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Contemporary African philosophy and development: An asset or a liability?

Osei, Joseph, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1991

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Aibor, MI 48106

CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AND DEVELOPMENT:

AN ASSET OR A LIABILITY?

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Josep h Osei, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1991

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

Andrew Oldenquist

James P. Scanlan A dviser Donald C. Hubin Department of Philosophj Copyright by Joseph Osei 1991 To the memory of the late U.S. Congressman Mickey, who died in the

Ethiopian mountains trying to reach starving Africans with food and

hope; and to all missionaries, educators, and statesmen who have

sacrificed their lives, time, talent, or treasure to promote the well­

being of Africa. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

At this final stage of writing it is tempting to congratulate

one’s self, shouting, "Hurray, I did it!" But I prefer to shout,

"Hurray, we did it!" For I could not have reached this far without

the contribution of family, sponsors, professors, and mentors. Space

and time will fail me to list all of them here, but I am deeply grateful

to everyone who has made any contribution towards my education,

and, in particular, the writing of this dissertation. I can only men­

tion a few of those who deserve special thanks.

My first special thanks go to Professor Andrew Oldenquist, my advisor, and to the rest of my dissertation committee members. Pro­ fessor Donald Hubin and Professor James Scanlan, for their depend­ able guidance, critical reviews, and thoughtful comments at various

stages of this project.

My next special thanks go to my mentors: Professors Robert G.

Turnbull, Charles Kielkopf, and Alan Hausman of the Department of

Philosophy, The Ohio State University; Abiola Irele of the African

Studies Center, The Ohio State University; Gene Blocker and Warren

111 Ruckti of Ohio University in Athens; Dr. Moses Makinde of Awolowo

University in Nigeria; Professors Kwasi Gyekye and Rev. K.A. Dickson

of the University of Ghana; Dr. Kwame Safro of Lincoln University in

Pennsylvania; Rev. Dr. Brookman Amissah and Dr. K.O. Agyakwa of the

University of Cape Coast; and Dr. Esther Megill of Trinity College in

Ghana.

Next, I wish to extend special thanks to my team of word-pro­

cessing experts: Mr Godwin Ntuk; Godwin’s wife, Jenny Ntuk; and

Kimberly Holle. Thank you for being there whenever I needed help.

I cannot also forget to thank my corporate and individual

sponsors. I’m grateful to the Methodist Church in Ghana; Ohio Uni­

versity in Athens; The Ohio State University; and especially The Ohio

State University Alumni Student Research Award for my research ex­

perience in Ghana in 1990. I thank Mr. I.K. Sarpong of Dansoman once again for his trust and financial support, which made it possible for me to obtain a U.S. v isa in 1984.

Finally, my hearty thanks go to my immediate family. Thank you, Victoria, my wife, for your unfailing love and support all these years. Thank you, Lucy and Georgina, my senior daughters, for un­ derstanding and forgiving my long absence from home.

IV VITA

December 10, 1951 Born - Kokofu, Ashanti, Ghana

1975 - 1978 Theology, Trinity College, Legon, Ghana

1978 - 1981 B.A., Religion and Philosophy, University of Ghana, Legon

1981 - 1983 Teaching Assistant, Logic and Intro­ ductory Philosophy; University of Cape Coast, Ghana

1984 - 1985 M.A., Philosophy; Teaching A ssistant, Logic and Introductory Philosophy, Ohio U n iv ersity , A thens, Ohio-

1986 - Present Doctoral Student; Teaching Assistant, Logic, Introductory Philosophy, and Ethics; Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

PUBLICATIONS

Fundamental Principles of Logic (Ghana: University of Cape Coast Press, 1982).

"Quality Education For Third World Youth," T.O.D.A.Y. International (Winter/Spring, 1991).

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Fhilosophy

Studies in: Ethics, History o* Philosophy (Modern), and Metaphysics TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii VITA iv PREFACE X

CHAPTER

I. IS CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY A WESTERN IDEOLOGY? 1

The Argument from Ideology 8 Why Philosophy is not an Ideology 15 F ootnotes 29

II. IS PHILOSOPHY A LIXURY FOR AFRICA 32

Why Philosophy is not a Luxury for Africa 39

1. Philosophy Cultivates Critical Thinking Skills 40 2. Philosophy C ultivates C reativity 42 3. Philosophy and the Cultivation of Liberal A ttitu d es 45 4. Philosophy as the Conscience of Society 49 5. Philosophy as (part of the) Conscience of its Intellectual Community 54 6. How Philosophy Promotes the Growth of Science: The Example of Western Philosophy 59

Footnotes 77

III. THE DILEMMA OF AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 79

A Formal Representation of Africa’s Dilemma 81 The Empirical Bases for the Dilemma 82

VI What is Dependence? 84 A Critique of African Theories of Development 88

1. The Revolutionary Theory of Development 89 2. The Pragmatist Theory of Development 95

C ritique 98

Ideological Opportunism 98

Footnotes 104

IV. THE WAY OUT OF AFRICA’S DILEMMA: A POPPERIAN THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT 106

The Neo-Capitalist Theory of Development 107 Critique of Katapu’s Theory 111 A Contextualized Theory of Development 115 Seven Strategies for Transcending Dependency 117

1. Indigenization 117 2. D om estication 118 3. D iversification 119 4. Horizontal Interpenetration 120 5. Vertical Counterpenetration 121 8. Domestic Austerity 123 7. Encouraging Northern Extravagance 124

My C ritiq u e of Ali M azrui’s Theory 125 A Popperian Theory of Development 129

1. Justification for the Development Virtues in my Theory 130

A. Critical Thinking 130 B. Complex Problem Solving Skills 132 C. M odernization 133 D. Procreative Industrialization 135

2. Strategies for Combating the Vices of Development 136

V ll A. D ependency 136 B. Bribery and Corruption 139 C. The Vice of Military Interventions 142

F ootnotes 147

V. CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY IN SEARCH OF THE BEST IDEOLOGY FOR AFRICA: THE NEW RATIONAL CHOICE 149

The Old Rational Choice 152 The New Rational Choice 158 Step 1: Scientific Socialism or Liberal Democracy? 160 S tep 2: Choosing the B est Form of Capitalism 188

1. Laissez Faire Capitalism 189 2. Welfare Capitalism 192 3. P roduction O riented Capitalism 194 4. Development Capitalism 196

Footnotes 203

VI. CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK: TRANSCENDING CULTURAL OBSTACLES AND PAVING THE WAY FOR SCIENCE 206

Wiredu On The Cultural Evils Plaguing the Akan Culture 208

1. Anachronism 208 2. Authoritarianism 212 3. Super naturalism 217

Sodipo and Makinde On Diagnosing and Prescribing Treatment for African Causal Explanations 220

Agyakwa and Nduka On Identifying and Bridging the Epistemological Gap 228

Irele and Agyakwa on Identifying and Transcending Forms of Cultural Alienation that Hinder Progress 234

Making Religion an Ally for Science and Development 248

V l l l 1. Nkrumah’s Approach 248 2. W iredu’s A pproach 250 3. Horton’s Approach 251 4. Appiah’s Approach 254 5. Osei’s A pproach 255

Footnotes 270

BIBLIOGRAPHY 275

IX PREFACE

It is no exaggeration to suggest in anthropomorphic terms that, while the condition of Western Philosophy in the 90s corresponds to the image of a grand old lady still running in her 70s, that of con­ temporary African philosophy corresponds to that of any one of the sick-and-dying African girls we have been seeing on the T.V. for the last decade.

’Adiyaa,’ meaning miserable, is the typical name given to an or­ phan or any miserable child among the Akans of Ghana. To reflect her miserable condition let’s call Contemporary African Philosophy

Adiyaa. Both of these Adiyaaa are the victims of the ongoing ideo­ logical and economic crisis in Africa.

From the ideological stance, the existence of contemporary

African philosophy as an academic institution is jeopardized by the growing suspicion that it is no more than a Western ideology being propagated by Western-trained African philosophers. They are, on this view, the conscious or unconscious agents of Western imperialism and neo-colonialism for the continued mental, economic, and political domination of Africa. On the basis of the similarity between the courses offered in our African philosophy departments and their

Western counterparts, the limited number of courses on "African Phi­ losophy," and the rationale that it is intended to make the African student competitive abroad, it has been argued that philosophy is

"an instrument of Western cultural penetration" and "dependency."^

Consequently, the discipline is perceived by these critics to be not an asset, but a liability or a counterproductive force to Africa’s de­ velopm ent.

From the economic stance, the existence of contemporary

African philosophy (or CAP, for short) is equally jeopardized by the unfortunate, but understandable, need to minimize government expen­ diture in education which, taking Ghana as an example, could absorb as much as 40 percent of the total gross national product. Notwith­ standing the enormity of this financial commitment. The World Bank, in a gloomy report on the developmental prospects of Sub-Sahara

Africa concluded that the quality of higher education in the region is

"low and possibly declining." The report warned that "the quality of

African education must be much better than it is today if African de­ velopment is to become self-sustaining.

Even more important for the purpose of this dissertation is the fact that one of the World Bank’s proposals to save the educational system and to maximize their potential as instruments for development

XI was that African governments should cut back in fields that "do not support economic development.The proposal is, of course, not new. Political and educational reconstructionists have been forced by economic conditions to start the implementation of similar proposals using "relevance to economic development" as the main criterion.

Given its abstract nature, it should come as no surprise that philosophy has been judged to be among the disciplines with no rel­ evance for economic development. Thus it has been argued that compared with agriculture, medicine, technology, and the sciences, in general, philosophy is non-productive; it is "a luxury which devel­ oping countries can ill-afford."*

This dissertation is my response to the growing skepticism and threat to the discipline, and my objective is twofold. First, I will argue that contemporary African philosophy is neither a Western ideology nor an instrument of Western domination. Second, I will ar­ gue that, far from being a luxury or a liability for economic develop­ ment, contemporary African philosophy is an indispensable asset for the accelerated and successful overall development of the region.

Since Western philosophy has met similar challenges from skep­ tics from within and without the discipline, has survived for over two thousand years, and began to flourish in recent years, it will not be unwise to reflect on her history for inspiration and guidance be

XU fore proceeding with my response to the African critics. Western

philosophy has been attacked from both the ideological and the rele­

vance perspectives. The most pervasive and best known can be

traced back to Karl Marx, who stated in the German ideology that

philosophy, like religion and law, is a form of false consciousness.

The economic base of society (the substructure) is what determines

all the other aspects of society, including social, religious, and gov­

ernmental, as well as philosophic, activities. Philosophers like

priests, artists, and musicians, unwittingly serve the interest of

those who control the means of production. According to Marx, the

articulations of deeper sentiments of justice, fraternity, equality, are

far from guiding the actions of kings and the military leaders who

merely respond to deeper sociological relationships. So the views of

the philosophers are just after-the-fact justifications or rationaliza­

tions of the actions already done by the kings and military leaders.

Most people would credit Locke and other social contractarians, for example, with initiating the move towards democratic governments.

But for Marx, Locke deserves no credit, for he was merely expressing

the existing social relations between the bourgeoisie and the aristoc­

racy. Historically, political power has been shifting from the aristo­ crats to the bourgeoisie since the end of the Middle Ages. The

hereditary nobility fought back by seeking to intellectually justify

X lll heritage privilege. So, in line with his subjectivity thesis, Marx says philosophers such as Hobbes, who were sympathetic to their cause, began to construct or to dust off arguments for the justification of divine rights of kings. Also, philosophers sympathetic to the rising middle class began constructing arguments to show that all men are originally and inherently equal. Similarly, when moralists praise the value of hard work and savings within the Capitalist system, Marxists argue it is just another rationalization of a middle class practice that already exists. Thus, it can be said that, for Marx, there is no ob­ jectivity in philosophy; it is an instrument for class control.

The seriousness of this charge for both Western philosophy and CAP cannot be over-emphasized for it presupposes a pervasive form of subjectivism that immediately undermines all claims to objec­ tivity and fairness within the disciplines. Since the epistemic status of CAP does not differ from that of Western or any critical philoso­ phy in general, I find it strategic to argue first that the character­ istics of philosophy as a critical discipline make it incompatible with the pejorative sense of ideology as used in the Marxist analysis. The

first chapter is an attempt to refute this charge. Thus I argue in first chapter that, while it is possible for any discipline to be manip­

ulated for political or ideological purposes, the characteristics of

philosophy as a discipline in general make it the least likely of all

XIV disciplines to be so victimized. These characteristics include the at­ titudes, methods, and the status of philosophy as not only a second- order activity, but also the most self-reflective of all disciplines. ,It is argued that, while the attitude of philosophy is one of doubting, being undogmatic, tentative, skeptical, and objective, the attitude of ideology in the pejorative sense is one of unquestioning acceptance, dogmatism, and uncritical commitment and loyalty. Regarding their methodologies, it is argued that while the methods of philosophy are critical, analytic, objective, and rigorous, those of ideology in the pejorative sense are uncritical, unanalytic, subjective, and indoctri­ nating. Some of the professional activities of contemporary African philosophers are cited to show that they are consistent with the characteristics of the discipline assumed in the main argument.

The rest of the chapters, Two through Six, are aimed at refut­ ing the second argument claiming that philosophy is a luxury Africa, as a part of a developing world, cannot afford. Any attempt to cir­ cumvent this argument by appealing to such principles as academic freedom and the independence of the universities, I argue should be condemned as irresponsible and inhumane in view of the original ex­ pectations and the contrasting reality after three decade of political independence. The dream was that the universities would be the key

XV instruments for the rapid socioeconomic and technological development of the continent, but the reality is institutional decay and worsening socioeconomic conditions in most parts of the continent.

In the Chapter Two, I argue that philosophy as a discipline promotes the cultivation of certain thinking skills necessary for maximizing both quantitative and qualitative intellectual productivity.

These include critical/analytic thinking, creativity, and problem-solv­ ing skills. Philosophy also promotes the cultivation of certain liberal attitudes, such as open-mindedness, being non-dogmatic, and a will­ ingness to suspend judgment when necessary, as well as tolerance.

Philosophy, I argue is also useful as part of the conscience of the social, as well as the intellectual, community of which it is a part.

The discipline also contributes to the moral education through the cultivation of certain intellectual and moral virtues. Finally, and most important of all, I argue that philosophy, as evident in the

Western tradition, promotes the growth of science. Not only is Phi­ losophy the mother of all the sciences, it is also their companion, counsellor, critic, and public relations accessory par excellence.

Are these skills and values relevant for the development of

Africa? If so, how are contemporary African philosophers applying them to the solution of the developmental problems of the continent?

The rest of the chapters. Three through Six, are consciously de

XVI signed to answer both questions. One of the basic problems that has preoccupied postcolonial African intellectuals and statesmen is the conceptualization or the reconceptualization of development for there appears to be a dilemma, which is either unrecognized or misunder­ stood by the theorists of development. To demonstrate the value of the cognitive skills cultivated by philosophy, I construct a conceptual schema reflecting the ideological dilemma facing Africa in the third chapter, and show the way out of the dilemma in the fourth chapter.

The process involves a critical examination of the dominant theories of development designed for Africa: the Revolutionary Theory of De­ velopment; the Pragmatist Theory of Development; the Neo-Capitalist

Theory of Development; and the Contextualized Theory of Develop­ ment. Of these four, I argue the most promising is Ali Mazrui’s con­ textualized theory which, but for the inconsistencies among his sug­ gested counter-dependency strategies, is capable of resolving the dilemma in question. In the fourth chapter I deal with the inconsis­ tencies and suggest other ways of improving on Mazrui’s theory.

The result is my own new theory: the Popperian Theory of Develop­ ment.

Next, I discuss the dominant intellectual preoccupation among the African intelligentsia: the beat ideology to facilitate our development. Given our goals of development, such as economic re

x v ii covery, sustainable economic growth, and self-dependence, and the

Popperian Theory of Development as our way out of the dilemma of development, I argue, the rational choice for Africa at the moment is neither African socialism (Nyerere’s rational choice) nor any of the existing forms of the capitalist system. It is rather a combination of liberal democracy and development capitalism. Development capitalism is my term for a suggested synthesis of laissez faire capitalism, pro­ duction-oriented capitalism, and welfare capitalism in a way that minimizes their individual disadvantages while maximizing their overall utility for the countries that adopt them.

Finally, I examine some of the activities of contemporary

African philosophers that related to science and technology which are the most obvious indicators of development anywhere. Their activi­ ties include the identification and critique of cultural obstacles to the orientation to science; the discovery and suggestions for bridging the epistemological gap between Western and traditional African ways pertaining to the analysis, acquisition, and dissemination of know­ ledge—especially scientific knowledge; analysis and suggestions for transcending alienation which has become another cultural obstacle to the orientation to science and development in general; the critical evaluation of African causal explanations and suggestions for their improvement; and my own examination of four philosophical positions

xvni taken by some of our contemporary Africa philosophers on the rela­ tion between science and religion. In the process I challenge the

Russellian view that religion is by nature opposed to science and human progress, and conclude with suggestions on how to make the religious traditions in Africa—traditional African religion, Islam, and

Christianity—allies of philosophy for development.

The Conclusion consists of a quick summary of the major argu­ ments in the six chapters and two recommendations for the formula­ tion of a new philosophy of education. In order to insure that the educational system become the key instrument for the rapid develop­ ment of Africa, we need a development-oriented philosophy of educa­ tion to replace any existing philosophy of education. The essential components of this new philosophy of education should be:

(a) emphasis on the cultivation of thinking skills for criti­

cal/analytic thinking, creativity, and problem-solving, and

especially the methods of scientific thinking;

(b) emphasis on the cultivation of certain Aristotelian type of pro­

development intellectual and moral virtues, including self-re­

liance, a sense of patriotism, honesty, respect for human

rights, and the love for freedom and justice.

XIX FOOTNOTES

^Mazrui, Ali A., ’The African University as Multinational Corpo­ ration: Problems of Penetration and Dependency,’ Education and Colonialiam, edited by Philip G. Altback and Gail Kelly (New York, Longman, 1978), pp. 331-354.

*A summary of the World Bank report was published in The Chronicle of Higher Education, February 6-13, 1990.

3Ibid.

^Etuk, Udo, "Philosophy in a Developing Country," Philoaophy, Vol 62, No. 23 (Jan u ary , 1987), pp. 59ff.

XX CHAPTER I

IS CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AN IDEOLOGY?

The most distinctive indicator of development in the contempo­

rary sense of the term is obviously the degree of technological

capacity a society can bring to bear on the management of its envi­

ronment for productive purposes. The observable correlation between

the growth of science and its application is therefore far from a mere

coincidence^. The orientation to scientific thinking can therefore no

longer be regarded as inconsequential to any society that aspires to economic development. And to this Africa is no exception.

As part of their contribution towards the process of modern­ ization and general development in Africa, Western-trained African philosophers have begun a conscious analyses and criticism of many aspects of traditional African culture which they consider to be detrimental to scientific thinking and the general orientation to sci­ ence and development. They have also consistently rejected any at­ tempts by African politicians and Africain scholars or "experts" on

Africa to glorify the culture and thus insulate it from criticism. As a result of their position on these issues these African philosophers have been condemned as agents of imperialism and neo­ colonialism and their discipline has accordingly been condemned as no more than a Western ideology or an instrument of Western ideology for the continued mental, and economic domination of Africans by the

West. The two most outstanding of these critics are Kwasi Wiredu

(representing the Anglophone division) and Pauline Hountondji

(representing the Francophone division).

In what follows I wish to present some of their views and the reaction from their opponents. I hope to show that Contemporary

African Philosophy is neither a Western ideology nor an instrument of any ideology and that the contributions of the philosophers for de­ velopment have been misunderstood. Let us first consider some of

Wiredu’s views in this regard. Although an Akan by birth, Wiredu has found it necessary to point out what he calls "evils" that plaque the Akan culture and hinder our orientation to science and modern­ ization. Three of these evils, he states, are anachronism (defined as the failure to let go outmoded beliefs, customs and institutions); authoritarianism, (defined as the unjustifiable overriding of an indi­ vidual’s will); and supernaturalism (defined as the exclusive use of religion as the means for determining what is right or wrong).

(These will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six). Examples of the anachronisms according to Wiredu are "certain habits of thought" that are "unscientific" "intuitive," and "unanalytic".* Against those who try to glorify the African culture, Wiredu and professor Peter Bodunrin of Nigeria have argued that not all as­ pects of the culture are glorious, and that the way of life which made it possible for our ancestors to be subjugated by a handful of

Europeans cannot be described as totally glorious®.

Hountondji has also written extensively against the attempt by

Senghor, the president of Senegal, to project and to cause Africans to celebrate "Negritude" as one of the uniquely African cultural ele­ ments Africans and Blacks in general should be proud of. Negritude as a cultural philosophy can be summed up in these two maxims:

"Emotion is Black ... Reason is Greek" and "I feel therefore I am" for the African, as opposed to "I think therefore I am" for the West­ erner.* For Hountondji, Senghor's negritude is based on an unac­ ceptable apriori: the will to differentiate at all costs between the form of black thought and the form of European thought. "Where knowledge is concerned," he explains, "it is dangerous to look for differences in logic between different cultures and societies." Al­ though logic as a form of thought is expressed in different languages and conceptual systems, it’s universality is not in doubt since logic is the expression of human rationality which is universal.*

Those intent on glorifying the African past have been insisting that the traditional worldviews of Africans constitute an African phi­ losophy in the same sense as Western philosophy is a philosophy.

This argument has also been rejected by these contemporary African

philosophers as another form of cultural romanticism. They argue that in the traditional culture there is no unanimist worldview among all Africans. Further, they contend, even if a common worldview exists at all, it should be regarded as ethnophilosophy at beat as long as such worldviews lack the rigorous methodology and critical discussion which are the essential characteristics properties of phi­ losophy in the proper sense of the term. In their view African phi­ losophy-proper has only just began—within the last 30 years—with the training and practice of Western trained African philosophers of which they are exemplars.®

Another common trend in their criticisms of the African culture and the views of their fellow African intellectuals is their unanimous rejection of ’Nkrumaism.’ For those unfamiliar with contemporary

African history and politics it may help to state that Nkrumah led the political struggle for Ghana’s Independence in 1957 and became not only the first President of Ghana, but also an inspiration for the rest of African countries in their struggles for independence. Also as a founding father of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) and the

N on-Aligned Movement (N.A.M), N krum ah’s name has become a symbol of the struggle of the Black World and the Third-World in general against (what he called) the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism.

His ideals for the political and economic liberation of the victims of

Western domination constitutes the ideology associated with his name

—Nkrumaism.

In his book, entitled Consciencism, Nkrumah presents and at­ tempts a defense of his ideals which he calls (in the subtitle of the book) "Philosophy and Ideology for De-colonization and Development

with particular reference to the African Revolution." Having studied

philosophy, with special interest in Political Philosophy at the Lincoln

University, Pennsylvania, (in the late 40’s) Nkrumah became exposed

to both Capitalism and Socialism. Taking cognizance of the unpleas­

ant history of Capitalism in the Third World and the prospects for

rapid economic development under Socialism for Africa, Nkrumah, like

Nyerere, argued for the rejection of Capitalism in favor of Socialism

as the ideology for Africa’s liberation and economic development. In

his own words, "Capitalism is but a gentleman’s method of slavery."’’

"Capitalism would be a betrayal of the personality band conscience of

Africa."*

Since the conditions in Africa are not identical to the condi­

tions in Europe or the Soviet Union, however, he modified his version of Socialism to reflect Leninism and what he perceived to be uniquely

African values (such as egalitarianism and communalism which pre­ clude exploitation and class struggle) and some of his own innovative ideas (such as how to transform the religious traditions in Africa into instruments for development). Thus his brand of African Socialism came to be called Consciencism or Nkrumaism.®

Both Wiredu and Hountondji have criticized Nkrumah’s philoso­ phy/ideology both in theory and in its application to the process of decolonization or African liberation. In his famous book, A frican philosophy: Myth Reality, or Hountondji argues that, hitherto the 1970 edition, there were two basic flaws in Nkrumah’s Conaciencism. One is the assumption that there was no class struggle in Africa because the traditional society is characterized by egalitarianism and commu­ nalism. Nkrumah probably needed this assumption for ideological purposes. For to justify his preference for socialism he tried to show that socialism is indigenous "For the social-political ancestor of

Socialism one must go communalism" (in the traditional African cul­ ture).“ But anyone familiar with the history of African societies would find it ridiculous how Nkrumah could say this of kingdoms that frequently fought, captured, and enslaved members of other African tribes or ethnic groupings. Or how can one reconcile the existence of the predominantly hierarchical political structures in which kings and chiefs are sill sometimes carried in palanquins by certain clan members with egalitarianism? It is, however, satisfying that after his overthrow from office, Nkrumah made further reflections on his thought and repudiated this piece of dogma and explained his own overthrow as the result of an ongoing class struggle in Ghana with

support for the bourgeoisie from external forces for neo-colonial­ ism.^^

The other flaw in Nkrumah’s ConacienciBm according to Houn­

tondji is the assumption that traditional African society had a single

ideology. Hountondji calls it the "the unianimist illusion." The pres­

ence of Islam and Christianity, therefore, creates a pluralistic condi­

tion that needs to be synthesized for the new socialism or Scientific

Socialism in africa. This synthesis, he maintained, could only be

found in his ideology: Consciencism. The crucial weakness of Nkrumah’s project, states Hountondji resides in the basic assumption that Africa needs a collective philosophy.

It is deeply regrettable that Nkrumah, usually such a lucid thinker, should have failed to realize that this assumption was untenable,..and a matter of deeper regret that in the revised edition of 1970 he did not perceive the close link, the indissoluble complicity" between this philosophical project and the thesis he had meanwhile abandoned, namely that there were no classes in precolonial African society". The problem with the book,and hence Nkrumaism is that it preserves ’the unanimist illu­ sio n "".

To acknowledge the ability of Nkrumah to change his position on class struggle and some of the supporting ideas Hountondji proclaims,

"Nkrumaism is dead but long live Nkrumah.

Wiredu is even more critical of Nkrumaism especially in the mode Nkrumah tried to apply it in Ghana during the 60’s. In pursuit of political unanimity consistent with his view of socialism which he thought impossible without the belief in the metaphysical unanimity

(found in dialectical materialism), Nkrumah abolished the opposition party (led by Professor K.A. Busia) and transformed the state into a one-party state. Members of the opposition party and those who op­ posed or were suspected of opposing his ideologies were put into detention without trial. The press, workers, farmers, churches, teachers, and profession associations of all kinds were made to con­ form or suffer dire consequences. Reflecting over these practices

Wiredu argued there are two kinds of ideologies: ideology as a set 8 of ideas for organizing society; and ideology as "a set of dogmas to be imposed by the government with force if necessary." Since

Nkrumaism depended on forced unanimity and coercion and created

"intellectual strangulation" in Ghana, it must be regarded as an ide­ ology in the negative sense. Cor relatively, the task of philosophy in this connection is to oppose ideology in the negative sense and to promote ideology in the positive sense.**

On strict empirical grounds it will be hard to prove how many of Wiredu’s students have acted in obedience to these moral impera­ tives. But it is also undeniable that students in at the University of

Ghana (probably more than the rest of the students in the country) have opposed several governments whose ideologies they disliked since Wiredu started teaching there. And it is probably no coinci­ dent that one of his students, now a colleague of his. Dr. Kwame

Safro, made a critical analyses of what it means for a political action to be a revolution and concluded that the present revolution began by Fit. It. Jerry Rawlings (considered to be a Neo-Nkrumaist) did not qualify as a revolution in the proper sense of the term, but only in the insignificant sense of a sudden violent change of government th ro u g h th e u se of force.*®

The Argument from Ideology

These and similar criticisms by contemporary African philoso­ phers have been met with nothing less than intellectual hostility especially from the group of African scholars known as Africanists.

The attitude of the Africanists towards the works of the professional philosophers in question receives its best exemplification in a paper written by Professor Oyekan Owomoyela, with the self-revealing title

"Africa and the Imperative of Philosophy: A Skeptical Consideration"

(1987).^® In that paper, Professor Owomoyela alleges that the critical attitude of the professional African philosophers towards African culture, traditional African thoughts, and the African scholars who regard it as philosophy, is a product of their miseducation under their Western European teachers. According to Owomoyela, their fail­ ure to understand and to appreciate their own culture can only be explained in terms of their "cultural amnesia", their "alienation", their "unabashed Europhilia," and their "insensitivity to racist nu­ ances."^’

The condition of their mentality according to Owomoyela is pathetic; for they cannot even realize the similarity between their mentality which sees superstition and fetish priests in Africa while it sees religion and thinkers in Europe, and that which sees natives, savages, and tribes in Africa while it sees citizens, civilized peoples, and nations in Europe, even when the tribes are far more numerous than the nations. "The condition is further seen in their belief that their future lies in becoming in thought, speech, and habit, like their erstwhile colonizers.

Having thus diagnosed their problem, Owomoyela proceeds now to offer them the necessary prescription. For their cure, he pre­ scribes nothing short of a mental "rehabilitation": The cause of their 10

problem is miseducation, ... and it will take a different sort of edu­

cation to cure the new African of the hypnotic compulsion toward

Westernism and the almost pathological conviction that African ways

are important only as Illustrations of things from which to distance

oneself.

In order to prevent this pathetic mentality from spreading in the intellectual community and to the larger society, he recommends not only the reha­ bilitation of the professional philosophers but also the need for African universities to absorb the discipline of philosophy into their institutes of African Studies. The philosophers, he believes, will then have the strong inducements to shed their disdain for African Studies and might even dis­ cover Frankfort’s thesis about cultural pluralism to the effect that the values found in different civi­ lizations are incommensurate.“

It is pertinent to add that Professor Owomoyela is not the only

African scholar crusading against philosophy on these ideological

grounds. Similar remarks and arguments are presented by Professor

V.Y. Mudimbe in his paper with the self-revealing title, "African Phi­

losophy as an Ideological Practice; The Case of French-Speaking

Africa."*® The perceptions and arguments of the professional

philosophers according to Mudimbe, show the consequence of their

"silently depending on a Western episteme."*® This, I take it, means

the African professional philosophers uncritically assume Western methods and theories of knowledge and use them to reject African thoughts, beliefs, and practices. 11

What conception of ideology emerges from the foregoing com­ mentaries on the works and attitudes of our Western-trained African philosophers? Ideology can be used in the non-pejorative sense to mean a set of principles intended to organize or to reorganize society from one state of being into a better state of being. Used in this sense all the political philosophies we know can be described legiti­ mately as ideologies: classical liberalism, reform liberalism, conserva- tivism, neo-conservativism, Marxism, democratic socialism, and anar­ chism etc.

There is, however, another sense of ideology which is clearly pejorative. As H.B. McCullough puts it, "To categorize something as ideological is often to speak pejoratively about that thing, because it is felt to be illusory or distortive of reality"*®

The Africanists allege that these Western-trained African philosophers suffer from western miseducation, cultural amnesia with regards to Africa, unabashed Europhilia, and insensitivity to Euro­ pean racism against Africans, etc., as a result of their exposition to

Western Philosophy. It is clear that when they object to philosophy because it is a western ideology or a means of perpetuating western ideology they cannot mean it in the non-pejorative sense, but only in the pejorative sense.

This conception of ideology as false consciousness or a distor­ tion of reality for mental domination, social control, and exploitation is definitely not new. It is Marxist in origin and has been popular­ ized in Africa by Ghana’s first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who 12 was himself ironically a Western-trained philosopher and one of the foremost African political thinkers. In the German Ideology, Marx and

Engels use the term to refer to any epistemology, politics, meta­ physics, ethics, religion, or any form of consciousness which ex­ presses the basic attitudes or commitments of a social class. Such ideas are on this account the product of falsehood and distortion and are consequently subjective, biased, and uncritical. It is clearly ideology in the pejorative sense.^i It is a form of false conscious­ ness or class-bound subjective ideas.

Nkrumah explains in Consciencism** (discussed above) that in every society there is to be found an ideology. And where there are competing ideologies, it is usual for one to be dominant. This domi­ nant ideology is that of the ruling group. The dominant ideology, on

Nkrumah’s analysis, performs several social functions including pro­ viding the source for in-group identity, solidarity, and determining the attitudes and purposes for the society as a whole. It is this dominant ideology that is responsible for deciding what forms insti­ tutions shall take and in what channels the common effort should be directed." The dominant ideology through the instrumentality of the social institutions, created or modified to conform to its norms, serves as a means of social control or subtle means of "coercion" in the interest of the group’s cohesion and other benefits"

What has philosophy to do with ideology? According to

Nkrumah, the dominant ideology makes use of several means of social 13 control or "coercion" to achieve cohesion and one of these is philoso­ phy. Referring to how Mazzini uses the concept of ideology in rela­ tion to a revolution, he argues that in a revolution the statement, the elucidation, and theoretical defense of the ideology or the principle

behind the revolution will collectively form a philosophy. Hence, he concludes, "philosophy admits of being an instrument of ideology."**

That he uses ideology in the pejorative sense in this context becomes evident in the examples he cites and the comments he makes on them.

The examples discussed by Nkrumah in this connection include,

Plato's use of philosophy to construct and Nkrumah alleges, to ra­ tionalize social inequalities in the R epublic,

Another example is Hobbes' use of the Social Contract which,

states Nkrumah, "we all know was unhistorical to justify dictatorship

by kings. Further," he says, "socialist philosophers also use philos­ ophy as a means of social control and Western philosophers since the time of the Greek philosophers have used a humanist ideology with implications for political theory, class-structure, history, literature, art, and religion. The ideology of society is total, and it acquires a philosophical statement. Through Western education, and Christianity, he alleges, the ideologies of Capitalism and its highest form, imperi­ alism, have reached Africa. Philosophy's role remains unchanged.

Its ideological function takes shape as political philosophy or as ethics which is taught in the schools and universities.

Through political philosophy, it lays down certain ideals for our pursuit and fortification, and it becomes an instrument of unity 14

by laying down the same ideals for all the members of a given soci­

ety. Through ethics, philosophy proposes to throw light on the na­

ture of moral judgments; and it also seeks to expose the source of

the validity of ethical principles, and so of moral obligation.

It is in the light of these benefits of philosophy and ideology

that Nkrumah proposes in the said book his new philosophy called

"consciencism," which he explains simply as an ideology for decolo­

nization. In the Ghana context it was to be the dominant ideology to

control the three existing ideologies identified as Euro-Christianity,

Islam, and African traditional religion and culture.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the concept of ideol­

ogy as used among African intellectuals, especially Nkrumah, and its

relation between philosophy, the argument of the critics from the

ideological standpoint may be summarized thus:

PI. Africans cannot attain the goals of development unless

they achieve mental liberation from their former colonies.

P2. But the achievement of mental liberation is impossible

unless our educators are free from all forms of mental domination.

P3. Philosophy as a discipline is an ideology that promotes mental domination.

P4. Hence, the teaching of philosophy in Africa is incompati­

ble with the goals of Africa’s development.

C. Consequently, the teaching of philosophy must be rejec­ ted in African Universities. 15

Why Philosophy is not an Ideology

The crucial premise in the above argument the third which claims that philosophy is an ideology that promotes mental domination.

So I wish to focus on that and try to show that it is not true of

Western philosophy in which the professional African philosophers have been trained.

As argued above the sense of ideology used by the critics is pejorative and represents the usage in the German Ideology by Marx and Engels. The term refers to such general systems of ideas and norms directing political and social action but "only in so far as they are recognized to contain falsehood and distortion generated by more or less unconscious motivations."*®

The question now is: what is the justification for using this derogatory sense of the term to describe the activities of profes­ sional philosophers?

That philosophy cannot be an ideology or an instrument of ide­ ology in this pejorative sense can be seen in the nature of philoso­ phy itself, especially its attitude and method. The philosophical attitude may be characterized by the following list of adjectives: troubled, perplexed, wondering, reflective, doubting, undogmatic, open-minded, tolerant, willing to be guided by experience and reason, uncertainty, suspended judgment, persistent, unemotional, etc. Philo­ sophical thinking does not begin unless there is an intellectual chal­ lenge which makes one begin to be troubled, to be perplexed and to 16 wonder about things which often others take for granted. In think­ ing deeply about the problem one becomes reflective. To be able to sustain this reflective attitude one must keep doubting his tentative solutions, and remain undogmatic. When confronted with alternative solutions to the same problem the philosopher is expected to keep an open mind and to be tolerant. As a rational person he must be will­ ing to suspend judgments pending convincing evidence or arguments for a position and be guided by experience and reason, rather than emotions, slogans, and dogma. He is noted for being "cool, calm, and reflective."

It is for these reasons that philosophy has been defined and described variously as a general theory of criticism and speculative activity. In philosophy both extreme skepticism and extreme dogma­ tism are equally unacceptable. In the words of Betrand Russell, "The dogmatist is dangerous but the (total) skeptic is useless." According to Alfred North Whitehead, "Philosophy is an attitude of mind towards doctrines ignorantly entertained" and "it refuses to be satisfied by the conventional presupposition that every sensible person knows the an sw er."

Given this description of the attitude of philosophy, it must be clear that it is incompatible with anything that discourages the holding of such attitudes. But ideology is clearly a form of dogma­ tism, and does not favor the critical, open-minded and speculative attitude philosophy calls for. Ideology cannot encourage tentative­ ness about its answers to the existential problems for which it has 17 been conceived. Rather, it calls for faith and commitment to the ideals envisioned for the state. In view of this incompatibility of their attitudes it must be concluded that philosophy can neither be an ideology nor the handmaid of any ideology.

A brief look at the method of philosophy will also reveal similar incompatibilities between philosophy and ideology. In many respects the method of philosophy is identical or similar to the method of sci­ ence. Both employ inductive and deductive methods of thinking, as well as the method of experimentation. However, while scientists tend to emphasize practical experiments, philosophers tend to emphasize thought experiments. Besides these, philosophers also employ another critical thinking method known as dialectical thinking. The well- known Socratic method is a form of dialectical thinking, as well as the famous Hegelian method of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—es­ pecially when the synthesis is not interpreted as a final stage but as a possible stage for another thesis that may generate another an­ tithesis, leading to another synthesis ad infinitum .

A different form of dialectical reasoning not so well known but common to science and philosophy is what Karl Popper calls the

Method of Critical Elimination in his theory of Evolutionary Epistemol­ ogy. He explains the method thus: When confronted with a problem we begin to look for tentative solutions. We then test and examine each of the tentative solutions and try to eliminate the errors we find in them.*’ This does not mean we have found a final answer.

Our achievement is that we have discovered new problems and we 18

now know that our first tentative solutions are inadequate. The pro­

cess must continue since we never arrive at the truth in the empiri­

cal realm, given human fallibilism, and the incompletability of human

knowledge. We can, therefore, only approximate truth within the em­

pirical realm. For Popper, then, if knowledge requires certainty,

then within the empirical realm there is no knowledge. But if hu­

man knowledge is the total sum of our theories or tentative solutions

that have survived continuous critical testing to the moment, then we

have human knowledge.

The method of pejorative-ideological thinking and dissemina­

tion cannot follow any of these rigorous methods. If they did they would generate skepticism and argumentation rather than belief and commitment which are necessary for the successful deployment of every ideology. It might however be objected that ideological think­ ing can be dialectical if nothing else. That is true. However, the dialectics involved cannot be identical to that described by Popper above.*® For in order to justify or rationalize the ideology, it is necessary for the ideologue to assume that the common ideal of the society is identical with the synthesis the dialectics is leading to and that it is not going to change into another form of thesis and an­ tithesis ... and so on. This, however, is not the same as the Hegelian dialectic I described above, for that one admits of an incomplete pro­ cess.

Pejorative-ideologies, of course, thrive on propaganda and brainwashing, rather than any of the objective and rational methods 19 of logic and critical thinking described above. If Popper is right, and I think recent events in the Eastern block have borne him out,

Marxism is the paradigm case of political ideologies in the derogative sense, and it's survival and transmission depends on closed, rather than open, minds.*® P opper rig h tly co n tra sted such societies w ith those where critical discussion and argumentation are encouraged by calling the former closed societies and the latter open societies. The new openness in that part of the world is an admission that hitherto they have been living in a closed society. Since philosophy employs these critical methods and argumentation, it belongs to the open soci­ ety. And since pejorative-ideology does not employ such critical methods, but propaganda, brainwashing, etc., it belongs to the closed society.®® In view of th e se obvious differences, philosophy can nei­ ther be an ideology nor an instrument of any ideology.

That philosophy is the most self-critical of all the disciplines is a fact acknowledged by experts on comparative literature and meta- philosophy. Professor Abiola Irele, for instance, who is uncommonly familiar with both Anglophone and Francophone philosophical litera­ ture in the West as well as in Africa, has compared philosophy with other disciplines and found that:

Philosophy can be regarded as the most self-con­ scious of disciplines. It is the one discipline that involves by its very nature a constant process of reflection upon itself. This process of self-reflec­ tion, inherent in the nature and practice of philos­ ophy, bears upon its relation to the world and to human experience in its multiple expressions, upon its status among other disciplines and forms of in­ tellectual pursuit and discourse, but also, most 20

radically, upon its very nature as an activity and as an enterprise.^^

This view of philosophy as a critical activity whose function embraces an interrogation of its own nature and meaning is, Irele points out, undoubtedly, a legacy of the Greek Philosophers. Plato insisted on the distinction between the objects of doxa and the ob­ je c ts of aophia, and maintained that true knowledge, i.e., philosophi­ cal knowledge, as distinct from unsupported beliefs and propaganda, etc., can only correspond with aophia but not doxa.3* Aristotle on

his part insisted on the self sufficiency of philosophy. He defined

philosophy as simply thought thinking about itself, so that whatever

benefits it might impact on society is incidental but not essential to

its being.

Thus over the years, and especially from the beginning of the

20th century until the 60's or so, philosophy has been preoccupied

not only with the content of the problems within its areas of concern

but even more so with the manner or the methodology in which they

have been produced, presented, discussed, or transmitted. In fact

philosophy has often been so preoccupied with analyzing and evalu­

ating its own methodologies that it has been charged with being a

disinterested and overly detached from reality.

If philosophy is so self-critical, how then can it be used as an

instrument for mental domination rather than mental liberation? Are

the disguises too clever for the African philosophers to detect? If

these African philosophers have been as ideologically conditioned as 21 the critics would have us believe, then one would expect that at least

Wiredu and Hountondji who are the prime examples would be in all probability pro-capitalist in their political orientation since that is the dominant orientation of Western philosophers. That, however, is not the case with either of them. They are both critical of capitalism, especially the unrestrained capitalism that is largely re­ sponsible, they would say, for Africa’s economic crises and cultural alienation. Wiredu categorically rejects both capitalism and socialism, and argues in support of a version of philosophical anarchism*®

No one familiar with their writings and public presentations will doubt that these are highly critical and independent thinkers. Both of these intellectuals were invited for public lectures here at The

Ohio State University in 1989. A person who has been so brain­ washed by Western philosophy should neither have the capacity nor the desire to challenge any of the basic thesis of Western philosophy such as the theories of truth and punishment. Yet, Wiredu, at a

Spring colloquium in the Department of Philosophy that year at­ tempted to refute by rigorous argumentation a number of counter­ examples from the linguistic analysis of the Akan language. For in­ stance, Wiredu argued that there is no conflict between truth and fact in the Akan language. For "nokware" (Akan for truth) means

"nea ete sa" (Akan for fact or what is). Thus for Akans there is only one basic criterion of truth, and that is correspondence.

On the theory of punishment Wiredu argued that the problem of justifying retributive punishment, which is a perenial problem in 22

Western philosophy, does not arise for the Akan philosopher because

the word for punishment in Akan is "asotwe" which literally means

the act of pulling the ear. Since pulling the ear is a means of

making a person more self-conscious or alert, it follows that punish­

ment is not a form of revenge but a method of character reformation

or moral discipline. These arguments and others presented by

Wiredu were intended to criticize the tendency of Western philoso­

phers to universalize philosophical claims emanating from the linguis­

tic analysis of the just the English language.

In a similar vein Hountondji argued, during the Fall Quarter as

a guest of the Center for African Studies, to the effect that Western­

ers are responsible to a large extent for the lack of scientific and

technological productivity in Africa. His main reason was that West­

ern educators and educational, research, and industrial foundations

have created, what he calls, a condition of scientific dependency that

militate against the efforts of African students and scientists to be

productive. These obstacles include absence of any significant re­

search centers in Africa, the attraction of promising scientists and

researchers to the West, the lack of support for Africa-based re­

search centers, and the absence of any major African scientific jour­

nal. He charged that the relevant donors and sponsors were not

interested in supporting African research because they benefit from

the ongoing brain-drain, especially of our scientists and technical experts in various fields. If Owomoyela and the other critics were

right these philosophers have a pathetic pro-Western ideological bias. 23

Philosophy is not only critical of its own activities, it is also critical of all other human activities. It is for this reason that phi­ losophy has been called a second-order activity as distinct from first-order activities. The reason for the name is that philosophy analyzes and evaluates the assumptions, theories, claims, values, and methods of all disciplines, including itself. Howard Kane puts it best when he states, philosophers "keep the books on everyone, including themselves. The role of the philosopher in this regard is analogous to that of a surveyor who evaluates his own work and also offers criticisms and suggestions to insure that others do their best. Thus he may point out to the road-maker that the path he has made be­ hind him is crooked." The Akans of Ghana express their recognition and appreciation for such second-order activities when they say in a proverb, "The path-maker does not realize when the path cut behind him looks crooked." He is therefore grateful to the passer-by who draws his attention to the error made.

The weakness in the argument of the critics becomes more ap­ parent when we reflect on the role of philosopher as a second-order activity in relation to political theories, ethical theories, and ideolo­ gies in either the subjective or the objective sense since these theo­ ries or principles are in relation to philosophy first-order activities.

Thus, in the typical philosophy classroom, seminar, or conference, unlike a political rally where particular ideologies are presented for unquestioning commitment, ideologies of all kinds would be subjected to critical analyses and discussion. For the philosopher an ideology 24 is not an object of faith and commitment; it is, like all other issues, the object of rational and objective criticism. If philosophy is com­ mitted to anything, it is the method of rational and critical discussion rather than any dogma, political or otherwise. The view that philos­ ophy is either an ideology or an instrument of an ideology should be rejected for it depends on the false presumption that the character­ istics of the discipline are compatible with those of ideology. They are incompatible.

Further, to insist that philosophy is an ideology, not with­ standing the observation that they belong to different logical cate­ gories, is to commit a variety of what Gilbert Ryle has called, "The

Category Mistake." In this case, it is the failure to realize that the two concepts belong to different levels of abstraction.

It is evident from Owomoyela that one of the reasons for the continuing attack on the African philosophers within the analytic tra­ dition is the refusal of the professional philosophers to recognize

African folk-beliefs and ideas as African philosophy. They insist that those ideas constitute ethnophilosophy, but not philosophy proper.

Their refusal is not based on a dislike of their own culture or any wish they have to be regarded as "Westerners." Rather, it is for the fact that African folk-beliefs and ideas (like their Western counter­ parts) belong to the level of first-order activities. Thus, the folk- beliefs and ideas, no matter how long they are studied and described by anthropologists or cultural historians and sociologists, cannot be­ come African philosophy-proper until they are made the objects of 25 rigorous, rational, and objective criticism. Part of the reasons for the ideology-peddling charge must be the failures of the critics to realize that to say that any set of folk-beliefs and ideas (or ethnophilosophy) constitutes philosophy is to commit a category mis­ take. It is like confusing the work of a newspaper editor with the work of his staff-writers and reporters.

While not denying the normative and prescriptive functions of philosophy in formulating and recommending principles and standards for moral thinking action-guidance, I wish to emphasize that within the philosophic tradition dating back to Socrates the two have been regarded as inseparable. If one is to discover standards and norms for deciding and acting, rigorous analysis is essential as a first step in order to minimize ambiguities and vagueness and to insure clarity, coherence and correct inferences, as well as consistency with other entrenched principles. Thus Plato’s theory of the state in the Re­ public has been criticized in various ways by other philosophers.

Karl Popper, for instance, in the OpenSociety and Its Enemies charges Plato with not only utopianism, but also totalitarianism which became for Marx both a model and a justification for his communist ideology. Plato’s unfairness towards the lower classes, women, and certain races are also deplored in the book and elsewhere. Similarly,

Hobbes’ political and moral theories have been subjected to serious analyses and criticism ever since they were published some 200 years ago. Their assumptions of crude egoism and defense of political ab­ solutism, which Marx cited as examples of subjective thinking in phi­ 26 losophy, are among the most criticized of all socio-political theories.

Even those who are sympathetic to his political and moral orientation like Gregory Kavka have found it necessary to reconstruct some of the arguments.

Long before Kavka, of course, John Locke had challenged

Hobbes’ theory of human nature regarding our moral and rational ca­ pacities for cooperation and peaceful co-existence. For Hobbes, this condition was impossible without the power of an absolute sovereign without whom civil society will return to the state of nature and further degenerate into the state of war. For Locke, on the other hand, government is necessary just for certain "inconveniences," such as the administration of punishment by individuals but not to prevent the return to the state of nature. Both opposing views con­ tinue to be debated up-to-date. It is, therefore, undeniable that philosophical theories including those on socio-political issues are not treated as objects of faith and commitment like creeds and ideologies in the subjective sense. On the contrary, they are the objects of thought to be criticized, amended, or rejected in accordance with ra­ tional methods.

The kind of unanimity or consensus presupposed in the use of creeds and ideologies for social coercion in Nkrumah’s analysis are simply missing or rare within this Socratic tradition. Almost every point of the political spectrum is represented among these philoso­ phers, including the African in question. Their positions range from 27 one extreme to the other: from Hobbeaian absolutists to Wolffian an­ archists, not to mention the middle positions occupied by all shades of conservatives and liberals. Similarly, when it comes to religion one would find philosophical or practical atheists, but also agnostics and theists of varying degrees of commitment.

How do the Marxists reconcile this political and religious diver­ sity among philosophers with Marx's thesis that one's ideology is the product of one's social class, given Hume's law (same cause, same ef­ fect) and the empirical fact that most of these professionals belong to the middle class of their respective societies? Maybe there is a more sympathetic reading of Marx that can resolve this paradox. But the burden of proof is clearly on the critics who want to use the Marxist thesis of ideological subjectivism.

It must be clear from the foregoing that the charge that con­ temporary African philosophy is either an ideology or the instrument of Western ideology has been shown indefensible. It depends on the false assumption that the characteristics of philosophy make such an identification or application possible, or at least plausible. While the possibility cannot be ruled out, I have shown that the characteristics of philosophy in terms of its attitudes, methods, degree of self-criti­ cism, and its status as a second-order activity make it implausible that it is the instrument of any particular subjective ideology for so­ cial control. The incompatibility between the works and attitudes of the professional philosophers, including the African, and what one would expect of political ideologue further minimize the plausibility of 28 the critic’s position. Such an identification or application is also to be based claim by the African critics. Whatever plausibility is left also seems to have vanished with the undeniable diversity in their political and religious orientations.

If the critics are not raising these objections just for the sake of cultural romantism, but in the inheres of Africa’s development, they will find this dilemma inescapable: Suppose for the sake of ar­ gument that the criticisms are justified, and that contemporary

African philosophy is indeed a Western idealogy intended for the continued domination of the African mind. Then it will seem to follow that since the only way we can understand the strategies of the dominant forces and contain or counter them is by studying them, the study will maximize our chances our development. Studying the discipline, therefore, is in our rational self-interest. On the other hand, if they accept the above criticisms of their position and admit that the charge against philosophy is unjustifiable, then the charge should be withdrawn. But either the charge is justifiable or it is not. Hence, in either case, they ought to permit the teaching of philosophy in the universities®*

Ideology-peddling is not the only charge made against the dis­ cipline and its professionals. There is also the charge that philoso­ phy as a discipline is economically non-productive and is therefore a luxury Africa cannot afford. It is time to examine that now. 29

FOOTNOTES

^Irele, Abiola, "Education and Access to Modern Knowledge" in DAEDALUS: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. "A World To Make: Development in Perspective", Winter, 1989. Is­ sued as Volume 118, Number 1, of the Proceedings of the Americsm. Academy of Arts and Sciences, p. 125

*1. Wiredu, Kwasi, Philosophy And An African Culture (Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 1-25.

®Bodunrin, Peter, "The Question of African Philosophy." In Richard Wright (ed.), Africsm Philosophy: An Introduction (Lanham, University Press of America), pp. 1-24. Wiredu makes the same point in Falloff and An African Culture, op cit., p. 61

^Mazrui, Ali, The Africans: A Triple Heritage (BBC Publica­ tions, 1986), pp. 73, 75

“Hountondji, Pauline, West Africa, August 22, 1983, p. 1955. He made these statements in an interview with the well-known Ghanaian journalist, Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill.

“Oruka, Oderaka H., "African Falloff: A Brief Personal History and Current Debate." In G. Florstad (ed.). Contemporary Falloff: A New Survey, Vol. 5 African Philosophy (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Pub.), pp. 45-77

’Nkrumah, Kwame, Consciencism: Philosophy And ideology for the De-colonization and Development with particular reference to the African Revolution (London, Heineman, 1964), p. 72.

«Ibid., p. 74

«Hountondji explains the duality by saying that Nkrumah him­ self preferred to refer to his ideology as Consciencism, and he could not have made a better choice for "consciencism is direct response to the classic project of falloff as consciousness, in the sense that in the Western philosophical tradition 'consciousness' has always been the ultimate unifying principle ... for diverse beliefs." The members of his party. The Convention People's Party (C.P.P.), however, pre­ ferred to fix his name to the ideas to insure that they were never lost or identified with other people's ideas. Hountondji, op ciL , p 149

Consciencism, op cit., p. 73. 30

one of his final books, Dark Days In Ghana (New York, International Publishers, 1968), he alleges that the CIA and the U.S. State Department were involved in the military coup that overthrew him in 1966. Another book reflecting his change of mind is his Class Struggle in Africa (Paris, Panaf, 1970).

^*See Myth and Reality, p. 149f

^®See West Africa, ibid.

^♦Wiredu, op cit., p. 53, 58

^®See Philosopher, Journal of the Legon Philosophy Ja n Club, ­ uary 21, 1988.

leowomoyela, Oyekan, African Studies Review, Vol. 30, Number 1, M arch 1987, pp. 79-100.

^’’Ibid., p. 94.

^^Ibid., p. 95

^®Mudimbe, V.Y., "A frican Falloff as an Ideological Practice: The Case of French Speaking Africa," Africa Studies Review, Vol. 26, Nos. 3-4 (September and December 1983).

^^’Mudimbe, ibid., p. 95.

z^McCouIough, H.B., Political Ideologies and Political Philoso­ phies, (Toronto, Wall and Thomson, 1989), p. 2.

**For a discussion on the distinction between pejorative and nonpejorative senses of ideology, see the introduction and the first chapter in The Age of Ideology (New York, Houghton Mifflin Co.).

"Professor James P Scanlan has drawn my attention to an at­ tempt by a Soviet expert on Marx to argue in 1965 that Marx and Engels were aware of both nonscientific (illusory) and scientific (truthful) ideologies. In 1977, however, as reported in a discussion paper by Professor Scanlan, the expert, T.l. Ojzerman has admitted that he was wrong and that neither the term nor the concept of sci­ entific ideology can be found in the writings of Marx and Engels. See the discussion paper entitled "Yakhot and Odjerman on Ideology" in Studies in Soviet Thought 22 (1981), 193-195.

^*ConBciencisin, op cit., p. 59.

»^Ibid., p. 60. 31

**Consciencism, op cit., p. 56.

^’’Dictionary of Fedloff, 1979, Anthony Flew (ed.).

“ Russell, Bertrand, Unpopular Esaays (London, Simon and Schuster, and George Allen & Unwin, 1950) rpt. in Basic Philosophical A n a lysis by Charles L. Reid (Encino, Dickenson, 1971), p. 123.

“ Whitehead, Alfred, Modes of Thought, pp. 223-224.

“ Popper, Karl, Objective Knowledge (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 156ff.

®^See, also. Popper’s book. Conjectures and Refutations (6th impression) (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).

“See "Morality and Ideology" by Henry David Aiken in E thics and Society (New York, Doubleday, 1966), pp. 149-172; especially, pp. 150, 151, 155.

“ See Karl Popper’s, Open Society and Its Enemies, op.cit.

“ See Irele, Abiola, "Introduction," African Falloff: Myth and R eality by Pauline, Hountondji (1983), op cit.

“ See Plato’s Republic: V.

“Wiredu revealed this in an interview with the editor of The Philosopher, The Journal of the Legon Philosophy some Club time in 1980. But I suspect that it may be his philosophical way of protest­ ing against the injustices within the so-called democracies-capitalist or socialist in Ghana run by civilians or the military since indepen­ dence.

“The need for critical thinkers who can see through attempts by people or agencies within or without the continent to use decep­ tive strategies and persuasive but logically unconvincing but persua­ sive arguments to deceive and to take advantage of unsuspecting government officials, local rulers, and indigenous business enter- preneurs in these moments of critical reconstruction in Africa cannot be overemphasized. It is therefore disappointing to notice how these critical thinkers in the falloff departments are being psychologically and physically rejected by their fellow intellectuals who should know b e tte r. CHAPTER II

IS PHILOSOPHY A LUXURY FOR AFRICA?

What is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc.,and if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life?

Ludwig Wittgenstein

As stated in the Preface, the growing skepticism about the role and value of philosophy for development has jeopardized the exis­

tence of philosophy as an academic discipline in African Universities.

In Chapter One we examined the charge that philosophy is an ideol­ ogy and found it to be unjustifiable. In this chapter, I wish to examine the charge that, compared with agriculture, medicine, indus­ trial technology, and the sciences in general, philosophy is a luxury

Africa, as a continent of developing nations, cannot afford.

Against this view, I wish to maintain that the stereotypical image of philosophy as good for nothing but the intellectual pleasure of the well-to-do-elite is incorrect. I will argue that, historically.

32 33 philosophy has made and continues to make very significant contri­ butions to human progress through the cultivation of certain intel­ lectual skills, human values, and the growth of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge.

The anti-philosophy argument from this perspective may be reconstructed thus:

P.l Any discipline that is just for intellectual pleasure is a luxury Africa, as a continent of developing nation, cannot afford.

P.2 Philosophy is just for intellectual pleasure.

C: Hence, philosophy is a luxury Africa cannot afford.

It is tempting to challenge the first premiss on the grounds of the academic freedom in the universities by arguing that, since the universities are guaranteed academic freedom, the state has no right to question which courses are or are not on the curricula. The temptation, however, must be rejected in view of the high cost of education for these states which sponsor the universities, as well as

the harsh socio-economic conditions in these countries. I could not agree more with Udo Etuk when he says, "It would indeed be a lux­

ury which developing countries can ill-afford if philosophy were no

more than armchair theorizing and hair splitting."^

The temptation should be resisted as soon as one realizes that

for most African leaders education is corporate investment aimed at 34 the overall development of their individual nations. Nkrumah, himself a Western-trained philosopher, rejected this ’ivory tower mentality’ when he said in the spirit of the Addis Ababa Conference on Educa­ tion and in his philosophy of education:

We have been doing a great deal to make education available to all. It is equally important that edu­ cation should seek the welfare of the people and recognize our attempts to solve our economic, cul­ tural, technological, and scientific problems. We look to the universities to set an example for us by their efficiency and their sense of responsibil­ ity in the use of public funds. They must also set an example in loyalty to the Government and the people,in good citizenship, public morality and be­ havior.*

Similarly, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda told the people of Zambia, and indirectly all African educators, at the opening of the University of

Zambia;

Many of our hopes for the future of our land and its people are wrapped up in this institution. Without it we cannot hope to become the nation we want to be. The University of Zambia is one of the keys that open the door of the future and help us to overcome persisting evils of poverty, ignorance and disease.*

In view of these high expectations of education as an instru­ ment for the rapid development of Africa on one hand, and the de­ pressing socio-economic and political realities that exist today on the other hand, it will indeed be not only professionally irresponsible but 35 totally inhuman for our African philosophers to try to circumvent the quest for relevance embodied in this premiss by appealing to the principle of academic freedom and similar defensive mechanisms. The temptation to reject the first premiss based on this 'ivory tower’ mentality should therefore be resisted for the lack of both empirical and moral support. Without exception, anyone who accepts a teaching or research appointment in an African university gives consent, im­ plicitly or explicitly, to contribute towards the nation's overriding goals of education: the acceleration of that country's process of de­ velopm ent.

The real issue in this argument then is not the first but the second premiss. For if it is indeed true that by its nature philoso­ phy is just good for intellectual pleasure of the enlightened, then the conclusion is unavoidable that Africa cannot afford it. But is philosophy just for intellectual pleasure? It might appear strange, but it is true that many philosophers, including Aristotle and Kant, have given this impression about philosophy. However, I hope to show that it is only an impression.

Three of such references are worth discussing in some detail since they seem to lend credence to the view that philosophy is nothing more than a source of Aristocratic pleasure.

1. Aristotle, describing the nature of philosophy, stated that it is

the only discipline that is studied for its own sake. 36

2. Similarly, the Logical Positivists concluded that traditional phi­

losophy is a pursuit not after knowledge, but after pseudo-

knowledge,' for the problems it tries to solve are unreal.

3. J.F. Rosenburg, a contemporary American philosopher, states in

his Handbook For the Practice of Philoaophy, that philosophical

inquiry is not instrumental. It is not a tool. It aims at clar­

ity, not as a means of facilitating action or other independent

life-goals, but simply for the sake of clarity.*

When Aristotle or any philosopher states that philosophy is the only discipline that is enjoyed for its own sake what does he mean?

It is clear that by this they mean philosophy has an intrinsic value and it is the only discipline that has this value. Other disciplines are said to have merely extrinsic values. Thus, the conclusion seems to be that a given discipline has either an intrinsic value or an ex­ trinsic value, but not both. The connective "or" is here used in the exclusive sense.

My first response is that it is false that philosophy is the only discipline that is or can be enjoyed for its own sake. Take music for example. Music can be enjoyed for its own sake and also for other purposes such as entertainment, and education. It can be used to stimulate people towards war, peace, love and almost any human action. Music therefore has both intrinsic and extrinsic values. The representation of the values in the form of an exclusive disjunction consequently amounts to a false dichotomy between intrinsic and ex­ trinsic values. There is, therefore, no logical reason why philosophy 37 cannot have both the intrinsic value it has as well as extrinsic values such as guiding peoples’ thoughts and actions at the personal, social political levels.

The history of philosophy indeed reveals that philosophy has been instrumental in the cultivation of the thinking skills, the for­ mulation of conceptual schemas, and the critical attitude that led to the revolution of scientific, and democratic ideals that have shaped the Western world and eventually affected the whole human race.

Specific instances of this influence will be discussed below when we consider philosophy as the conscience of the socio-political community of which it is a part, the conscience of its intellectual community and an accessory to science.

Meanwhile, the foregoing considerations alone show that neither the statement attributed to Aristotle nor that of Rosenburg can be taken as evidence in favor of the premiss that philosophy is just for intellectual pleasure. The objection based on Logical Positivism should not be hard to dismiss either. After all Logical Positivism is no longer as tenable as it used to be some thirty years ago. Logical

Positivism has committed what might be called "intellectual suicide" by insisting on a criterion of meaningfulness which rendered many intellectual discourses including itself nonsensical.

Having learned its lessons from positivism philosophy today is noticeably concerned with normative and contemporary issues in edu­ cation: principles of war and peace, and debates on capital punish­ ment, abortion, euthanasia, drug abuse, reverse discrimination, and 38 many other public and international policy issues. Not only do they clarify the issues concerned, they also contribute significantly to the debate by presenting positions on these issues, and in some cases by prescribing solutions in accordance with normative principles from philosophy. Commenting on Professor Andrew Oldenquist's book The

Non-Suicidal Society which is paradigmatic of what many, if not most, philosophers have been working on in Europe and North America in the 70s, E.O. Wilson, of Harvard University, stated "At last a philoso­

pher is doing what philosophers are supposed to do on behalf of society...." Of course, European philoaophy, represented by existen­ tialism and phenomenology, has almost always been associated with problems of human existence, and the same can be said of Soviet

Philosophy which has always been pre-occupied with the p ra xis of

Marxist-Leninist political thought.

The conclusion from our discussion of the foregoing proposi­ tions is that none of them can be taken seriously as providing evidence in favor of the premiss in question. The argument of the critics is, therefore, impaired and it consequently fails to prove that

philosophy is a luxury by its nature.

At the risk of committing the ad hominem fallacy, it seems per­

tinent to ask why the critics would question the relevance of philos­ ophy given the fact that most of them are members of the African

intelligentsia which is predominantly Marxist or Neo- Marxist. They cannot pretend not to know the relevance of Marxism for educationed and sociopolitical reconstruction since the educational or political 39 programs they are involved in are at least, in part, Marxist-oriented.

Neither can they pretend to be ignorant of the fact that Marxism dominates as much as one-third of the human race. So either they are being hypocritical or they are simply ignorant of the historical origin of Marxism as a philosophical doctrine formulated and defended by the philosopher Karl Marx. In either case, the best solution ap­ pears to be to present to them a kind of conceptual analysis of phi­ losophy that focuses on the nature of philoaophy and its values, actual or potential, for the accelerated development nations and to point out that Marxism at its best is a significant component of this global intellectual tradition called philosophy.

Why Philosophy is not a Luxury for Africa

If you asked a thousand philosophers what they mean by phi­ losophy you are likely to obtain one thousand different responses.

This diversity of their responses, however, is not necessarily a re­ flection of any weakness within the discipline. On the contrary, it is a reflection of its scope, the open-endedness of its issues, as well as the open-mindedness of these lovers of wisdom. As long as most of their responses are consistent with each other, and are not contra­ dictory, the diversity gives us a richer view than what any one standardized definition can offer.

Below I wish to discuss four of the functions of philosophy which will not only reveal its essential nature and value for develop­ ment, but will guide subsequent discussions in this dissertation. 40

1. Philoaophy Cultivates Critical Thinking Skills

Critical thinking begins with the refusal to take anything for granted. It is the careful and conscientious determination of whether to accept, reject, or suspend Judgment about beliefs, theories, hy­ potheses, and other claims in the light of the given evidence for the claim or the lack of it. Our identity as rational beings, as well as our survival and well-being as the human race, depend almost exclu­ sively on our ability to think analytically and constructively for the solution of our actual or anticipated existential problems.

Fortunately, the need for the kind of education that will sig­ nificantly improve our thinking skills in both quantitative and quali­ tative terms is beginning to dawn on some of our African and other

T hird World lead ers. In 1962, a UNESCO re p o rt on th e quality of ed ­ ucation in African universities revealed that the teaching of the sciences have failed to stimulate the African students ability to think critically. Rather, it has led to mere memorization without the ability to derive these principles from observation and experimentation.®

Addressing a Conference of Third World Countries in India in

1983, an Indian professor of Economics admitted that the lack of proper analysis is the number one weakness of Third World coun­ tries, and that, of course, includes African countries.® In a newspa­ per article, headlined "We Need Think Tanks Now", a famous Ghanaian journalist agreed with the Indian professor and lamented that

"whether it’s a change in educational set up or planning an economic strategy, it’s the same shallow thinking that is usuaHy brought to 41

bear on it." That same year the secretary of finance, Dr. Kweai

Botwe, himself a renown economist, deplored the lack of critical ap­

proach to economic issues and stressed the need to upgrade the level of critical thinking to our national issues and problems.’

Can philosophy indeed cultivate these critical thinking skills?

Philosophers have claimed their ability to improve these skills in their students, but the more interesting testimony should be some kind of well-conducted empirical research from non-philosophers.

Reports of a series of tests conducted in 1957, 1961, and 1977, among college students in the U.S., indicate that most students in the lib­ eral arts, especially philosophy, excel in these thinking skills tests with wide margins. The same is true of the differentials on their scores in the analytic skills on the Scholastic Aptitude Test and the

Graduate Admissions Tests in general.®

Even more interesting is the results of the 15 or more experi­ ments conducted by the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy to Children (I.A.P.C) at Montclair, New Jersey, founded by the head of the Philosophy Department, Matthew Lipman. Summarizing their findings on the experiments with various high schools in the country,

Ross and Semb concluded.

The data allow us to conclude that the null hy­ pothesis that the teaching of philosophy courses make no difference in the improvement of thinking skills is false: Philosophy can teach students to think.® 42

Nader Chokr, of the Department of Philosophy at the University of

Cincinnati and formerly of the Ohio University in Athens, directed a pilot project for the cultivation of thinking skills in the Ivory Coast that also showed tremendous success in critical reading and scientific thinking. My own experience as a teacher of logic in Ghana and as a student of logic for nearly 10 years confirms the conclusion that the null hypothesis is false.

Since one of the major aims of education has always been the cultivation of critical minds that ask for evidence and evaluate them before accepting, rejecting, or suspending judgment on claims, the relevance of philosophy in this connection cannot be denied in Africa where, as Professor Nduka puts it, we have developed a variety of philosophies (sometimes called folk-talk) but not critical philosophy which paved the way for Western science in the 18th century.*®

2. Philosophy Cultivates Creativity

For a people who admit lagging behind in development and perceive education as a vital key for it, the improvement of creativ­ ity in the schools should be of grave concern since scientific think­ ing certainly requires both critical and creative thinking. Creative

thinking is also necessary as a supplement to the Recall Model which

has unfortunately dominated our schools since the colonial times and

has contributed to making us less productive than our Western

counterparts.

Skeptics maintain that creativity cannot be taught and that it

is either caught or is inborn. So the question whether or not 43 creativity can be taught, especially through philosophy courses, must be addressed directly.

According to the famous cognitive psychologist Guilford, cre­ ativity can be identified by four capacities:

1. Sensitivity: the ability to sense the presence of prob­ lems that call for a solution;

2. Fluency: the ability to produce many relevant ideas for the solution of a problem in a short time;

3. Flexibility: the ability to change one’s mind in the face of changing problem situations to look for new possible solu­ tions; and,

4. Originality.

Given this analysis it becomes evident to every one who is familiar with logic that these aspects of thinking skills are covered by any standard logic course. Students are trained to look for falla­ cies in contrived as well as real everyday expressions, especially in the media, and also how to reconstruct the arguments to avoid the fallacies they find. Thus philosophy teaches sensitivity to problems that call for a solution. Logic exercises asking for reconstruction and proof of arguments under examination conditions also contribute towards fluency in thinking. Flexibility is also developed as students struggle in the classroom and under examination conditions to look for solutions to problems that appear similar to but not exactly like ones they have encountered previously. 44

The value of philosophy in this regard is, I think, best seen in

the following quote from Russell. Answering the charge that philo­

sophical discussion often leads to no certain solutions, he said;

The value of philosophy is to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind with­ out the cooperation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are con­ temptuously rejected. [In Guilford’s analysis this will amount to the lack of sensitivity.] As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find ... that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts it raises, is able to suggest many possibili­ ties which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom." [Fluency and flexibil­ ity are also suggested in this part of the quote]^^

The more interesting evidence should, however, be research reports from reputable researchers on thinking skills. One of the most important of these tests, developed by Guilford and Torrance, on whether or not the intellectual abilities associated with creativity can be improved through education shows that specific programs de­ signed to improve fluency, flexibility, and related activities through practice on tasks such as the exercises on creativity tests are suc­ cessful. The studies also indicate that motivating creativity through an environment that calls for and rewards it, participation in creative 45 activities such as creative writing, and stressing creative thinking activities as an integral part of traditional courses all contribute to increasing creative potential. Even more encouraging for developing nations is the result of another test that was initiated in 1959, in­ volving 236 high school students and followed up in 1966 and 1971.

The subjects were evaluated on the quantity and quality of their creative achievements in art, music, literature, science, drama, busi­ ness, and politics. The result was that those who scored high on the

Torrance tests tended to be more creative than those who scored less. The evidence was based on the quality and quantity of their poems, stories, articles, books published, awards for works done, business initiated, devices invented, etc. In all these categories, those who scored high on the Torrance test in 1959 were found to be more productive than their counterparts^*

3. Philosophy and the Cultivation of Liberal Attitudes

Not only does philosophy cultivate critical and creative think­ ing skills it also cultivates the kind of liberal attitudes that are necessary for the practice of democracy in social and political inter­ actions. Like the rest of the liberal studies, philosophy is intended to "liberate" individuals by freeing them from ignorance, narrow­ mindedness, bigotry, and intolerance of others’ viewpoints. Since philosophy broadens our understanding of the world, and greater understanding brings greater self-control leading us to be more dis­ ciplined in our interactions with the physical or metaphysical envi- 46 ronment, it cannot be denied that philosophy promotes human libera­ tion.

Plato conceives of the unliberated man as a prisoner chained to the pegs at the bottom of a dark cave. With education, he becomes free and enlightened as he leaves the cave and pursue knowledge of the forms. Such a person is no longer satisfied with personal opin­ ions or beliefs. He looks for knowledge of the universal principles underlying all phenomena: causation, freedom, justice, equality, hu­ man dignity, etc. He no longer looks for narrow selfish interests, but mostly what will benefit others and himself. He might not always live to this ideal; his greatness lies in his continuing effort to realize th e ideal.

Do the people of Africa and the rest of the developing world need these liberal attitudes? There are those who suspect that all this talk about critical thinking and liberal attitudes is just another set of ploys being sponsored by those who want to perpetuate their intellectual and political domination of Africa to divert attention from the real issues: economic exploitation by foreign powers. While it cannot be pretended that such powers and intentions are unreal, I think there is an opportunity for us to develop the intellectual skills and liberating attitudes that will enable not just a few, but many people of the developing world to understand the dynamics of human and international relations so that we can minimize the incidence of intellectual domination and economic exploitation. What is it about philosophy that made the British and the French, for instance, deny 47 it to the natives in their colonies? Why does South Africa permit

Blacks to study virtually every discipline in the Universities except philosophy? Why is philosophy the "forbidden fruit" to colonized people? My hypothesis is that it is not in the interest of the colo­ nizer to open the eye or to liberate the mind of the colonized lest he loses control of the liberated person. The hypothesis is not without some initial credibility, for as Russell puts it:

As we begin to philosophize, ... we find ... that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, although unable to tell us with cer­ tainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly in­ creases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liber­ ating doubts...."

My hypothesis is confirmed by Russell’s description of the

"liberating doubts" that philosophy generates in the mind of the in­ dividual student. It is further confirmed by the historical fact that

Nkrumah, who initiated the move towards colonial freedom in Africa, had a philosophical training. It is also pertinent to note that he had to leave Britain for the U.S. to have his education in philosophy (to the Master’s level).

Besides, there is the need for the kind of discipline that will awaken us from what Kant calls the "dogmatic slumber" so that we 48

can begin to question our entrenched, but unexamined beliefs about

witches, ghosts, charms, ancestors, divinities, and the Supreme Being.

The unexamined life, Plato would say, is not worth living. For not only does it deprive us of the intellectual pleasure assured in the

process but it also makes it difficult if not impossible to develop the orientation to science which we need to enhance our goals at devel­ opment. Human qualities like tolerance, open-mindedness, and non- judgmental attitudes are certainly necessary if we are to overcome

the problems of tribalism (or ethnicism), religious fanaticism, violence, and other abuses of human rights that have made a menace of

African politics and rendered African unity a mere dream. It is well known that it is philosophy which led the battle against superstition in the West and thus paved the way for science by helping people to discover their potentialities and value as humans whether or not they were religious. If we are to avoid the kind of religious fanaticism, bigotry, ethnicism, civil wars, narrow-minded nationalisms, and re­ lated evils which are destroying certain parts of the world before our own eyes from spreading to Africa, I cannot see any alternative to intensifying the teaching of philosophy because of its humanistic values that help to check the growth and influence of such evils.

The sceptic of philosophy might ask: Is there any convincing evidence that the study of philosophy can actually make people more liberal than they would otherwise be? The general conclusion by a number of experts in the U.S., using the Omnibus Personality Inven­ tory (DPI) and the Complexity Scale, etc., have concluded that college 49

students over a four-year period showed a greater appreciation for

reflective thought, became more intellectually curious and more inde­

pendent in thought, and became less dogmatic and more liberal in

their political, economic, and social values. In general, says the re­

port, the changes were significant in comparison to the relevant

changes in their peers who did not go to college. It is also inter­

esting to note that the result remained constant even when academic

aptitude and socioeconomic differences were controlled. Even more

interesting for my claim is the fact that students in philosophy were

found to rank high in all these respects.

So, there is sufficient evidence that the teaching of philosophy can help cultivate the liberal attitudes that are necessary for

peaceful co-existence, stability, freedom, and justice, etc., which are, in turn, necessary for national development as will be defined in due course.

4. Philosophy as the Conscience of Society

Religion, especially Christianity, is perceived, at least by its adherents, to be the conscience of society. So what justification do I have for projecting philosophy also as the conscience of society since the use of the definite article "the" seems to exclude a multiplicity of consciences of society. Be that as it may, the fact is philosophy also plays the same role in the society of which it is a part, and may even play a more fundamental role in this respect since its argu­ ments and concerns are not limited by religious considerations. 50

Consider a situation where the state accuses the Church of in­

terfering in politics or where the Church accuses the State of reli­

gious interference. There is the need for an independent court of

appeal which will readily be found in philosophical principles for the

separation of church and state which may or may not be part of that

country’s constitution. So the role of philosophy as the conscience

of society appears to be more basic than that of religion. This truth

becomes more evident when we consider a situation where the Church

or any religious group is threatened with persecution by political

authorities. In such a situation the Church or group concerned can­

not appeal to its own beliefs and principles to defend itself. The

intervention of an independent and objective thinker like a social

philosopher will be timely and helpful to all concerned. Below I wish

to discuss three of the functions that philosophy as the conscience

of society might play.

The critical and constructive functions of philosophy in criti­

cizing and helping to transform societies have been well-known at

least since Karl Marx, who said, "The Philosophers have interpreted

the world,the point is to change it" [Karl Marx: Easentisd Writings],

The Leninist extensions and applications to the African context by

Nkrumah, Nyerere, and other African leaders are also well known.

Socio-political philosophy is becoming increasingly popular in those

parts of the West where analytic philosophy was the order of the day a few decades ago. There are many who, while not fully sympathetic with Marxism, nevertheless accept part of his analysis of society and 51 apply it to current socio-political problems. Examples of Western

Marxists in this endeavor include Marcuse, Gorz, Sartre, and Haber­ mas. Others like Henry Giroux, David Purpel, Maxine Greene, and

Andrew Oldenquist have effectively applied some aspects of Marxist analyses to understanding and prescribing solutions to the problems of alienation affecting the poor working classes and the minorities living in the slum areas of American inner cities. Educational theo­ rists and educational philosophers including Giroux, Purpel, Scheffler, and Freire, using Marxist analysis, have discovered "the hidden cur­ riculum" which reveals how the schools and schooling have been used as instruments of class reproduction rather than instruments of class transformation as they were originally intended to be.^*

The role of the philosopher as the (or part of the conscience of society) can also be seen in his attitude to "truth." Truth is neither the will of the majority nor the minority. Truth is absolute and unbending to human wishes, and in this age of socio-psychologi- cal manipulation advertisers, propagandists and demagogues, it is obvious that there is the need for someone who can remind the

masses of the nature of truth before they are taken in by people

who would want to distort the truth for economic and political gains.

By virtue of his training the philosopher is more likely than most

people to approximate the ideal of an observer or an observer behind

the veil of ignorance as in John Rawls’ theory of Justice. Thus he

could be an asset to his society when it comes to identifying and

defending truth objectively. This is by no means an easy task since 52 it is often connected with issues of justice and injustice. Socrates died as a martyr for truth and justice; other philosophers have suf­ fered variously for the same course and many more will risk their lives for these values convinced that they are playing their roles as the conscience of their respective societies.

One of the greatest of all human values is freedom; every one desires it and every state claims to be committed to the protection of the freedom of its peoples. No one who witnessed the recent gallant effort put up by the students of China to achieve democracy in their land will dispute this. When asked to define freedom, however, it will be found that freedom means something totally different from

East to West, as it did from one student to the other in China. For while the West seems to be talking of negative freedoms, the East seems to be describing positive freedoms.

In view of the importance of understanding democracy in to­ day’s society, I cannot think of a better way of ending this section than by quoting the famous summary of the relevance of philosophy to democracy by Maritain. For him, the value of philosophy in pre­ serving the concepts of Truth and Freedom are particularly relevant to domocratic societies because

the foundations of a society of free men are es­ sentially moral. There are a certain number of tenets—about the dignity of the human person, human rights, human equality, freedom, law, mutual respect and tolerance, the unity of mankind and the ideal of peace among men—on which democracy presupposes common consent; without a general, fair, and reasoned-out conviction concerning such tenets, democracy cannot survive. It is not the 53

job of scientists, experts, specialists, and techni­ cians; it is the job of philosophers to look for the rational justification and elucidation of the demo­ cratic charter. In this sense, it is not uncalled for to say that the part philosophy plays in society as to principles is as important a part as the states­ man is to practical government. Both may be great destroyers if they are mistaken. Both may be genuine servants of the common good if they are on the right road. Nothing is more immediately necessary for our times than a sound political phi­ losophy.^®

For us in Africa a sound political philosophy may not be the most immediately necessary commodity since there are many who need food, medicine, shelter, and other bare necessities of life to survive.

But with regards to our short- and long-term goals for development and our experience with foreign and domestic ideologies, coupled with our problems with military interventionisms, the need for social and political philosophy certainly cannot be overemphasized. Discussions on the meanings of the concepts and the values in the domain of competing ideologies need not be too technical for the paricipation of the masses. The relevant materials could be translated into local languages to insure participation by the illiterate masses before they go to the pools or make any important political decision. In this and similar ways philosophy can be seen by our African societies as in­ deed the conscience of society. 54

5. Philosophy as (part of the) Conscience of its Intellectual

Community

Notwithstanding the growing scepticism about its value, it is

interesting to note that some professors of political science in Nigeria

have called for the increasing involvement of philosophy in national

politics and education. The conference, which was held by the

Nigerian Political Science Association (N.P.S.A.) in 1979 for the critical

review of the teaching and research of the discipline in African uni­

versities, agreed that their discipline has not made significant

progress for the following reasons:

1. Conflicts in their scientific methodologies.

2. The lack of moral and ethical principles among the facul­

ties.

3. The lack of a national socio-political philosophy

4. The lack of a national philosophy of education.^*

The first problem arises from the lack of uniformity among the

African political scientists regarding the choice of scientific methods in research. In principle the sciences are supposed to be value free

but, as Professor Wang Metuse observed at the Conference, the

methodologies in use are divided along ideological lines: the Marxist and the Non-Marxist. These divisions which are manifestations of the political persuasions of the researchers are, according to Professor

Mentuse, further reflected in the content of their books and the paradigms they employ. 55

Which of these methods if any is more suitable for Africa than the others? Is there any alternative method? Is possible to utilize the two methods in analysis? Is any of them value-free or free from ideological biases? These and similar questions are unquestionably legitimate problems for the African philosopher; and whether he ap­ proaches them from the point of view of the philosophy of science or the philosophy of education, he will be functioning as the conscience of his intellectual community.

With regard to the lack of ethical and moral principles among the faculty, as well, the African philosopher will be of much help.

These include open bias in favor of certain regimes and hostility against others reflected in the teaching and writing of these profes­ sionals. In particular, they show indignation towards the faculty who consciously makes himself an instrument of class domination and ex­ ploitation, as well as neo-colonialism.

By virtue of his training, the contemporary African philosopher is in a unique position to introduce for discussion the rational- humanistic principles for determining right and wrong that are more basic than the policies of any regime. Among other things he could open discussions on utilitarianism, Kantian ethics. Prima Facie and

Stringent Duties, Rawl’s Principles of Justice, Reciprocal Altruism, and

Group Loyalties. Out of these discussions they may decide to adopt certain principles to help them determine what is professionally right or wrong for them to do and what kind of rewards and punishments would be appropriate to reinforce the desired professional ethical 56

behavior. To the extent that the African philosopher performs these and related moral functions, he makes philosophy the conscience of its intellectual community through the creation and prescrition of

these action-guiding principles which Popper calls "plastic con­

tro ls ." "

On the lack of a national socio-political philosophy, one of the

speakers, Ejembi, argued that without the prior settling of the "Great

Issues," without the "good" and the "bad" in the life of any nation

having been settled beforehand, without philosophy taking roots, it is

doubtful that political science can make much meaningful contribution

to the political development of any country. For it is normative phi­

losophizing that distinguishes between political "facts" and "non-fact"

on a national scale in any country.

In America, for instance, Ejembi illustrates the citizens have

proclaimed their unflinching belief in the (Western) democratic way of

life and representative government and institutions. Largely, they

have adopted the socio-political philosophy of John Locke whose in­

fluence was already dominant in England during the I8th century

when the U.S. constitution was made.

The African philosopher may not know the best form of gov­

ernment for any African country. However, by virtue of his training

in socio-political philosophy, critical thinking and decision-making, I

think he is uniquely qualified to lead or to contribute significantly to

discussions in this connection. Unlike others who are easily carried 57 away by their emotions, he can direct participants to consider the is­ sues from the objective point of view, and this makes him the con­ science of his intellectual community as well.

The fourth and final complaint—the lack of a philosophy of education—is perhaps the most significant since a good philosopher of education could do all of the above as well as the specific function the speaker assigned to him. He is challenged to prescribe, after due analysis of the problems and prospects of African education, what should be the function of the schools and universities. Should the schools prepare people for present and future jobs? Should the school prepare students to fit into the logic of the society as it exists or to transform it? What kind of teaching models ought to be implemented in the classroom in ordr to insure the kind of education that will faciltate the process of development? These are but a few of the issues that must be determined in the formulation of a coher­ ent and effective philosophy of education. It must also be a reflec­ tion of the socio-political philosophy of the country concerned.

That these are appropriate tasks for a philosophy should not be in doubt at all as soon as we recall the contribution of Western philosophers to education in their countries and beyond. A few ex­ amples should be enough to establish this point. Plato did not only speculate on the ideal state, he also prescribed the kind of education that will beat prepare its leaders to function most effectively. Aris­ totle is also famous for his concept of the educated man and what he 58 is supposed to know. Anticipating John Dewey by about two thou­ sand years, he decried narrow vocationalism and argued for a well- balanced education for all citizens.

In modern times we cannot forget Francis Bacon who challenged the English to shun various forms of "idols" and "superstition" and pursue scientific knowledge. For him "knowledge is power," and without knowledge no individual or society can claim to be really free. Neither can we forget Alfred North Whitehead, who challenged the traditional view going back to Locke that the child’s mind is a tabula rasa or a passive clay to be molded by educators. For him, as for many contemporary educators, "students are alive, and the purpose of education is to stimulate and guide their self-develop­ ment."*® He is, as well, noted all o v er B ritain and North America fo r his protest against departmentalization of knowledge. The value of interdisciplinary approach to issues and interdisciplinary studies are recognized in almost every university today, thanks to Whitehead.

The concept of development, as we will see in the next chapter, tran­ scends all academic disciplinary boundaries and, thus, represents a good example of issues that require the interdisciplinary approach.

When an issue such as abortion is raised, it cannot be discussed meaningfully either wihin biology, sociology, anthropology, or medicine. Such issues are said to be philosophical. So the interdis­ ciplinary approach is in practice a philosophical approach.

To be economical, let me cite just one example of a contempo­ rary philosopher whose conceptual schema and related ideas has in­ 59 fluenced various scholars and intellectuals. Popper’s philosopher, writes H.J. Perkin who has been researching and writing on Popper’s

Evolutionary Epistemology or Fallibilism approach for more than a decade, "has influenced physical and biological scientists, world lead­ ers, historians, psychologists, sociologists, physiologists, anthropolo­ gists, economists, etc." In a paper, entitled "Education and Learning

From Our Mistakes", Perkins has argued convincingly that Popper’s philosophy does offer a theoretical framework for interpreting, syn­ thesizing, and explaining much of the innovative work done in the field of education in the 20th century. Popper’s philosophy, he ar­ gues, helps us to better understand, more effectively employ, and consciously improve the theories and practices of educational theo­ rists and psychologists such as Maria Montessori, Jean Piaget, A.S.

Neill, and B.F. Skinner.^®

The number of examples could be multiplied, but I think we have enough to illustrate the functions of the philosopher as the conscience of his intellectual community. Of more direct interest to developing nations will be the relation between philosphy and sci­ ence.

6. How Philosophy Promotes the Growth of Science: The

Example of Western Philosphy

Philosophy p er se is not a science, but in the Western tradition it paves the way for science and development through speculative and analytic thinking. 60

First, humans everywhere wonder about perennial questions which do not lend themselves to any scientific solutions. These in­ clude questions such as: Do we survive death in any sense, and if so do we survive for a time or forever? Can mind dominate matter, or does matter completely dominate mind, or has each, perhaps, a certain limited independence? Has a universe a purpose? Or is it driven by blind necessity? Or is it a mere chaos and jumble, in which the natural laws that we think we find are only a fantasy gen­ erated by our own love of order?

No philosopher or scientist can claim to know for certain any answers to these questions. Raising such questions, keeping interest

in them, and scrutinizing suggested answers, however, according to

Russell, should be seen as one of the functions of speculative philos­ ophy. Human life, he believes, would be impoverished if they were

forgotten or if definite answers were accepted without adequate evi­

dence.

Fighting dogmatism in areas where science is yet to bring con­

sensus is thus an important philosophical task not only in Europe,

but indeed every part of the world. It requires the cultivation of

virtues such as suspended judgment, open-mindedness, and tolerance.

For the learning of every virtue, says Russell, there is an appropri­

ate discipline; and for the learning of these particular virtues, the

best discipline is philosophy. Not only will the philosophical cultiva­

tion of these virtues minimize bloody conflicts, it will also prepare

the intellectual grounds necessary for the reception and tolerance of 61

the alternative hypotheses that scientific thinking would introduce into the dominant worldviews of each culture.

In performing the above role, speculative philosophy might be considered to be encouraging mere skepticism. Thus it is pertinent to point out that what is being advocated here is a skeptical attitude towards life, a habit of not taking anything for granted pending rig­ orous scientific investigations, but not total skepticism or mere skep­ ticism. Russell categorically rejects mere skepticism on the grounds that:

...if philosophy is to serve a positive purpose , it must not teach mere skepticism, for while the dog­ matist is harmful, the skeptic is useless. Dogmatism and skepticism are both, in a sense, absolute philosophies; one is certain of knowing, the other of not knowing. What philosophy should dissipate is c e rta in ty , whether of knowledge or of ignorance.*®

Knowledge, Russell explains, is not so precise a concept as is commonly thought. Thus we should be tentative in our claims to knowledge, especially in the areas that depend on our sensory experiences. When discussing practical edfairs such as politics, he counsels we should be conscious of the vagueness and the lack of precision regarding the meaning and value of concepts such as

"democracy."

More positively, speculative philosophy also provides alternative hypotheses to the pre-scientific or mythological explanations to phe­ nomena found in cultures which have not embraced the scientific ori­ 62

entation to life. Until Newton introduced hia precise measurements,

observations, predictions, and empirical testing into the study of the

solar system, ancient Greek philosophers, for instance, held various

cosmological theories that were fully or at least partially demytholo­

gized as alternatives to the purely mythological explanations dominant

in the popular culture and religions of the time.

Anaximander was the first to speculate that men probably de­

scended from fishes. This speculative theory of evolution was thus

the foreshadow of Darwin’s scientific Theory of Evolution. What

makes the latter scientific is simply the fact that the evidence is not

based on mere speculation, but on the data from fossils, and the

distribution of animals and plants in many parts of the world. The

speculations of the Pythagoreans in astronomy, of Anaximander and

Empodocles in biological evolution, and of Democritus about atoms and matter laid the eggs which were latter hatched by scientists.

In short, part of philosopher’s task is the framing of large general hypotheses as alternatives to prevailing mythological expla­ nations in anticipation of scientific procedures for testing and verification or falsification. In Africa, where most explanations of phenomena are cast in mythological or personal idioms such as gods, ancestral spirits, witches, charms, and destiny, etc., the need for the alternative explanations from speculative philosophy as preparation for scientific explanations cannot be overemphasized.

Further, speculative philosophy teaches it is not enough to recognize that all our knowledge and, hence, our hypotheses are in 63 greater or leas degrees uncertain and vague. It la necessary, in ad­ dition, to learn how to act upon the best hypothesis without dogmati­ cally believing it. Apart from apriori propositions and those regard­ ing our existence and veridical experiences, there is hardly anything for which we are entitled to feel certain according to Russell. Even

scientific laws should not be taken to be certain, but as "nearly

certain, or only slightly probable, according to the state of the evi­

dence. If we act on a hypothesis about which we are conscious

that we have no certainty, we should not risk too much on it, espe­

cially human lives. Since we are not certain of the hypothesis and

its outcome, we should act in such a way that in case our hypothesis

turns out to be false, the resulting harm, if any, would be minimal.

This piece of advice may sound commonsensical, but history, and es­

pecially the history of warfare, shows that it is very easy for us to

forget our human limitations in knowing and to become certain of

untested hypotheses and their results in formulating or prescribing

policies and actions with far-reaching consequences.

Finally, speculative philosophy also teaches the right attitude

that we have to take to science. According to Russell, there are two

extreme attitudes about science that are to be deplored. First, there

is the attitude of complacency that comes from those who think that

science knows all things and can solve all problems. They accord­

ingly decry all interest in problems not having the circumscribed

definiteness that is necessary for scientific treatment. Thus they

have no regard for the wisdom and morality which are necessary for 64 guiding science and technology in order to avoid human self- destruction or ecological disasters. On the other hand, there are those who find no value in science as a rule, but prefer some ancient and pernicious superstition. They accordingly refuse to admit the immense increase of human well-being and happiness that science has made or would make possible if used wisely. In place of these ex­ treme attitudes, speculative philosophy teaches the attitude which may well be described as one of cautious optimism by making clear at once the scope and the limitations of scientific knowledge.

The set of opposing attitudes depicted here seems to be the exact replica of the views of the Westernized African elites who are almost sentimental about the values of science as a panacea for

Africa, and the traditionalists who also fail to see any value at all in adopting the scientific orientation to life which they consider to be nothing more than another form of Western cultural imperialism.

Thus, it is essential that contemporary African philosophers try to work out the cautious-optimism synthesis as part of the strategies for paving the way for the orientation to science in Africa.

One could add to these examples of speculative thinking cited by Russell by referring to the works of Thales, who was the first to conceive of water as the primal stuff with a scientific; Anaximenes who speculated that the primal stuff is air; and others missing from his list. But there is no point in multiplying the examples once the point has been established. Two other significant points, however, 65 remain to be made in this connection in order to underscore the re­ levance of speculative thinking in general for the African context.

The first is that the Milesians are not famous only for revolu- tionalizing cosmological explanations by the introduction non- mythological hypothesis as alternatives to dominant mythological ac­ counts of their epoch, they are even more important for their inven­ tion of critical or dialectical thinking. Their cosmological speculations were not meant to be accepted without question or on the basis of divine authority or tradition. Each of them saw his contribution as part of an ongoing dialectical argument in which truth is the common objective. Thus, Anaximander criticized Thales on the grounds that the fundamental stuff could not be any one of four "elements"

(water, air, fire, earth) because "if one of these were infinite, the rest would at once be destroyed." Since water, for instance, is ca­ pable of putting out fire, an infinite amount of water would put out all fire. So, since this has not happened, none of them could be called infinite.

The argument is, of course, suspect in many respects. For in­ stance, it presupposes that water is infinite, and that each element can consume the others. To dwell on these errors is, of course, to miss the point, which is simply that they were the first to invent or, at least, to popularize the dialectical method. Without this method of self-criticism and improvement, probably Greek speculative thinking could not be significantly different from the speculative thinking of traditional Indians, Australians, or Africans about reality truth and 6 6

value. And this must explain why our contemporary African philoso­

phers insist that in the absence of any rigorous methodology or ar­

gumentation, traditional African myths and folklore cannot be classi­

fied as philosophy in the strict sense but only as ethnophilosophy.

A little further reflection over the history of philosophy also enables us to explode the myth that philosophy is essentially Greek or European and to show that it is possible for all peoples to philos­ ophize. To underscore this point, it is pertinent to point out the

historical conditions that facilitated the philosophical productivity of these early philosophers. Philosophers of history recognize four of such conditions: commercialism, cultural cross-fertilization, absence of a priestly caste, and individualism.

First, the dominant occupation of the Ionian cities were manu­ facturing and commerce. Trading is more competitive than farming, hunting, and other occupations, and thus requires more shrewdness, and the ability to improvise and to adopt to changing political and economic circumstances.

Second, trading also fosters social mobility as well as geo­ graphical mobility. In either case, the individual comes into contact with new people and hence new ideas and patterns of thought through communication which is necessary for survival in the com­ mercial world. To get the most from such interactions also requires the posture of open-mindedness, suspended-judgment, and sympa­ thetic tolerance for diverse views that may even stand in conflict to one’s own traditional viewpoints. It is for these and similar reasons 67 that historians have recognized commerce as "the chief incubator of intellectual innovation.**

Third, the Greeks were one of very few peoples who never de­ veloped a priestly caste or recognized priesthood as a profession in the sense that it was the exclusive duty of any special group of people. The temple officials in the various temples of the cities were ordinary citizens whose priestly duties and privileges neither occu­ pied their entire efforts nor set them apart as a special group whose sole means of livelihood depended on the propagation and flourishing of myths. Neither did they conceive of their gods as infinitely wise and powerful or morally perfect. Rather their deities were seldom personified or worshipped, and they were often associated with human weaknesses such as acts of injustice and the payment of reparation. The functions attributed to them also lent themselves to easy transformation into metaphors representing one law of nature or the other. As a result of this vacuum, folkways and myths never had the chance to dominate the thinking of the Greeks as they do in other cultures. This means that early Greek thinkers did not have to contend with any well-established religious authoritarianism as their counterparts, for instance, in the Middle Ages had to do. The importance of such a condition for creativity and innovation can hardly be overemphasized.

Finally, individualism, in the sense of respect for the rights of individuals to self-expression and the existence of ample opportuni­ ties for the individual, as opposed to collective, for self-expression 68 also contributed to the conditions that made Greece ripe for the cul­ tivation of the philosophical spirit. As noted above, philosophical thinking requires the ability for dialectical thinking. And that, in turn, requires individuals who are confident enough to proclaim their own views and prepared to defend them against all other views, irre­ spective of their source of authority or origin. The Greek theaters, together with the benefits associated with the age of commercialism, cross-cultural fertilization, and the absence of religious authoritari­ anism, provided the Greeks with ample opportunities for self-expres­ sion through paintings, drama, poetry, and the arts in general. They also provided these early thinkers with the individual freedom, the confidence, as well as the raw materials for formulating their own ideas or for criticizing other’s ideas regarding the nature of reality, truth, and value. Although the methodological emphasis in Western philosophy has shifted from the speculative to the analytic. Contem­ porary African Philosophy could learn similar foundational lessons from the analytic tradition too.

Does critical/analytic philosophy also contribute to the growth of science? Here is a little anecdote to explain why I have these terms paired. American philosophers, unlike their British counter­ parts, are said to prefer "critical" to "analytic" as the best way to characterize their interest within the discipline. There is no signifi­ cant logical or linguistic difference between these terms unless you are on your way to an interview for a non-philosophical position in 69 the U.S. For here, I understand, employers prefer people with ana­ lytic minds to people with critical minds. Can we blame them? We all like people who can analyze problems and figure out solutions; but who likes to be criticized?

It is hard to find a better spokesperson for this tradition than

Moritz Schlick, the founder of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivist philosophers. According to Schlick, it is a mistake to think of phi­ losophy as the queen of the sciences either because the sciences have evolved from philosophy or because philosophy is the search of general truths while science is the search for particular truths.

Philosophy is the queen of the sciences, he argues, but only in the sense that it has always been involved with the clarification of meaning from the earliest stages of the growth of scientific thinking up to now. Thus philosophy is itself not a search for truth, and hence it cannot be a science.

If philosophy were a science, Shlick argues, there is no reason why Kant, for instance, would say he cannot teach philosophy but he can only teach "philosophizing." The use of the verb in place of the noun clearly indicates that Kant does not consider philosophy to be a body of true propositions as we find in science, but an activity of the mind. The view is also supported by Leibniz who found no rea­ son to reserve a special place for the teaching of philosophy in his

Prussian academy of Science in Berlin. According to Moritz, Leibniz’s rationale for leaving out philosophy was that philosophy is not a 70 pursuit of any particular kind of truth, but an activity that must pervade every search for truth.

Similarly, Wittgenstein argued, "The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy itself is not a theory but an activity. The result of philosophy is not a number of

’philosophical propositions’ but to make propositions clear." The views held by these analytic or critical philosophers do thus confirm

Shlick’s view that philosophy is at least, in part, the search for m eaning.

To illustrate what is meant by the search for meaning, Shlick refers to the philosophical activity of Socrates, Newton, and Einstein.

The purpose of Socrates in Plato’s Dialogues is not to find the truth through the asking of questions. Rather, Shlick argues, "the whole investigation was carried on for the primary purpose of making clear what was meant when certain questions were asked or when certain words were used. For instance, in one of the Dialogues S ocrates asks, "What is justice?"; he receives various answers to his question.

In turn, he also asks what is meant by these answers, why a parti­ cular word was used in a particular way and not in other ways, and it usually turns out that his disciple or opponent is not at all clear about his own opinion. From this, Shlick concludes that Socrates’ main objective was to try to clarify thought by analyzing the mean­ ing of our expressions and the real sense of our propositions.

Socrates’ philosophy consists then of "the pursuit of meaning," he ad d s. 71

While philosophy is the search for meaning, science is the search for truth. The two disciplines are, therefore, theoretically distinguishable; but in practice they remain inseparable. For, ac­ cording to Schlick, before we can know whether any proposition is true or false we must first know what it means. We know what a proposition means when we know exactly the circumstances under which it would be true (or false). For Schlick, as for the Logical

Positivists in general, "the description of these circumstances is ab­ solutely the only way in which the meaning of a sentence can be made clear" [p.l33]. Here we have the explanation of Shlick’s famous statement which became the cornerstone of the Logical Positivist

Movement: "The meaning of a statement is its method of verification."

All great scientists, Shlick states, have given wonderful exam­ ples of finding out the hidden meaning of the propositions which he uses in his science. Newton discovered the hidden meaning of

"mass". Since this was a concept used commonly in the beginning of science without any clear understanding or definite account, Newton was on this view really a philosopher at the time and not just a sci­ entist seeking truth.

The greatest example of the scientist-philosophers in modern times, however, is, according to Schlick, Einstein. Although people before him thought they knew what it meant for two events to occur simultaneously, say in New York and San Francisco, it was Einstein who first clarified the meaning of simultaneity by showing the logical 72 conditions under which the truth or falsity of such a claim could be

verified (or falsified).

Without adding to the number of examples, I think Shlick has

succeeded in making the point that philosophy indeed helps to pave

the way for science. Even though the thinkers cited are Western,

there is no reason to assume that non-Westerners cannot benefit from

their achievements.

There is, therefore, no need for African philosophers to re­

invent the wheels, so to speak, but to clarify meaning to their own

scientists or students of science when necessary, and more impor­

tantly to discover the hidden meanings of words used that may be

hindering scientific thinking and the orientation to science in the

African context. Such words, as Wiredu, Gyekye, Agyakwa, Sodipo,

and Makinde have discovered, include words like "truth," "soul,"

"cause," and "destiny." I will have more to say on these in the

C hapter Six.*^

In the meantime, since nothing should be taken for granted in

philosophy, it is necessary to reflect on the two representations of

the task of philosophy received from Russell and Shlick. First, we

need to see whether or not they could be reconciled, and whether

indeed each of them or even both of them exhaust(s) all the possibil­

ities regarding their accounts of the main tasks of philosophy.

Given the foregoing, there is no doubt that philosophy makes a

significant contribution to science in the way presented by Schlick.

Schlick himself was a physicist and was, therefore, in a position to 73 see more clearly than his counterparts in philosophy without a simi­ lar exposure to science the distinction between the nature of the re­ lationship between the two disciplines. However, to say that the sole or the main job of philosophy is the search for meanings is to commit an reductionist fallacy. The history of philosophy did not, of course, begin with the analysis of meanings but with wondering or speculat­ ing about nature, truth, and values. It was only in the course of wondering that philosophers encounter conceptual or linguistic prob­ lems that require analysis. So historically speaking, there could be no linguistic analysis in philosophy without philosophical speculation.

The British Philosopher John Wilson was among those that re­ jected the capsuling of philosophy into the tiny bit called "The

Search for Meaning." He argued that, in addition to the search for meaning through linguistic analysis and the search for truth through speculation, philosophy was also involved to a large extent in the clarification of method for playing the "games of life." In a word, says Wilson, "philosophy is the clarification of method, of the way in which these games are played." By games, he means all the activities of life in which man is involved or could be involved such us lan­ guage usage, logical thinking, behavior towards others or other countries, our work, and the world, etc. Since we are here inter­ ested mostly in science, I will examine the implications of this view of philosophy for science.

The metaphor of games and rules is appropriate for character­ izing the relation between philosophy and science. For in science, as 74 in a law court, personal relationships, study of logic, ordinary com­ munication, etc., there are rules that people consciously or uncon­ sciously try to obey. There are also principles in science as in all these other human endeavors that guide us in our attempts to obey the rules well and to be successful in the game of science. In addi­ tion, there are science skills to be learned, for in order to play the game of science successfully as in any of the other games, such as language or logic, one must learn certain relevant skills.

Picking on democracy for an example Wilson explains that new nations trying democracy for the first time often fail because they lack the feel of democratic procedures: there are certain tacit as­ sumptions which must be observed if parliamentary debates are not to break down, and these are like rules in a game which some play­ ers do not understand. Applying the game metaphor to science, Wil­ son is implicitly saying that new cultures trying science for the first time often fail because they lack the feel for scientific procedures.

Wilson also applies the game concept to religion and states people who reject religion in toto often do so because, as it were, they cannot find their way around the conceptual landscape of reli­ gion. The concepts and experiences of religion (like those of poetry or music) form a game which takes skill, practice, and study to play.

Again substituting science for religion, Wilson is saying people who reject science in toto often do so because, as it were, they cannot 75 find their way around the conceptual landscape of religion. The con­ cepts and experiences of science form a game which it takes skill, practice, and study to play.

Within this metaphor, a number of tasks that philosophy plays for the growth of science becomes clear. It has been one of the tasks of philosophy to clarify the rules of the science-game. We are all familiar with these rules—standard technique of observation with our senses, the formulation of hypotheses, making crucial experi­ ments, framing theories and laws, and making predictions from them.

Historically, this process appears simple; it was not until the

Renaissance that humanity gained a clear understanding of this game.

Anyone sufficiently familiar with the history of science or the history of philosophy knows that the change from the predominantly magical and mysterious worldview to the new worldview in which nature is considered to be essentially explicable and predictable was long and ard u o u s.

Those, like Kuhn, who describe the process as "paradigm shift" give the wrong impression that there was a sudden change. But actually it took a long time for mankind to grow out of a fear in magic, and to depersonalized objects which could be weighed, mea­ sured, and analyzed, etc.

Historically, it has been the task of philosophy to facili­ tate this process by clarifying the method of the science-game.

He explains the rules of the game to the players, and as they begin to play on the ground floor. 76

it is as if philosophy had to move to a higher story and watch the people on the ground floor playing their various games with more or less suc­ cess, and then assess and criticize their rules; or as if one were presented with a compendium of games in a box, like a Christmas present, only the rules had been left out—one has to try and work out what the games are, how they should be played, and whether they are worth playing at all.2«

These contributions to the growth of science from the specula­ tive tradition, the analytic tradition, and the game metaphor as de­ scribed by Russell, Schlick, and Wilson, respectively, clearly show that philosophy is not only the mother of all the sciences, it is also the companion, the critic, and the public relations accessory for the sciences par excellence. In the final chapter, I will show how con­ temporary African philosophers are paving the way for science and the orientation to science in these three modes as part of their con­ tribution towards Africa’s development.

The concept of development is itself problematic. It requires both the kind of conceptual analysis Schlick has described as well as a philosophical clarification on what it means to play the development game as suggested by Wilson. In the next chapter, I wish to illus­ trate how helpful these two methods could be in our attempts to un­ derstand and to pursue accelerated development plans in Africa. 77

FOOTNOTES

*Etuk, Udo, "Philosophy in a Developing Country," Philoso­ p h y , Vol. 62, No. 239 (January, 1987).

*Nkrumah, Speech at the opening of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, October 25, 1963. See Axioms, a collection of speeches by Nkrumah, (London, Panaf, 1980) p. 59.

^Kaunda, Kenneth, Inaugural ceremony of the University of Zambia (Lusaka Government Printer), p. 7. See African Social Re­ search, June 25, 1978, No. 25, p. 386f.

*Rosenburg, J.F., Handbook For The Practice of Philosophy (Englewood, Prentice-Hall, 1978) p. 9.

sFishel, M., "Attitudes Towards The Curriculum of the African University" (Part II), I7est Africa Journal of Education, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (June 1969), p. 91.

^Ghanaian Times, 1983. A comprehensive report on the educational system in Ghana can be found in Dzobo’s report, "The New Structure and Content of Education in Ghana", Accra, Ministry of Education, 1974.

’Ghanaian Times, ibid.

^Proceedings of the APA Western Division Program, March 1985, Vol. 58, No. 4. The original source of the figures is The Chronicle of Higher Eduction, 1985 (see Appendix A).

»Ross and G. Semb, "Philosophy Can Teach Thinking Skills," Teaching Philosophy, Vol.4, No. 2 (April 1981), p. 111.

^“Nduka, Otonti A., "African Traditional Systems of Thought and Their Implication for Nigeria," West African Journal of Education, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (June 1974), p. 158. See, also, Brownoski, J. and Mazliah, B., The Western Intellectual Tradition (Penguin Books Ltd., 1970), p. 558.

i^Russell, Bertrand, "The Value of Philosophy," in The Problems of Philosophy (New York, Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 153-161.

^*Annis I. and Annis B., Metaphilosophy: The Philosopher as Teacher, p. 91. See their references, especially 28, 29, 30. 36, 37, an d 38.

^^Russell, ibid. 78

^*See H enry Giroux and David P urpel (eds.), The Hidden Cur­ riculum and Moral Education: Deception or Discovery? (Berkeley, McCutchan, 1983). See, also, Andrew Oldenquist, The Non-Suicidal Society.

^®Maritain, Jacq u es, On the Use Of Philosophy (Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 3-13. Rpt. inFundamentals of Phi­ losophy by David Steward and H. Gene Blocker (New York, McMillan, 1982), p. 29.

^®See Political Science In Africa: A Critical Review, edited by Yolamu Barongo (London, Zes Press, 1983). See especially presentations by Henri I. Ejembi, pp. 17-25; Wang Metuse, pp. 48-50; Olatunde, J.B. Ojo, pp. 56-64.

I’P opper, Karl, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 239.

^®Whitehead, Alfred, The Aim of Education, op. cit.

^®See In Pursuit of Truth: A Collection of papers to commemorate the 80th birthday of Karl Popper in 1982.

^“Russell, Bertrand, Unpopular Essays (London, Simon & Schuster and George Allen & Unwin, 1950). Rpt. in Basic Philo­ sophical Analysis by Charles L. Reid (Encino, Dickenson, 1971), p. 123.

" Ib id ., p. 124.

zzwallace I. Matson, A New History of Philosophy: Ancient and Modern, Vol. I (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1987), pp. 16-17.

sspor an example of how the concept of the soul and related metaphysical concepts can be clarified through linguistic analysis of the Akan language, see Kwasi Gyekye, "The Akan Concept of a Per­ son," International Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1978): 227-287.

**Wilson, op. cit., p. 148. CHAPTER III

AFRICA’S DILEMMA OF DEVELOPMENT:

A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

Practice without thought is blind, thought without practice is empty.*

Kwame Nkrumah

To pursue development without a clear conception of its nature is like going on a treasure hunt without an idea of what or where the treasure is. The hidden treasure may well lie within one’s reach, but without knowing the object of one’s search or its location the chances of hitting the treasure for any member of the crew is no better than a blind person among them. In such a situation it is im­ perative to review, to re-interpret, or to reconstruct the codes or the maps for clues that will lead you to the exact location of the ob­ ject even as the search-mission continues. This, in short, is the nature of the conceptual challenge presented by the crises of

Africa’s development to the African intellectual, especially the African social and political philosopher.

79 80

The frustrations, paradoxes, and contradictions African leaders have encountered, in their attempts to re-conceptualize and pursue accelerated development plans on the continent, can best be contem­ plated within the context of a formal dilemma rooted in Africa’s en­ counter with European powers, as well as the superpowers. From the initial simple economic interaction between Africa and the European explorers in the 15th century, this relationship has grown not only in depth but also in width to encompass the religious, political, cul­ tural as well as the ideological realms between Africa and these tech­ nologically advanced nations. These underlying factors cannot be ignored in any meaningful discussion of what has come to be called

"The African Problem," which is manifest in the ongoing economic and political crises on the continent.

A philosophical response to "The African Problem" has become an imperative for two main reasons. First, in view of the intensity and complexity of Africa’s encounter with these nations, it is evident that no single discipline—history, economics, political science, psy­ chology, or sociology, etc.—can present any satisfactory diagnosis, let alone a satisfactory prescription, of the problem. By its very nature philosophy is the most suitable arena for the discussion of such undefined multidisiciplinary or interdisciplinary issues. Second,

"The African Problem" is, in reality, a human problem of survival and well-being. Thus, it is the pursuit of what Aristotle calls eudamonia, which is the foundation for all ethical pursuits. It follows then that

"The African Problem" is essentially a moral problem. 81

It is to illustrate this concern and how fruitful the philosophi­ cal approach could be for discussing "The African Problem" that I

present the following perspectives. Thus, I do not presume to have

found the ultimate diagnosis or the panacea for Africa’s problems.

The Dilemma of Africa’s Development

PI. Historically, post-independent African states have pur­

sued either capitalist or socialist patterns of development. (Now as­

sume, for argument sake, these are the only options open to us as

models.)

P2. The states pursuing capitalist patterns of development at

best have to settle with achieving some measure of economic growth

at the cost of dependency. (I present eu-guments for this below.)

P3. The states pursuing socialist patterns of development at

best have to settle with achieving some measure of autonomy at the

cost of poverty. (I present arguments for this below.)

P4. Therefore, the African states pursuing development have

to accept either economic growth plus dependency, or autonomy plus

poverty. (Dilemma from PI to P3).

P5. Further, since they have no problems accepting the first

components within the two packages above, economic growth and au­

tonomy, the real choice is now between dependency and poverty.

C. Assuming there is no third option open to them, and the

African states have to choose either capitalism or socialism, then they

have to accept either dependency or poverty. 82

Do the post-independent African states indeed face such a dilemma? Is it possible for them to overcome poverty without losing their autonomy or independence and thus dissolve the dilemma. If so how?

I have a three-fold objective in this chapter directed at an­ swering these questions:

1. To argue that, on the basis of very plausible historical and

contemporary research data, the dilemma is an accurate repre­

sentation of the developmental problems facing the African

sta te s.

2. To critique four dominant theories of developement with respect

to their capacity for resolving the Dilemma, in theory or in

p ractice.

3. To construct and defend my own tentative theory of develop­

ment aimed at dissolving the Dilemma, in theory and in prac­

tice, in the earliest possible time.

Thus, I hope to demonstrate in support of the main thesis of the dis­ sertation that the critical and constructive functions of philosophy are essential to the process of development in Africa with respect to the ongoing re-conceptualization, as well as the planning and imple­ mentation stages.

The Empirical Bases for the Dilemma

The first premiss should be understood as a contingent rather than a logical truth; the two patterns do not exhaust the possibili­ ties. Also, it should be noted that many of the countries have ex­ 83

perimented with both patterns under different regimes and different ideological climates. Based on recent reputable research on the

political economies of Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and other French-

speaking African countries, G.W. Wesley Johnson and Aguibou have concluded that "all African countries of French colonial legacy de­ pended and still depend on foreign aid to finance their development programs."*

The Ivory Coast is the paradigm case of an African country which has achieved some measure of economic growth but at the cost of dependence, or loss of autonomy or self-determination despite d e- ju r e independence. The story of the English-speaking African coun­ tries is not different. Ghana, which led the race in industrialization in the early 60s, as well as Nigeria which has been blessed with large deposits of oil, have not been able to break out of the poverty cycle and the loan-trap. According to the editors of the The Journal of African Development, Africa is more dependent than ever upon the goodwill of the industrialized West,* despite all the exports of agricultural products, the mines and oil industries, in addition to various loans and other forms of Western assistance.

The countries which have adopted or experimented with social­ ist patterns of development have not fared any better economically or politically. Countries in this mode, such as Guinea (1961-63 and

1965-71); Ghana (1961-66, 1979, and 1981-84); Mali (1961-65); Tanzania

(1964-present); and Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia (1984-present), remain not only poor but also dependent after a brief time of 84 autonomy or less dependence. Thus, as Professor Drake puts it, "all

African nations at present, whether they call themselves socialist or not, are appendages to a worldwide capitalist system."*

The term dependence plays a significant role in this discussion, but it is not at all obvious what it means in this context so I think it is important to analyze it before we turn to the theories of devel­ opment. Hopefully, we can clear it of some misleading ambiguities or v ag u en ess.

What is Dependency?

Dependency may be used descriptively in reference to a rela­ tionship in which one party depends for a long time on the other(s) for its basic needs without an equivalent reciprocal giving. This is typified by the parent-child relationship in which the child is said to be dependent on the parents. Within the context of colonialism, this can be applied to the relationship between the colonized territory and the colonial power. Thus, according to Wesbster, dependency is a state of being dependent or something depending on or being sub­ ordinate to another, especially a country controlled by another.® In this sense, the concept of dependency is not used in a normative sense. It is purely descriptive and, therefore, non-judgemental.

However, if the child reaches the developmental stage when he is expected to assert his autonomy or independence from his parents and he fails to achieve that developmental task, his parents and soci­ ety in general may frown upon his continued dependence. When this happens, the concept of dependency is no longer purely descriptive. 85

It is now transformed into a prescriptive or normative concept high­ lighting the economic inferiority of a country which has attained political independence.® The blame for this developmental failure may be entirely ascribable to the child if he failed to cooperate with his parents or to take advantage of opportunities offered him for this purpose by the parents or the larger society. However, if the par­ ents contributed to the failure of their child by things they did or failed to do to educationally, financially, or psycho-socially to pre­ pare him for the transition to self-dependence, then they are morally responsible. In many cases, however, both parents and the child may be blame-worthy for the dependency relation. The same is true of the dependent state and its past or present dominant political

pow er.

When African scholars or Third World scholars in general use

this concept to characterize the relationship between the developed

nations and the underdeveloped or developing nations, they mean to

use it in the normative sense. Thus, it is a tool for blaming the

former colonies or the developed world in general for the poverty, as

well as the political instabilities, in their countries. While some are

ready to admit that part of the blame must be put on our Third

World leaders, most of these scholars, especially the revolutionaries,

put the blame exclusively on the developed countries that used to or

continue to participate in coloialism or neo-colonialism in the Third

World. The following is a good illustration of this normative use of

th e term . 86

[Dependency is] the conditioning or subordinating of economies and societies of neocolonies to metropolitan powers and transnational corpora­ tio n s.’

In the following extracts from Kwame Nkrumah, the meaning becomes clearer and readily applicable to the African situation. The concept is implicit in his analysis of neo-colonialism.

The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State, which is subject to it, is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and, thus, its political policy is directed from outside. Neocolonialism is based on the principle of breaking up former large united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable States which are inca­ pable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial power for defense and even internal security. Their economic and finan­ cial systems are linked, as in colonial days, with those of the former colonial ruler.... Neo-colonial­ ism is the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsi­ bility, and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress.®

Dependency theorists generally accept this analysis and explain fur­ ther that the neocolonies draw unequal benefits due to the interna­ tional division of labor imposed by the West on Third World countries since the 19th century. This economic pattern makes the industrial­ ized countries the centers of decision-making and control of the 87 world economy. Dependency is therefore seen by them as an ex­ ploitative relationship responsible for the material and spiritual im­ poverishment of Africa and the rest of the Third World.

Even though the concept never became popular until the 70s, it’s origin can be traced to Marx and Lenin. For Marx states un­ equivocally in the Communist Msuiifesio that dependency is part of the destructive consequences of capitalism. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi­ barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peas­ ants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.®

Lenin not only affirmed the reality of the dependence relations, but also showed that it resonates beyond the economic sphere into the political, the military, and other spheres of a nation’s life.

...it is necessary to steadily explain and expose among the broadest masses of toilers of all coun­ tries, and particularly of backward countries, the deception which the imperialist powers systemati­ cally practise by creating, in the guise of political independent states, states which are absolutely de­ pendent upon them economically, financially, and militarily....*"

In all of these usages by Third World writers, and by Marx and Lenin, there is the presumption that only the dominant power is responsible for the dependency condition. That, however, distorts the parent-child analogy. For in that analogy there is a part that the youth can and ought to play to maximize his chance for an inde­ pendent life after age 18. If he fails to plan and to work for that. 88 his failure to achieve his objective is not necessarily the fault of the parents. By the same token, the failure of the developing nations is not necessarily in each case the fault of the dominant power. Con­ tinued dependence in post-independent context could be the result of our failure to study the philosophical principles behind the free en­ terprise system and democracy. We have sometimes been to eager to dismiss the economic and political ideals of our dominant powers be­ fore we have had the time to study them obejctively. Thus Nkrumah once rejected capitalism on the grounds that it will be "too compli­ cated for Africans" and that "it is also alien.These are clearly excuses, rather than reasons, for the careful study and selective ap­ plication of the aspects of capitalism that could be to the mutual in­ terest of both partners. This lack of objectivity permeates the following theories of development rendering them almost stillborn from the moment of their conception.

A Critique of African Theories of Development

Before I present my own theory of development in the Chapter

Four, I wish to discuss two of the most dominant African theories of development in this chapter. These are: (a) the Revolutionary Theory of Development, and (b) the Pragmatist Theory of Development. I hope to show that both of these theories have made the African con­ dition worse than it would otherwise be, and that neither of them is capable of resolving the dilemma even in principle. 89

1. The Revolutionary Theory of Development

African political thinkers and leaders responsible for the Re­ volutionary Theory of Development include the following: Francis

Fannon, Cabral, Sekoure Toure, Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah

(especially in his post-coup era), the present Head of State of Ghana,

Jerry Rawlings (who is a neo-Nkrumaist), Chinweizi, and the leaders of a new African Marxist movement who refer to themselves as

(African) Scientific Socialists.** For these leaders Africa’s poverty or underdevelopment cannot be understood without reference to the exploitation of the continent by the forces of colonialism and neo­ colonialism, or imperialism. Adopting the Marxist-Leninist analysis of global capitalism, they believe that European expansionism, including the activities of the missionaries to Africa, is entirely responsible for the present condition of economic depravity and cultural alienation.

The process, as every reader of history knows, included the application of military and political force, forced labor, slavery, and the conscription of African soldiers to fight European wars in Europe or to fight fellow Africans for the colonial masters. The social and economic institutions of the colonies were reshaped to make them conform to the needs of the colonial powers, often called the metropolitan centers. In post-colonial states where the military and political forces are no longer operational, these former European states, together with the United States (at least since the 1960s), in­ sure their dominance in these countries by a number of economic ties. These include international pricing, marketing, financial systems 90

(such as loans), and other economic forces. Together these economic forces render the satellite economies neither self-generating nor self- perpetuating, but dependent on the metropolitan powers. In addition, the metropolitan powers employ conservative local elites and their own special agencies to secure their interests in these former colonies. This new relation of external dominance and dependence is what they call neo-colonialism*®' **

Lenin defined imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism.

When, by neccessity. Capitalism resorts to the search for more mar­ kets and profits overseeas, Lenin explained, monopolistically regulated trade and/or investment abroad occurs at higher rates of profit than those obtaining in the metropolitan country. This essentially is the economic definition of imperialism; but these African leaders know that it also had political, intellectual, cultural, and other dimensions.

At the Third All-African People’s Conference held in Cairo in 1961, the members, led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who was then Ghana’s president, jointly considered neo-colonialism as the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries, which become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, social, military, or technical

[forces]. Imperialism, he said, is the greatest threat to African countries that have newly won their independence or those ap­ proaching this status.*®

What are their strategies for Africa’s development? According to these revolutionary thinkers and leaders, the key to Africa’s 91 liberation and self-determination after decades of colonialism and neo­ colonialism is simply total decolonization. This means the African na­ tions determined to achieve genuine independence and authentic growth should detach themselves totally from the powers of neocolo­ nialism. Their aim is to regain for Africans freedom and human dig­ nity lost through centuries of slavery, colonial domination, and economic exploitation. Their overall attitude is best expressed in

Sekou Toure's slogan, which the others adopted, "Better indepen­ dence with poverty than plenty in servitude" (Yansane, p. 29).

With the exception of Julius Nyerere, all these leaders advo­ cated violence in confronting the dominant powers and their agents of neo-colonialism, foreign or domestic. Thus, Franz Fanon of Algeria stated that the first step of decolonization must be to demolish all colonial institutions by violence in order to free the colonized and

"cleanse his soul." This soul cleansing, he maintained, was necessary for the realization of the political and social freedoms of the individ­ ual. The violence involved in the process of decolonization, Fannon argued, is not unjustiable since it is counter-violence in self-defense from imperialist aggresion.*®

Similarly, Amil Cabral of Guinea was determined to use violence to achieve the primary objective of the national liberation movement in that country. This, for him, was to get rid of all the oppression that the national petite bourgeiosie will have allowed to develop into neo-colonialism when foreign domination has been removed. Removing both foreign and domestic agents of neo-colonialism is necessary for. 92 he argued, "... national liberation takes place when and only when national productive forces are completely free from all kinds of for­ eign domination. "

Critique of Total Decolonization

How responsible is total decolonization? Total decolonization as described above is certainly more than the quest for political inde­ pendence. It is the total detachment of developing countries from their economic, cultural, as well as political dependence on their pre­ sent or former colonial or neo-colonial powers. Since the decision for total decolonization involved the well-being of millions of people and future generations, it was a moral decision. It is, therefore, appro­ priate to ask whether or not it is a responsible position to take.

Being responsible implies that one does not take decisions that will unnecessarily jeopardize human lives, including one's own. So, unless there was, at the time, a decision made by our post-colonial

African leaders in favor of total detachment from the West, a realistic hope that the African nations implicated by their decision could flourish independently or had some reliable alternative sources of help, such as the Soviet Union, the decision for total decolonization must be rejected as irresponsible.

As subsequent events in Africa, especially the abject poverty, outbreaks of famine, and rising death rates have shown, these lead­ ers had no realistic plans beyond their rhetoric to insure the well­ being of their people. The rhetoric often featured "self-reliance" as the alternative to total decolonization. Apart from Tanzania, which 93

took concrete steps to implement this ideology as a national program for over a decade, for the most part, it was no more than a short­

lived slogan among these African leaders. As contemporary political

scientist, J. Gus Liebenow, observes.

Unfortunately, the ideology of "self-reliance" in many countries has remained largely an instrument for placarding dissident political challengers to existing regimes or for persuading a potential donor that the assistance sought will be short-term in nature...."

As a result of the effectiveness of the slogan as a commercial advertisement for external assistance, its popularity has proceeded at about the same accelerated pace as the African states’ increased- reliance upon external grants, loans, and other forms of assistance.

Again Tanzania, which took the boldest strides for self-reliance, is also the best example of countries caught in this paradox. The ex­ ternal debt of Tanzania (the eighth highest in Africa) went from 248 million dollars in 1970, to 1.6 billion dollars in 1982. Its share of development assistance to all Africa from overseas donors went from

267 million dollars in 1976, to almost three times that figure in

1982." So, in the absence of any alternative means of supporting their people, the move towards total decoloration, must be rejected as totally irresponsible.

But, probably they could count on the Soviet Union. Couldn’t they? With hindsight, thanks to glaanost, it is now clear that it was a mistake to count on the Soviet Union, for historically the majority 94 of their assistance to the Third World has not been food, agricultural technology, machinery, or any form of economic assistance, but mostly military hardware without any significant economic assistance.^® Our leaders, especially Nyerere, should have known better than to count on Soviet economic assistance, for he is the same person who once wrote, "Socialism is essentially distributive. There is nothing like ac­ q u isitiv e socialism; th a t will be an o th er co n trad ictio n in terms."®® So our leaders knew that, even if the Soviets were willing, they did not have the means to sustain the fragile economies of these developing nations of Africa.

Given their experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism, and the resultant state of alienation towards the West, I think it was only natural for these leaders to try and avoid the West as a form of psychological and political retaliation. However, since the West has been and continues to be our main source of loans, emergency aid, donations, our major trading partner, training grounds for our sci­ entists and administrators, etc., it was irresponsible of them not to override their natural impulses for retaliation and make this decision bound to affect the conditions of existence and well-being of several million people. Yes, we need defacto independence and not just d e - ju r e independence; we need self-determination and dignity. But, first, we must survive before we can become self-reliant. For, as the

Akan proverb goes, "The dead person does not know that his or her

body is naked." In other words, what is freedom and dignity to a

dead person? No wonder, after a massive sociological research on 95 the attitude of West Africans towards total decolonization in 1976,

Professor Drake and his team concluded, "There is scant evidence that anyone really wants this [i.e., total decolonization] to happen, except for a few students who have been studying Marxist-Leninist thought.*!

Further, since any good theory of development should be capa­ ble of resolving the dilemma of development, it must be asked whether or not this revolutionary theory can actually save us from it. So the question is, "can total decolonization enable us to avoid poverty or dependency?" As seen in the foregoing, historically the nations which adopt it end up with poverty, whether or not they make, in theory or practice, self-reliance a component of this theory.

It needs to be pointed out, in closing, that one of the choices left by the dilemma of development is poverty. In order to be rescued from poverty, most of these nations tend to depend so heavily on foreign, especially Western aid, the debtor nations become more dependent.

So countries which follow the ideology of total decolonization and self-reliance end up either poor, or dependent, or both. Hence, the

Revolutionary Theory of Development cannot resolve the dilemma of development. We should, therefore, shift our attention to its alterna­ tive in this chapter, the Pragmatist Theory of Development.

2. The Pragmatist Theory of Development

The majority of postcolonial African leaders and political thinkers did not consider total decolonization either possible or pru­ dent in view of its potential socioeconomic and political consequences 96 for them and their people. Thus many of them were willing to coop­ erate with Western governments and Western countries, as well as

Marxists countries, in order to accerelate national development efforts by reforming their economies and political structures. Prominent among the leaders here were Leophold Senghor, Obafame Awolowo,

Ezikwe, Jomo Kenyata, Miltone Obote, and Houphoeut Boigny of the

Ivory Coast. Even Nkrumah, who has been described above as a

Marxist revolutionary fighting for total decolonization, never found it expedient to identify himself publicly as such during his presidency until his overthrow in 1966, when he wrote his most revolutionary w ork, Neo-Colonialiam.

An African leader of the reformist/pragmatic kind in the early

60s, who has survived 27 years of imprisonment, describes his ratio­ nale and those of his contemporaries saying.

Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless so­ ciety, an attraction which springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part from my admiration for the structure and organization of early African societies in this country... [he was speaking to the South African court that sentenced him in 1964].

It is true ... that I have been influenced by Marx­ ist thought. But this is also true of many leaders of the new independent States. Such widely dif­ ferent persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser all acknowledge this fact. We accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty. But this does not mean we are Marx­ ists.... From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression that Communists regard the parliamen­ tary system of the West as undemocratic and reac­ tionary. But on the contrary, I am an admirer of 97

such a system. I have great respect for British political institutions and for that country's system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and imprtiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration. The American Congress, that country’s doctrine of separation of powers, as well as the independence of its judi­ ciary, arouses in me similar sentiments**.

Since Mandella never had the opportunity to implement his re­ formist/pragmatic strategies for development, we must turn to

Senghor, who not only stood as an advocate for this moderate posi­ tion, but also implemented it to a large extent in Senegal. His ver­ sion of African Socialism was described as a middle ground between the Western type of democracy and Stalinists single-party model. It also supports the idea that limited diversity provides complementality and a sound political atmosphere.

As a leading advocate of the philosophy of negritude, Senghor became the symbol of the desire of postcolonial Africans to reject the cultural arrogance of Europeans and to affirm and to project unto the world stage the existence of a uniquely African culture and its validity. In his own words, negritude is the whole complex of civi­ lized values—cultural, economic, social, and political—which charac­ terize the black peoples or, more precisely, the Negro-African world.

All these values are essentially informed by intuitive reason. The sense of communion, the gift of myth-making, the gift of rhythm, such are the essential elements of negritute, which you will find in­ delibly stamped on all the works and activities of the black man.** 98

In another place he traces this intuition and the rest of the charcteristsics of negritide to a distinctive African mode of appre­ hension, one of the "affective participation" of the black subject in the object of his experience, and concludes that "in other words, while the European can boast of his mode of apprehension, which is through his reasoning faculties; the African can also boast of his mode of apprehension, which is through his emotions.(The impli­ cations of this for Development will be discussed in Chapter Six)

Unlike many of the other leaders, Senghor could recognize the positive contribution of the French to Africa’s development. Conse­ quently, he was in favor of organizing Francophone West Africa to be incorporated in to the European Common Market [EEC]. Together with Nkrumah and the other leaders in this mode, he was determined to follow the policy of non-alignment and, thus, keep Africa out of the cold war between the super powers.

C ritique

Ideological Opportunism

Ideological opportunism appears to be the best way of charac­ terizing the nature of the relationship that many postcolonial African states tried to maintain with the industrialized countries of the West­ ern and Eastern blocs. It was an attempt to play the "ideological game" in such a way that they could maximize their self-interest, but not pay the corresponding price in terms of ideological loyalty or re­ ciprocity. My thesis regarding the countries which adopted the pragmatist ideology is that many of the states associated with this 99 strategy for decolonization and development were misled by their leaders into this moral category, and it is partly responsible for the present socio-economic and political crisis in Africa.

Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, summarizing the seven prin­ ciples issues by the Organization of African Unity to guide the na­ tions in their relations with the power bloc states, in part, call for a mature responsibility in which participation does not require loyalty to any of the super powers or an obligation to side with any of them. Thus, it leaves a state free to make the choice in its own in­ terests; it may side with one super power on an issue, and with a

different power on another.

In practice, however, the states behaved differently as they found appropriate. As Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, two contem­

porary political scientists at Howard University, reported from their

research in 1977, the states of Africa have tended to lean toward one

bloc or another, and one can distinguish with reasonable accuracy

between states that are (I) nonaligned, but tend toward the West; and (2) those non-aligned, but who tend toward the Communist

bloc.*®

The evidence for my thesis of ideological opportunism becomes

more apparent when they state that "the African states do not fit

easily into the conventional East-West/Communist-capitalist cate­

gories."** They cite Guinea as one clear example of these states

caught in this game of ideological inconsistencies. Although ideologi 100 cally Guinea was very close to the Communist world, it does not hes­ itate to look to the West in planning economic development. The exploitation of very valuable new bauxite deposits has been under­ taken by Guinea, in partnership with American, Canadian, French, and

West German corporation.

Ghana under Nkrumah was also a good example of the states being involved in the game of ideological prostitution. Despite his popularity as a communist by declaration and, by far, the most out­ spoken critic of the West, Nkrumah consulted not with one, but with three U.S. presidents for financial aid for construction of the

Akosombo Dam in Ghana.*’ He took loans not only from the U.S., but also from Britain, Canada, West Germany and the Societ Union, etc.

At the same time he wrote a note to heads of all Independent African

States, urging them to refuse aid. "Conscious of our responsibilities towards Africa and its people, we must guard against any attempts by the imperialists, colonialists, and neo-colonialists to use financial aid as a means of economic infiltration and, ultimately, of political subjection."*®

It was such an attitude which led Babu of Tanzania to make the following critical remarks about Nkrumah,

His socialism was a socialism of reforms, not revo­ lution. His anti-colonialism was partial, not univer­ sal. He was ready to hobnob with the agents [of imperialism].... His call for African Unity, there­ fore, sounded hollow. Nkrumah failed to see the emmergence of neocolonialism and the implicit sup­ port he was accidentally giving to imperialism.*® 101

Babu is critical not only of Nkrumah, but also of other African lead­ ers and intellectuals, especially the Marxists, for sustaining economic and numerous other threads with imperialism through associations

such as the E.E.C., which is (in his view) a vehicle for continuing

European economic and political influence in Africa. Some of these

threads involve African links with the IMF, World Bank, and GATT for what he calls, "multilateral decision-making" within the same im­ perialist framework.

It might be argued that such economic contacts were essential to the survival of these young states, and were therefore justifiable.

This argument is, however, not inconsistent with my thesis of ideo­ logical opportunism. It is not a criticism of the economic aids they received or tried to receive; on the contrary, it is a criticism of the ethic of deception and manipulation they used for the exploitation of the cold war and international goodwill for their unilateral interests.

My thesis is also a critique of the wisdom in such a strategy.

It does not take much imagination to realize that ideological oppor­ tunism undermines the conditions of trust, loyalty, or credibility which are necessary for the much needed investment, significant aid, and longterm partnership from the West. Western leaders resented the periods of close ties with the East. Sometimes, they became jeal­ ous and vengeful and did not hesitate to brand such leaders communists. Naturally, this condition is followed by a period of alienation which translates almost inevitably to economic reprisals.

And, of course, since credibility of host countries is a necessary 102 condition for foreign investment and business, these countries also suffer as a result of ideological opportunism.

The alienation from ideological opprtunism did not only come from the West. The East also resented the lack of loyalty to Marxism by these African leaders. In fact, it was once argued by a Soviet diplomat that, just as there can be no Senegalese or Tanzanian mathematics, there could be no African Socialism, that there is only one Socialism, and it is universal; so the leaders must accept it as it is or stop deceiving the world and themselves that they were Social­ ists. Of course, one could challenge the Marxist critique by refering to Marx’s own position on the contextual nature of ideologies. In the

M anifesto Marx states that an ideology is a reflection of the existing socioeconomic conditions, or milieu, of a people. And, of course, the existing socioeconomic conditions in Africa are not the same as the conditions in the Soviet Union (past or present). Hence,the assump­ tion behind the criticism contradicts the theses that ideology is the product of the social milieu.

However, the fact that they made such criticisms is enough to establish my claim that the alienation resulting from their ideological opportunism was from both East and West. Although this alienation condition did not, for obvious diplomatic reasons, lead to the total withdrawal of support from the super powers or the West in general, the existing aids and investments diminished to the extent that they became more symbolic than substantial. The economic repurcussions 103 severely affected these newly independent countries and destroyed all their hopes for rapid economic development.

The implication of this alienating condition for the "Dilemma of

Development" is this: Since the dilemma can be resolved only if poverty and dependency could be removed or diminished, and prag­ matism worsened the poverty condition, it follows that the Pragmatist

Theory for Development, without any changes in strategy, is inca­ pable of resolving the dilemma. 104

FOOTNOTES

^Nkrumah, Kwame, Conscienciam, op. cit., p. 78.

*Wesley, G.W. and Aguibou Johnson, Decolonization And Dependency: Problems of Development of African Societies, edited by Yansane (Weaport, Greenwood Press,1980), p. 8. See, also, African Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1974), p p . 71-76.

spayer, 0., The Debt Trap: The International Monetary Fund and The Third World (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974); A. Krassowski, Development and the Debt Trap: Economic Planning and External Borrowing in Ghana (London, Grom Helm, 1974).

*Drake, Clair, Prospects for Total Decolonization in West Africa. Rpt. in Yansane (ed). Decolonization and Dependency, op. cit., p. 59.

“The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary (1989), p. 257.

“Hadjor Buenor Kofi, On Transfering Africa: Discourse with Africa's Leaders (London, Africa World Press, 1987).

’Liebenow, Gus J., African Politics: Crises and Challenges (Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 246.

“Y ansane, op. cit., p. 25.

“Nkrumah, Kwame, Neocolonialism. See the Introduction, pp. ix, xi, and xiii.

lOMarx and E ngels, Communist Manifesto (Peking, Foreign Lan­ guages Press, 1988), p. 38. There is a footnote by the publisher saying that the translation was made from the original 1848 text by Samuel Moore in 1888, and was edited by Frederick Engels.

^^Lenin, 1936, Vol. 10: 237. See Africa: What Can Be Done? by Ben Turok (London: Institute for African Alternatives, Zed Books, L td.), p. 46.

"N krum a, Consciencism, op. cit., p. 76.

i“The Journal of African Marxists, A ccra, 1985.

^*Studiea in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972), p. 164. See, also, Jerome Slater in At Issue: Politics in the World Arena, edited by Stephen Spiegel. Slater observes that this concept is no longer in the exclusive domain of radical scholars; it is becoming more popular among the mainstream. 105

longer in the exclusive domain of radical scholars; it is becoming more popular among the mainstream.

isVoice o f Africa, No 4 (April 1961), p. 4. See, also, Imperialiam and Underdevelopment, edited by Robert I. Rhodes.

^®Fanon, F ran cis, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp. 12-13, 36-37, 315, and the Conclusion.

"Liebenow, op. cit.

^®World Bank, Toward Sustained Development, pp. 70-75. See, also, Liebenow, ibid.

^®Mazrui, Ali A., "S uper Power E thics: A T hird World P ersp ec­ tive," Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 1, 1987, p. 17.

®®Nyerere, Ju liu s, Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism (Published as a Tanu pamphlet in April, 1962), p. 4.

z^Yansane, op. cit., p. 22.

®*Mandella, Nelson, Melson Mandella: No Easy Walk to Freedom (London, Heiman Educational Books, 1965), pp. 182-183. See, also. South Africa's Moment of Truth, by Edgar Lock (New York, Friend­ ship Press, 1988), p. 88f.

*®Senghor, Leopold, Senghor. See references in Yansane, op. cit., p. 32.

**Senghor, L ib e rty (Paris, Seuil, 1984).

*®Rubin, R. and W einstein, Brian, Introduction to African Poli­ tics: A Continental Approach (2nd ed.) (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p. 274f.

2®Jbid.

®^Mazrui, Ali, The Africans: A Triple Heritage (London, BBC Productions, 1986), p. 227.

®®Babu, A.M., African Socialism or Socialist Africa (London, Zen Press, 1981), p. 107. See, also, Ben Turok, Africa: What Can be Done?, p. 148. CHAPTER IV

THE WAY OUT OF AFRICA’S DILEMMA:

A POPPERIAN THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT

Without a vision the people will perish.

Isaiah

In the preceding chapter I constructed a dilemma and argued that it is the best formal representation for discussing the current socioeconomic and political crises in Africa. Further, I presented two of the dominant theories of development on Africa and argued that they are partly responsible for the dilemma and, therefore, cannot all by themselves dissolve the Dilemma.

In this chapter, I wish to discuss two new theories of develop­ ment aimed at resolving the present crises. First, I will discuss what I term the Neo-Capitalist Theory of Development as advocated by a U.S.-based Ghanaian expert in nation management economics. At the end of my analysis I hope to show that, although it is strong on minimizing poverty by its emphases on maximizing productivity, it is

106 107 weak in dealing with dependency; hence, it cannot dissolve the

Dilemma of Development as constructed above.

Next, I will discuss a new theory of development which I have named the Contextualized Theory of Development. It is espoused by

Ali Mazrui, the eminent African political scientist and historian made world-famous by his BBC productions and recently by the PBS docu­ mentary, "The Africans." After examining it in some detail, I hope to show that although it is promising, it is too narrow as a definition.

And, more importantly, I will show that it is crippled by a pragmatic paradox which is the result of certain inconsistencies within his strategies for transcending dependency.

Finally, I will project and defend my own theory of develop­ ment, evolving out of the other theories of development discussed before it. Thus, I will call it an Evolutionary Theory of Development.

I will argue that, unlike the other theories of development, it can re­ solve the dilemma in both theory and practice. Thus, I will show how we can overcome our persistent poverty by maximizing produc­ tivity, and how we can transcend our present dependence by gradu­ ally transforming it into a genuine form of interdependence.

The Neo-Capitalist Theory of Development

Development in Africa, according to the Neo-Capitalist theory, should mean increased productivity through generic industrialization and Westernization. In the words of one of its leading advocates,

Agbeko Katapu, 108

Development of a nation should mean the carrying out of activities that would improve, strengthen, and increase peoples’ productive capacity or job performance.^

The main contributing factor to Africa’s persistent poverty, says Kat­ apu, is the misunderstanding of development. The key to under­ standing development, however, is to find the meaning and cause of poverty. Poverty, he explains, is the result of the inability of people to produce enough goods and services to meet their essential needs.

Solving the problem of poverty, therefore, implies increasing produc­ tivity through such activities as improving, strengthening, and in­ creasing the people’s capacity to produce. It is for this reason that he maintains the key to understanding development lies in under­ standing poverty and its cause(s).

To achieve development thus defined, Katapu argues that our traditional tools and methods are not helpful. Neither are the con­ ventional quasi-modern methods and technologies being used by

African governments and non-peasant farmers. What is needed now is advanced technology and generic industrialization for the produc­ tion of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, irrigation systems and the general infrastructure required for self-sustaining high productivity.

Such a project requires not only expertise in agriculture, but also dedicated and honest leadership. Since African leaders have time and again proved to be unreliable by virtue of their misconcep­ tions of independence and development, their unwillingness to let go of outmoded African customs, and distributive socialism, they cannot 109

be entrusted with this new strategy. So, in their place, Katapu ar­

gues, we should have Western experts and "supervisors." Most of

the chapters in the book describe in detail how Africa could keep an

"open door" for the foreign experts and supervisors and allow itself

to be Westernized, or more specifically be Americanized, for a period

of 12 years. His plea in short is.

We must attach Africa to the West; we must West­ ernize our thinking and our way of doing things or our entire way of life because Westernization symbolizes modernization of subsistence pre-indus­ trial culture.*

Further, he counsels, African should not be ashamed of borrowing

from the West. After all, modernization was introduced into Africa by

the West, and Africa would not be the first nor the last region of the

world to borrow Western technology and expertise. The examples of

the Soviet Union (via Peter the Great, etc.), Japan, and the South

East Asian countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and

Malaysia, etc., are classic cases of "copying and development," to use

his own terms.

The most curious aspect of Katapu's argument, however, is his attempt to deny the external factor in Africa's underdevelopment. He

states in the introduction.

The book dismisses the popular notion among we (sic) Africans that colonialism and the Western in­ dustrialized nations are the cause of our persistent poverty so that our minds can be focused on the real issues of African poverty.* 110

Later in the book, he attempts to dismiss the external factor argu­ ment by two counter-arguments. First, he argues, no nation, no matter the magnitude of its industrial and military power, is capable of holding back or sabotaging permanently the economic development of any free nation, if the free nation understands economic develop­ ment and how to engineer it. Second, if Western countries were determined to perpetuate their domination of Africa by keeping it poor, as the critics allege, then Western countries would not sponsor

African students since education is the "most potent force that drives man out of the quagmire of backwardness and poverty".*

Not only does Katapu reject African claims to neo-colonial ex­ ploitation, he also dismisses as "funny" the fear that the large-scale prolonged Western involvement might lead to overdependence. A nation is independent, he argues, only if it can produce its basic needs for survival or when the nation is self-sustaining. Since

African nations do not have this capacity for meeting their basic needs, it follows that the African nations professing independence and apprehension of the loss of their independence through external dependency are not truly independent. Hence, they have no good reason to worry about the loss of independence since they do not, in the first place, have it. I ll

Critique of Katapu*s Theory

Beginning with the last point made by Katapu, I wish to dis­ cuss some of the serious weaknesses in his argument before I high­ light what I find to be its strengths. It seems to me that Katapu could have improved upon the quality of his theory if he had sug­ gested precautions for the prevention of the condition of dependency instead of attempting to trivialize the fear expressed by the majority of the intelligentsia in Africa, which is based on decades of exploita­ tion through colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Moreover, his attempts at trivializing their fear reveeds a con­ ceptual blunder or his ignorance of the distinction between d e ju re independence and defacto independence. For, by virtue of their political independence and sovereignty, postcolonial African states have achieved independenced eju re, even if they have not achieved independence defacto, which is self-sufficiency. The logic in Kat- apu’s argument is therefore analogous to the logic in the argument that an emancipated slave is still a slave because he is poor. The logic in the two arguments are as similar as they are weak.

His attempt to deny the historicity of neo-colonial exploitation is even more objectionable. Both of his arguments are totally unac­ ceptable. The first one which tries to argue that no nation however advanced can deprive another of her freedom for a long time simply misses the point. The point in the discussion is whether or not

Western countries have exploited post-colonial African countries, but 112 not how long they can continue their domination of post-colonial

A frica.

The second argument which tries to show that Western spon­ sorship of African students and scholars is a proof of the genuine determination to assist Africa is interesting, but not convincing.

Although I personally have no good reason to doubt the sincerity of these sponsoring nations, to make the argument convincing even to the mildly skeptical he has to show that their education is relevant and qualitatively good enough for the task of African development.

To fail to accept the historicity of neo-colonial exploitation without good counter-argument or to trivialize such a well-docu­

mented case by leading African and non-African historians, political economists, sociologists, and international studies experts, is nothing

short of intellectual dishonesty which does not speak well of one who

accuses African leaders of dishonesty. The researchers and writers on Africa’s exploitation by the West are not all Marxists or anti-capi­

ta lists.

I should say no more than quote a passage from a conservative

U.S. professor of economics, Carl Kreiger, to this effect. He writes in

the introduction to his book. The Rich and The Poor:

The reader will quickly discover that I write from a Capitalist bias.... [Yet he goes on to say] I want to avoid two extreme positions. Some have held that the poor countries are victims of forces over which they have no control. I will observe in chapter two that most of the LDCs [Least Developed Countries] were formerly colonies of some great power. When they achieved their independence they did not immediately become rich. Instead 113

they suffered with "economic colonialism." Some would say that their poverty was caused entirely by others. If that were the case the only effective way to improve the lot of the poor nations is to get other nations to change their policies.

At the other extreme are the people who say that poverty of the poor countries is entirely their own fault. If this were the case, the only way to improve would be for the poor countries to put their own houses in order.®

He adds that he believes the answer lies somewhere between these extreme positions. Carl Kreider justifies his middle position by ar­ guing that since the impoverishment of the poor countries has been caused by both the rich and the poor countries, the development of the poor countries must be their Joint responsibility.® Why Katapu should try to deny the obvious which is not even denied by conser­ vative political economists like Carl Kreider is curious but not worth pursuing here.

Notwithstanding these intellectual pitfalls in Katapu's overall argument, I think his suggestions for higher productivity with West­ ern assistance should be taken seriously. There are those who insist that we should lift ourselves up by our own bootstraps and so we do not need assistance. But as the Reverend Jesse Jackson once said,

"You can’t lift yourself by your own bootstraps if you don’t have boots.’

Since our poor and/or dependent nations do not have the boots

(i.e., the technology and the capital), we need external assistance in various forms. And, as long as we are determined to improve our 114 conditions and to reciprocate the kind gesture of the helper-nations and organizations in kind, there is no need to be ashamed of their assistance.

While most Africans will welcome such assistance, there are many among the intelligentsia who, unlike Katapu, remain skeptical of its long-term benefit for Africa. Their main concern is with the pos­ sibility of Africa becoming even more dependent on the West if we open our doors wider to Western investors, experts, technicians, and supervisors. Instead of addressing this issue seriously, Katapu sim­ ply glosses over it by saying that even the thought of it is "funny."

He also argued that since we have no real independence, it makes no sense to fear losing our independence to foreigners. As I have shown above, the argument commits the fallacy of equivocation by failing to make the necessary distinction between defacto in d ep en ­ dence and d e ju re independence. Besides, since the possibility is a real one in view of the existing overdependence relations between

African countries and the West, it is a serious "sin" of omission to have failed to deal with this threat. As demonstrated in the master argument for Africa's dilemma, attempts at development via Western or non-Western models leave us with the unpleasant choice between poverty, dependency, or both. No serious attempt at development can fail to deal with poverty and ignore dependency. Fortunately, we find such a serious attempt in the next theory of development. 115

A Contextualized Theory of Development (By Ali Mazrui)

The first serious attempt by any African statesman or intellec­ tual to re-conceptualize development with the intention of avoiding the scilla of poverty and the charybdis of dependency is contained in Ali M azrui’s p ap er, "Beyond D ependency in th e Black World."®

Hitherto, most scholars in this field have merely analyzed the causes of the poverty and dependency. The Revolutionaries and Pragmatists

(as discussed in the previous chapter) took steps to break the de­ pendency, but no serious steps to end the poverty. The Neo-capi- talists (you will recall) present very brave proposals to end Africa's poverty, but virtually nothing to prevent or to deal with the problem of overdependence. Unlike the Neo-Capitalists who ignore or trivial­ ize the threat of overdependence, but like the Revolutionaries and

Pragmatists discussed earlier, Mazrui recognizes the reality of the threat of overdependence and prescribes various strategies to combat it.

According to Mazrui, modernization is necessary but is not enough for insuring development. Northern industrialized states are no doubt modernized, but they face the problem of income redistri­ bution plus social justice and environmental pollution. Thus, these

Northern industrialized countries, despite all their advances in tech­ nology, are not yet fully developed. They continue to be challenged by standards of justice between classes, races, cultural subgroups, and the sexes as they pursue full development. 116

Similarly for Africa, modernization will not be enough for the attainment of full development. For we cannot claim to be fully developed if, after eliminating poverty by modernizing our farms, our industries, our infrastructure, and the means of communication, etc., we are still economically, militarily, culturally, technologically, or psychologically overdependent on external powers. So, he concludes,

development in the Third World must for the time being mean

"modernization minus dependency."

Thus, the meaning of development for Africa is relative to

African needs, just as the meaning of development for the Western

world is relative to Western needs. It is for this reason that I term

his theory "contextualized." A simple equation for the theory is

Development = (Modernization - Dependence) for Africa for the time

being*

Contrary to the predominantly Western definitions of modern­

ization as attempts by less developed countries to imitate Western in­

dustrialized countries, Mazrui defines modernization more objectively

as "change in the direction which is compatible with the present

stage of human knowledge, and which does justice to the human per­

son as an innovative and social being.

In analyzing modernization for the Third World Mazrui indicates

that the most important aspects are:

1. Secularization: This does not mean the abolition or suppression

of religion as it might first appear. By this he means a shift- 117

ing of the balance in scientific explanation and ethics away

from the supernatural to the temporal.

2. Technicalization: A shifting of the balance in technique from

custom and intuition to innovation and measurement.

3. Future-orientation: A shifting of the balance between preoccu­

pation with ancestry and tradition to concern for anticipation

and planning.

Seven Strategies for Transcending Dependency

Since on Mazrui’s account modernization is not identical with

development there is the need for a set of realistic and rational

strategies for dealing with the problem of dependency in the Third

World. Up to the time of writing, Mazrui has presented seven of

such strategies, some of which are already being implemented in the

developing world. I will briefly describe them here and proceed to

critique them:

1. Indigenization

This is the process of increasing the utilization of indigenous

resources, ranging from native personnel to traditional local technol­

ogy. To attain true liberation in Africa, he argues, there is the need

to Africanize to a large extent the administration, the management,

and the clerical-manpower positions. Also, instead of relying on im­

ports when the option of relying on local resources is open, we must

resist the temptation to import. For example, greater utilization of

hydro-electric power, which can be obtained from damming some of 118

the great rivers in Africa, would reduce dependence on imported coal

or oil.

One of the negative impacts of colonialism was the neglect of

traditional or indigenous science and technology. Our ancestors were

not only skillful in smelting and processing iron, gold, silver, and

other metals into implements for war and farming, as well as orna­

ments for leisure, they were also very skillful in the use of medicine,

especially herbal medicine for therapy. Some attempts have been

made in postcolonial times to recapture some of these lost sciences

and technologies, but there is a lot more to be done in order to re­

duce our overdependence on external sources.

2. Domestication

This is the process of making an imported resource more rele­ vant and more appropriate for the African situation. As an example,

he refers to the African university today which, he says, is basically foreign. It is, in his eyes and certainly in the eyes of many African scholars and politicians—including those who have called for the re­ jection of philosophy from African universities, a foreign institution transmitting foreign culture and techniques, consolidating foreign academic traditions, and preparing the way for foreign ideologies among students and future teachers. Thus, domesticating the African university would involve making it more relevant to local needs and more responsive to the need of the African student to know African history, African culture, and African philosophy, etc. 119

In the past, most African states adopted the Westminster model of parliament with all the British paraphernalia and the Queen’s

English without adapting it to local conditions. This must explain, in part, why most of these experiments in liberal democracy have failed in Africa. Kenya has taken one step at domesticating the model by

substituting the Queen’s English with Swahili as the language for

parliament.

Another important aspect of domestication relates to the econ­ omy. There is the need to reduce the importation of foreign foods by focusing on domestic foods. The technique of production also, according to Mazrui, can be domesticated by emphasizing labor-inten­ sive technology over capital intensive ones, since we are rich in pro­ viding cheap labor but poor in providing capital.

3. D iversification

This process begins with the assumption that a slave/servant can maximize his chance for freedom by multiplying his masters.

This might sound paradoxical until you realize that the existence of multiple masters creates the condition for the possibility of playing one master against the other and, thus, maximizing one’s own options.

Applied to the African situation, Mazrui argues that it is more advisable for African nations to diversify and sometimes to their multiply trading partners and their investors, as well as their aid donors. The rationale is, in part, to avoid the predicament of exces­ sive dependence on one or few commodities, trading partners, in­ vestors, and donors. 120

Mazrui also counsels diversification in cultural and ideological influences on the people. For centuries now the dominant external cultural influence on Africa has come from the West and, I must add, from the Islamic World. The time has come to reduce this cultural dependency by exposing ourselves to other cultural influences from

India, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, etc. On ideology, he maintains, closed-ideological systems perpetrate mental and intellec­ tual dependency. To avoid this, African nations need to open their doors to what he calls "the free market of ideas." So, in addition to

Western liberal and Marxist thoughts, we must expose ourselves to alternatives like Ghandian ideas of compromise and indigenous African cultural values.

4. Horizontal Interpenetration

This fourth strategy to transcend dependence presumes that hitherto the structure of the world economy has been dominated by two patterns. First, there is the North-South trade between the in­ dustrialized countries of the North and the developing countries of the South. Second, and more important, is the North-North trade among the industrialized countries of the Northern hemisphere. This strategy calls for a new dimension in world trade. In the words of

Mazrui, this is a "South-South economic interaction."

This means African countries must begin to do more trading and pursue other avenues for economic and political cooperation among themselves. Next, they should initiate and foster cooperative economic relations and trade between them and other Third World 121 countries in the Arab world, in Asia, and in Latin America. In recent years, some aspects of this strategy have been seen in the export of manpower from India and Egypt to other Third World countries and, also, in the military assistance from Cuba to Angola in the course of

Angola’s liberation struggles. By dealing with other Third World countries in these and similar ways, African countries can be sure of reducing their over-dependence, especially on the West.

5. Vertical Counter penetration

This strategy aims at encouraging Third World countries to counterpenetrate the citadels of power in the North to reciprocate the penetration of the South by the North since the Age of Explo­ ration. The rationale is to increase the share of the Third World countries in the economies of the developed industrial nations in or­ der to maximize international leverage.

In line with this strategy, Mazrui disagrees with the Third

World analysts—especially those in Africa—who advocate the total disengagement of African economy from the international capitalist system because of the experiences of colonial and neo-colonial ex­ ploitation and overdependence. That strategy, he maintains, would be disastrous for our fragile countries which cannot survive by self- reliance.

However, he believes that by counterpenetrating in solidarity with other Third World countries, we can maximize our chances for fair bargain and for influencing international economic and political decisions and policies in our favor. As an example, he cites the 122 ability of the OPEC countries to use their economic power to dictate to certain transnational corporations which had previously dominated their individual national economies. OPEC has been able to use its economic power to stop certain Western firms from trading with

Israel. Nigeria has also been able to use her oil power to foster what Mazrui calls "enlightened Western policies for Southern Africa."

Other examples of Third World counterpenetration include the investment of Third World countries and companies to invest or buy substantial shares in Western banks.

While most Third World intellectuals and diplomats lament the outflow of African scholars to Western countries, Ali Mazrui sees some positive aspects in this phenomenon called "brain drain." For him, the outflow of these African scholars into the citadels of power is not necessarily evil. It can be creatively transformed into a constructive instrument for counter-penetration. It is well known that Jewish

Americans, Irish Americans, Polish Canadians, and British Indians exercise their collective political pressure on their host governments to influence policies in favor of their homelands. Similarly, African nationals in these countries could influence policies by the U.S.,

Canada, Britain, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, etc., in favor of Africa. This can be very effective, especially if these African residents are professionals in law, medicine, and international busi­ ness, and can have contacts with the relevant state or government officials and lobbyists. 123

6. Domeatic Austerity

A Western visitor to any of the big cities in Africa will marvel at the lifestyles of the rich and the famous in the midst of the star­ vation and decay for which Africa is best known to the outside world. There is hardly any luxury item in the advanced Western countries that cannot be found in these African cities, including pri­ vate jets, the latest car models, ultra-modern homes, expensive Euro­ pean clothing, as well as imported luxury foods and drinks. The weekends are marked with expensive weddings and funerals extrava­ gances which would astonish the average middle-class American.

Before we can minimize our dependence, it is imperative that we restrain the importation of these luxury goods and adopt greater circumspection regarding our consumption patterns. Together with that, it is also necessary to take austerity measures for the redistri­ bution of income and, in some cases, the redistribution of land through land reform measures. The governments must reduce the importation of various nonessential goods without jeopardizing, for example, the minimum nutritional, medical, and educational needs of the people.

Austerity measures require discipline and restraint, as well as courage by the leaders of government. Many African leaders are consequently reluctant to adopt it. However, there have been promising experiments in Tanzania, Somalia, Mozambique, Guinea, Bis­ sau, and currently also in Nigeria and Ghana.** 124

7. Encouraging Northern Extravagance

This strategy is undoubtedly the most controversial of all the seven strategies for overcoming overdependence. It is aimed at en­ couraging Western countries, especially the U.S., to continue their extravagant consumption of oil and similar commodities for which they are vulnerable to external pressures from the Third World. Unless we do this, Mazrui argues, the U.S. might reduce its dependence on foreign oil by encouraging the economical usage of oil at home. If this happens, then they will be less vulnerable to Third World pressures. True interdependence, however, requires "mutual vulner­ ability to each others’ pressures. An America self-sufficient in oil is an America invulnerable to external pressures.

He denies that this strategy is aimed at the total collapse of

Western civilization. That, he maintains, would be a disaster for the human race since it is the Western civilization that has enhanced man’s control over nature, enriched man’s own creativity and inven­ tiveness, and deepened man’s understanding of the ultimate and the spiritual. However, he argues, "a partial decline of the civilizations of the Northern hemisphere is a necessary precondition for creating a genuinely new international order" since the Western world and the

Soviet bloc are responsible for some of the most serious problems facing the human race. For instance, these advanced countries have permitted the technology of production to become a declaration of war on nature and the environment, the technology of destruction to become a declaration of war on man, and the technology of communi- 125 cation to become a declaration of war on ultimate values such as peaceful co-existence, the sacredness of human sexuality, collective responsibility, and reciprocity, etc.

By adopting these seven strategies for transcending depen­ dency, in addition to the process of modernization as defined above,

Mazrui is convinced Africa can achieve development since development for Africa simply means "modernization minus dependency."

My Critique of Ali Mazrui's Theory

With the exception of the seventh strategy just described above, I think that all the strategies are morally sound, realistic, and reliable for transcending our problem of over-dependence. I will ar­ gue against the seventh on the grounds that it is morally unaccept­ able and logically inconsistent with the other strategies and will consequently create a moral dilemma for development. In its place, I will subsequently make a case for international moral unity and col­ laboration which will facilitate the operation of the other strategies.

The seventh strategy is that which is aimed at encouraging

Western extravagance as a means of making the West-especially the

U.S.—more liable to Third World pressure. This pressure, he alleges, is a necessary condition for securing the partial decline of the civi­ lizations of the Northern hemisphere; and their decline, he argues, is, in turn, a necessary precondition for a genuine new international or­ der. 126

The new international order Mazrui is referring to is that of genuine interdependence. While that is undoubtedly a good ideal for the world to aim at, I think that the method for achieving it must be morally sound since the world would be reduced to chaos were we to assume that, in the ethic of international relations, it is the end that justifies the means.

Mazrui does not provide us with any reason why we should en­ courage Western extravagance, except that it will work as a means of increasing Western vulnerability to Third World pressure and, ulti­ mately, reducing Western civilization. Such a pragmatic justification will, however, fly in the face of international justice which requires fairness to all nations.

One might argue that the Western countries have encouraged

Third World extravagance through their commercial advertisements for luxury goods and their movies, as well as by encouraging corrupt government officials to open private accounts overseas with govern­ ment money. This response will, however, only justify the continued use of such strategies by the West in the name of tit-for-tat. And, since they have better means of communication and manipulation through the mass media—in particular, the television, it will not be in our rational self-interest to make this argument.

Moreover, it is surprising that Ali Mazrui failed to realize that this seventh strategy is inconsistent with many of the other strate­ gies he advocates above. Take, for example, the strategy of domesti­ cation. By definition, domestication presupposes the availability of 127

foreign goods and, consequently, the cooperation and goodwill of the

external source through trade, aid, or donation. Despite the caveat

that this seventh strategy is not aimed at the total collapse of West­

ern civilization, a malicious intention is implied in the very thought of pursuing a strategy that will engineer its partial collapse. It goes

without saying that such an intention undermines the same interna­

tional goodwill and cooperation needed for the success of the domes­

tication strategy.

Both diversification and vertical counterpenetration also require

international goodwill and cooperation from the West. Without doubt.

Third World countries might succeed in the diversification of their products, but how can we be sure that the donors and investors, feeling their interests threatened, might not reconsider their commer­ cial commitments to Africa?

Counter penetration is also impossible unless the host countries in the North are willing to grant visas and work permits, etc., to the students, scholars, and professionals from the Third World. Such willingness is, however, undermined by the hostility implicit in this seventh strategy.

Ali Mazrui should also worry about whether or not such a pol­ icy is universalizable. If it is, then he should be prepared to grant that the West also have a moral right to engineer the partial collapse of our fragile nations by encouraging the extravagant use of oil or similar limited resources for which we are dependent on external 128 sources. But that will, of course, be against our rational self-inter­ est since it will make our dependency condition worse than it is. On the other hand, if it is not universalizable, then it is a violation of the first version of the Categorical Imperative in which we are un­ justly using certain countries as mere means to our selfish end.

Either the principle behind our action is universalizable or it is not.

In either case, the strategy is morally unacceptable.

Recent events at the international scene, with particular refer­ ence to the Gulf Crisis, also indicate that the partial decline of the

U.S. as a super power will not be in the interest of world peace.

For although the U.S. might not qualify on moral grounds to serve as the dejure police of the world because of her own sometimes ques­ tionable policies towards other nations by acting as defacto police of the world and, later, by organizing and leading the allied army in

Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein has been effectively ejected out of Kuwait, Kuwait is liberated, and Saddam has been checked in his ambition to annex Saudi Arabia or any other country. It is, therefore, imperative that the fragile republics of the Third World support, rather than undermine, the well-being of such a nation.

Finally, the cannons of rationality also require that we consider all the options available for a given course before we make a choice.

There are alternatives to encouraging the extravagance of the West as a means to making them more susceptible to Third World pressures and, ultimately, for the creation of a new international order. For instance, in addition to the United Nations, its agencies, and its Com- 129 missions, such as the U.N. Commission On Human Rights and the World

Court, there are such international forums as the North-South Dia­ logue, the New Economic World Order, the African Development

Agency, and the Helsinki Accord, etc. (The Helsinki, as we saw in

Chapter Two, is partially responsible for some of the ongoing socio­ political transformations in the Eastern bloc.) In addition, of course, is the appeal to the international moral conscience, or world opinion, which was effectively demonstrated last year by Nelson Mandella during his post-imprisonment "triumphant visit" to the U.S. and the

Western world in general.

The conclusion to this discussion must be obvious. Breaking away from the tradition of analysis without prescription, Mazrui boldly projected onto the African stage his simple but profound theory that Development = (Modernization - Dependency). However, as we have seen, there is more to development than just these two components of the theory. So we must say the theory is too narrow.

More importantly, the inconsistencies among some of the counter­ dependency strategies show that the theory requires more work to be coherent.

A Popperian Theory of Development

In this section, I wish to present my own theory of develop­ ment. I will argue that it is the beat theory of development as far as its potential for dissolving the dilemma and facilitating the process of development is concerned. 130

Simply slated the theory is this: Development (for Africa) =

(critical consciousness + the cultivation of complex problem-solving skills + modernization + fecund industrialization) - (overdependence + bribery + corruption + unwarranted military interventions + all other significant context-dependent barriers to progress).

The theory has two main parts. The components listed before the minus (-) constitute elements that are required in the society for development, while the components listed after the minus (-) are ele­ ments in the society that need to be either minimized or eliminated before development can take place. In Aristotelian terms, we might call those elements we need "development virtues" and those we abhor "development vices." In what follows, I wish to justify the selected development virtues for my theory.

1. Justification for the Development Virtues in my Theory

The development virtues in my theory are: (a) critical consciousness, (b) cultivation of complex problem-solving skills, (c) modernization , and (d) fecund industrialization.

A. Critical Thinking

According to the existentialist, Merleau-Ponty, consciousness exists primordially in the child and it is the ground of all knowledge and rationality.*^ Agreeing with his philosophic precursors, R.S.

Peters has said, "Consciousness is the hallmark of the mind, and always related in its different modes to objects."** The objects of consciousness, says Peters, are first and foremost objects in a public 131 world that are marked out and differentiated by a public language into which the individual is initiated.

If consciousness is so fundamental to knowledge and rational dealings with the external world, then no society can develop without a deliberate effort to arouse the consciousness of its members to the conditions of their existence in relation to other conditions of existence—actual or possible. As a result of this stimulus, the society begins to develop critical consciousness. For example, this will be evident in their refusal to take things for granted and a tendency to question, in non-personal and scientific terms, why their conditions of existence are so poor in relation to some other actual or possible conditions. Without critical self-consciousness many traditional societies will continue to accept their condition of poverty and misery as their God-given fate or destiny. Others might continue to believe that life does not get any better than it is for them or that they have been cursed by some evil gods or ancestors.

Through critical self-consciousness, however, many of them will come to reject these myths and to realize that their conditions of poverty and dependency are essentially man-made conditions which are reversible with some hard work and minimal assistance from others.

Mazrui left this crucial point out of his theory of development as "modernization minus dependency." Although I like his theory of modernization, I think his theory as a whole is too narrow for dealing with the complexities of creating self-sustaining, free, and just modern societies out of the mostly poverty-stricken, demoralized, 132

overdependent countries of Africa. For instance, the omission of

critical consciousness and strategies for boosting their morale for

self-improvement are very serious omissions, since no authentic

change can occur without the change of our mental attitudes and

moral behavior.

To be fair to Mazrui, however, he writes toward the end of the

paper—probably as an afterthought:

A new consciousness is now needed capable of not only diagnosing the nature of dependency, but also of discovering avenues for escaping from it.*®

What this means is that his theory is incomplete. There is, therefore,

the need for a new theory broad enough to include critical con­

sciousness and other essential components including complex problem­

solving skills.

B. Complex Problem Solving Skills

Becoming conscious and critical of their conditions of existence, members of the society will naturally feel the urge to improve the socio-economic conditions of their existence. And that, of course, re­ quires tools. Man’s tool par excellence is, of course, his brain, but to face the task of social transformation, the mind needs to be trained and equipped for complex problem-solving. There is the need for a realistic, purposeful assessment of their problems so that ra­ tional decisions could be made, directed at both ameliorative and in­ novative actions aimed at their own individual and collective 133 betterment. Hence, there is the need for the kind of education that does not focus on the recall of transmitted facts, but on cognitive problem-solving skills so that he can deal with actual or future problems in his society. As noted in Chapter Two this is one of the values for studying logic and critical thinking in general through formal courses in philosophy.

C. M odernization

Modernization, according to Wiredu, is "the application of the results of modern science for the improvement of the conditions of human life." Modernization is not identical with development, but is a necessary condition for development. It is also the most visible side because of its immediate association with advanced technology applied in communication, transportation, agriculture, medicine, and education. It, therefore, makes it relatively easy to distinguish a developed society from all others. These outward signs of modern­ ization sometimes make it difficult to recognize the inner aspects which engender and sustain the external signs. Thus, I cannot agree more with Wiredu when he maintains that genuine, or thorough, mod­ ernization must begin with a change of our traditional uncritical habits of thought and attitudes towards our culture regarding funer­ als, gods, ghosts, and witches. Despite our long exposure to Western education and scientific thinking, these habits of thought and super­ stitious beliefs remain because they are being perpetrated in the name of African philosophy by certain anthropologists, cultural na­ tionalists, and statesmen. 134

There are many aspects of our culture that require moderniza­ tion. Ali Mazrui has identified three of such areas: (a) secularization

- which means shifting of the balance of scientific explanation and ethics away from the supernatural to the temporal; (b) technicaliza- tion - which means a shifting of the balance in technique from cus­ tom and intuition to innovation and measurement; and (c) future orientation - which is the shifting of the balance between pre-occu­ pation with ancestry and tradition to concern for anticipation and panning.

Modernization is often opposed in Africa because it is often confused with Westernization, understood as the wholesale copying of

Western culture by traditional societies. Although most of the visible signs of modernization are present in Western countries, to identify modernization with Westernization is a mistake because the two con­ cepts are not co-terminus. Westernization, as a process for tradi­ tional societies, terminates with the successful imitation of Western societies. But modernization, as an ideal and a process, goes beyond the reach of Westernization; otherwise, we have to grant that Western countries cannot modernize beyond their present levels. And that is obviously false, since the process of modernization is an ongoing concern in the West. Among the challenges of modernization facing the West are how to modernize industries, automobiles, and pesticides, etc., in order to minimize their negative impact on the environment and human health. Another important challenge is how to modernize the educational, legal, and correctional systems in order to minimize 135 the level of drug abuse, crime, and social violence, in general. Since modernization is an essential component of development, this implies that the West is still in the process of development. The quest for development, then, should not be seen as a burden for Africans or

Third World people. As Wiredu puts it, "it should be viewed as a continuing world-historical process in which all peoples. Western and non-Western alike, are engaged."^®

D. Procreative Industrialization

Another serious omission in Mazrui’s theory of development is industrialization. It is hard to conceive of any nation which could become developed without industrialization. It is the key to mass production, which makes it possible for commodities that are afford­ able to the few to become affordable to the many. There can be no authentic development in Africa until we have learned to manufacture our own basic needs. Basic needs for a country does not just mean medicine, food, and clothing, but also the infrastructure and machin­ ery for agricultural production. Thus, the kind of industries that we need must be such that they can engender the growth of other in­ dustries and businesses. So, we do not need industries simpliciter; we need industries that will produce other industries. That is what

I mean by procreative industries. This implies the need for heavy

(as opposed to light and footloose) industries for the construction of tractors, well-digging and irrigation devices, silos, and trucks for the mass production, storage, and distribution of food. Katapu’s theory of development, it will be recalled, makes higher productivity 136 through Western-assisted industrialization identical with development for Africa. While that is plainly false, there is no doubt that it is a key component to any development theory.

It is on the bases of these considerations that I include as es­ sential ingredients of my theory the set of development virtues: critical thinking, complex problem-solving skills, modernization, and industrialization. The following are among the most pervasive vices that undermine the efforts at development in Africa.

2. Strategies for Combating the Vices of Development

A. Dependency

There is no country that is totally self-sufficient. Every na­ tion depends, to some extent, on other nations for some of its needs.

These vary from raw materials to hi-tech, unskilled labor to technical expertise, and from a few gifts to billion-dollar loans. However, as noted in the analysis of dependence in Chapter Three, dependence can become a problem for a nation if the degree of dependence goes beyond certain limits and begins to threaten or to undermine that nation’s autonomy or dejure independence. It is for this reason that many African nationalists, especially the revolutionary theorists, have called for immediate and total decolonization which means total de­ tachment from the West as the first condition for Africa’s develop­ ment.

As argued earlier in Chapter Three, however, immediate total decolonization or detachment from the West is too desperate and can neither be the rational nor the responsible option for us at this 137

stage. A better option is that of Mazrui, which encourages continu­

ing the relationship with the West while taking appropriate measures

to minimize dependency. These measures or strategies, as we saw

earlier in this Chapter, are: (a) indigenization, (b) domestication, (c)

diversification, (d) horizontal interpenetration, (e) vertical counter­

penetration, (f) domestic austerity, and (g) encouraging Northern ex­

travagance. As argued above, the seventh of these strategies pre­

supposes an evil-intention that contradicts the spirit of goodwill

required for the successful deployment of some of the other strate­

gies, such as domestication, diversification, and vertical counter­

penetration. It is also inconsistent with the efforts at modernization which are practically impossible without the cooperation of Western

co u n tries.

So, in order to facilitate the process of modernization and

development, I suggest that the seventh strategy be replaced with a

new strategy—international moral unity and collaboration. The idea is for Africa to promote international moral unity and collaboration with all friendly nations. A realistic assessment of our situation in

Africa now shows that, just as we cannot lift ourselves by our own

bootstraps unless we have boots, we cannot count on our own re­

sources to deliver our people from the present doldrums of poverty and misery. It is, therefore, in our best interest to create the con­ ditions that make for moral unity among African nations as well as all other nations. East or West, that show interest in giving us any form of genuine assistance to help us on our way up. Moral unity and 138 collaboration, unlike political unity, does not call for the dissolution of political boundaries or the ouster of any governments. It is, therefore, more realistic and likely to win the support of African leaders than political unity in the sense advocated by Nkrumah and the rest of the Revolutionaries. Moral unity and international collab­ oration, in a sense, is not new. The existence of the Organization of

African Unity (G.A.U.); regional economic groupings, such as the Eco­ nomic Commission of West Africa (Ecowas); and the now dormant East

African Economic Community (EAAC), demonstrate that we have both the capacity and experience for moral unity and international collabo­ ration, The role of the West African peace-keeping force in resolving the Liberian civil war is another clear testimony that international moral unity and collaboration is the way to go.

We do not need to be philosophers of history to realize that

"in unity lies strength." My illiterate, but wise, grandmother used to say in our Akan language, "Dua koro gye mframa a ebu," which means "No tree can withstand the storms for a long time without breaking." And it is inter sting to note the similarity between her argument and that of Alfred Whitehead for the same conclusion:

The trees in a Brazilian forest depend upon the association of various species of organisms, each of which is mutually dependent on other species. A single tree by itself is dependent upon all the ad­ verse chances of shifting circumstances. The wind stunts it; variations in temperature check its fo­ liage; the rains denude its soil; its leaves are blown away and are lost for the purpose of fertil­ ization.^’ 139

Instead of contradicting some of the counter-dependency strategies like Mazrui’s seventh strategy, my replacement strategy will facilitate the deployment of all the other six strategies. Unlike the revolutionary approach, which calls for the immediate detachment from the West, what is being advocated here is a gradual but total decolonization through a gradual transformation of our dependency relation into one of genuine interdependence. It is a long tedious process, but, unlike the revolutionary strategy, it is not unrealistic.

It is the path that France, Britain, West Germany, and Japan, etc., took after the devastation of the Second World War to transform their dependence on the United States into the kind of interdependence we witness today between the United States and these Northern coun­ tries. It might be argued that the Northern countries already had the technology and lots of infrastructure before the war and so the reconstruction did not take too long. This objection, however, does not destroy my argument; all that it can show is that the African countries will take a longer time to reach the level of interdepen­ dence that these Northern countries have already reached with the

United States.

B. B rib ery And C orruption

By the reckoning of both the United Nations Conference on

Trade and Development and the World Bank, Sub-Saharan African

countries constitute two-thirds of the world’s poorest countries.

These countries have also experienced the highest number of coups 140 per country than any other region of the world. Together they have experienced not less than 40 coups since independence. Individually, some countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda have had five or more coups. In all of these coups, however, the dominant recurring explanation given is bribery and corruption. Whether this is a rea­ son or an excuse, no serious attempt to develop the region can fail to deal with this development vice. Let us consider a few cases to underscore the immensity of this problem and its implications for political stability and economic development, and to point out that it was a mistake on Mazrui’s part to leave it out of his theory.

Bribery and corruption have long been associated with Ghana­ ian politics since independence in 1957. Although few doubted the honesty of Dr.Nkrumah in these matters, one of the main reasons given for his overthrow was his inability to deal with the wanton bribery and corruption among his own cabinet members and his

Party. Similarly, the leaders of the Second and Third Republic were charged with ineptitude in dealing with bribery and corruption within the government. This vice, however, reached its peak by the end of the 70s, when the military regime led by Colonel Kutu

Acheampong which had overthrown the Second Republic, ostensibly to correct these vices, became directly involved. Bribery and corrup­ tion was given a new name: Kalabule (roughly, keeping the lid on through economic malpractice). Kalabule became the order of the day; and the Acheampong regime, as Naomi Chanzan puts it, "created nothing short of an official kleptocracy."^® When he tried to repress 141 criticism and rising opposition, he and his henchmen were shot by a firing squad in the wake of the populist revolution led by Fit. Lieu­ tenant J.J. Rawlings in 1979. Again the main justification for the coup or revolution was given as a moral reform to rid the country of bribery and corruption. As noted earlier, Rawlings overthrew the

Third Republic and returned to power in 1981 to continue the moral reform which the Lemann regime could not handle.

The situation in Nigeria is not significantly different, except that it involves billions, rather than thousands, of dollars. Reports on bribery and corruption in 1983 alone included the mishandling of

2.5 billion in import licenses by the Minister of Commerce, acceptance of a large bribe by Nigerian legislatures from a Swiss firm, the ap­ prehension of a Nigerian governor in London for attempting to smug­ gle millions of naira into Britain, and the revelation by a federal minister that the country was losing close to billion dollars a year in payroll fraud. To cover up their evil operations, the 37-story head­ quarters of the Nigerian External Telecommunications in Lagos was set on fire. In its January 25th, 1983, report. The New Nigerian

(Kaduna) condemned the fire as "a calculated act, planned and exe­ cuted to cover up corruption and embezzlement in the company." Not surprisingly, the students of Nigeria in several cities took to the streets once again and called for the return of the military."

For along time it was believed that Nyerere’s Socialist Tanzania was the only exception to this socioeconomic condition. This myth 142 was, however, exploded when, in 1990, Nyerere himself admitted that

"we are now like the rest of Africa."*®

To fight corruption African governments have used strategies of all kinds from religious sermons to political exhortations, imprisonments, public whippings, and even firing squads. None of these seems to work, so far. New strategies are, therefore, neces­ sary to reinforce the existing ones or to replace some of them. Two things immediately come to mind: a democratic government with a strong independent judiciary system; and an educational system that emphasizes a critical examination of the cultural roots for this prob­ lem,*^ which appears to be the acceptance of an uncritical form of reciprocity from the traditional culture** and an Aristotelian approach to moral education. (I will have more to say on this in my recommendations after Chapter Six.)

C. The Vice of Military Interventions

As noted above, the incidents of military interventions in poli­ tics occur in the name of coups; counter-coups, both abortive or successful; populist revolutions; and civil wars. Not only do they destabilize the political conditions of the countries concerned, they also disrupt the already fragile economies by scaring away investors, bankers, and other businesses. Since the military have made it their business to fight bribery and corruption, and "sin" continues to abide with us, it would seem to follow that we are going to have more military interventions. 143

In his analyses of African coups, Mazrui identifies three domi­ nant reasons. First, he argues that in Africa the technology of de­ struction is ahead of the technology of production. And, so, ultimate power resides not in those who control the means of production, as

Marxists would argue, but in those who control the means of de­ struction. Second, according to Mazrui, most of the non-military in­ stitutions in Africa (such as labor unions, professional associations, religious leaders, universities, the judiciary, peasant associations, and the civil service) are relatively weak. As a result, they are unable to stand up to the military. Third, Mazrui maintains, there is a low level of professionalism within the armed forces. The criteria for re­ cruitment and promotion are determined often by ethnicity, and the low pay they receive tends to encourage corruption. The fourth, and probably the most neglected, is that there is a great deal of boredom within African barracks. In most of these countries, there are no major defense needs. As an alternative to heroism sought on the battle fields, our African soldiers are consequently easily tempted to pursue their dreams of heroism in the political arena and claim to be th e d e fe n d e rs of th e people.*®

The antidote to the last of the four reasons should not be hard

to find. All the military should be trained in jobs other than the primary defense job or training they have. For instance, they can

be trained as experimental farmers, road constructors, primary health care officers, automobile repairers, low-cost housing builders,

mechanical repairers, and pilots, etc. The problem of ethnic nepotism 144

is a form of corruption, so it’s solution should be the same as that suggested above. Part of the solution should include the kind of education that will make the military have confidence in the demo­ cratic system’s ability to deal with social evils. The military should also be decentralized and placed under advance intelligence surveil­ lance within and without the army.

These vices by no means exhaust the list of vices that militate against progress in the African countries pursuing development.

Civil wars, lack of family planning, lack of incentive for work, gen­ eral ill-health of the population, and poor educational facilities, etc., are a few other problems that come to mind. I will, therefore, leave the theory open-ended and flexible so that countries can add to the list of vices to be eliminated to make it applicable to their special circumstances.

The reader may have noticed that this theory has grown out of my attempt to criticize the four theories of development and their capacities for dissolving the dilemma of development. Karl Popper has, for a long time, held as a thesis of evolutionary epistemology that knowledge grows through the critical elimination of the errors in our theories which are nothing but tentative solutions to problems.

It is for this reason (and the fact that Popper has had a profound influence on my thinking) that I refer to my theory as "A Popperian

Theory of Development."

It is superior to both the Revolutionary Theory of Development and the Pragmatist Theory because, while the former aimed at dealing 145 with dependence through total detachment, it aggravated the poverty condition; and, while the latter aimed at dealing with dependence through the multiplication of dependents, it also aggravated the poverty condition as a result of ideological opportunism. It is also superior to the Neo-Capitalist Theory of Development advanced by

Katapu for, while it takes seriously the question of poverty, it fails to take any measures against dependency. Ali Mazrui's Contextual- ized Theory of Development is superior to all of the above because it is the only one that incorporates strategies for dealing with both de­ pendency and poverty simultaneously. However, as noted above, it is crippled by the logical inconsistencies and moral dilemmas as a result of the conflicts between the seventh counter-dependency strategy and some of the other strategies. It has also been shown to be too narrow for a theory since it leaves out many of the perennial prob­ lems of development on the continent, including bribery and corrup­ tion, and recurring military interventions. The superiority of my theory lies in the fact that, like Mazrui, it deals with both depen­ dency and poverty; but, unlike it, it is not crippled by any logical inconsistencies and moral dilemmas. It is also not too narrow for a theory, since it incorporates many of the elements missing in Mazrui’s theory; and, most of all, it is the only one so far that can dissolve the dilemma of development.

How does my theory dissolve the dilemma of development? It will be recalled that the second premiss of the master argument (see page 14) states that the Western pattern of development leads to 146 economic growth, but not without a high risk of dependence. What my theory does is to weaken this premiss to the extent that it is no longer plausible. For, with critical consciousness, complex problem­ solving, modernization, and fecund industrialization, the chances for economic growth will be optimal. At the same time, the enriched counter-dependency measures will insure that the existing asymmetri­ cal dependency relation, in which Africa supplies mostly "the bever­ age and desert"25 of the West, is transformed into a genuine form of mutual dependence or interdependence. 147

FOOTNOTES

^Katapu, Agbeko, Workable Strategies To End Africa's Poverty: Some Aspects of nation Management Economics (New York, C enter For Nation Management Economics, Inc., 1987), p. 3.

^Ibid., p. 71.

^Katapu, ibid., Introduction, xxii.

*Ibid., p. xxii.

sRrieder, Carl, The Rich and the Poor: A Christian Perspective on Global Economics (Scottdale, Herald Press, 1987), pp. 18-19.

6 J b id .

’’Ibid., p. 19.

®Mazrui’s paper is reprinted in Yansane (ed.), op. cit., pp. 85- 97.

®Mazrui, ibid.

^"Mazrui, Ali, The African Condition (New York, Cam bridge University Press, 1988), p. 79.

^^Africa Abroad, June /July and September/October issues.

^'M azrui, African Condition, op. cit., p. 86.

*®Merleau Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962. Also see his Primacy of Perception, edited by J.M. Edie (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 119.

^♦Peters, R.S., Ethics and Education (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 60.

**Mazrui, op. cit., p. 97.

^®Wiredu, op. cit., p. 43.

^’Whitehead, Science And the Modern World (New York, Macmillan, 1967), p. 206.

"Chanzan, Naomi, "Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence of Civil Society," in Democracy in Developing Countries: 148

Africa, Vol Two, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, Lynee Reinner Publishers, 1988), p. 108.

*®Diamond, Larry, "Nigeria In Search of Democracy," pp. 906- 908. See, also. Democracy In Developing Countries, op. p.cit., 53.

^°The New York Times: International, February 27, 1990, p. A- 10, re p o rt by Jane P erlez.

*^Ali Mazrui observes that all over Africa, people are no longer where traditional prior appreciation ends and the sin of bribery and corruption begins. See Mazrui, The Africans, op. cit., p. 241.

^^Achebe, A., No Longer At Least (London, Heineman Educational Books, 1960, and New York, Astor Hornor, 1961), pp. 87-8. It is stated here that "a man expects you to accept ’kola’ from him for services rendered, and until you do, his mind is never at rest.... You may cause more trouble by refusing a bribe than by accepting it."

^^Mazrui, A., The Africans, op. cit., p. 183.

*

*®Ali Mazrui uses this metaphor to refer to the nature of the unequal exchange between countries of the North and their Southern counterparts. While the North supplies very expensive and essential goods for the survival and economic development of the South, those in the South especially, African countries, supply mostly cocoa, cof­ fee. tea, peanuts, bananas, and similar goods that are easily replace­ able or dispensable among Northern consumers. CHAPTER V

CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY IN SEARCH OF THE BEST

IDEOLOGY FOR AFRICA: THE NEW RATIONAL CHOICE

Only the best is good enough for Africa.^

Dr. Kwegyir Aggrey

If there is any one theme that has dominated the thinking of moat African intellectuals in the postcolonial era, it must be the search for the beat ideology to accelerate the pace of development on the continent. The attraction of Western liberalism and its democratic institutions are irresistible; yet one can hardly resist the Marxist-

Leninist explanation and prescription for Africa's socioeconomic predicament. At the same time, all the pragmatic attempts to synthe­ size the two paradigms in Africa so far have failed to work.

This ideological dilemma and its resultant contradictions are best represented in the following poem by a Nigerian writer:

Here we stand Infants overblown Poised between two civilizations Finding the balance irksome

149 150

Itching for something to happen To tip us one way or the other, Groping in the dark for a helping hand— And finding none. I’m tired, O my God, I’m tired. I’m tired of hanging in the middle way— But where can I go?*

Since the poem was written in 1956, it might be argued that, in view of the collapse of the Soviet economy and its political consequences, the prayer of the poet has been answered and that there is now a clear choice for Africa. Such an argument is, however, guilty of the hasty conclusion fallacy and is consequently unacceptable. For to arrive at this conclusion one has to show that there is no ideology that is more utility maximizing than liberal democratic capitalism which is the alternative to socialism. The argument also presupposes that the Soviet Union has been faithfully implementing classical

Marxist doctrines; and that is, of course, very debatable.

In order to arrive at a rational choice for Africa, we have to examine our present and future goals. Among these goals are, as noted in the previous chapter, economic recovery, economic indepen­ dence, political stability, the consolidation of our political freedom, and maximizing socioeconomic justice. Some of the ideologies compet­ ing for adoption are African Socialism, Marxist Socialism, or any existing brand of liberal democratic capitalism—laissez faire, welfare, or production-oriented capitalism. In their place I propose and de­ fend, on predominantly prudential and utilitarian grounds, a new ideology: Liberal Democratic Development Capitedism, which is 151

designed to reflect our past experiences but more so our present and

future needs.

My argument will proceed by the method of critical elimination

on the competing ideologies listed above, and the criteria will be

their capability in achieving the basic goals of development. The ar­

gument will have to be inductive and the conclusion tentative, since

the possibility will exist for a new, or better, ideology. Also, as noted

in Chapter One, ideology could be used in the pejorative or a non-

pejorative sense. In this chapter, however, the term will be used in

its nonpejorative sense to mean a set of ideas for organizing society

for a common goal.

The African philosopher, according to Professor Wiredu, has a

two-fold duty towards ideology: first, to combat ideology in the pe­

jorative sense by getting people to think critically about the abstract

notions at their base, and second, to promote ideology in the good

sense.3 Thus, contrary to the view of some of its critics, it is obvi­

ous that CAP is not the kind of philosophy detached from reality and absorbed in some kind of mystical contemplation. To put it in

broader perspective, CAP belongs to the philosophical tradition com­

mitted to social and political meriolism from Plato and his R epublic

through Marx and socialism to John Rawls and his theory of justice.

In his attempt to reconstruct philosophy towards meriolism, John

Dewey* said human values and moral problems come into play when

some practical choice is made involving human conduct, desires, and

satisfactions. Human aims, says Dewey, are not to be taken as fixed 152 ends in advance of inquiry into, and intelligent deliberation about, concrete moral situations. Accordingly, it was Dewey’s belief that we ought to assess various roads to human improvement rather than ar­ gue about the validity of this or that description of the final desti­ nation.

In our present context, the final destination is development, and the various roads to be assessed are the suggested ideologies.

Again paraphrasing Wittgenstein, it must be asked, "What is philoso­ phy if it cannot help us resolve the most important questions of life?

The Old Rational Choice

Nyerere, Africa’s philosopher king of the 60s, argued that given capitalism and socialism as alternative ideologies for propelling development in Tanzania, as for other young independent African countries, the rational choice could not be capitalism but socialism.

His main argument was based on the feeir that international capitalism

will assimilate or dominate the subordinate and weak capitalisms to be created and consequently capitalism will threaten both the economic

and political independence of the young African states. Socialism, on

the other hand, he was convinced, will not only strengthen their

economic self-reliance and political independence, but will also insure

their rapid development as it had done in the socialist countries.

In view of the poor economic conditions among the young

states and the need for large sums of capital for investment and

mass production, Nyerere realized that heavy financial borrowing

from external capitalist systems would be as unavoidable as it would 153 be threatening to their economic and political independence.of the newly independent African countries. Parts of his argument are worth quoting at length for analysis.

In fact, Third World capitalism, will have no choice except to cooperate with external capitalism,as a very junior partner. Otherwise, it would be stran­ gled at birth. You cannot develop capitalism in our countries without foreign capitalists, their money, and their management expertise. And these foreign capitalists will invest in Africa only if, when, and to the extent that they are convinced that to do so would be more profitable to them than any other investment. Development through capitalism, therefore, means that we Third World nations have to meet conditions laid down by oth­ ers—by capitalists of other countries. And if we agree to their conditions, we should have to con­ tinue to be guided by them or face the threat of the new enterprises being run down,of money and skills being withdrawn, and other economic sanc­ tions being applied against us.*

That goes for the economic threat. On the political side, he argued:

In fact, a reliance upon capitalist development means we give to others the power to make vital decisions about our economy. The kind of economic production we shall undertake; the location of fac­ tories, the amount of employment....and even the kind of taxation system we adopt; all these matters will be determined by outsiders.®

Nyerere cannot pretend not to be aware of such wise counsels as "No pain no gain," "Nothing ventured nothing gained," or "He who will rule one day must learn to serve first." Why can’t he and the junior partners of capitalism take consolation from the fact that their period of subordination and apprenticeship, painful as they may be. 154

are only temporary. In anticipation of this objection, he argued that

all such businesses that may be initiated would have to serve the

multinationals for survival.

They would therefore be absolutely dependent upon it, flourishing when it expanded and collapsing if it closed down. Local businesses would thus be the puppets not the enemies of foreign enterprise—the subsidiaries, not the competitors. They would be forced to identify themselves with all the demands made by foreign capitalists. The loss of real na­ tional self-determination would therefore be in­ creased—not decreased; for the foreign owners would have secured a local base to back up their economic power.... The foreign domination is per­ manent, not temporary.’

It does not take much reflection to recognize the outright dis­

tortions and exaggerations in Nyerere’s characterization of capitalism

in the premisses. For example, the risks of inviting external capital­

ism are clearly distorted and exaggerated when he says, "In fact, a

reliance upon capitalist development means that we give to others the

power to make vital decisions about our economy." Further, he

states that local capitalist businesses would be "absolutely depen­

dent" on external capitalism and be the "puppets," rather than the

competitors, of the foreign businesses.

There is no denying that the multinationals can and often do

influence local politics as a way of insuring political stability and the

security and well-being of their investments. Some may, of course, exceed this prudential and hence understandably step and unduly interfere in local politics, but how can such incidents warrant the 155 conclusion that external capitalism will deprive local authorities of their rights to make vital economic decisions? Since it takes local cooperation and support, as well as the lack of vigilance and similar counter-interference measures for any multinational to interfere and to dominate local politics, what Nyerere should have done was to take the necessary counter-interference measures to minimize any such lo­ cal influence instead of the total rejection of capitalism. This refusal to take any risks for fear of consequences that are exaggerated and unlikely is analogous to the position of the fourth person in Jesus’

Parable of the Talents. It is, therefore, equally irresponsible. There is hardly any human progress made without some risks.

It must be added parenthetically that Nyerere was not alone in holding these pessimistic views about capitalism. Nkrumah once said,

"Capitalism is but the gentleman’s method of slavery.... Capitalism would be a betrayal of the African people... Capitalism is unjust....

Capitalism is too complicated for our people."®

On the question of dependence, the distortions and exaggera­ tions are even more obvious. As junior partners, of course, sub­ sidiary local businesses must depend on the multinationals for their growth and flourishing as suppliers of raw materials, brokers, whole­ salers, or distributors, etc. But that’s a far cry from saying "they will become absolutely dependent on them—flourishing as they do or perishing as they do." The logic here is as deplorable as that of a spinster who refuses to marry for fear that her husband might domi­ nate her life. The risk is real, but relatively insignificant, if the 156 prospective husband can help provide your basic needs and have children with you.

The picture that Nyerere is painting is no more than the worst case scenario for the developing countries. He is, therefore, either deliberately ignoring or is personally ignorant of the more attractive scenarios of, say, Japanese and the Pacific realm companies that have either transformed themselves into independent companies or gen­ uinely interdependent companies. All of these companies started as junior companies, but they are certainly no "puppets" in the hands of the multinationals. There are effective strategies for insuring that the external dependence and influence are minimal. As we saw in

Chapter Pour, these include indigenization, diversification, domestica­ tion, horizontal penetration, and vertical counter-penetration.

The success of these local businesses and their respective countries indicates that the period of their dependence on external capitalism was only temporary. On premisses that could only be gen­ erated from Marxist economic determinism, Nyerere argued that

"foreign domination is permanent, not temporary.” The economic destinies of these junior companies, he explains, are determined by enterprise conflicts which originate outside their own borders. On that basis he predicts, "The small ones will remain small or be bought out!" This gloomy picture of capitalism is happily contra­ dicted by the reality of the success of all the companies mentioned above, as well as similar ones that have flourished in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana for the last 30 years or more as independent companies.* 157

Nyerere insisted that his brand of African Socialism, aimed at achieving development through traditional methods and institutions of self-reliance (Ujamaa), repudiated class antagonisms and eschewed violence. Yet, like the rest of African Socialists, he was hopeful that once he made the so-called rational choice for socialism, the Soviets would support his country with &dl the financial and technological

needs for the rapid development of their countries. It is now evi­ dent that, apart from military aid, the Soviet Union has made no sig­

nificant contribution to any developing nation in Africa. In the w ords, of Ali M azrui,

The socialist superpower is the champion of the liberal cause of freedom and self-determination with minimum participation in the more socialist mission of global economic redistribution.^®

Now at last, thanks to gla sn o st, it is evident that even if the Soviets

had the moral will to assist Third World Socialist countries, it simply could not afford it."

After 30 years of experimentation with African Socialism, Tan­

zania—despite all the external aid, especially from the Scandinavian

countries—is not only poor and overdependent, but more so than

most African countries. Blaming it all on corruption, Nyerere, now

Chairman of the Revolutionary Party, the sole political party in the

country, admits corruption in Tanzania is now "serious" and

"rampant." "We are now like the rest" of Africa." 158

Nyerere and his party officials have not only expressed regret for their affair with socialism, they have indeed—like Ghana, Nigeria,

Botswana, and Kenya, etc.—opened up for the ongoing Structural

Adjustment Programs (SAP) and conformed to the conditionalities of the I.M.F. and the World Bank, including privatization and liberaliza­ tion. While it would be a hasty conclusion to claim that Tanzania and the countries in a similar mode of transformation in Africa have now opted for democracy or capitalism like their counterparts in Eastern

Europe, it is undeniable that they have abandoned the socialist path for its totalitarianism and economic dead ends. Since the objective of this chapter is to find the ideology that best maximizes our chances of transcending the current economic crises, as well as our chances of attaining economic independence, it goes without saying that the time has come for a new rational choice to be made in place of

African Socialism, which has yet to establish a single show case in

A frica.

The New Rational Choice

If the only viable ideologies for this contest were simply capi­ talism and cocialism, it could be said that, in accordance with the logic of disjunctive syllogism, there is no need for further argument since the foregoing argument eliminates socialism or African Socialism in favor of capitalism. That is, however, an over simplification of the ideological debate. For instance, not all socialists in Africa believe in

African Socialism. Most of the radicals believe that African Socialism is an impossible proposition because socialism is scientific and, hence. 159

universal. Just as there can be no Senegalese mathematics, there can be no Senegalese socialism. One must either accept scientific so­ cialism as a universal ideology or reject it. Any attempt to modify it for the African context is condemned as a betrayal of the ideology and a ploy for capitalism.

African intellectuals sympathetic to capitalism, on the other

hand, would reject the grim picture of capitalism painted by either

African Socialists or the Scientific Socialists. In fact, in view of the negative connotations associated with capitalism in Africa, the sym­ pathizers of this ideology prefer to refer to their ideology as Demo­ cracy or Liberal Democracy to distinguish it from other kinds of democracies. Thus, instead of a conflict between socialism and capi­ talism, Professor K.A. Busia (an ex-Oxford don and the second Presi­ dent of Ghana), could only see a conflict between Marxist-Leninist

Democracy and Liberal Democracy.

The implication of these differentiations for our argument is that, unlike Nyerere, we need to argue in two stages to arrive at the new rational choice. At the first stage we need to make a choice between Scientific Socialism and Liberal Democracy, used in Africa as the more respectable name for capitalism. At the second stage, we need to identify and distinguish the four different economic arrange­ ments associated with Liberal Democracy and make a choice. Thus, the alternative ideologies under consideration for the new rational choice are: (a) Scientific Socialism; (b) Liberal Democratic Laissez

Faire Capitalism; (c) Liberal Democratic Production-Oriented Capital- 160 ism; (d) Liberal Democratic Welfare Capitalism; and (e) Liberal Demo­ cratic Development Capitalism. In evaluating these ideologies, I hope to show that the most utility maximizing and prudent, with respect to our goals of development, is my proposed ideology: Liberal Demo­ cratic Development Capitalism.

Step 1: Scientific Socialism or Liberal Democracy?

According to the Journal of African Marxists, Scientific Social­ ism, as used by African progressives, is "a final stage of social development, i.e., not a first stage of communism, as understood in the Marxist-Leninist sense." It is their belief that all other so­ cialisms such as African Socialism, negritude, humanism, etc., have fallen into decrepitude with the exception of "the one and only so­ cialism, i.e.. Scientific Socialism.

Originally Marx and Engels coined this term to distinguish their brand of socialism from other socialisms in Europe during the 19th century, which they rejected as unscientific and utopian. In insist­ ing on this terminology, it is the intention of the African progres­ sives, therefore, to recapture and maintain this original sense of socialism prior to its "corruption" by Stalinism, Brezhnev’s central­ ism, and similar Soviet ideologies which they consider to be diver­ sionary. However, they like to include Leninism as a component of

Scientific Socialism in view of the need to extend Marxist analysis to international capitalism and imperialism.

An ideology, as defined above, is not an end in itself. It is an instrument for achieving certain social goals. The first test of an 161 ideology must, therefore, be how far it is relevant to the social goals of the society it is supposed to serve. This must explain why Marx said an ideology should reflect its socioeconomic milieu. On this, lib­ erals can agree. The liberal philosopher, Edmund Burk, similarly once said, "Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide fo r hum an wants.If he were addressing the relevance of ideolo­ gies, he might have well said, "Ideology is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants."

The question must now be put: Is Scientific Socialism the best ideology for maximizing our chances for economic recovery and eco­ nomic independence? The economic reality in Africa today is that all attempts at self-reliance and experiments with the socialist mode of development have failed, and that most African countries are experi­ menting with a new economic deal sponsored by the IMF and the

World Bank. It is known as the Structural Adjustment Program, and popularly called SAP. Countries that apply for this form of assistance are given the following set of conditions to satisfy before they are assisted:

1. Reducing the role of the state in African economies to insure

better economic management.

2. Establishing incentive prices.

3. Freeing up prices from government control.

4. Reducing the size of public government.

5. Privatizing government agencies.

6. Liberalization of trade and exchange controls and revisions. 162

7. Encouragement of private investment.

Most African countries that have accepted this offer—such as

Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, and Guinea Biseau—have achieved a significant measure of economic recovery and growth.*® The his­ tory of capitalist patterns of growth in Africa, however, shows that the recipient countries tend to become overdependent on the donor countries and institutions not only economically, but also politically, culturally, and in other respects. In view of this fear of overdepen­ dence, the Scientific Socialists are strongly opposed to the SAP and similar programs in Africa. Referring to the IMF conditionalities for the SAP and similar ones related to external debt problems. Professor

Bade Onimode told the African Marxist Conference meeting in Accra:

These in effect mean recourse to massive deflation­ ary policies with the huge retrenchment of work­ ers, the freezing of wages, higher prices of welfare services etc. In the process, the IMF is just insisting on two main things. One, the entrench­ ment of capitalist relations of production in various African countries. This is really what is meant by deregulating the economy for the operation of so- called free market forces. These are bourgeois- capitalist forces that they are insisting upon, and of course their insistence on the opening of the economy is nothing but saying that we should wel­ come multinationals to come and take over our countries."

So a second aspect of this is the tighter grip that the Western world wants to exercise on African countries, within the framework of recolonization of the African continent. I think the IMF-World Bank offensive should be seen as that." 163

Since the IMF and the World Bank are United Nations institutions

established for the purpose of assisting poor countries in ter alia,

they are supposed to be ideologically neutral. Ideally, then, they

would not deliberately trap African countries into capitalist domina­

tion. According to Onimode,

They are nothing like that. Fundamentally these are imperialist and ideological institutions and if you read IMF publications you will have no illu­ sions at all about the ideological commitment of the IMF to the entrenchment of capitalism.

It is not clear why Onimode worries about the commitment of these institutions to the entrenchment of capitalism. Onimode cannot pretend not to know that these institutions are financed by private and corporate investors in the West. Hence, their survival depends on the entrenchment of capitalism. If capitalism collapses, of course, these institutions will also collapse, so why should they be expected to do otherwise? This latter part of Onimode’s quotation reveals his bias against the capitalist system and they provide a key to analyz­ ing the preceding quotes.

The similarity between his apprehension and suspicion of the capitalist system and that of Nyerere can hardly be missed. They both tend to exaggerate the economic and political influence capitalist institutions could have on African countries. While no one can deny the direct or indirect influence of multinationals in domestic affairs, there is no evidence to support Onimode’s allegation that, "Their in­ sistence upon the opening of the economy is nothing but saying that 164 we should welcome multinationals to come and take over our coun­ tries." Not only does this exaggeration reveal his bias against capi­ talism, it also leads him to commit the hasty conclusion fallacy and to be susceptible to an irrational fear of capitalism. On the basis of these exaggerated fears of capitalism common among many African

Marxists, Onimode makes the following recommendation: African countries should not adopt the austerity measures recommended by the IMF and the World Bank because it is important to recognize that

"they are part of the problem; therefore they cannot be the solution.

At best, they can give us only temporary respite."

If we refuse this aid package because of its harsh conditions how else can we achieve our developmental goals? Is refusal in our rational self-interest? Given the collapse of the Soviet economy and our demonstrated failure to build self-sustaining economies, is not accepting this assistance our best attempt at disaster-avoidance?

Onimode’s response is this.

I think that in spite of everything that has hap­ pened, we have very good reasons to be optimistic that Africa will not come under the crunch. First, from a purely historical point of view, history has not yet recorded any civilization or continent that just suddenly collapsed under the sheer weight of the kind of crisis that Africa is going through.... That is not to say that the prospects are not des­ perate and gloomy: they are. But I think that we still have sufficient repository of imagination, and of course also time, that could be mobilized with some luck to pull us out of the crisis.^® 165

Convinced that the capitalist model of development is responsi­ ble for the crises, and operating on the assumption that as part of the cause capitalism cannot be the solution, he recommends that we choose an alternative model of development. This model must be one that attempts to match the resources of the majority of the people with their legitimate demands or basic needs. This, he believes, will be in the framework of increasing national and collective self-reliance within the African region. Adopting this model of development, he believes, imposes an ideological imperative: to choose Scientific So­ cialism and to reject all forms of diversionary African socialisms,

Arab socialisms, humanism, and, of course, neo-colonial capitalism.

In responding to these recommendations, it must first be pointed out that if X is partially or fully responsible for the existence of problem Y, it does not necessarily follow that X cannot help solve problem Y. If this were true, it would imply that if a surgeon creates a surgical problem on a patient during surgery, he cannot remove or cure that problem. But that is, of course, empiri­ cally false. Many surgeons who have caused surgical problems have performed further surgeries on their patients and have succeeded in correcting them. Granted that these financial institutions have ex­ ploited African countries in the past through their loans and invest­ ments, etc., why is it not possible for them with our cooperation to study the conditions better and modify their modus operandi to in­ sure that subsequent loans and investments go to the mutual benefit of both donor and recipient? 166

Second, the historical argument presented by Onimode as a ba­ sis for optimism in the face of Africa’s crises deserves some atten­ tion. It is an argument from analogy; therefore, it cannot work unless it is based on sufficient relevant similarities or dissimilarities that confirm, rather than disconfirm, the conclusion. It is not clear on what basis he is making this argument. Of course, many civiliza­ tions have not collapsed as a result of economic crises, but others have, including the Greco-Roman empires and African empires such as

Ghana, Mali, or Sokoto owing to economic, political, or military rea­ sons.

In either case, the kind of interdependence that exists in the world today has never existed in history before. Hence, it is less likely that any region or civilization today can survive and develop independent of any external assistance. There is no great civiliza­ tion, past or present, that has not benfitted from some input, espe­ cially technological and economic, from another culture. For instance, the Europeans have influenced Asian cultures through their technol­ ogy, but so have Asians influenced European cultures as evidenced

by the letter’s dependence on gun powder and the drinking of tea.

Not even the Soviets nor Japananese can boast of development with­

out Western assistance. For the Soviets depended as much on British

technology as Japan depended on American technology for their own advancement. Unless the progressives want to return Africa to its

pre-colonial developmental stages, they cannot fail to maintain or

extend its infrastructure, modern forms of transportation and commu- 167 nication, as well as health and education. How are we going to be able to achieve all these modern facilities without external support?

There is no doubt that most Africans will survive such a self- deprivation. But, of course, survival is not enough for development.

To develop we must not only survive; we also need the kind of nu­ trition and certain minimal conditions of living that will equip us with the intellectual capacities for problem-solving. Otherwise, we will have to depend on others to solve our intellectual, scientific, and technical problems for us.

Working within Aristotle's teleological paradigm regarding the achievement of human eudamonia, Abraham Maslow (the famous Ameri­ can philosophical psychologist) has argued that in order for a person to achieve self-actualization, non-material needs such as a sense of security, belongingness, self-esteem, and freedom to develop one's own capacities are as basic as the need for food, shelter, and cloth­ ing.*® If our African youth manage to survive under such harsh living conditions, it must be recognized that they and the whole con­ tinent will pay a high price for that. Part of that price will be that they cannot achieve all the necessary capacities, especially the high- level cognitive capacities to lead their generation in solving their scientific, technological, political, and other intellectual problems without excessive dependence on others.

Also, while there is no good reason to accept Feuerbach's the­ sis that we are what we eat, there is equally no good reason to deny that what we eat or don't eat helps to make us what we are. Nutri­ 168 tionists and other food scientists have long discovered that without protein and other food nutrients, for instance, children are likely to be mentally retarded. If the objective of the African Marxists in counselling the rejection of the capitalist offer is to avoid depen­ dence, they must realize from the foregoing that they are risking a worse form of dependence by rejecting it.

Another price to be paid for rejecting this foreign assistance, not withstanding its conditions, is that we shall remain the least de­ veloped of all cultures even if we limit the term to its minimal defi­ nition of technological advancement. For, since meeting basic human needs is essential for promoting self-actualization, one culture is better than another insofar as it is better at meeting the basic needs of its people. We cannot hide behind the facade of cultural relativity or cultural incommensurability to avoid this conclusion. This is be­ cause the argument utilizes a cross-cultural standard of evaluation; viz how far each culture is able to meet the basic needs of its people and, thus, maximize their chances at self-actualization.

Part of the grounds of Onimode’s optimism about Africa not coming under the crunch was that time is on our side and that, with some luck, we could pull ourselves out of the crisis with sufficient repository of imagination. Either Onimode is not aware of the thou­ sands of people who die of starvation, malnutrition, and related diseases each day in Africa or he doesn’t care about the well-being of the masses. In either case, he is not qualified to speak for the

African masses, since he either lacks the head or the heart for such 169 a grave responsibility. His lack of compassion for the suffering masses is further underlined by his willingness to count on "luck" to save them from the pain of malnutrition, hunger, and slow painful death.

It is also ironic to notice that Onimode, while maintaining that his brand of socialism is scientific, is counting on luck to save the continent for the crises. Whatever is meant by Scientific Socialism, it certainly cannot be scientific if it can do no better than depend pri­ marily on luck instead of rational strategies for combating economic c rise s.

Our African Scientific Socialists would like us to believe that the failure of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can­ not be taken as an indication that socialism in Africa has failed or is likely to fail too. Their argument is that the failure of the Soviet system is not the failure of Marxism, but of Stalinism, since the Sovi­ ets deviated from classical Marxism in favor of Stalinism after the death of Lenin in 1924. If one begins to reflect on Soviet history, however, it soon becomes evident that it was the failure of Marxist-

Leninism that led to the adoption of Stalinism, and that without that ideological adjustment the system would have collapsed long before the Second World War.

One of the inherent weaknesses of socialism is, of course, the lack of individual economic incentive for productivity. Consequently, maximizing productivity in both qualitative and quantitative measures have always been a chronic problem in these countries. When this 170 led to economic crises in the 1930s, Stalin imposed forced labor to maximize productivity.

Throughout the World Wars and in the heat of the Cold War, continuing the policy was possible and morally tolerable as a wartime contingency plan. However, as the World Wars ended and the Cold

War began to lose its bite in the mid 80s, it became increasingly evi­ dent that the people would no longer tolerate forced labor and re­ lated loss of individual liberties. Hence, the ongoing Gorbechev

Revolution, which began in 1985, was not an accident, but the result of the inherent weaknesses of classical Marxism.*^ Consequently, it is to be expected, on Hume’s principle of 'same cause same effect,’ socialists everywhere who fail to make the necessary political and economic adjustments are either doomed or likely to fail like their

Soviet counterparts.

The Scientific Socialists are once again recommending self-re­ liance instead of external aid. They are entitled to their opinions, but since such recommendations could be adopted as national policies, they owe the rest of us some convincing evidence that it will not lead the masses into unnecessary suffering and stagnation, and that it is better than all of its alternatives. (We must worry about the masses rather than the elites who propound their ideologies because, when it comes to crises, they as privileged members of the society hardly feel the pain of hunger and deprivation.)

Historically, no Marxist country has made any significant so­ cioeconomic advancement without capitalist structural adjustments. 171

Even die-hard Marxist regimes in Mozambique, Kampuchea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union are creating openings for Western capitalism.

So they cannot provide any historical evidence to convince us that this will be the case in Africa. In case they are counting on the So­ viets to assist them in achieving their self-reliance, they must be disappointed to learn that in view of her own economic crises, Gor­ bechev, in response to public outcry, has decreed that aid to the developing nations of Africa and Latin America should be slashed with immediate effect.**

Perhaps the boldest attempt by a contemporary African ruler to conduct a Scientific Socialist revolution for and through self-reliance was that by the neo-Nkrumaist, Fit Lt. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, with the advice of some of the best socialist brains on the continent—the

Tsikata family. Notwithstanding all the rhetoric and the hours of free or forced communal labor by the masses, the Rawlings Marxist-

Leninist revolution plunged the country into its worst famine period in 1983. The nation's infrastructure and industries did not just go into a state of disrepair, but they literally began to decay. Forced by the harsh socioeconomic realities in the country, Rawlings began to rethink his Marxist dogma and to become a pragmatist. Eventu­ ally, he embraced the SAP which he, like other African socialists, had earlier denounced as a ploy for neocolonialism. After six years of experimentation with the capitalist SAP, Ghana’s economy is now on the road to recovery and Rawlings is proud to be the leader of the new Ghana, dubbed by the IMF and the World Bank as "the show 172

piece of West Africa." My own observations during my short visit in

March, 1990, confirms the following report by The West Africa maga­

zine: "In virtually all economic and social sectors programmes of re­

habilitation o r reform have been u n d e r way."*®

Other countries which have achieved some significant measures

of economic recovery and growth are Nigeria, Kenya, and Botswana.**

AAF-SAP is, by no means, the panacea for Africa’s multifaceted prob­

lems, but at least it is better than nothing as long as it can help us avoid the disaster associated with so-called delinking and self- reliance ideologies. All the same, one cannot condemn such criticisms outright as the Babaginda administration tried to do in Nigeria. He tried not only to condemn, but also to suppress, the contrary opinions of the Scientific Socialists and others skeptical of SAP by a decree that ordered detention without trial.*®

One of the contributions that African philosophers could make in this kind of disputation is to consider the exchange as a dialecti­ cal tension between the thesis of pro-SAP and the antithesis of anti-

SAP, and to find a synthesis between the two extremes. Barbara W.

Tuchman has reminded the world, in her book The March of Folly:

From Troy to Vietnam,*® traced how from the Greek era until now policymakers have plunged people, societies, and nations into untold suffering, misery, pestilence, and wars because of their self-impris­ onment in the "we-have-no-alternative" syndrome.

Fortunately, in the case of the SAP controversy this black and white fallacy was averted. When the program was subjected to criti- 173

cal analysis based on research, it was found that, notwithstanding

the signs of economic recovery,

1. SAP has produced little enduring poverty allevi­ ation and certain of its policies have worked against the poor (U.S. Congress study).

2. Improvements in several countries have not been sustained. Budget deficits have been in­ creasing.... Investment/GDP and debt/export ratios have generally worsened during the decade (World Bank).

3. Unless SAP programs are closely related to the wider objectives of bridging the gap between the rich and the poor, there is the danger that the process will have negative impact on growth, living standards, employment, social development, and po­ litical stability (The Abuja Statement).

4. The Programs are incomplete because they are often implemented as if fiscal trade and price balances are ends in themselves, and are virtually complete set means to production increases. Human condition imbalances as related to employment, in­ comes, nutrition, health and education, do not re­ ceive equal priority... (The Khartoum Declaration).

In response to these constructive criticisms, instead of the outright rejection by the Scientific Socialists, an alternative framework has

been unanimously endorsed by the Economic Commission of Africa

(EGA). As the Secretary General of EGA and the Under-Secretary-

General of the UN put it, "It is now increasingly recognized that SAP is Africa’s launching pad into the 1990s."*’

This economic restructuring is undoubtedly Africa’s equivalent of perestroika. But, obviously, just as one cannot keep new wine in an old wine bag, we cannot hope to advance our economic recovery 174 without a corresponding political restructuring or glaanost. In o th e r words, given our needs for economic recovery and economic indepen­ dence and the opportunities for achieving these through the AAF-SAP programs, which is the best political ideology to maximize our chances of success?

Given Scientific Socialism and Liberal Democratic Capitalism, it is not hard to see why it is in our best rational interest to prefer

Liberal Democratic Capitalism to Scientific Socialism. As shown above.

Scientific Socialists are opposed to any kind of assistance from the

West, especially if it has economic and political conditions attached to it. Instead they prefer delinking Africa from the West in favor of the gloomy path of self-reliance, which has been shown time and again to be not only hopeless, but also irresponsible in view of the human suffering and the long-term consequences for future genera­ tions in achieving self-realization and development. Notwithstanding the stiff IMF-World Bank conditionalities, we have an opportunity to break the cycle of poverty and overdependence with these adjust­ ment programs, especially with the advent of the African Alternative

Framework (AAF).

While some of the conditions will have imposed austerity mea­ sures on our people, most of them are actually necessary for insur­ ing that the masses become participants in this recovery program, rather than tools or mere benefactors. Thus, insisting on Scientific

Socialism in Africa now, in view of the failure of the Marxist experi­ ment in the Soviet Bloc and the decree by Gorbechev slashing all 175 forms of aid to the Third World, is worse than foolhardy. It will be the most inhumane and irresponsible decision African leaders could make for their people.

Calling upon African leaders to liberalize their economy and to democratize their political institutions is not a call for them to jump unto the band wagon, as it might appear, but a call on them to wake up to reality. Part of this reality is that cultures which have ac­ cepted philosophical challenges such as "Man know thy self" have become not only aware of themselves and their relation to the rest of nature, but have studied nature so well that they are able to control a significant part of nature through science and technology. This knowledge has been brought to a peak through formal educational systems and the technology of communication. Such a degree of qualitative and quantitative knowledge and information, of course, make it impossible for authoritarian societies or empires to maintain the centralized power on which they depend. The impossibility is explained by the fact that, in order to maintain centralized power, they need to keep the masses ignorant which is hardly possible with the spread of 20th century education, mass communication, the politi­ cal consciousness, and self-consciousness it brings.

No matter what the dogmatic Marxist would say, there is no denying that Africa needs not only economic liberalization but also democratization. Although conceptually distinct, in practice the two are mutually interdependent: Just as in practice you cannot have 176 peace without justice and you cannot have justice without peace, one cannot have liberalization without democratization.

Let us imagine we are citizens in an arbitrary country, C, par­ ticipating in this AAF-SAP. First, we must recognize that we cannot sustain the economic recovery programs unless we maximize produc­ tivity. This, however, requires that, in accordance with the psycho­ logical principles of predominant egoism and of stimulus and response relations, the farmers, workers, and business entrepreneurs among us be given price and other economic incentives to insure both quality and quantity in productivity. Since money is of little or no intrinsic value to the indidvidual unless he also has the right or the freedom to spend it as he sees fit, the government has a prima facie obliga­ tion to respect and to protect the freedom of the individual to pursue his interests in education, travel, standards of living, recre­ ation, religion, and association with others, etc.

Now suppose our government in country C has, in the past, acted like a rent collector (i.e., or middle man between local farmers, producers, and overseas markets) with a huge bureaucracy and wel­ fare programs, then it would be realized that without the government cutting back on expenditures and the bureaucracies, etc., it would be virtually impossible to provide such price-incentives for productivity.

It is also necessary to insure that individual prima facie rights to property and free trade in C are guaranteed, otherwise neither the individuals nor businesses would have the confidence to save their monies or to invest them in the banks. This would be even more ur­ 177 gent if we need to attract foreign companies to invest in our country

C. To insure that governments do not confiscate, nationalize, or mis­ appropriate such private savings and investments, it is, of course, necessary to establish and maintain democratic institutions of justice where the rule of law, rather than the will of any individual or group of persons, is supreme. This is necessary both for stability and credibility, especially from the point of view of external in­ vestors and other agents of development.

Further to insure that the laws of the State and the business, etc., are fair for all, we have to insure that the people who make the laws are not the same as those who execute them, and that the per­ sons who insure the interpretation and compliance with the laws are distinct and separate from those with the other two functions. Lord

Acton would remind us of the risk in giving all these powers to any one individual or group of persons without checks and balance. In his own words, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts abso­ lutely." Since human beings are not totally altruistic, it must not be assumed that they will always work patriotically towards the common goal rather than their narrow self-interests. So it is also necessary that we institute penal systems, including fines and imprisonment for crimes against the state. To maximize the chances that each citizen, including officials, will not take undue advantage of others or their positions, it would be necessary to insure that individuals and the press have the right to criticize, to sue each other and to recall, im­ peach, or vote out all government officials, including the head of 178 state, out of power as we find necessary. This level of political par­ ticipation does not only legitimize the political authority and preclude both anarchy and dictatorship, it also facilitates the economic and so­ cial development of the citizenry in C.

One could choose any name for this set of necessary conditions for the overall development of our hypotheical country C. But it just so happens that in the English language it is called Democracy or Liberal Democracy to distinguish it from other social arrangements rightly or wrongly called democracy. And it also happens to be the case that historically it has been tried and improved upon through open debates and criticisms, lessons from unsuccessful applications, and other error elimination processes in the West more than any other part of the world. Hence, the choice of Democracy for African countries participating in the AAF-SAP must be seen as a rational choice based on an objective assessment of our needs v is a vis the alternative ideologies known to us.

That Western democracy especially—the American model—has the characteristics depicted in our imaginary African country C must be evident to every student of social and political philosophy. To understand the Western ideal of democracy one must go back to its philosophical roots in the libertarians, especially John Stuart Mill, and the principle of liberty. According to this principle, "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self­ protection." Mill elaborates upon this saying the only purpose for 179 which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civi­ lized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient.

The influence of John Locke is also indelible on the American

Constitution and similar ones. Individual rights are guaranteed and, in particular, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, which, of course, includes the right to the pursuit of the means of happiness, including private work, private property, or wealth. To insure that the citizens in a sovereign state are not subjected to the tyrannical rule of a dictator. Mill insists on the right of individuals not only to criticize and to vote to change their leaders when neces­ sary, but also the right to rebel against such an abusive govern­ ment. The American Constitution also makes for the separation of the powers/functions of state and that insures maximum checks and bal­ ances within the system, thus making it next to impossible for any one person, no matter how well-intentioned, to become a dictator.

The recent heated debates on whether or not the U.S. should go to war with Iraq, following Iraq’s unjustifiable annexation of

Kuwait and open threat to Saudi Arabia, present a clear illustration of how the American democratic system works to preclude dictators.

As a spectator from a Third World country under military dictator­ ship, where freedom of speech is no more than a trap for hunting down suspected counter-revolutionaries, I could not help admiring the degree of freedom individuals have in expressing their views for or against the government’s proposals. At both the Senate and the 180

Congressional levels, individual senators and representatives had the right and the opportunity to argue and to vote for or against the proposal independent of their party affiliation. These recent events have convinced me of what Carl Cohen says of democracy:

...democracy is a process, a kind of governing. It is not socialism, capitalism, or any other economic system. It is not to be identified with the forms or institutions of any country—the United States, or Great Britain, or any other country—although such countries do try to realize democracy. It is not just majority rule, or the competition for lead­ ership, or protection of minority rights, or any of those things normally associated with it. Democ­ racy is the name for a way of conducting our com­ mon business. It is that way in whcih the busi­ ness is conducted according to the people’s wishes. No one can know in advance what the people of any community will wish. It follows that democ­ racy, in itself, entails no particular conclusions in resolving controversy. It is not itself a solution to any problem, but an instrument with which solutions to many problems may be sought.... It is a method by which a community’s objectives are established and advanced.*®

Even though the Americans will be the first to admit that their system is not perfect—especially regarding the redistribution of wealth—there is no question that it holds a lot of valuable lessons for us in our attempts to secure political stability in Africa. For in­ stance, notwithstanding the numerous sociopolitical, economic, and military tensions, the system has survived for 200 years without a single military coup, while relatively young African countries such as

Ghana and Nigeria have experienced no more than seven military up­ heavals each in the name of coups or revolutions. 181

The unusual longevity here, as in other Western governments since the rejection of the divine right of kings theory and the adop­ tion of the democratic charter, cannot be explained in terms of luck or the docility of the citizens, but only in terms of the inherent strengths of the system—such as its resilience and flexibility to changing socioeconomic and political circumstances. These inner qualities are summed up briefly by John Dewey, when he says,

"Democracy is a method." It is not a set of dogmas to be believed and applied without critical discussion and debates. It is a method of conducting the business of the state in such a way that the inter­ ests of both the majority and the minority are catered to. It is a way of insuring that every citizen participates in self-government di­ rectly or indirectly. This explains why, of all the liberties associated with democracy, the most important is the freedom of expression.

The libertarian philosophers would not compromise on this right for anything. Thus, John Milton once said, "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties." For Aristotle and the Greeks, in general, meaningful par­ ticipation in political decision processes is a requirement for the ful­ fillment of human nature, for only those who do are fully free and can realize their human potential. Similarly, the Akan man who is left out of a discussion in which he is entitled to participate feels that his humanity is threatened, so the first question he would ask those who met without him is: "Mennye nipa?"—meaning, "Am I not a person?" 182

Presumably it was in line with this tradition, which sees democracy as intrinsically related to human nature, that Abraham

Lincoln characterized democracy as "a government of the people by the people and for the people." Lincoln's definition is not only aesthetically beautiful, it is also a source of three distinct criteria for distinguishing genuine democratic institutions from their many imitators. First, "by the people" represents the criteria by which we can judge whether or not a political system is democratic. This judgment is made by examining the institutions and procedures of government to see if they express the actual will of the people under the government's rule; for example, whether those subject to the system can, in due season, willingly vote their rulers out of office.

Second, "for the people" represents the interpretation that the claim that some regime is democratic is the claim that the rulers are, in fact, acting effectively in the interest of the people. Thus, a regime cannot claim to be democratic if it spends most of the country's wealth in insulating itself from military coups or counter-coups or for building basilica's, etc., while many citizens remain jobless and homeless. Finally, "of the people" represents the interpretation that, to be truly democratic, the system must insure that opportunities for meaningful political participation and diplomatic service are available to all citizens, and that persons of every kind of social background have equal access to such offices through education.**

When these criteria are applied to the so-called democracies or processes of democratization in Africa, it will be found that most of 183 them are not genuine. For example, Ghana’s head of state holds that

"Democracy does not mean a mere paper guarantee of abstract liber­ ties, but above all food, clothing, shelter, and access to the basic amenities without which life is not worth living.Another a sp e c t of his conception of democracy is participation. He declared, in a public speech in 1985, that participation is a fundamental tenet of the revolution, and that it is viewed as the right and obligation of every citizen to be involved in the making of decisions, in the implementa­ tion of decisions, and in the monitoring of the progress of their im­ plementation. Because of these welfare propositions and participation propositions, Rawlings refers to his revolution, the June 4th Revolu­ tion, as dedicated to "true democracy"®^ for Ghana.®*

Among the socialist regimes and one-party states in Africa this conception of democracy is common. So since, at the moment, they constitute the vast majority of governments on the continent, it can­ not be denied that this is the dominant conception of democracy in

Africa. Declared or undeclared, this conception of democracy is in­ tended to be a substitute for parliamentary democracy, requiring voting rights and multi-party systems, which is decried as a source of divisive politics responsible for the disunity and instability in

A frican politics.®®

Whatever the merits of these so called "true democracies," they do not measure up to the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a political system to be democratic as defined above within the humanitarian tradition. For example, in Rawling’s type of democracy. 184 it cannot be said that it is a government by the people inasmuch as the rulers were not elected or chosen by the people. Further, they have no control over their removal or stay in power.

In general, no regime, military or civilian, that comes to power as a result of a military coup or other forms of military intervention other than the ballot box can claim to satisfy this first condition for being democratic. The only exception may be governments formed as a result of a popular insurrection or revolution, but then to be le­ gitimate a free referendum must be held to obtain the proper man­ date to rule.

The socialist revolutionaries, such as Rawlings, often boast of increasing political participation in decision-making and national de­ velopment. Such forms of participation are, however, necessary, but not sufficient for democracy unless the people also have the power to freely decide who their leaders should or should not be, as well as what kinds of laws are just or unjust through their representative assemblies or legislatures. By their nature, military regimes and one-party states cannot satisfy these conditions. You cannot call any decision free when it is made in an environment dominated by the power of the military or a single party regime, for there is always the genuine fear that those in power will not tolerate contrary opin­ ions. Hence, military and one-party regimes—no matter how much they preach the doctrine of participation and good works for the needy—cannot qualify as democratic institutions. By the Greek and

Akan standards requiring meaningful political participation as a con­ 185 dition for determining full human self-realization, the so called "true democracies" dehumanize rather than liberate people.

As noted earlier, democracy is a method, or an instrument, for managing business of the state. Ex hypothesi, democracy is not just an end in itself. Its values must, therefore, be not only on the in­ trinsic criterion, but also on the extrinsic criterion, which means be­ ing judged on utilitarian grounds. In particular, we must ask what kind of contribution it could make to the AAF-SAP programs under­ way for our economic recovery and economic independence. First, judging from the American and other Western models, it is undeniable that they insure both the political stability and national security needed for private investments, international trade, and businesses.

A socialist regime, military or civilian, cannot create such a congenial atmosphere for the economy. In addition to the safety of their lives, the investors and their representatives, based on the record of such regimes on the continent, cannot be sure whether or not their pri­ vate investments and businesses, etc., are going to be nationalized or confiscated.

Also since bribery and corruption are so rampant in Africa— the commonest reason or excuse for all the military interventions so far—any ideology we choose must insure that such practices are brought to the minimum. Admittedly, bribery and corruption occur under both democratic or socialist governments. However, since the leaders of government are often involved in such scandals, the pro­ secution of suspects becomes problematic, especially under one-party 186 regimes and military dictatorships. But this is less problematic in a democracy where the rule of law is supreme and no one is above the law. Hence, democracy is more conducive to our economic recovery and advancement than socialist regimes in military or one-party sta te s.

The need for the democratic transition to buttress economic re­ structuring was the theme of the February, 1990, Arusha Conference on Africa’s Recovery Program organized by the UN Economic Commis­ sion for Africa (ECA) and various non-governmental Organizations

(NGOs). The charter adopted by these organizations and 500 repre­ sentatives of African grassroots organizations maintained that, in order to overcome the ongoing crises, "there must be an opening up of political processes to accommodate freedom of opinion, and tolerate differences.

If any African leader is genuinely interested in the well being of the continent and its people in both the short run and the long run, then given all these characteristics of democracy in relation to socialism, scientific or African, his rational choice cannot be socialism but Liberal Democracy. The appeal the U.N. Under-secretary made to

African heads of state at the International Conference on Popular

Participation in Tanzania last year (1990) makes the choice for demo­ cracy not only rational, but a moral imperative:

Africa needs fundamental change and transforma­ tion, not just adjustment. The change and trans­ formation required are not just narrow, economistic and mechanical ones. They are the broader and fundamental changes that will bring about, over 187

time, the new Africa of our vision where there is democracy and accountability not despotism, au­ thoritarianism and kleptocracy; and where the gov­ erned and their governments are moving hand-in- hand in the promotion of the common good, and where it is the will of the people rather than the wishes of one person or group of persons, however powerful, that prevails.

Referring to the democratic revolution sweeping through Eastern

Europe (before those in the Soviet Union and the efforts of Chinese students), he asked.

Will we Africans stand by and allow the wind of change to pass us by? Will we remain onlookers or will we join in the crusade in order to set in mo­ tion the badly needed process of change and transformation? We stood by during the period of the renaissance. We were even less than onlookers in the era of industrial and technological revolu­ tions. Now that the rebirth of democracy is taking place at a time when the last vestiges of colonial­ ism have disappeared from Africa, are we going to allow the continent to be out of the main stream? Let the African people decide. Let them face their h isto ric challenge.®®

Critics might charge that the argument of the U.N. Under-secretary is no more than a bandwagon fallacy calling on Africans to "get on board." That objection, however, cannot be sustained in view of the utilitarian argument he provides to justify the call. In particular, he emphasizes the point that democracy will provide a necessary com­ plement to the economic recovery programs so that we can achieve a genuine social transformation and not just an adjustment. Moreover, he emphasizes that if we fail to choose democracy we will pay a 188 price—the price of marginalization, which will not just be psychologi­ cal, but also political and economic.

Even if we choose democracy, we still have to contend with the choice of the economic aspect of the ideology necessary for pro­ pelling our development. Our commitment to AAF-SAP, of course, binds us to capitalism for now, but it does not bind us to any par­ ticular form of capitalism. Many of those who oppose all forms of capitalism, I suspect, have not taken the pains to take a close look at the system. If they did, they would discover that there are at least four varieties of capitalism, one of which makes it possible for us to operate within the system to maximize economic growth without maxi­ mizing dependence as a collateral damage. What are these forms of capitalism, and which of them is the bearer of Africa’s hope? That is what we have to find out in the second step of the rational choice.

Step 2: Choosing the Best Form of Capitalism

There are at least three varieties of capitalism that are histori­ cally observable: laissez faire capitalism, welfare capitalism, and pro­ duction-oriented capitalism. Combining these three varieties in a certain order, it is possible to create a fourth variety, which I will argue, is most suitable for Africa’s development with a few modifica­ tions. Because of this unique feature it will be called development capitalism. 189

1. Laissez Faire Capitalism

Simply put, laissez faire capitalism is the economic counterpart to political liberalism. It is the philosophy or practice of avoiding economic planning and government controls in economic affairs.®®

Historically, it was a doctrine that evolved as a reaction against mer­ cantilism and it found its classic formulation in Adam Smith's 18th century classic, The Wealth of Nationa (1776). At the national levels, it was dominant in the 19th century, but has been superceded by economic planning within individual countries.

Capitalism within the United States is often referred to as lais­ sez faire, or free market, economy. That, however, is an anomaly since, in reality, the U.S. economy is far from being unplanned. Any claim to the contrary will be contradicted by the economic develop­ ments that have taken place at least since the New Deal of President

Roosevelt, the Fair Deal of President Truman, and the introduction of various government interventions, such as the graduated tax system, social security, minimal wages legislation, unemployment compensation, and various welfare programs. While it is true that the Republican governments, especially under Presidents Reagan and Bush, have sought to reduce such interventions in preference for a more liber­ tarian approach to the economy, the changes are not significant enough to justify the claim that the U.S. economy is unplanned.

At the international level, however, laissez faire capitalism re­ mains the dominant ideology, especially in the transactions between the North and the South. Even while preaching laissez faire at home. 190

Reagan did and Bush continues to practice protectionism to a signifi­ cant degree, especially with Japanese investors. At the same time, they join the rest of the capitalist North in demanding free and open markets in the Third World where obviously the local companies, en­ trepreneurs, and governments are too fragile for competition with multinationals. An ideal observer would rather call for the protection of these weaker elements from the stronger ones, but in the meantime it is "realpolitik" and that must explain, in part, why as a general rule the rich gets richer and the poor gets poorer in the North-

South context.

In his "Lessons for the 1990s," the Secretary of the U.N. Eco­ nomic Commission for Africa lamented the economic consequences of this ideology for Africa.

It is tragic but nonetheless true that three decades after independence, Africa’s colonial eco­ nomic structure has remained intact with its nar­ row production base, with the predominance of commercial and traditional activities based mainly on imports and exports with domestic production playing a secondary role, with its excessive openness which renders it highly susceptible to external shocks....

Whatever the utilitarian value of this openness to the global economy, including the AAF-SAP, it certainly has not been in the ra­ tional self-interest of Africa. It is the ideology that makes possible the enormous capital flow from the poor countries to the rich ones.

Nigeria, for instance, despite all its enormous oil production and sale remains on Baker's list of the 15 most indebted countries in the 191

world. Capital flight from Nigeria totalled about $60 billion by 1980,

$130 billion by 1982, and $200 billion by 1987, while its GNP declined

from $91 billion in the early 80s, to $39 billion in 1987, and $28 bil­

lion in 1988. For similar reasons, the Ivory Coast, which is supposed

to be the model of capitalist development in Africa, remains on

Baker’s list as well.®’

Except for the brief period in the 1960s, when most African

countries led by Nkrumah, Toure, and Nyerere, etc., opted for social­

ist planning, most African countries have been practicing this laissez

faire political economy. Yet, at the beginning of the last decade of

the 20th century, the 47 countries of Sub-Sahara Africa, with its life

expectancy of 47 years for its 470 million people, has no more pur­

chasing power than Belgium, the smallest country of Europe, with a

population of only 10 million. In real terms, this means if it becomes

necessary for these countries to purchase patriot missiles or any

other essential commodity to protect their citizens, together the 47

Sub-Saharan countries can buy no more than Belgium can buy for

her 10 million people.

It is this kind of political economy that has created a bad

image for capitalism in Africa. Terms such as "neo-colonial states,"

"satellite states," and "dependencies" represent the indictment of our

people against this ideology, which is hardly practiced by any other countries or region of the world. If this is all that capitalism can offer Africans, then surely it cannot be the beat for us. Fortu­ nately, there are better options as shown below. 192

2. Welfare Capitalism

Welfare capitalism refers to the politico-economic ideology in which the government plays a key role in the protection and promo­ tion of the economic and social well-being of its citizens. Its philo­ sophical base includes the principles of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those who are unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life.38 It is a broad term that covers various forms of economic arrangements lying on the continuum between laissez faire and so­ cialism.

Thus, while the U.S political economy is better described as welfare than laissez faire in view of the interventionist policies adopted since the New Deed, it is far from being the paradigm of a welfare state. For a paradigm one must go to Western Europe, espe­ cially among the Scandinavian countries. Here, welfare provisions such as public education, health services, mass transportation, and housing far exceed what obtains in the U.S. system.. Unlike socialist countries, however, welfare states do not provide or guarantee em­ ployment and administration of consumer prices.

Most African states, as a result of some quasi-socialist planning in the 60s, do provide most of these services to their people, with the exception of employment. The state has consequently come to be regarded as a "big rich and gracious daddy" capable of, and usually willing to, supply all the needs of his children. As in most of the

European welfare states, the system is creating problems of depen­ 193 dence and is, consequently, affecting the national economies of the countries concerned with the exception of Switzerland. (I will explain this exception below.) Many of these European countries can afford to maintain the system with minimal adjustments because of their well established industries, multinational corporations, and accumulation of wealth gained from overseas trading. But since African nations, with the possible exception of Nigeria, have no comparable resources, the consequences of the welfare system are much more devastating. The best way out of this condition is obviously to provide more jobs and sufficient incentives for productive work. Without external assis­ tance, such as the AAF-SAP, however, any attempt to offer sufficient incentives for productive work and to minimize government spending in these respects will almost certainly lead to the collapse of their econom ies.

Welfarism is certainly among the main causes of the current crises. It is useful in countries such as the U.S. whose problem is not productivity, but income redistribution. So, until we have in­ creased productivity and established a significant industrial base and accumulated some national wealth, welfare capitalism is certainly not the best option for us. The time has come for our leaders to convey to our people the wisdom in Kennedy’s challenge to American citizens,

"Do not ask what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." 194

3. Production Oriented Capitalism

The term "productive capitalism" may not be found in any dic­ tionary of political economy or social and political philosophy; yet I think it is the best way of depicting the kind of capitalism that ex­ isted in the West prior to the period when it acquired its laissez faire and welfare characteristics. Of course, it has not lost this characteristic and it serves as a very useful terminology for distin­ guishing the kind of capitalism practiced in Africa from that prac­ ticed in the West.

Ali Mazrui makes this same distinction when he refers to the capitalism of the West as "mature capitalism," and that in Africa and other parts of the South as "immature/naive capitalism." The basic difference is that while the capitalism practiced in the West is essen­ tially productive, our capitalism is essentially distributive. The naivety in our system becomes obvious as soon as we realize that logically production precedes distribution, but we have the causal order reversed. Historically, Western productivity can be attributed to several variables, most of which are missing in our African context. These include the wintery conditions which enforced the creative drive in man to overcome or adapt to his environmental lim­ itations in order to survive. Some of the related skills achieved in the processes are the ability to predict and to control the natural elements, which were also reinforced by the theology of imago dei— man as steward of nature, as well as the Protestant ethic of voca- tionalism and thrift. Productivity and thrift led to capital accumula- 195 tion and that, in turn, led to further investment and new forms of productivity ... and on and on. And that simply is how capitalism spread globally.

Since these original ecological and religious conditions that generated and enhanced productivity are virtually non-existent in

Africa, the only alternative way for us to achieve it should have been through Western acculturation. However, the laws of supply and demand, division of labor, and competition, etc., did not make it prudent for the colonizers to impart to us the "secrets of their suc­ cess." So, instead of being taught to mass produce our own basic needs, we were made to produce the raw materials to be processed overseas and to wait for the finished goods. New consumer items were created in the course of the cultural interaction; but then the more we demanded these new goods and services, the more dependent we became. This is why Ali Mazrui once said that the problem with

African capitalism is not that it is too much, but that it is too little.

Putting it in quantitative terms makes it a little misleading, since the difference is essentially qualitative. Our kind of capitalism is inferior to that of the West inasmuch as ours is extremely less pro­ ductive and does not produce our basic needs because of the need for foreign exchange, etc. It is, as the economists put it, an import- substitution economy. The post-colonial measures taken to correct these lapses of the ecology and acculturation have also been under­ mined by socialist diversions, capital-labor distortions such as build­ ing capital intensive industries rather than labor-intensive ones, and 196 separating national manpower development from university education, etc.

If Africa is to flourish, not just survive this 20th century, and to take its rightful place among the comity of nations in the 21st century, then we cannot afford to adopt any form of capitalism un­ less it emphasizes productivity rather than open markets or welfare.

A capitalist system which excludes either openness or welfare will, on the other hand, not be in our best interest either since, as noted above, we can survive, but we cannot flourish by self-reliance.

Moreover, we cannot achieve stability if we fail to insure some mini­ mal level of economic distributive justice.

4. Development Capitalism

Development Capitalism is my own idea of an economic ideology derived from a careful analysis, reconstruction, and combination of the three capitalist economic ideologies discussed above in such a way that it minimizes their overall disadvantages while maximizing their overall utilities for the countries which adopt them. Given our top priorities in Africa now—economic recovery and economic independence—we must first and foremost adopt laissez faire capital­ ism. This will create the conditions of openness, liberalization, pri­ vatization, etc., that are presently required by the IMF and the

World Bank to proceed with the AAF-SAP programs which, as noted elsewhere, have been effective in promoting verifiable economic growth in some African countries for about six years now. Of course, laissez faire does not mean the governments of the develop­ 197 ing nations will completely leave everything to the market forces.

They will still play the minimal role of providing security and insur­ ing that contracts are fair and consistent with international conven­ tions and any reasonable national standards or guidelines, including cultural prescriptions in the countries concerned.

Next, as the economy begins to recover as a result of the in­ ternational interventions, the economic policy must shift from laissez faire capitalism to productive capitalism, as described above, to in­ sure sustained economic growth. People of the developing countries concerned must be aroused through formal and informal mass educa­ tion programs to a stage of critical consciousness whereby they will begin to reflect critically on their personal and environmental limita­ tions and the new possibilities open for them to escape their poverty and alienation. Economic and social incentives, such as bonuses and public recognition, should be provided all individuals and companies to maximize their productivity. These efforts should, of course, in­ volve all the appropriate modern methods, technology, and mecha­ nisms for large-scale production, storage, and distribution with as much foreign assistance as will be found consistent with the security and sovereignty of the countries concerned.

The critic concerned about our overdependence on external aid might ask how it can be eliminated or minimized in this plan. The answer is provided in the third component of this ideology as de­ scribed below. 198

The third stage must be the introduction of Welfare Capitalism at some advance stage of the country’s economic growth. This will be a critical stage for the development in accordance with my Pop- perian theory of development, which emphasizes productivity minus overdependence, corruption and social injustices, etc. Among other things, it will be necessary at this stage to take measures to mini­ mize national, corporate, and individual overdependence on external agents by implementing, as policy guidelines, the seven steps for minimizing external dependence. These as presented in Chapter Four are: (a) indigenization, (b) domestication, (c) diversification, (d) domestic austerity, (e) horizontal penetration, (f) vertical counter­ penetration, and (g) international moral unity and collaboration.

Another important component of this will be the traditional welfare role of insuring that economic dependents are minimal and that the worst off can live some minimally decent life with the sup­ port of the state and the community to which they belong. Further, the welfare programs must insure that everyone has a genuine op­ portunity to compete for all positions or offices of the state. The rational for these programs is that given the natural, physical, mental, and emotional, inequalities among people, not everyone can advantage of the new opportunities created in the countries for self- actualization. Since our philosophy of development has no intention of discriminating or leaving any one out, it must be the state’s re­ sponsibility to provide support services for the aging, the handi­ capped, drug addicts, ex-convicts, orphans, and the unemployed, etc. 199

Equal, as well as unequal or "special," opportunities should be pro­

vided them to be insure their ability to live as self-dependent and

fulfilling a life as will be found compatible with their individual cir­

cumstances.

Again the critic might wonder how our welfare system can avoid creating more domestic overdependence, thereby weakening the

economy as is happening in most European welfare states. This

would be a valid question for my ideology. The major problem with

domestic welfare programs, as noted earlier, is increasing depen­

dency. This could be in terms of people who deliberately prolong their period of dependency by refusing to cooperate with the state and local agents providing the support services or by refusing to learn new skills, to find new jobs, and to make the necessary transi­ tional adjustments. It could also be in terms of people who deliber­ ately refuse to work or behave in such a way that they can remain self-supporting without welfare support-systems. In either case, the people concerned are unjustly exploiting the system for selfish mo­ tives, and unless counter measures are taken this could weaken the national economy as is happening in most of the European welfare capitalist countries.

Switzerland, as noted earlier, is the only clear exception in this trend and we will do well to adopt their model. Concluding research into the Swiss system and why it has avoided the weaknesses in the other welfare states, Ralph Segalman writes. 200

It seems that the combination of an effective pat­ tern of schooling, employment, local government, and an involved and concerned population has re­ sulted in the successful prevention and manage­ ment of welfare dependency and its ills.^®

Highlights of the pattern of schooling are that the educational system is well integrated into the society which exercises high controls through a policy of decentralization. Thus, failure in school becomes a concern not just for the school personnel, but also for the child’s family, relatives, diverse agencies, and interested people in the com­ munity. Because of their concern for family, i.e., family reputation, and because in Switzerland completion of basic education is the path to economic success and self-sufficiency, parents and children alike are extraordinarily serious about education. Each child in this school, according to the research, is taught to assume responsibility for his actions, whether they occur in a group or alone. The ethic of hard work is instilled in them from the earliest stages of school­ ing. As a Swiss political scientist puts it, "...the true Swiss is ready and willing to work, rising early and working late as if for the joy of it." "

In order to maintain the ethic of responsibility, grown up chil­ dren are responsible for the aged parents and most accept this re­ sponsibility. This ethic of caring is reciprocal: good parenting is rewarding by the care provided by grown up children for their aging parents. Judging from the quality and the frequency of their visitations to parents, there is no doubt that the parent-child eco­ nomic relationship as depicted by the researchers is satisfactory to 201 both parties. For the state, this is not only a desirable social good; it is a means of minimizing both child and aging parent dependencies.

The welfare system, as a whole, is a means of creating political sta­ bility by the principle of fair income redistribution

To facilitate local government and family participation in wel­ fare programs, the state permits a high degree of decentralization.

Many of the tax bases are relegated to the smaller units of govern­ ment where the local citizens could get involved. Since they live in the communities, they best know those who are corrupt or honest and dedicated. Thus, they have the best chance of voting into power the best leaders to handle their problems.

Since these characteristics of family and communal concern and responsibilities are typical of most African societies, there should be no doubt at all that such programs will generally work to minimize state dependencies and to enable as many people as possible to live responsible and productive lives under Liberal Democratic Develop­ ment Capitalism.

The main arguments in this chapter may be summarized this way. It has been shown that Nyerere's rational choice between cap­ italism and socialism was mistaken not only in terms of its economic consequences, but primarily in view of the unsoundness of his argu­ ment for the rejection of capitalism in favor of socialism. In the new rational choice, it has been argued that given our present circum­ stances and our development objectives. Liberal Democracy (sometimes called capitalism) is better than socialism, but it is not enough for 202 our development objectives. What we need is a new kind of capital­ ism best suited to our special needs to combat overdependence and corruption. And that, as shown above, could neither be laissez faire alone, production oriented capitalism alone, or welfare capitalism alone, but a skillful combination of all three with a concern to mini­ mize both external and internal overdependence and corruption. This new ideology is what I call Liberal Democratic Development Capitalism.

It is the new rational choice for Africa. 203

FOOTNOTES

iDr. Kwegyir Aggrey was the first African headmaster of Achimota Secondary School which was founded in 1924 and gave birth to Ghana’s premier university, The University of Ghana, Legon. He is famous for this philosopher and for his philosophy of racial harmony: "You can play a sort of tune on the black keys only. You can also play a sort of tune on the white keys only. But for harmony you have to play both the black and the white keys.

zjolaoso, Mabel Imonkhude, "Conflict," published in the maga­ zine, Odu Nigeria, 1956. Quoted in The Way in Africa by George Waylland Carpenter (New York, Friendship Press, 1959), p. 105.

^Kwasi Wiredu, "What Can Philosophy Do for Africa" in Phi­ losophy and An African Culture, 1980, p. 58.

4John Dewey, "Reconstruction in Moral Concepts" (Boston, Beacon Press, 1948) in Philosophy Looks to the Future, edited by Peyton E. Richte and Walter L. Fogg (New York, Allyn and Bacon Press, 1979).

®Julius Nyerere, "The Rational Choice" in Man and D evelopm ent (London, Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 117.

^Ibid.

''Ibid., pp. 118-119.

*Kwame N krum ah, Consciencism (London, Hainmann, 1964), p. 72, 74.

^Ibid., p. 119.

'°Ali Mazrui, "Super Power Ethics: A Third World Perspective," Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 1 (1987), p. 17.

''Ib id .

^^Julius Nyerere, quoted in The New York Times Internationa], February 27, 1990, p. A-10.

i^K.A. Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy (New York, F re d e r­ ick A. P raeg er, 1967), p. 162.

i^Bade Onimode, "The Character of the Crisis," Journal o f African Marxists, No. 10 (June 1986), p. 21. 204

*®Edmund B u rk e’s view is quoted in Basic Beliefs by Howard Kahane, p. 148.

^^Africa Abroad, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 3, 12-13.

*’Bade Onimode, "The Character of the Crisis," Journal o f African Marxists, No. 10 (June 1986).

iSfW d.

"Ibid., p. 26.

20Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being.

Economic Systems," 1990 Britannica Book of the Year, p. 57.

2*CharIes Quist Adade, "Soviets Abandon Africa," West Africa, 8-018 (October 1990).

"W est Africa, 8-14 (January 1990), p. 9.

^*Africa Abroad, June 1990, pp. 3, 12-13.

^^The African Guardian (Nigeria), September 25, 1989, pp. 22, 42.

'"Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Viet- nam.

*?Adebayo Adedeji, Under-secretary of the U.N. and Executive Secretary of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, "Lessons for the 1990s," West Africa, 8-14 (Jan u ary 1990), p. 14.

"Carl Cohen, Four Systems (New York, Random House, 1982). See Philosophy: Paradox and Discovery by Arthur J. Minton and Thomas A. Shipka, 1990, p. 474.

^^Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Anthony Flew, 1984. See "Democracy."

^Daily Graphic, Accra, Ghana, August 20, 1981.

^^Talking Drums: The West African News Magazine, London, Au­ g u s t 1984, p. 16.

"G hana News, Information Service, Embassy of Ghana, Wash­ in g to n , D.C., Vol. 13, No. 7 (July 1984), p. 6.

"It is necessary to point out that in direct or indirect re­ sponse to the IMF-World Bank conditionalities for aid, and in keeping with global trends towards democratization as evidenced in Eastern 205

Europe and the Soviet Union, etc., many African military and one- party states are beginning to change over to multi-party states. These countries include Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Ivory Coast, and Benin. See The New York Times International, December 27, 1989, and th e Washington Post, March 7, 1990. An International Conference on Popular Participation was held in Arusha, Tanzania, on February 16, 1990. See, also. Times article on Africa, "Continental Shift," May 21, 1990, pp. 35-36.

^*Africa Abroad, Vol. 1, No. 4 (S eptem ber/O ctober 1990), p. 2.

3®From the closing statement by the U.N. Under-secretary Gen­ eral Adebayo Adedeji at the International Conference on Popular Par­ ticipation in Arusha, Tanzania, on February 16, 1990. Quoted in the Washington Post, March 7, 1990, p. A-26.

3®Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (Boston, Beacon Press, 1960), p. 104f.

^’Adebayo Adedeji, "Lessons for the 1990s," op. cit., p. 15.

^"Welfare State," Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 1987, p. 569.

®®Ralph Segalman, "Welfare and Dependency in Switzerland," The Public Interest, No. 82 (W inter 1986), p. 119.

*°Ibid., p. 116. CHAPTER SIX

CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK: TRANSCENDING

CULTURAL OBSTACLES AND PAVING THE WAY FOR SCIENCE

The culture of a people is no less than the totality of their characteristic beliefs, values, norms, and the lifestyle reflecting them.

This includes every aspect of a society’s life—in the ways they re­ late to their environment, with one another, and with their neighbors.

Thus, every culture embodies a network of physical, metaphysical, religious, ethical, aesthetic, political, and sociological characteristics that uniquely identify and distinguish it from all others.

This underlying network is reflected in the philosophy, or the

Weltanschauung, of the culture. Moritz Shlick shares this broad un­ derstanding of culture, when he states, "The different elements of human nature that help to build up the culture of a certain epoch or nation mirror themselves in one way or the other in the philosophy of that nation."*

In the second chapter, we reflected on how philosophy has contributed to the growth of science and development in the West.

206 207

Philosophy, I argued, is not only the "mother" of all sciences, it is also a critic, a companion, a counsellor, and a public relations officer for the sciences. My objective now is to show how contemporary

African philosophy is helping in the present and could help in the future to pave the way for science as another way of demonstrating that it is an asset, and not a liability, to Africa's development.

Since the characteristics of a culture are inevitably bound up with the self-consciousness and identity of the people, in many tra­ ditional societies it is feared that changing any aspect of the culture will necessEirily weaken the group’s bonding and lead to identity crises and the loss of their self-identity. Thus, in many African tribes incoming kings, chiefs, and clan leaders are made to take oaths in which they swear, as part of their initiation ceremonies, to do all in their power to keep the culture intact and thus preserve the identity, soul, or persona of the community. It goes without saying that any attempt to transform or to change any aspect of the culture is vehemently resisted, and that is part of the explanation for the lack of significant development in most of the traditional so­ cieties. The question, however, is not whether or not we should ini­ tiate the changes, but who will bell the cat?

The contemporary African philosopher is uniquely qualified to initiate this task, given his training in critical/analytic thinking and his/her familiarity not only with the African culture, but also with the Western culture which has, for decades, overcome most of these foundational problems. It is in this connection that the pioneering 208 works of Wiredu, Sodipo, Makinde, Irele, Agyakwa, Nduka, Horton and

Appiah become significant as models for other African and Third

World philosophers.

Wiredu on the Cultural Evils Plaguing the Akan Culture

Beyond the descriptive study of African culture undertaken by anthropologists for over a century now, there is the need for a criti­ cal and constructive study of African culture. This approach has become necessary given our need to create the conditions that will facilitate the ongoing process of modernization. Philosophy, Wiredu submits, has obvious responsibilities in this connection. Among these are the need to call attention to some of the obstacles within our culture that militate against our orientation to science and, for that matter, our development. Three of these cultural evils are discussed below.

1. Anachronism

Anachronism, according to Wiredu, is "the failure to perceive anachronistic things for what they are and to discard or modify them as the case may require."* Within the context of a given society, various habits of thought and practice can become anachronistic things. Similarly, an entire society can become anachronistic within the context of the whole world if the ways of life within that society are predominantly anachronistic. One cannot discard the anachronis­ tic society, but its modernization becomes an imperative once it is recognized as such. 209

In discussing anachronism within a society, he lists several ex­ amples from the Akan culture and argues that the most basic and pervasive is the traditional mode of understanding, utilizing, and controlling external nature and of interpreting the place of man within it. It is the kind of "intuitive," or essentially unanalytic, un­ scientific mode which Senghor has been projecting with pride as a uniquely African mode of thinking.^

While not denying the reality of this mode of thinking among

Africans, Wiredu argues that its role is exaggerated by Senghor and, more importantly, its extensive application to life and problem-solving is to be deplored rather than celebrated. A little familiarity with the methodology of science will reveal that, in order to promote scientific thinking, it is essential to cultivate a mode of thinking suitable for logical, mathematical, analytical, and experimental procedures. Our traditional culture failed to promote such cognitive skills and that must be at least part of the explanation for our weaknesses in sci­ ence and the technology of warfare, architecture, and medicine, etc., as well as our present socioeconomic crisis.

Against those who maintain that Africans lack innovation,

Wiredu contends that our ancestors were gifted with penetrating per­ ception, as evidenced by their knowledge of various medications for various ailments sometimes beyond the reach of modern medicine.

However, the lack of these science-oriented cognitive skills has ren­ dered our traditional medical experts terribly weak when it comes to diagnosis and pharmacology. In place of natural explanations, Wiredu 210 complains, they would mostly offer personal or mythological explana­ tions in terms of malevolent witchcraft and necromancy. Since these poor diagnoses and unresearched prescriptions are causally responsi­ ble for the preventable deaths of millions of adults and children, especially the latter, Wiredu argues that any attempt to glorify this unscientific cast of mind "is not just retrograde; it is tragic."*

Intuition, of course, has its proper place, but not when it comes to engineering, architecture, medicine, and large-scale produc­ tion and industrialization, which require precise measurements. Yet most people in our culture, including educated workers, prefer the intuitive way to the way of scientific measurements of time, space, solids, and liquids, etc. The result is shaky constructions and un­ necessary delays and, if I may add to the list, the lack of consis­ tency in quantity and quality. This condition, Wiredu explains, is not caused by laziness, stupidity, or ill-will, but by "their having been brought up in a culture that places no special value on exact mea­ surement."®

Other forms of anachronism identified by Wiredu include the following:

1. The pervasiveness and stress on ceremony and ritual in many

aspects of social life: However important their value in society

previously, Wiredu suggests the time has come for them to be

kept in reasonable bounds.

2. The principle of age as a vital criterion of wisdom: The wis­

dom of uninstructed longevity, he argues, is unlikely to prove 211

extensively applicable in the complex environments of modern

life.

3. The importance attached to fertility: No longer can any

serious-minded couple ignore the socioeconomic implications of

the upkeep and upbringing of their children for themselves

and their society.®

There is no doubt that intuition can play a role in helping us to make good judgments in all of these respects. But suppose the cap­ tain of a sinking boat crew were to refuse rescue offers from a passing ship; we would condemn his action as not only irrational, but also irresponsible, for unnecessarily jeopardizing not only his life, but the lives of the crew as well. The behavior of an African leader who rejects the scientifc orientation to life in favor of the intuitive way is not significantly different from that of the captain of the boat. Therefore, Wiredu is right in condemning the anachronistic at­ titude among our leaders.

Whoever has any illusions about the need for precision in thought and action should reflect on its impact on Western civiliza­ tion as presented by Abiola Irele from Carlo Cipllas’ book, European

Culture and O verseas Expanaion:

[The] decisive factor in the world supremacy of Europe was the stubborn application of intelligence and skill to the improvement of firearms, ocean­ going vessels and above all precision instruments; to the perfection of all these technical resources which finally gave the advantages to the Europeans in their onslaught upon other races, other peoples and nations, other civilizations.’ 212

In short, the secret of Europe’s success in world domination during the colonial era lay in her discovery and deployment of the scientific method. It is the method that manifests itself in terms of precision instruments for thought and action, organization, discipline, and or­ der, as well as imagination. The role of the "smart bombs" in the recent Gulf War dramatizes in both the literal and metaphorical senses the value of precision instruments and the scientific method in the above quote.

2. Authoritarianism

The second evil plaguing the culture of the domimant ethnic group in Ghana, the Akans, according to Wiredu is authoritarianism.®

Any human arrangement, he explains, is authoritarian if it entails any person being made to suffer something against his or her will, or if it leads to any person being hindered in the development of his will.

However, since this would include and thus condemn the justifiable overriding of refractory individual wills, it must be rejected as too broad for a definition. Authoritarianism, then, is "The unjustifiable o v e rrid in g of an individual’s will."®

The Akan traditional society, especially in pre-colonial times,

Wiredu complains, was deeply authoritarian. "Our social arrangements were shot through and through with the principle of unquestioning obedience to superiors, which often meant elders."^® Unlike what 213 one would find among most middle-class Westerners, curiosity and in­

dependence of thought among those of tender age are hardly encour­ aged or even tolerated. Even though proverbs abound and are

resourceful for revealing practical wisdom, Wiredu observes, there is

hardly any traditional proverb which extols the virtues of originality and independence of thought. In support of Wiredu’s observation, it

must be pointed out that instead of such proverbs what one would find is a good number of proverbs and maxims that tend to discour­ age critical minds in favor of unquestioning obedience.

These include the following literally-translated proverbs and

maxims from Akan:

a. If you are fond of asking questions about new situations you would be told: When you enter a new situation watch with your eye, but keep your mouth shut.

b. When a young person is caught asking "adult" questions about God, life, death, sex, and procre­ ation, etc., he is often stopped with a proverb to the effect that: It is not the child’s business to crack (the shell of a) tortoise but just (the shell of a) snail.

c. To discourage critical examination or deep probing into an issue, an elder may veto such at­ tempts by simply stating: If you keep digging too deeply into the eyes of the dead, you would dis­ cover a ghost.^^

How does authoritarianism influence the education of the

African youth? The making of a deliberate rational choice is impossi­ ble without the possibility or availability of relevant alternatives to be considered. Hence, no education of the youth can be adequate if 214

it is heavily influenced by authoritarianism in as long as education

aims at training the mind so that people can make deliberate rational

choices.

Authoritarianism, in as much as it discourages curiosity, ques­

tioning, and innovation, would rather promote indoctrination, but not

education. For unlike education, indoctrination is the kind of mind-

molding which leads to built-in choices. Unfortunately, authoritari­

anism is not found only in the homes among parents and the elderly,

but also in churches where children are baptized without their ra­

tional consent, and also in the classroom where teachers provide pre­

determined answers with little or no opportunity for questioning,

discussion, or dialogue. It is no different when one examines the

public life of educated Africans working, say, in government min­

istries. If you ask basic questions such as "Why is the government

doing this and not that?", the typical response one can expect from

them would be "That is how it has always been done. I don’t want

any argument, "i* As a reflection of how entrenched and widespread

this attitude has become, Wiredu states:

The very atmosphere we breathe, in many areas of life in our society, seems to be suffused with an authoritarian odor; though if our noses have been acclimatized to it through long conditioning we may possibly not find the odor offensive, or even re­ mark on it in the first place.

Authoritarianism as depicted here is, of course, not unique to the African culture. It is, in fact, to be found in all cultures where 215 the level of general education is low and religious authoritarianism or fundamentalism is a dominant reality. It is, therefore, significant to note, as we did in Chapter Two, that the ancient Greek religions, at the time when the speculative philosophers were laying the founda­ tions for science, were non-authoritarian.

A lot of the beliefs and practices in the traditional cultures are shrouded in secrecy. One must mature to a certain age, and be a member of certain gender and inner groupings, to be privileged enough to be told certain "truths," which are, of course, to be re­ ceived without questioning. Very often questioning is construed as a mark of distrust or insubordination to ones superiors.

During the 1984 All African Students’ Conference for the U.S. and Canada, held at Ohio University in Athens, three speakers spoke on the implications of this sacrosanct or authoritarian attitude to­ wards truth. In order to be the recipient of the "Truth," one always

has to offer "something." Depending on the prevailing tradition or one’s luck, this could mean anything from the tooth of a tiger, an egg, or a bottle of drink. The practice has been extended to public offices. Thus, a researcher going to any public office is typically

met with questions like "What have you brought?", "Where is your

drink?" (in Ghana), or "Where is your cola?" (in Nigeria). Drink or cola, within this modern context, is no more than the surrogate term

for the offering or "something" required within the traditional con­

text. Usually finanial substitutes are given before one could be pre­

sented with "the Truth." 216

Nowhere could the impact of authoritarianism be as devastating for developing nations as in the schools where young minds are be­ ing molded. According to the famous Swiss philosopher of education,

Jean Piaget, the principal goal of education is "to create men who are capable of doing new things, not simply repeating what other gener­ ations have done—men who are creative, inventive and discoverer".**

The second goal of education is to form minds that can be critical, that can verify and not accept everything they are offered. Besides trying to foster creative and critical minds, another goal of education is to develop certain attitudes, personal traits, and values, such as being non-dogmatic—open-minded and tolerant. These are, of course, the basic goals of every liberal education of which philosophy is the fulcrum .

When the school atmosphere is overshadowed by authoritarian­ ism, as implied by the descriptive aspect of Wiredu's account, the dominant reality is virtually the complete negation of all of these goals.*® No less in d ig n an t th a n Wiredu, an o th er p ro fe sso r of philos­ ophy in Nigeria, Otonti Nduka, condemns the authoritarian tradition in the schools saying, "It leads to the discouragement of intellectual curiosity and independence of thought and action."*®

Since authoritarianism, as shown in the foregoing, determines or at least influences our African conception of truth, and impedes scientific research and teaching, it goes without saying that authori­ tarianism represents a major obstacle to the growth of science in

Africa. By drawing attention to such obstacles, the contemporary 217

African phiulosopher is making no leas a significant contribution than what could be expected of a surveyor whose exploratory tasks pre­ cede that of an architect or a civil engineer assigned to develop a new city.

I could not agree more with Wiredu in this light when he rec­ ommends that, in order to provide our students with the kind of qualitative education necessary for our development, our education

(in Africa) needs to be given a considerable methodological component starting from fairly early stages. Our children should be initiated early in life into the discipline of formal and informal logic and the methodology of rational thinking.

The intolerance of these philosophers for authoritarianism is illustrated and corroborated by that of Thomas Jefferson who wrote,

"I have sworn before the altar of Almighty God eternal hostility to every form of tyranny over the mind of man."** Such a strong commitment against authoritarianism, not unlike that of Socrates, is bound to be misconstrued as subversive to the state. No wonder the call for the rejection of philosophy in Africa have often come from dictatorial regimes since, unlike democracies, their survival depends on authoritarianism.

3. S upernaturalism

The third and last of the cultural evils discussed by Wiredu is

Supernaturalism. The term is a bit misleading because it does not represent the belief in supernatural beings, as it might first appear.

On his account, it means "the tendency to seek the basis of morality 218 in some supernatural source when this may be potentially harmful to

humanity."" He contrasts the concept with humanism, which is the

point of view according to which morality is founded exclusively on considerations of human well-being. The contrast makes it clear then

that this form of supernaturalism is restricted to the realm of ethics.

As a consequence, it it is more appropriate to call it ethical super­

naturalism than supernaturalism.

It is not too hard to see how ethical supernaturalism could be­ come a hindrance to science and development. One of Wiredu’s exam­

ples is this: Suppose it comes to be believed that it is the will of

God that the number of human beings should multiply without any artificial control. Suppose, further, that the will of God is held to define what is morally good or morally evil. And, lastly, it can be shown that unless artificially controlled, the increasing numbers of our species will lead to human misery; it would be morally acceptable to say "no" within the Catholic tradition. In fairness to the Catholic tradition to which Wiredu appears to be referring, it must be pointed out that they advocate abstinence and the rhythm method as

"natural" alternative methods of birth control over the use of artifi­ cial methods. So, if their teaching is universally adopted, the dreadful consequence Wiredu is depicting can be precluded.

The point of supernaturalism and its impact on our efforts at science and development can, however, be illustrated simply by fo­ cusing on traditional African moral practices based on supernatural beliefs. For most traditional Africans, the will of the Supreme Being, 219 the gods, and the ancestors are the dominant factors in determining what is right or wrong.*® When it comes to deciding issues such as whether or not to abandon traditional methods of therapy and go to the modern hospital; to cooperate with food and nutrition experts or agricultural extension officers; or to minimize the number of days

spent on funerals as a means of promoting agricultural and industrial

productivity, many people, including those with formal Western

education, would prefer to do the perceived will of the gods rather

than follow the government or development agent.

Contemporary African philosopohers, such as Wiredu, do not

only call attention to the existence of such counter-productive habits

of thought and action, they also try to encourage the diversification

of the principles for determining right from wrong. Wiredu has

called attention to the elements of humanism in Akan moredity which

could be developed as an alternative or supplement to ethical super­

naturalism. For example, "the good" in Akan is defined as "that

which is fitting" (Akan: nea efata); and "that which is fitting" is also

defined as "that which is beautiful." Therefore, for Akans, "the

good" is by definition "the beautiful." Thus, one way of convincing

the people for change could be to convince them that such changes

are fitting for their personalities and culture, and are thus beautiful

and hence good. By providing and encouraging the use of such al­

ternative means of "plastic control," CAP underscores the thesis that

it helps pave the way for science and development. 220

Sodipo and Makinde on Diagnosing and Prescribing Treatment for

African Causal Explanations

The African cosmology, not unlike that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, is full of thousands of spirits: gods, witches, ghosts, charms, etc., and, of course, the Supreme Being, God. Such beliefs, with the exception of the belief in God, are often condemned by evi- dentialists as superstitious because of their lack of a rational justifi­ cation. In Africa, notwithstanding all the zeal of the puritan and evangelical Western missionaries and their local agents for the last

200 years or more, these beliefs continue to be regarded as sources of several "taboos" (i.e., do’s and don’ts) and to provide causal ex­ planations for both ordinary and extraordinary phenomena. Examples of pregnant women and children forbidden to eat eggs, chicken, or beef, etc., which they need for their special conditions, abound all over the continent.*^

The scientifc implication of such nutritional condition is obvi­ ous. Yet if these women and children fall sick from anaemic condi­ tions, it is hypothesized that their condition is the result of their having secretly partaken of such forbidden foods. Of course, the causal argument here commits the hasty conclusion fallacy. The problem is not total ignorance of scientific explantions. The problem is that sometimes the scientific discourse is couched in mystical terms to insure unquestining obedience to whatever it entails. For example, children are told never to sing while eating or taking their baths, otherwise their mothers would die. The scientific explanations for 221 these taboos, known to every matured member of the community, are, of course, the risk of choking with food and poisoning from danger­ ous soapy water, respectively.

Besides scientific causal explanations Africans, like many other predominantly religious cultures, utilize personal causal explanations.

These are the kinds of explanations of phenomena in which causal chains involve supernatural beings such as witches, gods, ancestors, the Supreme Being, and what these beings have fore-ordained—called destiny. I wish to discuss examples of these "personal explanations" in Africa and how they hinder the growth of scientific thinking and development.

On the sudden death of a child not known to be sick previ­ ously, the tendency is always to look for the metaphysical or per­ sonal explanation as opposed to the physiological or scientific explanation. Both Sodipo and Mosis Makinde, prominent professors of philosophy in Nigeria, cite as an example the following as a typical response among Yorubas when a child dies suddenly in the night:

Only yesterday evening the witch made her pres­ ence felt through her cries; this morning the child died; who does not know...?**

The rhetorical structure and the open-ended style, Makinde explains, are linguistic devices for indicating that the rest of the story is too obvious to be told. In other words, it is not at all doubtful to them that this child has been killed by the witch who cried the night be­ fore. Not only does this commit the p o st hoc fallacy, it also reveals. 222 in the opinion of Sodipo and Makinde (and I agree with them), one of the major types of obstacles to scientific thinking chen-acteristic of traditional societies. It is an obstacle in the sense that, instead of first looking for the natural or scientific causal explanation by pro­ jecting and testing all credible relevant alternative hypotheses, the traditional approach starts with a personal explanation which often prematurely excludes or terminates the search for an impersonal or scientific explanation.

Of course, personal explanations are not totally defunct in sci­ entifically advanced cultures. They exist as ultimate explanations in terms of God, destiny, or chance. However, normally these are not considered until the natural possible causal hypotheses have been exhausted. As explained by Edward Harret Carr, however.

It would not do for a student to answer every question in history by saying that it was the fin­ ger of God. Not until we have gone as far as most tidying up mundane events and the human drama are we permitted to bring in wider considera­ tions.^^

While this guideline does not condemn the deployment of per­ sonal explanations (such as the finger of God), it does require giving priority in time to the search for natural or scientifc explanations over personal explanations. In the African traditional paradigm, how­ ever, to borrow Sodipo’s expression, "the personal explanations take over too soon."** Assuming the child's death above was caused by some preventable or curable medical condition such as high fever. 223 tetanus, or pneumonia, similar sudden deaths will continue in the community until a scientific cause and cure are found. Another ex­ ample is found in how the typical African responds to the experience or report of a car accident. The scientific-minded person will nor­ mally begin looking for causes in terms of the physiological or psy­ chological condition of the driver, the mechanical condition of the automobile, the physical condition of the roads, and visibility, etc.

The traditional African will also ask why, but instead of examining possible causal conditions of the type mentioned above, he or she will focus almost exclusively on the personal explanation and ask ques­ tions like: Why here now? Why me? Why not the other person?

Such questions are, of course, unanswerable in scientific terms and can only be satisfied by appealing to the work of evils forces such as angry gods, ancestors, witches, charms, or a bad destiny called

"Ori" in Yuroba and "nkrabea" in Akan. Consequently, rituals, such as libations or prayers, may be performed as if they were sufficient conditions for the prevention of the disaster’s recurrence. Thus, the real or scientific cause of the accident may never be investigated, leaving the conditions ripe for the disaster’s recurrence.

Such personal explanations are also readily applied to the de­ cline in agricultural productivity, especially among the cocoa farmers in West Africa. Crop scientists have long noted that cocoa trees die between the ages of 30 and 40. And, of course, almost all cocoa farmers alive today have observed the death of the cocoa trees of the first generation farmers. Yet in violation of the Humean causal 224 principles (such as "same cause, same effect"), our traditional farm­ ers often explain the lack of productivity of their trees in terms of the activities of distant witches in their family, angry gods and an­ cestors, charms, or bad destiny.

Makinde has made a very interesting critical examination of the concept of destiny as used among the Yorubas of Nigeria and found it to be incoherent in causal explanations. Everyone is believed to

have an ori which literally means "head." Ori is used in two senses:

inner ori and outer ori. The inner ori is metaphysical, and the outer

ori is the physical manifestation of the metaphysical one. The inner

ori is the bearer of one’s destiny and is functionally equivalent to

the guardian angel in Christian doctrine or mythology. The charac­

teristics and functions associated with ori are, Makinde notes, similar

to what one would find in Socrates’ treatment of the soul. When

misfortune strikes, as in the case of sudden deaths in the family, a

poor harvest, a car accident, poverty or prolonged ill-health, the

typical Yoruba blames it on the kind of Ori that he or she chose

when departing from "heaven" for the earth to be born.

According to Makinde, the inner head, like the mind, seems to

have an effect on the outer head and is therefore important for a

person’s life. An ori is either good or bad. The choice of a good or

bad ori determines one’s destiny, which is observable in the form of

the outer ori as it translates into either fortune or misfortune. When

people pray that the inner head may not spoil their outer head, how­

ever, there is the implication that sacrifices for purification could be 225 made for the adjustment or transformation of one’s inner head or d estin y .

The notion of sacrifice in principle and practice, Makinde ar­ gues, raises a number of philosophical puzzles that may lead to the possible abandonment of the concept of destiny:

If destiny or fate is something that can never be altered, and this concept is linked with the concept of ori, then it seems that destiny has also been altered once ori is altered to a good one. But if this is to be the case, then either we deny that the concept of ori may be altered to a good one and vice versa, or we accept that ori, however good or bad is subject to change. In either case the philosophical concept of ori in Yoruba remains, but what needs to be done with it is the re-exami­ nation of the concept of destiny in its relation to it in order to see which one is in need of concep­ tual modification.*®

An interesting fallout of this argument for the thesis that CAP paves the way for science and development is this. Either destiny is alterable or not. If it is, then destiny is no longer an acceptable ex­ cuse for low productivity, or for poverty, prolonged ill-health, sud­ den deaths, or any misfortune, since they could be avoided with the necessary ritual sacrifices. If it is not, then the notion of sacrifice is inconsistent with the account on destiny, and, consequently, the whole theory of destiny as a causal explanation should be rejected or modified for the incoherence.

One way of modifying the destiny account could be to make a distinction between alterable and inalterable destinies; or, corre­ spondingly, strong and weak destinies. The distinction is as signifi­ 226 cant as that drawn by William James to depict the distinction between hard and soft determinism to show that the latter, but not the for­ mer, is compatible with moral responsibility. On that premiss, the original account would imply a weak destiny and the new account would imply a strong destiny. An immediate benefit from this demar­ cation is that, contrary to what is suggested by the notion of des­ tiny, a bad destiny is not necessarily a barrier to personal or communal well-being.

The belief in destiny is, of course, common to virtually all cultures. Eastern, Western, or African.** Among the Akans of Ghana, it is strongly believed among the traditional people that before birth each individual soul is given the opportunity to request a personal destiny and every one requests a good destiny. However, some peo­ ple meet with the principalities and powers of evil on their way to earth and consequently lose all or part of their good destiny. Fur­ ther it is held that destiny once given can never be altered.**

A critical reflection on the Akan notion reveals philosophical puzzles not unlike those revealed by Makinde’s analysis. Consider the following three propositions:

PI. Everyone chooses a good destiny before departing to the earth .

P2. Destiny is by definition inalterable (Akan: "Nkrabea nni kwatibea").

P3. Ill fortune is caused by evil forces who alter destinies in transit to the earth. 227

All these three propositions are presumed true and integral to the

Akan account of destiny. Yet a little will show that the three propo­ sitions are logically incompatible: Suppose it is true that by defini­ tion destiny is unalterable, then it is logically impossible for anyone including the forces of evil to alter it. So, if P2 is true, then PI is false. Therefore, if the evil forces altered anything of your’s while in transit to the earth, it could not possibly be your destiny. That means P3 and P2 are incompatible. Further, if you requested any­ thing from God in your pre-departure arrangements with God, that thing could not possibly be your destiny since it would have been impossible for the evil forces to alter it. So, if P3 is true, then the conjunction of P2 and PI is false. Hence, either we reject P2, or the whole destiny account is rejected as incoherent since the three propositions are incompatible because of P2.

Even if we grant that P2 is false and that destiny by defini­ tion is alterable, it would entail that evil forces could alter a good destiny into a bad one. But, then, we have to reject the proposition that it was a good destiny to start with for it is only a bad destiny that could have the ill-fortune of meeting an evil force. A good destiny, once created and determined to be good by the Supreme

Being, must remain inalterable even by witches and any lesser spirit.

So, on the pain of incoherence, I submit, the whole notion of "a good destiny so determined by the Supreme Being yet alterable by evil forces" should be rejected on purely logical grounds. 228

Like all philosophical arguments this might not convince most people to abandon their dogmatic belief in destiny as a rational ex­ planation for their misfortunes. We can, however, be sure that when properly and widely presented to the public it could stimulate intelli­ gent discussions that might lead many people to become sceptical of the notion of destiny. At least they will realize that destiny is nei­ ther a necessary nor a sufficient condition for failure or success in life, and so we should expect them naturally to begin to minimize their dependence on destiny as a source of rational explanation for their existential misfortunes. In view of the psychological connection between belief in destiny and the resignation of troubled souls to a life of fatalism or pessimism, it cannot be denied that this effort which prevents the formation of such attitudes by rational argumen­ tation helps pave the way for the scientific orientation to life and development on the continent.

Agyakwa and Nduka on Identifying and Bridging the Epistemological

Dr. K.O. Agyakwa, of the Department of Educational Foundations at the University of Cape Coast in Ghana, trained as a philosopher of education at the Columbia Teacher’s College in New York. His doc­ toral dissertation was in the field of comparative epistemology be­ tween Western and Non-Western cultures. The dissertation attempted to answer one basic question: How does the traditional African think? Or, more specifically, "What happens when an individual, who 229 has internalized the indigenous Akan habits of thought, attempts to learn Western concepts?"*®

The basic question, he argues, is relevant because the answer will determine the kind of methodology that would be found appropri­ ate for the teaching of Western knowledge, especially science and technology, to African students. His thesis in this connection is that

African scholars especially in the sciences are less productive than their Western counterparts because educators have failed to recog­ nize the existence of the epistemological gap between Western and traditional ways of knowing. In their zeal and haste to bring

"salvation" and "civilization" to Africa, Agyakwa alleges, the early missionary and colonial educators failed to raise the above question and proceeded to introduce Western knowledge to the African context.

The result, as noted earlier, is, for the most part, mere memorization without understanding and a low-level of productivity in science and technology among our scholars.

Agyakwa’s thesis is corroborated by the conclusion drawn by

Professor Otonti Nduka, who made a similar comparison between West­ ern epistemology and traditional African Knowledge using the Yoruba culture as a paradigm case. According to Nduka,"One is inclined to agree with Gellner that scientific knowledge is so vastly different from the knowledge associated with African traditional culture that the difference amounts to a difference in kind."*®

In the attempt to substantiate his thesis, Agyakwa examined four aspects of epistemology: (a) sources of knowledge; (b) theory of 230

truth; (c) mode of reasoning; and (d) skepticism. Taking the mode of

reasoning to be the crucial test for determining the nature of the

two epistemologies, he concluded that the Akan mode of reasoning,

unlike that of the West, is neither deductive nor inductive. There­

fore, the difference between them is not a difference in degree but

in kind.

In order to put into the right perspective the contribution of

Agyakwa’s thesis to the ongoing debate, some of his presuppositions

need to be challenged and modified now. On the Akan mode of

reasoning Agyakwa, an Akan himself, makes the following claims: "It

does not go beyond common sense inference and has some missing

steps."®“ He states, using a metaphor from physics, that the Akan

mode of reasoning operates on an epistemological wavelength that is

radically different from that of an open system. His example is this:

If Z is related to X, who is a witch, then Z is a witch."3%

Such an argument, Agyakwa remarks, conforms neither to the inductive nor the deductive mode of reasoning in the Western paradigm. It was on the basis of this that he concluded the differ­ ence between the two paradigms is a difference in kind. Granted that there the two epistemlogies have differences in all the four re­ spects, the inference that the difference is a difference in kind, meaning it is not a logical argument, is highly objectionable. An in­ ductive argument, in contrast to a deductive argument, is one in 231 which the conclusion is not supposed to be guaranteed by the pre- miss(es), but only to be made probable by the premiss(es). The de­ gree of probability accorded the conclusion in the above argument may be weak, but that does not imply that it is not an inductive ar­ gument. The form of the statement, as it stands, is a simple condi­ tional and obviously such a conditional statement by itself does not constitute an argument. However, as in most colloquial expressions, some premisses are missing, as well as the modality for the condi­ tional. When these are fully supplied, it becomes more obvious that it is an inductive argument:

Most witches pass on their witchcraft to their relatives.

If Z is related to X, who is a witch, then [probably] Z is a w itch.

The above argument has the same form as this:

Most rich people pass on their wealth to their relatives.

If Z is related to X, who is rich, then [probably] Z is rich.

Since the two arguments have the same form, if one is inductive so is the other.

Thus Agyakwa is clearly wrong in concluding, on the basis of this model, that the Akan mode of reasoning is neither deductive nor inductive and, consequently, the two epistemologies represented are different in kind. Further, Agyakwa’s argument is incorrect because 232

it presupposes that every argument in the Western paradigm is ei­

ther deductive or inductive. That, however, is an oversimplification.

Take Mill’s Fifth Element of Scientific Method, the Method of Residue:

If the alternative hypotheses have a definite finite number, then it is

a deductive model. But where the number of alternative hypotheses

is indefinite and one or more could be added, it is an inductive

model. Also, hypothetico-deductive models have both inductive and

deductive components; hence, they may be regarded as neither de­

ductive nor inductive depending on the context.

Agyakwa’s main contribution to the orientation to science and

development lies in his suggestions for bridging the gap between the

two epistemologies to facilitate science education and learning in gen­ eral in our African schools and colleges. However, if it is true, as

he thinks, that the difference is in kind, then the task of bridging the gap is either impossible or extremely difficult. My counter­ argument should, therefore, be seen as a positive contribution to his effort, for now it becomes apparent that notwithstanding the onto­ logical status of one’s subject matter, bridging the episteological gap where it exists is neither impossible nor as difficult as first imagined. A few of his recommendations for bridging the gap are worth listing describing here.

First, on the sources of knowledge, he notes that there is too much dependence on the authority of the elders or tradition. So educators must encourage students to shift from "according to the elders" to "according to the scientists." This requires methodologies 233 that involve experiments to disprove some of the empirical claims made by the elders in the attempt by modern educators to prove that scientific knowledge of empirical matters is more reliable than the intuition of the elders.

Second, since traditional knowledge is often communal, students should be encouraged to shift emphasis from "we believe" to "I be­ lieve," In sociological terms, it is the shift from heterognosis to autognosis, which is essential for independent thinking and personal responsibility. To achieve this, there should be pedagogical strate­

gies that promote individual thinking more than group work, and at­

tempts to prove that the majority is not always right.

Third, Agyakwa argues that Akans are more credulous than

Westerners, partly because they depend more on what they hear than on what they see. On that basis, he recommends that we should

encourage healthy criticism among our students. This requires in­

volving them in learning experiences in which there are long-term

experiments requiring students to suspend their judgments; asking

them to present several alternative hypotheses, or explanations to ac­

count for a given phenomenon; or challenging them to find alterna­

tive solutions to a given problem. He believes that, in the end,

students will come to realize that if Z is related to X, who is a witch,

Z may not be a witch. "The overall objective," says Agyakwa, "is to

eliminate the sacrosanct attitude to truth"“

Finally, like Wiredu, he recommends the teaching of deductive

and inductive logic, as well as the methodology of scientific thinking 234 as described by John Dewey to our students even in the elementary schools.

Irele and Agyakwa on Identifying and Transcending Forms of Cultural

Alienation that Hinder Progress

In his 1982 inaugural lecture at the University of Ibadan, pub­ lished under the title In Praise of Alienation, Professor Abiola Irele articulated a radically new way of responding to the cultural alien­ ation of Africa. So profound was his insight and presentation that I am convinced it is bound to go down in history as a major contribu­ tion to the attempt at using philosophy to pave the way for science and development in our culture.

Alienation, according to Irele is "a dual state of mind and sen­ sibility. The long-standing historical encounter between Europe and Africa, he observes, has created a conflict of cultures and this condition has, in turn, produced a condition of alienation perceived by most African intellectuals as negative. Contemporary African writ­ ers affirm this position by arguing that the European impact has left the continent in a state of "a profound ambivalence" and humiliation.

These include Chienwuzu, in his book The West And The Rest of Us;

Obaro Ikime, in The Fall of Nigeria; Senghor’s poetry; and Achebe’s masterpiece. T he A rrow o f God. They all agree that modern imperial­ ism was a calculated act of aggression resulting in a master-slave relationship, both in the literal sense and in the metaphorical sense, used by Hegel and Kierkegaard. 235

The consequences of the experience have been unsettling in

various ways. Traditional societies were disrupted all over Africa as

a result of colonial expansion, slave trade and the World Wars. Apart

from the loss of lives, the discontinuities of indigenous basic science

and technologies, and economic exploitation and domination, most

Africans had to endure political domination until the 60s. These sen­

timents, according to Irele, remain vivid and we are conscious of

their irreversible nature.

The ambivalence in our attitudes towards the Western culture

and our African traditional culture is also to be seen in our attach­

ment to the two worlds. The traditional pre-colonial culture and its

ways of life continue to exist, but it is so disoriented that it has to

conform with modern scientific and technological methods or perish.

At the same time, the Western civilization, which is responsible for

the present predicament, represents the paradigm of modernity to which we aspire. The obvious result is that states.

[Our] mixed feelings, the troubled sense of accep­ tance and rejection, of a subjective disposition that is undermined by the objective facts of life. There is something of a paradox here, for the intensity of the ambivalence which we demonstrate in our re­ sponse to Europe and Western civilization is in fact a measure of our emotional tribute: it is expressive, in a profound way, of the cultural hold which Europe has secured upon us—of the alienation which it has imposed upon us as a historical fate.®*

Without denying the reality of our existential predicament or at­ tempting to mitigate it, Irele argued that our state of alienation is 236 not wholly negative and that it presents possibilities that could con­ fer upon the transforming values of Western civilization, in their ef­ fect upon our society, a positive significance.

Before examining how Irele argues directly for his thesis, it is pertinent to see how he disposed of the two dominant responses to our cultural alienation: Negritude and Cultural Nationalism. The con­ cept of negritude was discussed in Chapter Three and need not de­ tain us here. Suffice it to say that it is a reactionary African ideology that arose in response to the doctrine of European racial superiority. It sought to emphasize the uniqueness of the African to the extent that his qualities were incommensurate with that of the

European. Thus, according to Senghor, while the European is ratio­ nal and can boast of his rationality, the African is deeply emotional and intuitive and could boast of his deep-emotions and intuition.

"Emotion is Black.. Reason is Greek." In place of Descartes’ "I think therefore I am," which he takes to be a representation of rationality, the genius of the West, Senghor, stated for the African, "I feel therefore I am." In other words, Senghor, the former president of

Senegal and the most distinguished proponent of Negritute, is saying that the great genius or excellence of Africa lay not in European concepts of rationality, but in indigenous capacities for intuition; not in principles of scientific methodology and objectivity, but in wisdom of custom and instinct; not in cold analytical reason, but in warm re­ sponsive emotion. 237

As we saw in this chapter in the section under the heading

"Anachronism," Wiredu argues effectively to show that it is counter­ productive to science and development. According to Ali Mazrui, "It is in this sense that Senghor has sometimes been accused of reducing the African genius to the poetic concept of the Noble Savage."3®

Mazrui aptly characterizes this naive form of negritude as "romantic primitivism."

Cultural Nationalism is similarly a romantic ideology which maintains that "culture is an intrinsic value, bound to the natural environment of a people or race and therefore determining a natural correspondence between a way of life and collective identity.It presupposes an organic conception of culture and, according to Irele, it has a romantic vision of the past. This vision confers an ontologi­ cal status upon the notion of identity and constitutes the abstraction of national culture into its transcendental category, he explains. The movement of thought which culminates at this level, Irele maintains, proceeds from an organic fallacy, which derives from a confusion of metaphor with fact. The organic conception of culture has a tree as its dominant imagery. Thus, it suggests growth and vitality; yet the organic conception of culture is a static conception of societies.

His argument is that if we conceive of tradition as a specific configuration of social relations, of techniques and modes of produc­ tion, of collective representations, and so forth, in short as a totality of culture as it is lived, then it is easy to understand that any mod­ ification in any one part will affect the totality. Yet it is evident 238 that tradition by nature is vulnerable to change. The dynamism of modern life puts pressure upon tradition and shapes and reshapes it over time until it is no longer recognizable as a specific relation to specific parts within the total structure, but simply as an idea. The idea may retain a meaningful correspondence to a present reality and thus serve an integrative function. In a time of social revolution or rapid social change, the functional correspondence between the idea of tradition and the actual forces and processes of collective life dis­ appears and is replaced by a pronounced asymmetry. In such cases, tradition as an idea becomes dysfunctional; but its value as a concept lies in being functional, rather than being axiomatic.” The lesson for our purpose seems to be this: Tradition, as a concept, should be measured by how appropriately it corresponds to the reality of a living culture and need not have any moral connotation that discour­ ages modernization.”

The argument from tradition to support cultural nationalism,

Irele continues, simply fails to take account of the transformations in our whole political and social order. The perpetuation of polygamy, for example, is often defended by arguing that it is not only justi­ fied by the African way of life, but is even dictated by it. While this may be true for the rural dweller in view of the labor-inten­ siveness of our traditional methods of farming, it is far from true for the typical urban dweller, such as a civil servant. Apart from the 239 absence of the social pressure upon his life for a polygamous mar­ riage, the very socioeconomic conditions of his life make the disci­ pline of monogamy an imperative. The civil servant can neither afford the financial means for supporting two wives nor the time to deal with the social tensions that often accompany polygamy.

The tendency to invoke tradition for the justification of such practices that have become impractical or (in Wiredu’s terms) anachronistic, Irele argues, is another indicator of the degree of alienation within the culture. Practices such as the wearing of leo­ pard skins over the safari suit, and adoption of indigenous names in place of given foreign names, the animation of traditional dancing, etc., provide apt illustrations for the point. The converse of this state of confusion is the spurious Westernization of the national bourgeoisie. Their inability to grasp the implications of the ongoing process of transformation is betrayed by their shallow spirit of materialism evident in their craving for Western luxuries and certain immoral behaviors, Irele says.

Our cultural alienation also manifests itself in the tendency to magnify and glorify the past achievements of our ancient forebearers.

This tendency is characterized by Ali Mazrui as "romantic gloriana," which is the antithesis of Senghor’s "romantic-primitivism." While it is undeniable that the early Egyptians constructed the Pyramids,

Irele argues, and I could not agree more with him, it is of no practi­ cal consequence if today we cannot build and maintain by ourselves 240 the roads and bridges and have to depend on outsiders for the ne­ cessities of modern civilization.

The benefit of this aspect of cultural nationalism as a source of inspiration in the colonial period cannot be denied; but it loses its significance if instead of being taken as an inspiration to greater achievements, it is taken to be "an encouragement to cultural smug ness." Using a historical coincidence to illustrate the point about a pietistic attitude towards culture, he states.

the pieties of cultural nationalism led to the scan­ dal of our being caught dancing at Algiers in 1969 on the day the Americans landed a man on the moon for the first time.”

That cultural nationalism, like naive negritude, can be a real hindrance to our orientation to science can be seen in the argument by certain social anthropologists to the effect that the traditional culture produces children who are better adapted for life than chil­ dren in the modern culture as found in the urban areas of the con­ tin en t.

The children of the new elite did not know that the teapots and teacups which they were using were made of clay, while all the local children knew this. Indeed, some of them helped their parents to make clay pots and cups and fire them, the chil­ dren at home could name all the trees around, and talked about the palm trees, banana and yam, while the children of the new elite knew nothing about them. They ate them and that was all. The chil­ dren from the urban area talked about aeroplane, television, hotels, birthday parties, fine dresses 241

and shoes. Those at home talked about masquer­ ades, wrestling on the sand, making traps and fishing.*®

This kind of demonstration has often been used by social an­ thropologists to argue in favor of educational reforms to incorporate learning the basic facts about life in the rural areas. On this Irele cautions that the responses of the children should be put in the context of life. It then becomes obvious that the urban child is far more prepared for a modern technological civilization and the kind of development I have argued for in this dissertation.

How can we our transcend cultural alienation and thus avoid all these foregoing negative implications and influences on our orienta­ tion to science and development? Irele offers five main steps to this end. First, we need to abandon the romanticism and the self- consciousness associated with negritude and cultural nationalism as a condition for dealing realistically with our existential problems in

Africa. This means, in the words of Irele,

we need a new determination, a spirit of adventure fired by modern imagination—a new state of mind that will enable us to come to terms with our state of alienation and to transform it from a passive condition we confusedly endure into an active col­ lective existential project. We need to take charge of our collective alienation by assuming it as an in ten tio n so as to endow it with a positive signifi­ cance 41

Second, it is pertinent for us to recall that the concept of alienation, in its rigorous philosophical form introduced by Hegel as 242 contrasted with its sociological interpretation by Feuerbach, Marx, and Weber, contains this positive significance. For Hegel it is only through the active confrontation of matter by mind that culture and thought are produced. History is made possible only by the adven­ ture of mind in the realm of nature. The mind sets in motion the

historical process, within which mind undergoes refinement and pro­

gresses towards the ultimate perfection of the "Absolute Idea." Cul­

ture and thought are thus the objectified forms of mind within the

historical process of primal mind alienated in nature. The state of alienation is thus a condition for the fulfillment of mind; and, he adds, perhaps even for its self-recognition.

The implication of this analysis for our thesis is that we need

not deny our state of alienation or try to escape it by any defensive

mechanism. Rather, we should retain the notion of alienation as the

principle of all becoming, or simply as the moving power of the pro­

cess of transformation we wish to accelerate. Thus instead of a neg­ ative reality in our history and culture, alienation will become a

positive reality: "a willed movement out of the self and a purposive

quest for new horizons of life and experience."^*

Third, as Africans, Irele suggests, we will also benefit psycho­

logically from the awareness that there are interesting parallels in

the history of our condition of alienation and problems with develop­

ment. Like us, the early Europeans were conquered, colonized,

exploited, and even enslaved by the Romans. Later, these cultures

were Christianized and subsequently their cultures, including their 243 languages, were permanently altered as evident in the emergence of the Romance languages. On the positive, these European cultures learned the civil works, the architecture, and one can add, Roman

Law.

Fourth, not only did the Europeans borrow from their Roman colonizers, they have also borrowed heavily from other cultures around the globe. European conquests and domination throughout the colonial era are unimaginable without the invention of gun pow­ der; yet the technology of gunpowder was borrowed from the Chi­ nese. We cannot also forget that tea, which has become synonymous with the European’s appetite for beverages, is a Chinese legacy.

After decades of humiliation and Japanese bashing, Europeans now consider "the yellow peril" as "the yellow paradigm," says Irele.

Art historians also credit African artists with helping to transform the European landscape and to give modern technology its most adequate mode of presentation. The influence of African art is manifest in the simplicity and functionality of modern products of technology. The rise of Black consciousness and the works of revi­ sionist historians in the U.S. have also produced incontrovertible evidence that the African has not only contributed physically, but also technologically to the development of the New World.

In a section of his paper entitled "What can Philosophy Do for

Africa," Wiredu presents an independent corroboration of these criti­ cal remarks on our cultural alienation and how to transcend it. In 244 support of the suggestion that we should not feel ashamed to borrow from other cultures, he says,

It always ought to be remembered that the history of human civilization is a history of mutual bor­ rowing among nations, peoples and races.*®

Further, like Irele, he warns against the "uncritical over evaluation" of things and ideas originating from our former colonizers, as well as an "uncontrolled nationalistic enthusiasm" that could lead to "cultural recrudescence which would in the long run prove to be self-defeat­ ing."**

In place of such extreme reactions, he recommends balancing the enthusiasm for cultural revival with a spirit of forward-looking self-criticism. The initiative in this direction, he remarks, will not come from the people, but from their thinkers. Wiredu's idea of for­ ward looking-self criticism finds its best demonstration in the works of Professor Agyakwa of the University of Cape Coast, Ghana, on

"Sankofaism." Sankofaism is derived from the Akan expression,

"Going back for it" and the related proverb which says, "It is not a taboo to go back and collect what you have forgotten." Sankofaism is the spirit of African cultural revival, not unlike the spirit of cultural Renaissance that caught Europe between the 14th and the

16th centuries. Among ordinary people and populist politicians,

Sankofaism as a cultural ideology represented a total rejection of

Western civilization in favor of the cultural revival of our pre-colo­ nial past. In view of the utilitarian considerations mentioned by both 245

Irele and Wiredu, particularly the technological disadvantage to our developmental objectives, Agyakwa was motivated at the peak of

Africa’s cultural revivalism in the early 70s to make the following philosophical trimming of the concept and, thus, make it a more ra­ tional proposition than the naive Sankofaism associated with our pop­ ulist politicians and poets such as Senghor and, to some extent,

Nkrumah.*®

1. It’s a call to go back to our cultural roots to search diligently for enduring things or values that have characterized our existence as a people. It’s not an attempt to seek refuge in the past. For example, we cannot afford human sacrifices now; neither can we have unusually large families. We cannot continue making cruel facial and bodily marks or destroy twins at birth all in the name of cultural heritage.

2. It’s a process of cultural renewal and develop­ ment with the sole objective of creating a new awareness of the values, guiding principles and awareness of the importance of indigenous African cu ltu re .

3. It's a critical re-appraisal of our indigenous culture which enables us to restore it to it’s true image, by discovering it’s potentials for the im­ provement of the quality of human life.

4. It’s an attempt to introduce more rationality and balance into our contemporary cultural awareness of development.

5. It’s a process of liberating minds of Africans from Western propaganda about so-called superior­ ity of Western culture. As a result of this libera­ tion, we should be able as Africans to think ratio­ nally independently and intelligently.

6. It is not the rejection of every foreign or alien culture. It does not imply cultural isolationism. For it must be realized culture needs interdepen­ dence. We can’t therefore remain in an island unto 246

ourselves. We need the cooperation of others in our attempt to be ourselves.*®

These qualifications are essential to the ideology of Sankofaism. Evi­ dently, they transform Sankofaism from a naive political ideology for

decolonization into a rational political ideology. In the words of Dr.

Kwame Appiah, it shows that the mental decolonization being pursued

is not "a return to pristine, traditionalist Eden, a return to the lares and penates of those shady beings we are in the habit of calling an­ c e s to rs ." "

It is indeed an attempt to introduce more rationality and bal­ ance into our contemporary cultural awareness of development, and

thus enable us to transcend the cultural alienation depicted by Irele above. Nevertheless, I do not think that it goes far enough towards

this goal. I have three complains against the principles. To be pro­

ductive, the sole objective of Sankofaism cannot be the creating of

new awareness of the values, guiding principles, and awareness of

the importance of indigenous African cultures as stated in the third principle. For that, awareness is not an end in itself. It is impor­

tant only as a means of stimulating and encouraging us on our journey toward development, just as the European cultural Renais­

sance was a booster to Western development.

Also the fifth principle contains a very controversial claim, which, under certain interpretations, represents a formidable obstacle 247 to our development. There are those who insist that cultures are in­ commensurable and, therefore, no culture can be judged to be supe­ rior or inferior to others. The incommensurability thesis which seems to underlie this argument is, however, indefensible. Cultures as whole units may be incommensurable, but not with regard to how well they fulfill certain cultural functions, such as insuring the security and well-being of the people. Cultures can be judged to be better or worse than others. For instance, when it comes to technological, medical, communication, and agricultural achievements, and how they enhance the well-being and flourishing of cultures, there is no denying that the West is superior to Africa which is predominantly a traditional society. The traditional cultures of Africa, on the other hand, may be superior to other cultures regarding such values as respect for nature or the environment, communal moral support, re­ ciprocity, and respect for the dignity and sanctity of life.

Until we cease hiding behind the facade of total cultural rela­ tivism or cultural incommensurability and self-consciously accept our shortcomings in science and technology, we will hardly be in a posi­ tion to abandon our intuitive and unscientific attitudes. Yet it is these attitudes that perpetuate our scientific and technological de­ pendence on Western and non-Western cultures, such as Japan and

Korea, which have transcended their own cultural alienation and man­ aged to accommodate Western-style modernization without losing their own cultural identities. 248

Making Religion an Ally for Science and Development

The history of religion and science in the West since the Mid­

dle Ages, at least, shows that religion can either be a hindrance or

an asset to the growth of science. That the Church opposed scien­

tific inquiry and tried to suppress the growth of knowledge not only

through dogmatic teachings, but also through excommunication and other extreme measures, is well known. For instance, in 1551, the

Papal Legates presiding over the Council of Trent ordered.

That the Divines ought to conform their opinions with the holy Scripture, Traditions of the Apostles, sacred and approved Councils, and by the Consti­ tutions and authorities of the holy fathers

That the Church and some religious thinkers promoted scientific

thinking by actually inspiring, conducting, or sponsoring scientific experiments and applications are not so well-known.

In this final section, I wish to reflect on how contemporary

African philosophers approach the religious aspect of their ongoing efforts to pave the way for science and development. I will discuss four such approaches and argue that there is the need for a new alternative aimed at making religion an ally for science and develop­ ment.

1. Nkrumah's Approach

From a Marxist standpoint, informed by a Freudian or

Durkheimian explanation of religion, Nkrumah stated that religion is 249 an instrument of bourgeois social reaction. People who are most ag­ gressively religious, according to Nkrumah, are the poorer people; for religion is social, and contemporary religious forms and practice have their main root in the social depression of workers. Fear, he ex­ plains, created the gods and preserves them—fear in bygone ages of war, pestilence, earthquakes, and nature gone berserk; fear of "acts of god"; fear today for the equally blind forces of backwardness and rapacious capital.

In order to deal with the three-dominant religious traditions in

Ghana, and as a model for other African countries, he declared, "It is essential to emphasize in the historical condition of African that the state must be secular."*® In order to implement this policy, Nkrumah introduced his ideology called Consciencism which was aimed at as­ similating the three religious traditions in Africa—African traditional religion and culture, Islam, and Christianity. From his awareness of the socio-political conditions in Communist countries, he knew that without taking practical steps to insure its disappearance, religion, contrary to Marx’s prediction, will not simply "wither away" with the improvement of socioeconomic living conditions. So his strategy was to assimilate into a political religion the three traditions with himself as the Messiah. In the process, he assumed this title, which trans­ lates in the Akan language as Osagyefo (meaning Savior). His intolerance and persecution of certain leaders of the Churches and their schools created impediments in the slow, but steady efforts of these institutions at critiqueing certain unscientific beliefs, values, 250

and attitudes that impede the growth of science. At the same time,

Nkrumah glorified traditional religious beliefs and practices in the

name of sankofaism and the positive projection of African peronality

thus discouraged their objective criticism. Since such criticisms are

a necessary prelude to the grounding of the scientific attitude to life

within the culture, it is undeniable that Nkrumah’s approach failed to

promote the scientific orientation to life in Ghana or in Africa. If all

the allegations about his dabbling in magic and sorcery could be

proved, it would follow that he discouraged rather than encouraged

th e o rien tatio n to science.®®

2. Wiredu’s Approach

Wiredu acknowledges the effectiveness of traditional medicine in

treating certain ailments even when modern medicine has failed. His

overall approach to the religious question is, nevertheless, condi­

tioned by his Logical Positivist orientation to philosophy.

Religion, in general, is for him not only meaningless, but a form of superstition. It also promotes both authoritarianism and su­

pernaturalism since all these three vices of religion hinder the

growth of science and the orientation to science. It goes without

saying that, for Wiredu, religion is a hindrance to Africa’s develop­

ment. His solution lies in introducing children into the methodology of science and critical thinking starting "from fairly early stages."^® 251

This perception of religion as a hindrance to science is best presented by Russell, who wrote frequently and openly against reli­ gion. I will, therefore, defer my comments on Wiredu’s position until

I have examined Russell’s below.

3. Horton’s Approach

Horton’s approach to the religious question is contained in his

African Traditional Religion And Western Science. The main argument he develops is that the religious beliefs of traditional peoples are ex­ emplars of rational explanatory theories. On the basis of these theo­ ries, he adds, attempts are made to predict and to control events of the world. Hence, traditional religious beliefs and their derivative actions are rational, and hence similar to Western scientific theories.

Notwithstanding their similarities, however, Horton contends, the theories eu-e dissimilar in other respects. For instance, while the

theories of traditional religion are presented in personal terms, those of science are presented in impersonal terms. Also, borrowing Pop­

per’s terminologies, he maintains that the traditional theories are

closed (in the sense that alternative hypotheses are not tolerated),

whereas those of Western science are open (in the sense that alter­

native hypotheses are entertained).

Further, Horton maintains that, unlike Western science, the tra­

ditional religious theories lack "logic or philosophy." This, he ex­

plains, is due to the lack of any thinking directed to discovering

norms for the general arguments or the general evidential justifica­

tion of claims to knowledge. This is further explained in terms of 252 the second defect—the lack of alternative hypotheses. For where there is no alternative, there is no choice; where there are no choices, there are no norms for choosing. Another difference is that apart from the goals of explanation and prediction, which are central to science, the traditional religions also aim at fulfilling a need for personal relationships among members of the spiritual community and those of the physical world.

Further, Horton suggests that traditional thinkers and Western scientists have different ways of reacting to failed predictions. Un­ like the Western scientist, the traditional person is eager to resort to ad hoc excuses instead of questioning his ontological assumptions and the epistemological status of divination.

Some of the details of Horton’s analysis are highly controver­ sial. For example, he does not realize that it is certainly a concep­ tual blunder to suppose that the traditional thinkers have theories and explanations for their beliefs and actions and to deny within the same context that they have logic. What makes a set of statements a theory or an explanation is, of course, the logical structure: deduc­ tive, inductive, or the combination of the two into hypothetico- deductive structures. Hence, a theory or an explanation without a logical structure is simply a contradiction in terms.

It is also patently false to assume that traditional theories lack alternative hypotheses. When a traditional African farmer feels a painful sensation on his leg, his immediate reaction would be to hy­ pothesize that he has been bitten by an insect or a snake. If the 253

pain intensifies and the environment is known to be snake-infested,

he will assume that it is a snakebite and proceed to apply traditional

first aid. Next, he will seek medication from the nearest herbalist.

If the herbalist tries a particular kind of medication and it doesn’t

work, he will pursue alternative procedures. These are often accom­

panied by personal explanations to answer questions like "Why me?",

"Why here now?", especially if no treatment seems to work. Alterna­

tive hypotheses are also frequently employed within the personal id­

iom paradigm. For one may hypothesize that the snake bite was

caused by a witch, an evil god, an angry ancestor or one’s God

given destiny that has been altered by evil forces. To say that tra­

ditional explanations are closed or lack alternatives is to grossly mis­

represent the traditional rationality.

Even if the comparisons and contrasts were accurate, Horton’s

approach would not necessarily constitute a significant contribution

to the attempts at paving the way for science. It could, in fact, be­

come another hindrance in the hands of cultural nationalists who

might infer from the analyses that the traditional explanations and

the Western ones are both rational and, therefore, equally valid as

explanations of phenomena.

Compared with Wiredu’s approach, which represents a wholesale

rejection of religious explanations, however, Horton’s approach is, in a sense, more constructive. For it attempts, with some limited suc­ cess, to draw attention to the similarities and differences between the 254

two paradigms. Consequently, given some modifications, it could be­

come a significant contribution to the attempts by Agyakwa and

Nduka to bridge the epistemological gap between the two cultures.

Thus, it could be a valuable means of promoting scientific thinking

within traditional cultures.

4. Appiah's Approach

Appiah recognizes that the philosophical study of traditional

religion along the lines suggested by Horton and his philosophical

opponents are important because it is central to the conceptual is­

sues raised by modernization; as a study, it is one way by which we

can begin to understand modernization. Appiah explains this causal

relation saying, "One of the marks of traditional life is the extent to

which beliefs, habits of mind, and behavior in general are shot

through and through with what we call ’religion’."®^

Another reason for the study is that most black Africans,

whether or not converted to Islam or Christianity, still share the be­ liefs of their ancestors in the ontology of invisible beings. If mod­

ernization is conceived of, in part, as the acceptance of science, we

have to decide whether we think the evidence obliges us to give up

the invisible ontology. Recognizing that there might be inconsisten­ cies that cannot be reconciled, he recommends that we learn from other cultures, such as the Japanese, who have "managed to keep separate moral-political and cognitive spheres."®*

It seems to me that Appiah is missing the point by laying em­ phasis on the ontologies. For the problem with traditional beliefs is 255 not the number of entities the people believe to exist, but what the people do or do not do as a result of their beliefs. As noted above, in the discussions of causal explanations, the tradition explanations involve both the impersonal or scientific and the personal; the main problem is that, unlike the Western paradigm, the traditional paradigm allows the personal explanation to take over too soon. What needs to be done in this regard then is not to insulate one from the other, but to explain the difference between the two paradigms and to encourage sustained explorations within the impersonal realm be­ fore turning to the personal realm when necessary for psychological or other reasons.

5. O sei's A pproach

My own approach to the question of religion is twofold. First,

I wish to argue that, contrary to the view presumed by Nkrumah and

Wiredu and widely spread by Betrand Russell, religion is not neces­ sarily a hindrance to science and development. The first step will be to show that religion, especially the organized Churches, has made and continues to make significant contributions to science and devel­ opment. Next, I will suggest a method for the reconstruction of certain theological beliefs in the dominant religious traditions with the aim of making them more oriented to science and development.

According to Whitehead, science requires not only a sense for coherent system, but, above all, a general sense of order in things.

The orientation to science is thus impossible without the development 256 of logic. The long dominance of scholastic logic and scholastic divin­ ity insured that "the habit of definite exact thought was implanted in th e European mind."®^

Of course, medieval theology is virtually extinct, but the habits of cultivating a "clear head" and "analytic thinking" have survived as a legacy from that era for rational thinking and the growth of science. The greatest contribution made by the medievalists to the formation of the scientific movement, however, according to White­ head, is not their logic or analytic thinking. It is rather.

the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occur­ rence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles. Without this belief the incredible labors of scientists would be without hope. It is this in­ stinctive conviction, vividly poised before the imagination, which is the motive power of research: that there is a secret, a secret which can be un­ veiled. How has this conviction been so vividly im planted on the E uropean mind?"®*

It is not hard to see how this belief in universal causality could arise in Europe at the time. The medievalists insisted on the ratio­ nality of God, conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher. This God, as portrayed by the medievalists, was both rational and personal and so it is not too hard to see how such ideas could influence the minds of the me­ dieval Europeans. The principle of causality, for Whitehead, repre­ sents "faith in the possibility of science." And his explanation for 257

its existence, antecedent to the development of modern scientific the­

ory, is that it is an unconscious derivative of medieval theology.

These doctrines, as every student of theology knows, included imago

dei creatio ex nihilo, orderliness of the cosmos, and the teleological

interpretation of all reality.

When it comes to the practical application of science, the con­

tribution of certain churchmen cannot continue to be ignored.

Gregory and Benedict, for example, combined practical science with

their religious and cultural activities. St. Benedict, for instance,

made the monasteries the home of practical agriculturalists, as well as of saints, artists, and men of learning. According to Whitehead, the alliance of science with technology, by which learning is kept in

contact with irreducible and stubborn facts, owes much to the practi­

cal bent of the early Benedictines.

In short, "Modern science derives from Rome as well as from

Greece." This Roman strain, he adds, was a gain for science, for it explains how thought could be kept closely in contact with the world of facts.*®

It is also known that the person who discovered the units of

heredity, later called the genes—which are fast becoming key ingre­

dients in forensic science and in medical science, was Gregory

Mendel, a 19th century Czech monk. Many people are, of course, aware of all the advances made in genetics and its applications in biology and medical research, but it is interesting that precise laws of heredity were first discovered by a monk.*® 258

The point of all these references should not be hard to see:

The view that religion by nature perpetuates dogmatism and opposes

the advancement of science is just a myth. The most unusual thing

about this myth is that it has been perpetuated by prominent

philosophers, including Betrand Russell. In his book, Why I am Not A

C hristian, for instance, Russell refers to the Inquisition with its tor­

tures and the burning of witches. Russell further alleges,®^

You find as you look around the world that every single bit of progress in humane feeling, every im­ provement in the criminal law, every step toward the diminution of war, every step toward the bet­ terment of the colored races, or every mitigation of slavery, every moral progress that has been in the world, has been consistently opposed by the orga­ nized churches of the world. I say quite deliber­ ately that the Christian religion, as organized in its churches, has been and still is the principal enemy of moral progress in the world.®®

Further, under the section "How Churches Have Retarded Progress,"

Russell claims that the Church is still in its major part an opponent of progress and of improvement in all the ways that diminish suffer­

ing in the world. According to Russell, this is true because the

Church has chosen to label as morality a certain narrow set of rules and, when you say this or that ought to be done because it would

make for human happiness, they think that has nothing to do with

the matter at all. Thus the Church asks, "What has human happiness

to do with morals?", and maintains that "the object of morality is not

to make people happy." 259

The only support Russell gives for such a serious allegation

against the Church is the Catholic’s Church’s opposition to divorce

and the use of birth control. Even when one’s partner happens to

have syphilis, says Russell, the Chruch will neither permit divorce

nor the use of contraceptives to prevent the birth of children in­

fected with syphilis. To be fair to Russell, the Catholic Church

would not officially permit abortion even if one of the parents is

diagnosed as having Aids. However, it is neither fair to the Chris­

tian community nor logically correct for Russell, of all people, to con­

sider this extreme case in the Catholic Church as sufficient evidence

for the claim that the Church is an opponent of progress and im­

provement, knowing very well that the Catholic church—although the

largest denomination —is only one among several major Christian de­

nominations.

Also, Russell does not appear to realize that a moral system

does not have to be hedonistic in order to achieve happiness for mankind. Kantian ethics, for example, is by no means hedonistic.

Yet if every one were to act out of a sense of duty and abide by the principle of the categorical imperative, it would surely maximize fair­

ness or justice in the world. And that will, of course, promote hap­ piness. Similarly, if a religious morality aims at bringing glory to

God, it could make relieving poverty and suffering, sharing material goods, and promoting peace and justice part of the means of glori­ fying God. Hence, there is no prima facie contradiction in aiming at 260 glorifying God as one’s Summum Bonum and promoting human happi­ ness. Where conflicts arise, as they would in all ethical systems, they would have to be resolved by other means.

There is no denying that the Catholic Church conducted the

Inquisition and witch hunting. However, Russell leaves unsupported the serious allegations in the major quote above, viz. that organized churches, not just the Catholic Church, have opposed "every bit of progress in humane feeling...." Yet it is obvious to everyone who cares to look at the Churches’ record, especially in the mission field, that the Churches and individual Christiana have done a great deal towards the Development of most Third World countries.

Professor Odamtte, of the University of Cape Coast, argues in his book The Missionary Factor In Ghana^B D evelopm ent th a t th e

Church missionary bodies are not only responsible for most of the best schools and hospitals in the country, but are also responsible for the introduction and cultivation of cocoa which is still Ghana’s chief export. They were also responsible for training locals in building technology, masonry, carpentry, and commerce. Also, the leadership experience the educated elites got from religious schools and Church admnistration became instrumental in the struggle for in­ dependence and subsequent self-government.

Talking about humane feelings and human rights, it is only fair that we examine the record of Western philosophy, which is Russell’s heritage. Notwithstanding all the claims about humanism and human rights in philosophy, some of the major Western philosopohers have 261 held views that can only embarrass contemporary Western philoso­ phers. Both Plato and Aristotle, for example, saw nothing wrong with slavery as long as the victims were not Greek citizens. Plato's Re­ public, for example, presupposes the legitimacy of class distinctions and a form of totalitarianism. When told of a Negro in Jamaica who was learned, David Hume responded:

I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There scarecely ever was a civilised nation of that complexion, nor ever an in­ dividual, eminent in action or speculation. It is likely that he (the learned man of Jamiaca) is ad­ mired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few w ords plainly.*®

Karl Marx is also said to have held very negative views about

Negroes. In a letter to Engels, he writes this piece intended as an insult to Lassalle: "This combination of Jewry and Germany with a funamental Negro streak.... The fellow’s self-assertiveness is Negro too."6° In recounting the "sins" of the Church, Russell was either ignoring these instances or he was ignorant of these equally serious

"sins" of philosophy against humanity and the humanities. If he was ignorant, then his criticism of the Church was based on insufficient evidence and balance. On the other hand, if he was aware but ig­ nored them, then his work in this regard is intellectually dishonest.

There is and there will always be some room for improvement, but no honest Third World intellectual can deny the role of the

Churches and their international development agencies, such as 262

Catholic Relief Services, Feed the Children, and Oxfam in the estab­ lishment of primary and secondary schools, hospitals, emergency food aid, and agricultural extension services. Russell, as a British intel­ lectual, could not plead ignorance of all these programs and similar ones run by Church missions which have been going on between

Britain and her former colonies, as well as the rest of the Western world and their mission fields. He also appears to be ignorant of the role of the Churches and individual Christian leaders like Reverend

John Wesley, Reverend Henry Veen, Reverend William Lloyd Paterson, and Reverend Theodore Parker in the abolition of slavery in Britain and the U.S. His book was certainly written before the civil rights struggles led by Dr. Martin Luther King, efforts of the World Council of Churches, and Church leaders like Bishop Tutu to end Apartheid in South Africa. Such recent developments make the revision of Rus­ sell’s book and the repudiation of such anti-Church bias within phi­ losophy an imperative.

Contemporary African philosophers should avoid similar hasty conclusions and the wholesale condemnation of all Churches or reli­ gions. Instead, they could collaborate with the Chruches and help discover reasons why certain religions promote scientific thinking, while others tend to hinder it. In what follows, I will illustrate this.

There are two main models for representing the God-man- nature relationship in African traditional teligions. One is the pyra­ mid, which depicts the hierarchy of powers. At the apex is, of course, the Supreme Being, and on each side of the triangle are the 263 divinities and the ancestors. At the base of this triangle are the lesser spirits: witches, charms, juju, magical forces, etc. Since man is perceived to have little or no power of his own, he is outside this hierarchy of powers. The model receives its illustration and justifi­ cation from the political structure in traditional societies. The ordi­ nary citizen has no power, and can only contact the king through the mediation of the linguists or subchiefs. By parity of reasoning, the common worshipper cannot have any direct communication with the Supreme Being; he has to depend on the intermediary role of the ancestors or gods provided by their priests or spokespersons.

The second model of the God-Man-Nature relationship consists of a number of concentric circles. At the core of the concentric cir­ cles is man, followed by the lesser spirits, then the ancestors and gods, leaving the outermost circle for the Supreme Being. This re­ presentation depicts the scope of the worshipper’s attention, rather than power relations. Since the magical powers, ancestors, and divinities are closer to him than the Supreme Being, it is clear that they receive more of his attention than the Supreme Being. The ex- plantion is that the concentric circles represent God in such a way that his transcendence now dominates his immanence. Thus, we see the African is not only subordinated to these spiritual entities be­ sides the Supreme Being, but is also so completely sandwiched by them that he can hardly conceive of himself as an autonomous being.

Having totally submitted his will to these forces he is no longer in a position to make his own decisions and to insist on his right to self- 264 determination. He perceives himself to be so helpless that, without these entities, there is hardly anything he can do for himself.

Professor Patrick A. Twumasi, of the University of Ghana, has argued that the ultimate concern of the Asantes of Ghana is the be­ lief in ancestral principles.

One cannot ignore the will of the ancestors with impunity. Kinship relations define the social meaining of life for the Asantes and provide the symbolic structure in terms of which they under­ stand their relation to supernatural forces. The belief in ancestral principles is the crucial moti­ vating force in everyday life. This is the ultimate reality in their quest for the explantion of human existence. Even the idea of God is understood from the idea of kinship.®^

This condition, which exists to some extent in all religions, is a form of religious overdependence. It should be seen as not only pathetic for the individual, but also counter-productive to the goals of na­ tional development which require a significant degree of individual moral responsibility and a determination for self-improvement inde­ pendent of the will of these spiritual forces.

When we turn our attention from the traditional worldview to the Christian worldview, however, we see a totally different picture as far as the place of man is concerned. At the base of the Chris­ tian worldview are two major traditions, the Greco-Roman and the

Jewish. Having demythologized their universe, the Greek philosophers, represented by Perminides, projected the humanist view that by virtue of his rationality "man is the measure of all things." This 265 elevated picture of man was further boosted by the Judaeo-Christian worldview, which depicted man as created in the image of God (imago

Dei), and with an end superior to that of any other creature. The conceptual and practical implications of these worldviews amounted to a Revolution of Ideas in Western culture. God’s transcendence is given more emphasis over his immanence. Thus it becomes possible for the Western man to see himself as the crown, or center, of cre­ ation. Capitalizing on his God-given rationality and freedom, he be­ gan to study and to take control of the rest of creation as God’s steward. The Protestant ethos, in particular, created more room for individual praticipation in life by de-emphasizing the role of God in the mundane affairs of the individual. The capitalist ethos, inspired by the Protestant ethos, also emphasized that man is in greater con­ trol of nature than previously thought. Thus, while Protestantism emphasized the doctrine of diminishing divine control over man, cap­ italism was a doctrine of increasing human control over nature.

Environmentally conscious critics or moralists might complain, and rightly so, that Western man has not been a good steward of nature.

That, however, does not negate his status as the crown of creation on this view.

Another significant implication of this worldview was human equality. For if all men are created by the same God in his own im­ age, then there is no justification for treating some people unequally.

With time, the concept of equality led to movements towards liberty, democracy, socialism, and social justice. In the words of Gueddo 266

Piero, the Italian social researcher and writer, "This first revolution of ideas is the drive behind all the scientific discoveries, explo­ rations, exploitations of nature, and other human achievements. For if man is the king of all creation, then, not only is he dignified, he is also given the authority and the challenge to study and manage nature in such a way that it will benefit him.

In the absence of these progressive and revolutionary ideas which have laid the foundation for science and technology in the

West, it is difficult for any culture to assimilate or accommodate sci­ ence and technology. And this explains, in part, the difficulty faced by agricultural extension officers, development agents, family plan­ ning experts, and all others involved in the transplantation of sci­ ence and technology in most non-Western cultures.

Apart from Max Weber, who was the first to do conduct a sci­ entific study of these claims, other sociologists confirm them.

Christopher Dawson, for example, concludes that the religious con­ cepts "freed man from enslavement to nature, gave man his knowl­ edge of his dignity and a messianic hope to fight for in history and beyond."®*

The Islamic conception of the God-Man-Nature Relationship in the Arab world was also informed by Greek philosophy and is quite similar to that of Christianity. Man is created by Allah to be his special representative, or viceroy, on earth. He is given supremacy even over angels (whereas the Judaeo-Christian tradition subordinates man to the angels). He is also given the mandate to 267 study and to control nature to his advantage.®® Several portions of th e Quoran can be cited to support these claims. Here is just one:

"God told human beings, 'I have something to present to all of you: the earth, the sky, mountains, seas, and animals; to hold as trust."®*

The literal meaning of Islam from the Arabic language is

"submission," but, clearly unlike African Traditional Religions, the submission is not to ancestors, lesser spirits, or gods, but only to the Supreme Being, Allah. Their achievements include the Arabic number system, algebra, experimental physics, and medicine.®®

Since both Islam and Christianity have exnded for centuries into Africa, it is to be wondered why these concepts have not made a similar impact in Africa. "Unfortunately', sighs professor Nduka, "the type of Islam in Nigeria (as in most parts of Africa) is not like that in the Arab States of the world which promote science and develop­ ment."®® Professor El Gall M.S., himself an African Muslim, expresses similar sentiments, saying, "Islamic learning in the African extensions is more mystical and less rational, more superstitious and less realis­ tic, than the Afro-Arab world."®’

An equally plausible explanation on the Christian side for this progressive-mentality vacuum is found in The Miaaionary Factor In

Ghana'a Development by Profesor S.K. Odamtten. Most of the early missionaries, he argues, were too ill-equipped educationally for these 268

metaphysical and normative discussions and their implications for sci­

ence and development. The fundamentalists among them, pre­ occupied with otherworldly concerns, were naturally uninterested in improving conditions in this world.®®

As a result of these educational disappointments, one of the

significant contributions the contemporary African philosophy of reli­ gion or culture could make for the advancement of his people be­ comes clear. Given his training and his familiarity with the

traditional culture, he is in a better position than most religious leaders to draw out the implications of the metaphysical assumptions and their significance for science and development. The existence of

God is, of course, an open-ended question and fortunately the phe- nomeological approach to cultural studies has demonstrated that this intermediary role of the philosopher does not require an ontological commitment on his part to Theism or any religious doctrine. God’s existence, the doctrine of imago dei, and man’s unique place in na­ ture, etc., could be taken simply as metaphysical postulates from which one could draw the relevant implications and suggestions for human rationality and for science and development.

Of all the alternative approaches for dealing with the religious question, this is the only one that takes seriously the reality of reli­ gion as a social phenomenon that cannot be wished or argued out of existence. It is also the only position that shows how the three reli­ gious traditions could be transformed into a dynamic instrument for social transformation. Making religion an ally for development is. 269 therefore, more utility maximizing than all the alternative positions under consideration. Such a partnership stimulated by a common objective—the well-being of the people—will almost certainly make the philosophers more productive in their efforts to pave the way for science and development in Africa. 270

FOOTNOTES

^Schilck, Moritz, "The Future of Philosophy", College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy, 1932. Rpt. in Basic Philosophical A n a lysis (Encino, Charles L. Reid, 1971), p. 125.

*Wiredu, Kwasi, Philosophy and an African Culture (London, Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 2.

^Ibid., p. 15.

*Ibid., p. 13.

sjbid.

^Ibid., p. 24.

’Irele Abiola, In Praise Of Alienation, An Inaugural Address delivered on the 22nd of November, 1982, at the University of Ibadan, p .22 of 1987 rp t.

®Wiredu, ibid., p. 4.

sjbid., p. 2.

^°lbid,, p. 4.

^^Similar proverbs and maxims for authoritarianism abound in other African languages [give examples from Yoruba and Ibo, Hausa and Swahili).

"Wiredu, op. cit., p. 3.

^^Ibid.

"Sarte, Jean-Paul, quoted in Metaphilosophy, Vol. 10, No.l (January 1979), p. 84.

"B usia, Kofi A., A Purposeful Education For Africa (The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1968), and Fishel M., "Attitudes Towards the Curruculum of African University (Part II), West African Journal Of Education, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (June, 1969) p. 91.

"Nduka, Otonti, "African Traditional Systems of Thought," West Africa Journal of Education, Vol. xviii. No. 2 (June 1974), p. 59.

"Wiredu, op. cit., p. 34. 271

i®These words of Thomas Jefferson are beautifully engraved in the Conference Hall at Baker House, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.

‘®Wiredu, op. cit., p. 5.

*°One should be careful not to give the impression that Akan or African ethics is exclusively religious, for that would definitely be wrong given the existence of alternative determinants of rightness and wrongness on principles of reciprocity, communal well-being which is utilitarian, and human dignity or human rights. Professor Kudadjie of the University of Ghana argues that traditional life and thought in Africa is not inextricably bound up with religion. There is the tendency to exaggerate the role of religion in traditional soci­ ety, according to Kudadji, to combat some of the erroneous impres­ sions of Europeans about African life and thought. But then, he cautions, we should avoid over-reaction. See J.N. Kudadje, "Does Re­ ligion Determine Morality in African Societies? A Viewpoint," in J.S. Pobee (ed.). Religion in a Pluralistic Society (E.J. Brill, 1976), pp. 66ff. See, also, Dickson, op. cit., p. 37f.

zipor example, the Jaba people of North Central Nigeria, ac­ cording to Dr. B.H. Jaba, a native, forbid women and children from earing eggs because that might tempt them to "eat" the "eggs" in the embryo of pregnant women. The underlying reason is that witches "eat" the "eggs" in the wombs of pregnant women. So if they eat eggs, they may be tempted to behave like the witches. See African Cultural Revolution and the Christian Faith by Dr. B.H. Kato, Jos, Nigeria, 1976, p. 10.

**Sodipo, J.S., "Notes on the Concept of Cause and Change in Yoruba Traditional Thought," Second Order, An African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Jan u ary 1975), p. 13.

*®Quoted in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Art of Wonder­ in g (5th edition), by James Christian (The Dryden Press, 1990), p. 22.

**Sodipo, ibid., p. 14f.

*®Makinde, M.A., "Robin H orton’s Philosophy: An O utline of In ­ tellectual Error" presented at a symposium at the University of Ife, Nigeria, June 1978, pp. 65-66. The passage was quoted by Sodipo at the World Congress of Philosophy (at Düsseldorf, August-September, 1978) to illustrate the nature of the intellectual rigor that character­ ized and distinguishes contemporary African philosophy from African ethno-philosophy.

^®There is a correspondence between the use of "destiny" in this context and concepts such as moira in Greek mythology, fore-or- dainment or predestination in Christian theology, karma in Eastern religions and philosophy, and "the will of Allah" in Islam. 272

"Reverend Professor K.A. Dickson has discussed the paradoxi­ cal nature of this belief based on linguistic analysis of the Akan us­ age in relation to other usages in Africa. As he argues later, the paradox is only apparent, for there is an attempt to reconcile God’s primary in determining what happens to the individual and individual moral responsibility. See Kwesi A. Dickson, Aspects of Religion and Life in Africa (The J.B. Danquah Memorial lecture series, February 1977, Accra, Ghana), pp. 3-8.

2®Agyakwa, K.O., Akan Epistemology and Western Thought (unpublished) Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia Teachers’ College, New York, 1976, p. 1.

"Nduka, Otonti, "African Traditional Systems of Thought," P7esl African Journal of Education, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (June 1974), p. 59. See, also, E. Gellner, Thought and Change (Weinderfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 72.

"Agyakwa, op. cit., p. 139f.

" Ib id .

"Agyakwa, op. cit., p. 227.

" Ire le , ibid., p. 5.

" Jb id ., p. 7.

"M azrui, Ali, The Africans: A Triple Heritage, BBC Publications, 1986, p. 74.

"Irele, op. cit., p. 41.

"Ibid., p. 14.

^^Ibid., p. 15.

^ Ib id ., p. 17.

*°Onwuejeojwu, A., The Social Anthropology of Africa (Heineman), quoted in Irele, op. cit., p. 18.

4ilrele, op. cit., p. 19.

*^Ibid., p. 2.

"W iredu, op. cit., p. 60.

**Ibid., p. 58. 273

*®Nkrumah was deeply involved in what Ali Mazrui calls roman­ tic gloriana. He tried to create the impression that almost all the in­ gredients of literate culture and written science originated from African scholars. Postcards published in Ghana during his regime had the following representations; Tyro, an African, alleged to be the inventor of shorthand, and the secretary of Cicero, an African, teaching mathematics to Greeks. Other postcards also indicated that the science of law originated in Africa and was practiced in the an­ cien t Ghana em pire by 10 B.C. See Ali M azrui, op. cit., p. 74f.

*®These p rin cip les w ere given as le c tu re notes for s tu d e n ts of African philosophy of education at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana, in 1982. I was then Agyakwa’s teaching assistant, and a stu­ dent of post-graduate certificate for education. Similar views on Sankofaism are found in Sociology of Education for African Schools, by D.K. Agyemang, University of Cape Coast.

A ppiah, K., Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, Vol. 5 (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), pp. 207-234.

*®Whitehead, A., Science and the Modern World (New York, Macmillan Company, Inc., 1967), p. 9.

^®Nkrumah, Conaciencism, op. cit., p. 13f.

s®Several allegations implicating the former president in magic and sorcery surfaced after his overthrow in 1966. A good example is his involvement with a fetish called Kankan Nyame imported from Guinea, published in The Believer, September 27, 1979, under the heading "Real Causes of Ghanians Suffering."

®*Appiah, op. cit., p. 208.

5*Ibfd., p. 231.

*®Whitehead, op. cit., p. 12.

s*Ibid.

®®Whitehead, op. cit., p. 15.

“ A ppiah, K., Necessary Questions: An Introduction to Philoso­ p h y (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1989), p. 88.

S’f bid.

ssRussell, B., "Why I am Not a Christian," in Philosophy and Contemporary Issues (2nd edition), edited by J.R. Burr and M. G oldinger (New York, Macmillan), p. 124. 274

®®Hume, D., E ssays (London, George Routledge and Sons, Ltd.), footnote on pp. 152-153 in the course of the essay on "National Char­ acters." See, also, Wiredu, op. cit., p. 49fn.

®°Wiredu, op. cit.

eiTwumasi, P.A., Ultimate Reality and Meaning: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Philosophy of Understanding, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Septem ber 1984), pp. 201-208. The quote is from the Introduction, by the exec­ utive editor, S.J. Hoirvath.

®*Weber’s findings are contained in his famous book. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1930. C h risto p h er Daw­ son, Religion and Culture (New York, Sheed and Ward, 1948), p. 47. More recent sociologists who confirm these views include Talcott Par­ sons, "Christianity and Modern Industrial Society" in Religion's Influ­ ence in Contemporary Society (Columbus, Charles Merrill Publishing Co., 1972), edited by J.E. Faulkner.

®®Mbow, Islam, Philosophy and Science (Paris, UNESCO P ress, 1981), Preface.

^*Quoran, xxxiv, 72.

®*Gueddo, op. cit., p. 43.

®®Nduka, op. cit., p. 164f.

®’E1 Garh, "The Philosophical Basis of Islamic Education in West A frica," West African Journal of Education, Vol. XV, No. 1 (F eb ru ary 1971), p. 20.

®®Odamtten, S.K., The Missionary Factor in Ghana's Development, 1820-1880 (Accra, Waterville, 1978), p. 227f. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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