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Maquetación 1 article 137. 12/2016 EU and Turkey at a Crossroads: Avoiding a Foreseeable Break-Up Euro-Mediterranean Policies. European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) Introduction On 24 November 2016, the European Parliament (EP) passed a non-binding resolution calling for a temporary freeze of the membership negotiations with Turkey, twelve years after giving its green light to the opening of the accession talks. According to European lawmakers, temporarily suspending the accession negotiations would be the logical consequence of the “disproportionate repressive measures” taken by the Turkish government since the failed military coup attempt, which have further undermined the rule of law and fundamental freedoms. The EU keeps repeating to the Turkish leadership that the repression, which has been targeting many sectors of Turkish society, including media and deputies from the opposition, weakens the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, while the leadership has systematically dismissed European critics and accused the Union of applying double standards to the country. Beyond the EU-Turkey dispute following the post-coup repression, the predicament in which the relationship currently finds itself is the product of a much longer process discussed by this policy brief. The issue of Turkey’s membership of the Union has been at the centre of the relationship. However, the stalled accession negotiations opened in 2005 have fuelled distrust and resentments on both sides. After fifty years of waiting to enter the EU, some signs show that Ankara has chosen to move away from the Union and its values. Meanwhile, the 28-state block remains committed to keeping Turkey anchored to the Union, be it for strategic reasons or more pragmatic considerations, including preserving the migrant deal signed with Ankara. As the membership process has lost its credibility, with neither side honestly believing in Turkey’s accession anymore, this may be the moment for the EU to redefine its relationship with Turkey in order to regain leverage. Among the options at the EU’s disposal, reengaging with Turkey on the economic level, a field where the EU’s soft power may not have disappeared, would be worth exploring. The Long Journey towards Membership Negotiations Turkey’s first bid to embark on the European integration project dates back a few years following the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. After applying as associate member to the EEC in 1959, the country signed an Associate Agreement with 1 the Community (1963) with the aim of progressively establishing a Customs Union. The article country’s journey towards the EEC continued through the 1980s with the formal application for full membership (1987), but eventually came to a halt with the decision by the Commission of the European Communities to reject it. The EEC argued at the time that it was inappropriate to launch new accession negotiations, stressing Turkey’s democratic and economic shortfalls. However, while acknowledging Turkey’s “general opening towards Europe” and its “strategically important geopolitical position,” the Commission expressed its willingness to pursue its cooperation with Ankara, announcing the completion of the Customs Union for 1995 (Commission of the European Communities, 1989). This objective was met in due time, granting Ankara access to the EU internal market with exceptions, notably including agricultural, coal and steel products. Turkey pursued its long march towards the accession in the following years, successively being recognised as eligible for membership (European Council of Luxembourg, 1997) and finally as a candidate country (European Council, Helsinki, 1999). On 11 March 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) became the new Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey. The new strong man of Turkey would play an important role in giving a new impetus towards the EU. The former mayor of Istanbul (1994-1998) had realised that Turkish Islamists had to change their strategy to win the elections and remain in power. Indeed, the Constitutional Court and the military systematically had thwarted their claims to power. In 1997, Erdoğan’s mentor, Necmettin Erbakan, was forced by a “post- modern” coup to step down as Prime Minister. Moving away from Erbakan, Erdoğan founded his own party, the AKP, which adopted a pro-European stance. He believed that the EU would enable the AKP to gain legitimacy and implement its domestic political agenda. His assumptions were that the democratic reforms required to become an EU member would help eliminate the greatest concern of the Islamists, the army’s political interventionism. The structural economic reforms required to enter the Union would also give a framework to revive the Turkish economy. Ensuring the economic recovery of Turkey would, in turn, help ensure the AKP great popularity. Additionally, liberal and democratic requisites, especially regarding religious freedom, would also help ease secular restrictions on public manifestations of Islam, such as the veil ban in universities. Moreover, embracing European values could hardly be met by the opposition of secular and liberal segments of the society. The AKP’s political line and reforms to meet the EU criteria was, in turn, welcomed by many Europeans. Some saw the opportunity to demonstrate that Europe was willing to open itself to a Muslim-majority country as well as to spread the message of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Thus, in December 2004, EU leaders decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey, 46 years after Ankara’s first application for associate membership to the EEC, 18 years after submitting its formal application to full membership, and six years after being granted the status of candidate country. Losing Faith (2005-2013) Immediately after the opening of the negotiations, however, it appeared that Turkey’s path 2 towards membership would be full of pitfalls. While Turkish support for membership amounted article to 62% of the population in October-November 2004 (European Commission, 2004), a popular rejection of Europe’s enlargement towards Turkey could be easily perceived from the polls. According to Eurobarometer, 64.55% of Europeans were opposed to Turkey’s membership, against 31% in favour (European Commission, 2005b). The same survey showed that issues such as migration and cultural differences were the primary reasons for this opposition. European politicians have often played with these issues to thwart the European project or to attract votes in national elections. The recent Brexit campaign’s use of the Turkish scarecrow to attract support for the “no” vote was not a novelty. Even a few months before the decision of the European Council to open negotiations in 2004, it featured high among the arguments used by opponents to the “European Constitution”. Austrian, French and German leaders made no secret of their opposition to Turkey’s accession. On many occasions, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy suggested that Turkey should be offered a “privileged partnership” instead of full membership, triggering angry reactions from Ankara. The French President also claimed that if Turkey were to successfully complete the negotiations, he would put the Turkish issue to a referendum (Hürriyet Daily News, 2008). His initiative to create a Union for the Mediterranean was also perceived by the Turkish side as a way to divert it from the EU membership path. The Cyprus problem was obviously another serious pitfall on Turkey’s road towards membership. Since the Turkish military intervention in 1974, Ankara has never recognised the Republic of Cyprus, an EU member state since May 2004. Before opening the negotiations, the European Council required its agreements with Turkey to be extended to the new EU member states, including Cyprus. By a compromise, Turkey signed additional protocols while specifying that they would not amount to recognition of the Republic of Cyprus (Euractiv, 2016a). EU leaders finally agreed to adopt a Negotiating Framework clearly outlining that Turkey’s progress will also be measured on its support for a comprehensive settlement and the normalisation of bilateral relations with all member states (European Commission, 2005a). Nevertheless, the issue would remain a major hurdle for the success of the process. While formal negotiations between Ankara and Brussels began in 2006, they were almost immediately stalled. Indeed, on 11 December 2006, eight out of the 35 negotiating chapters were blocked by the European Council to sanction the Turkish refusal to implement the Ankara Agreement to the Republic of Cyprus. While no progress towards the resolution of the Cyprus problem was made in the following years, the path of the reforms in Turkey started to slowdown. Additional chapters were opened but Ankara suffered another blow in 2007. France decided to block the opening of five chapters that would have made Turkish membership inevitable. Furthermore, in 2009, the Republic of Cyprus vetoed six additional chapters, including no. 23 on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and no. 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security, decisive to address Turkish democratic shortfalls. In total, after 11 years of negotiations, one chapter has been closed, 15 are open and 16 remain blocked. Despite attempts to reinvigorate the talks based on mutual interests, the Cyprus issue, the opposition of some member states for political and cultural reasons, as well as the limited 3 progress made by Turkey on key issues immersed the negotiations into lethargy. article For the Turks, the prospect of seeing their country joining the European Union was vanishing. The political opposition manifested by several EU countries convinced large segments of Turkish society that their country was facing double standards. Turkish Chief Negotiator Egemen Ba ı publicly admitted that even if the membership remained his country’s objective, it may never be reached because of “stiff opposition and prejudices” by EU members (Hürriyet Daily News, 2013b). Again, the polls revealed a considerable loss of support for the membership along the years (see graph).
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