DOCSLIB.ORG

Moral Lessons from Psychology

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Moral Lessons from Psychology Henrik Ahlenius Moral Lessons from Psychology Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their Relevance for Ethical Theory Moral Lessons from Psychology Lessons from Moral Henrik Ahlenius ISBN 978-91-7911-354-4 Department of Philosophy Doctoral Thesis in Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, Sweden 2020 Moral Lessons from Psychology Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their Relevance for Ethical Theory Henrik Ahlenius Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Friday 18 December 2020 at 13.00 online via Zoom, public link is available at the department website. Abstract The thesis investigates the implications for moral philosophy of research in psychology. In addition to an introduction and concluding remarks, the thesis consists of four chapters, each exploring various more specific challenges or inputs to moral philosophy from cognitive, social, personality, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 1 explores and clarifies the issue of whether or not morality is innate. The chapter’s general conclusion is that evolution has equipped us with a basic suite of emotions that shape our moral judgments in important ways. Chapter 2 presents and investigates the challenge presented to deontological ethics by Joshua Greene’s so-called dual process theory. The chapter partly agrees with his conclusion that the dual process view neutralizes some common criticisms against utilitarianism founded on deontological intuitions, but also points to avenues left to explore for deontologists. Chapter 3 focuses on Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer’s suggestion that utilitarianism is less vulnerable to so-called evolutionary debunking than other moral theories. The chapter is by and large critical of their attempt. In the final chapter 4, attention is directed at the issue of whether or not social psychology has shown that people lack stable character traits, and hence that the virtue ethical view is premised on false or tenuous assumptions. Though this so-called situationist challenge at one time seemed like a serious threat to virtue ethics, the chapter argues for a moderate position, pointing to the fragility of much of the empirical research invoked to substantiate this challenge while also suggesting revisions to the virtue ethical view as such. Keywords: consequentialism, deontology, emotion, ethics, evolution, innate, moral judgment, moral philosophy, psychology, utilitarianism, virtue. Stockholm 2020 http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-185993 ISBN 978-91-7911-354-4 ISBN 978-91-7911-355-1 Department of Philosophy Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm MORAL LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGY Henrik Ahlenius Moral Lessons from Psychology Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their Relevance for Ethical Theory Henrik Ahlenius ©Henrik Ahlenius, Stockholm University 2020 ISBN print 978-91-7911-354-4 ISBN PDF 978-91-7911-355-1 Printed in Sweden by Universitetsservice US-AB, Stockholm 2020 To my beloved Lisa and to our kids Stella and Tom I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for having achieved my life’s ambition, to find a way of answering moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was sur- rounded on the mountaintop by the graves of all those other phi- losophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical worms had been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the achievement was an illusion. Richard Hare Preface 1 Introduction 5 1 The resurgence in empirically oriented philosophy 8 2 The rise of the new empirical moral philosophy 9 3 The plan of this thesis 13 4 Moral innateness 14 5 What pushes our moral buttons? The neuroscience of moral judgment 15 6 Bracketing our evolved psychology 15 7 Lack of character? 16 8 Why this? 17 1 Is Morality Innate? 19 1 The meaning of innateness 22 2 Innateness in non-moral domains 24 3 Morality – content and capacity 26 4 The emotional bases of moral judgment 28 5 Morality as commitment device and social signal 30 6 The Moral Foundations Theory 32 7 Universal Moral Grammar 34 8 Framing effects 36 9 The moral/conventional distinction 37 10 The case against innateness 38 11 Conclusion 41 2 Deontology: Reductio ad Amygdalam 43 1 The trolley problems 43 2 The trolley problem from a psychological point of view 45 3 An fMRI investigation of emotions and moral dilemmas 46 4 Accounting for the results 50 5 Philosophical relevance of the study: a problem for deontology? 53 6 “Emotions bad, reasoning good” 54 7 “Deontological judgments are based in heuristics” 55 8 “The argument from evolutionary history” 55 9 Deontological judgments as responding to irrelevant factors 56 10 What is added by the empirical work? 61 11 Restating the challenge 62 12 What are deontological and what are consequentialist judgments? 63 13 Conclusion 66 3 Coping with Debunking: Ethical Truths of Reason 69 1 Evolutionary debunking 70 2 Sharon Street’s challenge 71 3 Accounting for miracles 72 4 Self-evidence in ethics 74 5 Debunkproofing moral principles 75 6 Agreement of other careful thinkers 77 7 No evolutionary explanation 79 8 Is what survives empty? 83 9 Can universal benevolence be debunked too? 84 10 Concluding remarks 86 4 Virtue Ethics, Schmirtue Ethics? 89 1 Situating the debate 90 2 The problem 92 3 The case against robust character traits (“globalism”) 94 3.1 Help for a dime 95 3.2 Obedience to authority 95 3.3 Clerics in a hurry 97 3.4 Bystander effect on helping behavior (“Lady in distress”) 97 4 Implications of the psychological data 98 5 Virtue ethical responses 99 5.1 Virtues do not allow for that kind of testing 99 5.2 No surprise here, virtues are rare 103 6 The science of individual differences 105 6.1 Vicious biology 106 6.2 The Five Factor Model 108 7 Between a rock and a hard place 110 8 Situationism – in psychology, and in philosophy 116 8.1 The ongoing reappraisal in social psychology 117 9 Conclusion and moving forward 120 Appendix: Same but different 124 5 Concluding Remarks 129 6 Svensk sammanfattning 133 7 Bibliography 145 8 Index of names 161 Preface The goddamn thesis is finally finished! I started graduate school so long ago it has become an embarrassment. Former students of mine finished before I did – something that is, our head of department in- formed me in brazen denial of the thesis’ major presupposition, “un- natural and, hence, wrong”. A friend told me, in yet another misguided attempt at cheering me up, that a possible upside to working for such a long time on the dissertation is that my chapter on the evolutionary origins of moral thinking must be the first ever Pleistocene eyewitness account of what really happened back then. Oh well. Anyway, here it is. I wish to thank the many friends and current and previous col- leagues who have provided support over the years. These include Sama Agahi, Jonas Åkerman, Gustav Alexandrie, Per Algander, Simon Allzén, Erik Angner, Gustaf Arrhenius, Andrea Asker Svedberg, Con- rad Bakka, Lars Bergström, Katharina Berndt Rasmussen, Stina Björk- holm, Greg Bognar, Björn Brunnander, William Bülow O’Nils, Åsa Burman, Staffan Carlshamre, Åsa Carlsson, Jens Dam Ziska, Hege Dypedokk Johnsen, Jonathan Egeland Harouny, Karin Enflo, Björn Eriksson, Romy Eskens, Daan Evers, Maria Forsberg, Anna Petronella Foultier, Lisa Furberg, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Jimmy Goodrich, Johan Gustafsson, Gösta Grönroos, Sören Häggqvist, Bob Hartman, Anandi Hattiangadi, Lisa Hecht, Mattias Högström, Madeleine Hyde, Mats In- gelström, Mikael Janvid, François Jaquet, Sofia Jeppsson, Eric Johan- nesson, Hana Kalpak, Karl Karlander, Mirre Khan Oidermaa, Ulrik Kihlbom, Simon Knutsson, Palle Leth, Johan Lindberg, Sandra Lind- gren, Anders Lundstedt, Hans Mathlein, Andreas Mauz, Victor Moberger, Niklas Möller, Tara Nanavazadeh, Pavlo Narvaja, Jonas Nordebrand, Karl Nygren, the late Ragnar Ohlsson, Niklas Olsson Yaouzis, Sara Packalén, Peter Pagin, Martin Peterson, Anna Petrén, Mikael Pettersson, Dag Prawitz, Marcel Quarfood, Daniel Ramöller, Emma Runestig, Peter Ryman, Håkan Salwén, Stefan Schubert, Levi Spectre, Henning Strandin, Maria Svedberg, Gunnar Svensson, Kjell Svensson, Nils Sylvan, Claudio Tamburrini, Torbjörn Tännsjö, Folke Tersman, Amanda Thorell, Olle Torpman, Hans-Jörgen Ulfstedt, Emma Wallin, and Åsa Wikforss. 1 An early version of chapter two was presented at University of Gothenburg’s Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of Science. Many thanks to organizer Ingmar Persson and all the others who participated in those discussions. I was most fortunate to be able to spend a semester working with Gilbert Harman at lovely Princeton University. I thank Gil and the many new friends I made while there, in particular Mark Budolfson, Angela Mendelovici, Philipp Koralus, and Jack Spencer. My stay at Princeton was made possible by grants from The Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education (STINT) and from the Anders Karitz Foundation. I am very grateful to both of these institutions for their support. For many years, I’ve had a second academic home at Karolinska In- stitute’s ethics group within the Department for Learning, Informatics, Management, and Ethics (LIME). I was given the opportunity to pre- sent an early version of chapter four there, and I wish to thank my many good friends at LIME: Gert Helgesson, Annelie Jonsson, Niklas Juth, Petter Karlsson, Anna Lindblad, Niels Lynøe, Tomas Månsson, and Manne Sjöstrand. A third and more recent academic home has been DIS where I’ve taught a course on medical ethics for American students spending a semester in Stockholm.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics”
    Regina A. Rini (forthcoming). “Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics”. To appear in Springer Handbook of Neuroethics (ed. J. Clausen and N. Levy). Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics Regina A. Rini University of Oxford [email protected] Abstract: This chapter discusses the philosophical relevance of empirical research on moral cognition. It distinguishes three central aims of normative ethical theory: understanding the nature of moral agency, identifying morally right actions, and determining the justification of moral beliefs. For each of these aims, the chapter considers and rejects arguments against employing cognitive scientific research in normative inquiry. It concludes by suggesting that, whichever of the central aims one begins from, normative ethics is improved by engaging with the science of moral cognition. Key words: is/ought gap, moral agency, moral intuition, moral philosophy, ought-implies- can I. Three Central Questions of Normative Ethics It is undeniable that the field of empirical moral psychology has grown dramatically in the last decade, with new experimental techniques allowing us unprecedented understanding of the causal and computational structures of the human moral faculty. Or, at least, it is undeniable that this research contributes to a descriptive project, one of better understanding the facts about who we are and how we think.1 But what might be denied is that these investigations have much to offer to normative ethics, a distinctively prescriptive sort of inquiry.2 The purpose of this chapter is to show why normative ethics - the study of 1 Although this chapter discusses quite a range of psychological findings, it is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature.
    [Show full text]
  • The Deep Purple Tributes
    [% META title = 'The Deep Purple Discography' %] The Deep Purple Tributes Here we will try to keep a list of known Deep Purple tributes -- full CDs only. (Covers of individual tracks are listed elsewhere.) The list is still not complete, but hopefully it will be in the future. Funky Junction Plays a Tribute to Deep Purple UK 1973 Stereo Gold Award MER 373 [1LP] Purple Tracks Performed by Eric Bell (guitar), Brian Downey (drums), Dave Lennox (keyboards), Phil Lynott (bass) and Fireball Black Night Benny White (vocals). Strange Kind of Woman Hush Speed King The first known Purple tribute was recorded as early as 1972. An unknown, starving band named Thin Lizzy (which consisted of Bell, Downey & Lynott) were offered a lump sum of money to record some Deep Purple songs. (The album contains also a few non-DP tracks.) They did - with the help from two Irish guys. The album came out in early 1973. It wasn't a success. In February, Thin Lizzy had a top ten hit with a single of their own. Read more about it here. The Moscow Symphony Orchestra in Performance of the Music of Deep Purple Japan 1992 Zero Records XRCN-1022 [1CD] UK 1992 Cromwell Productions CPCD 018 [1CD] Purple Tracks Smoke on the Water Performed by the Moscow Symphony Orchestra, conducted by Constantine Krimets. Arranged by Stephen Space Truckin' Child in Time Reeve and Martin Riley. Produced by Bob Carruthers. Recorded live (in the studio with no audience) during Black Night April 1992. Lazy The Mule Pictures of Home No drums, no drum machine, no guitar - in fact, no rock instruments at all, just a symphony orchestra.
    [Show full text]
  • Reflections on the Evolution of Morality Christine M. Korsgaard
    Reflections on the Evolution of Morality Christine M. Korsgaard Harvard University1 All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is what I call the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his “soul.” The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquiring depth, breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. - Nietzsche 1. Introduction In recent years there has been a fair amount of speculation about the evolution of morality, among scientists and philosophers alike. From both points of view, the question how our moral nature might have evolved is interesting because morality is one of the traditional candidates for a distinctively human attribute, something that makes us different from the other animals. From a scientific point of view, it matters whether there are any such attributes because of the special burden they seem to place on the theory of evolution. Beginning with Darwin’s own efforts in The Descent of Man, defenders of the theory of evolution have tried to show either that there are no genuinely distinctive human attributes – that is, that any differences between human beings and the other animals are a matter of degree – or that apparently distinctive human attributes can be explained in terms of the 1 Notes on this version are incomplete. Recommended supplemental reading: “The Activity of Reason,” APA Proceedings November 09, pp. 30-38. In a way, these papers are companion pieces, or at least their final sections are.
    [Show full text]
  • The Moral Presentation of Self: Causes and Consequences of Perceptions of Politicians' Character Traits Scott Clifford
    Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2013 The Moral Presentation of Self: Causes and Consequences of Perceptions of Politicians' Character Traits Scott Clifford Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC POLICY THE MORAL PRESENTATION OF SELF: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIANS’ CHARACTER TRAITS By SCOTT CLIFFORD A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2013 Scott Clifford defended this dissertation on March 27, 2013. The members of the supervisory committee were: Jennifer Jerit Professor Directing Dissertation Art Raney University Representative Jason Barabas Committee Member Brad Gomez Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements. ii This dissertation is dedicated to Kirsti for her unwavering care and support. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to Jennifer Jerit for all of her help and support. It is difficult to imagine an advisor that has devoted more time and energy to her graduate students. She has been endlessly supportive and I would not have come this far without her help. I would also like to thank Jason Barabas and Brad Gomez for all of their help and encouragement throughout the program. Finally, I would like to thank everyone in the FSU Department of Political Science, who created a fun and supportive environment and made a huge contribution to my professional development.
    [Show full text]
  • Shifting Liberal and Conservative Attitudes Using Moral Foundations
    PSPXXX10.1177/0146167214551152Personality and Social Psychology BulletinDay et al. 551152research-article2014 Article Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin Shifting Liberal and Conservative 1 –15 © 2014 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc Attitudes Using Moral Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Foundations Theory DOI: 10.1177/0146167214551152 pspb.sagepub.com Martin V. Day1, Susan T. Fiske1, Emily L. Downing2, and Thomas E. Trail3 Abstract People’s social and political opinions are grounded in their moral concerns about right and wrong. We examine whether five moral foundations—harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity—can influence political attitudes of liberals and conservatives across a variety of issues. Framing issues using moral foundations may change political attitudes in at least two possible ways: (a) Entrenching: Relevant moral foundations will strengthen existing political attitudes when framing pro-attitudinal issues (e.g., conservatives exposed to a free-market economic stance) and (b) Persuasion: Mere presence of relevant moral foundations may also alter political attitudes in counter-attitudinal directions (e.g., conservatives exposed to an economic regulation stance). Studies 1 and 2 support the entrenching hypothesis. Relevant moral foundation-based frames bolstered political attitudes for conservatives (Study 1) and liberals (Study 2). Only Study 2 partially supports the persuasion hypothesis. Conservative-relevant moral frames of liberal issues increased conservatives’ liberal attitudes. Keywords morality, moral foundations, ideology, attitudes, politics Received July 1, 2013; revision accepted August 19, 2014 Our daily lives are steeped in political content, including 2012). Understanding the effectiveness of morally based many attempts to alter our attitudes. These efforts stem from framing may be consequential not only for politics but also a variety of sources, such as political campaigns, presidential for better understanding of everyday shifts in other opinions.
    [Show full text]
  • MORALITY in IRAN 1 in Press, Evolution and Human Behavior
    MORALITY IN IRAN 1 In press, Evolution and Human Behavior https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.07.014 Foundations of Morality in Iran Mohammad Atari1, Jesse Graham2, Morteza Dehghani1,3 1Department of Psychology, University of Southern California 2Department of Management, David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah 3Department of Computer Science, University of Southern California Author Note Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to Mohammad Atari, [email protected], 362 S. McClintock Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90089-161 MORALITY IN IRAN 2 Abstract Most moral psychology research has been conducted in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. As such, moral judgment, as a psychological phenomenon, might be known to researchers only by its WEIRD manifestations. Here, we start with evaluating Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, and follow up by building a bottom-up model of moral values, in Iran, a non-WEIRD, Muslim-majority, understudied cultural setting. In six studies (N = 1,945) we examine the structural validity of the Persian translation of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, compare moral foundations between Iran and the US, conduct qualitative interviews regarding moral values, expand the nomological network of “Qeirat” as a culture-specific set of moral values, and investigate the pragmatic validity of “Qeirat” in Iranian culture. Our findings suggest an additional moral foundation in Iran, above and beyond the five foundations identified by MFT. Specifically, qualitative studies highlighted the role of “Qeirat” values in Iranian culture, which are comprised of guarding and protectiveness of female kin, romantic partners, broader family, and country.
    [Show full text]
  • Evolution and Ethics 2
    It is still disputed, however, why moral behavior extends beyond a close circle of kin and reciprocal relationships: e.g., most people think stealing from anyone is wrong, not just stealing from family and friends. For moral behavior to evolve as we understand it today, there likely had to be selective pressures that pushed people to disregard their own 1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution- interests in favor of their group’s interest.[3] Exactly and-ethics/ how morality extended beyond this close circle is debated, with many theories under consideration.[4] Evolution and Ethics 2. What Should We Do? Author: Michael Klenk Suppose our ability to understand and apply moral Category: Ethics, Philosophy of Science rules, as typically understood, can be explained by Word Count: 999 natural selection. Does evolution explain which rules We often follow what are considered basic moral we should follow?[5] rules: don’t steal, don’t lie, help others when we can. Some answer, “yes!” “Greed captures the essence of But why do we follow these rules, or any rules the evolutionary spirit,” says the fictional character understood as “moral rules”? Does evolution explain Gordon Gekko in the 1987 film Wall Street: “Greed why? If so, does evolution have implications for … is good. Greed is right.”[6] which rules we should follow, and whether we genuinely know this? Gekko’s claims about what is good and right and what we ought to be comes from what he thinks we This essay explores the relations between evolution naturally are: we are greedy, so we ought to be and morality, including evolution’s potential greedy.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy 316K Science and Philosophy: Moral Psychology MWF 1:00-2:00 GAR 3.116
    Philosophy 316K Science and Philosophy: Moral Psychology MWF 1:00-2:00 GAR 3.116 “In present-day philosophy an explanation is required how an unjust man is a bad man, or an unjust action a bad one; to give such an explanation belongs to ethics; but it cannot even be begun until we are equipped with a sound philosophy of psychology.” G. E. M. Anscombe “Scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized." E. O. Wilson “I do not believe that a moral philosophy can ever be founded on a scientific basis. The valuation of life and all its nobler expressions can only come out of the soul’s yearning toward its own destiny. Every attempt to reduce ethics to scientific formulas must fail. Of that I am perfectly convinced.” Albert Einstein Instructor: Michael Dale Email: [email protected] Office: WAG 421 Office Hours: XXXXXXXX & by appointment 1 Course Description: This particular version of Science and Philosophy will focus on the burgeoning field of moral psychology. The last few decades have seen unprecedented advances in the empirical sciences, particularly neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology. What happens when these empirical findings—many of which undermine or at least come into conflict with our ordinary intuitions about ourselves and the world—run up against the traditionally theoretical discipline of ethics? Can they weigh in on such debates or should they be understood as mere descriptions of the world? For example, can the empirical finding that peoples’ behavior is not so much predicted by their character traits but instead by the situations that they find themselves in undermine virtue ethics, which presupposes the existence of character traits? Or what about morality itself? Can the idea that natural selection shaped our moral beliefs call the objectivity of morality into question? In this class, we attempt to answer these questions.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cognitive and Cultural Foundations of Moral Behavior T Benjamin Grant Purzyckia,*, Anne C
    Evolution and Human Behavior 39 (2018) 490–501 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Evolution and Human Behavior journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ens The cognitive and cultural foundations of moral behavior T Benjamin Grant Purzyckia,*, Anne C. Pisora, Coren Apicellab, Quentin Atkinsonc,d, Emma Cohene,f, Joseph Henrichg, Richard McElreatha, Rita A. McNamarah, Ara Norenzayani, Aiyana K. Willarde, Dimitris Xygalatasj a Department of Human Behavior, Ecology, and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Germany b Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, USA c Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, New Zealand d Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History, Germany e Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology, University of Oxford, UK f Wadham College, University of Oxford, UK g Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, USA h School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand i Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Canada j Department of Anthropology, University of Connecticut, USA ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: Does moral culture contribute to the evolution of cooperation? Here, we examine individuals' and communities' Morality models of what it means to be good and bad and how they correspond to corollary behavior across a variety of Cross-cultural ethnography socioecological contexts. Our sample includes over 600 people from eight different field sites that include for- Cognitive anthropology agers, horticulturalists, herders, and the fully market-reliant. We first examine the universals and particulars of Evolution of cooperation explicit moral models. We then use these moral models to assess their role in the outcome of an economic experiment designed to detect systematic, dishonest rule-breaking favoritism.
    [Show full text]
  • Methods, Models, and the Evolution of Moral Psychology
    Methods, Models, and the Evolution of Moral Psychology Cailin O'Connor Abstract Why are we good? Why are we bad? Questions regarding the evolution of morality have spurred an astoundingly large interdisciplinary literature. Some significant subset of this body of work addresses questions regarding our moral psychology: how did humans evolve the psychological properties which underpin our systems of ethics and morality? Here I do three things. First, I discuss some methodological issues, and defend particularly effective methods for addressing many research questions in this area. Second, I give an in-depth example, describing how an explanation can be given for the evolution of guilt|one of the core moral emotions|using the methods advocated here. Last, I lay out which sorts of strategic scenarios generally are the ones that our moral psychology evolved to `solve', and thus which models are the most useful in further exploring this evolution. 1. Introduction Why are we good? Why are we bad? Questions regarding the evolution of morality have spurred an astoundingly large interdisciplinary literature with contributions from (at least) biology, sociology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, and computer science. Some sig- nificant subset of this body of work addresses questions regarding our moral psychology: how did humans evolve the psychological properties which underpin our systems of ethics and morality? Debates in this literature are ongoing, and often heated. One reason for this is that there are a number of methodological problems researchers must tackle in addressing the evolution of moral psychology. Human psychology evolved in the deep past, over the course of millions of years, and as a result of countless interactions between individuals.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of Animal Play, Emotions, and Social Morality: on Science, Theology, Spirituality, Personhood, and Love
    WellBeing International WBI Studies Repository 12-2001 The Evolution of Animal Play, Emotions, and Social Morality: On Science, Theology, Spirituality, Personhood, and Love Marc Bekoff University of Colorado Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/acwp_sata Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Behavior and Ethology Commons, and the Comparative Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Bekoff, M. (2001). The evolution of animal play, emotions, and social morality: on science, theology, spirituality, personhood, and love. Zygon®, 36(4), 615-655. This material is brought to you for free and open access by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI Studies Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Evolution of Animal Play, Emotions, and Social Morality: On Science, Theology, Spirituality, Personhood, and Love Marc Bekoff University of Colorado KEYWORDS animal emotions, animal play, biocentric anthropomorphism, critical anthropomorphism, personhood, social morality, spirituality ABSTRACT My essay first takes me into the arena in which science, spirituality, and theology meet. I comment on the enterprise of science and how scientists could well benefit from reciprocal interactions with theologians and religious leaders. Next, I discuss the evolution of social morality and the ways in which various aspects of social play behavior relate to the notion of “behaving fairly.” The contributions of spiritual and religious perspectives are important in our coming to a fuller understanding of the evolution of morality. I go on to discuss animal emotions, the concept of personhood, and how our special relationships with other animals, especially the companions with whom we share our homes, help us to define our place in nature, our humanness.
    [Show full text]
  • Moral Psychology Fall 2016
    PSYC GU4672: Moral Psychology Fall 2016 PSYC GU4672: Moral Psychology (seminar, 4 points). Fall 2016. Tuesdays, 10:10 AM – 12:00 PM. 405 Schermerhorn Instructor: Larisa Heiphetz ([email protected]) Office hours: By appointment The best way to reach me is via e-mail, and I typically reply to e-mails within 48 hours. I am happy to meet with you throughout the semester to discuss anything related to the course; please e-mail me to set up an appointment. I. Bulletin description II. A full description of the content of the course III. The rationale for giving the course IV. The reading list and weekly syllabus V. Course requirements I. Bulletin description Prerequisites: Two courses in psychology, including at least one course with a focus on social and/or developmental psychology, and permission of the instructor. Review of theories and current research on moral cognition and behavior. Topics include definitions of morality, the development of moral cognition, the role that other aspects of human experience (e.g., emotion, intentions) play in moral judgments, and the relationship between moral psychology and other areas of study (e.g., religious cognition, prejudice and stereotyping, the criminal justice system). II. A full description of the content of the course. How do children learn to distinguish right from wrong? Why do some people act more morally than others, and how is it that the same person can make moral decisions in some circumstances but not others? What does it mean to be “moral”? Questions like these have fascinated scholars and laypeople for centuries. In this seminar, we will discuss a) theories of moral cognition and b) empirical findings on morality in children and adults.
    [Show full text]