War Diary from July 15 to August 3, 1918
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88th IKFANTRY DIVISION TEAR DIARY From 1 January 1918 to 10 December 1918 Extracted: War Diary from July 15 to August 3, 1918. Translation from the German bys GUSTAV J. BRAUN, Major, Infantry, Assistant Librarian* The Command and General Staff School Port LeaTOmsorth, Kansas. 1937 88th INFAOTRY DIVISION MR DIARY FROM 1 JANUARY 1918 to 10 DECEMBER 1918 Extracted: War Diary from July 15 to August 3, 1918, Source a); Combat report of the 88th Infantry Division, relative to the fighting in the Champagne during the period of 15 July to 1 August 1918. Index 1* Introduction (orientation)• 2» The attack terrain* 3* The hostile positions* 4« The hostile distribution of troops* 5« Our own. order of battle (distribution of troops) 6. The deployment of our own. troops* 7« The day of the attack* 8« The combat results* 9« The fighting in the outpost zone. Appendix (a) Personal -writings of the German Crown. Prince. (b) Our own losses* (c) Booty of the division (captured material). (d) Combat experiences. (e) Map 1J25,OOO. -1 I* Introduction (orientation)« At the end of June a^ter the division had been moved into the Ripont Sector immediately following the close of the "Great Battle in France", it was taken out of this sector and moved into the vicinity around Ballay east of Vouziers. Here it was to complete the training of those necessary replacements that had lately arrived in preparation for the contemplated offensive. The division was selected in cooperation with the XVI Corps for the decisive position in the attack in a 2 knu (1.2 miles) wide zone (Division - Sector 5) via the road Tahure—Souain to Perthes and thence in a southeasterly direction to the Tourbe* The 88th Division was not to engage in the preparatory phase of this offensive as a front line division except in slight measure in that its minenwerfer company and some of the communications troops and trains were moved up to support the front line division (228th Infantry Division). The remaining troops, e specially the infantry and the artillery, were not informed of their attack sector until they made their reconnaissance when they both reconnoitered their assembly areas. The terrain was especially wall suited for the approach march of large forces of assault troops into the assembly areas. The assembly areas on the north were entirely masked from enemy observation by the ridges which run from west to east, namely, Butte de Souain—Kir schberg— Uassauer Hill—Hummerschere. Horse and wagon traffic was possible to just in rear of the front lines. Our own position -which was organized in depth, permitted the forward assault battalions ample billeting possibilities, for those battalions in rear, the combat train and echelons, there -were excellent assembly spaces in the -well kept conifer -woods and the numerous ravines well hidden from aerial observation. II. The combat terrain. Nassauer Hill which is located in the old front line, offers an excellent panoramic view into the combat terrain. The far reaching, pine •wooded range of hills with its deeply out ravines and protruding ridge noses gives the entire terrain feature of the Champagne a distinctive picture,, -2 Initially the assault zone -wJiich is 7 km* (4.5 miles) deep runs beyond the Roman Road in a north and south direction, going from the northerly heights of Arbre Hohe via Hill 197, Waldhohe, Tfllblfsberg, and Baumberg to the range reaching to Pietz. The only place -where this range is cut is bet-ween Arbre-Hohe and Hill 197, -where three ravines cut through from east to west, namely, the Arbre ravine, Manstein ravine and Courbiere ravine. The Pietz with its 207 meter hill is -without question the most outstanding elevation in the entire sector. It joins -with the previously mentioned ridge coming from the protruding lettereoke in a south-westerly direction over Muhlenhohe 190 -which is southeast of Perthes. The five basin-like valleys of Perthes are surrounded by both these ridges and the angle formed by Klitzing-Massiv. Generally the terrain dominates and provides visibility far into the rear area. The we stern slope of the range of hills running to the south of Arbre Hill -with its protruding noses and depressions is covered by a continuous scrub forest, except for a few scattered and sparsely covered fir groves, the sector is generally barren* The road net is not dense, various roads leading from the north join at Perthes, from -which in turn several roads go into a southerly direction. In addition to this, during the dry season, the chalky terrain off the roads is traversable for heavy truck trains. The crossing of the area immediately north and north-roe st of Perthes, -which is covered -with shell craters from previous fightings -will be difficult even though t-wo roads -which are now being used by the French lead across it, one coming from the Waldhohe and the other from the east edge of the artillery woods. III. The hostile positions. The hostile trench system is disposed in numerous positions. -5 The first position runs through numerous trenches one behind the other on the slopes of northernmost Arbre heights, and running in and bet-ween the Arbre, Manstein and Courbiere ravines. The main line of resistance of this position, Tranchee Lafargue, runs along the ridge betTween Arbre and Manstein ravine; it -was the reverse slope position and possessed the necessary position equipment. The support line -whose trace ran on the heights immediately south of the Courbiere valley through the communicating trenches, Lamar and Eberfeld Woods ms connected up with the first position by seven serviceable communications trenches* According to previous observations it "was assumed that this line -would be strongly garrisoned and manned by the advanced units of the support battalion* The bulk of the heavy machine guns -were also formerly emplaced in this line -whereas in the forward lines only light machine guns had been observed* Four communications trenches 2 l/2 km. (lo5 miles) long connected this support line with the second position system -which reached in front of Berthes and Wolfsberg* The second position was organized in depth, and it ms made up from the front line trenches of both sides from the time of the Champagne battles* The numerous large mine craters are traces of the former vigorous mine warfare. It was doubtful if the enemy contem plated a stubborn resistance here. At any rate, ifc must be reckoned that the progress of the attack over the crater field, even though it met with only moderate opposition, would encounter considerable purely material difficulties* Two kilometers (1*3 miles) in rear of the second position was the third position, a thonoughly modern construction of large strong points completely interconnected with communication trenches. It could be assumed that this position which was considerably in advance of the billets of the reserve battalions, was prepared for a delaying defense. -4 The zone south of the third position -was also traversed for about 2 kms. (1.3 miles) by old trenches. Behind this position, as far as Tourbe in Sector 5 there -mere no more fortifications. Beyond the Tourbe -was located the great fourth position with the Mont Yvron switch position in construction. IV. The hostile order of battle. At the beginning of July an additional French division was inserted in front of the left flank of the First Army and consequently the boundaries of the right adjoining divisions -mere shifted one regimental breadth to the east. It was not definitely known which divisions -were opposite Sector 5. Three weeks ago the 6th Infantry Division was identified through captured prisoners but in the meantime it could be estimated that it had been replaced. It is believed that it was replaced by the 43d Infantry Division. This division was rated high as an assault division but during the recent fighting in the Chemin des Dames it had lost 45% of its personnel so that at present it could be referred to as a division needing rest. Its sector extends from Arbre Hill to Betterocke. Three regimental sectors were verified to be in this sector by means of the listening in equipment. From previous experience it could be assumed that each of the three regiments had one battalion in the front line, one battalion in support and one battalion in reserve* From this it could be concluded that opposite the entire Sector 5 at the moment there was at most, 1 French front line battalion with possibly 2 companies in the front line and the third company in the rear trenches of the first position. Also based on previous experience it could be assumed that the support battalion was located in the above mentioned support line and that the reserve battalion was located in billets behind the second or surely the third positions. -5 That the garrison of the advanced combat zone had recently been augmented rather than diminished could be assumed, since more traffic had been observed during the last few days in the first position, also more energetic machine gun fire was noticeable and a greater number of smoke columns from dugouts -were visible than heretofore. Daring the past few -weeks the enemy had prepared t-wenty-four artillery positions in Sector 5 which he used only at intervals. At the same time there were never more than ten batteries active against Sector 5 , apparently the enemy made ample use of roving guns. The hostile artillery was defensively organized well in depth; the distance of its firing positions varied from 3 to 7 kms« (1.9 to 4.3 miles). V* Our own combat dispositions« To the right of the 88th Infantry Division was the I Bavarian tony Corps -which had been moved in for the attack.