DOCSLIB.ORG

Economics and Rent Regulation: a Call for a New Perspective

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Economics and Rent Regulation: a Call for a New Perspective ECONOMICS AND RENT REGULATION: A CALL FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE PHILLIP WEITZMAN* INTRODUCTION During periods of rapidly escalating rents, housing activists often urge the adoption or extension of measures to regulate rents and to strengthen se- curity of tenure. Their proposals, generally lumped under the heading of rent control, are soon met by an outpouring of economic analyses purporting to demonstrate that rent controls are at best misguided and, more likely, a pro- gram for unmitigated disaster. Among the most important claims is that rent regulation inevitably leads to undermaintenance, reduction of rental housing construction, housing abandonment, and misallocation of housing resources.' These arguments are so universally shared by members of the economics pro- fession that they are often used by textbook writers to educate introductory students to the "evils" of government interference with competitively deter- mined market prices.2 Economic literature is rich with arguments and counterarguments re- garding other areas of government interference in market pricing such as min- imum wages, agricultural price supports, fixed exchange rates, and tariffs. Yet there is virtual unanimity among economists that rent controls are "bad" and have no place in housing policy.' This paper explores the logic of the conventional economic analysis of rent regulation and discusses some of its deficiencies. It argues that the basic * B.A., Tulane University, 1964; Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1969; J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1975. Member of the Bars of New York and the District of Colum- bia; private economic and housing consultant I would like to thank Robert Schwarz and Henie Lustgarten for their encouragement and valuable suggestions that made this article possible. I would also like to thank the members of the New York University Review of Law & Social Change for their excellent editorial comments and assistance. 1. See President's Comm'n on Housing, The Report of the President's Commission on Housing 91-92 (1982) [hereinafter President's Comm'n on Housing]; M. Lett, Rent Control: Concepts, Realities, and Mechanisms 42-48 (1976); Rent Control, Myths and Realities: Inter- national Evidence of the Effects of Rent Control in Six Countries (W. Block & E. Olsen eds. 1981) [hereinafter W. Block & E. Olsen]; Resolving the Housing Crisis: Government Policy, Decontrol, and the Public Interest (M. Johnson ed. 1982) [hereinafter M. Johnson]; C. Baird, Rent Control: The Perennial Folly (Cato Public Policy Research Monograph No. 2, 1980). 2. See, eg., W. Baumol & A. Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy 64-69 (2d ed. 1982); C. McConnell, Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies 715-16 (8th ed. 1981); P. Samuelson, Economics 396-97 (1lth ed. 1980). But see W. Baumol & A. Blinder, supra, at 606 n.5 for virtually the only reference in an introductory economics textbook to the possibility of "salutory effects" of rent control in the short run. 3. See Frey, Pommerehne, Schneider & Gilbert, Consensus and Dissension Among Econo- mists, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 986, 987-991 (1984). 975 Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [V/ol. XIII:975 supply and demand model is inadequate for an understanding of the residen- tial rental housing market and that there is little empirical data to support many of the economic criticisms made about the new generation of rent regu- lations. It also argues that policy makers need to consider contemporary rent regulation as more complex, sophisticated, and purposeful than a simple price ceiling in a competitive market. I THE BASIC ECONOMIC MODEL The basic analytical tool used by economists in their criticisms of rent control is the simple supply and demand model of a competitive market.4 In this model the supply of housing services is considered fixed within a short period of time or, at best, is not very responsive to price changes in the "short run."'5 Supply is drawn as a vertical (or nearly vertical) line. (See Figure 1.) Demand, on the other hand, is drawn sloping downward to reflect the inverse relationship between price and the amounts people are willing and able to purchase. While the degree to which people will adjust their demands to price changes in the "short run" is subject to dispute, there is little doubt that price changes will trigger some response. In a competitive market, the rent will tend to be that price at which the amount of housing services7 landlords are willing and able to supply equals the amount tenants are willing and able to purchase. (Rm for "market rent" in Figure 1.) If there were no shortages for any significant period of time, people would offer higher than existing rents to induce landlords to rent to them. If there was a surplus of housing, landlords whose units were not being rented would agree to accept lower rents rather than take the loss that comes from a vacant unit.8 Fluctuations in demand or supply (if any) therefore would be 4. Most serious housing analysts modify their analysis to take into account the fact that the housing market is segmented into various submarkets and that the wide variety of types of housing are not totally substitutable. However, the simplified supply and demand model presented here is the one usually appearing in the basic economics textbooks and is implicitly used by most of the economic critics of rent regulation. The existence of market segmentation is important here primarily because differences in local attitudes and regulations concerning rent and eviction controls may affect the relative attractiveness of investment in rental housing. 5. The "short run" is conceptually a period of time of undefined length in which the total level of investment in housing cannot be significantly changed. Most students of rental housing markets believe that the short run for rental housing may be quite long, especially as compared to other goods and services. See M. Stegman & H. Sumka, Nonmetropolitan Urban Housing: An Economic Analysis of Problems and Policies 89 (1976); Moorhouse, Optimal Housing Maintenance Under Rent Control, 39 S. Econ. J.93 (1972). 6. In technical terms, short run supply has a price elasticity approaching zero, while price elasticity of demand is negative. 7. Housing economists often use the term "housing services" rather than "number of units" to reflect that a given dwelling unit can vary in the amount to which it yields services valued by tenants (e.g., quality, space, and amenities). "Housing services," or what I will simply refer to as "housing," is the abstract unit of analysis used in this paper. See Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J. Pol. Econ. 1081, 1082 (1972). 8. Provided that rents exceed operating costs, a vacant unit can only reduce net income. Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change 1984-85] ECONOMICS AND RENT REGULATION Figure 1 Price of Rental Housing Services S R- Rc -------------------------------------- Qm QC Quantity of Rental Housing Services met by changes in rents that would tend to restore the balance between the amount desired and the amount offered. 9 Two important consequences follow from the model. First, in a competi- tive market no landlord can succeed in raising rents above the market level. This is another way of saying that there is no exercise of monopoly power to "exploit" tenants.' 0 Second, if the housing rentals yield profits greater than other markets, investment capital will flow into residential construction, supply of rental housing will gradually be expanded through new construction, rehabilitation, or conversion, and any excessively profitable rents will ultimately be elimi- nated. 1 On the other hand, if rentals yield low returns, investors will gradu- ally withdraw their capital from rental housing. The market would experience less construction, more conversion to other uses and, perhaps, accelerated de- terioration or abandonment of properties. No other benefit can accrue to a landlord by keeping a unit off the market because no individual landlord can influence the market rent. 9. The market's function is to set a price or rent that will tend to equate supply with demand. Nothing in this market-clearing process guarantees a socially acceptable minimum housing standard or rental levels that meet any particular definition of "affordability." 10. See Block, Postscript: A Reply to Critics, in W. Block & E. Olsen, supra note 1, at 292-93; Hazlett, Rent Controls and the Housing Crisis, in M. Johnson, supra note I, at 280. 11. It is a fundamental tenet of market-oriented capitalism that investment capital will tend to flow into industries where the rate of return (adjusted for risk) is greater than average and will tend to leave industries where the rate of return (adjusted for risk) is less than average. The existence of above normal ("excess" or "pure") profits is the key to expansion or contrac- tion of industries. Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. XIII:975 Major negative effects of rent control are inferred from this portion of the analysis. Controls lower rents below unregulated market levels and allegedly force property owners to accept a less than competitive return on their invest- ment.' 2 This is illustrated in Figure 1, where the permissible controlled rent is denoted by Rc. At this rent level the quantity of housing services demanded (Qc) exceeds the amount landlords are willing and able to supply
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Affordability Crisis: How Rent Control Is Making Waves In
    THE AFFORDABILTY CRISIS HOW RENT CONTROL IS MAKING WAVES IN MULTIFAMILY Formerly known as the War Emergency Tenant Protection Act, rent control was proposed during the World War II era to protect tenants from war-related housing shortages. These policies were first enacted in New York and Washington, D.C., as they experienced the most significant shortages. Fast forward to today, rent regulation has spread to California, Maryland, New Jersey, and most recently, Oregon. THREE YEARS POST WWII, 2.5 MILLION NEW HOMES WERE BULIT ACROSS THE COUNTRY. Although there are no housing shortages today as severe as during World War II, the rent regulation policies have evolved with the intention to create more affordable housing options and simultaneously protect tenants who live on a fixed or low-income, such as the elderly. Rent control is a law implemented by the government in which they control and regulate the amount a landlord can charge a tenant for rental housing. This policy prevents landlords from overcharging rent and protects tenants from eviction without just cause, such as late payments. ™ Rent control has been a buzzing topic as of late, with new statewide enforcements within New York, Oregon, and most recently, California. In this article, Matthews™ will discuss the current state of rent regulation laws and how tenants and investors are reacting. ADVANTAGES OF RENT CONTROL DISADVANTAGES OF RENT CONTROL Policymakers tend to account for the voice The audience speaking out against rent control supporting rent regulation laws by implementing laws is primarily investors. Professionals and rent control to combat affordability issues.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of Toronto ⁎ Martine Augusta, Alan Walksb, a Edward J
    Geoforum 89 (2018) 124–136 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Geoforum journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum Gentrification, suburban decline, and the financialization of multi-family T rental housing: The case of Toronto ⁎ Martine Augusta, Alan Walksb, a Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA b Department of Geography, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S-3G3, Canada ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: While traditional forms of gentrification involved the conversion of rental units to owner-occupation, a new Financialization rental-tenure form of gentrification has emerged across the globe. This is driven by financialization, reduced Apartments tenant protections, and declining social-housing production, and is characterized by the replacement of poorer REITs renters with higher-income tenants. Many poorer renters are in turn being displaced out of the inner city and into Inequality older suburban neighbourhoods where aging apartment towers had provided a last bastion of affordable Gentrification accommodation, but which are now also targeted by large rental housing corporations. These dynamics are Suburban decline increasingly dominated by what we call ‘financialized landlords,’ including those owned or run by private equity funds, financial asset management corporations, and real estate investment trusts (REITS). Such firms float securities on domestic and international markets and use the proceeds to purchase older rental buildings charging affordable rents, and then apply a range of business strategies to extract value from the buildings, existing tenants and local neighbourhoods, and flow them to investors. This paper documents this process in Toronto, Canada's largest city and a city experiencing both sustained gentrification and advanced suburban restructuring.
    [Show full text]
  • Housing Financialization and Rent Control Working Paper 2020:01 Department of Economics, John Jay College Jacob Udell1
    Housing Financialization and Rent Control Working Paper 2020:01 Department of Economics, John Jay College Jacob Udell1 Abstract This working paper attempts to consolidate a number of insights about commercial real estate finance over the last 25 years in New York City to suggest a general framework for thinking about gentrification, housing financialization, and rent control. In particular, it argues for the need to account for the supply of capital seeking out returns in NYC, with an emphasis on the market for older-stock, rent-stabilized multifamily buildings. It also sketches out some potential dynamics following the passage of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act in June 2019, which significantly strengthened the NYC rent stabilization regime and had an important effect in the acquisiton market for rent stabilized properties. Finally, it analyzes an example of a portfolio of Bronx buildings owned by Emerald Equity Group and financed by Freddie Mac, to explore some of these dynamics. Many of the parts of this paper are in draft-form, and areas to expand upon and develop are noted throughout the paper. 1While this working paper was conceived with much help, it does not reflect the analysis of anyone but myself, as a graduate student in Economics at John Jay College. Please do not cite without contacting the author at [email protected]. Draft 2 – 2.20.2020 Introduction NYC private landlords and their investors have been able to profit handsomely over the last 25 years by acquiring large portfolios of existing rent-stabilized, older-stock properties.2 In that period, prevailing prices for rent stabilized buildings have increased almost unabated, with the few years around the 2008 Financial Crisis being the only exception.
    [Show full text]
  • What More Do We Need to Know About How to Prevent and Mitigate Displacement of Low- and Moderate-Income Households from Gentrifying Neighborhoods?
    What More Do We Need to Know about How to Prevent and Mitigate Displacement of Low- and Moderate-Income Households from Gentrifying Neighborhoods? VICKI BEEN1 New York University he extent to which gentrification results in the displacement of low- and moderate-income households from neighborhoods undergoing signifi- cant change is still the subject of study and debate among urban policy researchers.2 Recent evidence suggests that, at least in areas outside low- vacancy “superstar cities”3 with intense gentrification, renters who likely Tare the most vulnerable to displacement generally do not move away from gentrifying neighborhoods at higher rates than such households move from nongentrifying areas.4 Elected officials, housing advocates, and the public, on the other hand, have no doubt that gentrification can and does cause displacement.5 There are a number of reasons the research findings on displacement may be less accu- rate or complete than reports from affected neighborhoods. First, there is considerable disagreement, especially early in the process, about which neighborhoods actually are gentrifying. Second, data tracking people’s moves to and from neighborhoods is limited because of concerns about the confidentiality of tax, social service, and other governmental data files that follow individuals over time, and because private sources of linked data, such as credit reporting bureau files, are incomplete in a variety of ways (some households don’t have credit files, for example). Third, even if residents of gentrifying neighborhoods may move no more often from gentrifying neighborhoods than similar households in other areas, they may move for different reasons. Residents of non-gentrifying neighborhoods may more often move voluntarily — seeking better neighborhoods or jobs, for example — while residents of gentrifying neighborhoods may more often move involuntarily, wanting to stay in the neighborhood but unable to afford it.
    [Show full text]
  • Full Report Introduction to Project
    THE ILLUSION OF CHOICE: Evictions and Profit in North Minneapolis Author: Principal Investigator, Dr. Brittany Lewis, Senior Research Associate Contributing Authors: Molly Calhoun, Cynthia Matthias, Kya Conception, Thalya Reyes, Carolyn Szczepanski, Gabriela Norton, Eleanor Noble, and Giselle Tisdale Artist-in-Residence: Nikki McComb, Art Is My Weapon “I think that it definitely has to be made a law that a UD should not go on a person’s name until after you have been found guilty in court. It is horrific that you would sit up here and have a UD on my name that prevents me from moving...You would rather a person be home- less than to give them a day in court to be heard first...You shouldn’t have to be home- less to be heard.” – Biracial, female, 36 years old “I’ve heard bad “There is a fear premium attached to North Min- things. He’s known neapolis. Because what’s the stereotypical image as a slumlord...But people have of North Minneapolis? I could tell you. against my better Bang, bang. People are afraid of it. If you tell people, judgment, to not I bought a property in North Minneapolis. What they wanting to be out say is, ‘Why would you do that?’” – White, male, a place and home- 58 year old, property manager and owner less and between moving, I took the first thing. It was like a desper- ate situation.” – Biracial, female, 45 years old For more visit z.umn.edu/evictions PURPOSE, SELECT LITERATURE REVIEW, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS Purpose Single Black mothers face the highest risk of eviction in the Single Black women with children living below the poverty line United States.
    [Show full text]
  • Ph6.1 Rental Regulation
    OECD Affordable Housing Database – http://oe.cd/ahd OECD Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs - Social Policy Division PH6.1 RENTAL REGULATION Definitions and methodology This indicator presents information on key aspects of regulation in the private rental sector, mainly collected through the OECD Questionnaire on Affordable and Social Housing (QuASH). It presents information on rent control, tenant-landlord relations, lease type and duration, regulations regarding the quality of rental dwellings, and measures regulating short-term holiday rentals. It also presents public supports in the private rental market that were introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Information on rent control considers the following dimensions: the control of initial rent levels, whether the initial rents are freely negotiated between the landlord and tenants or there are specific rules determining the amount of rent landlords are allowed to ask; and regular rent increases – that is, whether rent levels regularly increase through some mechanism established by law, e.g. adjustments in line with the consumer price index (CPI). Lease features concerns information on whether the duration of rental contracts can be freely negotiated, as well as their typical minimum duration and the deposit to be paid by the tenant. Information on tenant-landlord relations concerns information on what constitute a legitimate reason for the landlord to terminate the lease contract, the necessary notice period, and whether there are cases when eviction is not permitted. Information on the quality of rental housing refers to the presence of regulations to ensure a minimum level of quality, the administrative level responsible for regulating dwelling quality, as well as the characteristics of “decent” rental dwellings.
    [Show full text]
  • Nine Facts New Yorkers Should Know About Rent Regulation
    NINE FACTS NEW YORKE RS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT RENT REGULATION Ju ly 2009 Citizens Budget Commission Since 1993 New York City’s rent regulations these households still pay a high portion of have moved toward deregulation. However, their income for rent. Moreover, rent there is a possibility that the direction may regulation is providing valuable benefits to a be changed. In early 2009, the New York significant number of higher income house- State Assembly passed legislation that holds. In addition, the impact of regulation includes sweeping proposals such as the is concentrated in Manhattan. Finally, many elimination of high-rent vacancy decontrol households with low incomes are not in the and the re-control of most apartments that regulated sector or other government hous- were deregulated under this provision. The ing assistance programs; they face high rent current deep economic recession is viewed burdens in the unregulated housing market. by some as a reason to seek protections for more tenants, and by others as an oppor- At this juncture, CBC believes the Legis- tunity to lift regulations without fear that lature should be cautious about initiatives to market forces will result in burdensome rent extend the reach of rent regulation. Instead, increases. Regardless of what may happen state leaders should think more broadly in the current legislative session, the state about ways to better target assistance to enabling legislation for rent regulation is lower income households and to allow the due to expire in 2011. market to work in ways that better allocate housing and expand housing choices for all Given the legislative interest in rent New Yorkers.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws
    Fordham Urban Law Journal Volume 46 Number 5 One Hundred Years of Rent Control: An Examination of the Past and Future of Rental Article 1 Housing (Symposium) 2019 Laboratories of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws Vicki Been Ingrid Gould Ellen Sophia House Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj Recommended Citation Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen, and Sophia House, Laboratories of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws, 46 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1041 (2019). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol46/iss5/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LABORATORIES OF REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE DIVERSITY OF RENT REGULATION LAWS Vicki Been,* Ingrid Gould Ellen,** and Sophia House***† Introduction ........................................................................................... 1042 I. Understanding the Goals of Rent Regulation ................................ 1043 A. Stated Goals of Rent Regulation Programs ....................... 1043 B. Existing Research and Challenges ....................................... 1046 II. Features and Trade-Offs of Rent Regulation: Defining the Regulated Universe .......................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • No Place Like Home: Defining HUD's Role in the Affordable Housing Crisis
    adm_71-3_41554 Sheet No. 105 Side A 09/18/2019 13:09:53 ALR 71.3_SMUCKER_ME REVIEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/19 5:47 PM NO PLACE LIKE HOME: DEFINING HUD’S ROLE IN THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS K. HEIDI SMUCKER* Introduction .............................................................................................. 634 I.HUD: An Agency or Writer of Federal Checks? ................................... 636 A. The Evolution of Rental Housing Assistance: What Worked and What Didn’t ............................................................................ 637 B. A Funnel for Federal Funding ................................................ 639 II.Houston (and San Francisco, D.C., and New York), We Have a Problem ....................................................................................................... 640 A. The Rise (and Potential Fall) of San Francisco’s Restrictive Zoning .................................................................................... 641 B. Washington D.C.: Negative Implications of Cookie-Cutter Development .......................................................................... 643 C. I Heart New York, But Not The Rent ................................... 646 III.Baby Steps, Tiny Victories, and Their Potential for Impact ............... 647 IV.Affirmatively Furthering Affordable Housing: A (Possible) Recipe for Success ........................................................................................... 651 A. Reviving an Obama-Era Ghost in the Name of Efficiency .... 652 B. A Bird in the Hand
    [Show full text]
  • Rent Regulation for the 21St Century: Pairing Anti-Gouging with Targeted Subsidies
    POLICY BRIEF | APRIL 2021 Rent Regulation for the 21st Century: Pairing Anti-Gouging with Targeted Subsidies A central purpose of rent regulation is to provide stability against unexpected increases in rent. Low-income renters are especially vulnerable to rent shocks. Most rent regulation systems, however, confer the largest benefits on higher- income renters, prompting the question of how rent regulation can offer more effective protection to lower-income households. Expanding rent regulation to impose tighter rent restrictions on more of the housing stock has adverse consequences for housing markets; meanwhile, means testing rent-regulated housing would be highly burdensome and potentially counterproductive. In this brief, we argue that pairing anti-gouging rent regulation with shallow, targeted subsidies to low-income renters is a better way to ensure that the benefits of rent regulation reach vulnerable households. We argue that neither expanding rent regulation Introduction to impose tighter rent restrictions across more of Rent regulation debates have intensified in recent the housing market nor means testing regulated years, especially in jurisdictions where increased units is an optimal way to achieve rent regulation’s demand for rental housing has led to unprec- aim of preserving housing stability for low-income edented rent increases.1 Although low-income households. Instead, a more efficient way to ensure renters are particularly vulnerable to the harms that low-income households receive the benefits of that rent regulations aim to mitigate, most of rent regulation is to pair broad-based, anti-gouging the protections of rent regulations are not tar- rent regulation with targeted subsidies that reduce geted and may not reach these renters.2 This housing costs for low-income tenants.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws Testimony Of
    Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws Testimony of Sophia House Legal Fellow, Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy New York University Before Jersey City Council Rent Control Reform Committee Rolando Lavarro, Council President November 13, 2019 President Lavarro and members of the Committee, I am honored to share with you our research on the diversity of rent regulation ordinances nationwide. My name is Sophie House, and I am a fellow at the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy at New York University. The Furman Center is a joint research center of NYU’s School of Law and Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service. Founded in 1995, it is one of the nation’s leading academic research centers devoted to the public policy aspects of land use, real estate development, and housing. I will provide an overview of the Furman Center’s research on rent regulation to aid the committee as it evaluates Jersey City’s rent regulations. Along with Ingrid Gould Ellen and Vicki Been, I am the co-author of an article forthcoming in the Fordham Urban Law Journal entitled Laboratories of Regulation: Understanding the Diversity of Rent Regulation Laws. Our research catalogs the diversity of rent regulation ordinances, identifying the decisions and tradeoffs involved in designing and implementing these regulations. Regulating Rents Annual rent increases Establishing permissible rent increases is the core task of rent regulation. Jurisdictions can opt to use a pre-determined formula; create a new agency or board; or charge an existing institution to set increases.1 Using a formula — for example, linking maximum rent increases to an index of inflation2 — simplifies the process, but may understate or overstate costs.
    [Show full text]
  • The 7 Deadly Sins of Rental Property Management
    7 Rental Property Sins That’ll Put You in The Poor House 1 - All Property Management About AllPropertyManagement.com We give rental property owners powerful resources to turn their properties into thriving, lucrative investments. As the largest network of property management services on the Internet, we’re known for expertly answering rental property owner’s questions on how to maximize their income potential. We also vet and introduce investors to more than 2,000 property management companies with local expertise through our unique search tools. Our tools work for investors at every level. It doesn’t matter if you’re the owner of a single property who needs a qualified local property manager or you’re an institutional investor looking for appropriate managers for each property in a large portfolio. We can quickly and easily help you locate and compare thousands of rental and association management companies throughout the United States and Canada. You’ll also find a wealth of information on real estate investment and property management best practices. Contents Accidents Happen ............................................................................3 Sin #1: Setting Your Own Rental Rates ........................................................7 Sin #2: Chasing Rent Checks ..................................................................9 Sin #3: Anemic Marketing ....................................................................12 Sin #4: Renting to The Wrong People ........................................................14 Sin #5: D.I.Y. Tenant Repair and Maintenance ................................................17 Sin #6: Overpaying Contractors ..............................................................19 Sin #7: Overlooking Housing Laws ...........................................................22 2 - All Property Management Accidents Happen Last year 2/3rds of rental property owners failed to make a profit. The 3.8 million landlords whose properties lost money saw their dreams of a steady, annual rental income evaporate into the ether.
    [Show full text]