DOCSLIB.ORG

Absentee Landlords, Rent Control and Healthy Gentrification: a Policy Proposal to Deconcentrate the Poor in Urban America Jorge O

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Absentee Landlords, Rent Control and Healthy Gentrification: a Policy Proposal to Deconcentrate the Poor in Urban America Jorge O Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy Volume 17 Article 1 Issue 1 Fall 2007 Absentee Landlords, Rent Control and Healthy Gentrification: A Policy Proposal to Deconcentrate the Poor in Urban America Jorge O. Elorza Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Elorza, Jorge O. (2007) "Absentee Landlords, Rent Control and Healthy Gentrification: A Policy Proposal to Deconcentrate the Poor in Urban America," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 17: Iss. 1, Article 1. Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol17/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ABSENTEE LANDLORDS, RENT CONTROL AND HEALTHY GENTRIFICATION: A POLICY PROPOSAL TO DECONCENTRATE THE POOR IN URBAN AMERICA Jorge 0. Elorza* ABSTRACT Empirical data overwhelmingly suggests that the presence of mid- dle- and working-class homeowners is beneficial for inner-city communi- ties. Yet, absentee landlords have a systematic financial advantage over resident landlords when it comes to purchasinghomes in blighted neigh- borhoods. This advantage has disastrous effects for inner cities, as the communities with the greatest need for the stabilizing presence of mid- dle- and working-class homeowners are the ones least likely to attract them. The lack of in-moving homeowners and the resulting increase in poverty cause declining neighborhoods to fall deeper into downward spirals. In this Article, I propose a rent control plan designed to attract middle- and working- class homeowners to blighted neighborhoods, and I argue that many positive outcomes will result. By designing this plan, I hope to challenge the conventional wisdom that rent control has only one legitimate purpose, reducing tenants' rents, and call attention to the ex- ternalitiescaused by the absentee landlord industry. Second, I provide a legal and economic model for inner cities to deconcentrate poverty and to better integrate the poor into mainstream society. Third, I develop a model for healthy gentrification whereby vicious cycles of poverty are transformed into virtuous cycles of stability. A B STR A C T .................................................. 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................. 3 I. UNDERSTANDING URBAN INSTABILITY ........... 5 * Assistant Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.S., Univer- sity of Rhode Island; J.D., Harvard Law School. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Duncan Kennedy and Colleen Murphy for their helpful comments. I also benefited from the comments of Emilie Benoit, Jeffrey Dana, Jared Goldstein, Andrew Horwitz, James Huguley, Bruce Kogan, Timothy Kuhner, George Nnona, Nicolas Retsinas, Leticia Tejada, and David Zlotnick. I would also like to thank my able and diligent research assistants Timothy Cavazza, Katherine Johnston, Michael McMillen, and Rikin Mehta. This research was generously sup- ported by a RWU SoL Summer Research Grant. 2 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:1 A. CONCENTRATED POVERTY AND THE ABSENCE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS ........................................ 7 1. The American Ideal & Exclusionary Zoning ..... 7 2. Federal Housing Policy & Racial Discrimination .. 9 B. BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED RENT CONTROL PLAN... 12 1. Middle- and Working-Class Presence ........... 12 2. Higher Rate of Homeownership ................. 17 C. ABSENTEE LANDLORDS AND THE SELF-PERPETUATING CYCLE OF BLIGHT .................................... 19 II. A PROPOSED RENT CONTROL PLAN TO ENCOURAGE AN INFLUX OF RESIDENT LAN DLORDS ......................................... 26 A. THE BASICS OF THE PROPOSED RENT CONTROL PLAN. 26 1. Setting the Rent Ceiling ........................ 28 a) Minimum Departure from Fair Market V alue ..................................... 29 b) Maximum Departure from Fair Market V alue ..................................... 29 2. Targeted to Blighted Neighborhoods ............ 33 3. Targeted to Neighborhoods with a High Rate of 2- to 4-Unit Homes ............................ 34 B. GENTRIFICATION AND DISPLACEMENT ................ 36 1. Traditional Process of Gentrification ............ 37 2. Likely Class Composition of Rent-Controlled Home Purchasers ............................... 38 3. Displacement of Homeowners by Higher-Income Hom ebuyers ................................... 39 4. Displacement of Low-Income Tenants by In- Moving Resident Landlords ..................... 40 5. Displacement of Low-Income Tenants by Higher- Income Tenants ................................ 43 6. Healthy Gentrification.......................... 44 C. OTHER PROVISIONS ................................... 48 III. POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ..................................... 51 A. ECONOMIC CRITIQUES AND BARRIERS ................ 51 1. Deterred New Construction and Decreased Supply of Rental Housing ....................... 51 2. Inefficiencies Caused By Over- and Under- Consumption of Housing ....................... 53 3. Under-Maintenance of Rental Units ............. 55 B. POLITICAL CRITIQUES AND BARRIERS ................ 57 1. More Effective Alternatives ..................... 57 2007] LANDLORDS, RENT CONTROL AND HEALTHY GENTRIFICATION 3 2. Government Bureaucracy and Corruption ....... 58 3. Government's Woeful Track Record ............. 59 4. Political Feasibility ............................ 60 C. LEGAL BARRIERS ................................... 61 1. Substantive Due Process-Takings Clause ....... 61 CONCLU SION ................................................ 66 A PPEN D IX ................................................... 69 1. Additional Tenant Protections................... 69 2. Risk of UnderestimatingHigh Tenancy Turnover ...................................... 72 INTRODUCTION Until recently, rent control has been almost unanimously con- demned by economists. While rent control has been effective as a short- term tool for reducing tenants' housing costs, its long-term, adverse con- sequences have been commonly believed to outweigh its benefits.' 2 While I agree with these assessments of traditional rent control schemes, I challenge the conventional wisdom to the extent that it assumes rent control can have only one legitimate purpose-the reduction of tenant's housing costs. In this Article, I hope to provide a new perspective by developing a rent control plan with an entirely different goal: deconcen- trating poverty by encouraging an influx of middle- and working-class 3 homeowners into blighted neighborhoods. 1 See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 555 (1984) ("The popularity of rent control is puzzling in view of the virtual unanimity among professional economists that rent control is, in the long run, bad for all concerned-tenants as well as landlords."); ANTHONY DOWNS, A REEVALUATION OF RESIDENTIAL RENT CONTROLS 45-74 (1996) (arguing that rent control de- ters new rental construction, encourages under-maintenance, reduces tenant mobility, and pro- duces many inefficiencies); Richard Amott, Rent Control: The International Experience, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 415 (2002) (arguing that rent control reduces maintenance of the rental units, incites gentrification and abandonment by landlords, and ulti- mately does not make the units more affordable due to key money issues and black market transactions); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 767 (1988) (arguing that rent control deters new construction not only by making the rental housing market less profitable in rent-controlled zones but also by sending a chilling message that non-rent-controlled zones may soon become regulated); Robert C. El- lickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 947, 948 (1991) (stating that rent control forces landlords and tenants into uncooperative relationships). 2 I define traditional rent control schemes as any whose primary purpose is the reduc- tion of tenants' housing costs. 3 With a long and unified opposition to rent control, it is only recently that economists and legal scholars have begun, on a limited basis, to challenge the conventional wisdom. Commentators have examined whether a fine-tuned rent control ordinance, often referred to as "second-generation" rent control, can partly accomplish the goal of reducing rents without producing the harmful results of "first-generation" rent control. Often times, this analysis is not motivated by a normative claim such as "second-generation" rent control is desirable but rather that "second-generation" laws are not as bad as "first generation" laws. See Arnott, 4 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:1 The rent control scheme I propose has been entirely overlooked by legal and economic scholars. Depending on the needs of the local com- munity, rent control may be designed to address an array of different goals, and each scheme will have different legal, economic, and political consequences. Much of the literature has missed these points and has declared broad pronouncements of the desirability of rent control without 4 considering its infinite permutations. This rent control plan is intended to
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Affordability Crisis: How Rent Control Is Making Waves In
    THE AFFORDABILTY CRISIS HOW RENT CONTROL IS MAKING WAVES IN MULTIFAMILY Formerly known as the War Emergency Tenant Protection Act, rent control was proposed during the World War II era to protect tenants from war-related housing shortages. These policies were first enacted in New York and Washington, D.C., as they experienced the most significant shortages. Fast forward to today, rent regulation has spread to California, Maryland, New Jersey, and most recently, Oregon. THREE YEARS POST WWII, 2.5 MILLION NEW HOMES WERE BULIT ACROSS THE COUNTRY. Although there are no housing shortages today as severe as during World War II, the rent regulation policies have evolved with the intention to create more affordable housing options and simultaneously protect tenants who live on a fixed or low-income, such as the elderly. Rent control is a law implemented by the government in which they control and regulate the amount a landlord can charge a tenant for rental housing. This policy prevents landlords from overcharging rent and protects tenants from eviction without just cause, such as late payments. ™ Rent control has been a buzzing topic as of late, with new statewide enforcements within New York, Oregon, and most recently, California. In this article, Matthews™ will discuss the current state of rent regulation laws and how tenants and investors are reacting. ADVANTAGES OF RENT CONTROL DISADVANTAGES OF RENT CONTROL Policymakers tend to account for the voice The audience speaking out against rent control supporting rent regulation laws by implementing laws is primarily investors. Professionals and rent control to combat affordability issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Housing Financialization and Rent Control Working Paper 2020:01 Department of Economics, John Jay College Jacob Udell1
    Housing Financialization and Rent Control Working Paper 2020:01 Department of Economics, John Jay College Jacob Udell1 Abstract This working paper attempts to consolidate a number of insights about commercial real estate finance over the last 25 years in New York City to suggest a general framework for thinking about gentrification, housing financialization, and rent control. In particular, it argues for the need to account for the supply of capital seeking out returns in NYC, with an emphasis on the market for older-stock, rent-stabilized multifamily buildings. It also sketches out some potential dynamics following the passage of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act in June 2019, which significantly strengthened the NYC rent stabilization regime and had an important effect in the acquisiton market for rent stabilized properties. Finally, it analyzes an example of a portfolio of Bronx buildings owned by Emerald Equity Group and financed by Freddie Mac, to explore some of these dynamics. Many of the parts of this paper are in draft-form, and areas to expand upon and develop are noted throughout the paper. 1While this working paper was conceived with much help, it does not reflect the analysis of anyone but myself, as a graduate student in Economics at John Jay College. Please do not cite without contacting the author at [email protected]. Draft 2 – 2.20.2020 Introduction NYC private landlords and their investors have been able to profit handsomely over the last 25 years by acquiring large portfolios of existing rent-stabilized, older-stock properties.2 In that period, prevailing prices for rent stabilized buildings have increased almost unabated, with the few years around the 2008 Financial Crisis being the only exception.
    [Show full text]
  • What More Do We Need to Know About How to Prevent and Mitigate Displacement of Low- and Moderate-Income Households from Gentrifying Neighborhoods?
    What More Do We Need to Know about How to Prevent and Mitigate Displacement of Low- and Moderate-Income Households from Gentrifying Neighborhoods? VICKI BEEN1 New York University he extent to which gentrification results in the displacement of low- and moderate-income households from neighborhoods undergoing signifi- cant change is still the subject of study and debate among urban policy researchers.2 Recent evidence suggests that, at least in areas outside low- vacancy “superstar cities”3 with intense gentrification, renters who likely Tare the most vulnerable to displacement generally do not move away from gentrifying neighborhoods at higher rates than such households move from nongentrifying areas.4 Elected officials, housing advocates, and the public, on the other hand, have no doubt that gentrification can and does cause displacement.5 There are a number of reasons the research findings on displacement may be less accu- rate or complete than reports from affected neighborhoods. First, there is considerable disagreement, especially early in the process, about which neighborhoods actually are gentrifying. Second, data tracking people’s moves to and from neighborhoods is limited because of concerns about the confidentiality of tax, social service, and other governmental data files that follow individuals over time, and because private sources of linked data, such as credit reporting bureau files, are incomplete in a variety of ways (some households don’t have credit files, for example). Third, even if residents of gentrifying neighborhoods may move no more often from gentrifying neighborhoods than similar households in other areas, they may move for different reasons. Residents of non-gentrifying neighborhoods may more often move voluntarily — seeking better neighborhoods or jobs, for example — while residents of gentrifying neighborhoods may more often move involuntarily, wanting to stay in the neighborhood but unable to afford it.
    [Show full text]
  • Ph6.1 Rental Regulation
    OECD Affordable Housing Database – http://oe.cd/ahd OECD Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs - Social Policy Division PH6.1 RENTAL REGULATION Definitions and methodology This indicator presents information on key aspects of regulation in the private rental sector, mainly collected through the OECD Questionnaire on Affordable and Social Housing (QuASH). It presents information on rent control, tenant-landlord relations, lease type and duration, regulations regarding the quality of rental dwellings, and measures regulating short-term holiday rentals. It also presents public supports in the private rental market that were introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Information on rent control considers the following dimensions: the control of initial rent levels, whether the initial rents are freely negotiated between the landlord and tenants or there are specific rules determining the amount of rent landlords are allowed to ask; and regular rent increases – that is, whether rent levels regularly increase through some mechanism established by law, e.g. adjustments in line with the consumer price index (CPI). Lease features concerns information on whether the duration of rental contracts can be freely negotiated, as well as their typical minimum duration and the deposit to be paid by the tenant. Information on tenant-landlord relations concerns information on what constitute a legitimate reason for the landlord to terminate the lease contract, the necessary notice period, and whether there are cases when eviction is not permitted. Information on the quality of rental housing refers to the presence of regulations to ensure a minimum level of quality, the administrative level responsible for regulating dwelling quality, as well as the characteristics of “decent” rental dwellings.
    [Show full text]
  • Nine Facts New Yorkers Should Know About Rent Regulation
    NINE FACTS NEW YORKE RS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT RENT REGULATION Ju ly 2009 Citizens Budget Commission Since 1993 New York City’s rent regulations these households still pay a high portion of have moved toward deregulation. However, their income for rent. Moreover, rent there is a possibility that the direction may regulation is providing valuable benefits to a be changed. In early 2009, the New York significant number of higher income house- State Assembly passed legislation that holds. In addition, the impact of regulation includes sweeping proposals such as the is concentrated in Manhattan. Finally, many elimination of high-rent vacancy decontrol households with low incomes are not in the and the re-control of most apartments that regulated sector or other government hous- were deregulated under this provision. The ing assistance programs; they face high rent current deep economic recession is viewed burdens in the unregulated housing market. by some as a reason to seek protections for more tenants, and by others as an oppor- At this juncture, CBC believes the Legis- tunity to lift regulations without fear that lature should be cautious about initiatives to market forces will result in burdensome rent extend the reach of rent regulation. Instead, increases. Regardless of what may happen state leaders should think more broadly in the current legislative session, the state about ways to better target assistance to enabling legislation for rent regulation is lower income households and to allow the due to expire in 2011. market to work in ways that better allocate housing and expand housing choices for all Given the legislative interest in rent New Yorkers.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws
    Fordham Urban Law Journal Volume 46 Number 5 One Hundred Years of Rent Control: An Examination of the Past and Future of Rental Article 1 Housing (Symposium) 2019 Laboratories of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws Vicki Been Ingrid Gould Ellen Sophia House Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj Recommended Citation Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen, and Sophia House, Laboratories of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws, 46 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1041 (2019). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol46/iss5/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LABORATORIES OF REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE DIVERSITY OF RENT REGULATION LAWS Vicki Been,* Ingrid Gould Ellen,** and Sophia House***† Introduction ........................................................................................... 1042 I. Understanding the Goals of Rent Regulation ................................ 1043 A. Stated Goals of Rent Regulation Programs ....................... 1043 B. Existing Research and Challenges ....................................... 1046 II. Features and Trade-Offs of Rent Regulation: Defining the Regulated Universe .......................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • No Place Like Home: Defining HUD's Role in the Affordable Housing Crisis
    adm_71-3_41554 Sheet No. 105 Side A 09/18/2019 13:09:53 ALR 71.3_SMUCKER_ME REVIEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/19 5:47 PM NO PLACE LIKE HOME: DEFINING HUD’S ROLE IN THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS K. HEIDI SMUCKER* Introduction .............................................................................................. 634 I.HUD: An Agency or Writer of Federal Checks? ................................... 636 A. The Evolution of Rental Housing Assistance: What Worked and What Didn’t ............................................................................ 637 B. A Funnel for Federal Funding ................................................ 639 II.Houston (and San Francisco, D.C., and New York), We Have a Problem ....................................................................................................... 640 A. The Rise (and Potential Fall) of San Francisco’s Restrictive Zoning .................................................................................... 641 B. Washington D.C.: Negative Implications of Cookie-Cutter Development .......................................................................... 643 C. I Heart New York, But Not The Rent ................................... 646 III.Baby Steps, Tiny Victories, and Their Potential for Impact ............... 647 IV.Affirmatively Furthering Affordable Housing: A (Possible) Recipe for Success ........................................................................................... 651 A. Reviving an Obama-Era Ghost in the Name of Efficiency .... 652 B. A Bird in the Hand
    [Show full text]
  • 1. the Damnation of Economics
    Notes 1. The Damnation of Economics 1. One example of vice-regal patronage of anti-economics is Canada’s ‘Governor General’s Award for Non-Fiction’. In 1995 this honour was bestowed upon John Raulston Saul’s anti-economic polemic The Unconscious Civilization (published in 1996). A taste of Saul’s wisdom: ‘Over the last quarter-century economics has raised itself to the level of a scientific profession and more or less foisted a Nobel Prize in its own honour onto the Nobel committee thanks to annual financing from a bank. Yet over the same 25 years, economics has been spectacularly unsuc- cessful in its attempts to apply its models and theories to the reality of our civili- sation’ (Saul 1996, p. 4). See Pusey (1991) and Cox (1995) for examples of patronage of anti-economics by Research Councils and Broadcasting Corporations. 2. Another example of economists’ ‘stillness’: the economists of 1860 did not join the numerous editorial rebukes of Ruskin’s anti-economics tracts (Anthony, 1983). 3. The anti-economist is not to be contrasted with the economist. An economist (that is, a person with a specialist knowledge of economics) may be an anti- economist. The true obverse of anti-economist is ‘philo-economist’: someone who holds that economics is a boon. 4. One may think of economics as a disease (as the anti-economist does), or one may think of economics as diseased. Mark Blaug: ‘Modern economics is “sick” . To para- phrase the title of a popular British musical: “No Reality, Please. We’re Economists”’ (Blaug 1998, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Rent Regulation for the 21St Century: Pairing Anti-Gouging with Targeted Subsidies
    POLICY BRIEF | APRIL 2021 Rent Regulation for the 21st Century: Pairing Anti-Gouging with Targeted Subsidies A central purpose of rent regulation is to provide stability against unexpected increases in rent. Low-income renters are especially vulnerable to rent shocks. Most rent regulation systems, however, confer the largest benefits on higher- income renters, prompting the question of how rent regulation can offer more effective protection to lower-income households. Expanding rent regulation to impose tighter rent restrictions on more of the housing stock has adverse consequences for housing markets; meanwhile, means testing rent-regulated housing would be highly burdensome and potentially counterproductive. In this brief, we argue that pairing anti-gouging rent regulation with shallow, targeted subsidies to low-income renters is a better way to ensure that the benefits of rent regulation reach vulnerable households. We argue that neither expanding rent regulation Introduction to impose tighter rent restrictions across more of Rent regulation debates have intensified in recent the housing market nor means testing regulated years, especially in jurisdictions where increased units is an optimal way to achieve rent regulation’s demand for rental housing has led to unprec- aim of preserving housing stability for low-income edented rent increases.1 Although low-income households. Instead, a more efficient way to ensure renters are particularly vulnerable to the harms that low-income households receive the benefits of that rent regulations aim to mitigate, most of rent regulation is to pair broad-based, anti-gouging the protections of rent regulations are not tar- rent regulation with targeted subsidies that reduce geted and may not reach these renters.2 This housing costs for low-income tenants.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws Testimony Of
    Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws Testimony of Sophia House Legal Fellow, Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy New York University Before Jersey City Council Rent Control Reform Committee Rolando Lavarro, Council President November 13, 2019 President Lavarro and members of the Committee, I am honored to share with you our research on the diversity of rent regulation ordinances nationwide. My name is Sophie House, and I am a fellow at the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy at New York University. The Furman Center is a joint research center of NYU’s School of Law and Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service. Founded in 1995, it is one of the nation’s leading academic research centers devoted to the public policy aspects of land use, real estate development, and housing. I will provide an overview of the Furman Center’s research on rent regulation to aid the committee as it evaluates Jersey City’s rent regulations. Along with Ingrid Gould Ellen and Vicki Been, I am the co-author of an article forthcoming in the Fordham Urban Law Journal entitled Laboratories of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws. Our research catalogs the diversity of rent regulation ordinances, identifying the decisions and tradeoffs involved in designing and implementing these regulations. Regulating Rents Annual rent increases Establishing permissible rent increases is the core task of rent regulation. Jurisdictions can opt to use a pre-determined formula; create a new agency or board; or charge an existing institution to set increases.1 Using a formula — for example, linking maximum rent increases to an index of inflation2 — simplifies the process, but may understate or overstate costs.
    [Show full text]
  • 2,000+) Apartments Upon Vacancy
    Table II. (continued) Highlights of Rent Regulation in New York 1983 Omnibus Housing Act transfers administration of rent regulations from the City to the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal. 1985 Official involvement of the Rent Stabilization Association and the Metropolitan Hotel Industry Stabilization Association in promulgating codes governing rent stabilized units is terminated. 1993 Under the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993, the state begins deregulating high rent ($2,000+) apartments upon vacancy. Also adopted is a high-income deregulation provision for occupied units with rents of $2,000 or more as of October 1, 1993 with tenants whose household income exceeded $250,000 in two previous years. 1997 Under the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, the state expands high-income decontrol to cover households with incomes of $175,000 or more. In addition, the state adopts a mandatory formula for rental increases upon vacancy. 2003 The Rent Law of 2003, in effect until 2011, limits the ability of NYC to pass laws concerning rent regulatory issues controlled by the State; allows for the deregulation of an apartment upon vacancy if the legal regulated rent may be raised above $2000, even if the new rent the tenant pays is not actually an amount above $2000; and permits an owner, upon renewal, to increase a rent stabilized tenant's rent to the maximum legal regulated rent, regardless of whether a tenant has been paying a preferential rent (but does not prohibit contractual agreements between owners and tenants to maintain the
    [Show full text]
  • Absentee Landlord” Beast
    The Resurgence of the “Absentee Landlord” Beast By Philip A Farruggio Region: USA Global Research, August 05, 2019 Theme: Global Economy No politician from either of the Two Party/One Party imbroglio will ever mention anything about this Absentee Landlord disgrace. Sadly, absentee landlords have been with us since time in memoriam. These people were even mentioned in the story of Jesus in the New Testament. It seems everybody just accepts that people have a right to own property and rent it out to others who are in need of shelter. Making a profit on someone else’s critical want of a place to live is what ‘Makes Amerika Great Again’, right? No, wrong! This writer, before finally being able to afford my own home at the age of 45, always lived under the thumb of a landlord. For God’s sake, even the term Landlord comes straight out of Feudalism! The lord of the manor rented out parcels of his land to house the serfs who worked his property, or in some cases his coal mine (See the great 1993 Claude Berri film Germinal). In the fine 1987 John Sayles’ filmMatawan , practically the whole town of Matawan WV was owned by the coal company, and the miners all lived in cheaply built rental housing owned by the company. To add insult to this economic injury, they were logistically forced to shop at company stores using company script to purchase necessities at too high prices. Such is how feudalism operated, always, in the case of Matawan, under the guise of a ‘free market’ for labor.
    [Show full text]