response Bruno Latour’s anthropology of the moderns A reply to Maniglier

Gunnar Skirbekk

An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology humans have become more and more liberated from of the Moderns – published with the motto: si scires nature. (Yet, who says so today, in a time of climate donum Dei (for those who do not know the Holy change and ecological crises?) Throughout An Inquiry Scripture, this is John 4.10: ‘if you knew God’s gift’) – into Modes of Existence Latour persistently attacks is said to be the result of Bruno Latour’s research over these ‘Moderns’, claiming, for example, in typically the last twenty-five years.1 The book was presented dramatic terms: euphorically in three reviews in Le Monde, comparing it is truly a matter of wars, here – even of mas- Latour with the great philosophers of the past, and, sacres. The bonfires are still smoking with the most recently, in an article by Patrice Maniglier pub- witches burned alive at the time of the scientific lished in Radical Philosophy (‘A Metaphysical Turn?, revolution; the ashes are not yet cold after the Radical Philosophy 187, September/October 2014), auto-da-fés in which lay and religious missionaries which concludes that ‘Latour has produced what will alike piled up fetishes (and sometimes the fetish- henceforth stand as one of the great philosophical makers) every time they came in to ‘deliver the tribes from their superstitions’. (184) proposals of our time’. In what follows, I will present a rather different view. As this implies, one of the most immediately strik- The book, according to Latour, is a work of ing aspects of Latour’s book is the overwhelming anthropology, philosophical anthropology, empirical (and positive) role played within it by religion as a philosophy, and also an enquête, an investigation. ‘mode of existence’, including its gods and angels, However, it does not look like an empirical-scientific who presumably engender and confirm our status project; nor does it look like a philosophical work in as persons, saving us by the Word: ‘Words of love an academic sense. Indeed, it seems to belong to a have the particular feature of endowing the person strange genre: on the one hand, it presents itself as to whom they are addressed with the existence and open and inviting; on the other hand, it constantly unity that person has lacked’ (302). So, for instance, teaches and tells the reader (via an imagined female Latour writes in chapter 11: investigator) what he or she has understood at the various stages. Should An Inquiry into Modes of Exist- There is a risk, obviously, that this requirement to treat religion rationally will be mistaken for a ence be thus conceived as an intellectual text, trying return to the critical spirit, that is, to the good old to clarify problems, positions and arguments? Or ‘good sense’ of the social sciences [this is what has should it be conceived as a rhetorical praxis for the to be avoided by this anthropology of modes of purposes of ‘conversion’, an ‘eye-opener’? being: to avoid the critical spirit of the social sci- Referring to his earlier book We Have Never Been ences – GS]. But it should be clear by now that we Modern, Latour declares that due to the develop- can expect nothing at all from the ‘social explana- tion’ of religion, which would amount to losing the ments of science and technology there is an increas- thread of the salvation-bearers by breaking it and ingly intimate attachment between humans and replacing it with another, while seeking to prove non-humans, completely contrary to the vision of that ‘behind’ religion there is, for example, ‘society’, the Moderns, according to whom, Latour asserts, ‘carefully concealed’ but ‘reversed’ and ‘disguised’

Radical Philosophy 189 (jan/feb 2015) 45 [therefore: a ‘flat’ anthropology; there can no so- His first writing was on Péguy Clio).( He makes it ciological explanation – GS]. Such an ‘explanation’ explicit: he learnt the repetitive style from Péguy, and would amount to losing religion, to be sure, but from Péguy he got the idea of modes of existence. As also to betraying the very notion of the rational he puts it in the Social Studies of Science interview: – not to mention that we would not understand anything about ‘the social’ either. There is nothing ‘It’s from Péguy that I got the idea of what I now call ‘behind’ religion – no more than there is anything a mode of existence: a sort of stream or continuity of at all interesting ‘behind’ fiction, law, science, and action, interrupted by a hiatus. It’s a mixture between so on, for that matter, since each mode is its own Péguy and Bultmann’: explanation, complete in its kind [and thus there is no room for social criticism of religious ‘modes of Strangely, to my eyes, the systematic decon- existence’ – GS]. (307) struction by exegesis of all dogmatic certitude, far from weakening the truth value that the successive While Latour had been criticized for being a con- glosses played out over and over, made it possible structivist and a relativist, who says that material at last to raise the question of religious truth. But objects are agents, and who lacks a clear scientific only on condition of acknowledging that there foundation, as far as I can see nobody has pointed was an itinerary of veridiction with its own felicity critically at the decisive role played by religion in his conditions, an itinerary whose traces remain in exegesis and of which Péguy had tried to reproduce project. This is basically an onto-theo-logical work. the disturbing tonality with his repetitive style at In taking intellectual work seriously, we need to the turn of the twentieth century. contextualize it (at the same time as the arguments should be taken head- on). Indeed, is contextualization not an essential exercise for all anthropol- ogy? And should not anthropologists contextualize themselves as well? It is useful, then, to consider Latour’s own autobiographical remarks in a recent interview in the journal Social Studies of Science (2013). From 1966 to 1975 – aged 19 to 28 – Latour was (in his own words) a ‘militant Catholic’, first at the University of Dijon, then at the University of Tours, where he wrote his PhD in theology: Exégèse et ontologie: Consequently, this is my hypothesis: Latour’s basic à propos de la resurrection. Resurrection, the mode and formative concern is religion (that is, Roman of existence of Jesus, from Friday to Sunday, and Catholicism), and his peculiar style and genre are thereafter: what ‘mode of existence’ is this, what kind consistent with this concern, as a crucial part of his of ontology? Evidently, a simplistic dual ontology attempt to avoid an analytic critique of religion. A of subject–object won’t do. Resurrection, by biblical ‘flat’ interaction, focusing on immediate experiences, exegesis: but how? By learning from Rudolf Bult- is a way of avoiding sociological (or psychological) mann, we are told. In short: biblical exegesis as a way explanations of religious phenomena, and thereby to a revised ontology. avoiding that kind of criticism of religion which stems Latour is explicit here about what he was, but he from Marx and Freud, as well as from the radicalism does not mention what he was not. In 1968 he was 21. of the youth movement in the 1970s. Suggestively That year, in Paris, the student revolt broke out, with repetitive, conceptually vague, and characterized by militant demonstrations and formative discussions a blend of inclusive reasonableness and aggressive about the Vietnam War, capitalism and the one- confrontations, Latour’s is a style that is unusual for dimensional society, Marx and Marcuse. Latour was academic work but that is common in the realms of not, however, in Paris, but in the provinces, pondering both politics and religion. religious mysteries. And there, before his encounter Instead of military service, in 1973–75 Latour went with Bultmann, was Charles Péguy. Each September, to Africa to teach (‘a sort of French Peace Corps’, Latour used to go with his mother and father to the as he describes it in Social Studies of Science). He Péguy symposium in Orléans, for memorial lectures. now describes himself at that time as ‘a provincial,

46 bourgeois Catholic’, who was suddenly confronted procedures, have I been able to make perceptible with (French) neocolonialism. Here, he ‘discovered to readers a certain number of tonalities or wave- all at once, the most predatory forms of capitalism…’ lengths that modern institutions in their shambles In other words, only in 1973, relocated in Africa, have made it impossible to capture?’ (477). Does this does Latour, this ‘provincial bourgeois’, discover mean that it is ‘unjust’ to blame Latour for his lack capitalism. To what end? To take part in the current of precision? Apparently, his ambition is to come up discussions or political protests? No. He now dis- with new and improved conceptualizations of the covered ‘the methods of ethnography, the puzzles of major ‘modes of existence’ in a plural modern world. anthropology’. Again, it is modernity that appears as In so doing, he pretends to ‘improve’ the overall the great evil. conceptual scheme, and thereby overrule the various In the concluding chapter, Latour apologizes for specialists. But when he says that it would be ‘unjust’ what could be seen as ‘the bizarre taste of an auto- to criticize his formulations, this claim functions didact’, since (he now says) the whole thing is but as a rhetorical twist that also precludes unpleasant ‘a “provisional report” on a collective inquiry that questions about his gigantic project. Yes, there is a can now begin, at last’ (476). Therefore, the reader need for interdisciplinary reflection. But the idea that should not be too strict: ‘the reader mustn’t deal one discipline – the Latourian version of anthropol- with them [my formulations] too unjustly’ (480). Yet, ogy – could be able to provide the (one and only) this can hardly counter the fact that, after nearly adequate conceptual overview of the whole of the 500 pages, it still remains unclear exactly what modern world, with its plurality of values, activities Latour means by ‘the Moderns’. This is surprising, and institutions, and of all the other disciplines with because, after all, there is no shortage of extensive their various perspectives and insights, is both naive discussions on various conceptions of modernity and and arrogant. modernization. Could we not expect, and require, an Latour’s aim is to elaborate a conceptual scheme explanation of Latour’s contribution to this lengthy for all main ‘modes of existence’, by some kind of gen- history? It is clear, for example, that the subject– eralizing abstraction from everyday experiences. But object dichotomy has been thoroughly criticized what about the selection and representativeness of from dialectical and phenomenological perspectives these presumably everyday experiences? What about through to the pragmatic–linguistic turn and the the way they are transferred into general concepts? critique of instrumental rationality, as well as via a What about the status of this abstract conceptual focus on different forms of situated rationality (or scheme? As to the question of representiveness: what Wissenschaft). If someone claims to have new and about ordinary people, and their everyday experi- interesting contributions to make to such debates, ences, from around the globe? For instance, what is it too much to expect some clarification as to how about the various and well-entrenched experiences these differ from what has already been said and of religion in India or China, or in Muslim countries? done before? Are their experiences taken care of by Latour’s com- Symmetrical treatment, Latour says. Yes, but ments on religious experiences, conceived in terms of also self-reflective, both as to one’s own epistemic interpersonal love relations? (Maniglier acknowledges presuppositions and as to one’s own geo-cultural this problem, but can only say that Latour ‘must be ‘situatedness’ – which, ironically, is precisely what his own judge on this score’.) we should expect from an anthropologist. In the Finally, we should respond to the decisive state- 1970s, in Africa, Latour saw himself as a ‘provincial ment, made at the end of the book: ‘If this test fails, bourgeois Catholic’, but not as French – something if my readers do not feel better equipped to become which could have been useful in contextualizing sensitive to the experiences assembled here, if their his own experience of ‘the Moderns’. As it is, the attention is not directed toward the beings whose whole project is somewhat Kafkaesque: there is an specifications differ in each case, then the affair is enquête, an investigation, in which those who are the over’ (477). On its own terms, the Latourian game is, accused are presented as terrible and dangerous – but for me, over. The case is closed. it remains unclear who the accused are, and of what precise crime they are accused. Notes In the concluding and apparently self-critical 1. Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An An- thropology of the Moderns, trans. Catherine Porter, Harvard chapter, Latour states: ‘The first test can thus be University Press, Cambridge MA, 2013. Page references to formulated this way: by following these navigation this edition appear in brackets within the main text.

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