LASHKAR-E-TAIBA: LOCAL ORGANI- SATION, GLOBAL AMBITIONS the Pakistani Jihadist Group Lashkar-E-Taiba Has Been Labelled As Potentially the Next Al- Qaida

CSS Analysis in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 132 • April 2013

LASHKAR-E-TAIBA: LOCAL ORGANI- SATION, GLOBAL AMBITIONS The Pakistani jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba has been labelled as potentially the next al- Qaida. It has shown both the desire and the capacity to attack Western nationals. The group has gained a certain degree of state protection in Pakistan by compartmentalising its activities into violent and non-violent components, and selectively cooperating with security agencies. Due to its global ambitions, growing operational presence, and internal dynamics, it now poses a serious threat to international security.

trace LeT’s organisational evolution from its genesis and the development of institu- tional contacts with Pakistani state agencies, before examining how growing prox- imity to al-Qaida and internal pressures have led the group to develop an extra-regional concept for jihadist operations. The brief will conclude by offering an assess- ment of the threat posed to the West and suggestions for combating it.

Origins of LeT LeT was created on 22 February 1990 as the armed wing of a proselytising organisation based in Pakistan’s Punjab province. Known as the Markaz Da’wa wal-Irshad (MDI – Centre for Preaching and Guid- ance), this organisation subscribed to the Ahl-i Hadith school of Muslim jurispru- Reuters / Jayanta Shaw dence. The Ahl-i Hadith had common- The burning Taj Hotel in Mumbai: This attack placed LeT in the focus of public attention. 27 November 2008. alities with the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia and with other strains of puritanical or With the threat of major attacks by al- riety in 2008. That year, its cadres carried “Salafist” Islamist thought. Qaida increasingly remote, attention out a sea-borne suicide raid on the Indian has turned to jihadist groups of similar city of Mumbai, killing 25 foreign tourists One of MDI’s most prominent founders ideological persuasion. Among the most and 141 locals. After the attacks, it became was Abdullah Azzam, a radical Palestinian prominent of these is a Pakistani organi- evident that the targeting of Western na- cleric based in Pakistan. He formulated the sation named Lashkar-e-Taiba (“Army of tionals had been prioritised. This came as a idea of a borderless jihad that would unify the Pure”). US security officials believe that surprise to counterterrorism experts, who present and past Muslim territories into this group poses the single-biggest threat had hitherto assumed that the group’s re- a global Caliphate. His protégé, Osama to Western interests in South Asia. Its ties gional focus was limited to South Asia. bin Laden, hijacked this concept to legiti- with the Pakistani state make it difficult mise the formation of a pan-Arab jihadist to combat, and the growing sophistication LeT has always had global ambitions, but group named al-Qaida. Bin Laden aspired and reach of its overseas operations has managed to conceal these behind a re- to lead a mercenary army that would fight become a matter of serious policy concern. gionalist narrative. Over 20 years, it has for Muslim interests worldwide. Azzam evolved into a triple-faceted militia that responded by backing the creation of LeT LeT was well-known to the international is a charitable organisation domestically, as a rival group with an identical ideology counterterrorism community throughout a guerrilla force regionally, and a terrorist and mission, consisting mostly of Pakistani the 2000s, but only attained public noto- network internationally. This analysis will cadres.

themselves being gunned down. This tac- The LeT leadership structure tic negated the need for an escape route. It was less demanding logistically and less Hafiz Saeed LeT Leader vulnerable to intelligence-led disruption. SDGT 27 May 2008 From 2002 onward, LeT also attacked un- protected civilian targets with the aim of Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi Yahya Mujahid Abdul Rehman Makki Haji Muhammad Ashraf generating a higher death toll. Operations chief Spokesman External affairs chief Finance chief SDGT 27 May 2008 SDGT 1 July 2009 SDGT 4 November 2010 SDGT 27 May 2008 Throughout this period, the ISI retained control over LeT operations at the strate- Azam Cheema Sajid Majeed gic level, but its personnel in the field were Intelligence chief Transnational susceptible to “reverse indoctrination”. SDGT 4 November 2010 operations SDGT 30 August 2012 Many intelligence officers assigned to su- pervise LeT ended up assisting provocative SDGT: date of designation as Specially Designated Global Terrorist by US authorities terrorist attacks that severely vitiated In- do-Pakistani relations. Former members of Despite the factional rivalry out of which Since neither had extensive operational the Pakistan army’s Special Services Group it had been born, LeT proved amenable to contacts with Palestinian groups, though, (SSG) provided training and advice for car- outreach by al-Qaida. The instrumental their common worldview did not lead to a rying out mass-casualty assaults in urban link was a marriage alliance between the common strategy. Al-Qaida remained a de- areas. Their professional input is believed family of LeT operations chief Zaki ur-Reh territorialised network of Arab exiles, while to have crucially enabled LeT in carrying man Lakhvi and a senior bin Laden aide. LeT developed into a bureaucratised militia out its largest operation to date: the Mum- Lakhvi was a guerrilla leader and not a re- with official patronage. bai terrorist attack of 2008. ligious scholar, so he symbolically placed LeT under the overall leadership of Hafeez Connections with Pakistani The Mumbai attack was a paradigm- Saeed, a Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith cleric asso- military changing event. According to disclosures ciated with both Azzam and bin Laden. The main reason for LeT’s growth after from arrested LeT cadres, it was assisted 1990 was the protection and assistance it by mid-ranking ISI officers, who provided From its inception, LeT had a close ideologi received from the Pakistani army and the funds, contacts, and weaponry for the raid. cal kinship with al-Qaida. The Arab group Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), respectively. Following the assault, the then-ISI chief donated US$ 2 million for the construction LeT understood that the Pakistani military even admitted to US officials that “rogue of LeT’s headquarters and main training establishment was keen to wage a proxy operatives” from the agency might have complex, situated near the Pakistani city war in Indian Kashmir. Its leaders decided been involved. His admission, together of Lahore. Both groups set out to build a to strategically purchase Pakistani indul- with other indications suggesting partial name for themselves in the international gence for their ‘reconquest’ of India by complicity from state actors, raised ques- jihadist community by providing qual- tactically cooperating with the ISI in Kash- tions as to whether close ties with the Pa- ity instruction in military tactics to a new mir. They calculated that the “liberation” kistani establishment had restrained LeT generation of jihadists, who were expected of Kashmir would in any case provide a or emboldened it. to fight in “wars of liberation” across the springboard for further jihadist offensives world. They developed similar syllabi and into India by encouraging rebellion among Hitherto, conventional wisdom among even had common trainers. the country’s large Muslim minority. counterterrorist analysts held that ISI control over LeT kept the group’s focus However, their respective ethnic composi- Operating in the ethnically and linguisti- limited to low-impact actions. The scale tions caused their operational priorities to cally distinct Kashmir region was not easy, of the Mumbai attack, coupled with the differ. Al-Qaida was focused on promoting however. LeT was an overwhelmingly for- systematic targeting of Western tourists, regime change in the Middle East, since it eign organisation whose cadres needed threw these assumptions into doubt. In- saw control of the Arab world as key to es- local guidance in order to carry out guer- stead of submitting to Pakistani calibra- tablishing a Caliphate. LeT, in keeping with rilla attacks. Although ISI intermediaries tion, the jihadist group had leveraged its its Pakistani roots, was primarily focused arranged some degree of local assistance, contacts with the country’s military and on leading a Muslim reconquest of India Indian security forces countered this by intelligence community to launch more – a country that, its leaders asserted, had highlighting LeT’s doctrinaire nature, lim- sophisticated international operations, us- historically been part of the Muslim realm iting the degree to which the group could ing techniques pioneered by al-Qaida in before Western colonisation. Each group gain an ideological foothold. By 1998, the early 1990s. trained its cadres for subversive activities heavy losses due to Indian intelligence in its primary target area. penetration had thinned the LeT ranks. Learning from al-Qaida Like al-Qaida, LeT had a dual identity: it This difference in priorities was rhetorical- The jihadist group adapted by importing was both a training platform for free- ly papered over by a common antipathy to a tactic from the Middle East: the suicidal lance jihadists from across the world – a Israel. Both al-Qaida and LeT agreed that or ‘fedayeen’ raid. Instead of launching kind of “terrorist university” – and a direct the State of Israel represented an abomi- hit-and-run assaults, LeT gunmen would sponsor of terrorist attacks. It synergised nation on Muslim peoples imposed by the storm security outposts and kill as many this duality to boost its striking power. West, and that it had to be annihilated. soldiers or policemen as they could, before Talent-spotters in the Pakistani diaspora

encouraged Western-born jihadists to join ud-Da’wa. In practice, both the military Chronology the group. These recruits were trained in and political wings of LeT continued to Pakistan as sleeper agents and assigned function in unison, operating from the 2012 US government announces a US$ 10 handlers from LeT’s External Affairs De- same facilities. million bounty for evidence that would compel Pakistan to convict LeT chief partment. Upon return to their home Hafeez Saeed countries, they assisted in the procure- As the US-led war against al-Qaida gained 2011 Bin Laden killed, LeT organises rallies in ment of commercially-available military momentum, LeT noted that jihadist mili- support of al-Qaida across Pakistan equipment and reconnoitred potential tary capabilities could not be sustained for 2010 Several leaders of LeT designated as targets. The scale of their activities only long without public support. Its leaders ac- global terrorists by US became evident in 2009, when investiga- cordingly resolved to prioritise ideological 2009 LeT plan to attack media offices in Den- tors discovered a list of 320 targets world- subversion alongside military training. The mark disrupted by US intelligence wide that LeT planners had identified for group’s political wing had already built a 2008 LeT carries out Mumbai attacks under a pseudonym, its culpability is quickly possible attack. large network of schools across Pakistan, established, UN designates Jama’at ud- creating a middle-class support base. Af- Da’wa as a terrorist front organisation A major reason for the push towards inter 2001, Jama’at ud-Da’wa showcased for LeT ternational targets was the growing prox- these schools as examples of LeT’s positive 2006 LeT carries out train bombings in Mum- imity between LeT and al-Qaida’s fugitive societal contribution, together with the bai, partly funds “liquid bomb” airline plot in UK leadership after 2001. Documents recov- provision of welfare services. The jihadist 2005 London bombings by jihadists associated ered by US Navy SEALS from Abbottabad group’s violent actions were not publicly with LeT, UN designates LeT a terrorist in 2011 suggest that LeT chief Hafeez acknowledged. organisation Saeed maintained a running correspond- 2002 LeT banned by Pakistani government, ence with Osama bin Laden. A number of Externalising internal tensions but escapes police action through ad- ministrative change. al-Qaida leaders were hosted in LeT safe During the 2000s, three factors led LeT to 2001 11 September attacks, al-Qaida fugitives houses across Pakistan, following the US shift from merely fantasising about global hosted in Pakistan by LeT, LeT designated invasion of Afghanistan. The Pakistani jihad to actually launch attacks in support terrorist organisation by US and UK group came to be seen in the international of that vision. First, with the Kashmir thea- 1999 LeT begins suicidal attacks on security jihadist community as a “safe” gateway tre proving less hospitable than expected, outposts in India to joining al-Qaida, since it enjoyed state LeT developed a manpower surplus. Its 1998 al-Qaida and LeT ally in “International protection, but also had close ties with its training camps produced far more com- Islamist Front” against the West and Israel Arab counterpart. bat graduates than could be productively 1996 Bin Laden sets up permanent base in employed. This led the group to search for Afghanistan, begins training for major Unlike al-Qaida, LeT avoided claiming re- alternative targets. Its leadership was con- attacks sponsibility for acts of terrorism carried cerned about demoralisation and indis- 1993 LeT inducts guerrilla fighters into Indian out by freelance graduates of its training cipline borne out of inactivity, and so en- Kashmir camps, as well as its own operational cad- couraged planning for major international 1992 LeT begins recruiting for Islamic recon- res. The latter operated under the banner attacks. Until 2007, however, such attacks quest of India, al-Qaida designates US as primary enemy of phantom organisations with no appar- were only meant to be executed by trained 1990 LeT formed as military wing of Azzam’s ent Pakistani connections. Such subter- freelancers, and not directly by LeT’s own MDI fuge was necessary because LeT was far operational cadre. That changed after a 1989 Soviet Union completes withdrawal from more vulnerable to counterterrorist action political crisis in Pakistan enhanced LeT’s Afghanistan than al-Qaida: it had over 6000 offices in importance to the ISI. 1988 al-Qaida formed by Bin Laden Pakistan, and the whereabouts of its lead- 1987 Azzam-bin Laden split, Markaz Da’wa ers were well known to Western intelli- In July 2007, the Pakistani army assault- wal-Irshad (MDI) co-founded by Azzam gence agencies. To forestall any punitive ed a jihadist bastion. Six months later, a 1984 Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden begin collaboration in fighting Soviets action, LeT portrayed itself as an India- group of 27 organisations formed the Pa- 1979 Soviet Union invades Afghanistan centric guerrilla group primarily active in kistani Taliban, intent on punishing the Kashmir. Meanwhile, it unobtrusively act- army for its “betrayal”. The ISI, desperate ed on its long-standing global ambitions for intelligence on these groups, coopted A third factor was the effect of genera- through shadowy transnational networks LeT as a “loyal” jihadist force. In exchange tional change upon LeT operational plan- run in the compartmentalised style of an for hefty bribes and freedom to expand ning. By 2007, many of the group’s middle intelligence agency. its overground infrastructure, LeT assisted managers came from a generation born in the security establishment’s efforts to the 1970s, a period when Pakistani political Following a fedayeen assault on the Indian defuse jihadist militancy in Pakistan by culture became markedly “Arabised”. Under Parliament, intense international criticism funnelling it overseas instead. Its lead- the combined influence of petro-dollars, forced the Pakistani government to an- ers used the same logic that bin Laden sermons from the Saudi Wahhabi clergy, nounce a ban on LeT in 2002. According to had previously employed to hold al-Qaida and mass migration to the Persian Gulf, both US and Indian analysts, restrictions together, arguing that attacks on fellow many middle-class Pakistanis developed imposed on the group were cosmetic and Muslims were inexcusable, and that jihad an awareness of Middle Eastern geopoli- easily circumvented by a contrived admin- should only be directed against “unbeliev- tics. This led them to regard the West as istrative split. LeT ostensibly separated ers”. Their rhetoric was the second factor an enemy for having supposedly taken a from its parent body, the Markaz Da’wa creating internal pressure for carrying out partisan stance on the Arab-Israeli con- wal-Irshad, which was renamed Jama’at attacks overseas. flict. LeT’s transnational network was run

by ambitious cadres from this age cohort disrupted in the UK, France, Germany, Italy, safe, thus providing a face-saving device and economic class. They wanted to join Spain, Saudi Arabia, Australia and the US. for Pakistan, while severely degrading the al-Qaida’s global jihad. In certain cases, these networks were de- group’s military capability. So far, Pakistan tected shortly before they were about to has shown little interest in cooperating in A typical example was Sajid Majeed (bet- carry out major terrorist strikes. One ex- counterterrorism efforts against LeT due ter known as “Sajid Mir”), a former army ample was the 2006 “liquid bomb” plot to to the group’s usefulness as an instru- officer and ISI operative who was the main blow up trans-Atlantic airliners flying from ment for containing domestic militancy. Is- organiser of the 2008 Mumbai attack. For the UK. British investigators suspect that lamabad’s inability to restrain LeT’s global some years previously, he had been tracked the plot was partly funded by LeT with ambitions, however, means that Western by Western intelligence agencies as a hand money donated for humanitarian purpos- governments need to pool intelligence and ler of LeT sleeper agents. As an “Arabised” es following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. coordinate operations against the jihadist jihadist, he viewed mass-casualty attacks group, or else risk attacks on their own citi- on “unbelievers” as integral to the global Given the jihadist group’s ties with Paki- zens if violence continues to be external- Caliphate vision that underlay both LeT’s stani state agencies, US analysts believe ized away from Pakistani territory. and al-Qaida’s founding rationales. Ma- that there are few policy options for pro- jeed conceived of a suicidal amphibious actively combating it other than to quar- Author: Prem Mahadevan assault that would simultaneously strike antine Pakistan itself. Travellers from the [email protected] Western and Israeli tourists and Indian country are already subject to intense citizens in Mumbai. His motive was partly screening by Western authorities. An ad- Responsible editor: Daniel Trachsler personal: to prove himself as an innovative ditional counter-measure might be to [email protected] operational leader and upstage a rival in exert sustained pressure upon Pakistani German and French versions / other LeT who was in charge of non-suicidal op- security officials to cooperate in the- in CSS Analyses / mailinglist: erations. Following the Mumbai attack, he carceration of those LeT leaders who con- www.css.ethz.ch/cssanalysen planned a similar assault in Copenhagen, trol transnational operations. Such a step which was prevented when US authorities would leave LeT’s political wing relatively ISSN: 2296-0244 arrested one of his agents in 2009. Previous issues Threat and response Internal pressure has been critical in shap- No. 130: The ICC: High expectations, ambiguous record ing LeT’s attack strategy. Persistent ten- No. 129: Whole of Government: Integration and Demarcation sions between top leaders such as Zaki No. 128: European strategies against jihadist radicalisation ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Hafeez Saeed have No. 127: The Nuclear Suppliers Group at the Crossroads caused foreign operations to become a No. 126: State of Play in European Defence And armaments Cooperation mechanism for conflict management. 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