Which Way Forward for Macroeconomics and Policy Analysis? Roman Frydman and Edmund S
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The Simonian Bounded Rationality Hypothesis and the Expectation Formation Mechanism
Volume 2 Number 1 2002 Tadeusz KOWALSKI The Poznań University of Economics The Simonian bounded rationality hypothesis and the expectation formation mechanism Abstract. In the 1980s and at beginning of the 1990s the debate on expectation forma- tion mechanism was dominated by the rational expectation hypothesis. Later on, more in- terest was directed towards alternative approaches to expectations analysis, mainly based on the bounded rationality paradigm introduced earlier by Herbert A. Simon. The bounded rationality approach is used here to describe the way expectations might be formed by dif- ferent agents. Furthermore, three main hypotheses, namely adaptive, rational and bounded ones are being compared and used to indicate why time lags in economic policy prevail and are variable. Keywords: bounded rationality, substantive and procedural rationality, expectation for- mation, adaptive and rational expectations, time lags. JEL Codes: D78, D84, H30, E00. 1. The theoretical and methodological context The main focus in mainstream economic theories is not as much on the behavior of individual agents as on the outcomes of behaviors and the performance of markets and global institutions. Such theories are based on the classical model of rational choice built on the assumption that agents are aware of all available alternatives and have the ability to assess the outcomes of each possible course of action to be taken, Simon (1982a). Under the standard economic approach, decisions made by agents are always objectively rational. Thus rational agents select scenarios that will serve them best to achieve a specific utility goal. Under this common approach, rationality is an instrumental concept that associates ends and means on the implicit assumption that actions aimed at achieving goals are consistent and effective. -
16Th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics IMPA, Rio De Janeiro, July 6 - 9, 2016
WELCOME On behalf of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, we are pleased to welcome you in Rio de Janeiro on the occasion of the 16th SAET Conference. We wish to express gratitude to the various institutions that made this conference possible: first and foremost, to Instituto Nacional de Matemática Pura e Aplicada (IMPA) for their wonderful hospitality, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq), Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES), Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ), the University of Iowa, Itaú Bank and Bradesco Bank. Many thanks to the people who generously contributed to the success of this event, in particular, the members of the local organizing committee, the session organizers, the program committee and the help team. Special thanks to Suely Lima, Ana Paula Rodrigues, Leticia Ribas, Jurandira Ribas, Marcelo Viana, Michele Leite, Paula Dugin, Pedro Faro and Sonia Alves for their invaluable help along the progress, your help has been invaluable. We hope you enjoy the conference and we wish you a pleasant stay in Rio de Janeiro. Aloisio Araujo, José Heleno Faro, Juan Pablo Gama Torres, Susan Schommer and Nicholas Yannelis, Organizing Committee Executive Committee Bernard Cornet (President/Secretary) Robert Townsend (Second Vice-President) Nicholas Yannelis (Treasurer/Editor) Aloisio Araujo (Past President) David Levine (Member at Large) Charles Plott (Member at Large) Edward Prescott (Member at Large) Organizing -
How the Rational Expectations Revolution Has Enriched
How the Rational Expectations Revolution Has Changed Macroeconomic Policy Research by John B. Taylor STANFORD UNIVERSITY Revised Draft: February 29, 2000 Written versions of lecture presented at the 12th World Congress of the International Economic Association, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 24, 1999. I am grateful to Jacques Dreze for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The rational expectations hypothesis is by far the most common expectations assumption used in macroeconomic research today. This hypothesis, which simply states that people's expectations are the same as the forecasts of the model being used to describe those people, was first put forth and used in models of competitive product markets by John Muth in the 1960s. But it was not until the early 1970s that Robert Lucas (1972, 1976) incorporated the rational expectations assumption into macroeconomics and showed how to make it operational mathematically. The “rational expectations revolution” is now as old as the Keynesian revolution was when Robert Lucas first brought rational expectations to macroeconomics. This rational expectations revolution has led to many different schools of macroeconomic research. The new classical economics school, the real business cycle school, the new Keynesian economics school, the new political macroeconomics school, and more recently the new neoclassical synthesis (Goodfriend and King (1997)) can all be traced to the introduction of rational expectations into macroeconomics in the early 1970s (see the discussion by Snowden and Vane (1999), pp. 30-50). In this lecture, which is part of the theme on "The Current State of Macroeconomics" at the 12th World Congress of the International Economic Association, I address a question that I am frequently asked by students and by "non-macroeconomist" colleagues, and that I suspect may be on many people's minds. -
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress
Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress Professor Joseph E. STIGLITZ, Chair, Columbia University Professor Amartya SEN, Chair Adviser, Harvard University Professor Jean-Paul FITOUSSI, Coordinator of the Commission, IEP www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr Other Members Bina AGARWAL University of Delhi Kenneth J. ARROW StanfordUniversity Anthony B. ATKINSON Warden of Nuffield College François BOURGUIGNON School of Economics, Jean-Philippe COTIS Insee, Angus S. DEATON Princeton University Kemal DERVIS UNPD Marc FLEURBAEY Université Paris 5 Nancy FOLBRE University of Massachussets Jean GADREY Université Lille Enrico GIOVANNINI OECD Roger GUESNERIE Collège de France James J. HECKMAN Chicago University Geoffrey HEAL Columbia University Claude HENRY Sciences-Po/Columbia University Daniel KAHNEMAN Princeton University Alan B. KRUEGER Princeton University Andrew J. OSWALD University of Warwick Robert D. PUTNAM Harvard University Nick STERN London School of Economics Cass SUNSTEIN University of Chicago Philippe WEIL Sciences Po Rapporteurs Jean-Etienne CHAPRON INSEE General Rapporteur Didier BLANCHET INSEE Jacques LE CACHEUX OFCE Marco MIRA D’ERCOLE OCDE Pierre-Alain PIONNIER INSEE Laurence RIOUX INSEE/CREST Paul SCHREYER OCDE Xavier TIMBEAU OFCE Vincent MARCUS INSEE Table of contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. SHORT NARRATIVE ON THE CONTENT OF THE REPORT Chapter 1: Classical GDP Issues . 21 Chapter 2: Quality of Life . 41 Chapter 3: Sustainable Development and Environment . 61 II. SUBSTANTIAL ARGUMENTS PRESENTED -
Programme Colloque Pdf En Nicholas Stern Sustainable Development
COLLOQUE organisé par Nicholas STERN chaire Développement durable – Environnement, Énergie et Société et Roger GUESNERIE chaire Théorie économique et organisation sociale Managing Climate Change June 7 - 8, 2010 The conference’s program covers two days. During the first day, discussions will focus on long-term economics. Some of the chief participants in the animated debate that climate policy has generated among economists will be present. At the heart of the debate are the principles of cost-benefit analysis and the question of the long term discount rate. The second day’s discussions will revolve around innovation and institutional choices. As on the first day, leading specialists will present their views. Among the participants will be two Nobel Prize laureates in economics: Sir James Mirrlees on the first day and Thomas. C. Schelling on the second. Program June 7 The Economics of the Long Run June 8 Fostering Innovation and Climate Policy 9h15 Introduction 9h30 Nicholas Stern, College de France & London School 9h30 Martin Weitzman, Harvard University of Economics GHG Targets as Insurance against Catastrophic Low Carbon Growth and the Political Economy Climate Damages of a Global Agreement 10h15 Thomas Sterner, University of Gothenburg 10h15 Ujjayant Chakravorty, University of Alberta Climate Policy, Prudence, and the Role of Can Nuclear Power Supply Clean Energy in the Technological Innovation Long Run? A Model with Endogenous 11h00 Break Substitution of Resources 11h30 Roger Guesnerie, College de France & Paris School 11h00 Break of Economics 11h15 Philippe Aghion, Harvard University Ecological Intuition Versus Economic Reason Climate Change and the Role of Directed 12h15 William Nordhaus, Yale University Innovation Economic Policy in the Face of Severe Tail 12h00 Round Table: Climate Policy and Technological Events Change 13h00 Lunch Roger Guesnerie, Nicholas Stern, Jean Tirole and Henry Tulkens 14h30 Christian Gollier, Toulouse School of Economics Socially Efficient Discount Rate under Ambiguity 12h45 Lunch Aversion 14h15 Thomas C. -
Test the Robustness of the Results for Sequences of Approximat- Ing Finite Economies
Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents Author(s): Andreu Mas-Colell and Xavier Vives Source: The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 3, (Jul., 1993), pp. 613-629 Published by: The Review of Economic Studies Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2298127 Accessed: 27/05/2008 06:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=resl. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We enable the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org Review of Economic Studies (1993) 60, 613-629 0034-6527/93/00310613$02.00 ? 1993 The Review of Economic Studies Limited Implementationin Economies with a Continuum of Agents ANDREU MAS-COLELL Harvard University and XAVIER VIVES Institut d'AnadlisiEcono'mica (CSIC), Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona First version received December 1989; final version accepted October 1992 (Eds.) We study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information, and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximat- ing finite economies. -
In Memory of Edmond Malinvaud by Roger Guesnerie
In Memory of Edmond Malinvaud Roger Guesnerie, President of the Paris School of Economics Edmond Malinvaud passed away at the beginning of March, in his ninety-second year. His career was in many regards exceptional: he was one of the most influential French economists of the twentieth century, both in his own country and around the world. A multi-faceted career Top public servant, scholar and teacher, Edmond Malinvaud’s professional life took many forms, and for more than half a century, often at the highest level in each of these fields. As a top-ranking public servant almost all of his professional life, he held several positions of responsibility. After Polytechnique, he chose to join the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE), of which he remained a member until his election to the Collège de France in 1987. He played a determining role in the establishment of the Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration Economique, (ENSAE), of which he was the second director, from 1962 to 1966. Then, following his appointment as head of the Direction de la prévision of the Finance Ministry, he returned to INSEE as its director, from 1974 to 1987. In these last two posts, his energy and collegiality impressed everyone and he left a profound mark on the development of studies in both of these institutions. Edmond Malinvaud established himself as a scholar after a stay in the United States. In particular, on the basis of fruitful interactions with colleagues at the Cowles Foundation he produced a theoretical paper on the accumulation of capital that became a classic of the decade1. -
Renegotiation and the Dynamics of Contract Design
European Economic Review 34 (1990) 303-310. North-Holland Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation RENEGOTIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF CONTRACT DESIGN Patrick BOLTON* Ecole Poiytechnique, Paris and Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA 1. Introduction Besides sunk costs and reputation, long-term contracts are an important form of commitment. In fact, in the imaginary world of Arrow-Debreu there is no room for other forms of commitment than the fully contingent long- term contract. At the risk of oversimplification, one could describe a large part of the theoretical research effort of the past three decades as a systematic attempt at understanding the implications of gradually limiting the set of feasible long-term contracts further and further away from the set of fully contingent Arrow-Debreu contracts. Thus, the theory of incentives was born in the 1960s when information constraints were introduced. Later, other constraints relating to the difftculties of describing and verifying contractual performance have been imposed thus leading towards the first formal foundations of a theory of property rights and ownership. More recently, the role of renegotiation in limiting the commitment power of contracts has become the focus of attention. Basically, the possibility of renegotiation amounts to the addition of another constraint on the set of feasible contracts: now contracts must be not only ‘incentive compatible’ but also ‘renegotiation-proof. (When parties can commit not to renegotiate they have a choice of when to allow for renegotiation and when not. If this commitment possibility is withdrawn they are forced to renegotiate whenever there are ex-post gains from renegotiation. Since the outcome of this renegotiation is perfectly predictable they might as well write renegotiation- proof contracts). -
Understanding Robert Lucas (1967-1981): His Influence and Influences
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Andrada, Alexandre F.S. Article Understanding Robert Lucas (1967-1981): his influence and influences EconomiA Provided in Cooperation with: The Brazilian Association of Postgraduate Programs in Economics (ANPEC), Rio de Janeiro Suggested Citation: Andrada, Alexandre F.S. (2017) : Understanding Robert Lucas (1967-1981): his influence and influences, EconomiA, ISSN 1517-7580, Elsevier, Amsterdam, Vol. 18, Iss. 2, pp. 212-228, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2016.09.001 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179646 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ www.econstor.eu HOSTED BY Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect EconomiA 18 (2017) 212–228 Understanding Robert Lucas (1967-1981): his influence ଝ and influences Alexandre F.S. -
Economic Coordination and Dynamics: Some Elements of an Alternative “Evolutionary” Paradigm by GIOVANNI DOSI November 18, 2011
INET published a paper, written by John Kay, that deals with the relationship between economics and the world we live in. The Map Is Not the Territory: An Essay on the State of Economics spells out methodological critiques of economic theory in general, and of DSGE models and rational expectations in particular. INET forwarded Kay's paper to a handful economists and invited them to respond (Harald Uhlig, Michael Woodford, Paul Davidson, and Roger Guesnerie). Here, we offer a perspective by Giovanni Dosi, Professor of Economics at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy. Economic Coordination and Dynamics: Some Elements of an Alternative “Evolutionary” Paradigm by GIOVANNI DOSI November 18, 2011 This paper, largely based on the introduction to Dosi (2012)1, has been prompted by John Kay's sharp essay (Kay, 2011) - which I largely share - and the subsequent INET debate. Indeed, I do share Kay´s basic diagnosis that economic theory has taken a profoundly wrong path (in fact I will add few further critical comments on the point ). And I believe the fault is precisely at the core of the paradigm so well summarized by Gary Becker (1976), cited by Kay: “the combined assumptions of maximazing behavior, market equilibrium and stable preferences, used relentlessly and consistently, form the heart of the [that is, their+ economic approach”. The main task of this work however will not be the critique of that paradigm but rather the discussion of an alternative one - which I shall call evolutionary, in line with many likeminded colleagues, but the name is not so important - based on largely opposite building blocks. -
Rational Expectations: Retrospect and Prospect
Rational Expectations: Retrospect and Prospect A Panel Discussion with Michael Lovell Robert Lucas Dale Mortensen Robert Shiller Neil Wallace Moderated by Kevin Hoover Warren Young CHOPE Working Paper No. 2011-10 30 May 2011 Rational Expectations: Retrospect and Prospect A Panel Discussion with Michael Lovell Robert Lucas Dale Mortensen Robert Shiller Neil Wallace Moderated by Kevin Hoover † Warren Young * 30 May 2011 †Department of Economics and Department of Philosophy, Duke University. Address: Box 90097, Durham, NC 27278, U.S.A. E-mail [email protected] *Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University. Address: Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900, Israel. E-mail: [email protected] 1 Abstract of Rational Expectations: Retrospect and Prospect The transcript of a panel discussion marking the fiftieth anniversary of John Muth’s “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements” ( Econometrica 1961). The panel consists of Michael Lovell, Robert Lucas, Dale Mortensen, Robert Shiller, and Neil Wallace. The discussion is moderated by Kevin Hoover and Warren Young. The panel touches on a wide variety of issues related to the rational-expectations hypothesis, including: its history, starting with Muth’s work at Carnegie Tech; its methodological role; applications to policy; its relationship to behavioral economics; its role in the recent financial crisis; and its likely future. JEL Codes: B22, B31, B26, E17 Keywords: rational expectations, John F. Muth, macroeconomics, dynamics, macroeconomic policy, behavioral economics, efficient markets 2 “Rational Expectations” 28 May 2011 Rational Expectations: Retrospect and Prospect: A Panel Discussion with Michael Lovell, Robert Lucas, Dale Mortensen, Robert Shiller and Neil Wallace, Moderated by Kevin Hoover and Warren Young The panel discussion was held in a session sponsored by the History of Economics Society at the Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) meetings in the Capitol 1 Room of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Denver, Colorado on 7 January 2011. -
An Interview with Thomas J. Sargent
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 9, 2005, 561–583. Printed in the United States of America. DOI: 10.1017.S1365100505050042 MD INTERVIEW AN INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS J. SARGENT Interviewed by George W. Evans Department of Economics, University of Oregon and Seppo Honkapohja Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge January 11, 2005 Keywords: Rational Expectations, Cross-Equation Restrictions, Learning, Model Misspecification, Adaptation, Robustness The rational expectations hypothesis swept through macroeconomics during the 1970s and permanently altered the landscape. It remains the prevailing paradigm in macroeconomics, and rational expectations is routinely used as the stan- dard solution concept in both theoretical and applied macroeconomic mod- elling. The rational expectations hypothesis was initially formulated by John F. Muth Jr. in the early 1960s. Together with Robert Lucas Jr., Thomas (Tom) Sargent pioneered the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics in the 1970s. Possibly Sargent’s most important work in the early 1970s focused on the implications of rational expectations for empirical and econometric research. His short 1971 paper “A Note on the Accelerationist Controversy” provided a dra- matic illustration of the implications of rational expectations by demonstrating that the standard econometric test of the natural rate hypothesis was invalid. This work was followed in short order by key papers that showed how to conduct valid tests of central macroeconomic relationships under the rational expecta- tions hypothesis. Imposing rational expectations led to new forms of restric- tions, called “cross-equation restrictions,” which in turn required the development of new econometric techniques for the study of macroeconomic relations and models. Correspondence to: Professor George W. Evans, Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA; e-mail: [email protected].