The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism a Methodological Comparison of the Use of Scripture As a Source of Moral Knowledge Todd A
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Louvain Studies 26 (2001) 117-146 The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism A Methodological Comparison of the Use of Scripture as a Source of Moral Knowledge Todd A. Salzman It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that since the 1960s a schism has developed in Catholic moral theology that has profound implications for the Catholic Church today. The schism is evi- dent in the work of two groups of moral theologians, the one known as revisionists and the other, those who have developed a new natural law theory, what we will refer to as the Basic Goods Theory (BGT). The term “revisionism” designates the school that is commonly referred to as proportionalism. Revisionism, however, is a broader term that deals with the entire revision of Catholic moral theology, and does not focus exclu- sively on the normative ethical realm.1 The BGT has been developed by Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Joseph Boyle and includes, but is not limited to, Russell Shaw and William May.2 Both groups have attempted 1. The theologians who represent this school are too numerous to list here. How- ever, invaluable sources that both cite those theologians and their contributions to the revisionist school of thought are the ongoing “Notes on Moral Theology” published annually in Theological Studies and the series, Readings in Moral Theology (New York: Paulist Press) edited by Charles E. Curran, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Margaret A. Farley (volume nine). 2. The literature which articulates the BGT is extensive and can be found in the following works: Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus. Volume One: Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983); The Way of the Lord Jesus. Volume Two: Living a Christian Life (Quincy, IL: Franciscan Herald Press, 1993); Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ: A Summary of Christian Moral Principles (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Fundamentals of Ethics (Wash- ington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1983); Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 1991); Germain Grisez, Joseph M. Boyle, and John Finnis, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism 118 TODD A. SALZMAN to respond to Vatican II's call for a renewal in Catholic moral theology, but have done so in very different ways. Whereas the BGT has developed a quite complex ethical theory to explain and justify specific moral norms including the absolute norms taught by the Magisterium, revisionism's theory has sometimes challenged those teachings. These attempts at renewal have been the subject of scholarly, and sometimes even acrimo- nious, debate between the two schools of thought as well as the object of official magisterial pronouncements. Pope John Paul II's encyclical Veritatis Splendor3 on fundamental moral theology both implicitly recognized and confirmed this schism, but by no means settled it. It recognized the schism by addressing a pop- ular contemporary approach to moral theology known as proportional- ism or “teleologism” (sic). Though it clearly condemned this approach to moral theology as mistaken, and at times even utilizes the BGT's termi- nology and reasoning4 (thereby implicitly suggesting the BGT as an offi- cially approved ethical theory), it did not settle the debate among Catholic moral theologians. It did not do so because the ethical approach that it condemned is not an accurate representation of the revisionist position according to revisionist moral theologians.5 What the encyclical did do, however, was to emphasize the need for a clear conceptual understand- ing of the two predominant interpretations of natural law ethical theory within the Catholic Church. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987); and, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987) 99-151. 3. Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993). 4. Ibid., pars. 13, 48, 50, 67, 79. See Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus. Volume Three: Difficult Moral Questions (Quincy, IL: Franciscan Press, 1997) 851 n. 440; Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle, “Response to Our Critics and Collaborators,” Nat- ural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez, ed. Robert P. George (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998) 213-237, at 221-222; William E. May, “Germain Grisez on Moral Principles and Moral Norms: Natural and Christian,” ibid., 18-35, at 23-25; Charles E. Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition Today: A Synthesis (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1999) 159; Jean Porter, “‘Direct' and ‘Indirect' in Grisez's Moral Theory,” Theological Stud- ies 57 (1996) 611-632, at 611; and Joseph A. Selling, “Ideological Differences: Some Background Considerations for Understanding Veritatis Splendor,” The Month 27 (January 1994) 12-14. 5. For anthologies discussing the encyclical and its misrepresentation of the revi- sionist position, see Joseph A. Selling and Jan Jans (eds.), The Splendor of Accuracy: An Examination of the Assertions Made by Veritatis Splendor (Kampen: Kok Pharos Publish- ing House, 1994; Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 1995); Michael E. Allsopp and John J. O'Keefe (eds.), Veritatis Splendor: American Responses (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1995); and John Wilkins (ed.), Considering Veritatis Splendor (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press, 1994). THE BASIC GOODS THEORY AND REVISIONISM 119 What is it that fundamentally divides these two ethical theories? What has created (or reflected?) such animosity and division not only among theologians but also within the Church herself? While the focus of the division between these two interpretations of natural law generally revolves around normative ethics, absolute norms, and intrinsically evil acts, they are fundamentally differentiated on the level of method. This paper will investigate one aspect of the methodological division between the two theories. The point of departure for this investigation is the four sources of moral knowledge in Christian ethics: reason, experience, Scrip- ture, and tradition.6 One's ethical method interprets, prioritizes, and coor- dinates these sources into a comprehensive and comprehensible ethical theory. Though both revisionism and the BGT are natural law ethical theories, their respective methods distinguish them fundamentally. We will focus on Scripture as a source of moral knowledge that is utilized in both ethical theories. The role, function, and interpretation of this source in either theory, in part, distinguish the BGT and revisionism fundamen- tally. Before investigating the use of Scripture in ethical theory, however, we must briefly investigate a fundamental question debated extensively in Catholic moral theology over the last three decades. Namely, is there a specifically Christian ethic? The answer to this question will lay the foundation for how Scripture functions in these two theories. Epistemology and Theological Ethics: Is There a Specifically Christian Ethic? Norbert Rigali noted some years ago that “many a contemporary moralist is in the unenviable position of lacking a scientific grasp of the epistemological foundations of his own field.”7 While moral theology has come a long way in developing such a foundation, epistemology is, and remains, at the heart of differences between, and among, ethical the- ories. The late Richard McCormick, S.J., noted that the question of a specifically Christian ethic is primarily epistemological.8 This question is 6. Curran, Catholic Moral Tradition Today, 48ff. These four sources are frequently referred to as the Weslyan Quadrilateral. See Donald A. D. Thorsen, The Wesleyan Qua- drilateral: Scripture, Tradition, Reason, and Experience as a Model of Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990). 7. Rigali, “New Epistemology and the Moralist,” Chicago Studies 11 (1972) 237- 244, at 241. 8. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980 (Wash- ington, DC: University Press of America, 1981) 814. 120 TODD A. SALZMAN fundamental to the Catholic natural law tradition given its claim of acces- sibility to moral truth through reason. If faith contributes no new knowl- edge, and Christian and non-Christian alike can arrive at the same moral truth, what, if anything, does Christian faith add to natural law ethics? On the other hand, if faith does add new knowledge to natural law ethics, in what sense is natural law accessible to right reason alone? In the former case, Christian natural law ethics would be universal without par- ticularity; in the latter case, it would be particular without universality. As one would imagine, the BGT and revisionism have two very different responses to the question of the relationship between faith and reason and how it pertains to knowledge. The question is not if faith adds anything to moral knowledge, but rather how, and on what level of ethical discourse it relates to knowledge. The BGT maintains that faith transforms the human's ability to know.9 In so doing, it provides specifically Christian norms10 that are deduced from revelation and Christian charity. These norms do not contradict but rather fulfill those norms deduced from natural law purely through reason.11 Since the BGT claims a specific knowledge for Chris- tians that produces specific Christian norms, it is important to notice the epistemological flow of this specifically Christian knowledge. “The com- mitment of faith is the fundamental option of Christian life” for the BGT.12 In light of this fundamental option, one's knowledge is trans- formed through grace, which in turn transforms one's perception of reality and the available options of choice for a person of faith. “There are specifically Christian norms because there are specifically Christian acts.”13 Here, the epistemological flow of knowledge is from the willing subject and moral judgments to specific norms. The faith of the believer is, in a sense, projected onto reality and provides the hermeneutical key for obtaining knowledge of it.