat results. Based on instructions from higher headquarters Corps Headquarters ordered Early on the morning of 16 July that not only would the attack be energetically received but additional offensive preparations would also be made. The fighting on 15 July indicated that the enemy had not been surprised. The enemy had solved in a clever -way with his defense how to nullify our new offensive methods* The annihilating fire of our minenwerfer and artillery against the hostile advanced zone forced them to evacuate their first position and move back into the second position where our fire preparation had less hits and they were able to organize a defense in depth especially with artillery •which had not been identified nor participated in the attack strong enough to bring the German attack to a dead halt* In spite of this,excellent tactical successes were achieved. The hostile companies which had been delegated to put up a stiff resistance in the intermediate terrain to possibly delay our attack were overrun by the impetuousness of our attack, lost contact with the battalions to their rear and were taken prisoners by us. -17 The enemy in his hurry -was unable to completely evacuate the entire first position zone* Dozens of machine guns, many accompanying guns, and miscellaneous close range weapons and engineer equipment -were included in the booty. Also the amount of terrain captured -was not insignificant. Within a few hours the division in its small combat zone had recaptured six square kilometers of terrain which the French had captured, foot by foot, with severe losses, requiring months of heavy fighting in the previous Champagne battles. Considering the exact amount of booty as well as our own casualties the comparison is favorable. IX* The fighting in the outpost area. Simultaneously with the organization of the defense and the corresponding new echelonment in depth a tenacious fight started in the outpost zone. Before and the 16th of July itself passed fairly quiet. Only strong hostile artillery fire, without respite, lay on our outpost area, rear area and roads of approach. During the evening of 16 July a hostile patrol cautiously moved to our outpost line but was driven back by hand grenades. During the night of 17 July two hostile raids against the sector of the 426th Infantry Regiment were made, the last one by about two enemy companies. These were repulsed and one severely wounded prisoner fell into our hands. On the morning of the 18th the enemy endeavored to drive a vjedge into the outpost line where it connected up with the 1st Bavarian Infantry Division. These attempts were repulsed by counterattacks by our support units. -18 From about noon on, following a severe artillery preparation, seven hostile attacks, one after the other, -were made against the left flank of the division. Closely following the withdrawal of our advanced outposts a vigorous close range fight took place in the outpost area of the 353d Infantry Division. Eventually our shock troops after inflicting severe losses to the enemy, succeeded in recovering our original outpost line. Seven prisoners of the 31st French Chasseurs were captured this date. During the nights of 19-20 July and 20-21 July, in compliance with orders, the division took over the entire sector of the 1st Bavarian Infantry Division (a sector about 2 km. wide). In order to take over this sector it was necessary to utilize the 352d Infantry Regiment, the former reserve regiment, moving it into the new right flank. Whereas the 352d and 353d Regiments have but one battalion in the front lines, the 426th Infantry Regiment has tvx> battalions. This relief and great expansion of the front of the division sector, in face of the continuous fighting in the outpost area by a strong alert enemy made unusual demands on the greatly fatigued troops. The relief and taking ovei? the new sector was accomplished according to the plans and by using all precautionary means the enemy was unaware of the weakness of the German front* No German was taken prisoner during this procedure. In the meantime the outpost area south of Waldhohe was bitterly sontested. During the following days the enemy by consistent pressure succeeded in advancing his outposts as far as the intersection of the York and Dachet trenches. A counter raid by the 353d Infantry Regiment on the night of 21 July was very successful. Our outposts were advanced back to their former line; seven prisoners and four light machine guns and other weapons were brought back as booty. Immediately the next morning, hostile counterattacks were launched but were repelled by our rifle and grenade fire. After a strong artillery preparation the enemy launched a counter raid the following night regaining possession of the trench intersection. After an immediate counterattack of ours was repulsed, we were successful in our second attempt supported by artillery preparation we regained a foothold -19 in the York trench; the trench intersection itself remained in enemy possession* At 9:00 P.M., 24 July, mth artillery support, a rene-wed attack -was made by our shock troops to drive the enemy out of the trench intersection. This Twas but a temporary success because the enemy in turn supported by artillery put on a counterattack by -which they forced us out of the captured line back to our departure position. Various observations (especially noted in the hostile buzzerphone service and hostile artillery disposition) indicated that further attacks could be expected on the front of the 88th Infantry Division* on the night before or on the morning of the 26th of July, therefore all hostile roads of approach were subjected to energetic harassing and interdiction fire by ' our medium field pieces throughout the night until da-ron. After midnight -we subjected a hostile artillery nest, -which had just completed its registration fire, Perthes and parts of the second hostile position to a mustard gas shelling. About 4:00 A.M. our batteries subjected the alleged hostile assembly areas to three -waves of annihilation fire. Folio-wing this the hostile counterbattery fire against our guns subsided but shortly beforetfjQOA.M . a severe hostile artillery fire from about 20 batteries dropped on the German front line trenches from south of Waldhohe as far south of Fritschberg and continued iwith great intensity until 8:05 A.M. At 7:00 A.M. under the protection of this fire, strong enemy shock troops attack at the junction of the 88th Division and the 7th Division, driving the outposts of both divisions back more than 100 meters despite tenacious resistance. The contemplated systematic evacuation of the outpost area -was only partially accomplished due to the severe hostile artillery fire. -20 At 8:05 P.M. the 353d Infantry Regiment started an attack to regain the outpost area. Our shock troops were temporarily successful in pene trating the front line occupied by the enemy but -were unable to retain this position due to the effective hostile annihilation fire and -were forced back to their departure positions. Raids during the night by three hostile patrols against the outposts of the 426th and 352d Infantry Regiments were repulsed by hand grenade and rifle fire. On the night of 28-29 July the 353d Infantry Regiment, because of casualties and fatigue suffered in the recent offensive and outpost fighting, exchanged sectors -with the 352d Infantry Regiment. At 4:30 A.M., 30 July, the 7th Infantry Division engaged in a successful attack on that position of the outpost area still held by the enemy. On the left flank of the 352d Infantry Regiment, -where it joinfcd up -with the 7th Infantry Division, the German outposts -were again advanced and during this formrd movement into the outpost area, captured one light French machine gun. At 7:30 A.M., 1 August a hostile attack -was nipped in the bud by the wall directed annihilation fire of our batteries. On the afternoon of 1 August the 352d Infantry Regiment started a systematic counterattack to improve its outpost area -which had gotten too narrow. Following a short artillery preparation the shock troops of the 1st Battalion of the 352d Infantry Regiment moved to the attack against the hostile outposts and defensive facilities in the York trench and its four approach trenches, B. Duchet, Regnault, Chardoillet and Mangenot. These had been under the observed fire of our mortars, heavy field howitzers and minemwerfers for days. The enemy offered a tenacious resistance and by -21 immediate energetic barrage endeavored to prevent our shock troops from advancing. On the right flank the shock troops dashed from the southern slope of Waldhohe to the south; three hostile counterattacks prevented our troops from holding the ground gained at this point. In the center and on the left flank our shock troops crossed the Dynamit-Ravine, pressed on "beyond the York trench and ascended the ridge to the south. The Mangenot, Chardoillet and Regnault trenches -were rolled back for more than 100 meters depth and our outposts reestablished behind barricades -which were erected. The enemy, it was observed, suffered heavy losses; four were captured and numerous dead of the 149th Infantry Regiment remained in our hands* An apparent lull followed these wall planned and coordinated attacks by all weapons by which our outpost area" at the vital points was expanded from 800 meters to 300 more in depth. During this severe fighting of several weeks the enemy had suffered heavy losses in his efforts to retrieve the terrain taken by us on the 15th of July. On August 6 following a brilliant sortie, we managed to regain a firm foothold on the York trench at the junction of the Duchet trench. This was accomplished while the enemy temporarily evacuated during some of our well placed artillery fire. At the conclusion of this fighting the division received letters of commendation from the Army Group Commander, His Imperial Highness the German Crown Prince, In addition to this, commendations were received from the Commanding General and the Corps Commander, -22 Army Headquarters Hdqrs. 1 August 1918 Army Group of German Crowi Prince Commnde r-in-Chie f Army Order As reported to me, the brave 88th Infantry Division also performed exceptional services in the recent battles and in an outstanding manner performed its obligations, I -wish to express my thanks to the Division and fullest appreciation for this and feel assured that in the oncoming battles the Division -will be loyal to the men as before to its King and Fatherland. ('Signed) WILHELM Crown Prince of the German Empire and Prussia, Our oi/m Casualtie s During the Champagne offensive of 16-31 July 1918 the division suffered casualties of 92 officers and 2949 NCOs and men. Of these 21 officers and 305 NCOs and men sealed their loyalty to the Emperor and Empire by death on the battlefield. The officers "who died the heroic death: Lieut. Ahlbach, Res. Co, Comdr. Light MG Co. 1st Bn, 353d Inf. n Battenberg, Res. w 12th Co. 1st Bn, 426th Inf. n Keller, Res. " 4th Co., 1st Bn, 426th Inf. 11 Rentrop, Res. " 5th Co., 1st Bn, 353d Inf. !t Weingand, Res. " 2d Co., 1st Bn, 426th Inf. w Wendt, Res. ft 2d MG Co., 1st Bn, 353d Inf. " Gutt, Res, Adjutant 123d Foot Art. Bn. 11 Fuhrmann, Res. Company Off. 11th Co., 1st Bn, 352d Inf. " Kampmann, Res, " 6th Co., 1st Bn, 353d Inf. • Kohler, Res. !l 1st Co., 1st Bn, 353d Inf. " Thai, Res. * ^2th Co., 1st Bn, 352d Inf. -23 Lieut. Zimmermann, Land-wehr Orderly Officer 1st Co., 1st Bn, 353d Inf. w Haubold, Res. Battery Officer 5th Bat., 45th P.A. " Met lack, Res, 7th Bat., 247th F.A. Commissioned W.O. Schebera 7th Bat., 88th F.£. n l! T/Vutke Division H.Ps. Asst. Surgeon Esser Bn. Surgeon 2d Bn., 353d Inf. Landsturm male nurse Pelz Asst. Surgeon 3d Bn, 426th Inf. Acting Officer Bluschke Company Offieer ©fch Co., 353d Inf. Acting Officer Hartmann Company Officer 4th Co., 9th Labor Bn. 11 " Schladt 8th Co., 426th Inf. During the July 1918 Champagne fighting the division suffered 470 horse casualties of -which 233 -were dead. Divisional Booty In the Champagne fighting of July 15 - August 1, 1918 units of the division took the folio-wing number of prisoners and booty* HO officers, one of idiom -was a major, 475 UCOs and men of the 149th and 158th Infantry Regiments, 1st and 31st Chasseur Battalions of the 43d Infantry Division and the 2d Chasseur Battalion of the 46th Infantry Division, 30 Heavy machine guns, 19 light machine guns, 7 automatic rifles 7 grenade thro-roers 1 gas projector 4 trench cannons 1 7.5 cm field piece many thousand rounds of shell munitions for trench cannon, infantry and machine guns hundreds of land and rifle grenades numerous pistols, pyrotechnic rockets, equipment articles and other equipage -24 3 1/4 km. of copper cable, also 1 Engineer park containing 25 ton zinc covered and iron wire 570 -wooden obstacle pickets 120 Chevaux de Frize 3 rolls mesh -wire 100 trench "duck" boards 21 chests of 100 kilogram staple nails each 3 rolls tar paper 70,000 rounds infantry ammunition, 2,000 machine gun ammunition 2200 hand grenades 1 rapid fire grenade thrower 2000 screws and nuts 20 pieces of fuse with detonating caps 120 spades and mattock picks 100 sandbags 70 wood shoes with oilcloth uppers 220 signal shells of various colors 13 chests of 50 flares each. The division made the following report on July 29th relative to its combat experiences which attached to the Army Group of the German Crown Prince. I. The preparations. (l) Troops which are to be used for big offensive must be rested and should not be taken directly from position warfare prior to their use in open warfare - 14 days would suffice to give the required snap and energy for open warfare to a division after it had received a full complement of replacements or for the transition from position to open warfare. -25 (2) From the very beginning of the 14 day period the entire personnel and all organic units of the division and attached units must be present for the instruction rehearsing and combined exercises. (3) Assault divisions should within the realm of possibility, be organically equipped with the latest observation units: aviation, balloon, mobile flash and sound ranging units and these should remain with i t even when the division is withdrawn from ah offensive and moved to a rest area. This would make possible modernly superior artillery action and increased artillery efficiency which is the foundation of a successful combat. Such fundamental organization and equipment would repay itself a thousand fold. (4) Efforts to regulate even the smallest details prior to an attack must not lead to a condition in which the troops are swamped with detailed orders regarding unimportant things to the expense of (a) training (b) reconnaissance of terrain and facilities. The divisions received numerous orders pertaining to the offensive as late as 24 hours, 48 hours prior to the time of the attack -which naturally were not practical nor workable for the front lines to obey. There are a few important and basic things for which instructions could be given well in advance and not to wait until the last tivo days. These should not be altered for example battery positions, distribution of targets, rolling barrage. General instructions and orders sihould be issued in large edition with definite instructions that they be distributed through the message center and that supplementary orders would not follow all details must be left to the lower units to -work out. -26 (5) It has been proven best that troops should be provided with a list of weapons, munitions, equipment, clothing, rations, etc., required for open mrfare before they start their move out of the trenches* Basically the equipment should be the minimum, but with full complement of horses. The infantry should retain its pack but in summer its contents should be kept to the minimum to avoid fatigue. II. The battles. (1) In general lessons learned to date. Success depends on surprise and clockwork execution right up to the moment of transition from position warfare to mofrile warfare. Both of these Basic factors were lacking on 15 July and (a) Surprise was lackingi the enemy had been informed. (b) The enemy frustrated attempts for a clock like execution of the plans by his especially smart defensive measures, evasion preparation and evacuation of more than 1 kilometer in depth of outpost area. Flexibility of attack and a freedom to make decisions by lo-wer units could not be developed or not be made. Everything had been previously determined, ordered and centralized. Even the division had no means available from it s own units to be used against the hostile artillery which was distributed in depth. In that manner success slipped from our hands. (2) Artillery combat experiences. The enemy had only partially succeeded in his intentions of evasion and echelonment in depth of his infantry and supporting weapons. In fact, his utilization of artillery, its distribution and fire effect alone stopped the German attack. -27 The artillery preparatory fire can be appreciably shortened, in fact, confined to a minimum. Any systematic artillery preparation preceding an attack •would be useless -when an enemy evades by withdra-wal. It -would have been possible to start the attack simultaneously -with the first shot fired by the artillery (similar to patrol or shock troop raids). It -would be much better to take the conservative half--way measure,that is, after a short burst of fire (10 - 15 minutes) to start the infantry attack. (3) Even though the rolling barrage may have been useful in some instance, it did not meet the requirements here or in the attack of 2 March in -which this division participated. On 15 July the infantry kept up -with the rolling barrage until it was subjected to the hostile artillery fire in front of the second position. The front infantry -wave succeeded -without effort to penetrate the hostile second position -without the help of the accompanying and mobile artillery and minenwerfers. It -worked in careful cooperation -with the shock troops, light machine guns, and light minenwerfers. The -waves in rear, when subjected to the effective hostile barrage fire especially of medium and heavy calibers ran back and forth looking for cover, mising units and losing contact to the front -while the front -waves -which had energetically advanced became the booty of the enemy. Even our rolling barrage moves hither and yon at this period. -28 "When an enemy sacrifices a depth of several kilometers of his outpost area by timely evacuation^ it would be useless expenditure to use a rolling barrage as heretofore. The rolling barrage should only consist of light and heavy calibers from special artillery and should go as far as the next hostile main line of resistance, especially here where artillery resistance becomes noticeable. Here the barrage should immediately stop because no more of the assault infantry can keep up with it. Svery additional shot now would be a waste of ammunition. During this first pliase of the attack the known, hostile positions and installations in rear should simultaneously be subjected to shifting, unpatterned fire enclosing this area. Firing on far distant targets is not economical because at the extreme ranges the barrage is too thin and not suitable to accurate checking here as in mobile mrfare; the artillery must •work in close cooperation with the infantry. The artillery fire conducted and observed by ourselves must fall on the hostile lines of resistance and intermediate points over -which the infantry attack must pass. It is essential that those batteries which initially had fired at the extreme ranges without observation or flexibility until the barrage ended be moved up as soon as possible to get into profitable range for firing. The rolling barrage is only an idea and fct present serves only in the very initial stages because after that it fails to roll. (4) As a rule the division artillery should move with the infantry and not on previously designated roads (supply and roads for trains) but at such place where the hostile fire permits. Pre parations of the greatest possible number of approach roads as far as our own positions is naturally necessary. -29 On the 15th of July the displacement fonward was pre-rented by the hostile artillery -which dominated the supply roads and by its interdiction fire had destroyed many vehicles. The shambles of broken equipment and dead horses blocked the roads. Because of this the artillery and the mounted aiaxiliary -weapons -were unable to keep up -with the infantry. The lack of preparation for the crossing by the supply trains over the shell torn terrain, the unrepaired supply roads and the phlegmatic assistance and support of the attached engineers "was also responsible for the delay. In spite of these obstacles here and there the accompanying artillery and mobile division artillery were able to maintain their dash and energy. Another great delaying factor -was the effective unchecked hostile artillery. (5) Summary. As a resume of the foregoing i t can be said that our attack •was unquestionably stopped by the efficiency of the unknown, unchallenged strong hostile artillery -which was far back, echeloned in depth and out of range of our definitely emplaced artillery (most of which was that assigned counterbattery missions), This experience therefore demands a change . We must plan considering the following: (a) We cannot anticipate securing complete surprise in the future, especially against an alert and prepared enemy. (b) Our own preparatory fire must be shorter, and inmost cases, extemporfe more like the type used in mobile warfare, (c) From the front,positions should be permitted all possible mobility and maneuver space in their development to fit their own attack possibilities to the hostile defensive possibilities - here also there should be no premature dis positions. -30 (d) The successful smashing counterbattery fire, should not be delivered prior to the attack but should start -with the attack because it is at this phase -when the enemy shows his hand and exposes his defensive artillery. In the later phase of the attack the rapid achievement of a smashing fire superiority added to the above can be considered the require ments for the success for a breakthrough attack. (Penetration) Closely correlated mth this are the underlying questions: Artillery preparation Artillery barrage Displacement formrd of divisional artillery and transportation as pertaining to the success of the infantry attack itself, •which follows correct procedure at present. (6) The problem of the development of the necessary artillery superiority can be solired as follows: (a) By the use of ample medium and heavy flat trajectory artillery with great range of fire. This will provide the fire superiority. (b) But the forward displacement should start at the beginning of the infantry attack or as soon thereafter as possible, as far f ox-ward as the infantry line of departure. (c) By the organization of an observation system which can quickly locate new hostile artillery as it appears in the battle and effectively combat this hostile artillery with modern auxiliary weapons. -31 (d) By preparations in accordance mth Paragraph I: By having the division artillery almys organically with aviation, "balloons and mobile flash and sound ranging equipment. (e) By, instead of having a rolling barrage, there should be a continuous flow of artillery forward in such a manner that all the counterbattery artillery -would not remain as heretofore in a definite vicinity or position, but remain either attached to the bulk of the division or artillery group which is in moTOment forward, (7) In the initial stages of a combat the counterbattery firing does not take into consideration nor will it be diverted to assist the infantry in its fight for strong points and machine gunr.nests in the intermediate terrain. The infantry can only subdue the hostile machine guns and machine gun nests -when the hostile batteries have been silenced by the counterbattery fire. In the training for this the infantry accomplished much, so -well in fact, that considering the effect of the hostile artillery it was excellent and had it not been for the hostile artillery it -would ha-re completely solved its mission. It is understood that the infantry must also make similar preparations in their methods of combatting machine guns and nests of resistance in future fighting. Very little change in training will be required for this. To accomplish this, not only the infantry accompanying guns but the infantry as wsll as the mobile divisional artillery must learn how to fight in closett cooperation with each other. -32 It is advantageous to hold an attack in check where the hostile artillery resistance must first be reduced* The avoiding of easy objectives after notifying our artillery to place it under fire is as desirable as is the immediate resumption of the attack impulse -when the artillery had paved the -way or the hostile artillery fire had been confined, diminished or silenced. At the moment our infantry relieved from the pressure on its front must again resume its forward movement and notify its artillery immediately of its intentions. The infantry must be acquainted with the use of and have confidence in pyrotechnic, visual light (blinker) and -wireless communication. It should never -wait until the commanders of higher units step in and make the arrangements for the artillery preparation, and tell them "when and -where to attack. If it waits for instructions from above, many hours represents valuable time lost, the opportune moment lost. The higher command should not resume the regulation of the details until the new artillery assembly as scheduled has been completed and the newly coordinated attack has started. (8) From this experience the infantry and artillery with a few exceptions had not been sufficiently trained in crossing the shell torn terrain in the meagre time available. The purely physical preparedness of both, especially the transportation of the artillery and infantry must be materially raised. This phase of training must be drilled and rehearsed. Both arms must be able to negotiate the sherll torn terrain without depending on the help of attached engineers. Here as in so many other cases, the engineers were intended to work as flunkies. The assistance is good and must be retained in their proper missions. -33 The troops (artillery and infantry) must be educated and inoculated with the pride and knowledge that it is their responsibility to be able to quickly cross tjie shell torn terrain without outside aid. (9) Even though much more could be desired of the communication service within the division much was accomplished and learned in the interim between their training and organization with the latest communication equipment and its employment in action. Even though the telephone was disrupted by shell fire many times during the fighting, still there always was some form of com munication available to the front* Visual light messages, the conversation from the front lines were relayed to the division in 45 minutes which speaks very highly for this service. It has been demonstrated that in the present day combat communication between the commander and his troops should never be broken* The systematic installation and use of all available communication facilities would pre-vent such disruption. (10) The division has no definite suggestions or recommendations to make for the employment of tanks at this time. The statement or participants in the combat indicate that: although the tanks were able to negotiate our trenches and move forward over the conditions similar to that of the infantry, they too were sacrificed and stopped by the hostile artillery in front of the second position, despite their dash to pave the way for the artillery* -34 Division Headquarters, 7 August 1918 von Beczwarzowsky, Major General and Division Commander. From 21 July to 2 August 1918 The description and conclusion of the lively outpost combat contained in the foregoing combat report has been received. The division succeeded in establishing itself'in its new sector and prepare it defensively. In addition to the reconstruction of the position, designating the various main lines of resistance the infantry and artillery in conformance -with the latest ideas echeloned themselves in depth. The echelonment in depth of the machine guns, the antitank -weapons and minenwerfers required careful thought and orders for compliance •with the plan. Efforts -mere made and every regiment except the 426th Infantry Regiment immediately disposed themselves -with one battalion in the front line, one battalion in support and one battalion in reserve. In the 426th Infantry Regiment there were still tvro battalions in the front line. The battalions in the front line were located in the first main line of resistance and outpost area; the support and reserve battalions •were located in the terrain between the first main line of resistance and the second position. The defense of the second main line of resistance to which the troops will withdraw should the enemy penetrate the first position, will be the responsibility of Captain Schneevoigt, the Company Commander of the 249th Engineer Company. The following units are at his disposal as security troops: 2d Company 8th Land-wehr Engineer Battalion, 2d Company Rosenheim Landsturm Battalion and 2d Company 18th Landsturm Engineers, 201st Mountain Machine Gun Detachment and 1/2 machine gun company of the reserve battalions of the 353d Infantry Regijnent and 352d Infantry Regimentf in addition to the foregoing he has the 249th Engineer Company and the 3d Company 33d Reserve Engineers for a rese-rve. -35 The special units such as the 21st Infantry Gun Battery, the 12th Tank Battalion and the shock troop units, -which had been attached to the division, all moved back as far as the 201st Mountain Machine Gun Battalion position* "When the division reverted back to position -warfare it received numerous batteries of the field and foot artillery units so that on 23 JuJ.y i t had 26 light and 12 heavy batteries at its disposal, 3 August 1918 On the 2d of August the enemy subjected Dynamite Ravine and Elephant Woods to a gas shelling from 2*45 A.M. to 4:15 A.M., apparently as a reprisal for the successful raid on the 1st of August -which recaptured the 352d Infantry Regiment's outpost area. Our personnel considered the gas as harmless and prematurely removed their masks as they considered that the gas had been neutralized by the rain -which started. The enemy happened to have used mustard gas -with the result that during the course of the day, 1 officer and 98 men of the 352d Infantry Regiment became sick. At 10s00 A»M. on the 1st of August an enemy aviator shot do*wn our turo observation balloons Nos. 52 and 53j both observers -were saved. Well directed antiaircraft fire forced the enemy plane dowi behind the German lines north of Bohmer Hill. Casualties - 1 man -wounded Hostile artillery activity: about 200 rounds. War Diary 176th Infantry Brigade 1 July 1918 to 31 July 1918 Extracted: War diary from July 15 to July 31, 1918. Source b:) 15 July 1918 The artillery preparation for the contemplated offensive started at 1:10 A*M. in compliance -with Par. 3-20 of the attack plans. -36 At 4:30 A.M. the 426th and 353d Infantry Regiments moved to the attack -while the 352d Infantry Regiment folio-wed as the reserve regiment. At 6:30 A.M. the 426th Infantry Regiment reported from Arbre Hill that they -would continue the attack. At 7:30 A.M. the 353d Infantry Regiment reported that the regiment had fought its my across mid Hill and was now moving against the 2d French position. At 7:40 A.M. the 426th Infantry reported that the reserve had reached Hill 197 at 7:10 A.M. At the same time the 393d Infantry Regiment, which was advancing on the left of the brigade, reported that it moved its command post forward to 2156. At 7:55 A.M. the right reconnaissance patrol reported that Hill 197 and the Artillery Iflbod have been captured and our infantry is advancing against the hostile second position. At 8:00 A.M. the left reconnaissance patrol reported that at 7:30 A.M. Waldhohe (hill) 188 had been captured and our infantry at that point was advancing against the hostile second position. At 8:56 A.M. the 353d Infantry Regiment reported that the regimental headquarters had been located in B. Duchet east of Waldhohe since 7:30 A.M. and that the regiment had fought its way over the Waldhohe about 7:00 A.M. and had captured 159 prisoners from the 149th French Infantry and 31st Chasseur Battalion. The attack of the 2d Battalion, 353d Infantry Regiment came to a halt due to the strong resistance of hostile machine gunsj the 1st Bn., 353d Infantry Regiment lay with three companies in the York trench •while one company was sent to the assistance of the 2d Battalion. The infantry accompanying guns and minenwerfers were not available nor was there any communications with the direct support artillery. The regiment desires artillery support against the hostile position northwest of Perthes. The tank which advanced against Waldhohe has been put out of action. -37 According to a report from the 352d Infantry Regiment, that regiment had stopped in front of the hostile second position T/vhere it -was subjected to severe hostile counter artillery action and fire from many machine gun nests. The German artillery had not gotten into action because the accompanying guns and minen-werfers had not been able to keep up. To the left the situation had not been clarified. At 10:00 A.M. the 426th Infantry reported that the Artillery Woods lay under heavy hostile artillery fire. The front line (3d Bn., plus the 3d and 4th Companies -which -wefce attached to it) lay in front of Tranchee de Hambourg. Here also the enemy is supposed to have great machine gun strength. Here also, -with the 426th Infantry, the accompanying guns and auxiliary weapons -were unable to keep up. According to a report from the 352d Infantry a contact patrol from that regiment to the right neighboring division verified that the 2d Battalion 2d Bavarian Infantry Regiment is located in the hostile trench south of Camp 43 Map grid. 2453 (l:25,000) -where the enemy is offering tenacious resistance. The attack -will be resumed after a short artillery and minenwerfer preparation. In order to resume the attack the 12th Company, 2d Bavarian Infantry Regiment and the 2d Battalion 1st Bavarian Infantry Regiment -will move into the line to the right of the 426th Infantry Regiment. At 10:55 A.M. the 353d Infantry reported the capture of a company commander of the 31st Company of the 31st French Chasseur Battalion, wouthwest of Wolfsbprg. The prisoner stated that the French had been prepared for our attack for 14 days and knew definitely that our attack •would take place today. According to the prisoner's statement the enemy strong artillery and sufficient men available. He also informed us of the presence of Americans in the reserve. Units of the 8t$i Company, 353d Infantry had forced their my beyond the *erthes-Souain Road south of Arbrehohe but -were forced back north of the road by a hostile counterattack. -38 At 11:35 A.M. the 352d Infantry Regiment reported that the enemy is delivering heavy machine gun fire from his second position and delivering a flanking fire from the southwest using heavy batteries. The 1st Battalion 352d Infantry -with two weak companies and the 3d Battalion, 352d Infantry •with about 3 1/2 companies, are laying in some trenches running north from Hill 197. The regiment is urgently requesting that the heavy hostile batteries delivering flanking fire be Silenced. At 12:00 Noon Lieut, Rick, 10th Mounted Jagers, reported that the 426th Infantry is located in line along the southern edge of the Artillery Woods and in the Hamburger trench. Heavy machine gun fire from the second position, units intermingled. Artillery preparatory fire appears hecessary. The 353d Infantry Regiment is located approximately in the line of the York Trench at present. Contact to the left has not been established. The Brigade Headquarters, in the meantime, moved to Tranchee Jivet on the Souain—Tahure road and from this point ordered assembly of all units of other regiments found in that sector which in turn were to be used as reserve detachments. The attack would be resumed with the re organized units. The artillery was instructed to assist in every manner in the capbure of the second position. According to reports from the right Souain had been captured. The following Division Order was then issuedi (1) The attack of the division has been stopped in front of the hostile second position. (2) The enemy is holding the strongly defended position. (3) Following a planned artillery preparatory fire, 2:40 P.M. to 3:00 P.M., the 176th Infantry Division will attack the hostile second position at 3:00 P.M. -39 At present our front lines are located in the line, Hamburger trench—York trench. Contact with the units on the right along the same line; contact to the left is uncertain at present. (4) The exact verification of our own front lines will be conducted by all means available in order to gain contact with the 393d Infantry on our left, (5) The 2d Aviation Unit vhioh is now attached to the division is sending one infantry reconnaissance plane for this mission and its artillery reconnaissance planes are locateing the hostile battery positions in the S.W. which have given the most trouble. Communication between the infantry and artillery in the front lines must be established. (6) The regimental second line of Plato is made up from the available units from Hill 197 and will be reorganized, using all material that can be collected and the regiment will then be placed at the disposal of the division in an assembly area north of Waldhohe. (7) The attack will be made with the principal effort on the left. Point of penetration will be the eastern slope of Wolfberg between this hill and Perthes. Penetration will be made by Regiment von Thauvenay. (8) The 7th Infantry Division will breakthrough the hostile second position simultaneously with its right regiment immediately east of Perthes, driving in the direction of MuElenhohe (Hill 190). (9) The artillery commander of the 103d Battalion F.A. and other remaining units which will be attached to the 3d Direct Infantry Support Artillery (Mortar batteries) will support the new infantry attack with a strong concentrated surprise fire on the point of penetration at 2:40 P.M. He will combat the hostile artillery, within range, southwest of Tllblfsberg and remain in communication with the counter- battery artillery and long range artillery which will combat the hostile heavy artillery in the vicinity of Suippe. -40 At 3:00 P.M., simultaneous with the infantry attack, the fire of the combined friendly artillery will be shifted 400 meters fonward and thence move forward 200 meters every 8 minutes similar to a rolling barrage• (10) The division headquarters will remain for the time being at the tunnel and will move to the Nassauerhohe (Hill) when the infantry attack starts. The Brigade has ordered as follows: (1) The attack will be carried out as ordered in division order No. 2* (2) Von Gerlach's Regiment must provide security for its own right flank. Von Thauvenay's Regiment must provide contact and communication to the left and report when this has been done. (3) Von Platofs Regiment will place itself in readiness as Division Reserve on the Waldhohe (Hill) in the sector of von Thauvenay's Regiment with one battalion on the light flank on the right boundary of the regiment; to the left of this battalion there were two battalions, one behind the other just west of the Waldhohe—Perthes road, placed there to exploit the thrust at this point. At 2:10 P.M. the 353d Infantry oriented the situation as follows: Perthes was captured this morning by the 8th and 10th Companies, 353d Infantry but were unable to hold it. At present the 2d and 3d Battalions which have intermingled, are laying about 500 meters north of the hostile second position. The left flank is located about 300 miles south of the letter "D" of Dynamite Ravine on the mapi the right flank is abreast of the left flank, is located directly east of the TSaldhohe—Perthes road. Echeloned to the right rear thereof is the 1st Battalion 426th Infantry. Artillery support from the accompanying guns or direct infantry support guns firing from the gap between the right flank of the 353d Infantry and the Battalion -41 of the 426th Infantry iwhioh is echeloned in rear of the 353d Infantry, will be able to effectively combat the hostile machine gun nests. Also, the employment of the 1st Battalion, 353d Infantry, •without any previous artillery preparation, in an attack against the hostile position, would have little chance of success* At present the 1st Battalion, 353d Infantry is located in the trench running east and wast 300 meters south of Waldhohe. Every movement by the front line is stopped by sharp artillery and machine gun fire. The 353d Infantry Regiment is organized for the attack. Despite its preparedness the 353d Infantry requests that prior to the attack it be furnished an artillery preparation and that the Battalion of the 426th Infantry located in rear of the right flank of the 353d Infantry be moved forward. Word has just been received that the batteries of the 88th located in Ityn amite Ravine -were out of ammunition. Casualtiest 2 officers -wounded, 3 officers missing in addition to numerous platoon commanders, NcOs and enlisted men. Booty: 215 prisoners from the French 149th Infantry Regiment, Chasseur Battalions, 31, 50 and 1 -which include one company commander. A division order of 3:55 P.M. has postponed the attack on the second position three hours. Attacking simultaneously mth the division are the 1st Bavarian Infantry Division on the right and the 7th Infantry Mvision on the left, Trchich had just captured the north slope of Muhlenhohe southeast of Perthes and also Pistolenhohe. The preparatory fire should continue;.from 5:30 to 6:00 PoM. The brigade further directs that: (l) The attack against the hostile second position -will be continued tonight by our right neighbor division abreast of us and by our lefi; neighbor division from the northern slope of luhlenhohe. -42 (2) The hour of attack for Von Beczwarcowskyts Division is 6:00 P.M. (not 6:30 P.M.) (3) The accompanying artillery-will participate ik the artillery preparatory fire, the medium and light minem/verfers -will be employed by the regiments at the contemplated point of penetration of the hostile position. (4) The regiments will attack in their respective sectors. Von Thauvenay's Regiment mil attack in cooperation -with Bosenberg's Battalion -which is to move up until abreast of the regiment. Von Thauvenay's Regiment will attack with its left flank (1st Bn., 353d Inf.) east of Arbrehohe along the Waldhohe—Perthes road. Von Plato's Regiment will follow the attack as ordered and with his front battalions will push for-ward the left flank of the attack of the 2d Battalion, 426th Infantry east of Arbrehohe. (5) Brigade command post will be located south of Hill 197 on the north slope of Waldhohe. Boseriberg's Battalion must first carry his attack forward until abreast of Kuntze's right flank. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 353d Infantry will then attack front ally from the designated line while Demuth's Battalion will carry out an enveloping attack on the left. The regiment urgently requests that the 393d Infantry Regiment which was reported as having its right flank in grid square 2556,, 100 meters south of blue point 1, 100 meters south of blue point X (500 Meters east of l) beyond blue point p., be ordered forward to support Demuth's Battalion and assist in the attack on that side. -43 At 6:25 P.M. Lt. Kaspurm, the liaison officer of the 382d Infantry reported that his regiment in column, 1st, 3d and 2d Battalions, is in support and mil follow the 333d Infantry Regiment #ien it. moves formrd and in an emergency it will employ some of its units. The regimental command post of the 352d Infantry mi l remain until further orders at "d" of the -word Tflaldhohe 188 on the map. At 7:40 P.M. the 426th Infantry Regiment reports the situation as follows: The infantry attack at 4:50 A.M. managed to keep up with the rolling barrage until it reached Hill 197 when it was subjected to hostile eounterbattery action which at times was unusually severe. The attack -when resumed, came to a halt in the Artillery Woods where units were scattered and intermingled by the severity of the hostile artillery fire. Our front line runs generally about 300 - 500 meters in front of the hostile second position. This hostile position and the strong machine gun nests in the outpost area offered tenacious resistance to the repeated attacks. In compliance with orders for the attack on the second hostile position at 6:00 P.M. the 2d and 3d Battalions moved up as the attack on the left flank progressed forward. Reports state that severe hostile artillery fire prevented any forward progress. The 3d Battalion, 426th Infantry eventually arrived and scattered a French Battalion but was compelled to withdraw when outflanked. Previously mentioned officer casualties: 16 officers and 2 doctors. More exact information cannot be furnished until later. At 8:00 P«M. the 353d Infantry reported: The attack of the 353d Infantry carried out as ordered but was brought to a standstill due to the severe hostile counter measures. -44 The chances of the 2d and 3d Battalions to advance seem hopeless; the envelopment by the 1st Battalion, 353d Infantry ms also broken up by effective hostile fire. Continuation of the attack impossible •without help from the east. The activity of our OTTO, artillery is neglible. Our omi minamuerfers could not be employed in time but are now prepared for the defensive. The Brigade then ordered as follows: (1) The regiments -vd.il dig in indie re they are for the night. (2) 7on Plato's Regiment mil shift one battalion behind von Gerlach's Regiment and one battalion behind von Thauvenay's Regiment. The 3d Battalion -will be shifted behind the center about midmy bet-ween Waldhohe and bottom of the southern slope of Hill 197, as a reserve behind the center of the Brigade. The Brigade mil be informed of the location of the regimental command posts and their setup. (3) It is essential that the heavy machine guns and minenwerfers, as -mil as the infantry accompanying batteries, be moved up to prepare a distribution in depth* This distribution in depth is to extend as far as Baraguehohe. (4) The artillery: Majpu Meier -will prepare a box barrage to be placed in front of the line of the for-roard regiments #iich mi l drop on the hostile second position. Attention is invited to the pyrotechnic signal designated by army headquarters for barrag9 request. (5) The Brigade -will move back to the coimmnd post on Barasuehohe Tahur, e — Souain road* (6) Rations: iron rations, ammunition replacements in Bornburg and Torgau depots. -45 (7) Exceptional alertness and security is ordered for the night and the reorganization of units mil bd made. The division order No. 3 distribution at 10:40 P.M. is in accord •with these preparations. At 10:30 P.M. the liaison officer of the 1st Bavarian Infantry Division reported that i/yhen the 1st and 2d Bavarian Infantry Divisions started their attack they -were met by a hostile counterattack Tnftiich -was broken do-um but our o-ron troops -were forced back to their line of departure (mid slope of Bayernwald [Bavarian Woods] direction Trench de Hambourg •where i t has contact -with the 426th Infantry Regiment). The situation is unchanged on the front of the 2d Bavarian Infantry Division. At 11:40 P.M. the 353d Infantry Regiment oriented the situation as follows: Distribution of forces: right flank 3d Battalion, center 2d Battalion, left flank 1st Battalion -with continuous trenches; the left flank is directly south of the letter "D*1 of Dynamite Ravine, Map grid 2456, right flank on barrage line S-130 about at the junction -with the USaldhohe - Perthes road. Order of set of the companies: That of the 3d Battalion is still unkno-wn, 2d Battalion, 8th, 7th, 5th, 6th Companies 1st Battalion, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th Companies* Approximate strengths per Battalion, 80-90 men. In addition to the stragglers and -wounded there -were many sick as gas casualties (including Lieut. Hermann seriously ill) as the result of the severe hostile gas shelling during the last attack. Distribution: The Battalions, minenwerfers and light machine guns •will be eeheloned 400 meters in depth in individual squad strong points. -46 The light and heavy minenwerfers will distribute their barrage fire along the front, likewise the accompanying gun batteries, which will endeavor to connect up with the direct infantry support batteries if possible. Weather: Morning cool, later somewhat clear, (Sketches 3 - 20), 16 July 1918 During the night the 426th Infantry was subjected to the usual machine gun and rifle grenade fire. The hostile artillery fired on their rear areas. An enemy aviator who flew over the 426th Infantry sector was fired on by machine guns and minenwerfers. At 3:00 A.M. the 426th Infantry reported as follows: "Units of the 352d and 353d Infantry Regiments which had been located between the 1st and 2d Battalions, 426th Infantry, were reported by the 2d Battalion, 426th Infantry to have been withdrawn, thereby creating a gap. The 1st Battalion, 426th Infantry subsequently received orders to move over to the right to the 2d Battalion. Definite information is hot available because the requested sketches have not been received and the repeatedly dispatched runners have not returned. More complete report will follow as soon as more information is received". According to a report from the 426th Infantry, communication has been established between front line units and regimental to regimental head quarters with the Bavarians. The 2d Company, 426th Infantry was designated as contact company. Previously the 3d Battalion, 426th Infantry had designated a reserve company which lay in the vicinity of Battalion Head quarters for this duty. Communication has been established with the headquarters of the 352d Infantry Regiment. At 7:30 A»M. the reconnaissance detachment reported heavy artillery fire directed on Hill 180 was falling on z44z. -47 At 8:15 A.M. the 352d Infantry Regiment reported that the 1st Battalion -with the 201st Mountain Machine Gun Detachment was located behind the 426th Infantry, 2d Battalion 353d Infantry and 3d Battalion, behind the center of the Brigade• Heavy hostile harassing fire and gas shelling has been falling on the assembly areas. At present there is no communication available -with the 207th Reserve Infantry Regiment. The Mountain Machine Gun Detachment is echeloned in depth behind the 3d Battalion in the vicinity of the trenches south of Hill 197 - la Baraqu©. At 2:15 P.M. the 352d Infantry Regiment report as follows: (1) Order of battle of the regiment, (a) The 1st Battalion moved tiro companies into the front line gap (Tranchee de York) bet-ween von Gerlach's Regiment and von Thauvenayls Regiment. The left flank of von Gerlach's Regiment has been bent forward to the south, the right flank of von Thauvenay's Regiment rests in the Tranchee de York. The remaining companies , machine gun and minenwerfer rest echeloned in depth behind von Gerlach's regiment. (b) The 2d Battalion is located behind von ThauvenayTs Regiment. (c) The 3d Battalion with two companies, is located in the trench south of Hill 197, two companies, Machine gun - minem/verfers, 201st Mountain Machine Gun Detachment are echeloned in depth as far back as la Baraque. (d) The regimental headquarters is located behind the 2d Battalion on the northeast edge of Waldhohe. (e) The accompanying gun battery is located at LammerTvald. (2) Communication has been established with the right neighbor division, likewise with the 7th Company of the 2d Bavarian Infantry Regiment which is located in the Tr. de Hambourg. Units of the 48th Infantry Regiment are located in the trenches south of Iammemeld. -48 (3) The average strength per company is about 40 men. (4) Booty: 2 light machine guns and numerous hand operated weapons, several grenade thro-roer batteries vdth ammunition. Upon request the 353d Infantry reports that: (1) The enemy is remaining quiet, (2) The 7th Infantry Division has shifted its main line of resistance to the Dynamite ravine - Strong point 188 in contact -with the 353d Infantry Regiment, The outposts have been shoved forward about 600 meters. The following units are in the front line in the sector of the 353d Infantry Regiment:on the right the 2d Battalion 26th Infantry, -which is attached and on the left the 2d Battalion, 393d Infantry and the 1st and 3d Battalion 393d Infantry have been withdra-wn into the strong point in communication trench Map grid 2356. According to a report from the 353d Infantry it had captured the f ollomng: 5 officers, 232 men from the French 149th Infantry and the 1st, 31st and 50th Chasseur Battalions. In addition to these, 1 major and 6 -wounded Frenchman from the 136th Infantry Regiment. Also 4 heavy machine guns, 11 light machine guns, 2 trench cannon, 1 - 8 cm. gun and one gas projector. According to the final report of the 353d Infantry Regiment the enemy is carrying out isolated surprise gas shelling on our rear areas, otherwise the. situation is unchanged. Wolfsberg and the second hostile position are occupied in strength* In compliance -with division orders the division is preparing the captured position for defense. For details see Annex 21. Weather: Hot. -49 Annex 21. 17 July 1918. At 3:05 A.M. the 352d Infantry Regiment reported that the situation •was unchanged. Severe artillery fire lay on the assembly areas of the regiment. The battle setup as ordered yesterday has been carried out. The folio-wing -were captured by us: 1 heavy machine gun, 1 light machine gun, 1 grenade discharger battery, 1,000 hand grenades, 500 rifle grenades, 4,000 rifle cartridges, 10 rifles, 15 gas masks, 2 boxes machine gun ammunition. The average strength of our companies is 45 men. According to the morning report of the 426th Infantry Regiment, this regiment also succeeded in breaking off combat as directed. At 9:00 P.M. a hostile patrol of approximately 10 men -was repulsed by hand grenades and rifle fire. The hostile artillery fired -with con siderable energy into the rear area of the 426th Infantry sectori other than this artillery fire the night passed quietly in this sector. The 426th Infantry captured the folio-wing booty and prisoners: 138 prisoners, 2 field guns with 2,000 rounds ammunition, 5 light machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns and considerable ammunition and close range combat -weapons. At 3:00 A.M. the 353d Infantry reported that nothing new occurred other than energetic harassing fire mixed tilth isolated gas shells. The shift in this sector has not been completely carried out. The division command post has been changed to Blue mark K (on the map) in the communication trench Map grid 2356.* At 5:20 A.M. the 3d Battalion, 352d Infantry reported: "Situation bet-ween 4:00 and 5:00 A.M.: From 4:00 A.M. on the enemy placed an annihilating artillery fire on the front line and Hill 197. -5© From 4:20 until 4:40 A.M. a severe hostile barrage fell on the depression south of and on the south slope of Hill 197. Similarly a lively hostile artillery fire fell on the vicinity southwest of Hill 197. From 4:40 to 5:00 A*M. energetic hostile infantry and machine gun fire started. From 4:00 A.M. on the front lines of the 3d Battalion, 352d Infantry assumed an extreme alert to be prepared for eventualities. Toward 5*00 A*M. the hostile fire diminished* Only on several points did the machine gun fire continue* It appears that the enemy is contemplating a reconnaissance raid* An attack of greater pro portions -would require different preparatory action. After 5:00 iUM. the harassing fire -was unimportant11. At 6:10 A*M. the 353. Infantry Regiment reported that a very severe hostile artillery fire lay on von Thauvenay* s Regiment since 1:00 A.M. Hostile machine gun fire -was periodically audible, coming diagonally (45 degrees) to the right of the left flank. Otherwise the situation -was unchanged. reported that it had At 6:15 A*M. the 353d Infantry Regiment/received an oral message at 6:00 A*M* from the 2d Battalion, 353d Infantry Regiment, -which stated that a hostile bombardment was falling on their new position. In addition to the above,heavy hostile artillery fire since 2:30 A.M. lay on the rear positions north of TiBaldhohe between Lammer and Laufgraben (communication trench) Woods* The front line has called for the protective barrage, which -was given. An officer's patrol has been sent forward to investigate and determine whether the barrage request originated in the 353d Infantry sector. At 6:00 A.M. a messenger from the Regimental Headquarters arrived with the information that he had visited the new regimental sector main line of resistance between 4:00 and 5:00 A.M. and reports that the battalions have completed their change of positions as ordered for tonight* -51 At 2:00 A.M. Captain Ftyrkosh received the message by runner, to extend the right flank as far as the trapezoid shaped woods. Shortly after midnight Captain Demuth reported that the units of the 7th Infantry Division located to the left of us had not been informed of the change of position and refused to give -way for it . He was informed to orient himself with the area for the time being. For the remainder of the day the hostile infantry activity was meagre, but the hostile artillery was very active, including some surprise gas shelling of the rear areas. Minenwerfer and rifle grenade fire fell on the forward infantry lines of the 426th Infantry Division. During the morning the hostile aviation was active • In compliance with corps orders, the attached units of the 2d Assault Battalion will march to Vouziers at once. The 12th Tank Battalion has been taken from the combat organization of the division. Annex 22 contains the corps recognition of the accomplishments of the regiments. Annex 23, 24 and 25, give the division of the sectors, execution of the echelonment in depth, outpost area pp. In compliance with the division order the engineers, attached to the regiments* will return to their organizations and will be available to the engineer commander for construction of trench positions, etc. We athe r: Thunde r showe r s• Departures* Units of the 2d Assault Battalion. Annex 22* Annexes 23, 24, and 25. Departure: Engineers. -52 18 July 19X8* Corps headquarters is demanding a clarification of the hostile intentions, since the enemy has started to counterattack in front of the 33d Infantry Division and has become more active in our front, indicating intentions on a larger scale. The enemy also appears to have intentions of recovering the terrain lost in the recent fighting. The Brigade therefore ordered that a reconnoitering patrol be sent out the next night, or if the opportunity offered itself, to attempt to capture a hostile patrol. If these efforts prove unsuccessful, then on the folio-wing night a raid -would be made to bring in prisoners. In addition to above,orders -were issued that a reconnaissance of the hostile rear areas be made to determine the enemy*s intentions. From 6:00 A.M. on the right flank of the 426th Infantry Regiment -was subjected to severe hostile artillery fire. At 5:00 A.M. the enemy carried out a successful raid at the same point •where yesterday he made his penetration. He -was able to penetrate our position but -was driven out by a counterattack made by the 11th and 12th Companies of the 352d Infantry. The shift was carried out as ordered during the night. Contact -was established to the left and right. The enemy moved his patrols forward in front of the right flank of the brigade, in front of Camp L34Z and our outpost line. At 6:45 A.M. the 353d Infantry Regiment reported that hostile harassing fire of medium and heavy calibres fell until 6:20 A.M., on Pulverschjuoht (Powder Ravine) and the trenches traversing same. During the forenoon the 353d Infantry Regiment repulsed seven hostile attacks but in the eightjr attack, inhich -was preceded by a most severe artillery shelling, our troops were pushed back at K, map grid 2455. Our shock troops drove the enemy out again and captured 6 prisoners but the shock troops were compelled to withdraw, due to sudden rain of artillery fire. -53 Brigade therefore ordered that at 6:00 P.M.the shock troops of the 426th Infantry and 353d Infantry follomng an artillery preparation -mere to clear the enemy out of the outpost line at the intersection of the Duchet trench and York trench at Blue point K. The final report of the 353d Infantry stated that the situation had been restored mth the exception of a small portion of the outpost line on the flank of the 426th Infantry -which -was still in the hands of the enemy. Contact bet-ween the 426th Infantry and the 353d Infantry has been maintained. According to the Brigade order the 1st Battalion, 352d Infantry, -with the 201st Mountain Machine Gun Detachment, mil move into the line of departure on the next night. The regimental headquarters -will also be there. Also, the 3d Battalion, 352d Infantry mil be separated from the 426th Infantry due to the setup of the support battalion of the 426th Infantry and the tactical situation. The battalion headquarters and t-wo nompanies of the 3d Battalion, 352d Infantry -will remain in their billets -while the other two companies located at present north of the Tahure — Souain Road •will be used as contact units. In compliance -with division orders the brigade -will take over the sector of the regiment of the Bavarian division -which is on the brigade right. The brigade designated the 352d Infantry for this mission, directing that t-wo battalions be in the front line and one be held in reserve in the sector of 1 l/2 regiment -width. This relief is to take place during the night of 19-20 July. The sending of an advance party has been ordered and arranged so that the regimental headquarters mil occupy the Command Post Himmelreich on the eastern slope of Kluck Hill. Corps directed in the evening that the infantry gun batteries be mthdra-wn on the following night. Annex 26 contains the information concerning the condition of the main line of resistance. Ufeatheri Rainy -with sunshine later in the day. -54 19 July 1918. The night passed quietly. Nothing new to report other than the hostile harassing fire on the trenches and rear areas. The 1st Battalion, 352d Infantry, with the machine gun company, has moved into its,new position. One machine gun of the 2d Machine Gun Company, 352d Infantry, was destroyed by a direct hit and one light machine gun damaged* The 426th Infantry has completed its redistribution of forces and established contact with the Bavarians. The 353d Infantry Regiment has also completed the redistribution as ordered. Following an energetic artillery preparation the enemy succeeded in the early morning to push back the left flank of the Bavarians. Contact with the Bavarians -mas broken. At Is20 P.3UU hostile patrols forced their -may into the left flank of the 426th Infantry Regiment. During the day infantry activities -were meager, only the advanced outposts of the right flank company of the 426th Infantry was subjected to rifle grenade fire. Our own and also the hostile artillery were very active. The hostile artillery vigorously shelled the forward trenches of the 426th Infantry and dropped several bursts of surprise fire on the main line of resistance and camp G. The hostile artillery also subjected Nassauer-Hohe (hill) and areas further in rear to a brisk shelling. Our own and also the hostile aviation were quite active. The enemy is energetically entrenching in the area 100 meters north of "Blpkt. w. Plan. 2454". At this point traffic was also observed. During the afternoon the brigade headquarters moved into the Command Post on Wassauer Hone (hill) and the 353d Infantry Regiment moved into the command post in the Albertini trench. Division orders (Annex 27) contains the orders relative to the lateral expanding of the regimental sectors in the division sector. —55— An additional order (Annex 28) gives the instructions relative to the antitank defense, construction of positions (fortifications), organization of the defense, barrage signals, attachment of shock troops, and assault troops. Weather: Sunny. Annex 26 • Annex 27. 20 July 1918. At 5:00 A.M. the 2d Battalion, 207th Infantry reported the completion of the assembly in iSmmerroald (-woods). To-ward 12:00 midnight, 19 July, follomng a short artillery surprise fire, the enemy attacked the right flank of the 353d Infantry but -was repulsed by hand grenades. Yesterday at 10j30 P.M. the Bavarians counterattacked the enemy -who had infiltered into the outpost area of the Bavarian left flank during the lively hostile shelling of the Bavarian le^t flank and the 426th Infantry right flank. This counberattack regained the terrain lost in the outpost line. The redistribution of troops as ordered has been completed, that is, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 352d Infantry have moved as reserve, that is as support battalion into the Bavarian sector^ the 2d Battalion, 426th Infantry has taken over the left sector of the Bavarian Division, the 353d Infantry has extended its front to the -roest as directed and turned over to the 1st Battalion 353d Infantry, less 1 company, as Reserve Battalion to the 2d Battalion, 353d Infantry. The one company taken from the 1st Battalion 353d Infantry is to be employed -with front line battalion (the 3d Battalion, §53d Infantry), After the shock troops and the flame projecting troops of the 2d Assault Battalion have completed their task of clearing out the French occupying the York trench from as far as Duchet trench, they mil revert to the 33d Infantry Division. _ g6_ At midnight, 12:00 P.M., the 353d Infantry reported that the raid conducted by the shock troops in the York trench west from Duchet trench was only temporarily successful because the companies and Captain pyrkosch reported that powr of resistance of the troops had been exhausted. At the present the enemy has forged forward and now occupies the York trench as far as the Regnault trench. Captain Demuth has assumed command of the front line battalion in the meantime, replacing Captain Pyrkosch, who was evacuated. I have reinforced the exhausted front line battalion, ti4iich again was subjected to heavy hostile artillery fire tonight, with the 2d Company of the reserve battalion. Captain Demuth is contemplating a raid to drive the enemy out of the York trench again. The shock troops verified the fact that the enemy has moved new troops into the front lines, namely, the 116th Infantry The situation -would be auite simple if we could still depend on the troops. The troops are in urgent need of rest and are not fit for further fighting. It is more so a pity that the still fresh shock troops have been taken from the regiment. The division published the orders repeated in Annex 29. Weather: Sunny. Departures: Shock troops to flame protector troops of the 2d Assault Battalion. Annex 29, 21 July 1918. At 6:00 A.M. the 353d Infantry reported that at 9j00 P.M. the shock troops attached to the regiment drove out the enemy occupying the Duchet and York trenches. These trench sections were reoccupied shortly thereafter by the enemy who used flame projectors and artillery barrage fire (directed by -white Very pistol rocket signal branching out). -57 The enemy now occupies the intersection of the Duchet and York trenches. Our o-wn outposts aro as follow: the 12th Company 40 meters west of the York trench intersection, 9th Company about 150 meters north of the intersection in the Duchet trench. The 11th Company has been relieved in its York trench sector by the 12th Company and has occupied the main line of resistance east of Regnault trench. Casualties: 1 UCO (9th Company), 1 pvt. (llth Company) -wounded. The hostile artillery -mas very active in the sectdr of the 3d Battalion, 426th Infantry. Five men of the 249th Engineer Company, -while engaged in constructing barbed -wire entanglements, -were -mounded by a direct hit on the -wire. At 12:30 P.M. the division ordered that the intersection of the York and Duchet trenches, -which had been lost, be retaken. The 353d Infantry Regiment received instructions for this enterprise. The 353d Infantry Regiment therefore directed that it take place at 8:00 P.M. The raid -was carried out as contemplated. The enemy was driven out of those sections of the Duchet and York trenches occupied by them. The 12th Company, 353d Infantry forced its -way fonward in the Duchet trench to a point 150 meters south of the intersection -with the York trench and blocked this off about in line with the tanks. The 9th Company, 353d Infantry blocked off the York trench about in line -with the road leading to Perthes. The casualties incurred by this raid -were: 1 officer and 7 men •wounded and 5 Frenchmen taken prisoners. The relief of the Bavarians Hy the 2d Battalion, 352d Infantry ms carried out -without molestation. Deserters stated that the enemy intends to attack part of our front bet-ween 11:00 and 12:00 P.M., therefore the brigade ordered an alert be in effect from 11100 P.M. Weathe r: Cloudy• -58 22 July 1918. The 353d Infantry submitted the report of the raid as is repeated in Annex 30* At 1:15 A.M. the 2d Battalion, 353d Infantry completed its relief of the 3d Battalion, 353d Infantry as front lime battalion. Units of the 3d Battalion, 426th Infantry located between the former Bavarian and the new regimental boundaries of the 426th Infantry have been relieved by the 2d Battalion, 352d Infantry. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 426th Infantry have each detached one company as reserve. Bet-ween 1:00 and 2:00 A.M. a strong hostile patrol attack -mas repulsed by the right picket post of the 353d Infantry Regiment. Erom 2:00 to 5:00 A.M. a light harassing fire has been falling on Camp Y and 33Z* as -well as on the outposts in the sector of the 3d Battalion, 426th Infantry. Throughout the entire night there was active aviation activity. Toward 4:00 A.M. our engineers were working on the barbed wire just as the enemy fired a red and t-svo green Very pistol light signals. "Whereupon our barrage opened up. Two machine guns, model T08, of the 352d Infantry -were destroyed by a direct hit from an artillery shell in addition, txvo light machine guns of the 353d Infantry put out of action by hostile fire. The Brigade again put the organizations on intensive alert status. The Corps ordered that the division must organize still more in depth. For details see Annex 31. -59 23 July 1918 Our ovm artillery -was quite active - both the hostile and our aviation -were very active. Our aviators dropped four bombs on the hostile rear area* The reserve battalion of the 426th Infantry ms moved into shelter in the area on the southern slope, north of Arbrehohe Mansteinmld. The 353d Infantry had also completed its designated move in accordance -with Ia/6199—88th Infantry Division dated 22 July 1918, On orders from the division the baggage trains of the 353d and 426th Regiments moved into billets in Mont St. Martin and the adjacent camps, the 352d Infantry Regiment moved into billets in Orfeuil and adjacent camps* Equipment and material in Toges camp -will be removed* The 2d Battalion, 2O7th Infantry, by order of the Division, is relieved from divisional assignment and -will move into the Ripont Sector. Upon request of the 352d Infantry the Corps approved the change of main line of resistance I so that in the future it mil run, Baraquehohe (hill) to the -west (sector of the 426th Infantry) and blend into the heavy red French line as indicated on Map 1:10,000 with Bayou de ligne 2tt< The Division repeated the instructions given in Annex 32 for it s antitank defense. For the order of battle of units, see Annex 34. Tffeather: Rainy. Ia/6199 - 88th Unfantry mvision, 22 July 1918. Annex 32 Annex 34 -60 24 July 1918 During the night at 12:45 A.M., a numerically small hostile patrol appeared on the left flank of the 353d Infantry. It -was driven off by machine gun fire. The enemy fired some rifle grenades against our picket post in Duchet trench. The 352d Infantry has also completed its designated move* The raid by the 353d Infantry to mop up the outpost area south of Waldhohe -was carried out toiward evening. After a short but lively artillery fire on the hostile outposts, our shock troops forced their -way from the north and east over the intersection of the York and Duohet trenches -which -were occupied by the enemy. Our troops -were forced to return to their line of departure because of the ammediate severa hostile artillery fire -which was mixed -with gas and the pressure from the hostile troops. The Division repeated the instructions given in Annex 33 for the construction of field fortifications. Weather: Overcast, cool. Annex: 33. 25 July 1918 Combat activity unimportant. The hostile aviation -was fairly active. One hostile balloon -was in ascension. The command post of the commander of the front line troops of Sector 353 has been shifted to Blpkt. n Grid square 2255S By order of corps the assignment of the antitank guns (-which are to be issued) will be three per regiment in the regimental reserve line. The brigade ordered that the orders repeated in Annex 35 -will be in effect to cover the security forces. Corps daily order gives favorable recognition of the Division's energetically executdd outpost area combat. (Annex 36) Weather: cloudy. Annex: 35 Annex: 36 26 July 1918 As the result of information obtained from Army Headquarters that a hostile attack could be expected against the 8$th Infantry front (during the night or following morning) the medium and light field artillery subjected all the hostile streets and approach roads to an energetic harassing fire all night until 5*00 A.M. From about midnight on, counter preparation fire with yellow cross (mustard gas) was placed on the advanced artillery nest at Pertbes and on parts of the 2d hostile position. Toward 4:00 A*M# these same batteries placed three waves of annihilation fire on the assumed hostile assembly areas* The hostile counter activity up to this time remained unimportant* At 6:55 A*M* a severe hostile fire from about 20 batteries started on our front line positions, this continued until 8:05 A.M. Under cover of this heavy fire an attack by strong hostile shock troops was launched at 7:00 A*M* at our boundary with the 7th Infantry Division, During this attack, in spite of tenacious resistance, our outposts were driven back along the line 100 meters north of York trench intersection with Schaff hausen and Regnault trench - 2456K. The, contemplated mopping up of the outpost area was only partially carried out. Some of our personnel escaped through the barrage and reached the main line of resistance, another portion of the outposts -were found missing* At 8:05 P*M* the 353d Infantry Regiment endeavored to reoccupy the outpost area* Our shock troops succeeded in temporarily forcing their way into the front lines held by the enemy but due to the lively hostile annihilation fire inhich started at 8:00 P.M* and the counterattack activities of the hostile close range combat equipment, they were forced to return to their line of departure* -62 Raids by three hostile patrols against our outpost line in the sectors of the 426th and 352d Infantry Regiiramts -were repulsed by hand grenades and rifle fire. Three hostile balloons, the one in 3251 (9C) -were observed falling in flames at 12:00 noon* The 3d Battalion, 353d Infantry relieved the 2d Battalion, 353d (front line Battalion) during the night without incident. "Weather: Sunny, cool, wind and rain toward evening* 27 July 1918 That portion of the 352d Infantry outpost area occupied by the enemy in which the enemy is endeavoring to fortify himself by entrench ments, construction of obstacles and emplacement of close range combat weapons has been placed under a harassing firs from our batteries* In order to favorably prepare this lost area for recapture -we have maintained since evening a steady observed harassing fire from one of our mortars An the hostile outposts* At times a hostile balloon at low altitude was observed behind Bayerwald* The hostile artillery activity was unimportant. On orders from the division the shock troops of the 2d Shock Troop Battalion started their return march to their organization* The Brigade issued orders for the emergsncy security garrison (See Annex 37). The Brigade further ordered that that half of the light minenwerfers which were located behind the regimental reserve line prepare emplace ments for their weapons with those of that half -which is already located behind the front line* In compliance with Annex 38 the division ordered the relief of the 353d Infantry. Annex 37 Annex 38 -63 28 July 1918 Combat activities on both sides unimportant. The harassing fire hy one mortar on the York trench and approach trenches continued and the hostile outposts occupying that part of the 353d Infantry, outpost area •mre subjected to harassing fire from our cannon batteries. Moderate hostile artillery activity. One enemy balloon -was up in the direction of Baumberg. Weathe r: Overcast. 29 July 1918 During the night the front line and both advanced companies of the support battalions of the 353d Infantry -were relieved by the reserve battalion and both rear companies of the support battalion of the 352d Infantry. Unimportant hostile harassing fire fell on our forivard trenches, Waldhohe, Hill 197, Hassauer Hohe and Kolonnenwege (transport road). "Whereas our artillery -was fairly lively. The York trenches and approach trenches with their garrisons "were subjected to fire from our batteries and medium trench mortars. Unimportant hostile aviation activity and hostile artillery activity. At 3:00 P.M. troops -were observed -working in map square 2455. At 10:30 P»M. an explosion was observed in map square 2955 (2b); at the time of the explosion hostile batteries in close proximity to that point had been subje cted to our artillery fire. "Weather: Slightly cloudy* 30 July 1918 During the night the relief of the 353d Infantry by the 352d Infantry was completed. Hostile artillery became somewhat moro active. Aviation activity unimportant. -64 At 9:15 A.M. a hostile aviator dropped pamphlets. Toward 10:00 A.M. traffic was observed in the York trenches from the Regnault trench* Bet-ween 5:00 and 6:00 P.M. very active truck traffic was observed on the Perthes—Suippes Road. Probably as a reprisal for a raid conducted by the 7th Infantry Division, the hostile artillery delivered surprise fires on Sector J and strewed Manstein ravine, Hummerschere and Kirschberg ridge with artillery fire. Our batteries delivered harassing fire on the hostile outposts opposite Sector J, the roads in the hostile rear area and the known hostile firing batteries. In conjunction -with the 7th Infantry Division, our outposts on the left flank of the 352d Infantry were moved forward in Map Square 2456 from M to 100 meters east of M 1 and during this move captured one light French machine gun. Weather: Misty • 31 July 1918 Patrols of the 426th Infantry verified the location of sentries at 2454 g. During the night two hostile searchlights were adtive. As reprisal for the repulsed hostile raid against the right flank of the 7th Infantry Division, the hostile artillery activity became very active during the morning. SevsKal thousand rounds were recorded as having been fired against our Sectors H and J, and the left neighbor sector* Later the hostile artillery fire calmed down. Our tank which had bedn abandoned south of the York trench was converted into a defensive strong point by the enemy and now our artillery shelled it until it burst in flames. York trench and the approach trenches were kept under fire. Our own rainenwerfers shelled the hostile trenches and line of outposts opposite Sector J with 60 medium minenwerfer shells. -65 Daring the evening there -mas active hostile aviation activity. In the field, 1 AugMSt 1918 von Pfeil Major General and Brigade Commander* -66 88th Inf. Div. la No* 120 Mob* Rs. Div. Hdqrs, 6 July 1918 Strictly secret. Division Order No« 1 for the Attack Approach march and concentration. A. General. (l) The success of the attack depends entirely on how much mil •we be able to surprise the enemy. Complete camouflage of all movements against hostile observation, especially view from the air by day mil be the basis of success. I am holding all commanding officers accountable that the necessary instructions and precautions against hostile recon naissance be carried out. Not only will they see that the orders are issued but mil also see that they are enforced. All concerned must be uniformly instructed. (2) During the shifting of the troops there mil be no billets in the sense of roof and cover but due to the marching at night the rests •will be made during the day. The weather being favorable the troops mi l use the suitable convolution of the terrain for cover to rest during the day. They must rest during the day and in the event of bad gather, find some suitable shelter on the ground. (3) All organic and attached units mi l be assembled immediately as soon as camp is broken and mil continue to do so on every move. It mil be the duties of the adjutants to see that no one nor nothing be forgotten. Exact order of battle mi l be issued. From the beginning of the move until the moment of the attack every headquarters and troop unit, as ^11 as the vehicular transportation and baggage trains mil be kept together, loaded, and packed as per special ord9rs from the division, augmented by verbal instructions. -67 It is the care and duty of every commander to surprise the organization and equipping of their troops to the last article so that they -will be prepared for combat and that at the moment of the attack they mil not be bothered by orders for packing and will not be encumbered by superfulous articles. The division field trains mil assemble during the night of July 7-8. Orders for the assembly mil follow. These mil remove all superfulous articles. (4) A memorandum mil be issued for the advance from rtiioh there will be no deviation* Special attention is called to the order: (5) Daylight marches are absolutely forbidden. (6) New bivouacs or shelters must be taken up mth the beginning of dam at 4:30 A.M. at -which time the corralling of all vehicles and animals must be completed. Every commandant and commander must be certain that this has been complied with before he reports his new location. Likewise the commanders must check layout of their bivouacs and troops throughout the day to assure that cover has been properly taken. (?) Due to the short nights, it will be necessary to carefully calculate if the move as ordered can be carried out in the hours -which are available. (8) In the event the march objective is not reached by daybreak, due to unforeseen circumstances, then the troops will rest Tifcerever they are under cover from air observation. (9) For the change of locations for the first tw> nights the marches, as long as they are on the roads, will be in groups to spare the troops. Orders for these group movements will be issued by battalion and company commanders. Company organizations will not be broken in the future. -68 (10) Singing and horseplay during marches, in bivouacs and in the assembly areas are forbidden. (11) The use of lanterns or flashlights is absolutely forbidden at night, especially -while on the march, (12) Troops must be carefully instructed and rehearsed as to their conduct -when hostile planes approach. Every man must thoroughly understand the theoretical and practical reasons for these precautions. During the last three days aviation alarm sentinels "will be established. (13) The regiments of the division occupying the sector into which our division -will move, will furnish our regiments guiding detachments to assist in the reconnaissance to the assembly areas and show the approach roads into assembly areas I and II. Each battalion -will have one officer and man -who are familiar with the terrain, attached to them. This personnel will be available on direct request or through the division, for all re c onnai s sance s• The guides should go, preferably at night, with the battalion commanders of our division, over the selected roads leading to the assembly areas. (14) In addition, on Y-4 day, advance parties consisting of 1 officer, 1 NCO and 2 men for every headquarters and 1 officer, 3 NCOs, and 3 men for each company, will be sent by trucks. These trucks will report at 6:00 A.M. to the road crossing immediately south-west of Aure in the valley inhere they will be met by the guides of the regiments now in line who will orient them for the various roads and important features. This orientation into the assembly areas must absolutely be_ done at night. After the orientation- has been completed by the advance party, the guides will be released to return to their respective organizations during Y-4 day* -69 For this orientation and up to the moment of the attack, the commander of the front line troops and his -various services mil be at the disposal of the advance party, for information and help. (15) The assembly areas require careful reconnaissance to determine in detail where the troop units, companies, accompanying batteries, combat trains and individual transportation -will go. During the last night the maximum use mi l be made of available protection against hostile file* The regiments in the front lines mil turn over all necessary data such as charts, showing dugouts.and tunnel system and list of billets with their capacities* It is directed that the troops in both assembly areas will carry on the minimum shifting possible to avoid hostile shelling. Any shifts on a large scale must first be approved by the division. They are to be avoided if possible. (16) On the extreme right flank of our attack sector another line division with a 300 meter frontage overlaps into our sector so that von Gerlachfs Regiment will be required to take its assembly area during both nights and especially its line of departure in t-wo different division sectors. This will be taken into consideration in the preliminary reconnaissance of the assembly area so that contact will be established ,with both divisions. (17) Brigade, Engineer Commander and the Division Communications Cammander will report by A.M. of 11 July to the division, on sketch l:10#000, the assembly area in detail. Both map overlays indicated but one halt which must be reeonnoitered. (18) The morning following each marching night, the Brigade, Engineer Commander and Division Coiannniications Commander will report whether they have reached their destinations. The night before the attack tip to zero hour, the code w>rd of the report will be "Nothing New11. -70 (19) All orders or reports relative to the change of position mil be in -writing or if from the Brigade Engineer Commander and Signal Communications Commander, mil be in code over the telephone. Other use of the telephone in this situation is prohibited* The preparations for the first march must be Inept strictly secret so that Taken day is verbally designated the move can start within two hours upon receipt of same. The remaining forward displacements will be carried out with clocklike precision up to the moment of the attack. B» Approach march (and concentration). (1) The division will remain in its present billets until four days prior to the attack. (2) In three nightly forward displacements the division will reach its final assembly area for the attack. (3) The following billeting areas will be reached during the first night move: The Division Headquarters will remain in Ballayj The Brigade Headquarters will reach Brie res Ortj Headquarters 426th Infantry at north aviation hangar; 1st Battalion Hdq. & 2d Co. and M.G. Co. at Corbon; Two companies at Saint Morel; 2d Battalion at Monthois; 3d Battalion at aviation hangar north and eastf Accompanying battery and infantry gun battery at Monthois. Headquarters 353d Infantry in vicinity of Brieres; 1st Battalion and 2d Battalion at Brieres Ort and Artillery Camp whichever the regiment chooses; 3d Battalion at Monthois; Accompanying gun battery at Brieres Ort. -71 Headquarters 352d Infantry at Bavigny; 1st Battalion at Infantry Camp in Brieres 2d and 3d Battalions and Accompanying Gun Battery in Savigny. Headquarters Engineers and Engineer Companies around Marvauxj Communications troops at Monthois; Medical Company (to be designated later), (4) The battalions of von Gerlachfs Regiment and the 2d Battalion of von Thauvenay's Regiment mil march from their present billets at 10:15 P.M. Headquarters 1st and 3d Battalion of -von Thauvenay*s Regiment •will start their march at 11:15 P.M. Headquarters and battalions of von Plato's Regiment mil start their march at 1:00 A.M. and will give priority to the other marching regiments at road crossings. Engineer units will start their march at 10:30 P.M., communications troops at 10:15 P.M. and will be given road priority by the infantry troops. The squadron of the 10th Mounted Jagers will clear Belleville the day before and will move in small detachments to the organizations to -which they va.ll be attached. (5) The Aisne must be crossed by all troops by 2:00 A.M. The approach roads will be through Folaise—Savigny or Olizy—Monthois. (6) Mounted officers from division or officers of higher headquarters will check on these movements. (7) One officer per battalion and 1 NCO per headquarters and company will precede without transportation, as billeting detail to prepare billets for the first move. They will depart the night before the move. They will arrive at their designated locality by daybreak and report to the town major. -72 £• Assembly Area No* I* (1) The division will reach the assembly areas indicated on the attached map overlays in twj moves, arriving thereat on the night prior to the attack from the approach inarch areas according to Section B. The boundaries of the assembly sectors must be sho-wn thereon. (2) Yon Plato's Regiment -will advance further to the south,-which •will necessitate indicating this change due to the previously designated qreas. (3) Approach inarches mi l be made over roads from Monthois and St. Morel going through Liry and Marvaux to Aure, using such side roads in order to avoid crossings of marching columns, or blocking of roads •with the supply traffic* In an emergency it might be necessary to march on the sides of the main high-ways* Under no condition mil they cross the lines Challerange—north exit Maure to the south nor the present corps boundary to the north. (4r) Time of departure for von Gerlach's Regiment is 10:15 P*M., for von Thauvenay's Regiment, 10:30 P*M., for von Plato's Regiment, 1st Battalion at 11:00 P*M*, Headquarters 2d Battalion and 3d Battalion, 10:15 P.M. At march crossings and in blocking of roads the division mil have priority over the 228th Infantry Division. Supply vehicles of other organizations going to the rear mil be given priority, mthin the division the following mil be the priority* Von Gerlach's Regiment, Von Thauvenay's Regiment, Von Plato* s Regiment* (5) The roads mil be previously reconnoitered and traversed* (6) At 2:30 A*M. the supports of the front line regiments mil be mthdraww The support position of the 88th Division must then terminate. -73 (7) In this displacement forward both of the advanced battalions of von Gerlachts and von Thauvenayfs Regiments -will relieve the right reserve battalion of the division in line and close up with their advanced elements immediately behind the positions of the front line battalions of that division -which still occupies the main line of resistance and terrain in front of them. Definite fixed limits of the contact position are especially necessary. (8) Sector commanders and lower units of the division in line will give orders in their sectors up to 12:30 A.M. From this time on the Regimental and Brigade Commanders of von Beczwarzowslqy* s Division will assume command but they must be in their command posts No. I by 2:30 A.M. (see paragraph 11). (9) Hostile raids will be repelled by the front line battalions of the division occupying the position. The troops in the assembly areas for the offensi (10) At 10:00 A.M. the morning the offensive is to be launched, von Beezwarzowsky's Division will assume entire command of the attack sector* Those combatant troops of the division occupying the position at present will be at the disposal of the division until the various services of our division become engaged. Until such time all the supporting troops of the division occupying the position in the attack sector will be at the disposal of our division. As to artillery - the 5th Direct, infantry support artillery is at the disposal of the 88th Division under command of Artillery Commander Ho. 59# The remaining artillery in position is under jurisdiction of higher headquarters. (11) The Brigade will report by the morning of 7 July if after the reconnaissances by the commanding officers they selected intermediate command posts for concentration No. I or whether they considered it better -74 to move into the final command post II during the last nights. The division -will issue further information later. D. Assembly Area Ho. II. (1) Those battalions designated for the front lines for the offensive -will be moved forward from Assembly Area No. 1 to their line of departure on the last night. The remaining battalions vdll move into the vacated narrow Assembly Area No. II. (2) The Assembly Areas No. II and their fixed limits are shorn in the accompanying map overlay 1:25,000. The support position as indicated previously on the map mil be changed so that the front battalions of each regiment in line will be side by side, in line, rather than behind each other. (5) Van Plato*s Regiment with all its battalions will arrive at 10:15 P.M., the battalions of the second line of von Gerlach and von Thauvenay Regiments will also arrive at 10:15 P.M., and the four battalions of the front line will arrive at 10:45 P.M. The battalions must occupy Assembly Area No. II thirty minutes before the beginning of our artillery preparatory fire. Rearrangement to organize the -waves in depth for the assault must take place while our artillery is firing. Thirty minutes before the artillery opens fire the nedium minenwerfers of the minenwerffer company will stand by, without their crews, harnessed, prepared to move, with their battalions. (4) The combat troops of the division now in the front lines will not be relieved while the battalions (of the 88th Division) move into the front lines but will remain in their positions. In the reconnaissance by the advance party arrangements have been made that the dugouts and sections of trench to be occupied by the battalions will be so detached from the permanent troops that there will be no danger of intermingling of force especially at the beginning of the attack. To assist in this matter the permanent (troops actually occupying the front lines) are requested to give the incoming troops priority. -7§ (5) It must be definitely understood that the members of the assaulting waves will under no circumstances have anything to divert or interfere with them at the moment of the moment of the attack which will fritter a my their numbers. To assure this the leading wave must move up close to the hostile obstacles from which the echelonment in depth will be taken by the other units* (Signed) von Beczwarzowsky. Annex 4 Copy Division von Becz-warzowsky Div» Hdqrs., 6 July 1918. I a ffo» 119 mob« Rs» strictly secret. Division Order No» 2 for the attack Procedure of the attack (l) Von Beczwarzowskyfs Division, following several hours of severe artillery and mininwerfer preparation, will break through the hostile positions on a wide front between a point north of Arbre iShe and the eastern spur of the Uassauer-Hohe» It will then penetrate the hostile trench system to a depth of several kilometers in its initial impulse moving under the protection of its rolling barrage which it will follow closely in a southerly direction without hesitation or halting. The attack will then move in a Southeast direction over the Tourbe, thence over the Bionne* -76 (2) Ho limited objective -will be given for the first dayfs attack. Success can only be achieved by closely following the heavy rolling barrage and having every unit viciously and energetically attacking, making the maximum use of the initial attack impulse, thereby breaking down all hostile resistance. Also, success mil come by making good use of the long daylight hours using also the night during -which advantages can often be gained. This energetic attack must be made without regard of the progress made by the neighboring organizations or fear-should lateral communications be broken* Every commander must be amre of the above. The artillery and auxiliary -weapons must follow closely without hesitation, the pace of the infantry and machine guns in an effort to smother every hostile resistance in its inception, thereby making the going of the infantry easier over the battlefield. Should the troops be successful in carrying out the above they will suffer the minimum losses in the long run which would occur if resistance were allowed to become organized, also strengthening hostile resistance might even endanger the attack plan. The division will attack and concentrate on vital and decisive points and use these as a wedge on the dominating heights to drive into the enemy. This must be made known to every man so that the rapid success in advance will materially assist the neighboring units in their advance. (3) The division will be under orders of the XVI Corps Headquarters on its right flank daring the attack. To the right the Bavarian Division under Danner will attack simul taneously. Utzfs Bavarian Regiment is immediately on von Beczwarzowsky»s right. Attacking on the division's left will be the veteran Magdeburg Division of von der Esch, having the Regiment of von Hertel as the immediate left neighbor. -77 The troop numerical designations will be given later orally. Both neighbor divisions -will attack parallel to the division in their sectors. The units of the left neighbor division -will attack from three directions enveloping Klitzing, and from Wetterecke -will attack to the southwest striking Pritschhohe, Pistolenhohe and Muhlenhohe (190) seen in the distance from here southeast of Perthes, care must be taken to observe our infantry in time "when they reach these heights and the village of Perthes and in rear of the enemy. Communication and tactical contact must be maintained continuously with the neighboring units. In order to facilitate our advance -within our sector and without being misled by lack of flank protection, every opportunity must be grasped to overcome hostile resistance in neighboring sectors by an attack on the enemy from the flank and rear (4) Day of attack Y ) Hour of attack S ) will be designated later Time to open fire X ) (5) Division Order No, 1 contains instructions for the precautions to be taken during the approach march, in the assembly areas, up to the advance to the assault. The attached map overlays show the command posts at the beginning of the attack. Attached map overlay 1:25,000 shows the attack sectors of the regiments. (6) Von Gerlach's Regiment will attack as the rigjit front line regiment on an 800 meter front, in a southerly direction, with two battalions in the front line. The main effort of the division's attack will be made by this regiment. It will attack the ridge line going north and south. -78 The regiment occupying the northern part of Arbre-Hohe -will capture the small la Barasue Hill (Manstein-woods) in front of its right flank, and the -wooded Hill 197 by envelopment from the v*est. It will drive through the continuous -wooded terrain and various small batches of woods •with its right flank, thence through the hostile trench system of the second position which is organized in depth, including the western spur of Arbre-Bo^e (Wolfsberg) and then capture the heavily wooded Baumberg. The capture of the last named heights will be conducted by an envelopment from the right without halting or going throu^i the woods* Up to this time the infantry is to follow closely behind the powerful rolling barrage utilizing the attack impetus, so as not to interrupt its forward motion. It will be supported by its close range artillery which will be moved up rapidly in one single displacement and quickly capture the hostile third position where it can be expected the enemy will offer stronger resistance. It will drive through in cooperation with the left regiment it will capture the dominating Koltz des Pietz which will be enveloped from the west by Von Gerlach's Regiment* During the gradual turning of the attack direction to the south, the regiment will continue its drive without permitting the hostile billets and dugouts enroute to divert its attention nor the numerous wooded areas to unnecessarily stop it. It will continue to capture the high ground and move toward the f Tour be which it will cross between the Somme—Tourbe (exclusive) and St. Jean (exclusive) in order to establish a bridgehead on the south bank and then capture the Bionne Valley in a similar manner. Von Thauvenay*s Regiment, as the left front line regiment, will attack on a 1200 meter front, with two battalions in the front line, in a southerly direction. It will be responsible for maintaining contact with von (^rlachfs Regiment and have its principal effort on its right flank in the sector of its right battalion. -79 The regiment -with its right battalion almys keeping close contact to the right -will drive through the junction of the Arbre and Man stein ravines and the steep-walled Courbier ravine. It -mill capture the well organized strong point on the ascent to the plateau of Waldhohe 188 -which lay to its south. The regiment with its right neighbor, will then drive through the hostile trench system of the second position which starts at the last named heights (Waldhohe 188). The terrain at this location will be a mass of shellholes and difficult to traverse. The regiment with its contact flank on the west (right), holding the well used TSaldhohe—Perthes road will storm the southern portion of Arbre-fiohe (iblfsberg) which it will envelop from the left. Then after the rolling barrage stops it will advance, supported by the close range combat artillery which has been moved up, to the east slope of Baumberges, the heights of which it will hold in conjunction with von Gerlach's Regiment. Together they will capture the strongly defended hostile second position and the Pietz. Von Thauvenay's Regiment must not falter after the rolling barrage stops but must utilize the attack impetus especially against the Pietz. The regiment must remember that it is to use the minimum of forces on its left flank against the low terrain of Perthes. In the capture of that village it should continue to use the minimum of forces by cutting it off on the west. The village will next be cut off on the east by units of the left neighbor division which will have advanced over the chain of ridges of the Wetterecke to Muhlenhohe (Hill 190) which is southeast of Perthes. This action will cause the village to fall like a ripe fruit without the painstaking and costly village fighting. Its mopping up can be carried out by a minimum number of men. Following the assault and capture of the Pietz the regiment will endeavor to continue its advance along the hills during the movement of the inner flank in its turning movement to the southeast which will continue it s steady attack toward the Tourbe* -80 It -will capture the villages of St. Jean and Laval in the Tourbe Valley and establish a bridgehead on the east bank. In a similar manner i t -will take the Bionne Valley bet-ween Somme—Bionne (exclusive) and Hans* Von Platof s Regiment -will constitute the division reserve and "will be echeloned in depth, using the Brigade of von Pfeil, in the attack sector of the right regiment* It mil have three battalions, one behind the other, mth the leading -wave immediately behind the last units of von Gerlach's Regiment. (Signed) von BeezmrjoTwsky* Annex No* 5 Copy Strictly secret: Memorandum Relative to the equipment of the troops mth clothing, equipment, and ammunition* Infantry The soldier* Steel helmet, cap, rifle & pack Belt "with side arms, gas mask in gas mask container and reserve container (snap cover) 150 rounds of small arm ammunition in pouches - field glass, Signal ammunition and rifle grenades mth 60 shells 2 hand grenades (on the belt) som good thro-wers may have more tromblones mth 4-6 rifle grenades Necessary rifle cleaning material Cape or blanket, tent square Bread sack, 2 canteens, cup* 1 iron ration (less vegetable) bread and lard -81 Small entrenching equipment (per squad, 2 pickaxes, 6 small spades, and wire cutters) Desirable to take along more largs -wire cutters if available and less small wire cutters. Ground panels for aircraft signalling distributed to runners Rocket pistols (very-light pistols) Flare and signal ammunition (for every carrier, 20 rounds) 2 pair socks or foot cloths, necessary sewing kit (Requirement of an extra shirt in the pack is optional) 1 pair boots or lace shoes (with wrap leggings), optional which is used Cooking utensils and knife, fork, spoon A small coffee or salt container with chloride of lime or an old old gas mask container per squad with chloride of lime. Annex Ho* 6 Copy Division von Beczwarzowsky, Div. Hdqrs., 7 July 1918 Ia/lld No. 124 secret mob. rs. Strictly secret. The battle terrain, the enemy & his positions. (l) Sector 5 which begins between Nassauhohe and Butte de Tahure goes as far as Romerstrasse to a depth of 7 kilometers in an exact north and south direction but from this point it goes in a southeasterly direction. At the beginning the sector is exactly 2 kilometers wide but becomes broader until beyond the Romerstrasse (Roman road) it gradually becomes 4 kilometers wide. The entire terrain with its long drawn out series of hills, deep ravines and hill slopes has a similarity to the ground form found in the Champagne. In the first mentioned portion of the sector up to the Romerstrasse (Roman road) the elongated ridge run in a north and south direction from the northernmost Arbrehohe (Hill) via Hill 197, TTaldnase, Wolfsberg (south of Arbrehohe) and Baumberg to the Pietz. Only in its northern portion is this ridge traversed by ravines. Here between Arbrehohe and Hill 197, -82 three ravines cut through, namely, the Arbre ravine, Manstein ravine and Corbiere ravine, all going east and wast* The Pietz, isdth its 207 meter elevation is -without question the domineering height of the entire sector. It connects up with the long ridge (or series of hills) Tiuhich runs from the protruding Wetterecke in a southTsesterly direction over Muhlenhohe 190 (southeast of Perthes). These tw> ridges and the angle formed by Klitzing Massiv, -which i s located bet-ween them, forms a rim surrounding the basin of Perthes, Prom the Pietz the sector runs in a southeasterly direction to the Tourbe Valley. The slope of the sector lane tomrd the low ground of the Tourbe is intersected by numerous ravines and gullies leading tomrd the Tourbe. The descent tonsard the Tourbe is quite steep on the right flank (as much as 50 meters) on the left flank considerably more gradual and flat* -East of the Tourbe the terrain rises abruptly. Bounded on the north and -west by the Tourbe and on the south by the Bienne, there rises a sharply defined plateau to the east containing several peaks (in Sector 5) especially in the Kalvarienberg and the -western spurs of Handsrucken (Hunds Ridge) having an average height of 180-200 meters. From this point there is a sharp escarpment falling off to the east. East of the Bienne this terrain picture is repeated. Here the terrain rises steeply until it reaches the mass of mountain of Mont Yvron. In general the terrain dominates and affords a view into the rear area. The -western slop leading from Arbrehohe to the south mth its ridge noses and gullies is covered mth a connecting -woods of medium height trees* other than this the terrain of the sector is bare. Throughout its entire length the sector has numerous small batches of isoods scattered through it. These offer excellent cover* The terrain fts otherwise barren and of a chalk composition on the hillsj this chalk is covered by a thin coating of humus or mud and only in the valleys is there a sediment of loose earth and gravel* -83 The region has little water and in most cases water can only be found in the vicinity of brooks or the few villages. Perthes is the only village located in the beginning of the north- south lane of Sector 5 and when the sector veers to the southeast there are the villages of Laval and St. Jean in the valley of the Tourbe, farther to the east in the Bionne Valley are the villages of Somme-Bionne and Hans. Finally at the Suippes—St. Hfonehould RR the busy town of Valmy. Other than Perthes which is entirely in ruins, the other towns are in excellent condition. They are protected from medium calibre shelling and well equipped for defense. The houses are all constructed of stone and stoutly built. The road net is not great. Various roads approaching from the north meet at Perthes, from which several roads lead to the south. From these there are in turn numerous branch roads going east and west into the ravines leading to the Tourbe. In addition to these roads the chalky terrain is traversable even by heavy vehicles during the dry season of the year. The troops are only tied to the roads in the lowlands around the brooks or "when i t rains when the challcy terrain becomes slippery making progress difficult. The crossing of the shell torn terrain (of the former position warfare battlefield) immediately north and northwest of Perthes offers many complications and difficulties. Even through this there are at present two good roads used by the French leading from Waldhohe and the eastern edge of Artillery Iflbods. (2) The hostile system of positions is organized in four positions. The first position runs in several trenches, one behind the other, along the slopes north of Arbrehohe in and between the Arbre—Manstein— and Corbiere ravines. This maze of trenches offers no series obstacle because they have mostly all fallen in. The main line of resistance, the Tranchee Lafarque, runs along the ridge between Arbre and Manstein ravines. It is a reverse slope position and contains galleries (deep dugouts) for the garrison occupying the position. In Sector 5 the line -84 of strong points is connected with seven serviceable communicating trenches to the first position* This line of strong points runs along the hills immediately south of the Corbiere Valley through the communi cating trenches Lammer and Elberfeldwald. This line is constantly occupied by strong forces and covered by the forward units of the support battalions* It contains the bulk of heavy machine guns whereas the front lines generally utilize the light machine guns. The entire system of the line of strong points is heavily protected by barbed wire. This line also contains various command posts 6d? the lowar units and several support positions* It can be assumed that the support battalions have orders to offer resistance from this line* There are four communication trenches 2 1/2 kilometers long which connect this line of strong points with the system of the second position which is just in front of Perthes and Wolfsberg. The second position is organized in depth and consists of the trenches used by both sides in the former Champagne battles. Here there are numerous large mine craters, the remains of the former lively mine warfare. Salvage work on a large scale has not been carried out in the crater covered terrain for a long time. It is questionable if the trenches can assist a prolonged hostile resistance should one be contemplated here. The attack can in all probability, be carried across the crater area of the second position without any serious difficulties or hostile resistances. The somewhat more than 2 kilometers of terrain between the second and third hostile positions, especially the large Haidbar Woods on the western slope of Baumberg is covered by innumerable trenches which are interwoven with wire entanglements and prepared for defense. The third position which in Sector 5 connects up with its neighbor sectors, runs along the Romerstrasse (Roman Road) and is of latest construction* The position consists of individual, but located at regular intervals, large square strong points which are protected by strong wire eabanglements and provided with covered shelters for personnel. These -85 strong points in turn are interconnected by one or more parallel, but -well protected by barbed -wire, communication trenches. The entire con struction happens to be incompleted in Sector 5. It can be readily seen that this position because of its facilities to accommodate the reserves well up to the front, can offer determined resistance. The zone south of the third position continues to be intersected for a depth of 2 kilometers by old communication trenches, but these mill offer no material resistance or obstacle in the advance. From the Pietz to% beyond the Tourbe as far as the Bionne there are no more defensive installations in Sector 5* East of the Bionne the lane of Sector 5 -will run into the fourth hostile position -which runs along the Suippes—St. Ifenehould RR. On lift. Yvron which lies at right angles across the zone of Sector 5 in line with the ridge running to the southwest, there lies the Mt. Yvron—switch trench along the RR as far north as Maffrecourt which connects the fourth and third hostile positions. The fourth position including the switch position, on which the Italians were supposed to have worked recently, is in an incompleted condition. The trace of the trenches has not been completed. Obstacles are lacking almost entirely. In spite of this the Bionne Valley with its steep ascent to the Mont Yvron Ridge on the south bank still presents a formidable obstacle* During the past week 24 hostile artillery positions have been located in Sector 5. Up to this time there have never been more than 10 batteries opposing Sector 5. The enemy is making excellent use of roving batteries. The hostile artillery is well echeloned in depth for defense. The range of the firing positions from the front lines varies from 3 to 7 kilometers. Groups of batteries are located as follows: On the southern slopes of Waldhohe in the Artilleriewald (woods) in the eastern portion of Haidberfewald (woods) north of Baumberg and immediately north and south in the woods of the third position.^ The emplaoed guns in map square 2957/58 have individually become active recently, -86 (3) Now since the French have inserted an additional French division in front of the left flank of the First Army there has been a shift of the boundaries of the adjacent divisions on the right, moving each one regimental frontage to the east. The sector of the French troops opposite Sector 5 now reaches from Arbrehohe as far as Wetterecke. The prisoners captured during the past three -weeks belonged to the 6th Infantry Division but without doubt this division has been relieved and presumably replaced by the 43d Infantry Division. The 43d Infantry Division (regular) has been rated as an excellent assault division but during the recent battles at the Chemin des Dames it had lost 45% of its personnel so that at the present moment it can be rated as needing a complete rest. Confirming previous statements of prisoners, the listening-in equipment, it has been verified the 43d French Infantry Division has been moved into position with all three of its battalions. Each regiment has one battalion in the front linos, one in support and one in reserve. From the foregoing and in consideration of the boundaries of the French divisions, even though at the moment the exact numerical designation is unknown due to the scarcity of new prisoners, it can safely be estimated that at present the maximum hostile force opposite Sector 5 consists of one French combatant battalion mth probably t-wo companies in the front lines and the third company in the third position or main line of resistance in the protected gallery shelters in Corbiero Valley "fafcere the command post of the commander of the battalion is also located* Should the new division have been directed to the same billeting area as •was used by the 6th Infantry Division, then its support battalion T/dth three rifle companies and the machine gun company "which is split "mould be located in the second position or line of strong points* The reserro battalions of the regiment may have some of its units in Camp 642 and 742 (Camp A) behind the second position and with units in one or more camps south of the third position. The regimental command post is located on TOlfsberg viest of Perthes. -87 The headquarters of the division to vdiich the French Reginent opposite Sector 5 belongs is located in Somme-Suippes. St. Jean is the headquarters of the 161st Infantry Division vMch is its eastern neighbor. The camps in Sector 5 located behind the third position are still occupied by units of the eastern neighbor regfcnent i«hich is part of the 161st Infantry Division. According to the statements of prisoners the camps south of the Pietz (Camp p) contain the reserve battalion No. 215 and Camp 318X,Y,Z (Camp Allegre) contains reserve battalion 363. The recruit depot of the 161st Infantry Division is located in Laval. Nothing more is knoTan of other serviceable reserves. (signed) von Beczmrzowsky. Annex 6a copy Division von Becz-voarzowsky la Nr» 130 mob, rs. Div, Hdqrs., 7 July 1918. Strictly secret. Division Order No> 5 for the attack. A* Artillery, Special assault formations and Supporting -weapons* (1) The division artillery will be organized prior to the beginning of the attack for the development of the rolling barrage as follo-ws. (a) Infantry accompanying artillery. (b) Artillery to combat infantry targets (direct infantry support artillery), (c) Counterbattery firing artillery. (b) and (c) are mixed in with each other; (a) consists of only field guns (75s). -88 (2) Each infantry regiment -will ha-Te one infantry accompanying battery attached for the entire combat procedure. The batteries mil be brought formrd two nights before the attack by the infantry regiments. The regimental commanders mil allocate the infantry accompanying gun batteries to the front line battalions by platoon and batteries. Von Gerlach*s regiment which is on the right, mil have in addition to the above the Infantry Gun Battery of Albrecht (4 guns). (3) A direct infantry support group in addition to the infantry accompanying gun batteries mil function on strictly artillery missions •with the front lioe regiments and mil be organized as follows* (a) To Regiment von Gerlach: (Direct infantry support group right): Headquarters 2d Battalion 1 Battery field guns 1 light field homtzer battery 1 heavy field homtzer gun (b) To Reginent von Thauvenay (Direct infantry support group left): Headquarters 3d Battalion 2 field gun batteries 1 heavy field homtzer gun. The front line regimental commanders will bd the commanders of the "mixed detachrents1* and will have the artillery detachment commanders as their artillery advisors. (4) The direct infantry support group mil be constituted from guns (not attached to the infantry regiments) as follows: 2 heavy field homtzer batteries of 3 guns each 1 10 cm. battery, 1 mortar battery, all under the control of the headquarters of the heavy battalion. It will be subject to orders from the artillery commander who mil be at Division Headquarters. -89 The Field Artillery Regimental Commander will make his command post with the Infantry Brigade Commander. He will serve as the artillery advisor and has the povier to issue instructions to the "Direct Infantry Support Group" which are attached to the regiments of the brigade along the ideas of the brigade order, especially to secure the interchangeable cooperative functioning. He also calls for and regulates the counterbattery support Yiierever and whenever there is a break in the communications to the division to insure quick action on the spot. (6) This distribution and attachment of the Artillery Commanders to the Infantry Headquarters will assure the closest cooperation bet-ween both weapons by all headquarters, which is the first essential to the progress of an offensive and final success. (7) After the artillery preparatory fire ceases the rolling barrage will begin in compliance with special orders* Every infantry commander down to and including the company commander, will be furnished a sketch and time table of the rolling barrage. The infantry will follow closely behind the rolling barrage. (8) The infantry accompanying guns will not participate in the artillery preparatory fire nor the rolling barrage. They will come into action at the onset of the infantry assault at S-Time. Engineers will be attached to them to facilitate their quick traversing of the crater terrain. (See Par. D). All batteries of the "Direct Infantry Support Group11 lass the heavy field howitzers, will move forward at S plus 40 minutes* The heavy field howitzer will follow at S plus 90 minutes. One light field howitzer battery of the Counterbattery Firing Group will also more forward at S plus 40 minutes. The heavy field howitzer batteries and 1/3 of the light field howitzer battery will follow at S plus 90 minutes. The 10 cm. and mortar batteries will displace forward at the completion of the rolling barrage. -90 The transportation must be quickly brought forward for all batteries scheduled to change positions to assure the rapid displacement forward. The accompanying gun batteries -with the infantry -will be supported by the attached engineer platoons, the direct infantry support group, and counter- battery firing group must be supported by the engineers constructing the regimental roads* (9) The Direct Infantry Support Group -will then locate positions in the vicinity of Hill 197, in the folds of the terrain at the north edge of Waldhohe and on the north slope of Tfifolfsberg (south of Arbrehohe). Later they mil be moved forward to the northern slope of the ridge -which leads into the hostile third position in order to support the capture of the Pietz from that point* The Counterbattery Firing Group must absolutely follow the infantry by greater bounds because of delayed displacement forward in order to be in position in the vicinity of Tl&lfsberg—- Perthes to support the capture of the third hostile position. The fonward displacement of the artillery must be echeloned in order to keep part thereof ready for firing or supporting missions. The entire artillery must be instructed that it can best carry out its mission i f it can continually be at the heels of the enemy, closely follomng the infantry and moving forward as close to the enemy as the combat mission permits. Just by keeping up with the infantry they -will instill a feeling of confidence and superiority in them. B« Special assault formations (units)* (l) To assist in the attack the following -will be attached to von Gerlachfs Regiment: Assault unit A-ca of 75 men 1/2 Infantry gun Tbattery and numerous auxiliary -weapons of the 2d Co«, 2d Assault Battalion. To assist von Thauvenayfs Regiment the follomng are attached: Assault Unit Al of 25 men mth such supporting weapons as are attached to this Company. -91 Both assault units (shock troops) -will be brought forward as a unit two nights prior to the attack by the regiments and moved into the front lines behind the last waves of the front line companies in order to be on hand to immediately beat down any hostile resistance. After the Tour be is crossed they will be assembled and placed at the disposal of the division. (2) The 12th Tank Battalion consisting of five captured British tanks under the command of Captain von Frankenberg (2 male and 2 female tanks) will add impetus to the attack in the attack sector of von Gterlachfs Regiment. The tanks in their advance to the ridge line leading to the south are charged with the mission to assist in the capture of the hills noted in Division Order No« 2$ page 6, and assist in the penetration of the second and third positions. The attached special organizations will utilize their characteristics in close cooperation with the division to which they are-attached and will offer suggestions at correct times to assist in the attack. They will take their support positions I and II with the regiments, that is with the battalions in whose attack sectors they are to function. They will be unloaded at Manre two nights before the attack and then brought forward. The regajttents of von Gerlach and von Thauvenay will report by the evening of the 8th of July about the reconnaissance, discussion and plans for the general attackplans they have had with the special units. They will report by map overlays 1:10,000 those assembly areas still to be reconnoitered by the special units in the last two nights and submit reconmendations for their utilization by the evening of 8 July. -92 (3) Care must be taken that the previously planned attack tactics of our Infantry are not altered in these discussions with the special units. Every infantryman must be amre of the fact that the attack would fail if he permitted the special units to attempt the major portion of the attack* The infantrymen mil welcome their assistance but must not become dependent on it. The special units are to attack where resistance is encountered, break down this resistance and smooth the way for the infantryman. £• Minenwerfers. The 88th Minenwerfer Company -with four animal drawn medium minen werfers mil be attached by platoons to the regiments of von Gerlach and von Thauvenay and mil be ready and harnessed without its crew at their battalions in the vicinity of the regimental road at X — 30 minutes. Upon completion of the artillery preparatory fire the minenwerfer crews -will return to their transportation and will follow the assault infantry in compliance with instructions from the regiments. £l Engineers. The engineer companies of the division will be distributed as follows: to von Gerlach* s Regiment, 1 pjatoon" ) ) 249th Engineer to von Thauvenay1 s Regiment, 1 l/2 platoon ) Company, for the crossing of the crater terrain and the destruction of the obstacles in the front lines. There mil be 1 platoon of the 3d Company, 33d Reserve Engineers attached to each Infantry Accompanying Gun Battery for von Gerlachfs Regiment and with the Infantry Gun Battery. 1/2 platoon, 249th Engineer Company will be attached to the close range combat detachment. The Engineer troops mil join the troops t» which they are attached three nights before the attack and will arrive with them in assembly area No. 1. -93 The Lands-tuna Engineer Company XVIII Corps -which is attached to the division, mil repair the division supply road net and the regimental road on Y Day. During the last night it mil take position in the vicinity of the tunnel and will remain prepared at S-Hour to move from the line of departure and follow behind the first infantry assault -wave and immediately repair the roads* For detailed instructions of technical engineer features see Division Order Wo, "Special Instructions". The Engineer Commander will personally supervise the repair and construction of the streets and roads and will maintain communication with the division by an officer whom he will designate. E« Escadron (Cavalry). The Escadron of mounted Jagers will leave Belleville on the night of the 5th or 4th day prior to the attack and will move by individual units of mounted messengers, scouts and patrols (into -which they have been divided according to the special distribution plan) to those troops or headquarters to which they are to be attached. P» After the assault the Division Headquarters will move its command post beyond Hassauerhohe to Hill 197, thence on Wolfsberg (south of Arbrehohe) thence in the third hostile position and then on the Pietz. A special division order will give details relative to the communication and liaison. G. Sgecial orders will follow for: 1# Location and use of communication materiel. 2. Liaison and messenger^ service in the assault. 3. Location and use of combat aviation. 4# Special instructions for supply, evacuation and communications to the rear* (signed) von Becz-warzowsky. -94 Changes in Division Order No* 1 In Division Order No. 1 (Concentration) Section A, in general paragraph 18, insert the following for the last sentence! "in the night prior to the attack until X - 30 minutes the code word will be •Nothing New*11. 176th Inf. Brigade I 120 mob. Brigade Hdqrs., 8 July 1918, To the Brigade supplement to Division Order No. 1. 176th Infantry Brigade I a 113 mob. secret of 6 July 1918, supplement 3 must read 40 minutes before X - time - begin firing, (Signed) von Pfeil. Annex 7 Copy Brigade von Pfeil la 619 Brigade Hdqrs., 8 July 1918. Brigade Order« (1) The regiBBnts will report by the evening of 9 July which officers they contemplate to have as battalion commander replacements. (2) The battalion, company and platoon commander replacements will be carried out as follows: (a) With each reserve battalion, 2 company or platoon commanders. (b) With each regimental headquarters, 3 company or platoon pommanders* similar to the battalion commander replacements. -95 (c) With brigade headquarters, 3 platoon commanders, similar to the regimental commander replacements (designation of a definite staff officer who -will serve as regimental commander replacement will be announced later). (d) The remainder -will revert to the Field Recruit Depot on Y - 1 day. (3) The 426th Infantry will designate in addition to those reported to the brigade as platoon oommander replacements, three more officers to serve as company commanders and will report their names to brigade by the night of 9 July. (4) In the event of casualties the designated replacement if the casualty is a battalion commander will in turn immediately be replaced by a replacement candidate from the regimental staff and he in turn will be replaced by one chosen from the brigade replacement reserve. The brigade vacancy will in turn be filled from the Field Recruit Depot. (5) Under (d) above will be listed such officer candidates whose names will also be submitted by the evening of 9 July. (6) The replacement reserve for the Brigade Headquarters will report on Y - 1 Day at 7:00 I'M to the Brigade Command Post (nBulgarenhohew). (Signed) von Pfeil. Annex 8 Copy Gen. Hdqrs. Group Perthes la No* 100 mob. rs«, % July 1916. Transmitted by an officer. (1) Great caution will be exeroises especially during the last few days in reconnaissance which should be kept to a minimum. Only the company commanders of the front line battalions will be permitted to make any reconnaissance. -96 (2) The divisions now occupying the front lines are again cautioned that all reconnaissance must be conducted with a caution considering the contemplated offensive. All personnel conducting reconnaissances must be informed of these precautionary measures by the division now in line, Reconnaissances will only be conducted by men roaring the steel helmets and by units of the division in line which will be held accountable for the conduct of the reoonnoitering party. Maps will not be opened in the front lines and indicating directions by arm motions are forbidden. Both of these actions positively betray reconnaissance intentions. By order of the Commanding General, Chief of Staff, (Signed) van den Bergh, Colonel. Division von Beczwarzows&y la Ho. 129 mob. rs« secret Div. Hdqrs., 8 July 1918 Division Order Ho. 4 for the attack relative to the insertion and employment of the communication equipment. A. The frictionless cooperation of the telephone, wireless and other communications equipment, its rapid and anticipated installation conforming with the best method of its use and the following definite directions of inarch with the asix of signal communications to an advanced message center must be sought, from Brigade to Division Headquarters. The Division and Brigade will follow the axis of signal communications utilizing the former command posts of the loiuer units. In this manner it will preirent messengers being anable to locate command posts. -97 B« Telephones* Efforts must be made to maintain telephone communication, despite the distances involved to permit personal exchange of thoughts, etc, (1) The division telephone detachment -will be responsible for the maintenance of the axis of signal communication, and mi l follow the adjoining regiment on foot. It will establish a trunk line for the infantry from the communications terminal -with a switchboard at brigade* As long as there are but tm> regiments in the front line the trunk line will be kept close to von Gerlach's Regiment, later should there be three regiments in the front lines then with the center regiment. Special instructions have been given orally to the Commander of the Division Communications Detachment relative to the advancing of the trunk line, laying out the equipment enroute, apparatus and linemen maintenance service* A l/2 platoon will establish and maintain communication with the right neighbor division, the remaining 1/2 platoon will maintain the communications to the rear with the advanced message center of Army Headquarters* The remaining personnel and attached reinforoements will be used as trouble shooters (linemen) with the exception of t-wo squads -which will remain in reserve with Division Headquarters at the disposal of the Division Communications officer. If the infantry brigade is not located at the brigade switchboard, then it will be connected thereto by its own personnel by branch line. (2) As soon as the first trunk line is established the Division Telephone Detaehxrant will establish a second line for the artillery commander from his command post to the artillery message center which as a rule is located close to the brigade switchboard. The quick construction of this second line cannot always be depended upon. Since the artillery must establish its own telephone installations at the Artillery Commander's Command Post and the artillery message center, it has been found that the lateral communications to the division command -98 post and brigade switchboard come next and the artillery can use the infantry lines for their purposes. (3) The advanced communications terminal is the converging $>oint (tributaries) of the infantry lines, Regiirental and Battalion Command Posts yMch are close by -will immediately connect up -with it . TNhen the communications terminal i s shoved fonward the regiments and battalions flrom their new command posts will connect up with it again. The old lines mdll be dismantled after the new lines have been completed and communication to the rear has been assured. Likewise, the establishment and dismantling of lines between battalions will be carried on by themselves. (4) The artillery communications terminal is the tributary for the artillery lines to the troops. Direct infantry support artillery, left and right, will connect up with it at once, likewise the counterbattery artillery will connect up with Regiment Meier and the Artillery Commander on their own line and later with the infantry line. The counterbattery group will take direct communication with the Artillery Commander and will cause the communications to be run to the next Artillery Command Post nearest to it. The construction and dismantling will be the same as with the infantry. (5) Division and Brigade Command Posts and advanced infantry communications terminals will be occupied by telephone (Signal Corps) officers. The artillery communications terminal and artillery command posts will be occupied by unit (artillery) communications officers* C0 "Wireless Communications Service. (l) Wireless operations: They will assure unbroken communication during the advance of the principal command posts between them and the terminals of the axis of signal communications, also when telephone and visual light is out of order. -99 The Division Wireless Detachment will set up the following* At C.P. Regiment von Gerlach, one medium wirelessj At Brigade C.P., one large and one medium "wireless; At Division C.P#, one large and one medium -wireless No. 17. The second sets nrf.ll be set up when the Brigade or Division C.Ps. are "being moved fonward, moving with the headquarters. The first one will remain set up at the old C.P. until the new (2d) set is functioning, then dismantled and moved foimard. Messages beyond the brigade will be limited as long as von Gerlach1s Regiment i s advancing. The counterbattery artillery will receive three antennaes, that's trao from it s own equipment and one from Meier*s Regiment. Direct infantry support artillery right and left will each receive one additional antennae from the equipment of Meier's Regiment. The antennae will move forward by bounds with the batteries so that one or two are always ready to receive. The Division Wireless Batachment will furnish the division station two infantry aviation antennae. In exception to regulations the wireless equipment will march with the brigade telephone exchange, wnen the C.P. is located away from the telephone exchange for any length of time. It is best to avoid many changes of location of equipment. (2) Buzzerphone (telegraph)* This service is to furnish another means of comrmmication between the advanced artillery with the artillery regiment in addition to the telephone and the visual light service. One station will be set up with line to Regiment von Gerlach for the regiment and the direct infantry support artillery right, one station with a line to Regiment oron Thauvenay for the regiment and direct infantry support artillery left, one to the counterbattery group and two stations (one of which is a reserve station) to the artillery communications terminal at the brigade exchange. -100 Radio officers - including artillery sergeant majors as officer candidates - mil be sent to the Division, Brigade, and Artillery Communi cations Terminals and to Regiment von Gerlach. In all stations other than at the brigade and division, the communi cations officers will be attached to the headquarters but mil be super vised by the radio officer located with the brigade, (3) Visual Light (Blinkers)i The blinker service must cover the entire combat field even up to its most advanced point. This means of communication should be the easiest, fastest and lightest communication between large units and even the lower units to relieve the load on the telephone and other services, especially in impassable terrain, over valleys, •water and swamps where the installation of other equipment would require too much time and be too difficult to maintain. Blinker equipment, even down to pocket lamps, afford the best communication betvjeen assaulting troops working their way forward* In calling to the company and battery positions to open conversation the others will reply promptly with the code signal "Here we are", and immediately give their designation signal• The knowledge of the designated code identifications in the Morse Code will be of great help to the officers. (l) The Division Telephone Detachment will connect the communications terminal with the brigade exchange, the brigade exchange with the division and eventually with intermediate stations, should it be deemed necessary. Should it be impossible to operate the blinker service parallel to the axis of signal communication, then it will be fcetoured to get around dense woods, or too high mountains by use of wire communications connected to the army cable. In addition to these the Division Telephone Detachment will furnish lateral communication with the neighbor divisions and if possible to the rear to corps. At Division Headquarters the light blinker, Model 1917, will be used for communication with aviators and balloons. -101 (2) The infantry -will use the blinker lamps for service bet-ween battalion command posts and the regiment and mil not hesitate to call the brigade from the battalion through the brigade communications terminal or to the division terminal if this blinker path is free and -will assure quicker receipt of the message. The companies, battalions and the regiments also are connected by lateral communication* The units marching in reserve -will converse -with the exchange. The flank regiments assume contact -with the neighbor regiments. It is essential that this be established to the right. The regiment is responsible for contact -with the division blinker line* The light minenwrfers and machine guns must also establish blinker communications -with thsir organization command posts. (3) Like-wise the artillery blinker is bet-ween the communications terminal and the direct infantry support artillery left and right, counter- battery group -with the communications terminal and artillery commander, accompanying battery -with the infantry battalion, also lateral connection -with their advanced lower headquarters and neighbors. (4) The Division Telephone Detachment mil furnish one officer for the infantry communications terminal* (5) The ligit blinker Model 1917 mil be used by the infantry at its regimental headquarters and by the artillery at its direct infantry support artillery and counterbattery artillery for communications mth the balloons and aviators* D # Miscellaneous Communications Service. (1) Mounted messengers. As long as they possess understanding, honor, and love for country they constitute, mth the runners, the most reliable means of communications. They mil be used to the utmost degree but spared -when technical means can deliver the message faster. -102 Mounted men mil be attached to headquarters as follows: (a) To the infantry regiment, 3 mounted messengers „ 9 me n (b) To the advanced communications terminal, 2 mounted messengers (these will be — 2 mfin attached to the local telephone officer.) (c) To Brigade Headquarters, 1 NCO, 3 men as scouts and 4 mounted messengers 4 men 1 NCO — 7 men (d) To Division Headquarters, 3 scout squads of 1 NCO, 3 men 3 NCOs 9 men and 5 mounted messengers 3 NCO — 14 men (e) To the Military Police 1 NCO, 6 men 1 NCO — 6 men 5 NCO — 38 men The remainder of the escadron will go to the second echelon of the division. (2) Scout Squads (Infantry and Cavalry). They will follow the advance of the infantry either mounted or dismounted according to the situation and report their observations of the progress. In addition to the general report they will reconnoiter every important incident and report from periodically to their stations and report the information secured. The infantry scouts are on foot. The Artillery Commander will in a similar manner send a reconnoitering patrol to the front line battalion commander. The counterbattery group will locate by patrols the regimental command post of the front line regiment and the infantry brigade command post* (3) Runndrs: They will augment the activities of the mounted personnel in the front line up to the Battalion Headquarters. The condition of the terrain and the location of the hostile artillery fire will decide whether mounted or foot messengers will be used between the battalions and regiments. -103 (4) Cyclists: The cyclists are an important addition to the runner and mounted messenger as far as the battalion headquarters and wherever there are t raver sable roads or paths. The regiments will systematically divide their bicycles at the beginning, keeping out a reserve for replace ments* The brigade mi l furnish the advanced communications terminal with tiro cyclists and two bicycles, and the same to the brigade message center* These bicycles will be at the disposal of the local telephone officer. The Military Police under Sgt.Maj. Becker will receive five bicycles from brigade. (5) Carrier Pigeons: The pigeons will be quickly forwarded daily from the lofts at St. Morel and Vieux to the Division Command Post and a report will be made to the division every night as to how many were received and when they ware received, by the trained pigeoneers of the infantry and artillery to take them to their respective command posts. The division balloons will be supplied with pigeons when the pigeons are brought forward from the lofts. The initial receipt of the pigeons from the division will be one hour prior to the beginning of our own artillery fire by the brigade, regiment, battalion and detachment headquarters. Also for the Aimy Liaison Officer, During a very rapid advance the replacement of pigeons will be materially reduced* (6) Messenger Dogs: They cover such areas similar to the blinker which are difficult to traverse due to terrain, water or severe hostile fire and which is more safely traversed by the dog. Two dogs will be used between the communications terminal and the division. The regiments will utilize their dogs between the battalion and regimental command posts. It is difficult for a dog to traverse distances greater than 2 kilometers on a run. -104 (7) Pyrotechnics? I^rotechnio signals -will be announced by the brigade and artillery commanders and the attached Pyrotechnic Signal Table mil prevail. (a) Prior to the attack: Green —- barrage call Red ™ annihilating fire. (b) During the rolling barrage: Tflhite — our front line is here. (c) During the attack after the rolling barrage stops: Green — protective fire Red —- raise the fire "White ™ our front line is here. These signals as in position -warfare, are to be fired vertically in the air* (d) For communication with the infantry aviation (see the Division Order for Combat Aviation) the whit© signal -will be used to indicate the location of the front lines. The infantry plane, in addition to the streamer he uses, -will fire a white star signal when he calls for the infantry to display their panels. In reply to this signal request, all headquarters as far down as battalion and squad, -will display their panels, while the front line infantry will fire the designated white pyrotechnic signal. Hot until the infantry plane repeats its pyrotechnic signal will the advancing frontLine troops •wave their panels and place them on the ground to indicate the position. (e) The white pyrotechnic shells when fired horizontally toward hostile strong points, resistance nests, and approaching tanks mil indicate to the infantry accompanying battery (or our own tanks, etc. ) the direction of the target. -105 S i The contemplated Communication Terminals (See Div. Order Ho. 3, paga 4) Nassauer Bohe (Comm. Terminal No. 1 already set up) Hill 197 (Cosmu Terminal No. 2) South of Arbrehohe or ^blfsberg (Comm. Terminal No. 3) Third Position (Comm. Terminal No. 4) Pietz. (Comm. Terminal Wo. 5) The neighbor division on the right later will occupy communication terminals at Kluckhohe and Butte de Souain and the left neighbor division -will use Klitzinghohe, Fritschberg, Pistolenhohe, Bohmerberg. F* The combined use of all communication services as has often been rehearsed must now be practiced so that in case on means fails, that at no time -will the rear headquarters be uninformed of the situation at the front nor the front be unaware of orders or questions given from the rear. No matter -where a message is received it -will be the mission of every station to see that the message is forwarded promptly to its destination. G. Miscellaneous. (l) The new division -which is moving on is prohibited from using the telephone mthin a zone 4 kilometers from the front line. Emergency messages must be sent coded through the division actually occupying the sector. Our own radio and telegraph equipment must not function prior to the beginning of the attack. Afber the preparatory fire begins the communication traffic is carried on without code as far as Division Head quarters. (2) As soon as the combat has a lull or comes to a stop, the severest telephone conversation discipline will be resumed, code names and encipher all messages. All simple installations in front of the regimental command post will be dismantled. The artillery lines will be closed until aogood double metallic circuit can be installed. In rear of the regimental command post the lines should also be converted into double metallic circuits* -106 (3) The communication organizations have the right to overtake and pass columns on the halt or in march, in order to construct, repair or check on the communications net. (4) Troops must take great care to protect the telephone line along the route of march or across terrain from breakage. (5) The communications (signal) troops can receive food at any food distribution station by presenting a permit to receive this food. Also, they can receive billets in any village. (6) The division -wireless station, even during the advance, -will tune in with the command post to -which it is to be attached. The Division Communications Officer -will regulate by direct communication mth the division communications representative on duty mth the front line units, the occupation of the first advanced communications terminal and the brigade and division command posts by units of the 88th Division Telephone Detachment. (7) All communications personnel -will report themselves to their headquarters to be picked up for rations as soon as they are assigned. (8) A replacement for casualties in the mounted messengers can be made from the mounted officers* orderlies and such personnel H. Special attention is invited to la/la H. No 7107 op. rs. mob. of the army dated 2 July 1918 relative to the training for combat. The document "Orders for Liaison and Messenger Service in the Attack" will be issued to liaison and orderly officers by the headquarters. Special instructions as to the use of aviation in connection mth the liaison bet^en the infantry and the infantry plane mil be issued later. (Signed) von Becz-warzo-wsky. -107 Division von Becziwarzo-wsky I a/HJ War Diary No* 527 Secret, Division Headquarters, 7 July 1918 The follomng call codes are issued for the Visual Light (Blinker) stations -within the division: 1« Division von Becz-warzowislcy (a) Advance communications terminal ab (b) Brigade exchange bb (c) Division Command Post cb 2* Infantry Regiment von Gerlach (a) Regimental Command Post ag (b) Commander front line troops right ga (c) Commander front line troops left gb (d) Center battalion or reserve gc (e) 1st Company gl (f) 2nd Company g2 (g) 3d Company 6s (h) 4th Company g4 (i) 5th Company S 5 (k) 6th Company S6 (l) 7th Company S 7 (m) 8th Company S 8 (m) 9th Company &9 (o) 10th Company S* (p) 11th Company &? (q) 12th Company &z -108 3* Regiment von Thauvenay (a) Regimental Command Post at (b) Commander Front Line Troops right ta (c) Commander Front Line Troops left tb (d) Battalion as center or reserve tc (e) 1st Company tl (f) 2nd Company t2 (g) 3d Company t 3 (h) 4th Company t4 (i) 5th Company t5 (k) eth Company t6 (1) 7th Company t7 (m) 8th Company t8 (n) 9th Company t9 (0) 10th Company t x (p) 11th Company ty (q) I2fch Company tz 4* Regiment von Plato (a) Regimental Command Post aP (b) Commander .front line troops right pa (c) Commander front line troops lef t pb (d) Battalion as center or reserve pc (e) 1st Company P1 (f) 2nd Company P2 (g) 3d Company P3 (h) 4th Company P4 (1) 5th Company P5 (k) 6th Company P6 (l) 7th Company P (m) 8th Company P (n) 9th Company P9 (o) 10th Company Px (p) 11th Company P v (q) l^fch Company -1°9 " Pz 5* Regiment Meier (a) Regimental Command Post am (b) Direct infantry support artillery right (Hdqfcs. ma 2d Bn/Meier) 4th Battery ml 7th Battery m2 1 gun from 1st Bn. Heuze m3 (c) Direct infantry support artillery left (Hdqrs. mb 3d Bn/lfeier) 8th Battery m4 9th Battery m5 1 gun from 2d Battery Bn Henze m6 6« Count orbattery Group (Bn Heuze) (a) Battalion Command Post ah (b) 1st Battery (Hea-vy field Howitzers) ha (c) 2d Battery (Heavy field Howitzers) hb (d) 3d Battery (10 cm. cannons) ho (e) Mortars hd (f) Li#it field Homtzers (5th BatteryAfeier) he (g) Light field Homtzers (6th Battery/Meier) hf A.B. (Signed) Meene Captain, General Staff -110 Annex 10 copy Division von BecgTwarzowsky Ib No« 150 mob» secret Strictly secret Div. Hdqrs., 9 July 1918 •Special Instructions to Attack Order of 6 July 1918 for the organization of the supply & evacuation. 1« Map is attached for all the rearward communications and installations. 2» Highway and side roads> See attached map for the principal supply road of the Corps. This road can only be used by marching troops upon special permission granted by Army Headquarters. These instructions mil be most rigidly adhered to. Supply roads of the division for column and vehicular traffic including trucks is designated road M 5 W (see map. It is designated on the ground by signs -with the inscription W 5 n ). The Division supply road is designated principally for the general supply. In emergency troops can march alongside this road. At crossings with the principal supply road troops must avoid causing road Jams by crossing the road in small groups quickly through the gaps in traffic, (traffic police). Tanks mil move alongside the road. The combatant troops mil cross the trench and (grater terrain as follows: The Infantry mil move cross-country until the repair of the roads has been completed. -Ill In order to accelerate the climbing out of trenches the pioneers have been instructed to distribute and leave spades and pickaxes in the front line trenches with -which the infantry can cut footholds in the slope of the trenches. In the foremost trenches boards will be laid across the trenches. These boards are prepared into duck boards and laid across the trenches to facilitate the advance of the troops in rear. TlShere -wide trenches must be crossed these can be quickly leveled to facilitate the crossing by blowing up the brims and sides -with a bundle of grenades as an explosive* The 249th Engineer Company and five -wagons loaded -with temporary hasty bridges will be divided between von Gerlach's and von Thauvenay's Regiments, by brigade, to assist them in crossing the crater terrain. These engineers and their equipment will be moved up by the commander of the engineers with the first transport of the close combat equipment and turned over to brigade control. The artillery will be hauled forward during the change of position and the troop transportation will be moved forward on the roads which- are indicated by W5an and n5bn on the map. The 3d Company, 33d Reserve Engineers and five wagons of the artillery bridge equipment which is located with the leading section of the close combat column at the beginning of the assault will be brought forward by the Engineer Commander and will assist the movement of the artillery in the change of position* Six of the artillery bridges are designated for the crossing of the cratef* terrain and three for the crossing of creeks. These roads for the columns have been posted within our position system by markers inscribed in black as W5an and n5bw. These roads will be designated by white ribbons, small flags and small markers with which the 18th Landsturm Engineer Company is amply supplied. The Engineer Commander will check to see that the 18th Landsturm Engineer Company is equipped with white ribbon. -112 Both of the Engineer Companies of the 249th Engineers and the 3d Company, 33d Reserve Engineers, mi l only be used to accelerate the advance of the infantry and artillery and mil therefore be amply supplied with demolitions and wire cutters. Under no conditions mil they be used for the construction or repair of roads or bridges in terrain which has just been crossed by the leading infantry or artillery units* The Commander of the Engineers will see to it that the 18th Company, Landsturm Engineers will be so divided immediately after the infantry advances, that an officer will be designated to surprise the repair of each of the division supply roads and road for the regimental trains. The names of these officers will be submitted to Division Headquarters. Reconnaissance troops of the companies equipped with white ribbon and markers will move forward simultaneously with the assault troops and designate the direction of the road with their equipment. The Engineer Commander will personally supervise the pre paration of the designated roads and highways and will maintain one officer at division for liaison, (see Division Order No. 3 for the Attack la No. 130, mob. res«, strictly secret of 7 July 1918). At the corner of the road on the Nassauer Hohe (hill) and the Bulgarenhohe (hill) dumps will be established of material to be used for the crossing of trenches and the crater terrain. The shell crater area will be traversed in the following order by troops following the infantry* (a) Vehicles of the close range combat train with the engineers attached to the accompanying gun batteries. (b) Accompanying gun batteries with the ammunition carts and animal drawn minenwerfers with their attached engineers. (c) Light machine gun wagons Machine gun company wagon (1st echelon) Minenwerfer ammunition carts. (d) Mobile artillery and ammunition trains• -113 (e) Close range combat equipment vehicles ) ) on order Machine gun company mgon, 2d part and infantry ) of the ) Regiment ammunition -wagons ) Miscellaneous vehicles of the lid Echelon. ) (f) Field kitchens ) ) not until ordered Ration vehicles ) by the Division ) Message Center Miscellaneous vehicles of the Hid Echelon ) personnel at »ivision Headquarters• von Gerlaeh's Regiment mil use Kollen Road 5aj von Thauvenay's Regiment -will use road 5bj von Plato's Regiment has been assigned the division supply road. The artillery and other units mil use those roads assigned to the regiments to which they are attached. At the beginning of the assault one officer of the Military Police (Lieuts. Kervan and Klinge from the Field Recruit Depot and one officer of the traffic police) -will be ordered to each regimental road and to the supply road. They -will be responsible for the passage by individual vehicles and regulate and police these roads, to see that no unauthorized vehicles will cross the crater terrain. The Engineer officer mil notify him -when the necessary road repair is completed to permit passage of the transportation and he mil have the transportation promptly pass over the road. It will be the duty of all troops and columns halted in the crater area or difficult hostile positions, to assist artillery minenwerfers and troop vehicles fonward and take the initiative to remove the causes of jams, road blocks, etc. The minenwerfer units •which remain behind in the line of departure vdll especially assist the artillery in traversing the crater terrain. The intermediate Engineer Park Baden-Baden will have 20 signs with appropriate inscriptions ready to mark the roads and paths in the hostile terrain. -114 3« Railroads. (a) Pull gauge RR is available as far as St. Morel for munitions, engineer equipment, rations, ballast, hospital trains, artillery • empty material, replacements, supply trains• After the attack it is contemplated to quickly repair the full gauge RR Manre— Sommepy—Dontrion and Maure—Baden-Baden. (b) Field R.R. (meter gauge) From St. Morel via Liry—Aure—Maure—Baden-Baden -with connections with the munitions depot Liryberg, Aure, -with ration depots St. Morel, Liry and Aure, -with Engineer parks in Aure, Baden-Baden and -with the main dressing station. The field (meter gauge) ER i s the principal means of ammunition supply. The terminal -will be determined by the hostile fire on the day of the attack. It is contemplated to use the empty cars for the evacuation of -wounded. The narrow gauge RR is under corps control. Field tramways (60 cm gauge) -which are available are under division control. It is doubtful -whether any attempt mil be made to maintain the field tramway on the day of the attack. Connection with the tramway net in the hostile area as shown on the attached map and the repair of same may be taken up after the penetration of the hostile line. For this repair a supply of tramway rails and material have been laid down at the dumps as shown on the map. Such sections of tramway that are no longer needed north of the line of departure will be dismantled to extend the tramway immediately after the assault. This work will be under the Commander of the Engineers. He will have the 1st Co., 17th Bavarian Labor Detachment and the 2d Co., 110th Labor Detachment available for labor to construct the roadbed, etc. Orders will be issued later to bring up these troops for this work. Under no conditions will any of the hostile full gauge, field RR or tramway facilities be destroyed. -115 4* Military Police duty* Corps -will organize the military police service in the rear of the theatre of operations up to the area of the combatant divisions. Captain Fuchs, Commander of the Division Headquarters Troop -will be in charge of the Military Police service in the Division Sector vhile this is occupied. For this purpose he has the follomng at his disposal; (a) For the area north of the Sommepy—Maure RR: 3d Company, Rosenheim's Landsturm Infantry Battalion under command of the company commander* (b) For the area south of the Sommepy—Maure RR: Gendarme Troop of the 88th Infantry Division; ) ) Under Sgt. Maj* 1 Platoon Cavalry to be attached; ) Lieut. Becker ) 50 Jagers of the 76th Reserve Cyclist Co* ) The principal missions of the Military Police are: (a) Maintenance of road discipline and enforcement of traffic regulations on the main supply highway, supply roads and roads used by columns* (b) Preventing and breaking up traffic jams of all descriptions, especially -where ammunition supply was concerned at munitions distributing stations on the Idryberg, in Aure, and later at the road corner Nassauerhohe (hill) at the ration depots and Engineer parks, at the crossings of roads over 3R, at road crossings and roadforks, as -well as defiles, along routes of inarch and roads used by columns* (c) Supervision that no vehicular columns go back empty. -116 (d) Rounding up stragglers ana evacuation of miking oases of wounded and sick from the main dressing station to the lightly •wounded collecting station in St. Morel, (e) Guiding prisoners to the rear to the prisoner collecting stations of the division in Balkan Ravine. Captain Puohs mil regulate the distribution of sentinels and patrols for this purpose. He •will communicate with the former commander of the traffic police of the 228th Infantry Division, Captain Zimmer, Cavalry, now located in Corbon* From 3d Company, Rosenheim's Battalion: (a) A stragglers line is established under an officer for the control of traffic to the rear, this to be on a line with the Sommepy— Hanre R*R. This stragglers line may only be crossed to the rear by individuals upon showing their passes to the sentries posted there* (b) The road crossing in Aure -mill be occupied by a strong detail commanded by an officer to regulate traffic. The distributing point of the munitions depot and ration depot -will be occupied by a strong N.C.O* detail. (c) A detail of 1 N*C.O. and 10 men mil be stationed at the main dressing station in the former command post of the regiment in line for the purpose of guiding the walking cases back to the collecting station for the lightly wounded at St. Morel* The Military Police units (Gendarmerie) of the division plus the cavalry platoon which is still to report and the 50 Jagers of the 76th Res. Cyclist Company will all report to Sgt*Maj* Lieut* Becker on Y-Day for duty south of the Sommepy—Manre R*R* and remain ready at that point to follow directly behind the combat troops* -117 As soon as a town or camp has been captured, Sgt. Maj, Lieut. Becker enters with his personnel to take over all hostile magazinss, depots, engineer parks, etc*, and make an immediate rport of their contents, location and condition to Division, in conjunction -with the Segimental Supply Officer. They will collect and protect these supplies against pilfering. They will take energetic steps to. round up all stragglers and return them to their organizations. The combatant troops are also required to establish a special military police to supplement the activities of the police units mentioned above and carry out the above instructions with full severity. The 3d Company of Rosenheim's Detachment will occupy the ammunition camp at the road corner at Uassauerhill with a strong detail under an officer, as soon as the infantry attack begins. The exit points of the roads used by the columns and their crossings with the main supply road of the corps and the division supply roads will be occupied by details under a N.C.O. Further displace ment of the company forward as well as the prisoner collecting station will be made on instructons from the division. (See page 2 relative to the ordering of officers to the exit points of the roads used by the columns to be used to regulate the traffic on these roads during the crossing of the crater terrain by troops. All officers and men of the military police will wear white arm brassards with the division designation thereon* Their orders will be obeyed by all officers and men. On T-2 day the military police units will bi-rouac while on M«P« duty under cover in Monthois and on Y-l day in Aure. Captain Fuohs will report to Division Headquarters with two mounted messengers. -118 5. Ammunition: Corps munitions depot — Savigny and St. Morel Division munitions depot — Liryberg Advanced Division munitions depot — Aure Division distributing point — Aure Supply as far as the Division .Ammunition Depot, that is, as far as the division distributing point -will be by Field ER or columns by the corps* There may also be cases -where exceptions mil occur and the ammunition will be hauled by transportation from the division from the corps ammunition depot in St. Morel. The following will be at the disposal of corps on Y-day at 4:00 A.M. (a) On the Monthois—Marvaux Road with the head at Badener corner (under cover from air observation in the following order of march)* Army Motor Transport Column No. 100 loaded with 2000 rds field gun amm., 1000 rds field gun amm., model 1916, 800 rds light field Howitzer amm. Army Motor Transport Column No. 231 loaded with 500 rds heavy field Howitzer amm., 750 rds 10 cm cannon amm. Army Motor Transport Column No* 241 loaded with 600 rds light field Howitzer amm#, 300 rds mortar amm. (b) Along the road: Camp airdrome North-Marvaux, head of column at Spitzberg (road cleared and under cover from air observation): Transport Park Column No. 282 loaded with 1800 rds field gun amm., 900 rds field gun amm. Model 1916. -119 Transport Park Column No. 706 loaded -with 670 rds light field Howitzer amm., 275 rds heavy field Howitzer anrau S.O.S-. Ammunition Column No* 40 loaded -with 500 rds 10 cm. cannon amm., 250000 rds machine gun ammunition in belts. The responsibility of the troops starts when they load the ammunition carts or -wagons. •Artillery ammunition: The supervision of all ammunition replacement after Y-day •will be under the immediate orders of the division which is relegated to the Headquarters of the 2d Battalion, 275th F.A. as divisional ammunition headquarters. The ammunition headquarters -which must function until Y-2 day must check on the exact situation and condition of the ammunition depots assigned to the division. He must verify that they are filled and have his officer check that the munitions depots and firing positions of the advanced points have a sufficient supply. Special attention -will be given to the correct distribution of precussion pins and rods for sensitive fuzes by the munitions headquarters to see that the small box contains the correct number. Special officers are detailed for this purpose. A report will be made to Division on Y-2 day relative to the examination of the munitions depots and that all batteries have their required ammunition allowance. In addition to this the artillery commander will have his battery commanders and officers of his headquarters make a similar check that every battery has ammunition of the correct type and amount. A report will be made to the division by Y-2 day. -120 The mission of the munitions staff during the attack and advance: The regulating of the movement of all ammunition replace ment columns and battery columns in cooperation -with the artillery commander and division train echelon. It also regulates all issues of ammunition from the Division Munitions Depot after Y-day* This busy personnel (l/3 of the Artillery Park Co. Ho. 53, with Company Commander) will remain there for the time being, also during the attack and -will be attached to the Munitions Headquarters the entire time during a continued advance. The fallowing mil be attached to the Munitions Headquarters to assist in the ammunition replacement: 391st Divisional Train Echelon 137th Munitions Column 254th Munitions Column Division motor transport train less 4 trucks* In addition thereto, it -mill have all light ammunition trains in cooperation with the artillery commander* The Munitions Headquarters mil be responsible up to Y-l Day for the procurement and the filling of the columns, this in co operation with the artillery commander, division train echelon and commander of the division motor transport train. An order will follow as to the support. The Munitions Headquarters will be reinforced: (a) The Artillery Commander by a munitions officer; (b) The Division Train echelon by a liaison officer. The location of the Munitions Headquarters and the Division Train echelon after 4:00 A.M., Y-l Day will be Aure. Communication between the Munitions Headquarters and the Artillery Commander (Div. Hdqrs.) will be established by Lieut. Hinrichsen after 12 July from Ripont Sector to Division* -121 All requests for artillery munitions and artillery equipment must be made through the Artillery Commander. 3 1/2 days fire has been designated for the attack. Its distribution on Y-day mil be as folloira: Two days fire and gas and smoke ammunition in the firing position; Part of one days fire -will be in the column and battery echelon; The remainder will be in the munitions depot or at dumps. The ammunition of the accompanying gun batteries and infantry gun battery mil be provided by the Corps Munitions Depot and -will be received by special request from the Artillery Commander* The field gun batteries -will take 2 munition -wagons (only caissons) per gun, yfaich -will be replished from the light ammunition column* The gun caissons -will also be loaded in like manner* The ammunition for each must consist of 100 rounds blue cross shells, 12 small shells of fixed munition and 30 caliber 30 cartridges* 15 armor piercing shells* As a rule these batteries do the same as all other batteries changing position and instead of using long shells they use the Model 1915 shell because the caisson can carry more and the trajectory of the 1915 Model shell coincides closer to the range tables and -will furnish more accurate firing niiien exact information of weather influences are lacking. All the caissons and munitions mgons of the batteries, light ammunition column and battery columns of all other artillery parti cipating in the scheduled change of position must be harnessed and loaded, waiting in their assembly areas* Its ammunition supply must have blue cross and for the field gun batteries smoke to place artificial fogs on minanwerfor (trench mortar) nests* These mil receive this ammunition from the depots and dumps from mhich they mil receive them from the columns not later than Y-l day, upon instructions from the Artillery Commander and the Munitions Hoad -122 quarters. (The Munitions Headquarters -will check beforehand that sufficient ammunition will be available). The ammunition in the vehicles must not be used prior to the change of position except in an emergency. Should any be used in any other cases it will be replaced at once* The light ammunition columns and battery columns of those battalions and batteries which are to participate in this change of position will not be used after Y-3 day to haul ammunition but from this day on will be brought forward by the Artillery Commander. The artillery which will come under Aimy control after the artillery preparatory fire is completed will only be supplied with caisson ammunition* The Artillery Commander and the Munitions Headquarters will report to the Division Headquarters by the evening of Y-l day that all caissons and ammunition wagons ot the batteries, the light ammunition columns and battery columns as well as the ammunition columns and all the attached trucks of the Division Motor Transport are filled. After the assault begins both of the Ammunition Columns, the attached trucks of the Division Motor Transport will be used to fill the ammunition camp this side of the crater area as soon as the iafantry advance beyond the road corner Nassauer-hohe (hill)* A detail of labor troops from the 4th Company, 9th Labor Detachment will be attached to the Munitions Headquarters for this purpose* The exact number for this detail will be announced later* Ammunition will be supplied to all the advanced artillery units on the first day, taking precautions, due to the close proximity to the enemy* The light ammunition column and battery caluran, the caissons and ammunition wagons will fill directly at the ammunition camp at the road corner Nassauer-hohe (hill) in compliance with orders from, the Ifcmitions Headquarters. Supply for this camp has been -123 delegated, by the Munitions Headquarters to it s attached ammunition columns and -when possible by the tram railway. Additional orders relative to supplying ammunition will be issued from tin* to time as the attack progresses. A definite understanding must exist at all depots as to the number of shells and fuzes available therein* This information is especially important at the ammunition dump "which mil be established at Uassauerhohe immediately after the attack begins, because the Munitions Headquarters at this early date, must designate the amount and figure on the number of wsn required to handle it. Requisitions mil be accurately filled and a receipt given for that -which was received. This especially pertains to the issue of the instantaneous and delayed fuze rods for the sensitive fuzes. All ammunition depots will if possible, be provided with telephone communication. "When the batteries change position there will be an appreciable amount of ammunition left behind at the gun position despite the fact that its original amount had to be kept to the minimum* This expensive ammunition must not be left laying there for any length of time, otherwise it may deteriorate causing unnecessary demands on ammunition supply. Corps will assume the responsibility of collecting this ammunition and will organize a special collecting headquarters for this purpose. Detailed orders for this will follow. For the present the following is ordered. (l) Every battery when it changes position from its initial firing position will dispatch a well oriented mounted messenger to the Corps Collecting Headquarters with a special message from the battery commander relative to the place, amount and type of ammunition left behind. These mounted messengers remain until the ammunition is collected by the Collecting Headquarters and will serve as guides for the transportation which does the collecting* -124 (2) The Artillery Commander will detail a mounted officer to supervise the collecting of the ammunition within the division. For this purpose a chief articifer and a mounted messenger are assigned to him* Communication must be established between the Division Ammunition Headquarters and the Corps Collecting Station by mounted messenger* The collection of ammunition must start immediately afber the attack. Placards will be placed at collecting points with the in scription MUo souvenir ammunition* Left when battery changed position!n to prevent the continued thieving of empty shells* If the artillery unit can anticipate the early forwarding of the ammunition left behind to its new gun emplacement it will leave a sentinel at the old position or a sign marked "This ammunition will be called for"* The batteries will have signs of this type prepared and ready to take into the positions with them* In order to secure as soon as possible an idea of the maximum amount of ammunition available at the beginning of the forward dis placement of the artillery the troops must report immediately the amount they expended and the amount left behind. The Artillery Commander will report by 6*00 A.M. daily to the division: (a) The expenditure since the last report (b) The number of guns in firing condition ready to fire (e) Amount of ammunition on hand* If these reports are not forthcoming, then a special officer reconnaissance of the ammunition situation will be ordered. The troops must be aware of the importance of these ammunition reports of the individual batteries and that these are made keeping their interests in mind* -125 The collecting and transportation to the rear of all empty material is of great importance because the replenishment of ammunition hinges on the quick recovery of empty containers* It is especially important that the shell cases of the heavy and super heavy flat trajectory ammunition be forwarded to the home factories as quickly as possible. All empty containers mil be marked -with signs in yellow letters at the munitions depots or camps in lure and -will be taken to the division collecting station at Hassauerhohe. Prom this point they will be transported by Field RR or returning vehicular columns to the corps collecting station in St. Morel or the advanced corps collecting camp in Maure. See page 12 for details relative to the collecting service. Infantry and Machine Gun Ammunijbion. One Infantry Munitions Depot -will be established for each of the regiments -with machine gun ammunition in belts. These will be located at the line of departure and -will have 1,000,000 rds of -which 200,000 mil be in belts. In the immediate vicinity of the depots -which will be marked by large signs and road markers there will be dugouts with units on Y-l day to place ammunition in belts. The corps will keep a reserve of belted machine gun ammunition on the SOS Ammunition Column S.40 and in Corps Munitions Depot at Mouther's ready for issue. The next ammunition replacement will be made from the regimental depot. Each regiment will establish a regimental depot after Y-2 day under an officer as commader of the reserve and a belt filling detail of 1 NCO and 6 men with all the available belts and machine gun ammunition boxes. The supply of machine gun and infantry ammunition will also be made by trucks from the division motor transport train which in an emergency can move it quickly to the front. -126 This must not be interpreted that front line units can a short call for ammunition. These units must be informed that calls of this nature may upset the supply schedule. Instead of just calling and reporting on ammunition shortage they should take steps to have ammunition brought forward. Machine gun units must be cautioned not to depend on the supply of belted machine gun ammunition. It -will be the rule more often that they must reload their empty belts. The basis of smooth machine gun ammunition supply is the immediate return of the belts to the rear. The brigade -mill provide for the personnel for the belt loading details for the second and third echelons (for example using the regimental musicians). It -will make arrange ments for the quick delivery of empty belts to these locations. "Within the troops the ammunition replacement mil be as follows: (1) The infantry ammunition -will be replenished from the accompanying infantry ammunition -wagon. (2) four light machine guns -will be taken by each company from the light machine gun wagon. The 5th and 6th guns of the company mil be loaded on a wagon and moved back to the second echelon. Every light machine gun going up to the front should ha-re 2500 rds to go with it; for the 4 guns 4x2500 * 10,000 rds. Since the wagon holds 12000 rds there will be 4x200 s 8,000 rds remaining which will be loaded oh a single wagon as a mobile reserve to move as close as possible to the front. The two available empty wagons will go back to the above named infantry munitions depot to refill instead of refilling at the third echelon which is still far to the rear of the line of departure for the attack. (3) Each heavy machine gun will take 3000 rds with it to the front. Since each wagon carries 8000 rds there will be 2000 rds left when the two guns are supplied. The remaining supply from the three machine gun wagons will be loaded on one wagon and follow the combatant troops as a mobile reserve. The two empty wagons will go back to refill. In exchange two loaded wagons of the Machine Gun Company of the second echelon will move to -127 the front* The Corps will establish a corps machine gun equipment depot at the narrow gauge RR station in Savigny* A similar divisional machine gun equipment depot will be established by the brigade in Toges as the collecting depot for the division. After each machine gun company has taken out three Model 1908 machine guns the brigade will order the surplus machine guns and surplus equipment to the corps depot at Savigny until 9 July with the exception of 10 machine guns which will be set aside at the division depot mth the machine guns of the 1st Jager Eskadron. A complete report will be made to the division by the evening of 9 July (as previously directed). Orders will follow relative to the eventual future forward dis placement of the corps machine gun equipment .depot* "When new equipment is received the old unserviceable equipment will be turned in and the transaction will be noted on the prepared credit and debit slips. The brigade will render a report every morning to the division showing the use of machine gun equipment and munitions by the regiments on the previous day* MJaenwerfer - Munitions, Close Range Combat Weapons and Engineer Equipment. Corps Engineer Park St. Div. Intermediate Engineer Park Aure 3 Regts. Eng* Park in line of departure Minexrwerfer Dump at Engineer Park Baden-Badexu The following minenwarfer ammunition is available: (a) for each minenwerfer participating in the firing at least 50 rds heavy, 40 rds with vanes, 50 rds medium and about 200 rds light ininen warfer shells* -128 (b) in addition to the foregoing there will be a 1<# reserve in the advanced positions for defective ammunition or shortage and use up to the time of the attack* (c) allowance of load for the vehicles of the assault division. Each division will be allowed 160 rds medium and 1500 rds light minenwerfer shells. These can be received upon request from the Engineer Commander by Y-t day. The Brigade and Engineer Commander must render a report to the division by the evening of Y-l day that the loading has been com pleted. (d) There mil be 100 rds heavy, 500 rds medium and 5000 rds light shells placed in the trench mortar dump in the engineer park Baden-Baden protected against the -weather. Replacement of mininwerfer ammunition: Close range weapons and engineer equipment will be supplied from the advanced engineer depots and minenwerfer dumps by the troop transportation during the progress of the attack. Corps Headquarters will be responsible for the replenish ment of the Division Engineer Park. The division close range weapons column will call on the 657th Transport Park Column to be loaded on Y-l day in conjunction with the 391st Division echelon train at the corps park in St. Morel, this in compliance with instructions fromthe Engineer Commander. A report will be made to the division that the loading has been completed by the evening of Y-l day by the Engineer Commander. See page 10 relative to the attachment of the close range weapons column, and baggage trains. The close range weapon column must only be moved forward for replacements upon orders from the division after the above named engineer park has exhausted its supply. -129 The Engineer Commander will take charge of the supply after the penetration has taken place. Special instructions are given: (a) Minenwerfer ammunition* Since no special minenwerfer column is available a platoon of the close combat weapon column will be organized for the first replenishment for the minenwarfer company and light minenwerfer detachment of the infantry regiment after their own reserves are used* The two miaenwerfer carts carrying only 24 shells and forage for 2-3 days will remain loaded as long as possible with the first echelon and will be replenished from the light minenwerfer wagon. The initial ammunition allowance of the firing position will be covered against waather by the Carrying detail* (b) Engineer Equipment* The scheduled load of the close range combat weapons for the infantry is too heavy for the small Russian horses* The load can be made lighter by eliminating the grenade projector* Likewise the number of hand grenades are reduced* It is essential that the rifle grenade ammunition used with the grenade tromblones be taken along* See above for the loading of the close range combat weapon column* Protecting hostile engineer parksg See page 3 relative to the contemplated protection of captured hostile engineer parks. A record will be kept by the police service and on the maps of the previously located hostile equipment parks. An officer (name to be given later) will be detailed as salvage officer t -130 a guard detail secured from division immediately to such hostile engineer parks and dumps which are reported by the troops or military police to safeguard and inventory this equipment. Be will render an inventory report to the Engineer Commander with an attached map sketch 1:25,000, The report and sketch will be forwarded to Corps (Engineer Staff Officer 63). 6. Rations: Division Rations Depot: St. Morel and Livy with 7 days requirements Advanced Division Ration Depots: Aure with 5 days requirements. 3 Regtl. Ration Depots in the line of departure with the following supplies: 3000 rations canned meat 3000 rations zwieback 3000 bottles seltzer water 1000 cartoons canned heat 3000 candles 1000 boxes matches. On Y-2 day these supplies will be taken over by an officer of the Commander Reserves for each regiment. A report will be made to the division on the evening of Y-l day giving the name of the officer and statement that the supplies have been taken over. Issues from these depots will only be made in an emergency, then only on order from the Regimental Commander. At the beginning of the advance the depot will be taken over by the Division Supply Service. Troop ration allowance. (a) Each man will hav eon his person: 2 iron rations less canned vegetables 2 canteens filled with coffee or tea 125 grams of dried fruit -131 2 cigars 4 cigarettes 1 container of canned heat 1 box matches 1 candle to be issued until supply is exhausted 1 bottle seltzer -water. Troops in the front lines mil have in addition to the above: 2 rations of preserved meat 2 rations of sausage 2 rations of bread. "Whenever these articles of food cannot be carried by the personnel they mil be placed on the ration cart to be brought up later. (b) Every Company, Battery and Column mist possess in the kettle of the rolling kitchen 1 ration per man in the ration cart 1 iron ration per man on the ration T/sagon and forage isagon 1 ration of dried meat per man 2 rations forage per animal (The preparation of the ration depends on the available means of prepareing the forage). 2 portions of canned vegetables -which each man should carry on his person. In addition each Infantry, Engineer and Minemrcerfer Company will carry: 3 -water bags (Lister Bags) 6 small(Marmite cans) food containers issued by the Division Supply Officer, -132 (c) Medioal Company and Field Hospital each 1000 rations z-wieback ) 1000 rations canned meat ) ,__ ) For issue to 1000 rations dried fruit or vegetables ) ,«A , .^ ) iwounded only. 100 liters of brandy ) 5000 cigarettes ) in addition thereto 3 cook kettles to be erected at ration stations at the regimental (main) dressing station. Road sign mrith inscription "To the regimental (main) dressing station iwith ration kitchen". A supply of shirts, underdravjers and socks for 100 men. All equipment for preparation of food •wfaich is lacking for fully equipping men and organizations can be secured at the ration distributing station. Other preparations. (a) On the evening of Y-l day prior to the departure, ample hot food mil be brought to the new assembly area. In the night there -will be an issue of tea •with brandy, sausage and bread. It is problematic -whether the field kitchens can be brought forward on the first day. This -will make the soldier dependent on the rations he carries on his person. After the second day every effort must be made to have the field kitchens brought fori«ard so that the troops can be served warm meals. (b) On Y-l day a mounted assistant to the supply officer vdll report to each regiment. Regiment von Plato: Asst. Field Depot Inspector Ziehm PiSegiraent von Thauvenay: Field Depot Inspector Acting Officer Levdnski Regiirent von Gerlach: Field Depot Inspector Acting Officer Kochanski. -133 These assistants to the supply officer who move forward -with the regimental headquarters mil assist the supply officers especially in taking over and safeguarding the captured rations supplies. All former hostile supply and ration depots that are discovered mil te reported to the Regimental Headquarters by this assistant to the supply officer* He will provide their safeguarding and checking in cooperation with the Gendarmerie of SgfcvMaj. Lieut. Becker and will report the amount of artillery and other supplies to the Division Supply Agencies. The regiments will be responsible for the rapid delivery of these assistant supply officers1 reports to the division supply agencies. The assistant supply officer will turn over the supplies immediately after a guard has been placed over them to the senior officer or N.C.O. mho will be responsible for their condition and safety. The assistant supply officer '•ill then return to the regimental headquarters. Troops will be informed that severe punishment will be meted out to all who take any of the captured ration supplies. All of these supplies of food and usable equipment should always be made available to the combatant troops as soon as possible to be of real use to them. In making these available there should be an equal distribution to all participants, care being taken not to waste or destroy any of the sup plies. To facilitate the rapid evaluation of captured equipment for the troops, a column of several light wagons will be placed at Sgt» Major Lieut. Becker's disposal to transport the captured rations and useful supplies back to the division supply agencies. The distribution will be ordered on instructions from the civilian supply assistant to the division supply officer to the troop units which participated in its capture* -154 It is the duty of every commander to inform his subordinates of the gist of the above statements thereby preventing the senseless plundering and careless destruction of articles of great value. He will picture to them the plunderer in the same light as the thief in the Fatherland and that severe punishment will be meted out for infractions of this sort. In order to make absolutely certain that the rations -will be brought forward from the ration distributing station to the troops each company 'will detail an extra baggage mgon to the ration supply officer, in addition to that already available for that purpose. In this manner it mil be possible for the surplus transportation to keep in touch -with the supply agenoy during the period -while the local supplies are being transported to the troops instead of having the ration supply officer or his representative there. It is then also possible that even though the ration vehicles are going to the rear out of schedule that they can get the next issue to the troops in time. The troops must take care that the ration supply officer be informed in time of their ration needs to prevent any reconnaissance of the rations coming late or not getting to the troops at all. The responsibility rests -with the troops themselves that this be regulated in time. They should use the communications service available at the switchboard of the Commander of the first eombat echelon. To pre-vent the request for the next ration issue -which is delivered through the switchboard by the troops from coming too late the following precautions are given: Each ration supply officer mil leave a mounted or cyclist messenger to collect the orders -with the ration agency. This messenger ydll be required to wait for the nexfc ration issue request and forward it at once to the ration supply officer or his representative. -135 Should the location of the ration distributing station be changed the ration supply agency mil lea-re a representative at the old site to instruct the messenger -with the ration requests inhere to go* Messengers must sign at the ration supply agency that they are familiar mth the orders pertaining to ration distribution. See par. 10 on Columns and Baggage trains relative to instructions about the attachment of the ration train to the division supply officer. Service. (a) Regimental aid station. One or tw> regimental aid stations nri.ll be located in every regimental sector of the front line regiments. (The regimental surgeons mi l issue the necessary instructions for the medical occupation of these aid stations. On Y-2 day 12 litter bearers of the Medical Company mil be detailed to the regimental aid stations for the evacuation of •wounded to the main dressing station. These litter bearers mil remain at the disposal of the regimental surgeon until further notice* (b) Main dressing station. During the night of Y-l and Y day the medical company mil establish a main dressing station at the intersection of the Balkan ravine and the Sommepy— Challerange RR (Command Post of the front line regiment)* The medical company will also establish a resting station for the sick and -wounded milking eases in the close proximity of the main dressing station. The location of this resting station mil be visibly marked by signs. From this point the sick and wounded mil be assembled in larger groups and marched under special guides to the collecting station for the lightly -136 wounded. On Y-2 day one NcO and 10 men of the traffic military police will report to the medical company as guides for these inarching wounded. This detail will remain with the medical company for this purpose until further notice. These guides will return after each trip to the medical company where they will report to the chief surgeon the time of arrival of their group at the collecting station for the lightly wounded. (°) The collecting station for lightly wounded will be in St. Morel. (d) Field hospitals. There are or will be established: Field Hospital No. 54 in Liry Field Hospital No. 141 in Corbon. Two motor omnibuses will be placed at the disposal of the field hospitals for the transportation of the wounded from that point to the rear. The division surgeon will make the distribution ©f these motor omnibuses upon their arrival. This will be announced later. Evacuation from the main dressing station to the field hospital will be conducted by medical trucks or in prepared cars of the field RR. Empty columns are instructed t© take back such wounded who are unable to march. For the evacuation of wounded from the main dressing station the medical company will have one medical truck evacuation train consisting of 6 pneumatic tired motor ambulances and one small passenger auto, as well as 2 prime movers consisting of the truck prime mover for sitting wounded plus 3 trailers for lying cases, the time of arrival of this evacuation train will be announced later. -137 Medical carts -will be distributed to the infantry regiments (1 per Bn. ) These -will be amply equipped with medical equipment (bandages, splints) 100 iron Nations and 100 bottles of mineral water and "will be mo-ved as close to the regimental add stations as possible. Here they "will be unloaded and then used to evacuate litter cases* They id.ll move forward -with the regimental aid stations. The infantry medical wagon will follow the second echelon. Each regimental aid station, main dressing station (resting station for walking cases) and approaches to them will be plainly marked by signs. The medical carts will be provided with signs previously prepared. At 12!OO noon on Y-l day a mounted messenger of the Jager Escadron will report to the regimental surgeon for his exclusive service. Attention of the troop surgeons is invited to the directive of the Division Surgeon, No. 1918/18 of May 8, 1918. The regimental surgeons will be responsible that the subordinate doctors and medical personnel are made familiar with the medical installa tions and approaches to them. Water supply. The use of unboiled water is strictly prohibited. The medical company will be provided with a drinking water sterilizer. Detailed information will be issued by the division surgeon. There will be 40 hand water carts (of 100 liters each) and 10 horse-drawn water wagons, of 200 liters each, placed at the disposal of the division. Infantry Brigade similar to the attached Engineers. Artillery SO handcards 7 horse-drawn water wagons. 10 handcarts 3 horse-drawn water wagons. -138 It will be up to the troops to decide -whether they -will take the horse-drawn -water vagons. If these wagons are not taken then they mil be returned to the Division Collecting Depot. The -wagons can be secured from the corps engineer park at St. Morel on 11 July. Well sinking troopst The Engineer Commander in cooperation with the division surgeon, -will get in direct contact -with the Engineer Commander of the Tahure Sector to discuss the reinforcements required to establish a -well sinking detachment or reinforce the one now -with the front line division. The strength of these detachments should be 1 UCO and 10 men mth ample -well drilling equipment. The Engineer Commander -will report by the evening of 11 July the number of men available for reinforcements, the amount of 'well drilling equipment mil be transported by the close range combat -weapon column. Delousing troops. A delousing (sterilizer) -wagon will be issued to the medical company. A delousing unit consisting of 1 UCO and 10 men will be organized in the Division Sector. For this purpose the available delousing troops in the division will be assembled into the one unit. To accomplish this the division surgeon will get in direct contact with the division surgeon of the Tahure Sector and will report the results of their meeting to the Division Headquarters by the evening of 11 July. 8* Veterinary Service. (a) Veterinary hospital will move into billets in Baills Chateau on the night of Y-3 - Y-2, where it will establish its service. -139 (b) Veterinary Collecting Station of the division mil be located south of the -wide ridge north of Aure. Dr. Kohler mil be in charge of the collecting station. The veterinary hospital -will furnish 1 NCO and 12 men and 1 animal-dram transportation wagon for the collecting station. Dr. Kohler will move into this location on the night of Y-2 to Y-l day and prepare the location in the "woods thereabouts against air observation. All injured and sick horses will be taken to the Veterinary Collecting Station. Skinning details will not be organized because it is the responsibility of the corps collecting service to skin the dead horses and bury or remove their cadavers. 9. Equipping the troops with clothings equipcent and munitions* A — Infantry. (a) The soldier. Orders will be issued but it is definitely understood that pack, overcoat and tent square will be taken. (b) The Company. Based on Army Orders. 6 machine guns Model 1908 or 1915, one of which as equipment, one as tactical reserve, each light machine gun to have 2500 rounds of ammunition in belts of which 500 rounds will be armor-piercing. Each infantry cartridge wagon as far as possible will carry 1200 rounds of rifle ammunition. (c) The Battalion. 2 light miaenwerfers, the remainder to be turned in, The gun crews released when the weapons are turned in will be used to reinforce the ammunition carrying troops. -140 Each light minenwarfer mgon mil carry 72 projectiles. The grenade throwers will be left behind. (d) The Machine Gun Company. 9 machine guns - 3 of -which mil be kept as equipment reserve. 6 machine gun "wagons, each -wagon carrying 2 guns with ammunition and accessories. 9 machine guns -will be turned in. Each Model 1908 machine gun mill be on machine gun wagon and the machine gun munitions echelon mil carry 4500 rounds of ammunition in belts of which 500 rounds will be armor-piercing. Remarks? Each infantry ammunition and close range -weapon wagon (depending upon their load capacity) will carry 500 pyrotechnic "Very light11 shells. B. ~ Artillery and. Engineers Regulations will cover the equipment of the individual soldier. The recommendations of tha Engineer Commander will govern for the equipment of the engineer personnel and detachments. Any surplus equipment and clothing not required in equipping the personnel will be turned in to the Division Collecting Depot at Toges (see par. 10) columns and baggage trains. 10* Columns and Baggage Trains. Columns. The following are attached to the Division train echelon No. 193. (a) For tactioal and administrative purposes: .Ammunition Col. Ho. 137 - load capacity 27 tons Ammunition Col. No. 354 - load capacity 20 tons (as an ammunition column) -141 (b) Only for administrative purposes: Transport park column 697 - load capacity 27 ton as ration train Transport park column 657 - load capacity 30 ton as close combat •weapon train. The division train echelon regulates the munitions column in compliance with orders of the Munitions Headquarters. The ration columns are tactically under the Division Supply Officer -who "will regulate their movements. The close combat -weapon column is under the control of the Engineer Commander who mi l regulate its movements* The Division train echelon udll be located in Aure after 4$00 P.M. on Y-l day. The Division Motor Column "will have 3 vehicles at the disposal of the Division Supply Officer, 1 vehicle at the disposal of the antigas officer, the remaining vehicles will be at the disposal of the Munitions Headquarters* Orders will be issued relative to alerting the columns. Baggage trains* (a) Field trains. (Usually orders are issued in advance and have just —~—~—— been received). The field train exclusive of the ration vehicles and all surplus baggage such as field desks, records, reserve equipment and clothing, welfare equipment, field furniture of all des criptions, personal articles of the men as -well as the surplus troop equipment such as light machine guns, heavy machine guns, grenade throijers, etc., will be left in the collecting station at Toges #iich -will be prepared by Lt* Leichner in time to receive the above by the morning of 9 July. A complete report that the above has been carried out will be rendered to division by noon 9 July. Sgt. Major Lieut. Riedel of the 426th Infantry will be -142 the responsible officer and will supervise this unloading of surplus equipage. The watchman detail will arrive by 12:00 noon on 8 July and will be made up of the following -which will be under the command of Sgt, Major Riedel in Toges. (1) From the Gantry Brigade: per Bn.: 1 NCO per Co*: 1 man (2) From the Artillery Commander: per Bn: 1 Sgfc* or senior NCO per Bbys 1 man (3) Engineer Commander: per Company: 1 man (4) From the remaining units* per unit: 1 man. Commanders will immediately designate these men. Rations will be received from the ration dump at Ballay. St. Major Lieut. Riedel will organize the sentry service as soon as the first field train arrives. Nothing can be taken from the depot without authority from Division Headquarters* later these supplies will be segregated by organizations - orders for this will be issued later. The company escort wagons will be loaded at the Division Collecting Depot and will be taken along as two supply wagons. Combat train. The combat train will be organized as follows: (a) Infantry: Battalion: 1st Echelon: 2 grenade thrower carts 4 light machine gun wagons 3 machine gun company wagons plus telephone and visual light equipment and all pack animals. 1 medical wagon* -143 2d Echelon: 3 MG Co* "wagons (including store wagon) 1 light minenwerfer munitions -wagon 2 close range -weapon wagons 1 medical wagon 1 infantry munitions -wagon 1 entrenching equipment wagon 1 telephone wagon The inclusion of water wagons will depend on available animals and is optional 3d Echelon: (Heavy trains) 2 close range weapon wagons (the remaining vehicles of the machine gun company, including the forage wagon) 1 map reproduction wagon 1 ration headquarters wagon 5 field kitchens (rolling kitchens) 10 ration vehicles Regimental Hdqrs« 3d Echelon: 1 Headquarters ration wagon 1 minenwerfer - Regt. armour wagon 1 map reproduction wagon 1 telephone wagon 1 M.G. officers' wagon. All infantry vehicles are drawn by two animals. (b) Artillery: Field Artillery Bn: 3d Echelons 4 communications equipment wagons, Antenne, etc*) 3d Echelon: 1 Headquarters escort wagon 4 field kitchens (rolling) 4 ration wagons 4 shuttle wagons 4 forage wagons -144- 3 carts with spare parts* Regtl. Hdqrs: 3d Echelon: 1 Hdqrs. escort wagon First Art. Bn.: 3d Echelon: 1 Hdqrs escort mgon 6 field kitchens (rolling) 12 ration and forage wagons 3 shuttle wagons 3 spare parts wagons (c) Engineers: (including minenwerfer Co.) The attachment of the combat vehicles of the Engineer Company and Minenwerfer Company to the infantry and artillery echelons will depend on their tactical useand will be decided upon after a conference between the 1st and 2d echelons of the regiments with the Commander of the Engineer Company. The field (rolling) kitchens with their kitchen carts and forage wagons of the minenwerfer company will move with the 3d echelon. The 2d echelon will be commanded by the transportation officers of the individual battalions. Lt. Biennecke, Commander of the Field Trains of the 353d Infantry Regiment, will also command the third echelon of the entire division. The field train commanders of the other regiments will be subordinate to him. !Ijhe first echelon of the combat train will closely follow their combatant troops upon orders from their battalion commanders. The Regimental Commander will issue orders for the movements of the second echelon* It will not cross the shell crater area until the artillery and its munitions vehicles, as well as the minen merfers, have crossed. The Division Headquarters will regulate the movements of the third echelon'toward the front. This especially pertains to the movement of the field kitchens and the ration issue vehicles which will not be brought forward until the -145 division authorizes it. The Infantry Brigade, Artillery and Engineer Commanders -will coordinate -with the front line troops and then request the division to order the field kitchens, etc., forward. The division mil almys designate to -what place the field kitchens can be brought to the troops and after the food distribution is completed it designates when and where they -will rejoin the third echelon. The Commander of the third echelon -will be responsible for the accurate execution of these orders* Assembling the echelons of the combat train* All three echelons mil move -with their units into their new billets during the night of Y-3 and Y-2* The vehicles of the third echelon of the troops (less the field kitchens) will assemble in the assembly areas during the night of Y-2 - Y-l. The field kitchens will still be with the troops in Liry under Bt* Brennecke and will go into bivouac in that town or its vicinity under cover from air observation* Assembly areas will be reconnoitered* Messengers to receive orders will be at Division Headquarters all the,time. After the troops depart, for their new assembly areas, on the night of Y-l and Y, the second echelon will close up by regiments in the area north of the HR covered from air observation ready to move out, The field kitchens will remain in place as part of the second echelon when the troops move out. They will remain in their late assembly area when the second echelon departs and will close in with third echelon from this point when the third echelon moves forward. The first echelon will remain with their battalions and will be assembled south of the RR closed up by battalions* It is essential that a check be made of the loading of the wagons and the condition of the animals* -146 11* Prisoners* Corps prisoner collecting station — Maure Division prisoner collecting station — Balkan Ravine The prisoners will be escorted back to the prisoner collecting stations by the Gendarme troops, that is, during the attack along the main supply road, division supply roads and roads used by the various columns* The Gendarme troops are composed of the 3d Company Landsturm Infantry Battalion Rosenheira* A record will be made at the collecting station of the number of prisoners received and their organization designations. The details conducting the prisoners to the collecting points will receive a written receipt for the prisoners delivered* The Division will designate the following units for sentry duty at the prisoner collecting station: 2d and 3d Companies Landsturm Infantry Battalion Wehlau. Orders will be issued about the transportation of the guard detail, billets and rations* Also the commander of the collecting station will be named later* 12# Salvage Service, The Corps Headquarters will establish the salvage service. The corps salvage camp will be located in Manthois, the advanced salvage camps will be in Maure and the RR Station of Ardouil* The Division Salvage Camp will be at the Munitions Depot at Aure and at the munitions camp at Nassauerhohe (hill)* The salvage activity will be conducted by units of the 2d Salvage Company which will be under the command of the division salvage officer who will receive instructions from the corps salvage officer. No transportation will return to the rear empty. The traffic police are instructed to check and see that this order is enforced. Commanders of columns oominfc back empty will be punished* Every field RR returning -147 from the front must bring back material. All reports of captured guns will give the barrel number to prevent duplication. These reports mil be made to the Division Headquarters accompanied by map 1:25*000 showing the location of the guns. The guns will be marked with chalk W88th Infantry Division". The corps salvage service will be responsible for the collection of this booty. Similar reports will be rendered on captured trucks, bicycles, tanks. The robbing of booty for spare parts will be severely punished, Special units id.ll be organized to prevent the looting and pilfering of captured articles. No dead will be buried with uniforms, boots or equipment on the body. 13» The following labor companies were attached to the division: 4th Co., 9th Labor Regt. ) ) to be placed at the disposal 1st Co., 17th Bav. Labor Regt. ) of the Engineer Commander ) for road and narrow gauge KR 2d Co«, 110th Labor Regt. ) construction. The 4th Company, 9th Labor Regiment will be divided and sent to the various ammunition depots, engineer parks or reinforcements to the well drilling unit or to assist in the clearance work for moving the balloons. Detailed instructions will be issued later relative to the above work and the bringing forward of the labor troops. 14« Intelligence stations. Intelligence Headquarters for the division in Ballay. This will be prepared by the Army. Corps will prepare additional intelligence stations at the RR station of St. Morel and also the straggler collecting station. -148 15. Antigas defense. The companies, escadrons and batteries -will carry a lOfo reserve of their gas masks and containers in the second echelon vehicles, and a similar amount of the oxygen protective equipment nuith the third echelon vehicles. The battalion headquarters -will carry along the field breathing resistance tester. Supply: The division gas officer procures the necessary supply from the advance depot and makes daily trips in his truck to the vicinity of the ration distribution point so that the troops can load the required gas protective equipment on their ration mgons viien they come for their daily ration issue. The troops can then formrd these required antigas defense articles by their ration carts, rolling kitchens, or ammunition carts, to the front lines. The same procedure is used in supplying the troops -with chloride of lime. Every man should carry a small package of chloride of lime, similar to his first aid kit, with him. For this purpose each man will provide himself -with a small -waterproof, airtight container about the size of a coffee can (tin can for shoe polish, dubbing or cigarette case of lead, etc. )*s Since chloride of lime deteriorates quickly in dampness and in the open air, it is essential that the container be airtight, etc. 16. Mail service. Instructions mil be issued later. -149 Supplement No* 1 to par* 2) Highmys and roads (will be inserted bet-ween both paragraphs). The 320th Minenwerfer Company which is in position to participate in the preparatory fire has been called upon by the Direct Infantry Support Artillery Ho. 5 to assist the infantry accompanying gun battery with its animals from the first echelon and second echelon in the sector of the right regiment of von Gerlach* It is a matter of honor and espirit for them to work with the engineers to assist the division, the infantry and artillery during the attack to speedily cross the she 11 torn crater area. The Minenwerfer Engineer Company 320 will therefore be relieved not later than 12s 00 noon about 1 1/2 kilometers south of the line of departure and on Hill 197. They will then reassemble at their gun positions* Supplement No, 2 to par* 5) (insert aftef Engineer Equipment) "When the Engineer Park is taken over in the Tahure Sector all the personnel not organically assigned to the sector will remain behind* The Engineer Park Detachment will then be reinforced by men from the 4th Company, 9th Labor Regiment* The exact number of men will be ordered later* By Y-2 the Engineer Commander must take over the engineer parks plus the regimental engineer parks. A report that this has been completed will be rendered to the division by the evening of Y-2. Supplement No* 3 to .par* 6) Rations (insert after the last sentence) Sgfc* Major It* Becker of the Gendarmerie will place and report the arrival of the following on Y-l day* 8 Gendarmes to the ration officer at Sfc* Morel 1 Mounted messenger to the ration officer at St* Morel 2 Mounted messengers to the division supply officer at Ballay* signed von Beczwarzowsky -150 to Annex 10. 176th Infantry Brigade I b Ho« 131 mob, rs. Secret, Brigade Headquarters, 9 July 1918 Supplements by the Brigade. To Section 5. Infantry and M,G, Ammunition. The location of the munitions depots in the line of departure will be indicated on the maps being forwarded to the regiments. In a conversation -with Division Headquarters instructions "were given that corps desires that belts and belt loaders be maintained at the munitions depots. The regiments must also give each belt loading detail several belt loading machines, A report will be rendered to the Brigade Command Post "Bulgarenhohe" by the morning of Y-l day that these depots have been taken over by the regiments. In the event of a continued advance, the belt loading details mil be moved forward by the regiments according to the situation and attached to the second echelon. To Section 5, At the bottom of Par, 4,:~ The belt loading stations in the second and third echelons will be prepared by the regiments by calling on those members of the regimental band -who are not engaged as litter bearers. To Section 5. At the bottom of Par, 5,: As long as the third echelon is located behind the line of departure the two remaining empty •wagons will be loaded at the depot referred to and used as planned. The units concerned will be notified to this effect. To Section 5, At the bottom of Par, 6«g Sg-t, Major Lieut, Riedel of the 426th Infantry will prepare the division equipment depot at Toges, The following will be turned in to the division depot in Toges: from the 353d Infantry and 426th Infantry each will turn in five Model 1908 machine guns. The 353d Infantry and 42©th -151 Infantry will each turn in 4 and the 352d Infantry 9 machine guns, Model 1908 to the corps depot in Savigny. A report will be made by 4s00 P.M., 10 July, that these turn-ins have been completed. To Section 5. At bottom of Par. 10. A report of the expenditure of machine gun equipment will be rendered by 7:00 P.M. daily after Y-day, to the brigade* The regiment must consolidate these reports as much as possible before they are submitted. To Section 5« Minenwerfer Amm. o. It is imperative that the minenwerfer vehicles should be loaded now because there will be no opportunity to do so in the assembly area. To Section 5. Grenade tromblone ammunition (rifle grenade). Assignment of this is urgently desired. To Section 6. Additional information will be issued relative to the ration depot, as corps has made some changes. To Section 9. c. Two light minenwerfers per battalion will be turned in to the Division Equipment Depot to Sgt.Maj.Lt. Riedel, by the 426th Infantry, similar turn-ins will be made of grenade projectors. Confirming report that this has been done will be rendered by 10 July. Sgt.Major Lt. Riedel will inform the 426th Infantry by 4:00 P#M. that the Division Equipment Depot is ready. To Section 10. Baggage (field trains )• The turning in of surplus equipment will be in compliance %lth the corps order on what equipment, the individual soldier is carrying. All preparations will be made to turn in the surplus by the evening of 10 July. To Section 10. Last Par. The report rendered to the division is no longer required* Signed von Pfeil. P.d.S. name Lieut: Adjutant -152