Politics, National Identity, and the Compromise of 1850

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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

This Great Contest of Principle: Politics, National Identity, and the Compromise of 1850

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the

Department of History

School of Arts and Sciences

Of The Catholic University of America

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Robert R. Camilleri

Washington, D.C.

2015

This Great Contest of Principle: Politics, National Identity, and the Compromise of 1850

Robert R. Camilleri, PhD.

Director: Stephen West

The Congressional debates leading to the Compromise of 1850 represented a critical turning point in the United States’ sectional crisis, and were the product of a contest between differing conceptions of national identity. This study examines the actions, motivations, ideologies, and principles of members of Congress and the executive branch to determine how their respective national ideals were reflected in their proposals for defusing the territorial crisis, and how the interactions of ideological principles and personal rivalries influenced legislation that impacted the political order of the 1850s. The study utilizes transcripts of Congressional debates, manuscript collections, newspaper articles, and voting analysis. It identifies three competing visions of nationalism in the 31st Congress, termed Unionists, transformational nationalists, and

Southern nationalists, and describes how the territorial crisis was influenced by and in turn influenced the development of these visions. It also examines how personal rivalries disrupted

ideological and factional alignments within these categories, with consequences that impacted the legislative process and eventual terms of the settlement. It traces the development of these competing nationalist visions from their origins in the 1810s, 1820s, and 1830s, and describes how Unionism came to dominate the political elite following the War of 1812, but was increasingly challenged by Southern nationalism and transformational nationalism during and following the Presidency of John Tyler. It assesses the strengths of these groupings within the

31st Congress, and then traces how these principles were expressed during the ensuing debates over the admission of California to the Union as a state, Henry Clay’s Omnibus Bill, and the series of bills that were adopted to encompass the final Compromise of 1850. It concludes that the Compromise of 1850 failed to provide a lasting settlement to the territorial crisis due to the adoption of popular sovereignty, which ensured that territorial agitation based upon these three competing nationalist principles would persist, and that the adoption of popular sovereignty by

Unionism started the period of decline and eventual extinction of that nationalist vision.

This dissertation by Robert R. Camilleri fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in History approved by Stephen West, PhD., as Director, and by Timothy Meagher, PhD., and Jane Turner Censer, PhD. as Readers.

______Stephen West, PhD., Director

______Timothy Meagher, PhD., Reader

______Jane Turner Censer, PhD., Reader

To Amy, for everything.

iii

Introduction pg. 1

Chapter 1: A Malign Influence Threatens the Country pg. 34

Chapter 2: Between Scylla and Charybdis pg. 99

Chapter 3: Avowed Enemies pg. 147

Chapter 4: Rule and Ruin pg. 207

Chapter 5: Faction Rules the Hour pg. 267

Chapter 6: A Momentary Quiet pg. 310

Bibliography pg. 342

Introduction

September 8, 1850, witnessed an outpouring of relief and celebration throughout official

Washington, with political leaders and residents joining together for a day of celebration and revelry. “I have never before known so much excitement upon the passage of any law,”

Washington resident Jonathan Foltz reported to his friend, former Secretary of State (and future

President) James Buchanan.1 Foltz, like many contemporaries, believed that the laws passed that day, concluding the legislative settlement remembered today as the Compromise of 1850, had settled the sectional crisis over the expansion of slavery that had agitated the nation since 1819.

Despite the confidence of Jonathan Foltz, however, the territorial question would prove more resilient than the Compromise that was created to settle it. Rather than providing the pivotal moment that the revelers of September 8, 1850 had celebrated, the passage of the Compromise of

1850 is not remembered today as a transformative moment. Rather, it is remembered as one of several episodes in the evolution of a conflict between North and South that would eventually result in the Civil War.2

The sectional conflict over slavery has generally been recognized as the defining

American political conflict of the nineteenth century, and the crisis which resulted in the

Compromise of 1850 was a critical moment in the evolution of the conflict from a political to an existential crisis for the United States. At the moment when the political will for a permanent settlement of the conflict to preserve the Union was strongest, a collection of the nation’s

1 Jonathan M. Folz to James Buchanan, Sept. 13, 1850, James Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 2 David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 120. 1 2 greatest political minds devised a settlement plan that was effectively undone by 1854 and failed to prevent the dissolution of the Union in 1861. Rather than supersede the sectional conflict into a crusade for national unity, the Compromise of 1850 had, in the words of historian David Potter,

“weakened the basis of the Union.”3

The authors of the Compromise of 1850 had intended for the legislation to transform the politics of the United States, and indeed the Compromise did change national politics. The aftermath of the Compromise of 1850 and the accelerating sectional conflict resulted in a profound transformation in the political order. The Whig Party—deeply divided by internal factional disputes and in ideological transition at the time of the Compromise—struggled to prosecute a Presidential campaign by 1852, began collapsing in the North by 1854, was forced into fusion with the Know-Nothing Party to mount a Presidential campaign in 1856, and was essentially extinct by 1861. Northern Democrats, triumphant after the passage of the

Compromise, were gradually undermined by their conciliatory posture toward the South. Having established a near-stranglehold on the North by 1854, they suffered a chronic and continuing decline at the hands of their opponents, the Northern Whigs and Know Nothings who became the foundation of the Republican Party. Their credibility damaged by their identification with the unpopular fugitive slave law, Northern Democrats’ calls for sectional conciliation lost their appeal to a Northern electorate increasingly willing to confront the South. The beneficiaries of the Compromise of 1850, in the end, were those leaders like William H. Seward and Jefferson

Davis, who had developed national reputations as sectional spokesmen through their opposition

3 Potter, Impending Crisis, 143.

3 to the Compromise. The Compromise of 1850 did provide a political transformation, but it did so by accelerating trends, such as political party decline, factionalism, anti-slavery, and Southern nationalism.4

Despite these developments, many—if not most—historians have assessed the

Compromise of 1850 as a success. Though the Compromise ultimately failed to prevent the

Civil War, it was a moment when violence was averted, sectional accommodation was reached, and cooler heads ultimately prevailed. Historians have generally sympathized with the friends of the Congressional Compromise plan, and have generally credited the efforts of Henry Clay,

Daniel Webster, Stephen Douglas, and Millard Fillmore in preventing the outbreak of violence.

While the limitations of the bills have been widely recognized, the spirit of the effort has been appraised as just and proper. As a result, the blame for the acceleration of the sectional conflict and the collapse of the Compromise system has frequently been laid at the feet of Stephen

Douglas for his repudiation of the agreement through the Kansas-Nebraska act of 1854.5 In this telling, the Compromise of 1850 is best remembered as a final glorious triumph of the statesmen of the Age of Jackson over the forces of radicalism that forestalled the outbreak of Civil War and illuminated a path to eventual sectional reconciliation. This interpretation obscures the deepening social and economic differences between the North and South, which the leaders of the major parties struggled to understand and failed to contain. It underestimates the seeds of conflict that that the Compromise sowed through its precedent opening free territories to slavery

4 Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. 1964).

5 Michael Holt, The Fate of Their Country (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004).

4 for the first time, and through its flawed and inflammatory Fugitive Slave Act. It underestimates the role that personal pettiness, vindictiveness, and animosity played in the development of the settlement, as well as the dedication to principle, selflessness and patriotism that inspired the opposition to the Compromise. Most crucially, it ignores, as the framers of the Compromise did, the deep philosophical and ideological differences that divided the political elite over the meaning and future of the American political nation. In this ruthless struggle for power and principle, the Compromise of 1850 and the efforts of its authors to enact it were more complex and ambiguous than some recent historians have portrayed.

Unquestionably, criticism of Douglas for the particulars of the Kansas-Nebraska Act is warranted. However, the precedent of that Bill originated in the limitations of the Compromise of 1850. Regardless of the flaws of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Compromise of 1850 proved unable to accomplish its ultimate purpose—the permanent settlement of the sectional conflict.

Indeed, the failure of the Compromise of 1850 was striking. Whereas the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had soothed territorial conflict for thirty years, and the Missouri Compromise of 1820 had cooled tensions for an additional thirty years, within two years of the Compromise of 1850 sectional tension had essentially eviscerated one of the major political parties, and within four years the extension of the popular sovereignty principle engulfed the political nation in a new territorial conflict which resulted in Civil War. By establishing popular sovereignty as the governing territorial principle of the United States, the Compromise of 1850 transformed

American territorial policy.

Unlike the Missouri Compromise, which clearly delineated where slavery expansion was allowed while maintaining slavery restriction as a legitimate territorial policy, checked the slavery expansion controversy for a generation, the Compromise of 1850 introduced popular sovereignty as the new system for territorial organization. Rather than settle the question of which, if any, parts of the Mexican Cession should be open to slavery, the Compromise of 1850 ensured that the debate over slavery would need to be renewed whenever a territory in its burden applied for admission. By establishing a competing territorial organization principle to the clear geographic division of the Missouri Compromise., it also inadvertently reopened the possibility that territories currently closed to slavery could be opened via popular sovereignty. Rather than transferring the slavery controversy from federal sphere to the territorial one, the Compromise of

1850 ensured that slavery would remain a recurring national political issue.

Indeed, assessments of the Compromise of 1850 would be heavily influenced by contemporary politics, particularly during the run up to and aftermath of the Civil War. Prior to the Civil War, interpretations of the Compromise of 1850 were colored heavily by the commentator’s relation to the sectional conflict. Anti-slavery Northerners and Southern sectionalists viewed the Compromise as flawed at best and a sell-out at worst. Unionist leaders had likewise participated in the debate, and vehemently defended it. Many of the senior political leaders of the Union and Confederacy had come to national prominence during the 1850 debate, and with the horrors of the Civil War fresh in the memories of its participants and the passing from power of the political generation of the 1850s, positive interpretations of the Compromise and its authors became more commonplace. The romantic interpretation of the Compromise of

1850 had been firmly established by the end of the Reconstruction, and remained the primary interpretation of the legislation through the Progressive Era. In this telling, the Compromise of

1850 was forged against great adversity by Henry Clay, Daniel Webster and their allies against radicals and sectional opportunists. The primary areas for scholarly debate in this period revolved around the role of slavery and sympathy for the Southern side of the sectional conflict.

While nineteenth century historians like Herman Von Holst balanced an emphasis on the responsibility of the “slave power” in provoking the Civil War with a favorable (thought somewhat critical) interpretation of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster and their Compromise,

Progressive-era historians revised this interpretation to balance approval of the Compromise with a greater moral equivalence between the sectional causes. James Ford Rhodes would find Daniel

Webster’s “principles were mightier than those of [William Lloyd] Garrison,”6 and could praise

Webster and Clay for having “strove for a Union of hearts as well as law.”7 The interpretation of the framers of the Compromise of 1850 as selfless patriots reached its apogee and logical conclusion in J. G. Randall’s famous address to the Mississippi Valley Historical Association on

“The Blundering Generation.” For Randall, the generation that forged the compromise contrasted favorably with that of Lincoln and Davis, a “generation misled in its unctuous fury.”8

Unlike previous scholars, however, Alan Nevins provided a detailed and effective analysis of the political consequences of the Compromise in each section, and indeed in most states in each section, based around a powerful and persuasive summary of the critical

6 James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 1 (London, the Macmillan Company: 1920), 161. 7 Ibid. 191. 8 J.G. Randall, “The Blundering Generation,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 27, No. 1 (June, 1940): 7-15.

7 differences of each section’s understanding of the Compromise. “Southern acquiescence,”

Nevins argued, “was conditional”9 based upon the effective execution of the fugitive slave law.

In the North, however, the Compromise was more effective, resulting in the collapse of sectional radicalism and “the almost complete collapse of the Free Soil Party organization and press,” though this acquiescence was not without reservation.10 Most significantly, Nevins largely attributed the acceptance of the Compromise of 1850 to economic interests in both sections. “In the North no less than the South,” Nevins declared, “economic considerations were largely responsible for the trend towards acquiescence.”11 However, although economic interests were committed to the Compromise and Union, they were not in themselves sufficient to preserve the

Union. “The main problem,” Nevins concluded, was “the triple-headed monster of Slavery,

Poverty, and Race-Adjustment,” which could never be resolved by economic interests alone.

Revised assessment of role of Clay and Webster provided grounds for the reevaluation of the Compromise of 1850. In 1915, St. George L. Sioussat had recognized that “the death of

General Taylor was an event of greater significance than has sometimes been recognized,” and that “the history of the compromise of 1850 is still worthy of investigation.”12 Twenty years later Frank H. Hodder, in a turgid but groundbreaking article, argued powerfully that the conventional wisdom on the Compromise was in need of a thorough revision. Arguing that

Henry Clay’s identification with the Omnibus Bill was more of a hindrance than a help in

9 Allan Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union. Vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 379. 10 Nevins’s chapter on the North’s response to the Compromise is titled “Northern Acquiescence--With Reservations.” Allan Nevins, Ordeal. Vol. 1, 400. 11Ibid. 401. 12 St. George L. Sioussat, “Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Convention,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 2, no. 3 (Dec. 1915): 347.

8 passing the legislation, Hodder argued that the Compromise was “more largely a Democratic measure than a Whig measure, and more largely a Southern measure than a Northern one.” For

Hodder, the evidence indicated that “the Compromise of 1850 was chiefly the work of [Stephen

A.] Douglas,” and that he deserved the lion’s share of the credit for its passage.13 While both

Sioussat and Hodder had recognized that the Compromise of 1850 as worthy of extensive reinterpretation, neither scholar undertook additional publications on the subject.14 It fell to

Holman Hamilton to draw Sioussat and Hodder’s observations into a new narrative of the

Compromise of 1850.15 By the 1950s, scholarly interpretations of the Compromise of 1850 had begun to apply new thinking about national identity and ideology to the sectional conflict.

Rooted in similar assumptions about the rationality of the sectional conflict to Rhodes and

Randall, Avery Craven placed greater emphasis on the complexity that new ideological doctrines introduced to the conflict without conceding their legitimacy.16 “The crisis itself,” Craven argued, “had been precipitated by factors quite formal to the development of national life,” and represented a “struggle for power” to define the future of the nation. For Craven, the

Compromise of 1850 represented a futile effort by moderates to settle issues and constrain forces that had become dominated by abstractions “The importance of the Compromise of 1850,”

13 F. H. Hodder, “The Authorship of the Compromise of 1850,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22, No. 4 (Mar. 1936): 536. 14 The lack of a follow-up monograph on the subject by these authors is lamentable, especially in the case of Hodder. In addition to his work cited here, Hodder was an early author on the subject of propaganda, and his analysis of the efforts of the compromises’ supporters to secure support for the effort is sorely missed. 15 For a counterpoint to Hodder, see Robert R. Russell, “What Was the Compromise of 1850?,” Journal of Southern History 22, no. 3 (Aug. 1956): 292-309. 16 Avery O. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism (Baton Rogue: Louisiana State University Press, 1953). Craven’s previous work, The Repressible Conflict, demonstrates a largely similar interpretation as the contemporary works by Randall and Rhodes in emphasizing the “irresponsible leadership” the leaders of the eventual leaders of the Union and Confederacy, but takes the territorial issue more seriously than Randall.

Craven declares, was “that in spite of the growing tendency, first apparent in Calhoun and the abolitionists, to reduce the whole conflict to one of abstract principles, right versus right, Clay and his fellow statesmen had been able to temporarily push aside the abstract covering and get back to the concrete issues involved.”17 Unlike subsequent historians, however, Craven placed slavery at the center of his interpretation. It was the inability of the compromisers to reconcile the irreconcilable that caused Craven to judge the Compromise a failure. After the passage of the Compromise “the conditions that had produced the crisis, and the interests and ideals that lay back of contending groups, were still there,” Craven argues, adding “most of them had to do with things…that men will not compromise.”18

In a series of books and articles, Holman Hamilton offered a thorough revision of the

Compromise. First, it challenged the conventional view that the Compromise debate was dictated in large measure by the “Great Triumvirate” of the Senate—John C. Calhoun, Henry

Clay and Daniel Webster—along with sectional radicals like William H. Seward and Jefferson

Davis—and posited instead that Stephen A. Douglas, Zachary Taylor, Howell Cobb and Millard

Fillmore, along with external actors like the Texas legislature and Texas bondholders wielded comparable influence during the debate. In narrative terms, this analysis transformed the debate from the last stand of the Jacksonian-era nationalism against sectional radicalism (embodied in the debates between Clay, Webster and Calhoun) to incorporate an element of generational conflict between “the rising and setting suns.” 19 Secondly, Hamilton, through use of voting

17 Ibid. 118. 18 Ibid. 115. 19 Ibid.

10 analysis and an examination of the legislative mechanics of the Compromise, illustrated the critical role that the Democratic plurality in the House of Representatives played in the final passage of the compromise. Third, Hamilton’s voting analysis quantified the voting patterns that he had recognized earlier, and illustrated the existence of four clearly defined sectional/partisan voting blocs—Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, Northern Whigs, and Southern Whigs.

Fourth, Hamilton extended his analysis of the influence of the Texas bondholders and the participation of interest groups and patronage in the debate. Finally, Hamilton assailed the prevalent interpretation that the Compromise had been a success. Rather, Hamilton argued, “it had merely postponed the resort to arms, and perhaps made it inevitable.”20 Rather than a patriotic measure that postponed war, the Compromise had proven an epic failure, one in which

“not one of its component parts did all that many people thought it did, or expected it to.”21

Though previous historians had criticized the efficacy of the Compromise, most had generally ascribed the measure to patriotic motives, and none had blamed the measure for accelerating the sectional crisis. For Hamilton, however, there was greater ambiguity, particularly in the context of President Taylor’s plan, which Hamilton clearly favored “A golden opportunity was lost,”

Hamilton argues, “when Fillmore and Congress failed to confront disunionists with the bluntest sort of nationalism in the Jackson-Taylor tradition.” Furthermore, “the resolution of Taylor,” he continues, “either would have called the Texas bluff or would have defeated secession, rebellion,

20 Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, Soldier in the White House (New York: Bobbs-Merril; Company, Inc. 1951) 407. Holman Hamilton, “’The Cave of the Winds’ and the Compromise of 1850,” The Journal of Southern History 23, no. 3 (Aug. 1957): 331-353. Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. 1964), 189. 21 Hamilton, Prologue, 189.

Civil War, or challenges to federal authority under any other name.” 22 The Compromise, on the other hand, “demanded statesmanship, and especially presidential statesmanship,” of which none of Taylor’s successors were possessed. Taken together, Hamilton’s interpretation provided a detailed and extensive revision of the Compromise, which revolutionized both our understanding of the Compromise of 1850 and informed innumerable subsequent re-evaluations of other territorial crises during the antebellum era.23

Because the Compromise of 1850 was a pivotal event in the broader sectional conflict over slavery between the North and South, scholarly interpretations of it have been highly influenced by ideology and understandings of the Civil War. Scholars who find the Civil War to have been the result of an irrepressible conflict between the slavery and freedom driven by structural and ideological forces have generally sympathized with Hamilton’s judgment of the

Compromise as a failure. Because the conflict over the territories was driven by the divergent economic, cultural and social systems of the sections (and, for Sean Wilentz, differing understandings of the nature of Democracy), and because the Compromise did not address these issues, supporters of Hamilton’s interpretation like David Potter, Sean Wilentz and William

Freehling considered the Compromise of 1850 as something less than a true accommodation.

Rather because the legislation failed to address the overarching issue of the expansion of slavery that drove the sectional conflict, and did not result in a commitment by all or even most parties in

22 Ibid. 186. 23 Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor, Soldier in the White House (New York: Bobbs-Merrill; Company, Inc. 1951), 407. Holman Hamilton, “’The Cave of the Winds’ and the Compromise of 1850,” The Journal of Southern History 23, no. 3 (Aug. 1957): 331-353. Hamilton, Prologue, 189.

12 the conflict to support for its provision, these scholars have described the result variously as an

“armistice,”24 “truce,”25 or “sellout.”26 For these scholars, primary interested in the sectionalist opponents of the Compromise, the measures are significant mainly in having “everywhere failed to defuse explosive questions.”27 On the other hand, subsequent scholars who have highlighted factors in addition to the conflict over slavery as major contributory factors in the outbreak of the

Civil War have generally criticized Hamilton’s interpretation of the efficacy of the Compromise.

Michael Holt, William Gienapp, Robert Remini and Mark Stegmaier rather emphasize the success of the Compromise in having “postponed secession and Civil War by ten years,” and argue that subsequent political developments, such as the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the dissolution of the Whig party were the critical factors in allowing the sectional controversy to develop into a civil war.28 As these scholars do not believe the sectional conflict was irreconcilable, they focus instead on the ability of the Compromise to find support, and particularly emphasize the movement by Democratic and Whig national leadership to declare the

Compromise the final and permanent solution to the sectional conflict. For Holt and Stegmaier in particular, the Compromise of 1850 is best understood as a success, one which for most voters

“had permanently settled the slavery expansion issue”29 until undone by the Kansas-Nebraska

Act, and one which had been accomplished when “many senators and representatives chose to

24 David Potter, The Impending Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 113. 25 Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy ( New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005), 645. 26 William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, Secessionists at Bay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 510. 27 Ibid. 28 Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay (NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 762. 29 Michael F. Holt, The Fate of Their Country (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 91.

13 rise above their stated platform and campaign pledges.”30 Although these scholars are critical of

Hamilton’s assessment of the Compromise, they nonetheless generally concur with Hamilton’s non-ideological approach to the legislation. Focusing largely on the mechanics of the compromise legislation, and impact of patronage, interest group pressure, and state level political expediency for explaining the passage and success of the Compromise, their works tend to follow Hamilton in moving scholarship further away from the interpretations popular prior to

Prologue to Conflict.31

This tendency of recent scholars to dispute the particulars of Hamilton’s interpretation while working within his general assumptions is best illustrated by Mark Stegmaier’s Texas, New

Mexico and the Compromise of 1850. On one level, Stegmaier’s work is the most thorough refutation of Hamilton’s pro-Taylor interpretation. By focusing on the Texas-New Mexico border dispute as the most critical element of the Compromise, and the only element that was imminently capable of provoking the outbreak of actual warfare between the sections, Stegmaier crafts a narrative of the Compromise in which the threat of civil war was very real, and the confrontational policy of the Taylor administration nearly resulted in bloodshed and disaster.

Taylor’s plan, Stegmaier argues, was “simplistic,” and the President was far too willing to accept the risks of conflict with Texas and, potentially, the entire South, “rather than adopt a more flexible policy that might succeed in Congress and achieve the President’s basic goals without

30 Mark Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico and the Compromise of 1850 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1996), 321. 31 Robert Remini, The House, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. 2006), 147. William E. Gienapp, Origins of the Republican Party (NY: Oxford University Press, 1987), 444.

14 resorting to violence.”32 As the Taylor plan made no provision for the settlement of the boundary dispute,33 it offered no solution for the tangible issues between the sections that required federal action to resolve. In contrast, Stegmaier favors the Compromise plan of Clay and Douglas, and particularly praises the efforts of Millard Fillmore and Daniel Webster in throwing the support of the executive branch behind the Compromise effort. The result was a

Compromise which settled the territorial crisis, and which “might have succeeded in maintaining the ties of Union indefinitely longer had politicians of the early 1850s not miscalculated so badly” by passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.34

Twenty-First century interpretations of the Compromise of 1850 have attempted to synthesize interpretations of the debate that recognize the critical roles played by lesser political lights like Stephen Douglas and Millard Fillmore while restoring the primacy of Clay and (to a lesser extent) Webster to the narrative. Inspired by a distaste for the partisan tensions that continue to grip contemporary Congresses, Robert Remini and Fergus Bordewich published examinations of the Compromise that emphasize the Thirty-First Congress’s ability to forge a conciliatory and bipartisan compromise, and particularly praise the role of Clay. “It has been proven,” Remini asserts, “that little of lasting importance can be accomplished without a willingness on the part of all involved to seek out one another’s needs and demands.”35 Once the great men of the antebellum era passed away,” he continues, “the nation lacked individuals in

32 Mark Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico and the Compromise of 1850 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996), 318- 319. 33 Taylor’s plan called for the immediate admission of New Mexico as a state, whereupon the issue of the border between Texas and New Mexico would be adjudicated by the Supreme Court, rather than Congress. 34 Mark Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico and the Compromise of 1850 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996), 320. 35 Robert V. Remini, At the Edge of the Precipice (NY: Basic Books, 2010), xii.

15 positions of power who were passionately devoted to the Union” and possessing “leadership ability who could find solutions to the crises that arouse repeatedly over the issue of slavery.”36

Bordewich, while offering a more qualified assessment of the Compromise than Remini, became interested in the Compromise of 1850 “during a period when Congress was, and still is, considered by many Americans to be paralyzed and ‘broken.’”37 “By listening to the debate of

1850,” he continues, “we can learn to talk politics to each other so that we actually listen.”38

Seeing in the efforts of the Compromisers, especially Henry Clay, the patriotism and bipartisan spirit they perceive as lamentably absent in modern Congresses, these works provide compelling narratives that romanticize the leaders that succeeded in passing the eventual Compromise and echo the interpretations of late-nineteenth century historians, while incorporating more recent evaluations of less famous but equally critical leaders in the debate. In this, like other recent authors, they largely adopt the more sophisticated interpretation of the debate that Hamilton inaugurated while refuting his conclusions about the efficacy of the Compromise and the role of

Clay.

While scholarship since the publication of Prologue to Conflict has greatly expanded our understanding of the alliances, coalitions, and interests groups that participated and influenced the Compromise of 1850, the ideas that drove the participants in the debate has proportionally been deemphasized. Recent scholarly debate has focused on whether the sectional conflict might have been resolved, whether the Compromise of 1850 was a success or failure, and whether the

36 Ibid. xi-xii. 37 Fergus Bordewich, America’s Great Debate (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2012), 2. 38 Ibid. 3.

Compromise of 1850 helped slow or accelerate the slide to civil war. The role of ideology in the debate has been subject of limited examination. To be sure, scholars examining the rise of

Southern nationalism, such as William W. Freehling, have examined the ideological foundations of Southern opposition to the Compromise, just as scholars like Eric Foner and William Gienapp have examined the ideology of Northern opposition to slavery. However, to date little scholarly attention has been provided to explain the ideals of the supporters of the Compromise effort.

Rather, the Northern Democrats and Southern Whigs who provided the core support for the

Compromise have generally been assembled under the rubric of “Unionism,” despite the fact that these factions displayed distinct and radically different voting patterns during the debate.

Indeed, the ideological divisions between the Northern Democrats and Southern Whigs were profound, and those between urban and rural Democrats and pro and anti-Taylor Whigs were nearly as profound. From a functional standpoint, the role of ideological divisions in the construction of the pro-compromise coalition can hardly be overstated. While the principles of the supporters of the Compromise were unquestionably Unionist, their understandings of what the Union was and, more critically, what it should become were hardly homogenous. However, these distinctions have not yet received a comprehensive scholarly treatment. As scholarship about the Compromise of 1850 has refocused on partisan and economic interests, the ideological dynamism and diversity extant during the crisis has receded into the background.

Because of this shift away from ideology, our understanding of why the Compromise of

1850 was adopted has decreased even as our understanding of how it was affected has expanded.

To understand the role that partisan interests, personal ambitions, economic influence, and

17 practical considerations is of unquestioned value in the understanding of any legislation.

However, the Compromise of 1850 was more than a legislative event. It originated in divergent ideas of what the future role of slavery would be in the United States, brought into urgency by the acquisition of vast new territory from Mexico. These new territories became a canvas upon which politically-minded Americans projected their beliefs about the ideal political order of the nation. As a result, the settlement of the territories required political leaders to confront their own political belief—that combination of ideology, ideals, doctrines and prejudices that they most commonly termed “principles.” These principles represented the higher purpose (actual or alleged) for which each political leader held office. The crisis was sustained by the inability of

Congress to discover common ground upon which the consciences and constituencies of enough legislators could rest comfortably. It accelerated because proposals to limit the extension of slavery into the new territories were perceived as an insult to the honor of the South. The crisis reached the boiling point because a faction of Southern Whigs were persuaded that the

Compromise Omnibus could not solve the territorial crisis. It was finally resolved because enough legislators were convinced that the legislation, though deeply flawed, was at least superior to inaction. The Compromise passed not because its provisions were supported by a majority in Congress (they weren’t), but because enough legislators in the House and the Senate were willing to risk repudiation at the polls and overcome deep concerns about the efficacy of the legislation in order to sustain a Union that they believed was essential to the advancement of their vision for the nation. While interests and patronage were important in explaining how the pro-Compromise forces were able to bring fence-sitting legislators over to the Compromise, they

18 do not explain why these legislators were on the fence to begin with. Nor do they explain why the nation came to the brink of civil war in 1850 over territory that all sides acknowledged would be dominated by free labor. As Michael Holt has observed, “the slavery extension issue emerged because of decisions by elected officeholders…not because of a groundswell of popular pressure for or against territorial or slavery expansion.”39 How, then, could the territorial crisis reach a point by 1850 that civil war had become a possibility?

The crisis of 1850 was not only a clash of interests, but one of principle. As James Ford

Rhodes and Avery Craven recognized, many of the issues that animated the debate were abstract in the extreme. The territory of the Mexican Cession became a flashpoint in the sectional dispute despite the fact that very few politicians, North or South, believed that slavery could prosper there. If slavery could not exist there, then why did Southerners threaten disunion over its prohibition there? Why did anti-slavery Northerners insist on slavery’s prohibition from an area where it could never survive, or reject this natural limits hypothesis altogether? Why did pro-

Compromise Northern Democrats make common cause with Whigs Henry Clay and Millard

Fillmore against their party comrades in the South and fellow Northerners in the Whig and Free-

Soil parties? Why did Southern Whigs divide between Henry Clay and Zachary Taylor, and then reluctantly accede to support a compromise package that many had publically declared would fail to heal the nation’s wounds and which they believed would end their political careers?

While Hamilton and Stegmaier have provided a valuable service in documenting the role of interest, patronage, and financial incentives in the formulation and passage of the Compromise of

39 Holt, Fate 4.

1850, the complex permutations, divisions and gymnastics of the legislative process cannot be explained by interest alone. In this great contest of principles, we must account for role that political beliefs played in determining the outcome.

While the majority of Congressional races found Whig and Democratic candidates opposing each other on the Compromise of 1850 during the 1850 and 1851 elections, the division of both major parties by the territorial crisis points to another factor beyond party ideology to explain the impact of the crisis. As many scholars have noted, a struggle was underway within the sections as well as between them over the territorial issue between 1840 and

1861. Within each section, opposing nationalisms confronted each other to define the proper relation of slavery and the state. In Mastering America, Robert Bonner explains the process by which “proslavery nationalism” emerged which used “republican principles to legitimate a system of slavery that had developed within the context of a monarchical empire.”40

Slaveholders debated amongst themselves whether inclusion within the federal state provided sufficient protection for slaveholders, or whether an independent state was needed. Similarly, in

Shifting Grounds, Paul Quigley emphasizes that the majority of Southerners were strong

American nationalists, but that they were nationalist within certain parameters. “White southerners,” he argues, “were by and large committed to the preservation of the Union, but only the Union as they defined it: a proslavery Union that maintained southern rights, including the right to own slaves and to have access to the new western territories.”41 In the North, William

Gienapp and Tyler Anbinder have written on the role of nativism in the disintegration of the

40 Robert E. Bonner, Mastering America (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 82. 41 Paul Quigley, Shifting Grounds (NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 215.

Whig Party and the rise of the Republicans. Andre Fleche expands upon this to argue that the outbreak of Civil War in 1861 was driven by two competing nationalist visions, a southern nationalism seeking sectional independence and a Northern “Unionism” that sought the retention and transformation of a unified state. “Patriots in both sections,” Fleche argues, “crafted an answer to the national question that engaged the issues raised by Europeans in the years since the

French Revolution.”42 By recognizing the critical role that national identity played in the sectional crisis leading up to and during the Civil War, these scholars have not only expanded upon previous works on these themes (including Rhodes and Owsley), but have provided a nuanced view of the political process leading to secession and popular mobilization.

While the question of national identity has long been recognized as central to understanding the politics of the territorial crisis, to date no comprehensive study of the role of the competing nationalisms in the debate over the Compromise of 1850 has been completed.

Examinations of nationalism have generally been focused upon a single region (i.e. on works focusing on the North or the South), and have highlighted the nationalism of radicals in contrast with their more moderate political opponents. These interpretations impose a false duality on the national question, particularly during transitional periods when the meaning of nation and the relations of citizens and the concept of the nation were contested. Under the basic definition of nationalism proposed by Ernst Gellner, “a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent,” there were in fact two nationalisms at play during the territorial crisis of 1846-1861—one which proposed a single Union and another that asserted Southern national

42 Andre Fleche, The Revolution of 1861 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 7.

21 distinctiveness.43 While this definition captures very well the division strongly evident in the

South (but also in some radical abolitionist quarters) of the conflict between those who believed in a single nation and those who favored a division along sectional lines, it does not explain divisions among those who espoused the maintenance of a single nation, but held radically differing views about what membership in that nation should entail, and where slaveholders, their chattels, and foreigners fell within that identity. This work seeks to address some of these questions.

If we expand our definition of nationalism, the emergence of competing nationalisms helps to explain the sectional and political divisions that emerged during the territorial crisis.

“Nations and their assorted phenomena,” E.J. Hobsbawm reminds us, “must...be analyzed in terms of political, technical administrative, economic and other conditions and requirements.”44

While political leaders like Henry Clay, William H. Seward and John C. Calhoun agreed in principle that the maintenance of a single Union was desirable, they differed radically from each other on how the Union should be constituted, particularly on economic matters related to slavery. Men like Clay, Daniel Webster, Stephen A. Douglas, Millard Fillmore, and Lewis Cass believed strongly that the status quo was acceptable, and the Union should continue with one government managing a nation with distinct regional economic systems until the slave states determined that the termination of slavery was desirable. Those leaders believed in sectional

43 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 1; Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (NY: Frederick A. Prager, 1960), 9. Elie Kedourie defines Nationalism in similar terms as “a doctrine” which “pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively.” 44 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9.

22 compromise not only as a matter of expediency, but as a necessity in and of itself. Anti-slavery politicians like William H. Seward, Hannibal Hamlin, Salmon P. Chase and Thaddeus Stevens, on the other hand, believed that the Union should be maintained, but demanded that control of the central government must be wrested from the dominance of slaveholders and slavery should be placed on a path to obsolescence in order to achieve true representation of the nation, as they defined it, by the federal government. They differed from their more conservative colleagues in questioning the legitimacy of the government under the status quo and espousing the establishment of a new political order and new national economic and cultural homogeny. Like

Southern sectionalists, they also differed from Unionists of the Webster school in asserting, as

Hobsbawm puts it, “the political duty of [members of the nation] to the polity which encompasses and represents the… nation, overrides all other public obligations.” “This implication,” he continues, “distinguishes modern nationalism from other and less demanding forms of national or group identification.”45

By examining the political debates of the crisis of 1850 in the context of competing theories of nationalism, we can see that at least three competing nationalist ideals contributed to the Congressional deadlock over the territories of the Mexican Cession and persisted until the outbreak of Civil War in 1861. Unionism held that the United States was a single nation legitimately governed by a single national government with two distinct regional economic systems. While Unionists differed as to whether slavery should continue indefinitely as the economic system of the South, they held that the national government should not interfere with

45 Ibid. 10.

23 the institution (with interpretations of what constituted interference varying). While an eventual division emerged between unconditional Unionists and Unionists who favored the continuation of the Union only under certain favorable circumstances, they were in broad agreement that the

United States could and should continue as a single political unit without dramatic reforms to either section’s economic system. While the general principle that the interests of the states was best served within a single political structure had been extant since the Revolution, Unionist ideology clarified following the War of 1812 and in response to the New England separatist movement that culminated in the Hartford Convention. The administration of James Monroe actively promoted national consolidation, and the political generation that came to dominate federal politics in this period reached a loose consensus on the national question while dividing into competing political parties over economic issues. In this period, sectional issues such as the

Missouri Crisis, Gag Rule debates, and the Nullification controversy periodically roiled the political order along sectional lines, but the broad Unionist consensus in Washington allowed these crises to be decisively defused via bipartisan and bisectional means. Despite its bipartisan nature, Unionism was both assertive and aggressive in defining sectional issues as separate from party competition. The leaders of both parties upheld the national Union and denigrated the motivations of critics of Unionism, who were denounced as unpatriotic troublemakers motivated by self-interest and ambition. While other nationalist theories existed in the North and South during this period, their influence over national politics was limited until the accidental ascendance of a Southern nationalist to the Presidency inaugurated a new era of nationalist competition.

The most vocal and influential alternative to Unionism during the period between the

Missouri Compromise and the Mexican War was provided by Southern nationalism. Southern nationalists argued that the American South represented a distinct nation, one in need of protection from Northern domination. These Southern radicals differed from the earlier

Southern anti-nationalists of the John Taylor and John Randolph school, who concerned themselves primarily with securing negative rights against the encroachment by any national authority, irrespective of its sectional character. Southern nationalists advocated a unity of culture and identity among the white population of slaveholding states, irrespective of ownership in slaves. While Southern anti-nationalists remained strong in South Carolina throughout the period, the spread of popular politics throughout the South, increasing influence of the positive defense of slavery and the prevalence of Northern views of the South as a distinct sectional unit paved the path for a new generation of Southern leaders to assert the idea of the South as a distinct nation. Because Southern nationalism asserted unity of purpose and interest among all classes of free Southern men, it proved more successful at mobilizing support than previous anti-

Unionist ideologies had been. In addition, declining Southern representation in Congress comported with Southern nationalist criticism of the illegitimacy of the national government, a position which was strengthened by recurring conflicts with the abolitionist movement. With the ascent of a Southern nationalist to the Presidency in 1841 and his inauguration of renewed sectional strife over slavery, Southern nationalists were provided with an issue that they used to great effect to spread their ideas of Southern cultural distinctiveness and press the case for independence at best, or establishing conditions for remaining in the Union at the least. While

Southern nationalists were deeply divided on nearly every issue—most especially the conditions that would justify secession—concerns about Northern dominance of the federal government blurred the lines between those who viewed the maintenance of the Union only under certain conditions as a pathway out of the Union and Unionists whose ideal remained its preservation.

Despite the depths of their divisions and their limited influence in Washington, the willingness

(and in some cases desire) of Southern nationalists to dissolve the United States and go to war made them the greatest threat to the Union among the nationalist factions. Maintenance of

Southern influence in the context of increasing demographic and economic predominance of the

North became a powerful argument for them. Southern nationalists contested Unionists for a battle for the hearts and minds of Southerners, and gained strength throughout the 1840s.

While battle lines (however blurry) were drawn throughout the South over the question of whether continuation of the Union was desirable and under what terms, debates in the North centered around the future economic order of the Union rather than its preservation. Aside from some radical abolitionists, there was a broad consensus in the North that the United States was one nation, and the Union of the states should be preserved. Northern critics of Unionism, however, challenged the legitimacy of the current distribution of power. Opposition to the

Unionist status quo manifested in a variety of forms—criticism of slave representation in

Congress, opposition to the influence of secret societies in politics, temperance, efforts to restrict the political influence of immigrants, and opposition to the extension of slavery—but these themes were unified by a desire to transform and homogenize the culture of the nation and correct injustices in the distribution of power. Northerners had been concerned about the

26 disproportionate influence of slaveholders in the Federal government since the election of

Thomas Jefferson in 1800. After 1815, Northern concerns about the influence of the “slave power” did not assert themselves via calls for secession, but through calls for political reforms.

Prior to 1841, these critics exerted their greatest influence on the local and state level until the overtly sectionalist policies of the Tyler administration and implicitly pro-Southern policies of

James K. Polk placed the territorial issue at the forefront of national consciousness.

Transformational nationalism exerted influence among a majority of Northern Whigs, a minority of Northern Democrats and spawned a third party movement, the Free Soil Party, that sought to transform the national character through the prohibition of slavery expansion and the end of slaveholder dominance of the federal government. Transformational nationalists did not assert a distinct national identity for the North or seek to exclude the South from the nation. They questioned the legitimacy of a federal government dominated by slaveholders, and portrayed slaveholders as an alien elite who oppressed the rights of members of the nation in the North and the South. The reforms they promoted sought to redress imbalances in the distribution of political power and limit the influence of those they considered alien—such as slaveholders or immigrants (or both). While transformational nationalists and many Unionists (Northern and

Southern) spoke of slavery in similar terms—that slavery should eventually be eliminated and that the Federal government had no right to interfere with slavery in the slave states— transformational nationalist efforts to limit the influence of slaveholders differentiated the ideals.

The territorial controversy provided transformational nationalists a national platform from which they could challenge the Unionist order and advocate for its revision.46

While the Unionist/Southern nationalist/transformational nationalist trichotomy is useful for categorizing the thinking of nationalist politicians in Congress during the territorial crisis, it must be recognized that this approach obscures significant ideological complexities. Most obviously, it does not account for politicians whose ideological vision was opposed to nationalism of any construction. The most prominent anti-nationalist during the Crisis of 1850 was John C. Calhoun, though several other pro-compromise Southerners straddled the line between Unionism and anti-nationalism in arguing in favor of a sectional compromise. While prominent Unionists like Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Zachary Taylor vocally declared their willingness to fight for the Union against their own section in the event of armed conflict, not all

Unionists considered loyalty to the union as “overriding all other public obligations,” to paraphrase Hobsbawm. Consequently, this study proposes these categories of nationalism as representing a sliding scale rather than exclusive buckets, and recognizes that it is a limited approach that adds additional nuance to previous studies of the Compromise of 1850 rather than suggesting an essential revision.47

46 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men (NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), 40-72; Michael Holt, Rise and Fall of the American Whig Part, (NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 266-959; Daniel Walker Howe, Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 263-298; Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).

47 For a discussion of the relationship between nationalism and modernization, see Umut Ȍzkirimh, Theories of Nationalism (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 85-166.

Although each of the ideological factions discussed here influenced (positively or negatively) the final legislation that emerged from the crisis of 1850, the most critical decisions during the debates were taken by Unionists, and the crisis of Unionism that the Compromise of

1850 intended to settle would have the most significant consequences during the 1850s. The acquisition of the Mexican Cession challenged many long-held assumption among Unionists about the propriety and future of slavery, and Unionists had been shocked to discover during the long sectional debates of the 1840s how far their understandings of the future of slavery in the

Union had diverged. While Unionists commonly held that the Union should be maintained indefinitely with free labor and slave labor intact, they differed as to their beliefs as to the ultimate fate of slavery. One view evoked during the debates, held primarily by many Whigs and politicians of the older generation, posited that economic growth and modernization would eventually lead to slavery’s extinction by natural evolution. All Unionists opposed any effort by the national government to interfere with the institution where it existed, though many expected that natural limits imposed by climate and improving efficiency would eventually render slavery unneeded. As a result, these Unionists were at best ambivalent about slavery expansion, and under certain circumstances were willing to support de facto slavery restriction provided that affirmative federal action on restriction was avoided. Henry Clay, Thomas Hart Benton, John

Bell, and Zachary Taylor—all slaveholders—were among these leaders who were willing to accept an end to slavery expansion but who cared deeply that the federal government not directly intervene to halt it. These Unionists looked to non-action on slavery in the territories, or even an outright ban on legislation on slavery by territorial governments, as the preferred solution to the

29 controversy. Another group of Unionists—including Democrats in both sections and a small but vocal minority of Deep South Whigs—believed that slavery could be perpetuated indefinitely.

Pro-slavery Southern Unionists believed that slavery provided a superior mode of social and economic organization in the South. Northern Unionist Democrats, on the other hand, believed strongly that the slavery issue was not one that should be adjudicated by the federal government, and should be left to the local population. Ambivalent about federal overreach, free blacks, and reformist movements associated with antislavery Northern Whigs, they adopted popular sovereignty as an expedient policy to promote westward expansion and acquisition of additional territory.48

As Donald Fehrenbacher has observed, “to treat sectionalism and partisanship strictly as competing loyalties, with one of the other necessarily predominant, is to overlook their progressive interpenetration and the resulting decline in the number of Congressmen (principally

Southern Whigs and Northern Democrats) who had to choose between them.”49 By examining the political principles and vision of the two major pro-compromise legislative factions—

Southern Whigs and Northern Democrats—we can better understand why these groups chose to embrace the ultimately doomed cause of sectional accommodation. It will seek to explain how differing views about the future of slavery and personal rivalries led Southern Whig leaders to reject and disrupt Henry Clay’s compromise bill, develop and propose alternative plans, and yet finally support the compromise legislation. To accomplish this, this study will examine the

48 Holt, Rise and Fall, 319; Holt, What, 830-831; Wilentz, Rise, 616. 49 Donald E. Fehrenbacher. “The New Political History and the Coming of the Civil War,” Pacific Historical Review 54, no. 2 (May, 1985), p.136.

30 interaction of two related issues regarding slavery’s future in the United States—the distribution of power within the Republic and politicians’ interpretation of the question of territorial organization as a proxy for the future of the nation. Chapter 1 examines how the prerequisites for the emergence of exclusionary national identities in the North and South emerged in the first half of the Nineteenth century—the divergence of group understandings of the morality and, later, legality of slavery, revisions of the national distribution of power that promoted the emergence of voting blocs, sectional grievances over events that demonstrated developing distortions of the original distribution of power, the clear delineation of sections in geographic terms, the rise of mass politics, and generational changes in the political culture—and will discuss how these developments which had been held in check were unleashed by political contingencies during the 1840s. Chapter 2 will examine the political ecosystem of the executive and legislative branches extant at the outset of the Thirty-First Congress, and contrast how different partisan and nationalist groupings understood and approached the sectional crisis.

Chapter 3 will examine the efforts of Zachary Taylor’s administration to settle the crisis by promoting the admission of the territory of the Mexican Cession as states, and will illustrate how a competitive market of alternative settlement plans and personal rivalries among Whigs undermined Unionist unity and precluded moderates from making common cause to settle the controversy. Chapter 4 will focus on the struggle within Unionism to develop an agreeable policy framework to defuse the crisis, examine Henry Clay’s attempt to secure a comprehensive settlement through appeasement of Southern nationalism, and why his personal rivalries, poor leadership, and ideological short-sightedness alienated allies and brought about the demise of his

Bill. Chapter 5 will examine how Democrats led by Stephen A. Douglas and Howell Cobb succeeded in passing the Compromise of 1850, and how Democratic leadership of the

Compromise resulted in the adoption of popular sovereignty in the final legislation, providing a policy platform that would result in severe consequences for Unionism in the 1850s. Chapter 6 will trace the evolution of the Compromise of 1850 following its adoption, will assess the impacts of its assorted provisions and assess the overall value of the Compromise.

While this examination will focus on the ways in which nationalism and ideology informed political leaders during the Crisis of 1850, it will of necessity examine the roles of key participants in the debate. At various points during the crisis, Zachary Taylor, Stephen A.

Douglas, and Howell Cobb emerged as the prime mover in the political machinations related to the crisis, and their opinions, prejudices, and rivalries had a disproportionate impact in the settlement that followed. Above all, however, the principles, motivations and decisions of Henry

Clay will be examined due to his popular identification with the measures which were adopted.

These leaders’ position and influence exerted a disproportionate impact on the crisis, and as a result their ideals, personalities, and rivalries are crucial to understanding how the debate progressed as it did. Any study of a small community such as the Thirty-First Congress and the highest offices for the national government must account for the personalities of the participants, and this study attempts to do so. While the job of the political historian would be much simpler if political leaders consistently behaved in accord with clearly stated, transparent, and robust ideals, this is not and never has been the case. The political leaders of the 1840s and 50s were not political philosophers. While some of them displayed dazzling intellects, held unswayable

32 ideals and deployed poetic rhetoric, many more held vague (or artfully vague) principles superficially understood which they struggled to articulate. Some held office for pecuniary reasons, some did so to help friends and family members, and some did not want to be there at all. Often members were under severe pressure, ill and frequently drunk. Political principles were the primary drivers of the dynamics of the 1850 debates, as they defined the limits of what politicians were willing to countenance, but while looking toward the greater forces at work in driving the Crisis of 1850, we must also account for the role of personalities, context and human frailty in crafting the legislation that helped drive the crisis.

Finally, we must also assess whether or not the Compromise of 1850 was ultimately a success or a failure. This assessment depends largely on how one interprets the goal of the

Compromise. In this examination, we will define success in the way that the preeminent leaders of the competing efforts understood it: the permanent settlement of the territorial controversy.

Each of the major plans suggested during the debate sought permanent settlement of the crisis as its end. As we know, the Compromise of 1850 did not result in an extended period of sectional stability as the Northwest Ordinance and Missouri Compromise had. Consequently, we must consider whether the resumption of sectional crisis in 1854 during the Kansas-Nebraska debate four years after the passage of the Compromise of 1850 was caused by the former legislation or was due to deficiencies of the previous Compromise. We will seek to understand how the issues that proved contentious in the 1850s—popular sovereignty and the fugitive slave law—came to be proposed as part of the settlement, who promoted them and why, and how they were enacted.

We will also examine how critics of the eventual settlement plan interpreted its provisions, why some supported it anyway, and how they understood the law following its passage.

Winston Churchill famously once claimed that “history is written by the victors,” but tales of victors must inherently include a detailed examination of the vanquished. Moderates, rather than the vanquished, are the recipients of history’s most dire judgment—to be forgotten or ignored. Yet it is in the careers of these individuals that the answers of several of the major questions of American history may lie. Could the sectional controversy between the North and

South have been accommodated? Was there any real chance of the non-violent abolition of slavery in the American South? How do we balance the aspects of triumph and tragedy when assessing the American Civil War? By understanding the beliefs, motivations and principles of the moderate supporters of the Compromise of 1850, we open a window to the virtues and limitations of moderation in our own time.

A Malign Influence Menaces the Country

“The malign influence which wrought Mr. Van Buren’s overthrow…menaces the country,” National Intelligence, November 11, 1844.1

From the time of the revolution, the slavery and the institution of slaveholding was a central dilemma in American national identity. In his draft of the Declaration of Independence,

Thomas Jefferson blamed the introduction of African slavery into British America on the monarchy. King George III, Jefferson argued, “has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating the most sacred right of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, capturing and carrying them into slavery.” 2 Slaves, ignorant of western ideals, lacking in knowledge of colonial customs and conditions, devoid of hope, and perpetually on the verge of rebellion, reinforced slaveholders’ dependence on the crown. Because the threat of slave rebellion required the power of the state to mobilize military capability sufficient to meet the slave threat, the presence of slavery had increased the dependence of the colonies on the crown, the only authority with recourse to the legitimate use of violence. In this telling, slave owners had gained only responsibilities and fears from slavery (along with a certain measure of leisure), the King had gained much more. The North American colonists had rebelled against

King George because of his failure to treat them as Britons, but they also believed that he had failed to provide sufficient defense for their institutions.3 Despite its moral and logical

1 National Intelligencer, November 11, 1844. 2 Quoted in John Chester Miller, Wolf by the Ears (New York: The Free Press 1977), 8. 3 Linda Colley, Britons Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688-1783 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1990); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard 34 35 limitations, this Jeffersonian conceit was woven from certain facts. Thomas Jefferson decried that the slavery had been “unhappily introduced {in the colonies} in the infant state,” and that its abolition was “the great object of desire” of the colonists.4 While Jefferson identified a range of issues where the colonies held grievances against the crown and parliament, the problem of slavery was rooted in the same ground as the other complaints: the distribution of power. The central issues of the revolution—the imposition of taxes and the lack of colonial representation in parliament—were not challenges to the legitimacy of the king to reign and the parliament to rule, or levy taxes. They disputed the inequitable distribution of power that prevented colonial representation in parliament and restricted settlement in unorganized territory. Slavery, taxation and restriction of settlement all made colonists dependent on the crown for their well-being. For

Jefferson, nothing fostered dependency more than slavery, for both slaves and masters. Slaves were dependent on their masters for everything. Masters were dependent on the crown for self preservation. As Jefferson argued, “dependence begets subservience…and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.”5 Independence, in both the national and personal sense, would be the defining ideal of Jefferson’s Republican generation.6 It was also tied closely to the concepts of slavery—the purest form of dependence—and territory, which provided the surest means for attaining and sustaining independence.

University Press 1967), 236; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969). ; Brendan McConville, The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Freehling, The Road to Disunion 1. 4 Quoted in Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press 1967), 236. 5 Quoted in Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books 1991), 179. 6 Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton and Company 1975); Bailyn, Ideological Origins.

Although the challenges that slavery posed to the development of the American political system have long been recognized, the attendant problems that the nation faced in defining a national identity have not been studied as closely or as broadly. For a new country struggling to define an identity in a context of ethnic, religious, geographic and economic diversity, the relation of slavery and any idealized national identity was critical. While a number of scholars have examined the development of national ideals at various times and contexts—including

George Dangerfield, William Freehling, Robert Bonner, and Avery Craven—these studies have been constrained by a focus on a constrained period or geographic space, and as a result have not reflected the diversity and contingency of nationalist thought during the period. While each of these studies have identified important developments in nationalist thought in America, the transformation of American identity was and is ongoing and contested. Between the founding of the nation and the end of the Civil War, slavery was the preeminent catalyst in driving this development. Having outlasted the rule of the King, slavery recurrently challenged generations of political leaders to develop policies and construct ideologies to balance it and the promise of economic mobility in those regions where the form of the future national ideal would most clearly be realized: the territories. As the population and reach of settlements expanded, the national government was forced to make decisions in these settlements that impacted the division of power between slaveholders and non-slaveholders. Unionism—the principle that the United

States represented a single nation encompassing multiple regional cultures and economic systems with a national government that sought to harmonize the unity of the sections—evolved initially as a counterpoint to the anti-nationalism of a variety of opposition groups in the new

37 republic, and was eventually adopted as a core principle of the major political parties. While many of the core assumptions of Unionism were apparent in the Federalist Papers, following the

War of 1812 and the Missouri crisis of 1819 (and the corresponding collapse of the Federalist

Party) the Madisonian conception of federalism emerged as the dominant nationalist ideology, with anti-nationalist alternatives increasingly marginalized. Unionists dominated the major political parties, which in turn strengthened the Union by maintaining competitive national organizations around non-sectional political issues. Despite the hegemony of Unionism in the federal government, however, consensus remained illusory. Other nationalisms emerged out of disaffection with the political order to challenge it. In the wake of the evangelical movements of the Second Great Awakening came an increased emphasis on social reform, and with it a renewed push for the abolition of slavery from the North during the 1830s. While abolitionist influence remained limited in the 1830s, many Northern politicians believed the central government gave disproportionate influence to slaveholders, and argued that in order to become a world power the nation must abandon slavery and embrace modernization. These emergent transformational nationalists did not support abolition, but argued that restricting slavery to its current boundaries would allow the nation to expand and the economy to modernize while slavery withered away. In the South, slave plots uncovered in the 1820s and the Nat Turner rebellion in 1831 and the efforts of abolitionists to undermine the institution through a mass mailing campaign contributed to hardening Southern attitudes about the future of slavery.

Southerners viewing slavery as a positive good increasingly questioned the idea that the United

States constituted a single nation. Rather, they argued, that Southern culture, customs and

38 institutions rendered that section a distinct nation, one that required regional autonomy, or even independence, to endure. Adopting the principle that, as Ernst Gellner phrases it, that “the nation and the state should be congruous,” Southern nationalists strived to ensure that the national government was able in no way to interfere with the rights of slaveholders within the South or the Union.7 The emergence of these popular alternatives to Unionism increased sectional agitation, but proved unable to unbalance the political order until one of their numbers by happenstance assumed the Presidency. The effort by John Tyler to use the federal government to reconstruct the political order on a sectional basis undermined the Unionist consensus, and the sectional conflict that accelerated following the Mexican War and the acquisition of new territory loosed the nationalist furies that the major parties had previously contained. Territorial expansion would provide the catalyst that opened a path to power for sectional and transformational nationalists within the political elite. With the foundation of national identity challenged in both the North and South, the ability of the political leaders of 1850 to restore the dominance of Unionism by forging a settlement like those of 1789 and 1819 before them.8

In 1783, as the Revolutionary War was coming to a close, the Congress was challenged to develop a system of taxation that would allow the general government to retire its debt.

Because Congress’s taxation authority under the Articles of Confederation was largely dependent on remittances by the state, it soon became clear that the Articles would need to be

7 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1. 8 Robert E. Bonner, Mastering America (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Avery Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism: 1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953); George Dangerfield, The Awakening of American Nationalism: 1815-1828 (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1965); William W. Freehling, Road to Disunion, Vol. 1 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1990).

39 amended to distribute state remittances in an equitable manner and establish how slaves should be counted toward determining the tax burden of each state.9 States heavily invested in plantation agriculture were a numerical minority in the Congress, but on the strength of

Virginia’s large population constituted a majority of the absolute population (and thus, the tax burden) of the republic. As recognition that slaves should not be counted as independent producers, the bill created a ratio of five slaves for every three free persons for purposes of taxation. Known as the “federal ratio,” the proposed amendment was never able to gain sufficient support in the Congress to become law, in part because it would have imposed a tax burden upon the South disproportionate to its actual influence in the Congress. The idea of the federal ratio, however, had been widely accepted and would be repurposed.10

The Confederation Congress was also forced to establish new procedures related to slavery in the territories. The chair of the committee tasked with developing a system for organizing territories, Thomas Jefferson, developed a comprehensive bill that organized not only the territory that Virginia had already ceded, but the expected cessions of the Carolinas and

Georgia as well. The legislation was notable in that it provided for the creation of ten states out of the ceded territory and provided a population threshold of 20,000 that territories would be required to meet before they could petition for admission as states. Most dramatically, however,

Jefferson’s ordinance directly addressed slavery in the territories. In language which foreshadowed the future 13th Amendment to the Constitution, the bill required “that after the year

9 Because voting in Congress under the Articles was on the basis of each state casting one vote, number of slaves would have no impact on representation regardless of how they were counted. 10 Staughton Lynd, “The Compromise of 1787,” Political Science Quarterly 81, no. 2 (June 1966): 225-250.

1800…there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states, otherwise than in punishment of crimes.”11 The proposed Ordinance of 1784 was a striking piece of anti- slavery legislation, one that, if enacted, would have confined slavery to the coastal Southeast.

Like other anti-slavery plans proposed before the Civil War, Jefferson’s Ordinance failed, in this case by a single vote.12 The task then fell to James Monroe, whose Ordinance of 1787 (or, as it is better known today, the Northwest Ordinance) attempted to tackle the problem of territorial organization and barred the spread of slavery into the territory ceded by Virginia to the general government.13 However, two important contextual changes had occurred since 1784. First, and most significantly, a Convention was underway in Philadelphia, and representatives in Congress

(several of whom were also representatives at the Convention) were aware that that body had expanded its scope to devising a new Constitution. The new order would very likely abolish the single state veto mechanism that had rendered the Confederation Congress so ineffective.

National authority vis-à-vis the states would be much enhanced, sectional cooperation rendered more critical. Secondly, the land cessions from the Carolinas and Georgia had materialized, but with the condition that slavery would be allowed in these territories. Therefore, the Ordinance in

1787 only barred the slavery in federal territory north of the Ohio River, and did not impact territories in the Southwest at all. Southerners agreed to this restriction because they were confident that they would enjoy the support of the entire West, slaveholding or not, against the

11 Journals of the Continental Congress 26, January 1-May 10 1784 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 274-279. 12 John Chester Miller, Wolf by the Ears (New York: The Free Press 1977); Staughton Lynd, “The Compromise of 1787,” Political Science Quarterly 81, no. 2 (June 1966): 225-250. 13 Jefferson ally James Monroe took the lead in drafting the 1787 bill.

East.14 “If it is thought material to the interests of the Southern states that their scale be strengthened by an accession of this quarter,” a Southern Congressmen argued, “that object will be better served by the new [1787 Plan]…because under [the Plan] there may be an early admission of a state.”15 “The security of the Southern states want,” Pierce Butler of South

Carolina announced at the Philadelphia Convention, “is that their negroes may not be taken from them, which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very good mind to do.”16 A new distinction between the states was emerging—between the southern slave society and an eastern society in transition from a society with slaves into a free labor society.17

The passage of the Northwest Ordinance coincided with the settlement of slave representation at the Constitutional Convention on the federal three-fifths ratio. The adoption of the three-fifths ratio represented, in Gouverneur Morris’s phrase, a settlement “between two ends of the Union.”18 Southerners argued that, if slaves were to be taxed, they should be represented.

Northerners countered that slaves were property, like livestock, and that property should not be represented. Several delegates, including James Madison, were members of both the

Confederation Congress and the Constitutional Convention, and seem to have engaged in the 18th

Century version of shuttle diplomacy between New York and Philadelphia as the debates were

14 This opinion was widespread, and not as unrealistic as it seems today. For example, during the Missouri crisis Illinois’ two Southern-born Senators consistently supported the Southern bloc. Freehling, The Road to Disunion 1, 149. 15 Quoted in Staughton Lynd, “The Compromise of 1787,” Political Science Quarterly, 81, No. 2 (Jun. 1966) pp. 225-250. 16 Quoted in Lynd, “The Compromise of 1787,” pp. 241. 17 Leon Litwack, North of Slavery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961; Lynd, “The Compromise of 1787,” pp. 225-250; Donald R. Hickey, “New England’s Defense Problem and the Genesis of the Hartford Convention,” New England Quarterly 50, No. 4 (Dec. 1977), pp. 587-604. 18 Lynd, “The Compromise of 1787,” 239.

42 happening. The settlements represented calculated risks on the part of each section. Northerners at the time considered it a major victory that slavery had been restricted in the Northwest, and that chattels had been counted as less than a full person. In addition, the Compromise reached had guaranteed a Northern majority in the Senate, House and Electoral College in the short term.

Southerners were also convinced that they had driven a shrewd bargain. “North Carolina, South

Carolina and Georgia only,” Morris complained, “will in a little time have a majority of people in America.”19 If Southern growth continued apace, the next generation of Southerners could expect to constitute a majority in the three most critical institutions of the national government.

Slaves had boosted Southern representation in the House, and the admission of Western states was widely expected to extend this advantage.20

Arguments over the form of the legislature also contained a strong sectional element.

Although the debate over representation by state and by population has generally been framed as one between large and small states, there was a sectional dimension as well. As Madison observed at the time, “most of [the votes] stand divided by the geography of country, not according to the size of the states.”21 He feared that the question of representation constituted

“the great danger to the general government,” and would result in “the great southern and northern interests of the continent being opposed to each other.” The Convention neatly solved this problem through the bicameral legislature. The combined impact of the Connecticut

Compromise and 3/5 ratio made the approval of the Constitution by states possible, but did not

19 Statement in Constitutional Convention, July 13, 1787. Galland Hund and James Scott Brown (eds.), The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1920); Freehling, The Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 138-141. 21 Quoted in Lynd, “The Compromise of 1787,” 239.

43 stifle complaints about the sectional distribution of power. Although the anticipated Southern majority in the House of Representatives never emerged, that body was largely dominated by

Southerners, who contributed the Speaker to 20 of the first 30 Congresses. Southern representation in the House also translated into strength in the Electoral College early on, with four of the first five Presidents hailing from the section. The North was predominant in the

Senate.22

Recognizing the fragility of the national consensus, the republic’s earliest political leaders strove to keep sectional issues at bay. The absence of partisan political competition during the Washington administration largely kept sectional issues at bay. Though John Adams considered slavery to be “a foul contagion in the human character,” he avoided overly sectional issues, though opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts took on something of a sectional character.23 Nonetheless, the rise of the competitive politics based around the Northern-majority

Federalists and Southern-majority Republicans introduced sectionalism into the federal political order in the context of disputes over the extent of federal power. While Republicans (and most historians) celebrated the “Revolution of 1800” in terms of the rise of egalitarianism and democratization,24 many vanquished Federalists interpreted Jefferson’s victory as something less democratic, profoundly inequitable, and deeply sectional. While the defection of New York explained the difference between the election of 1796 and 1800, Jefferson’s Northern detractors blamed the Jeffersonian majority in the electoral college on slave representation. As William W.

22 Albert F. Simpson, “The Political Significance of Slave Representation, 1787-1821,” The Journal of Southern History 7, no. 3 (Aug. 1941), pp. 315-342; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 144-147. 23 Quoted in David McCullogh, John Adams, 134. 24 In other words, in Jeffersonian terms.

Freehling has noted, apportionment of the House of Representatives inclusive of slaves at the three-fifths ratio had resulted in the addition of 14 additional representatives to the states of the plantation South, with a corresponding increase in voting power in the electoral college. The

“extra” votes had broken to Jefferson at a ratio of 12 to 2.25 If apportionment had been based on free citizenship alone, John Adams and his discordant Federalists would have celebrated a narrow reelection in 1800 by an Electoral vote of 63 to 60. Timothy Pickering argued that it was time for “a new confederacy, exempt from the corrupt and corrupting influence and oppression of the aristocratic democrats of the South.”26 The Boston Register summarized Jefferson’s election as a “triumphal car drawn by a million of enslaved Negroes,” which “drives over the necks of those who have not bent the knee to Baal.”27 When the actions of the Jeffersonian

Republicans took an action inimical to the interests of the East, the Federalists would remind

Northern voters of the pernicious effects of the three-fifths clause.28 Northern discontent with slave representation took on an additional dimension with the rise of the transatlantic anti-slavery movement. After 1804, Federalist complaints about the iniquity of the distribution of power under the three-fifths clause, in the words of Albert F. Simpson, “aided materially in arousing in the North a more definite and widespread opposition to the ratio, and at the same time a stronger feeling of sectionalism.” 29

25 Freehling, Road to Disunion 1, 144-147. 26 Quoted in Kevin M. Gannon, “Escaping ‘Mr. Jefferson's Plan of Destruction’: New England Federalists and the Idea of a Northern Confederacy, 1803-1804” Journal of the Early Republic 21, no. 3 (Autumn, 2001): 413-443 27 Ibid. 421. 28 Albert F. Simpson, “The Political Significance of Slave Representation, 1787-1821,” The Journal of Southern History 7, o. 3 (Aug. 1941), pp. 315-342; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 144-147; Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, 34-49. 29 Simpson, “Slave Representation,” 315-342; Wood, American Republic, 197-256; Sean Wilentz, Rise, 34-49.

Like his predecessors, Jefferson largely (and deliberately) avoided questions of a sectional nature, but Napoleon Bonaparte’s offer to sell the Louisiana territory proved to be so enticing that Jefferson was willing to set his sectional concerns (and ideological scruples) aside.

The accession of the new territories by federal treaty forced the Congress to reopen the discussion of what role slavery should play in the future of the Republic. Federalists in this instance supported Jefferson, while opposition came from within his own party. Some Old

Republicans, led by John Randolph, broke with the President, seeing the purchase as an unconstitutional aggrandizement of federal authority. While the parties collaborated

(intentionally or otherwise) to constrain the sectional implications of the Louisiana Purchase, the organization of the territory would prove more divisive. The debate over the organization of the territories illustrated changes in ideological attitudes toward slavery between 1784 and 1804.

The so-called “Breckenridge Bill” of 1804, an attempt by Jefferson’s Senate ally John

Breckenridge (R-KY) to organize the Louisiana Territory on the lines of the Northwest

Ordinance, was met with a debate over the future of slavery that established the pattern of the debate that would recur in 1819 and 1850. Southern Senators argued that “the territory…can not be cultivated” without slaves, and that slaves, as property, should not be precluded from

Louisiana. “Why should the holders of this type of property be prohibited from sending and selling their slaves in Louisiana?” they wondered.30 Northerners, on the other hand, argued that

Elizabeth Varon, Disunion, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 31-36; Matthew Mason, “’Nothing is Better Calculated to Excite Divisions’: Federalist Agitation Against Slave Representation during the War of 1812,” New England Quarterly 75, no. 4 (Dec. 2002), pp. 531-561. 30 E.S. Brown, “Senate Debates on the Breckenridge Bill for the Government of Louisiana,” American Historical Review 22 (Jan. 1917), p. 361.

“liberty cannot exist with slavery,” and wondered why Southerners, who attested to their distaste for the institution, supported its expansion.31 Southern Jeffersonians were able to pass legislation organizing the territory in two broad sections without the implementation of any Northwest

Ordinance style restrictions on slavery. Unwilling to openly act to settle the slavery question,

Jefferson was content to pass the responsibility for settlement of that momentous question to future generations.32

The rapid pace of events after 1807—the embargo, the impotence of the Federalist Party in contesting the accession of Jefferson’s successor, the declaration of “Mr. Madison’s War,” and a string of military disasters—led to the nation’s closest brush yet with dissolution and provoked a determined effort to bind the nation together physically and ideologically. Jefferson’s embargo on trade and the War of 1812 convinced opponents of the Republicans that the Union of the states was no longer serving their sectional interests. Southern overrepresentation in the electoral college via the 3/5 clause, the accession of new slave territory, the abolition of slavery in New

England—had convinced some New Englanders that the union was based on an inequitable, and immoral distribution of power. Northern disunionists eventually succeeded in organizing a convention in Hartford, which accomplished little more than discrediting Federalism in the nation at large. The end of the War reduced sectional tensions, but fear of disunion and disaffection with the federal government persisted. Critically, the inadequacies of the central

31 Ibid. 32 Rothman, Slave Country (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005) 29-31; Kevin M. Gannon, “’Escaping Mr. Jefferson’s Plan of Destruction’: New England Federalists and the Idea of a Northern Confederacy, 1803-1804,” Journal of the Early Republic 21, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 413-443; Robert E. Shalhope, “Republicanism and Early American Historiography,” William and Mary Quarterly Third Series 31, no. 2 (Apr. 1982): 334-356.: Robert E. Shalhope,, “Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography,” William and Mary Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Jan. 1972): 49-80.

47 government’s administrative infrastructure and ability to project power had convinced many

Jeffersonians that its powers needed to be enhanced. James Monroe assumed the Presidency in

1817 determined to address these issues. Albert Gallatin, the brilliant Jeffersonian Treasury

Secretary, believed that the War of 1812 “had renewed and reinstated the national feelings which the Revolution had given and which were daily loosened” in the interim between 1783 and 1815.

The new President, more responsible than any individual for the nation’s military recovery during the war, shared in Gallatin’s optimism.33 “The sentiment of every mind of every citizen is national strength,” Monroe declared, and accordingly proposed a series of aggressive reforms aimed at empowering the Federal government to meet and overcome foreign threats. He would strengthen the national bank to ensure the flow of credit, expand the Army and Navy to defend vital strategic interests and sponsor internal improvements to expand commerce and improve the government’s ability to project power. Most ambitiously, Monroe believed that he could accomplish this while securing consensus among the national political leadership, destroying

Federalism and eliminating partisanship. “The great body of the federal party are republican,”

Monroe confidently declared to Andrew Jackson.34 He would accomplish this by allowing the

Federalists a return to influence, though only as supporters of his administration and its policies.

Outsiders like Rufus King (F-NY) smelled trouble. “Strong passions,” King advised, were

“concealed waiting only for an occasion to show themselves.”35 The Federalist Party, however, was no longer in any position to control the nation, or its own, destiny. The Republicans alone

33 Monroe had been appointed Secretary of State during the war, and had been appointed concurrently as Secretary of War following a series of military reverses. 34 James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, December 16, 1816, Writings of James Monroe, 346. 35 Rufus King to unknown, January 3, 1818, C. King (ed.), The Life of Rufus King, 79-80.

48 could bring themselves down. “Surely our government may get on and prosper without the existence of parties,” Monroe declared, concluding “I have always considered their existence as a curse of the country.”36 “The existence of parties,” Monroe wrote to (of all people) Andrew

Jackson, “is not necessary for free government.” 37 “A union of parties in support of our republican government,” was Monroe’s ultimate goal. With the War of 1812 having demonstrated the limitations of American national cohesiveness, Monroe and a number of young political leaders refocused the Unionism of the revolutionary generation into a more proactive and affirmative doctrine.38

There is a semantic problem with any discussion of the centralizing policies of

Republican politicians of Monroe’s stripe. Their ideas about strengthening the ability of the

Federal government to undertake large-scale internal improvements programs and enhance the ability of the central government to project power should more properly be termed “federalism.”

However, the existence of the Federalist Party (and the politically loaded nature of the term

“Federalist” then and since) precludes its use in this context. “Nationalism” is similarly obfuscatory, in that the centralizing objectives of the Monrovians do not imply an adoption of the principle that each nation should have its own state, nor does it imply that the Monrovian vision for national unification required the homogenization of regional economic and social systems or

36 James Monroe to James Madison, May 1822, Works of James Monroe. Vol. VI, (Hamilton ed), p. 286-291. 37 Quoted in Ammon, Monroe, 374. 38 James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, December 16, 1816, Works. Vol. V, 346; George Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings (NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company), 1952, 95-105; Harlow G. Unger, The Last Founding Father (Philadelphia, Da Capo Press, 2009), 261-286; Ammon, James Monroe (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1971) 289-380. Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 234-251; Joanna Freeman, Affairs of State, 11-61; Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010); Willentz, Rise of American Democracy, 181-253; Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 91-124; Norman K. Risjord, “1812: Conservatives, War Hawks and the Nation’s Honor,” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 18, no. 2 (Apr. 1961), pp. 196-210.

49 culture. For the sake of this argument, please consider the term “nationalism” and “nationalist” as presented in reference to any Jeffersonian Republican leader or policy to imply the belief that the authority and revenue of the central government should be strengthened to allow it to promote development and confront problems. For clarity, Monroe’s vision of national consolidation without economic, social or cultural transformation of sectional cultures will be termed “Unionism.” To the extent that a leader promotes ideas which espouse a transformation or homogenization of the economy and culture of the nation, those leaders will be referred to as

“transformational nationalists.” Ideas that assert a distinctive and separate Southern national identity based on regional economic and social systems and cultures will be termed “Southern nationalism.”

Southern sectionalism had been kept in check during the administrations of Jefferson,

Madison and Monroe by Southern domination of the federal government. As George

Dangerfield has observed, “Southern leaders still believed that they controlled the triumphant

Republican party, and with it, the machinery of the central government.”39 Control of the government provided an effective veto over this issue that most concerned the leaders of the

South—the maintenance of a stable, safe, and increasingly profitable slave society. Republican dominance of the South, however, did not translate into an absence of ideological conflict in the section. Opposition to Monroe’s plans came predominantly from anti-nationalist Southerners within his own party called the “Old Republicans.” The Old Republican ideal was the preservation of the political order of self-governing communities. While “national”

39 George Dangerfield, The Awakening of American Nationalism (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1965), 15

Republicans40 like Madison and Monroe differentiated between centralization necessary for national survival and what they perceived as the Federalists promotion of centralization in pursuit of social hierarchy, Old Republicans saw these means as essentially identical and equally corrupt. They opposed the internal improvements and military expansion that Monroe was promoting, and bitterly opposed the national bank. While Edmond Randolph, John Taylor and

William Crawford continued the struggle against national consolidation, a new generation of

Southern leaders had emerged whose nationalist beliefs and personal ambition placed them in direct conflict with the Old Republican establishment.41 As Dangerfield cogently observed,

“Southern nationalism rose and fell with [Southerners’] sense of control.” “In the last two years of James Madison’s Presidency,” he continues, “the congressional South was most nationalistic when it was most sectional.”42 Old Republicans found themselves a decided minority within a coalition in support of an administration with goals ideologically at variance with their own ideals. It would take a leader of extraordinary talents to hold such a coalition together.43

40 Because members of the “national” faction of the Republican party (like Adams and Clay) became the leaders of the more formal National Republican party, for the purposes of this argument “national Republican” will refer to the informal faction of Republican centralizers prior to the organization of the party of the same name, while “National Republican” will refer to the formal party. 41 Ammon, Monroe, 476-492; Eugene Genovese, Mind of the Master Class (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 221-224; William Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), 119-161. Dangerfield, Era, 95-105; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), 19. Fields, Missouri, 195-260; On theories of state development, see John Brewer, Sinews of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. 42 George Dangerfield, Awakening, 15 43 Ammon, Monroe, vii-ix, 1-289, 476-492, 515-528; Harlow Giles Unger, The Last Founding Father (Philadelphia: De Capo Press, 2009), 1-260. ; Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene Genovese, Mind of the Master Class (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 221-224; William Freehling, The Road to Disunion Vol. 1 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1990) 119-161; Dangerfield, Era, 95-105; Dangerfield, Awakening, 1-35; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953) 19; Fields, Missouri, 14-260. On theories of state development, see John Brewer, Sinews of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) and Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

The ascendency of Unionism during Monroe’s term profoundly affected the political generation of leaders that assumed roles of national prominence during it. Monroe’s administration coincided with the rise of what we now term the “Compromiser” generation to political prominence, further promoting ideological evolution away from the national constructions of Washington and Jefferson. Henry Clay, former uneasy partner of John Quincy

Adams in negotiating the Treaty of Ghent that ended the War of 1812, embodied the new strain of Jeffersonian Unionism. A brilliant orator, legislative tactician, and an underrated American political thinker, Clay had stormed onto the national political scene at the age of 29, when he

(unconstitutionally) had been elected to the United States Senate and later was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives in his first term in that body. Clay had been one of the leaders of the “War Hawks,” a faction of Republicans who promoted expansion and war with Britain.

When Clay declined an appointment as Secretary of War, Monroe selected another outstanding

War Hawk—John C. Calhoun—to take his place.44 This new generation of leaders considered, as John Quincy Adams put it, the “the continent of North America,” as the United States’

“proper domain.”45 In a letter to his cabinet colleague (and Presidential rival) William Crawford,

Adams confidently declared that “the United States and North America are identical.”46 For

Adams, the evolution of the United States from a coastal agrarian Republic to a great power was inevitable. To Adams, “it was impossible that centuries would elapse” without British and

The interpretation presented here relies heavily on Fields, especially pages 14-32. 44Monroe’s failure to appoint Clay as Secretary of State infuriated Clay, who passive-aggressively sought to undermine the President at every opportunity thereafter. As we shall see, this would not be the last instance of Clay failing to play nicely with a President of his own Party. 45 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs Vol. IV, 438. 46 John Quincy Adams to William H. Crawford, November 16, 1819, William H. Crawford Crawford Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Spanish North America being “annexed to the United States.”47 The emerging “national”

Republican faction provided both a counterweight to the Old Republicans, and provided a moderate middle ground for voters and politicians who rejected Federalism but sought modernization and reform. Newly minted Republican Congressmen included John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, John Eaton of Tennessee, James Tallmadge of New York, and John Tyler of

Virginia. The Heroes of New Orleans and Tippecanoe, Andrew Jackson and William Henry

Harrison, nursed political ambitions from outside politics. Revolutionary-era Republicans, with the exception of Jefferson, were often as suspicious of the tyranny of the mob as they were of a monarchical central government. These younger Republicans—particularly leaders of emerging machines like Martin Van Buren—enthusiastically embraced the new politics of democracy and the egalitarian political culture that accompanied it.48

While the desire to maintain the Union was uncontroversial, other issues arose to drivge political competition. For many rising Republican leaders, the emerging market economy was the defining political issue of the day—whether they embraced the market, as Henry Clay and

John Quincy Adams did, or were suspicious of it—as were Martin Van Buren and Andrew

Jackson. Republican interpretations of the market and manufacturing were closely related to views of state centralization. For national Republicans, the ability of the nation to successfully resist foreign encroachment and emerge as a great power depended equally upon strengthening

47 Ibid. 48 William Strauss and Neil Howe, Generations (NY: Quill William Morrow, 1991) 181-189; Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) 181-189; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (NY: W.W Norton and Company, 1969) 593-618; Wilentz, Rise, 281-311; Remini, Henry Clay,150-153; Unger, The Last Founding Father, 34; Ammon, Monroe, 383-394; Randall Strahan, Vincent G. Moscardelli, Moshe Hassard, Richard S. Wales, “The Clay Speakership Revisited,” Polity 32, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 561-593.

53 the ability of the central government to project power and on continued economic expansion and modernization. For Old Republicans, the threat of the emergence of a centralized, aristocratic tyranny required the emergence of an elite with sufficient financial resources to extend influence and foster dependency. A third group, which eventually would adopt the name “Democratic-

Republicans,” rejected both the centralization of the National Republicans and the elitism of the

Old Republicans. For Republicans occupying the ideological middle ground between the Old,

Democratic and National factions, section would play a decisive role in determining coalition alignments. Both the economic question and the question of national authority had significant implications for the future of slavery. If manufactures were promoted, and an economic transition from production of raw materials to the productions of finished goods adopted, slavery’s role in the future of the Republic was at best unclear. If the central government were able to achieve sufficient authority to influence economic development in the states, it would have authority enough to end slavery. As North Carolina’s Nathaniel Macon memorably noted,

“If Congress can make canals, they can with more propriety emancipate.”49 Economic systems, state centralization and slavery each divided the ruling Republican party, and raised questions about the nation’s future and the distribution of power.50

Monroe’s conception of Unionism sought not only to engage with these conflicts, but to resolve them. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun ably summarized the problem that the administration faced. “Let it not be forgotten,” he declared, “that the extent of the republic

49 Macon to Bartlett Yancey, April 15, 1818--quoted in Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 222. 50 Sellers, Market Revolution, 70-102; Wilentz, Rise, 281-329; Fox-Genovese and Genovese, Mind, 41-68; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1,162-210.

54 exposes us to the greatest of calamities—disunion.”51 In order to meet the threats to the nation, from both within and without, Monroe promoted the development of chains of fortifications and roads to improve national defense. Infrastructure improvements would allow the government to move troops and supplies. A strong Navy would protect against British incursions and defend trade routes. Monroe also promoted policies of a clearly economic nature. He supported the establishment and operation of a national bank to stabilize the currency and coordinate capital flows. Calhoun captured the spirit of the administration’s policies when he called for Congress to “bind the republic together with a perfect system of roads and canals.”52 Robert Pierce Forbes has argued that Monroe’s internal improvement plans also included a system for potentially resolving both the issues of slavery and of an aggrieved free black population. Like his political idol, Jefferson, Monroe was an active supporter of colonization and an active supporter of the

American Colonization Society.53 The transfer of emancipated slaves to Africa would require an immense commitment of resources. The central government, backed by the sales of public lands and tariff collections, was the only entity capable of funding such a scheme. “Implicit in

Monroe’s sweeping plans for the economic and moral advancement of the nation,” Forbes has argued, “was the need to remove the negative influence of slavery—and blacks—through a policy of federally-backed colonization.”54 For such a plan to work, however, it was essential that Monroe lessen sectional and partisan tensions through what Forbes terms “anti-slavery

51 Quoted in Arthur Styron, Cast Iron Man (NY: Longmans, Green and Company, 1935), 90. 52 Annals of Congress, 14th Congress, 2nd Session, 853. 53 Liberia --the colony established by the society --would name its capital for the President. 54 Forbes, Missouri, 9.

55 pragmatism.”55 As Robert Bonner has argued, “Monroe directly linked…cautious Unionism to misgivings about slavery.”56 The success of Monroe’s program would depend, however, on his ability to ensure devotion to the Union was powerful enough to overcome sectional differences, to convince free blacks to participate in colonization, and, ultimately, to persuade Southern slaveholders of the desirability of peaceful evolution away from slavery. While the North and

South encompassed differing economic and cultural orders, Monroe believed that their common devotion to the Union would prove sufficient to sustain the nation. Strengthening transportation and communication networks were just as capable as promoting regional integration instead of national integration. Infrastructure could forge unity only when paired with an integrated political program 57

Two events would disrupt Monroe’s plan for single-party rule and return the nation to intense ideological conflict: the Panic of 1819 and the application by Missouri to enter the Union as a slave state. The financial crisis, panic and economic depression that afflicted the nation put enormous strains on the political system and exacerbated conflicts within the ruling party on economic issues. National Republicans pushed for greater centralization, while Old and

55 Forbes, Missouri, 69. Forbes’ interpretation of Monroe’s anti-slavery rests on interpretations of ambiguous documentation and has proven controversial. The argument presented here utilizes Forbes’ interpretation of Monroe’s motivations, but does not rely upon it. Whether the promotion of national development in part to finance the possibility of compensated emancipation or colonization originated with Monroe or Henry Clay, the issues were intertwined in the minds of some slaveholding National Republicans. For a representative critical examination of Forbes’ work, see John Craig Hammond, “Review: The Missouri Compromise and the Meaning of America,” The Journal of the Early Republic 28, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 122-126. 56 Bonner, Mastering America, 16. 57 Forbes, Missouri, 1-121; Unger, The Last Founding Father, 305-312; Sellers, Market Revolution, 137-202; Willentz, Rise, 181-253; Howe, What, 120-160; Dangerfield, Era, 95-198; William R. Johnson, “Prelude to the Missouri Compromise: A New York Congressman’s Effort to Exclude Slavery From Arkansas Territory,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Spring, 1965): 47-66.

Democratic Republicans blamed an overreaching federal government. These fundamentally different views of the causes of the crisis and appropriate response made governance by consensus impossible. The Missouri Crisis proved even more of a shock. Although similar objections arose during the organization of the Arkansas territory, the Missouri controversy accelerated sectional conflict and arrayed Republicans against each other. With the economy in shambles and Republicans in conflict, Missouri appeared at first blush a subject to arouse unity rather than a potential source of serious conflict.58

The Unionist consensus was disrupted by a basic issue left over from the debates over the

Constitution: the sectional distribution of power. For James Tallmadge (R-NY) the admission of

Missouri as a slave state represented an existential crisis for the Union. An ally of Van Buren’s arch-rival DeWitt Clinton, Tallmadge was frustrated by Southern dominance of the Republican

Party and the government. The admission of Missouri would result in a Southern majority in the

Senate, and Tallmadge did not believe that the South, once possessed of a majority, would ever relinquish it. Rising before the House on February 15, 1819, Tallmadge proposed an amendment to the Missouri bill providing that “the further introduction of slavery or involuntary servitude be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes” and slaves born after the admission of Missouri to the Union would be “free at the age of twenty five years.”59 In proposing his amendment, Tallmadge explained, he considered himself to be occupying firm Jeffersonian ground. “While we deprecate and mourn over the evil of slavery,” he declared, “humanity and good morals require us to wish its abolition, under circumstances consistent with the safety of the

58 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 119-210; Forbes, Missouri, 14-33. 59 Annals of Congress, 15th Congress 2nd Session, 1170.

57 white population.” Reinforcing his commitment to the preservation of slavery in the South, he added “willingly…I submit to an evil which we cannot safely remedy.” Tallmadge drew the line, however, at the extension of slavery. “All [of the reasons for the preservation of slavery] cease when we cross the banks of the Mississippi, a newly acquired territory.” Tallmadge was shocked that his proviso had stirred such a controversy, including threats of disunion. Rather than backing down to Southern threats, however, Tallmadge was defiant. If checking the continued expansion of slavery meant that “a dissolution of the Union must take place”

Tallmadge declared, “let it be so.”60 Combining a Jeffersonian anti-slavery with Monrovian centralization, Tallmadge had crafted a powerful and influential argument of slavery restriction.61

While many were slow to recognize the danger of the Tallmadge Amendment, Henry

Clay was not. He rallied immediately to the defense of slavery, and used his authority as

Speaker to limit debate on the amendment. But Tallmadge’s words could not be unspoken.

Northerners largely assumed the desirability of the eventual extinction of slavery as a matter of course. Southerners largely assumed that Tallmadge’s Amendment would be quickly disposed, like the objections to the admission of Alabama had been. While Southern Republican views of the efficacy, morality and desirability of slavery had evolved since the days of Jefferson, those of

Northern Republicans had not. This divergence of expectations, along with the ideological differences that informed it, was more dangerous than most politicians recognized. Rufus King

60 Annals of Congress, 15th Congress 2nd Session, 1438. 61 Forbes, Missouri, 35-45; Sellers, Market, 130-139; Howe, What, 147-150; Appleby, Inheriting, 247; Freehling, Road, Vol.1, 144-154.

(F-NY) declared that any law supporting slavery was “absolutely void, because contrary to the law of nature, which is the law of God.”62 John Quincy Adams reported in his diary that slaveholders “gnawed their lips and clenched their fists” as King spoke.63 Timothy Fuller (R-

MA) went a step farther, and wondered whether slavery restriction “impl[ied] anything more than that its constitution shall be republican.”64 Southerners rallied to slavery’s defense. Clay declared slave property to be “inviolable,” and charged that without slavery women would be forced to perform “the menial offices of the family.”65 Representative James Pindall (F-VA) questioned whether the Union constituted a nation at all, declaring the Constitution to be an

“international compact.”66 King’s participation convinced many Republicans that the whole issue was a Federalist plot. The Federalist plot thesis was thin political gruel, but it provided sufficient cover for Northern Republicans and Southern Republicans to ignore the deeper implications of the controversy and come to a neat settlement among themselves.67 The balanced admission of Missouri and Maine, combined with an agreement to allow slavery south of the 36°30′ line defused the crisis.68

As Forbes has noted (and Congressional voting patterns demonstrate), the verbal pyrotechnics in the legislature was ultimately “merely an argument between a small majority of

Southern members of Congress and a small minority of Northern ones.”69 The neat solution to

62Robert Ernst, Rufus King: American Federalist (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 372. 63Allan Nevins (ed.), The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845, (NY: Longman Green, 1929), 226. 64 Quoted in Forbes, Missouri, 38. 65Quoted in Forbes, Missouri, 36-37. 66 Quoted in Forbes, Missouri, 41. 67 As may be expected, no evidence for a Federalist conspiracy behind the Missouri debate has emerged. 68 Forbes, Missouri, 36-120; Wilentz, Rise, 218-253; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 144-161. 69 Forbes, Missouri, 111.

59 the crisis, paired admission and division of the territories into slave and free zones, was both simple and embraced widely across both sections. Better yet, it had provided a permanent solution to the territorial question barring any changes in the national boundaries. At the same time, the settlement was flawed. First, each section had drawn different conclusions about what the settlement meant, and which section had “won.” The debate had resulted in a division of

Congress along lines of sectional—rather than partisan—interests, illustrating that sectional identity had the potential to trump partisan loyalties, a lesson that many participants would not forget. “Not until the Missouri Crisis of 1819,” Eugene Genovese has argued, “did many in the

Upper South firmly and publicly link slavery to Southern political interests.”70 Subsequent events would reinforce this. Lacy Ford identifies growing disaffection in the Southern political order as being promoted by the Denmark Vesey scare and the efforts of the American

Colonization Society to secure federal funding for compensated emancipation. For Northerners, the crisis had reinforced the belief that had been growing since 1800 that the expansion of slavery was inimical to Northern interests. While the Compromise had permanently settled the question of the disposition of slavery in the Louisiana Purchase, differing understandings of what that meant threatened to resurrect the debate if the nation’s borders changed. 71

The divergence of sectional expectations related to the expansion of slavery was revealed almost immediately when Missouri submitted its constitution to Congress. The document, reflecting Southwestern political fears about free blacks fomenting slave rebellions, barred them

70 Genovese, Mind, 72 71 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 254; Wilentz, Rise, 218-253; Howe, What, 158-160; Ford, Deliver Us, 299- 301.

60 from the state. North Carolina’s Nathanial Macon summarized the views of these Southerners succinctly. “There is no place for free blacks in the United States,” he declared.72 Southerners, including colonizers Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Clay, considered the removal of free blacks as essential to social order. This sentiment was not limited to the South. In New Jersey, the Supreme Court had recently ruled that “black color is the proof of slavery” for legal purposes despite the state’s prior emancipation of slaves.73 However, despite racist attitudes prevalent throughout most of the North, the Missouri provision also impacted white Northern rights and privileges. In Northern eyes, the barring of free blacks violated the constitution by barring some of their citizens. While the first Missouri crisis was fundamentally political, the second was based in identity and social norms, and much more difficult to compromise. “The words Civil

War and disunion,” Henry Clay reported disapprovingly, “are uttered almost without emotion.”74

The federal government could not override Missouri’s constitution without provoking the South, nor could it endorse Missouri’s position without violating the Constitution. The implications of the crisis seemed as fatal as they were seemingly insurmountable.75

Despite the danger, the breadth and depth of support for Unionism in the Congress provided political space for a second settlement. In a singular instance of a political leader meeting a crisis requiring their unique talents, personality and ability, Henry Clay formulated a solution sublime in simplicity, deviousness, and denial of reality. Clay’s proposal accepted the

Missouri constitution and declared that no aspects of the document should be construed as

72 Annals of Congress, 16th Cong. 1st session, I, 227-228. 73 Quoted in Dangerfield, Awakening, 136. 74 Henry Clay to Adam Beatty, January 22, 1820, Works IV, p. 60. 75 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 254; Forbes, Missouri, 141-178.

61 violating the rights of citizens any state. It was an affront to logic but a political masterstroke.

Clay offered both sides a retreat with honor from a conflict that few wanted and could destroy the nation. Both sides won, neither side lost. It would prove the crowning achievement of one of the world’s greatest legislators. George Dangerfield ably and succinctly summarized Clay’s triumph. “Clay was the only gentleman in the House,” he stated, “whose prestige, effrontery, and parliamentary skill could have sustained so ignoble a retreat from common sense.”76 With an unprecedented act of parliamentary legerdemain, the Great Compromiser had conjured a legislative chimera that not only defused the crisis at hand, but which also drew attention away from the implications of territorial policy for sectional identities for the next thirty years. While the sectional conflict over slavery would never dissipate during the coming decades, Clay’s compromise had confined it largely to less-dangerous political sectors than the Congress. The statesmanship and skill that Clay had displayed during the two Missouri controversies had propelled him to the first rank of American political leaders.77

Despite the settlement of the Missouri controversy, some influential leaders within the

President’s party doubted the value of single party government, opposed the economic policies of Monroe’s administration and believed that new inter-sectional alliances along economic grounds provided the best opportunity for salving sectional wounds. “Political combinations between the inhabitants of different states are unavoidable,” Martin Van Buren believed, “and

76 Dangerfield, Awakening, 136. 77 Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom (NY: Harper and Row, 1981); Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy (NY: Harper and Row, 1984); Wilentz, Rise, 312-455; Forbes, Missouri, 207-210; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 158-159; Dangerfield, Awakening, 136- 141.

62 the most natural and beneficial to the country is that between the planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the North.” Van Buren opposed Monroe’s amalgamation policy on political grounds, but as a matter of principle as well. He was convinced, in contrast with

Jefferson and his disciples, that society was inherently divided by irreconcilable interests and cultures, and that the existence of a robust system of party discipline was essential to ensuring that political conflict was confined to relatively “safe” areas of dispute. If the old political dichotomy of Republicans and Federalists were lost, Van Buren was convinced, “geographical divisions between free and slave holding states will inevitably take their place.” The decline of party sentiment had contributed to the emergence of sectional conflict in 1819, and the solution to the problem was the establishment of a new (or, as he saw it, the old) competitive bipartisan system. “Party attachments in former time,” Van Buren declared, “furnished a complete antidote for sectional prejudice.”78 Van Buren was no philosopher like Jefferson, no popular vote-getter like Jackson, no legislative mastermind like Clay and no spellbinder like Webster. He was, however, a “maker of combinations,” a sublime political architect who was able to translate the lessons he had learned building the nation’s first great political machine in New York and apply them to a national political organization. In the aftermath of the 1824 Presidential contest—in which Andrew Jackson secured a plurality of the popular vote but John Quincy Adams, with the help of Henry Clay, was elected President—Van Buren joined with Jackson and like-minded

Republicans to create a new political organization. Unlike the National Republicans, the

Democratic Party was organized to both organize voters and reward followers, a policy that the

78 Van Buren to Thomas Ritchie, January 13, 1827, Martin Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Adams administration had expressly rejected (to Henry Clay’s chagrin). With Jackson embodying the egalitarian political culture of the new party and with Van Buren modeling its organizational infrastructure, an alliance of opponents of the National Republicans coalesced behind the General. While it is easy to attribute the parentage of the Democratic Party to

Jackson and Van Buren, the ideological origins of the party are murkier and more contentious.

Among the plethora of leaders who contributed to the establishment of orthodox Democratic ideology, however, two early Jacksonian political thinkers stand out in defining the direction of the party’s political thought—Thomas Hart Benton and John C. Calhoun.79

As much as any politician except perhaps Old Hickory himself, Thomas Hart Benton served as a personal embodiment of a Western populist Unionist. Like Jackson, Benton’s politics were marked not so much by policy consistency as by a reflexive political egalitarianism.

It was this defining commitment to the cause of white, independent farmers and workers that served as the foundation of Benton’s commitment to the Union. He was equally willing to defend the Union against the perceived encroachment on Southern prerogatives from the North

(as he did during the Missouri debates) as he was to stand up to sectional radicalism from large slaveholders from the South (as he did during the nullification controversy). Unlike most

Unionists of the older generation, Benton’s conception of the Union was expressly popular, in

79 Wilentz, Rise, 312-510; Howe, What, 328-366; William G. Shade, “’The Most Delicate and Exciting Topics’: Martin Van Buren, Slavery and the Election of 1836,” Journal of the Early Republic 18, no. 3 (Autumn, 1998): 459- 484; Lynn Hudson Parsons, “In Which the Political Becomes Personal and Vice Versa: The Last Ten Years of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson,” Journal of the Early Republic 23, no. 3 (Autumn, 2003): 421-443; Thomas Brown, “From Old Hickory to Sly Fox: The Routinization of Charisma in the early Democratic Party,” Journal of the Early Republic 11. no. 3 (Autumn 1991): 339-369.  This interpretation differs from most analyses of Democratic Party ideology in emphasizing the importance of Benton and Calhoun, politicians who were outliers within the party at various points in their careers. For a more standard interpretation of the development of Democratic political thought, see Wilentz, Rise, 312-481.

64 that he considered “the Union” and “the people” to be essentially the same. His most lasting contribution was to firmly and consistently promote the idea that “the people’s” interests were inherently at odds with wealth, and that the government (particularly the President) was tasked with supporting the interests of “the people” against wealth through what he termed “the demos krateo principle.”

Benton’s conception of the nation assumed neither that the actions of the federal government were or were not in the nation’s interest, nor that every citizen of the country was a member of the nation. While previous American politicians (particularly the Old Republicans) had been concerned that the actions of government served to enrich the powerful and worried that patronage could subvert popular government, Benton and the Democrats in a sense reversed this argument. By assuming that in a state of nature (without extra government intervention) the wealthy still wielded too much power, the Benton formulation justified executive action against the interests of the wealthy, as well as the use of patronage to offset the power of the rich. In

Benton’s view, the government could either be active or inactive in protecting the interest of the masses depending on the circumstance, but its role was always to take the side of “the people” against “the interests.” Like his contemporaries in the Jackson movement, however, there was a major caveat to Benton’s egalitarianism—race. Benton was a proponent of white supremacy, and provided what would emerge as a core tenant of Democratic political ideology in during the

Missouri debate. “No process of reasoning can make it right,” Benton declared, that slaveholders “should be forced to the surrender of their slaves.”80 To Benton, the “Federal party

80 Benton, Editorial, St. Louis Enquirer, June 25, 1819.

[i.e. National Republicans/Whigs] in every question in the South West between the white people and the negroes or Indians regularly, officially, impertinently and wickedly, takes part with the

Indians and negroes against their white fellow citizens and fellow Christians.”81 Reconciling

Democratic egalitarianism with the perpetuation of slavery constructed an ideological framework that could accommodate Southern slaveholders and Northern egalitarians. At the same time, though Benton owned slaves and supported slavery where it existed, his sympathy for large slaveholders was very limited. This synthesis of Unionism, hostility to elites (be they bankers or planters), and white supremacy proved to be very palatable to Northerners and Southerners alike.

At the same time, Benton’s belief that the Union represented the greatest protection for “the people” against “the powerful,” led him to conclude that the best protection for Southern smallholders lay within the framework of the Union. In this, he could not have differed more from Calhoun, his personal, political and ideological foe. Calhoun’s ideas may have been more consistent and original, but Benton’s resonated more widely.82

While Benton’s political philosophy allowed for a loose interpretation of the roles and responsibilities of the Federal government, those of John C. Calhoun were rapidly evolving in the opposite direction. While Calhoun is studied today primarily for his views on slavery and the

81 Article signed “La Salle” generally attributed to Benton, St. Louis Beacon, October 7, 1829. 82 William Nesbit Chambers, Old Bullion Benton, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956). In his excellent study, Jacksonian Anti-slavery and the Politics of Free Soil, Jonathan Earle describes the ideology of his subjects in terms very similar to my interpretation of Benton above. While my interpretation is consistent with Earle’s, I believe Benton (and to a certain extent Van Buren) encompasses this strain of mainstream national Democratic thought more thoroughly than Earle’s subjects. Additionally, I am uncomfortable with the term “Jacksonian anti-slavery,” as any anti-slavery sentiments Old Hickory may have harbored have been lost to history. From my perspective, though, Earle’s Jacksonian Anti-slavery faction fits comfortably within the faction of Democrats I term “Bentonians,” and would differ from them primarily in tactics and national appeal. See Jonathan H. Earle, Jacksonian Anti-slavery and the Politics of Free Soil (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

66 constitution, his ideas regarding the idea of the nation—particularly his skepticism about the value of a Southern republic as a preferable alternative to the Union—warrant further study.

Despite his sectionalist reputation, however, Calhoun remained a Unionist, though one of an unusual type. From his entry into national politics through his service in the Monroe administration, Calhoun had been identified as one of the nation’s strongest nationalists.

Following his election as Vice-President in 1824, Calhoun’s thought evolved in an increasingly sectional direction. During the Adams administration, Calhoun largely viewed the political situation in the same terms as Jackson. In 1826 he declared to Jackson that “it must be determined…whether the real governing principle in our political system be the power and patronage of the Executive or the voice of the people.”83 However, Calhoun’s conception of the role of the national government, and particularly the President, differed radically from that of

Jackson. Whereas Jackson viewed “the voice of the people” to be best preserved by an active and powerful executive (so long as he was that executive), Calhoun viewed it as best preserved by the distribution of power and the preservation of community autonomy. “Our liberty and happiness depend on a due equilibrium of powers among the parts,” he argued, “and the difficult problem is to unite liberty and power.”84 Believing the chasm between North and South over slavery unbridgeable, he increasingly viewed expansion of Federal authority as disruptive of sectional harmony. Calhoun was at heart a Unionist, but an anti-nationalist one. “If we regard the duration of our institutions and the preservations of our liberty,” he warned, “we must hold it as a fundamental maxim, that the action of the Government should, with our growth, gradually

83 John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, June 4, 1826, Papers of John C. Calhoun. Vol. 10, 110. 84 Calhoun to Col. A.[lexander] Hamilton, March 28, 1830, Papers of John C. Calhoun. Vol. 11, 142.

67 become more moderate, instead of more intense.”85 While Calhoun and Jackson were both notionally State’s Rights Unionists, ideological and personal differences eventually made the two bitter enemies. Calhoun’s violent public break with Jackson ended his hopes for leadership of the Democratic Party, but his ideas remained influential with both mainstream Democrats and the emerging faction of anti-Van Buren Southerners. While his opponents denounced Calhoun as a disunionist, his primary preoccupation following his break with Jackson was reforming the government to ensure the preservation of slavery and Union. “Unless the republicans of the

South & over the country can be united on some ground the opposite side must triumph, when disunion or change in government must follow.”86 He fundamentally agreed with President

Monroe that, in the event of civil war between North and South “our free system of government would be overwhelmed.”87 Jackson may have been a man of “dark, lawless and insatiable ambition,”88 but the Democratic Party remained officially committed to State’s Rights.89

Jackson and Calhoun’s clash over the tariff and nullification exposed the assumptions regarding national identity that had emerged between and within the parties during the Jackson administration. Democrats combined a strong commitment to state’s rights with a conceptual hostility to separatism and robust endorsement of the Union. Calhoun, for his part, took

85 John C. Calhoun, Report of the Select Committee on the Extent of Executive Patronage, February 9, 1835, Papers of John C. Calhoun, Vol. 12, 424. 86 Calhoun to S. D. Ingham, July 31, 1831, Papers of John C. Calhoun. Vol. 11, 441-442. 87 James Monroe to John C. Calhoun, August 4, 1828, Papers of John C. Calhoun. Vol. 11: 409. 88 Calhoun, Speech on the President’s Protest, May 6, 1834, Papers of John C. Calhoun. Vol. 12, 302-318. 89 Roberta Hirzberg, “An Analytic Choice Approach to Concurrent Majorities: The Relevance of John C. Calhoun’s Theory for Institutional Design,” The Journal of Politics 54, no. 1 (Feb. 1992):54-81; Schlesinger, Age, 54. Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom (NY: Harper and Row, 1984), 8-24; Wilentz, Rise, 460-61; Ronnie W.F. Faulkner, “Taking John C. Calhoun to the United Nations,” Polity 15, no. 4 (Summer, 1983), pp. 473-491.

68 inspiration for his sectional vision from Jefferson and Madison’s Virginia and Kentucky

Resolutions. He rejected the idea of universal interests between the sections and sought to redefine the relations of the State and federal governments accordingly. The nullification controversy resulted from this. With the Democrats divided between Bentonites and

Calhounites, Jackson, ironically, needed the support of the National Republicans to break the impasse. “The only man,” Martin Van Buren conceded, “who had it in his power to extricate” the South Carolinians from the folly of nullification was Henry Clay.90 Despite the myriad of issues upon which the Bentonian Democrats and National Republican factions disagreed, in 1833 they joined forces to maintain the Union against the sectionalism Southern radicals were promoting.91

Despite the success of the National Republicans and Democrats in upholding the Union against nullification, the national government remained deeply divided between three distinct ideological visions relating to national identity and slavery. The Jackson/Van Buren/Benton

Democrats espoused an egalitarian politics where the rights of “the people” were defended by a limited federal government headed by a strong executive with the authority to reward “the people’s” allies, punish their enemies, and defend the Union. They were committed to the maintenance of one country with two distinct economic systems, and justified their political egalitarianism and support of slavery through the doctrine of what Sean Wilentz has termed

“Master Race Democracy.”92 Southerners increasingly believed that slavery was too deeply

90 Martin Van Buren to Silas Wright, February 23, 1833, quoted in Niven, Van Buren, 328. 91 Freehling, Prelude to Civil War (NY: Oxford University Press, [1965] 1966), 260-300. 92 Sean Wilentz, Rise, 198.

69 embedded in Southern society to evolve away from, and questioned whether such an evolution was even desirable. Consequently, they predicated their ideas on the need to defend the interests of the South against those of a diverging North. In essence, Calhoun supported Southern regional autonomy. Other Southern sectionalists increasingly rejected a nationalist construction of American identity while supporting a national Southern identity based upon the slave economy and distinctive culture of the section. They supported the maintenance of the Union, but their support was conditional.93

The evolving parties of the new Jacksonian political order remained committed to maintaining the Unionist political order, but divisions over sectional issues within each section contributed to the new political alignments. Following Henry Clay’s defeat in the 1832

Presidential election, a broad alliance of opponents began to coalesce under the “Whig” moniker.

The National Republicans/Whigs believed that the central government must promote development and maintain stability, and held that economic development and social progress would result in the eventual obsolescence of slavery. They asserted that the federal government had no authority to interfere with slavery in the slave states, and that any peaceful evolution away from slavery would happen at the initiative of the slaveholding states. Whigs envisioned the sections as peacefully converging through development and social reform. Former National

Republicans provided the largest faction of supporters of the new party, but in many respects the junior partners in the new party defined the political culture of the Whigs. In the South,

93 Howe, What, 367-445; Howe, Political Culture, 69-122;Wilentz, Rise, 482-520; Freehling, Prelude, 301-339; Brian Schoen. “Calculating the Price of Union: Republican Economic Nationalism and the Origins of Southern Sectionalism, 1790-1828,” Journal of the Early Republic 23, no. 2 (Summer, 2003): 173-206.

70 disgruntled sectionalists and enemies of Van Buren94 drifted into the new alliance. In the North, the incorporation of the Anti-Masonic party strengthened the opposition’s popular touch and infused the Whigs with a number of dynamic and populist politicians comfortable with the new democratic campaign style. Anti-Mason leaders like Thurlow Weed, William H. Seward,

Horace Greeley and Thaddeus Stevens were adept at electioneering and building popular political organizations. They also subscribed to a new transformational nationalism that sought the modernization and homogenization of the national economy and culture. The primary difference between the factions was how conciliatory they were willing to be toward slavery.

Transformational nationalists deplored the South’s disproportionate influence over the federal government and accepted confrontation with slaveholders over territorial policy as a means to mobilize Northern voters and accelerate reform. They were confident that the majority of

Southerners would benefit in the long run from the marginalization of the Slave Power and the modernization of the Southern economy. Unionist Northern Whigs, on the other hand, were reluctant to risk disruption of the Union through confrontation with the South, and sought to maintain stability within the Union through accommodation. These differences were apparent only where slavery was concerned. In the context of the political milieu of the 1830s and opposition to Jackson and Van Buren, they were superficially indistinguishable.95

94 Willie Mangum, John Bell, John Berrien and John Tyler were successful Democratic politicians who aligned themselves with the Whigs. 95 Wilentz, Rise, 33-58, 482-520; Howe, What, 367-488; Holt, Rise, 15-67;Schlesinger, Age, 59-131. Henry O. Robertson, “The Emergence of the Whig Party in Louisiana’s Florida Parishes, 1834-40,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 33, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 283-316; Grady McWhiney, “Were the Whigs a Class Party in Alabama?,” The Journal of Southern History 23, no. 4 (Nov. 1957): 510-522.

Despite the rise of Southern nationalism and transformational nationalism, the dominance of both major parties by Unionists ensured that partisan order reinforced national stability during the administrations of Jackson, Van Buren and (briefly) Harrison. During his brief time in office, Harrison pursued a conventional Whig policy package that promoted national infrastructure development and homogenization. The ascent of a sectionalist to the Presidency, however, transformed the dynamic. On paper, John Tyler’s qualifications to be the first man to succeed to the Presidency following the death of his predecessor were impeccable. Prior to his election to the Vice-Presidency, Tyler had served as a member of the Virginia Council of

Delegates, as a United States Representative, Governor of Virginia, and as a United States

Senator. He came from a family of Virginia political leaders.96 Tyler had known Jefferson and considered himself a loyal and orthodox adherent to Jefferson’s principles. When asked by the

Richmond Enquirer to summarize his political ideals, he stated simply that “I am a Jeffersonian

Republican.” Like Jefferson, he was concerned to maintain the balance of powers between the central government and the state, and considered slavery to be an evil inflicted on the South.97

Tyler’s version of Republicanism was rooted in the Old Republicanism of John Randolph and

John Taylor. As a member of the Whig Party of 1840, however, he was an anachronism. He owed his nomination for Vice-President to the Whigs’ need to balance William Henry Harrison with a Southern partisan of Henry Clay, though rumors of Tyler’s adherence to Clay would prove greatly exaggerated. As many observers would subsequently note, however, if the Whig delegates had known that William Henry Harrison would not survive his term, they would never

96 The Senior Tyler had publicly opposed slavery in the revolutionary milieu of the early Republic. 97 Speech at Glouchester Courthouse, August 22, 1835, Letters and Times of the Tylers. Vol. I, 573-582.

72 have nominated John Tyler for the Vice-Presidency. His closest allies were fellow state’s rights

Virginians who shared his worldview and desire for expansion. John Quincy Adams was scathing in his assessment of the new President. “Tyler is a political sectarian, of the slave- driving, Virginian, Jeffersonian school, principled against all improvement, with all the interests and passions and vices of slavery rooted in his moral and political constitution—with talents not above mediocrity, and a spirit incapable of expansion to the dimensions of the station upon which he has been cast by the hand of Providence.”98 A Whig wit summarized thus: “Tip was

Bank, Ty was anti-bank; Tip was tariff, Ty was anti-tariff…in fact, fellow citizens, Tip is Whig,

Ty is Democrat.”99 As President, Tyler’s relations with Congressional Whigs, especially Henry

Clay, proved extremely contentious. Tyler’s Jeffersonian vision collided with Clay’s ambitious

American System, and following a series of confrontations, disputes and vetoes most of

Harrison’s former cabinet resigned and Washington’s Whigs read Tyler out of the Party. “If a

God-directed thunderbolt were to strike and annihilate the traitor,” the Lexington Intelligencer declared, “all would say that ‘Heaven is just.’”100 Unwanted by the Democrats, Tyler turned for support to his natural ideological allies: Southern sectionalists. Reforming his cabinet, Tyler pursued the construction of a Southern Rights political party that would strengthen slavery and defend the section against the Whigs and Democrats. In this effort, he was aided by a network of like-minded sectionalist leaders including Beverly Tucker, John C. Calhoun, and Abel Upshur.101

98 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams X (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippencourt and Company) 456-457. 99 Quoted in Niles Register LIX, 395. 100 Quoted in The Madisonian, November 18, 1841.. 101 For a more favorable assessment of Tyler, see Oliver Perry Chitwood, John Tyler (NY: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc. 1939), 1-289; Glen C. Altschuler and Stuart Blumin, The Rude Republic (Princeton: Princeton

Though largely forgotten today, Abel Upshur played a key role in translating Southern nationalism from a theoretical possibility into a concrete government policy platform. The highlight of his political career prior to 1841 was a memorable stint as the most powerful advocate of Tidewater planters’ interests against the forces of democratization during the

Virginia constitutional convention of 1832. Upshur was also an important participant in the intellectual milieu of Southern nationalism through his friendship with John Tyler, Beverly

Tucker and John C. Calhoun. Like Tyler and Calhoun, Upshur had been a Jacksonian, and like them he had broken with “the madman of the Hermitage” over nullification.102 By 1836, Upshur had embraced the positive defense of slavery, and believed that the South was imperiled by northern aggression. He remained pro-nullification, but believed talk of secession was premature.103 Despite his Southern nationalist principles, as Navy Secretary from 1841-1843

Upshur worked tirelessly to increase the size and scope of the Navy, pressing Congress for unprecedented funding support as a means to pursuing expansion aimed at extending slavery.

His goal, however, was not national consolidation but the expansion of slavery. By combining institutional modernization with expansionist ambition, Upshur was able to win support for his naval expansion program from both Whigs and Democrats. In this, Upshur effectively linked the administration’s policies to its political goals of aligning dissident Whigs and Southern sectionalists under the Tyler banner. Upshur quickly emerged, even before his appointment as

University Press, 2000), 28; Joel Silbey, The American Political Nation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Wilentz, Rise, 524-527; Fox-Genovese Genovese, Mind, 82; Heidler and Heidler, Clay, 317-365; Howe, What, 589- 595; Holt, Rise and Fall, 125-136; Remini, Clay, 552-596; Watson, Liberty and Power, 227-230; Freehling, Road to Disunion Vol. 1, 368-371; Chitwood, John Tyler, 290-341; Wiltse, Cast Iron Man, 256-257. 102 Quoted in Claude H. Hall, Abel Parker Upshur (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1965), 112. 103 Hall, Upshur, 76-77.

Secretary of State in 1843, as the leader of Tyler’s new cabinet. In his opinion, Tyler must “form a party of our own” [sic] to save the South and the Republic.104

As Secretary of State, Upshur would act—in the Republican tradition—as the “premier” of the administration in addition to the chief diplomat, and he would use this position to tactfully promote the interests of slaveholders.105 Upshur remained skeptical about political democratization, and consequently held a very low opinion of political parties and their representatives. “Our public men seem determined to merge themselves in the two great parties,” he warned.” “At the very moment when the Federal Government is trampling on the states…these men are suffering all their State attachments and State pride to be absorbed in the interest of Federal politics,” he complained in 1840. “No good can come of this,” he concluded.106 Upshur encouraged the President to pursue policies that would divide the parties internally. Texas was an issue that combined his political and geostrategic objectives. “England is determined to abolish slavery throughout the American continent and islands if she can,” he warned Calhoun. “Ought we not move immediately for the admission of Texas as a slave holding state,” he asked, “should not the South demand it as indispensible to their security?”

Annexation would preclude British expansion and open the possibility of additional expansion through war with Mexico. It would also provide a point of relevant differentiation between Tyler

104 Abel Upshur to Beverly Tucker, October 30, 1841, Beverly Tucker Papers, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA. 105 Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay, Van Buren, and Webster had previously acted as the President’s chief political advisor and party leader in addition to the State Department portfolio, and John Clayton and Webster would do so in the future. William H. Seward would famously be rebuked for attempting to fill this role in the Lincoln administration. In Seward’s defense, the role of “premier” was no innovation, but had been the practice of previous administrations, including every National Republican and Whig cabinet. One can hardly blame Seward for assuming that the ex-Whig President would conduct his administration in a similar fashion. 106 Abel P. Upshur to Beverly Tucker, February 22, 1840, Tylers 2, 701-702.

75 and his presumptive opponents Henry Clay and Martin Van Buren. Better yet, Upshur fully expected Northern economic interests to mobilize support for annexation, and trump any concerns about slavery expansion.107 Upshur’s vision, which seamlessly integrated political, sectional and geo-strategic considerations, was striking for the essential “otherness” with which he considered the North. 108 Although the Texas government was attempting to pressure Tyler to take action, this pressure served the interest of Tyler and his allies as well. For his part, Upshur believed that “the annexation of Texas,” was “an event that must happen, sooner or later,” and that if his political allies and the cause of the South could be promoted all the better.109 “Judge

Upshur was very apprehensive that…[annexation] should assume a party aspect,” it was reported.110 Because Upshur and Tyler had largely avoided publicly invoking sectional arguments in favor of annexations (despite their primacy in the administration’s internal deliberations), they had provided cover for Northern expansionists to rally to the cause of annexation. As long as the administration did not explicitly invoke the cause of slavery as a justification for annexation, it seemed likely that annexation could pass with bisectional and bipartisan support.111 “Both parties may unite on [Texas],” Upshur argued, “for it is a Southern question, and not one of Whiggism and Democracy.”112

107 Abel P. Upshur to John C. Calhoun, “Letter of Abel P. Upshur to J.C. Calhoun,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Second series, 16, No. 4, (Oct. 1936), pp. 555-557. 108 It should be noted that Upshur’s political objective to enhance the candidacy of Calhoun, not Tyler, though the effect was roughly the same. 109 Upshur to Murphy, January 16, 1844, William R. Manning [ed.], Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Vol. 12 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1935), 59-65. 110 Letter of William Penn in the Madisonian, quoted in Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 278. 111 Quoted in Chitwood, Tyler, 355. 112 Claude H. Hill, “Abel P. Upshur and the Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 69, no. 3 (Jul. 1961), p. 290-299; Claude H. Hill, Abel Parker Upshur (Madison: The State

In an extraordinary instance of a random event profoundly altering the course of history, the gruesome demise of Abel Upshur in early 1844 transformed the Texas debate into a catalyst for a wide-ranging realignment of American politics on sectional lines. During the demonstration of a new warship which he had ordered while Navy Secretary to much of official

Washington, including the President, Benton, and Dolly Madison, Upshur and seven others were killed when a gun exploded. The tragedy plunged official Washington into mourning, and deprived the Tyler administration of its most effective and skilled strategist.113 Tyler desperately needed a statesman of stature to replace Upshur as the core political and diplomatic strategist for the administration. With a thin pool of dedicated supporters to turn to, Tyler offered the post to

John C. Calhoun. Although Calhoun was an eminent statesman and profound political theorist, he brought to the Tyler administration questionable tact and decidedly mixed motives. Where

Upshur had hidden sectionalist ends behind nationalist means, Calhoun adopted an overtly sectionalist tone. He de-prioritized the Oregon negotiations, arguing that “In the case of Oregon, time is acting for us,” and that “there is no question of honor involved, only a question of boundary.”114 Unlike Upshur, Calhoun explicitly injected sectional conflict into the Texas

Historical Society Wisconsin); Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 677-679; Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, 121-125; Chitwood, John Tyler, 345-355; Arthur Styron, The Cast Iron Man (NY: Longmens, Green and Company, 1935), 258-259; Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American West (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997) 13-39; Holt, Rise and Fall, 138-160; Michael Holt, The Fate of Their Country (NY: Hill and Wang, 2004) 10-18; Sellers, Market Revolution, 412-415; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 559-562; Freehling, The Road to Disunion Vol. 1, 387-394. 113 In addition to the political consequences of the Princeton explosion, the disaster had military implications that would last for decades. John Ericsson, the designer of the Princeton, was [unfairly] blamed for the explosion, which resulted in non-payment for his services in designing the ship and his estrangement from the Navy for decades. When, during the Civil War, the Confederacy began a program of ironclad warship construction, a desperate Navy was forced to hurriedly woo Ericsson back, resulting in the construction of the revolutionary all-metal ironclad Monitor. 114 Quoted in Wiltsie, Calhoun, Vol. 3, 262.

77 debate. After the signed annexation treaty arrived in Washington, Calhoun deliberately waited to submit the document to the Senate while he drafted a letter to British ambassador Richard

Pakenham. In his official capacity he publicly defended the morality of slavery and declared the

United States government to be dedicated to its promotion and preservation. In his Pakenham letter—which was leaked to the press—Calhoun expressly framed relations between Britain and the United States in Southern nationalist terms: abolitionist Britain against a pro-slavery United

States.115 Incredibly, John Tyler did not object, believing that on Texas “the great question is not as to the manner in which it shall be done but whether it shall be accomplished or not.”116 It was a disastrous miscalculation. Calhoun’s Pakenham letter offended both Northern Democrats and

Southern Whigs, and annexation advocates like Thomas Hart Benton soon found it impossible to align themselves with the issue. “That movement is…an intrigue for the Presidency and a plot to dissolve the Union,” he decided.117 Texas annexation might be desirable, but aligning the central government with the interests of slavery was another thing entirely.118

Calhoun’s sectionalization of the Texas issue reframed it in radical terms and transformed the 1844 Presidential campaign. The front runners—Unionists Clay and Van Buren—distanced themselves from annexation. In an unfortunate coincidence, both men published letters to this effect on April 17, 1844. The appearance of the letters in the press on the same day justifiably

115 Richardson, Letters and Papers of the Presidents. Vol. IV, 332. 116 Richardson, Letters and Papers of the Presidents. Vol. IV, 323-327. 117 Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years View. Vol. II, 582-583. 118 Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 565-566; Hill, Upshur, 210-213.

78 gave rise to accusations of collusion.119 It seems clear that fear of disrupting the Union was a key determinant of this decision, for, as John Tyler noted, both men had attempted to acquire

Texas as Secretary of State. For his part, Van Buren’s public opposition to expansion was a daring declaration of principle, which Sean Wilentz has termed “the most courageous act of his political career.”120 Later, Clay would declare that “personally I have no objection to the annexation of Texas, but I certainly would be unwilling to see the existing Union dissolved or seriously jeopardized for the sake of annexing Texas.”121 It is likely that both men expected the other to oppose annexation, and thus did not see their public declarations to be as risky as they turned out to be. Annexation of additional territory—tied as it was to the promise of social mobility—proved popular in both sections. Clay and Van Buren’s respective strategies were predicated on the assumption that economic issues could mobilize the electorate in the age of

Tyler. They did not recognize that Texas and slavery expansion had shifted the political paradigm.122

As the presumptive leader of the more Southern-skewed party, Van Buren was impacted more quickly by the effects of Tyler’s Southern nationalist program. He had not foreseen that

Southerners would hold his Northern origin against him. Van Buren had gone to great lengths

119 The collusion assertion was raised many times then and since due to a visit between Van Buren and Clay that occurred in 1842. Recent biographers of Clay and Van Buren reject the collusion charge, as both men corresponded widely in the drafting of the letters on differing timetables. The only overlap in the two drafting processes seems to be the date of publication. 120 Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, p. 568. 121 Clay to Miller, July 1, 1844, Calvin Colton [ed.], Works of Henry Clay. Vol. IV (NY: Barnes and Burr, 1863), 490-491. 122 Cole, Martin Van Buren, 392-395; Heidler and Heidler, Clay, 379-393; Sellers, Market Revolution, 413; Holt, Rise and Fall, 168-194; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 686-688; Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery (NY: Oxford University Press, 1992) 10-19; Remini, Clay, 611-641.

79 and had made profound political sacrifices to support slavery during his administration, and was convinced that his record of “respect to the rights of the South” would carry him through any controversy over his Texas letter.123 Van Buren assumed that he could rely on the loyalty of

Southern friends regardless of his stance on Texas, and that his control over the majority of

Democratic delegates at the convention would ensure his victory over Calhoun’s sectional minority. Having lost before, however, Van Buren was weighted with the additional burden of convincing his party that he could win. Van Buren’s problems were multiplied when Andrew

Jackson abandoned his candidacy. As William Freehling noted, Jackson’s shift of support to

James K. Polk had “summoned especially his first army, fellow southwestern racists, to new battle,” and their support and passive resistance was enough to deny the nomination to Van

Buren.124 Supporters of Buchanan, Lewis Cass and Levi Woodbury, recognizing that their candidates’ hopes rested on the imposition of the 2/3 rule at the Democratic Convention, lent their support to the Calhoun and Jackson alliance. Amos Kendall blamed Van Buren’s defeat on the hostility of his followers toward Tyler and Calhoun, most especially over Texas. “I verily believe…that had a mild course been pursued toward the friends of Tyler and Calhoun from the beginning, the mischief-makers would have found themselves powerless…and that Mr. Van

Buren would have been re-elected.”125 Instead, Polk was nominated, and Texas emerged as the central issue of the campaign. Van Buren supporter Gideon Welles would later view the 1844 convention as a turning point in the history of the Democratic Party. After Polk’s nomination,

123 Martin Van Buren to Benjamin Butler, May 20, 1844, Martin Van Buren Papers Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 124 Freehling, Road to Disunion Vol. 1, 415. 125 Kendall to Andrew Jackson, August 28, 1844, Andrew Jackson Papers Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

80 the “parties subsequently took on a sectional or personal character.”126 As many Whigs noted, the Democratic Party had adopted Tylerism without Tyler. Whig Sargent Prentiss teased the

Democrats about the convergence of their ideals and Tyler’s. “If I ever join the Mormons, I shall attach myself to Joe Smith, the founder of the sect, and not to one of his rival disciples,” Prentiss chortled. “And should I ever turn Locofoco on Texas, I will support John Tyler, not James K.

Polk.” 127

Polk was a Unionist, and his campaign attempted to balance the sectional implications of

Texas annexation with an equally belligerent position on Oregon, demanding that Britain cede the whole of the Territory to the Alaska border of 54’40” “or fight.” While Oregon did not evoke the visceral response that Texas annexation did, it did provide sufficient political cover for

Northern Democrats to claim support for Texas as a matter of principle rather than kowtowing to

Southern interests. Clay continued to rest on the laurels of his statesmanship, while softening his position on Texas as it became increasingly clear that the election would prove more competitive than he had hoped. For his part, Tyler considered Clay to be “the most obnoxious man in the

Union,” and suspicion that his continued candidacy would result only in Clay’s election made him receptive to Democratic overtures to withdraw from the race.128 Two thousand votes in the

State of New York decided the election, and won the day for Polk. John Quincy Adams

126 Quoted in Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men (NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 151. 127 Speech of Sargent Prentiss , June 20, 1844, George Lewis Prentiss, Memoir of S.S. Prentiss. Vol. II (NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1855), 315-316; Cole, Martin Van Buren, 392-398; Robert W. Merry, A Country of Vast Designs (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2009) 49-95; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 415-433; Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845 (NY: Haprer and Row, 1984), 490-511; Chambers, Benton, 274-276; Watson, Liberty and Slavery, 229-230; Styron, Cast Iron Man, 262-265; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 568-571; 128 Tyler to Mrs. Waller, September 13, 1844, Letters and Times of the Tylers. Vol. III, 114.

81 attributed the Whig defeat to “the partial association of Native Americans, Irish Catholics, abolition societies, the liberty party, the Pope of Rome, the Democracy of the sword, and the dotage of a ruffian.” The success of the Democratic Party was “sealing the fate of this nation, from which nothing less than the intervention of omnipotence can save us.”129

The election of the Unionist Polk did not blunt the drive of Southern nationalists to acquire new slave territory. While Polk was constituting his cabinet, Tyler succeeded in securing the annexation of Texas using the unorthodox procedure of a joint resolution of Congress.

Democrats’ relief was palpable. “One bone of contention is out of the way,” Democratic Senator

Lewis Cass wrote.130 Polk received both Texas annexation and the cassias belli he would require for confrontation with Mexico. Tyler’s sectionalist ends were being accomplished by Polk.

“The malign influence which wrought Mr. Van Buren’s overthrow in the convention being now triumphant …menaces the country,” the National Intelligencer warned.131 “The acquisition of

Texas and Mexico,” William Simms believed, “secures the perpetuation of slavery for a thousand years.”132

Though Polk did not deliberately seek to promote sectional tensions, memories of the

1844 Presidential campaign and suspicions of the President’s policies persisted. Throughout the first months of his term, Polk focused on a few primary goals. He used the military to establish

129 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs XII, 110; Holt, Rise and Fall, 194-209; Remini, Clay, 642-667; Merry, Vast Designs, 96-111; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 571-57; Sellers, Market Revolution, 414-417; 130 Lewis Cass to Hobart, March 1, 1845, Lewis Cass Papers (Ann Arbor: William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan) 131 National Intelligencer, November 11, 1844 (Washington: Library of Congress). 132 William G. Simms to James H. Hammond, July 14, 1847, Mary C. Oliphant (ed.), The Letters of William Gilmore Simms, 2, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1952) 330-333; Merry, Vast Designs, 112-144; Styron, Cast Iron Man, 267-269; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 579-581; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 698.

82 his territorial claims and provoke Mexico. The first Congressional session of Polk’s administration was a series of legislative triumphs. One month after taking office, he abrogated the Oregon treaty with Great Britain in an effort to force a settlement of the border dispute.

Daniel Dickinson spoke for the Northern Democracy when he argued that “we have a right to

Oregon, if our right embraces the whole, shall we not claim the whole?”133 On June 15, 1845,

Polk reached agreement with Britain that divided Oregon at the 49th Parallel. While the treaty was approved with bipartisan support in June 1846, in private Northern Democrats were enraged.

The Southern President who was proving so resolute on Texas and Mexico had proven to be much more accommodating when Northern interests were at stake. The positioning of General

Zachary Taylor’s army in disputed territory of what Donald Fehrenbacher has termed Texas’

“extreme proslavery boundary claim” in October made Polk’s intentions toward Mexico clear.134

Whigs immediately criticized the President for his haste and aggression. Why, asked John

Crittenden, “pluck that fruit green today which tomorrow will fall ripe into your hand?”135 Anti- slavery Northern Whigs denounced Polk and his Democratic allies as agents of the Slave Power using the army to achieve the exclusive ends of the planter class. In response to these assaults,

Northern Democrats could do little but support the administration in the crisis. Among themselves, they seethed at Polk’s duplicity and were stung by the Whig’s attacks. Outbreak of

133 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress 1 Sess. 443-448. 134 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 267. 135 Congressional Globe Appendix, 29 Cong. 1 Sess. 842-47.

83 war with Mexico achieved the final part of Polk’s plan, but left Northern Democrats further exposed to Whig attacks of a sectional nature.136

Polk did not recognize the role that slavery was playing in the breakdown of his party.

“Slavery…has…no legitimate connection with the War with Mexico,” he asserted.137 While

Polk clearly believed this to be true, numerous Northern Democrats and most Northern Whigs disagreed. “The charge was iterated and reiterated,” Democratic Congressmen Martin Groves reported, “that the war was undertaken on the part of the Administration…for the purpose of extending the area of slavery.”138 By failing to recognize the sectional and ideological dimensions of opposition to his war policy, Polk allowed sectional tensions to fester. He ascribed this new opposition to personal ambition, vanity and duplicity. “In the midst of these factions of the Democratic Party,” Polk lamented to his diary, “I am left without any certain and reliable supporters in Congress.”139 Northern Democrats were beleaguered and divided. “Every mail we receive from the north,” the Washington Union complained, “brings new and stronger proof of the breadth and strength of the Whig movement toward abolition.”140 Polk had won his great victory, but, as Sellers argues, “put the Republic irreversibly on the road to Civil War.”141

136 Merry, Vast Designs, 131-252; Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor Vol. 2; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 719; Henry Harrison Sims, The Life of Robert M.T. Hunter (Richmond: William Byrd Press, 1935), 53-55; Cole, Martin Van Buren, 399-403; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 594-596. 137 James K. Polk, Diary. Vol. II, 305. 138 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 2nd Session, 136. 139 James Knox Polk, April 4, 1846, James K. Polk, The Diary of James K. Polk During his Presidency 1845-1849 (Chicago: A.C. McClurb, 1910) 265. 140 Washington Union, October 10, 1846. 141 Sellers, Market Revolution, 425; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 749; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor Vol. 1, 217- 226; Merry, Vast Designs, 268-277.

The transformational nationalist conviction that the slave power was ascendant and that

James Polk was its leading representative had spread to encompass members of the President’s own party. There was little in David Wilmot’s background to suggest that he would be the author of one of the most famous and consequential pieces of failed legislation in American history. If the 32-year-old freshman Congressman from Pennsylvania had any distinction, it was that even among his fellow Northern Democrats Wilmot’s seat was particularly vulnerable.

Wilmot had been a supporter of Polk, going so far as to cast the only vote from the Pennsylvania delegation in favor of the President’s tariff revision, an unpopular stance in pro-protection

Pennsylvania. Wilmot, Jacob Brinkerhoff (D-OH), Preston King (D-NY) and other New York

Barnburners determined that the war funding bill that would soon come before the House would provide a perfect opportunity to distance themselves from Polk. Together they crafted an amendment that would proscribe the introduction of slavery into any territory acquired from

Mexico. They determined that the first who had the opportunity to speak would introduce it. In

August 1846, Polk’s appropriations bill reached the floor to debate. In response to a taunting speech by Hugh White (W-NY), which challenged the Democrats to prove that the war was not being fought to expand slavery by barring it from any territory acquired,142 Wilmot was given the floor and introduced the amendment, which required that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory, except for crime.” The implications of the

142 The serendipity of White’s call for the Democrats to introduce a bill essentially identical to the Proviso immediately before Wilmot introduced the amendment begs the question of collusion, but no evidence that White coordinated his speech with the Democratic apostates has been found.

85 proviso were simple, clear and unambiguous—the extension of slavery in the United States would be ended in the absence of further expansion.143

The thinking that underlay the Wilmot Proviso illustrates the degree to which transformational nationalism was predicated on the question of national identity and the distribution of power. While Wilmot’s proposal was unambiguously anti-slavery, Wilmot himself was no abolitionist. As he explained later, Wilmot did not introduce the Proviso in an effort to benefit slaves. Rather, he wanted to ensure that “white labor…can live without the disgrace which association with negro slavery brings upon free labor.”144 Wilmot’s views on race were neither more nor less enlightened than most Northerners. Wilmot justified the restriction of slavery in Jeffersonian terms. Because Mexico had abolished slavery, any Mexican territory acquired was currently free soil. If slavery was indeed a burden, as a dwindling number of Southerners still claimed, then surely it would be an error to introduce the institution to territory where it did not presently exist. “If free territory comes in,” he argued, “God forbid that

I shall be the means of planting this institution upon it.”145 The Wilmot Proviso said nothing about slavery in the South. It threatened the future of slavery (and, many Southerners would argue, affronted the South’s honor) without ever implying any impact upon the South itself.

What it would accomplish in concrete political terms was a gradual shift in the composition of the Senate to a free-state majority. The impact of the Wilmot Proviso in Congress was

143 Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 767-768; Earle, Jacksonian Anti-slavery, 123-143; Wilentz, Rise, 596-601; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 458-462; Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000) 134-161; Eric Foner, “The Wilmot Proviso Revisited,” The Journal of American History 56, no. 2 (Sep. 1969): 262-279. 145 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Sess. 1217.

86 immediate and profound. Among Democrats, it had the intended effect of embarrassing the Polk administration and in drawing a distinct line between the Northern Democratic anti-slavery faction and Southern Democrats and Northern conservatives. Ex-President John Tyler ably captured the sentiment of Southern sectionalists, stating that “the Wilmot Proviso is…nothing less than a gratuitous insult on the slave-states.” “It seeks to stamp upon the records of the country an anathema and an edict that is unnecessary and wanton,” he complained.146 While most Southern politicians considered the expansion of slavery into the Mexican Cession unlikely, it was the perceived insult of being banned from commonly held territory that was the immediate concern. In addition to the abstract question of Southern honor at stake in any territorial slavery ban, the Wilmot Proviso also threatened to expressly define slavery through federal action as not constituting a part of the America’s future identity. At the same time, the

Proviso comported with the traditional idea that local communities should be able to govern their own affairs. Slavery was illegal in Mexico, and as a result was already illegal in any territories acquired from it. Even a slaveholder like Thomas Hart Benton could find the introduction of slavery there objectionable. “I will not engage in schemes for extensions into regions…where a slave’s face was never seen,” he warned.147 The primary impact of the Proviso was to provide an issue around which Southern and transformational nationalists could draw lines to the detriment of Unionists. “The Whigs of the South will not sustain any man in favor of the Proviso,”

Thomas Corwin warned John Crittenden, and “the Whigs of the North will not vote for any man who is opposed to it.” While Corwin believed that “taking early and strong ground against any

146 Anonymous (John Tyler) to the Portsmouth Pilot, Letters and Times of the Tylers. Vol. II, 478. 147 Congressional Globe Appendix, 28th Congress, 1st Session, 474-486.

87 further acquisition”148 would mitigate the conflict, he underestimated the impact on Southern honor the Proviso had affected. It was one thing for slavery to be excluded from territory by climate, geography, or the organic development of the community. It was another thing entirely for the Congress to proactively bar slavery from national territory seized with Southern blood and treasure. Practically, there was no difference between exclusion via geography and exclusion via legislation. In the world of ideals, however, the difference was vast. For his part,

Calhoun believed that “if the South acts as it ought, the Wilmot Proviso instead of proving to be the means of successfully assailing us and our peculiar institution, may be the occasion of…enabling us to force the issue on the North.”149

With the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, Congress transformed almost instantly from a two-party dominated legislature to an essentially four-party150 pattern that would hold for territorial debates through 1860. While a similar breakdown had occurred on previous occasions, including during the 1840 debate over the imposition of a new gag rule, the frequent division of the Northern Democracy into pro- and anti-slavery factions precluded deadlock.151

Northern Whigs in general were strongly anti-slavery, and were frequently joined by Liberty

Party/Free Soil representatives. Northern Democrats were divided between anti-slavery and conservative factions, with the anti-slavery group frequently voting with the Whigs and, over

148 Thomas Corwin to John J. Crittenden, September 9, 1847, Thomas Corwin Papers, Ohio Historical Society. 149 Quoted in Bartlett, Calhoun. 337; Holt, Rise and Fall, 250-255; Wilentz, Rise, 598-601; Freehling, Road to Disunion Vol. 1, 461; Potter, Impending Crisis, 51-62. 150 The sectional voting blocs in each Party would correspond closely to the support for the four-way election of 1860 with Northern Democrats (Douglas), Southern Democrats (Breckenridge), Northern Whigs/Republicans (Lincoln), and Southern Whigs/Southern Know Nothings/Constitutional Union (Bell) supporters remaining surprisingly consistent throughout the sectional crisis from 1846 through 1860. 151 Richard, Slave Power, 138-139.

88 time, defecting to anti-slavery parties. Conservative Northern Democrats walked a fine line between supporting their section and attempting to maintain relations with their Southern allies.

Southern Whigs were also moderate, but opposed the Wilmot Proviso and generally supported any scheme that would remove the proviso from politics. Occupying the opposite sectional pole from the Northern Whigs were the Southern Democrats, who strongly favored annexation and opposed the Proviso. While some diversity of opinion existed within each caucus, two general dynamics held. Whigs hoped that the Proviso’s “chief value was in creating an interest North and South against extending our territory,” and that they would reap the benefit of the “No

Territory” stance in 1848. For the Democrats, on the other hand, the Proviso underscored the party’s basic problem—that there was almost no course the party could pursue that would reconcile its warring factions. Any determination on the Proviso would deeply offend a

Democratic constituency. Once the Proviso had been introduced, the Democrats were irreconcilably divided on principles which would require ideological gymnastics to overcome.152

Democratic divisions between Unionists, Southern nationalists and transformational nationalists profoundly impacted the 1848 elections. Transformational nationalist Northern

Democrats had planned to nominate popular ex-Governor Silas Wright for President, but Wright died before the convention. Unionist Lewis Cass, the eventual Democratic nominee, endorsed a new solution. He adopted an idea from his Senate colleague Daniel Dickinson (D-NY). This solution, squatter (or popular) sovereignty, removed the question of slavery expansion by relegating slavery to the purview of the territorial legislatures. This approach was appealing to

152 Holt, Fate of Their Country, 20-49; Potter, Impending Crisis, 63-89; Holt, Rise and Fall, 250-255.

Democrats in both sections. Not only did it avoid the Wilmot Proviso, but did so based upon the

Jacksonian principle of popular rule. As his most recent biographer noted, “Cass was willing to compromise on slavery because he viewed it as a constitutional—not a moral—problem.”153

Anti-slavery Northerners, led by the Barnburners, refused to accept Cass and bolted the party.

“To hold a human being in bondage was and must be repugnant,” Martin Van Buren’s son John declared.154 With the alliance of Southern Democrats and Northern conservatives that had elected Polk still in the ascendency, the dissident Democrats strengthened their ties to the Liberty

Party. In the absence of a viable national candidate, many Northern leaders looked to Van Buren to provide the ticket a boost. “You sir,” David Wilmot wrote to Van Buren, “are the only man left to us in the North, to whom we can look for advice.”155 “Free labor and slave labor,” the venerable ex-President declared in a public letter to his son, “cannot flourish under the same laws.”156 With this declaration of principles,157 Martin Van Buren immediately became the most available nominee of the Liberty/Barnburner alliance that would soon be dubbed the “Free Soil

Party.” As Daniel Walker Howe observed, “the person who legitimated political partisanship at a time when all conventional wisdom condemned it and the one who had done more than anyone else to create the national Democratic Party, now led a revolt against that party.”158 President

153 Willard Carl Klunder, Lewis Cass and the Politics of Moderation (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996), 163- 173. 154 Oliver Cromwell Gardner, The Great Issue, “Sketch of the Remarks of John Van Buren,” (NY: W.C. Bryant & Co. 1848), 64. 155 David Wilmot to Martin Van Buren, October 6, 1847, Martin Van Buren Papers, New York Public Library, New York. 156 Martin Van Buren to John Van Buren, May 3, 1848, Martin Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress, Washington. 157 Samuel J. Tilden assisted the ex-President in drafting what would soon be known as the “Barnburner Manifesto.” 158 Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought, p. 832.

Polk was apoplectic. He considered Van Buren’s course to be “selfish, unpatriotic, and wholly inexcusable,” and considered the Free Soil movement to be a “dangerous attempt to organize

Geographical parties upon the slave question.159 Whigs were generally amused by his shift.

“The leader of the Free Spoil Party” had become the leader of the Free Soil Party, Daniel

Webster chuckled.160 While Van Buren’s public avowal of anti-slavery represented a shift in his public sentiment, his motivations were more straightforward and consistent. He was loyal first and foremost to his New York political allies. Regardless of his motivations, however, his candidacy legitimized the Free Soil Party and brought voters to their ticket that no other candidate could provide. As Charles Sumner noted, “with him we can beat the slavepower; that is our first aim.”161

Southern nationalists, for their part, were equally uncompromising. John C. Calhoun considered the conflict over the Mexican territories to be the decisive moment in sectional conflict. “You will see that I have made up the issue between North and South,” he declared, “if we flinch, we are gone.”162 “Putting aside all minor divisions,” Calhoun argued, “the South should unite as one man” to defend slavery.163 Expansion had provided the South with an opportunity to maintain parity with the North in the Senate. However, the resultant controversy

159 Polk, Diary, Vol. II, 502. 160 Speech, September 1, 1848, Writings and Speeches, Vol. XVI, 123-129. 161 Edward Lillie Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner. Vol. 3 (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1893), 168-170; Bruce Levine, Half Slave and Half Free (NY: Hill and Wang, 1992), 178-186; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 615; Earle, Jacksonian Anti-slavery, 154-172; Foner, Free Soil, 149-155; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 829-832; Donald Cole, Martin Van Buren and the American Political System (Princeton, 1984), 410-417; Schlesinger Jr. Age of Jackson, 464-465; Dickinson, Speeches…of…Dickinson, 337-339; Klunder, Lewis Cass and the Politics of Moderation (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996) 168. 162 Charles W. Morrison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso Controversy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 35. 163 Quoted in Watson, Liberty and Power, 250.

91 had pressed Southern assumptions and prejudices to the ultimate test. As Richards noted,

“Southern Democrats during the 1840s lost the hard core of their original doughface support,” and the rise of the anti-slavery Democracy and divisions among Northern Democrats made it difficult for Southern sectionalists to maintain Northern alliances.164 Sectionalist leaders assumed that Northerners would be unable and unwilling to match Southern commitment to slavery expansion, as Northern economic interests could be expected to trump their opposition to slavery. As Eugene Genovese has noted, “an assumption that dollars and cents would ultimately determine the course of the North had become common fare in the South.”165 Calhoun and those who were more radical than him believed that if they could maintain unity in the face of

Northern anti-slavery, interests would trump principles and the Mexican Cession would be open to slavery. It was a gamble that they believed they could win. It was also a gamble that

Southern Whigs were unwilling to take.166

Whigs were also divided in the wake of the Mexican Cession, but despite the strength of transformational nationalism among its Northern members, Unionists dominated their

Presidential campaign. The Mexican Cession killed “No Territory” as a viable solution to the controversy, and Whig divisions largely involved developing a policy to confront the controversy. “The Whigs must succeed,” influential Senator Truman Smith explained, “or all of the evils of this war will be brought on the country.” “To do so, we must have the proper

164 Richards, Slave Power, 159. 165 Eugene Genovese, The Slaveholders Dilemma (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 102. 166 Styron, Cast Iron Man, 273-277, 325-336; Joel Silby, The American Political Nation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 85-86.

92 candidate,” he lamented, “who shall he be?”167 On the question of the future of slavery in the

Union, the leading Whig candidates were nearly indistinguishable. All Whigs born in the slave states, they agreed that slavery expansion into the Mexican Cession was unlikely and not particularly desirable, but they considered the Wilmot Proviso to be an affront to the South’s honor that must be avoided or deterred. The Whig contest focused more on the candidates and their electability than their principles. Zachary Taylor’s candidacy attracted support from party bosses and up-and-coming Whig politicians who were tired of losing elections. Henry Clay still hungered for the Presidency, and still could count on the support of ultra Whigs and a network of friends and supporters (and enemies) throughout the country.168 A number of powerful Northern political insiders like Truman Smith (CT) and Southern leaders like John J. Crittenden (KY),

John Clayton (DE) and John Bell (TN) supported Taylor, providing organizational skill and a national network of allies.169 Taylor, however, was widely suspected by many Whigs. His main asset—his ability to stand above politics and attract votes from Democrats as well as Whigs— made many Whigs suspicious of his intentions. Their fears were well-placed, as Taylor preferred to run on his own reputation as the candidate of “no party.” However, the Taylor campaign—led primarily by Crittenden, Clayton and Smith—maintained good relations with the supporters of other anti-Clay candidates, particularly the New York Whig machine of Thurlow Weed and

167 Truman Smith to William C. Rives, October 18, 1847, Rives Papers (Washington: Library of Congress). 168 Holt, Rise and Fall, 259-275. Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 827-829. Glyndon Van Deusen, Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947) 154-170. 169 As Michael Holt rightly noted, Smith was a particularly influential Whig leader, serving as what would be considered today to be the campaign chairman, he coordinated with Whig candidates across the country in defining campaign messages, recruiting candidates and securing resources. Smith’s support for Taylor had vastly more wide-ranging implications than Smith’s low public profile, then and now, would imply.

William H. Seward. Because Crittenden was so closely associated with Clay, his efforts on

Taylor’s behalf were particularly effective, and Crittenden emerged as the primary leader of the

Taylor movement.170

At first, Clay intended to declaim interest in the nomination, hoping instead that his allies could secure a draft. Shocked at the level of opposition he discovered, and enraged when a number of men whom had frequently expressed their support and admiration of him in letters turned against him, he soon abandoned this course. Of immediate consequence was Taylor’s unwillingness to withdraw in favor of Clay. Of greater personal significance were Crittenden’s efforts on behalf of the Hero of Buena Vista. 171 So great was Crittenden’s influence among

Congressional Whigs that Robert Toombs believed the Presidential nomination “in his grasp” if he wanted it.172 Crittenden was a national leader of surprisingly limited ambition, however.173

Crittenden demonstrated the extent of his influence by denying Clay the endorsement of the

Whig Party of Kentucky, but it came at the cost of nomination for Governor against his wishes.

As his Party’s gubernatorial candidate, Crittenden felt obligated to refuse serving either as a cabinet officer or legislative leader in any Taylor administration, and his election would necessitate the selection of a new Senator to serve the remainder of Crittenden’s term. While

Crittenden remained the preeminent leader of the Taylor forces during the campaign, his

170 Potter, Impending Crisis, 1-17; Van Deusen, Thurlow Weed, 156-161; Morrison, Slavery and the American West, 64-95; Holt, Rise and Fall, 269-275. 171 Remini, Clay, 687-713; Heidler and Heidler, Clay, 418-444; Holt, Rise and Fall, 259-283 172 Ulich B. Phillips, Correspondence of Tombs, Stephens and Cobb, American Historical Association Annual Report 1911, 2, 165. 173 Crittenden would continue to refuse to be a candidate for the Presidency through the 1850s, culminating in a final refusal to serve as the Constitutional Union candidate for President in 1860 to attempt to broker a final sectional settlement.

94 influence would increasingly need to be coordinated with allies at Washington, particularly John

Clayton. Concerns about Clay’s electability sunk the Kentuckian’s chances, and the Clay and

Scott forces were never able to join forces to prevent Taylor’s nomination. As Glyndon Van

Deusen notes, Taylor’s nomination over Clay was “evidence of the power of the Whig politicians,” who broke with the Whig’s most prominent leader in an effort to ensure electoral victory. Although Clay furiously refused to endorse Taylor and all but openly denounced his party’s nominee, most of his partisans campaigned for the General. Taylor was paired with conservative former Speaker of the House Millard Fillmore (W-NY), whom Southern Democrats managed to convince themselves was a closet abolitionist. 174

With the nominations of Taylor, Cass and Van Buren, a deeply divided Democracy faced a weakly divided Whiggery. Like the concurrent political crises in Europe in 1848, the outcome of the election would yield a mixed verdict. Zachary Taylor was narrowly elected President, but the election demonstrated that the electorate was badly divided. The victorious Whigs held a majority in neither house of Congress, with Democrats controlling 33 of 60 Senate seats175 and neither party commanding a majority in the House. What was clear was that factors aside from pure party considerations would be the organizing principle. With a “no party” President in the

174 Albert D. Kirwan, John J. Crittenden (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), 183-223; Joseph G. Rayback, “Who Wrote the Allison Letters: A Study in Historical Detection,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 36, no. 1 (Jun. 1949): 51-72; Malcolm C. McMillan, “Joseph Glover Baldwin Reports on the Whig National Convention of 1848,” The Journal of Southern History 25, no. 3 (August 1959): 366-382. 175 Four Senate seats would turn over during the course of the session, and two Senators (both Democrats) would join the Senate following California’s admission as a state. The number of Senators present in Washington at any given point during the debate varied.

White House, and a Congress where party discipline was limited, the political crisis of the 1840s had resulted in a political order where Party unity was weaker than any point since 1819.176

Would the new leadership in Washington prove capable of resolving the crisis? The

American political order had successfully navigate a series of sectional shocks between 1784 and

1841. Between 1784 and 1819, politicians had established a national territorial policy that either restricted slavery expansion or had remained silent, but the national government had not expressly promoted slavery expansion. The Missouri Compromise established a new territorial policy that also restricted slavery in the territories, but within defined geographic limits. This settlement, along with James Monroe’s promotion of national consolidation and the adoption by the leaders of the Republican’s successor political parties promoted stability following 1819.

While the emergence of sectional and transformational nationalism contested the Unionist order and caused periodic controversies (nullification, the gag rule, abolitionist mails), their influence was checked by the partisan order and confined to the fringes of the national political mainstream. Three shocks during the 1840s, however, had destroyed the Unionist consensus and brought on a new and more profound territorial crisis. First, the ascent to the Presidency of John

Tyler, a Southern nationalist unbound by party loyalty, allowed Southern nationalism to define political debates, use the national government to pursue sectional ends and empower radicals in both sections to challenge the Unionist consensus. Tyler’s influence extended into the

176 Cole, Martin Van Buren, 417-419; Holt, Rise and Fall, 331-382; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 475-479; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 628-632; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 827-836; Mike Rappaport, 1848: Year of Revolution (NY: Basic Books, 2008); Sándor Szilassy, “America and the Hungarian Revolution of 1848- 49,” The Slavonic and East European Review 44, no. 102 (Jan. 1966): 180-196; Timothy M. Roberts, “’Revolutions Have Become the Bloody Tax of the Multitudes,’” Journal of the Early Republic 25 (Summer, 2005): 259-283.

Presidency of his successor, James Polk, whose expansionist policies and unwillingness to confront the sectional nature of the controversy exacerbated Northern frustration and drove

Northern politicians to take further steps to demonstrate their sectional bona fides. Finally, the introduction of the nakedly sectionalist Wilmot Proviso provided an issue which could inflame moderates in both section and around which radicals in both sections could mobilize. With a large contingent of sectional and Transformational nationalists elected to the next Congress, it was at best unclear whether a Unionist consensus could be restored.

Despite the President’s weak mandate, however, the new administration enjoyed some advantages. Taylor was personally popular. His identity as a patriot and a slaveholder allowed him certain latitude in the South that no Northerner could expect. Both parties had committed, explicitly in the case of the Democrats and implicitly in the case of the Whigs, to the concept of popular sovereignty. With the rejection of both Free Soil and secession, the electorate had committed itself to a moderate settlement of the territorial issue. Although the Whigs controlled neither house of Congress, Taylor’s strategists believed that they could settle the territorial conflict along the lines of the Clayton Compromise and secure support from moderates of both parties, building the foundations of a restoration of the Monrovian political order. Taylor and his allies were convinced that slavery would ever take root in the Southwest, and was willing to concede a limit to slavery expansion there in fact, though not in theory. “No man of ordinary capacity can believe,” he wrote his former son-in-law, Jefferson Davis (D-MS), that Congress

“will ever permit a state to be made from [the Mexican Cession] to enter our Union with the

97 features of slavery connected to it.”177 If Taylor could affect a settlement of the territories, his popularity would make him unassailable and put an end to the age of Tyler. He and his friends and allies would reap the political rewards. As Democrats, particularly in the North, were committed to settlement at almost any price, Taylor’s allies had reasons for optimism that they could achieve their goals. Their biggest concern was the attitude of the new Senator elected by the Kentucky legislature to replace Crittenden. Henry Clay was returning to Washington.

Kentucky Whigs elected Clay as the statesman most likely to forge a new sectional settlement as he had done in 1819 and 1833. Taylor allies like Robert Toombs feared that Clay was returning to “rule or ruin the party” as he had done during the Monroe and Tyler administration.178 For his part, Taylor remained committed to acting as “the President of the nation & not of a party,” and to bring change to Washington under the banner of a new “Taylor Republican” movement.179

With the Presidency under the control of Southern Whigs Zachary Taylor, John Crittenden and

John Clayton, that faction would have the first chance to settle the sectional controversy. With success, they would restore the political order of Monrovian America and forge a new national consensus around the hero of Buena Vista. With the ascent of Taylor, the President’s allies could consider the sectional situation to be serious, but not hopeless. They were confident that they could settle the territorial issue and restore sectional peace. Taylor, Crittenden and Clayton, slave state Unionists of the Monroe school, would seek to settle the crisis in the same manner

177 Quoted in Hamilton, Zachary Taylor, Vol. 2, 45. 178 Toombs to James Thomas, May 1, 1848, Phillips [ed.], Correspondence of Cobb, Toombs and Stephens, 103- 106. 179 Louisianan Taylor and Virginian Winfield Scott would be the last nominees of the Whig party, while Michigander Lewis Cass, New Hampshire’s Franklin Pierce, and Pennsylvania’s James Buchanan would be the Democratic nominees in 1848, 1852, and 1856.

98 that the Northwest Ordinance and Missouri Compromise had done previously. The Mexican

Cession would be admitted as it was, with no insult to the institution of slavery but with the expectation that slavery would one day fade away. This time, however, three alternative visions would contest this approach. Southern sectionalists sought slavery expansion toward the end of indefinite perpetuation. Northern transformational nationalists promoted slavery restriction as a step toward putting slavery on the path to incremental extinction. Finally, Democrats in the

North through popular sovereignty promoted a new Unionist policy prescription that sought to redefine how slavery related to the political order. While Taylor and his allies bet that patriotism and statesmanship could restore the old Unionist consensus, it was unclear as the Thirty-First

Congress met in December 1849 whether Unionism could continue to dominate. 180

180 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 76-117, 149-161; Heidler and Heidler, Clay, 453-455; Remini, Clay, 716-717; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 633-636.

Between Scylla and Charybdis

“I thought I could steer between Scylla and Charybdis; and if I did, I am gratified. —Daniel Dickinson, August 22, 1849.1

Triumphant Whigs viewed the ascent of Zachary Taylor to the Presidency as an opportunity to resolve the sectional controversy and resurrect their party following eight years of sectional and intra-party strife. While Taylor’s “no party” reputation and risk-averse campaign left great ambiguity as to where the new President stood on crucial issues, two points were clear.

First, Taylor was deeply and clearly Unionist. He brooked no talk of secession, and made clear his view that the Union of states was inviolable. Secondly, as a slaveholder himself, he could be expected to oppose any initiative that threatened slavery in the South. Despite Taylor’s victory, however, the composition of the Congress did not reflect any clear preference by voters of how the territorial issue should be resolved. Neither party constituted a majority of the House, which was skewed heavily in favor of the North. Democrats dominated the sectionally balanced

Senate. Furthermore, each partisan and sectional caucus was divided into factions differing from each other in political interests and ideologies. As a result, no single party, section, or faction was positioned to impose a settlement of the territorial question, and the ability of each to maintain cohesion and build cross-sectional and bipartisan alliances. However, the composition, ideology and cohesion of each of these factions impacted its ability to influence the debate.

Taylor and his advisors came to office with a plan for settling the controversy, but without a

Congressional majority he would need the support—or at least the acquiescence—of some

1 Dickinson to Mr. Croswell, August 22, 1849, John R. Dickinson (ed.), Speeches Correspondence Etc. of the Late Daniel S. Dickinson of New York (NY: G.P. Putnam and Son, 1867) 414. 99 100 combination of Democrats and unfriendly Whigs to make it law. Understanding the composition and desires of the Congressional factions was essential to defining the range of possibilities for a settlement.1

“The session will be one of great excitement and confusion,” John C. Calhoun predicted to his son.2 Under the most favorable of circumstances, it was always challenging to forge consensus among the outsized personalities and egos of the Congress. As it happened, the

Thirty-First was hardly an average Congress. In the Senate, Calhoun, Webster, Clay and their bête noir Benton—the most dominant legislators of the last 25 years—were joined by skillful elder statesmen Lewis Cass, Daniel Dickinson, Henry Foote, Willie Mangum, Samuel Houston,

John Bell, and John Berrien. Younger Senators Jefferson Davis, William H. Seward, Hannibal

Hamlin, Stephen Douglas, and Salmon P. Chase sought to establish national reputations through their efforts and oratory. While the House leadership was not as distinguished as that of the

Senate, there were no shortage of luminaries present there as well. Andrew Johnson, Robert

Toombs, Thaddeus Stevens, Joshua Giddings and Alexander Stephens would achieve prominence on the national stage within and outside of the House. With so many strong personalities, the maintenance of order in Congress would be difficult in the best of times and under the strongest of leaders. The Thirty-First Congress, however, was particularly chaotic.

The body held 117 freshman Congressmen, 44 percent of whom were fated to not return to the

1 Hamilton, Zachary Taylo., Vol. 2, 13-148. Holt, Rise and Fall, 284-390; Brian G. Waldron, “The Elections for the Thirtieth Congress and the Presidential Candidacy of Zachary Taylor,” The Journal of Southern History 35, no. 2 (May, 1969): 186-202. 2 Calhoun to Andrew Pickens Calhoun, December 2, 1849, Calhoun Paper., Vol. 27, 126.

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32nd Congress. As Congress convened on December 3, 1849, it was instantly apparent that no one would be able to impose their will on the fractious body.3

In order to understand the extent of the challenge that leaders faced in developing any settlement, it is essential to understand the breadth and depth of the ideological and personal differences that fractured official Washington. Both major parties were divided by section, both sections were divided by party, and all of these groupings were further segmented into factions for reasons both profound and mundane. These factions defy easy categorization, and as a result will be examined here in terms of their ideological orientations and goals, and by those personal rivalries that contributed to the debates that followed. We will also examine the efforts of the

Taylor administration to simultaneously devise a territorial settlement prior to the opening of the

Thirty-First Congress and its attempt at reconstructing the Whig Party around the General, an effort that undermined its efforts to craft a Congressional majority around its settlement plan.4

The defining characteristic of the Thirty-First Congress was the balance of its divisions.

In the Senate 33 Democrats enjoyed a solid majority over 25 Whigs and 2 Free Soilers. The sections were equally balanced with 30 Senators per section. Every member of the Senate held a potentially crucial vote on the adoption of any measure.5 While Democrats held a narrow majority in the Senate, no party could claim a majority in the House. Democrats constituted a plurality of 107 members of the House opposed by 100 Whigs, 12 Free Soilers and 1 American

3 Holt, Rise and Fall, 385-390. 4 Hamilton, Prologue, 38; Holt, Rise and Fall, 466-469, Stegmaier, 325-330. 5 Mark Stegmaier assesses the Senate as being composed of 31 generally pro-compromise members arrayed against 30 generally anti-compromise members. However, he includes the two California Senators, who were not present at the outset of the debate, which explains the discrepancy in the numbers seen above. Stegmaier, 327-329.

102 party member. While the Northern representatives outnumbered Southerners 134-85, House members would prove to be less ideological and more accommodating than their Senate counterparts. With both houses of Congress so closely divided, the acquiescence of influential members in any settlement scheme was crucial.6

Although the Thirty-First Congress was composed of a confusing web of personal and ideological factions, on the territorial question the members of Congress functioned within the confines of three dimensions. In his groundbreaking analysis of the debates, Holman Hamilton demonstrated that sectional cohesion was limited. Party affiliation mattered as well. During the debates over the Compromise of 1850, Congress broke into what was essentially four competing blocs identified by their section and partisan affiliation. Northern Whigs and Northern

Democrats behaved differently from each other, and from their Party comrades from the South.

Mark Stegmaier deepened this analysis by demonstrating that each of these voting blocs differed in its cohesiveness during the debate, with Southern Democrats least and Northern Whigs the most cohesive factions on critical issues. As a result of the analyses, the dynamism of the

Thirty-First Congress has become clear, though the reasons for the varying cohesiveness of the partisan/sectional voting blocs remains obscure.7

Nationalism provides an answer for explaining differences within each partisan/sectional voting bloc. While each of the voting blocs identified by Hamilton and Stegmaier were uniform in section and party, they were diverse in nationalist ideology. Unionists, Southern nationalists

6 Stegmaier considers 116 House members pro-compromise, with 103 members anti-compromise. Stegmaier, 325- 330. 7 Stegmaier, 325-330; Hamilton, Prologue, 191-200.

103 and transformational nationalists existed within each party, and the predominance of an ideology among the members of a sectional/partisan grouping contributed to that faction’s response to options for settling the crisis. Unionists existed within each of the four party/sectional alignments identified by Hamilton and Stegmaier, and constituted a majority of Northern

Democrats and Southern Whigs. While Unionists in all factions sought the settlement of the territorial problem and the expulsion of the slavery controversy from national politics, they differed widely as to how best to accomplish this. Unionist Whigs, having opposed expansion, sought above else to avoid the Wilmot Proviso and were willing to make concessions to accomplish this. Unionist Democrats, on the other hand, sought to resolve the conflict over slavery by devolving it upon territorial legislatures. It was unclear whether Unionist Whigs could be convinced that popular sovereignty was a viable means to accomplish the common end.

With no consensus on which policy should be implemented to resolve the controversy and deep personal and partisan divisions, Unionists struggled to maintain cohesion in the face of determined opposition. Northern transformational nationalists, on the other hand, were able to maintain cohesion to a greater extent than the other nationalist factions because they engaged the debate with a limited number of clearly defined goals. As Horace Greeley explained, “slavery is not a mere industrial institution in this country….[I]t is a great political machine, whereby the minority in the Republic has long ruled the majority.”8 To remedy this, they sought to undo the sectional balance in the Senate through the admission of California as a state. If, in the process, they could preclude slavery expansion into the Mexican Cession, that would be ideal. While

8 Editorial, New York Tribune, March 9, 1850.

104 transformational nationalists were not a homogenous bloc (the unwillingness of the Free Soilers to cooperate with Northern Whigs during the election of the Speaker of the House would prove a particularly critical moment of discord), their limited and clearly defined goals would allow them an ability to maintain focus that the other nationalist groupings lacked. In addition, transformational nationalists were natural allies with Unionists on the issue of California admission. Southern nationalists were more difficult to specify. Unlike transformational nationalists, Southern nationalists did not come into the Thirty-First Congress with a defined set of policy goals, despite the efforts of Southern leaders like John C. Calhoun and the organizers of the Nashville Convention to accomplish that. In addition, the lines between Southern nationalists and conditional Unionists was often blurred through their use of common ideas and discourse. Despite these challenges, however, the core group of Southern nationalists in

Congress were clear that they considered admission of California as a free state and failure to open the Mexican Cession unacceptable and proved themselves cohesive and effective in organizing themselves to oppose these policies.9

The greatest challenge facing the incoming administration was the deep divisions within the major parties and the lack of consensus among major factional leaders about the goals of a settlement. Most leaders, even among radicals, supported the preservation of a reformed Union over the creation of a new nation. While John C. Calhoun (D-SC), Jefferson Davis (D-MS),

William Seward (W-NY) and Salmon Chase (FS-OH) favored the preservation of the Union in the abstract, they sought the preservation of a Union that was different from the one that existed

9 Fox-Genovese and Genovese, Mind of the Master Class, 243-6, 396-408; Foner, Free Soil, 80; Wilentz, Rise, 429- 433.

105 at that time. Expansion had introduced three critical questions that would need to be addressed, explicitly or implicitly, by any permanent settlement of the controversy. The overarching issue concerned the long-term future of slavery in the United States. The vague notion, embraced by political leaders since the time of the Founders, that the United States would peacefully evolve away from slavery was challenged by the near quintupling of the slave population and by an increasing number of Southern Democrats. While most Northerners—Democrats and Whigs alike—declaimed any intention to interfere with slavery in the South, they did so on the assumption that slavery there would collapse over time. If slavery were to be perpetuated, how would the rights of slaveholders interact with the rights of free labor in commonly held territory?

Which system would predominate? While the Union had so far endured as one country with two systems, could this approach be applied in a single territory? A second central question related to the future of slavery was the long-standing tension over the limits of federal power. While this issue was generally construed in the context of the overall strength of the central government, the question of federal authority was complex. Whigs and Democrats differed on the role of the central government, but attitudes toward federal authority did not determine the response of an individual politician toward the territorial controversy. Alexander Stephens (W-

GA) and John Bell (W-TN), for example, agreed that the federal government had the authority to govern slavery in the territories, but disagreed as to whether such intervention was desirable.

The ability of the political order to settle the territorial controversy was dependent on whether the Mexican Cession represented the apogee of American expansion, and the urgency of the territorial question related directly to issue of the acquisition of additional territory, which Whigs

106 generally opposed. In order to effect an enduring settlement of the crisis, a successful compromise would need to address each of these issues. “Our political affairs [are] in a worse condition since the adoption of the Federal constitution,” President Taylor fretted. “The slave question…if not speedily arrested will lead to great confusion, if not disunion.”10

With control of the Presidency and occupying moderate ground, Southern Whigs had the initiative in determining the terms of a settlement. As John Crittenden recognized, sectional settlement relied on maintaining unity within his faction. “You can not render a greater service,” he warned Clayton, “than by endeavoring to keep all of our friends, especially our Tropical friends, cool on the subject.”11 During the previous session, John Clayton had chaired a committee that had recommended a territorial compromise plan that had allowed the formation of territorial governments for Oregon, California and New Mexico and barred the latter two territories from legislating on slavery, while authorizing any slave brought into those territories to bring suit in federal court to determine whether slavery existed there. The goal of the bill was to avoid the Wilmot Proviso by transferring the slavery issue into the apolitical hands of the

Supreme Court. For his part, Taylor was clear that the question of the expansion of slavery into the territories of the Mexican Cession was of little concern to him. During the campaign, he had stated that “I would not [be elected President] if I could by advocating either the propriety of slavery or abolition; let this vexed question remain where the constitution placed it.”12 He believed firmly that the Union must be maintained, even in the event of Northern provocations.

10 Quoted in Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 51; Holt, Fate of Their Country, 19-49; Hamilton, Prologue, 38; Holt, Rise and Fall, 466-469. 11 Crittenden to Clayton, December 19, 1849, John Clayton Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 12 Quoted in Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 46.

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“So far as slavery is concerned,” he declared, “we of the south must throw ourselves on the constitution & defend our rights under it to the last & when arguments no longer suffice, we will appeal to the sword if necessary.” “I will not,” he stated, “give up the constitution and abandon it because a rent has been made in it, but will stick by it & repair it & nurse it as long as it will hang together.”13 During a tour of the North in August 1849, he was even more blunt. “The people of the North,” he declared, “need have no apprehension of the further extension of slavery.”14

While the “Clayton Compromise” had failed narrowly, leading Unionist Whigs believed that a similarly structured effort could succeed, and that their faction was ideally positioned to lead the effort. Not only were the President and four cabinet members Southern Whigs, but prominent Southern Whigs Henry Clay, Willie Mangum (NC), John Berrien (GA), John Bell,

Robert Toombs (GA) and Alexander Stephens were members of the faction. However, they constituted the smallest of the four partisan/sectional factions in the Congress, with 12 Senators and 27 House members. As Southern Whigs were in general more moderate than their

Democratic counterparts, the passage of any solution to the conflict would require their support to succeed. Although (or because) Southern Whig support was essential to the resolution of the crisis, they were deeply divided. Aside from a handful of sectional radicals among their ranks,

Southern Whigs favored the admission of California but disagreed what, if anything, should be linked to this. They were also deeply divided between those aligned closely with the President and those who were lukewarm or even hostile to the administration. Delaware’s Senators John

13 Ibid. 45. 14 Ibid. 225.

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Wales and Presley Spruance were aligned with John Clayton, and along with Representatives from Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee and Kentucky were largely loyal to the administration.

This group overlapped with and was difficult to distinguish from another faction of Whigs who were dedicated to a compromise settlement of the crisis, but were willing to consider settlements beyond Clayton’s preferred option. Senator John Bell, his allies in Tennessee and Joseph

Underwood (W-KY) followed neither Taylor nor Clay, though they tended more toward the former as the crisis continued. James Pearce (W-MD), though disgruntled with the Taylor cabinet, voted similarly to this faction throughout the crisis. These leaders shared a number of basic principles—including opposition to further expansion, desire to ensure that the settlement reached would permanently resolve the crisis, and opposition to the Wilmot Proviso as an insult to the South.15 They believed that the federal government had the authority to restrict slavery in the territories, and that slavery would fail to take hold in the Mexican Cession due the climate of the southwest. For them, the question over slavery in the territories was an abstraction. Slavery could not exist there, and economic development would eventually result in the peaceful emancipation of slavery at some point in the future anyway. As a result, they generally desired not only to avoid Congressional action on slavery, but also supported a prohibition of action by territorial legislatures on slavery as well.16

Wounds from the Presidential campaign of 1848 were also still fresh among

Congressional Whigs. Even though each of the major Whig Presidential contenders–Taylor,

15 John Wales of Delaware--an abolitionist--was an exception. 16 Charles Grier Sellers, “Who Were the Southern Whigs?,” American Historical Review 59, no. 2 (Jan. 1954): 335- 346; Holt, Rise and Fall, 466-469.

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Clay and Scott–were Southerners by birth, their candidacies had exacerbated deep divisions among Southern Whigs, and partisans of Taylor and Clay in particular harbored grudges. John

Clayton attempted to foster unity by cultivating Clay in Washington, appointing his son as minister to Portugal and engaging the former Secretary of State as an advisor in his son’s negotiations. Nonetheless, Clay remained convinced that Taylor “had been and would be the ruin of the Whigs.”17 Clay was particularly (and justifiably) concerned that Taylor’s “success may lead to the formation of a mere personal party,” which was exactly the intention of Taylor’s closest allies.18 The administration’s mandate had never been strong, and the inevitable conflicts that arose out of patronage questions caused it to begin losing support almost immediately. The question remained whether, given the opportunity, Clay would leverage his political talents, network of allies and reputation as a statesman to hoist the President on the petard of a sectional compromise of his making. “Many of [Clay’s] hollow hearted friends look forward to [his return] with much alarm,” Representative David Outlaw (W-NC) warned, “Mr. Clay is not a man to leave his debts of any sort unpaid.”19

The attitude of other Unionist Whigs was more ambiguous. Willie Mangum, for example, detested the idea of military men serving as President. He had complained in 1848 that he hoped that the Mexican War would not “place any blood-stained laurels in the Executive

17 Quoted in Holt, Rise and Fall, 144. 18 That Clay’s conduct could be interpreted as his seeing the Whigs as his own personal party was lost on the great Kentuckian. 19 David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, January 8, 1849, David Outlaw Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Henry Clay (NY: Random House, 2010); Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay (NY: W.W. Wilson and Company, 1991); Daniel Walker Howe, Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). Michael Holt, Rise and Fall, 414-458.

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Chair,” and Taylor’s election did not change his attitude.20 Rumors had Mangum supporting

Cass, and although Mangum maintained his loyalty to the Party, some were dubious.21 In fact,

Mangum had been advising Crittenden and Clayton, and seems to have personally liked Taylor.

In a long letter to Crittenden, he laid out his attitude toward the administration. “I always told you and Clayton, that I was a better judge of ‘horse-flesh’ and public opinion than either of you,” he warned the Secretary of State, “you (I mean, the administration) are gradually losing power.”

He considered it critical that the Taylor men settle quickly on a civilian successor to Taylor and solve the territorial issue. “Though Gen. Taylor is the best of all of you, he can neither succeed himself, nor can another military man,” Mangum lectured, while “the old pretenders to the crown, are absolutely out of the question.” “Have the California question settled—you have the power to aid in the settlement of it,” he advised Clayton, and “you may be the next President…if not you, the President will be a Democrat.”22 As one of the original Whig leaders, Mangum operated independently of both Taylor and Clay, but supported Clay in favoring a solution that extended beyond the admission of California and New Mexico. Mangum’s seniority and reputation as a statesman should have established him as a central player in the debate, but personal and financial misfortune as well as the serious illness of his wife distracted him.23 Like other Southern Whigs, Clay and Mangum agreed on the need to preserve the Union, avoid the

20 Willie P. Mangum to James F. Simmons, May 11, 1848, The Papers of Willie P. Mangum, V (Raleigh, State Department of Archives and History, 1956), 105. 21 Mangum to John S. Pendleton, August 8, 1848, Mangum Papers, Vol. V, 108-109. 22 Mangum to Clayton, May 1849, Mangum Papers, Vol. V, 151-152. 23 David Outlaw mentions Mangum’s misfortunes repeatedly in letters home to his wife. Outlaw portrays Mangum variously as drunk, bankrupt, and having abandoned his family during the period from 1848-1851.

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Wilmot Proviso, and favored some type of accommodation, though they disagreed in policy terms on what such a settlement would mean.24

While most Southern Whigs where Unionists who favored some type of compromise, some Southern Whig “impracticables” adopted Southern nationalism to greater and lesser degrees. Thomas Clingman (NC) in the House and Jackson Morton (FL) in the Senate were consistently radical. John Berrien (GA), Robert Toombs (GA), and Alexander Stephens (GA) preferred that the Union be preserved, but seemed to view the South as a distinct cultural entity with prerogatives that must be preserved. They believed strongly that the South must be conciliated in exchange for the admission of California. Southern Whigs in general had similar interpretations of the role, powers and privileges of the central government, but this group drew starkly differing implications from the potentials for the exercise of those powers. Mainstream

Southern Whigs viewed slavery in a Monrovian light—they opposed federal interference with slavery in the states where it existed but were largely ambivalent about its expansion. Southern nationalist Whigs, on the other hand, acknowledged the right of the central government to restrict the spread of slavery in the territories, but viewed the application of that right as justification to invoke their ultimate right to revolution. “The Constitution [does] secure and guarantee the rights of the master to his slave in every state or territory of the Union where slavery [is] not prohibited by law,” Alexander Stephens argued, “but it [does] not establish it in any territory or

24 Robert V. Remini, At the Edge of the Precipice (NY: Basic Books, 2010), 37-43; William S. Hoffmann, Willie P. Mangum and the Whig Revival of the Doctrine of Instructions,” The Journal of Southern History 22, No. 3 (August, 1956), 338-354; Thomas E. Jeffrey, “National Issues, Local Interests, and the Transformation of Antebellum North Carolina Politics,” The Journal of Southern History 50, no. 1 (Feb. 1984): 43-74.

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State where it was so prohibited.”25 Southern Whig sectionalists differed from Calhoun and many Southern Democrats in rejecting the argument that the Constitution established slavery throughout the Union.26 At the same time, however, they preferred the same remedy— secession—if California was admitted without recompense to the South. The crucial difference was in how the two groups justified secession. While Southern Democrats viewed secession as the ultimate defense of their Constitutional rights, Southern Whigs viewed secession as expressly extra-Constitutional. “All means consistent with [the Constitution’s] provisions should be exhausted,” Thomas Clingman (W-NC) summarized in words that anticipated William H.

Seward’s higher law argument, “before there should be a recommendation to appeal to our rights above it.”27 If Southern Whig sectionalists resembled their Northern Whig colleagues in their willingness to invoke superior authority to the Constitution, they also shared with them a more pronounced sectionalist identity from mainstream Southern Whigs. “We do not love you, people of the North,” Clingman declared, “well enough to become your slaves.”28 While Toombs and

Stephens resembled Clingman and Morton rhetorically, however, events would demonstrate that the radicalism of the former pair and their allies was more limited than the latter.29

While Southern Whig sectionalists prepared their appeal to the population on the right to revolution, their limited numbers rendered them a tiny, but influential, minority. Toombs had

25 Alexander Stephens to the [Georgia] Federal Union, August 30, 1848, in Ulrich B. Phillips (ed.), The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb (Washington: American Historical Association, 1913), 119. 26 Howe, Political Culture of the American Whigs, 238-261. 27 Thomas L. Clingman to Washington Republic, March 22, 1850. 28 Thomas L. Clingman, Selections from the Speeches and Writings of Hon. Thomas L. Clingman of North Carolina (Raleigh, John Nichols, 1877), 252. 29 Holt, Rise and Fall, 466-470.

113 declared himself to be “a Taylor man without a second choice” during the campaign, and had, with Stephens, been crucial in getting Crawford appointed to the War Department.30 By the end of 1849, however, Toombs and Stephans had turned on the administration. “Public feeling in the

South is much stronger than any of us supposed,” Toombs reported in July, and he and Stephens promptly began distancing themselves from Taylor.31 They blamed their apostasy on the influence of Seward and the (correct) perception that the administration was amenable to the organization of the territories of the Mexican Cession without slavery. Political ambitions and their rivalry with John M. Berrien also played a role. Like Stephens and Toombs, Berrien’s political principles had evolved in an expressly sectionalist direction. Unlike them, Berrien and

Clingman were friendly to Calhoun. Berrien denied being an adherent of the South Carolinian, and his efforts to offer a more moderate version of the eventual Southern address support his contention.32 However, the differences between Berrien and Calhoun were more of flexibility and tone rather than substance. Toombs, on the other hand said of Calhoun that “treachery itself will not treat with him.”33 He and Stephens were equally contemptuous of Clay. “No man in the nation is now more heartily and justly despised by the Whig party…as Mr. Clay,” Toombs claimed.34 For his part, Jackson Morton of Florida dealt with his political problems by becoming a Democrat in all but name. An elector for Taylor in 1848, Morton was elected narrowly by the

Florida state legislature due to Democratic divisions. With political representation in his state

30 Toombs to James Thomas, April 16, 1848, Phillips, Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens Cobb, 104. 31 Toombs to William Ballard Preston, July 18, 1849, Preston Family Papers (Richmond:Virginia Historical Society). 32 John M. Berrien to Hon Mr. Gilmer(Gayle?), Feb 3, 1855, John M. Berrien Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 33 Toombs to Crittenden, September 27, 1848, Phillips, Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 129. 34 Ibid.

114 divided between 22 Democrats and 8 Whigs, he was well aware that he needed to satisfy both parties to remain in power, and voted accordingly. Unlike Toombs and Stephens, who masked

Whig thought with Democratic rhetoric, and Clingman who was a unique party of one, Morton was a Southern Democrat in idea and action during the session.35

Questions over what justified secession divided Southern Democrats as well as Southern

Whigs, though there was less diversity of opinion among them that secession provided an appropriate remedy under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, profound disagreement on what action would justify secession undermined Southern Democratic cohesion. Ideological divisions among Southern Democrats were more subtle, and more blurred in a deliberate effort to foster unity. The sentiments of mainstream Southern Democrats was captured nicely by former

Missouri Senator Thomas Metcalf, who wondered, “is it impossible for the Whigs & Democrats to unite at least sufficiently to put down abolitionism?” “If not,” he concluded, “God help our common country.”36 Despite these efforts to maintain a united front, however, followers of

Calhoun, anti-Calhoun radicals and moderates were distinguished primarily by whether or not they were willing to accept any compromise. Although Calhoun, as always, was an exception because of his unique philosophical approach to the issue, his thinking captured many of the essential ambiguities that confronted Southern Democratic approaches to the crisis. Calhoun saw the territorial crisis as the critical moment in the longer and more important sectional

35 Stegmaier, Texas, NM, 85-86, 330. Thomas P. Govan, “John M. Berrien and the Administration of Andrew Jackson,” The Journal of Southern History 5, no. 4 (Nov. 1939):. 447-467; Hubert A. Doherty, Jr. “Florida and the Crisis of 1850,” The Journal of Southern History 19, no. 1 (Feb. 1953): 32-47. 36 Thomas Metcalf to David R. Atchison, David R. Atchison Papers (Columbia: Missouri Historical Collection)

115 controversy, and believed that Southern unity in the face of the admission of California would determine the fate of the Union. “The South is more united than I ever knew it to be,” he claimed to all who would listen. “The North must give way or there will be a rupture.”37

Calhoun believed that Southern unity against the Wilmot Proviso had provided a unique opportunity to secure a renegotiation of the agreement of Union between the North and South, and secure the rights of slaveholders in perpetuity. Any compromise that failed to secure the rights of slaveholders forever was beside the point. Calhoun was not an immediate disunionist— other members of the Democratic caucus were more radical on secession than he. The Union, he argued, could (and should ) be preserved by granting the South an effective veto over the actions of the federal government, creating a permanent firewall between slavery in the South and the abolitionists of the North. Southern parity in the Senate should be replaced with a new mechanism for sectional parity elsewhere. Unlike many other Southern sectionalists, Calhoun dreaded secession (believing that it would lead to war between the sections and the demise of

Southern liberty) and was lukewarm at best on expansion. He was not a true Southern nationalist, as he did not see the Southern states as a homogenous cultural entity, nor did he see

Southern independence as sufficient protection to slavery. His philosophy was anti-nationalist, rejecting the idea of a national community even among slaveholding states. Instead, he sought what Robert Bonner has termed a “Compound Republic” rather than a national one. While he endorsed peaceful secession as a last resort, his dread of social disorder caused him to prefer a settlement that would preserve the Union on the South’s terms. Nonetheless, Calhoun’s thoughts

37 Clyde N. Wilson and Shirley Bright Cook, The Papers of John C. Calhoun. Vol. 27 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003) 134.

116 reinforced Southern nationalist ends. In the “Southern Address,” the resolution signed by 69 of the 124 Southern Representatives in Congress, Southerners demanded equal access for slaveholders to the Mexican Cession, criticized Northern demands as leading to abolition and racial equality, and declared that the South was justified in using any means to resist. As

Michael Holt has observed, “the address implied that any Southerner who did not unite in defense of slavery was a traitor to section and that secession itself was an appropriate, if ultimate, means to protect the South.”38

Despite Calhoun’s prominence, the number of legislators who followed Calhoun’s lead on policy were very limited. Most Southern legislators accorded him respect, but forged their own course. Like Calhoun, other Southern Democrats recognized that their ability to negotiate a favorable settlement required an unprecedented degree of political unity. “Be not at all uneasy as to our harmonizing hereafter upon every branch of the slavery question,” the decidedly un-

Calhounite Henry Foote (D-MS) promised. “I shall not fail to show…a suitable and just deference for your judgment on the whole subject as our leader in the great contest of principle now in progress,” he pledged.39 Their greatest fear was that Free Soilers would provoke a bidding war between Democrats and Whigs for their support, hardening Northern sectionalism.

Convinced that the South was more united than it ever had been, or would be again, and fearful that the Northern political context would cause Northern unity to strengthen, they considered it

38 Michael A. Holt, Political Crisis of the 1850s, 69; John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 322-341; Bonner, Mastering America, 58-68; Fox-Genovese and Genovese, Mind, 218-220; Styron, Cast Iron Man, 325-358; Theodore R. Marmer, “Anti-Industrialism and the Old South: The Agrarian Perspective of John C. Calhoun,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 9, no. 4 (Jul. 1967): 377-406; Richard C. Rohrs, “American Critics of the French Revolution of 1848,” Journal of the Early Republic 14, no. 3 (Autumn, 1994): 359, 377. 39 Henry S. Foote to John C. Calhoun, October 28, 1849, Calhoun Papers. Vol. 27, 93-94.

117 critical that the South move quickly to extract concessions. 40 Unity of purpose and swiftness of action, Calhounites believed, were critical to securing peace and maintenance of the Union on the slaveholders’ terms.41

Despite Calhoun’s frequent declarations about Southern unity, Southern confidence was not as great as these proclamations would indicate. A bare majority of Southerners in

Washington endorsed Calhoun’s Southern Address, and only two Southern Whigs signed their names to the platform. Former Georgia Senator William Lumpkin summarized these fears in his correspondence with Calhoun. “I have to a great extent lost confidence in the virtue and intelligence of our Southern people,” Lumpkin complained. “I fear they will, for the sake of a few loaves and fishes,” he lamented, “shrink from maintaining their rights and liberties.”42

While Calhounites hoped that Northern economic interests would drive that section to acquiesce in Southern demands, they feared that these same interests could divide the South. That the two leading proponents of territorial settlement—Taylor and Clay—were slaveholders was not lost on them. Stephens’ argument during the 1848 Presidential campaign still held true—“shall it be said that South cannot trust their peculiar interest in the hands of a cotton and sugar planter from

Louisiana?”43 Although they considered Clay to be an abolitionist sympathizer and Taylor “a perfect Automaton in the hands of others,” they recognized that Taylor and Clay’s identities as slaveholders themselves posed an inherent excuse for wavering Southerners to accept a settlement at their hands. After all, would a slaveholder really promote a policy that threatened

40 Calhoun to Foote, August 3, 1849, Calhoun Papers. Vol. 27, 10-11. 41 Freehling, Road to Disunion 1, 479-482; Styron, Cast Iron Man, 325-358. 42 William Lumpkin to John C. Calhoun, John C. Calhoun Papers. Vol. 27, 37-38 43 Stephens to I.W. Harris, February 11, 1848, Alexander Stephens Papers (Washington: Library of Congress)

118 his own wealth and interests? Calhoun and his allies dreaded Southern adoption of another half- measure that would prolong the sectional conflict, sacrifice Southern parity in the Senate and eventually ensure a later confrontation when the South would be in a weaker position to resist.

The Calhounite approach left little room for error. The South must prove sufficiently united and confrontational to convince the North that either acceptance of its demands or peaceful separation must result, but not prove so confrontational that the North would resort to arms, consider Northern rights to be under assault, or divide the South. It would prove a challenging proposition. 44

While Calhoun’s identification with the Nullification movement and long history of sectional politics cast him in the North as the arch-secessionist, around half of the Southern

Democrats in the House and a majority of the caucus in the Senate were as or more radical than he. Unlike Calhoun, other radical Southern Democrats were less philosophical, less committed to the preservation of the Union, and more explicitly nationalistic than the Calhounites. While other Southerners viewed secession as a last resort to be adopted only if the institution of slavery was directly assaulted, Southern nationalist Democrat radicals saw secession as an end of itself.

Calhoun viewed central authority—regardless of position relative to the Mason-Dixon line—as inherently threatening to minority groups like slaveholders. For Southern radicals like Yancy and Ruffin, the South was a distinct nation. They desired, as Ernst Gellner has formulated, that

“the nation and the state should be congruous.”45 Their vision of the national community

44 Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made (Hannover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988[1968]) 136; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 479-482. 45 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1.

119 expressly did not include the North. They embraced a modern conception of nationalism that sought to define a distinct Southern culture and align the practice of government with it. While the Calhounites sought to redefine the terms of the national union, Southern radicals sought to redefine the nation itself. As such, they saw nothing to fear from the airing of sectional grievances. James Murray Mason (VA) captured this sentiment in a speech before the Senate in

1849. “Nothing should be suppressed” between the sections, he argued. “If they speak of the domestic institutions of the other sister States in terms of indignity and contumely, those other states should know it.”46 While some Southerners utilized threats of secession as a rhetorical device to threaten Northerners, others sincerely believed that in the long run the slaveholding culture was threatened by Union with the free labor North. Over time, they hoped, Southerners would come to demand an independent state, and Northerners would recognize the undesirability of preserving the Union.47

Southern nationalist ambitions to forge a new Union and Calhounite ambitions to reform the old one provided much of the intellectual grist for Southern Democratic rhetoric during 1849 and 1850, but a number of Southern Democrats placed less urgency on the territorial issue and were more open to the idea of a settlement. This group constituted a minority of Southern

Democratic Senators and slightly less than half of the party’s Southern House members. Like other Unionists, these Democrats considered the Wilmot Proviso an affront to Southern honor.

46 Congressional Globe, January 22, 1849, 30th Congress 2nd Session, 311-312; John McCardell, The Idea of a Southern Nation (NY: W.W. Norton and Company), 141-276. 47 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 499-500; Genovese, Mind, 19-87; Craig Simpson, “Political Compromise and the Protection of Slavery: Henry A. Wise and the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1850-51,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 83, no. 4 (October 1975): 87-405.

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However, they were much more skeptical than their radical and Calhounite colleagues that a settlement of the territories would represent a threat to slavery in the South. “Has Mr. Clay set his negroes free?” Henry L. Benning wondered to Howell Cobb (GA). “General Taylor is a sugar planter,” he noted, and was in a “much worse position” than other slaveholders should the institution be abolished.48 As for the territories, “citizens of slave states may settle with their slaves in the acquired territory until such time as the people thereof see fit to forbid it by legislation.”49 Southern moderate confidence was predicated on the idea that the Constitution guaranteed slavery until such a point that the state or territory forbad it. This differentiated them ideologically from Southern Whigs of all stripes (except Morton), who believed that the

Constitution offered no such guarantee, and tactically from other Southern Democrats, who believed that such guarantees meant little in the face of Northern aggression. The fundamental difference between Southern Democratic Unionists and other Southern Democrats was that

Unionists were confident that the Federal government would not strike down slavery in the

South. As Andrew Johnson (TN) noted, slavery “has become so closely connected with the commerce of the whole country, that it may now be considered as one of the ingredients of the political and social system.”50 In this assessment, they resembled Northern Whigs and Free

Soilers, though they drew extremely different conclusions about the desirability of this situation.

Southern Unionists, convinced that the Constitution protected slavery, were willing to stand with

Calhoun and more extreme sectional radicals only to a point. If the sections were politically

48 Henry L. Benning to Howell Cobb, February 23, 1848, Phillips, Correspondence Toombs Stephens and Cobb, 98. 49 Ibid. 100. 50 Quoted in Col. Fay Warrington Brabson, Andrew Johnson (Durham: Seeman Printery, Inc. 1972) 31.

121 imbalanced as a result of the Mexican Cession, expansion—not secession—was a viable alternative with which they could make common cause with their northern partisan brethren.51

While Southern Unionists differed from Northern Democrats on the legality of the

Wilmot Proviso, the ideological distance between Unionists of both sections was not insurmountable. As it became increasingly clear that, in Zachary Taylor, the South was faced with a resolute Southern man with Northern principles, prominent Northern men with Southern principles found themselves increasingly valuable as allies. Outstanding among Northern

Democratic moderates whom the Free Soilers and Whigs increasingly denounced as

“doughfaces” was the President’s opponent from 1848, Lewis Cass (D-MI). Following his defeat by Taylor, Cass had faced serious opposition to his reelection to the Senate, and had been confronted with, and faced down, instructions from the Michigan legislature to support the

Wilmot Proviso. A man of moderate habits as well as politics, Cass believed passionately that “a spirit of compromise,” which had been “necessary to create this confederacy,” would be equally crucial in sustaining it.52 Although Democratic moderates were, like Southern Whigs, vulnerable to sectionalist attacks from the opposition, Northern Democrats enjoyed a number of advantages that provided them with great latitude to support a settlement. First, they had originated—and

Cass had popularized—popular sovereignty, which provided a way to remove Congress from the slavery debate while still affording the people of the territories a say. Secondly, they shared a

51Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 635-636; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 402-452; Brian G. White, “Arkansas Politics During the Compromise Crisis, 1848-1852,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 36, no. 4 (Winter, 1977): 307-337; Howard C. Perkins, “A Neglected Phase of the Movement for Southern Unity, 1847- 1852,” The Journal of Southern History 12, no. 2 (May, 1946): 153-202. 52Quoted in Willard C. Klunder, Lewis Cass (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996) 239.

122 common interest in expansion with Southerners of both sects. Democrats aligned with urban machines and ethnic voting blocs were largely impervious to anti-slavery agitation, and politicians relying on support from these corners had little to fear from voter disaffection on the territorial issue. With Whigs divided between pro-Clay and pro-Taylor factions, some adroit

Democrats like Daniel Dickinson (NY) were able to insert themselves into the patronage battles of the opposition. Nonetheless, moderate Northern Democrats remained vulnerable to political pressure from their anti-slavery Whig and Free Soil competitors, as well as their own party. It was a process that Dickinson compared to “steer[ing] between Scylla and Charybdis.”53 The

Democratic Party remained a majority Southern institution. Because of the two-thirds rule, ambitious Northern Democrats aspiring to the Presidency could hardly afford to antagonize the

South. As a result, most of the most influential Northern Democrats of the next decade—Cass,

James Buchanan (D-PA), Franklin Pierce (D-NH), and Stephen A. Douglas (D-IL)—could be counted amongst the Unionist Democrats. With all of their ideals and political incentives reliant upon compromise, they would prove the most dedicated and loyal supporters of compromise in the Congress. 54

Because the Van Buren campaign had drawn many anti-slavery Democrats out of the party, the lines between transformational nationalist Northern Democrats and Free Soilers was quite blurry. While prominent and emerging politicians like David Wilmot (D-PA), and John

53 Dickinson to Mr. Croswell, August 22, 1849, John R. Dickinson (ed.), Speeches Correspondence Etc. of the Late Daniel S. Dickinson of New York (NY: G.P. Putnam and Son, 1867) 414. 54 Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 636-637; Holt, Fate of Their Country, 62-64

123

Van Buren (D-NY)55, abandoned the Democracy (for the time being in some cases), it was often difficult to distinguish them ideologically from some remaining antislavery Northern Democrats, like Hannibal Hamlin (ME). Northern politicians in each party desired to “limit, localize, and discourage slavery,” as the Free Soil Party platform espoused. Free Soilers, like Northern

Whigs, balanced their rhetorical audacity with healthy doses of pragmatism. Salmon P. Chase

(FS-OH) could declare his “hostility to slavery as a power” while supporting the maintenance of the institution where it existed.56 Though Free Soilers and Northern Whig radicals (and

Taylorites) often cooperated and voted together in the Thirty-First Congress, they differed from other Northern sectionalists in viewing slavery in egalitarian terms. Reflecting the Democratic myth of the party’s legitimate extension of the principles of the Jeffersonian Republicans,

Hamlin believed that the Wilmot Proviso would “enact the principles of Jefferson, who originated the idea of the [Northwest] Ordinance of 1787.”57 Slavery was “a state institution resting on the local law of the state,” he argued, “without the aid…support…[and] maintenance, of the Constitution in any way whatsoever.”58 Unlike declared Free Soilers, however, Hamlin was able to utilize his position (and his indistinguishability on the territorial issue from radical

Northern Whigs like Seward) to achieve a modicum of influence over the administration in its battle with anti-Taylor Whigs. Avowed Free Soilers were largely marginalized in the distribution of spoils and the exertion of influence, though their consistent votes against

55 Martin Van Buren’s influential anti-slavery son. 56 Quoted in John Niven, Salmon P. Chase (NY: Oxford University Press, 1995) 66. 57 Charles Eugene Hamlin [ed.], The Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin (Port Washington, NY: Kennikaw Press, 1971 [1899]), 173. 58 Hamlin [ed.],Life of Hamlin , 188.

124 compromise were relied upon. Unlike Southern radicals and Calhounites, they were unable to muster a credible threat of disruption of the political system aside from the imposition of the

Proviso, and in the rhetorical competition to define Northern sectionalism they would find themselves overmatched by Northern Whigs, especially Seward. In the battle for Northern hearts and minds engendered by the crisis, Free Soilers, especially those of Democratic antecedents, soon found themselves in competition with partisan opponents who occupied similar ideological grounds, but did so with the advantage of mainstream organization, credibility and patronage on their side.59

If Hamlin was an unusual case among the Northern Democracy for combining transformational nationalism with mainstream party discipline, his circumstance would prove to be the norm among Northern Whigs. Although fine divisions existed between true transformational nationalists like Seward, moderate anti-slavery Unionists like Truman Smith

(CT), and unconditional Unionists Daniel Webster (MA) and James Cooper (PA), on a fundamental level nearly every Northern Whig had qualms about slavery expansion and expansion in general. They were also wholly united on the admission of California as a state.

Only 2 (out of 15) Northern Whig Senators could be described as consistently pro-compromise, as could around one-third of the House delegation. What distinguished the clear transformational nationalists, however, was their unwillingness to countenance any compromise

59 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor 2, 286-300; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy,595-639; Eric Foner, Free Soil; Richards, The Slave Power, 162-190; Harry Draper Hunt, Hannibal Hamlin of Maine (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1969); Charles Eugene Hamlin, The Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1899); Holman Hamilton, “Democratic Senate Leadership and the Compromise of 1850,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41, no. 3 (Dec. 1954): 403-418; F.H. Hodder, ‘The Authorship of the Compromise of 1850,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22, no. 2 (Mar. 1936): 525-536.

125 with the South and their refusal to accept the legitimacy of slavery expansion in the territories, though not the perpetuation of slavery where it existed. Suspicious of Clay, Northern Whig radicals had been unsure about Taylor during the campaign, but had rallied to the administration as soon as it became clear that it would support unconditional admission of California. In

Taylor, they saw a strong and patriotic executive who could not be bullied and would not countenance or be intimidated by threats of secession. “The President will be put on the north side of Mason and Dixon’s line,” Seward confidently predicted, “and he will not flinch from any duty.”60

Like Southern radicals, radical Northern Whigs embraced a modern conception of nationalism that sought to transform American culture and align the practice of government with that vision. Unlike them, the Northern Whig radicals envisioned a country with a single free- labor economy and national commitment to industrial capitalism. Theirs was a modernizing, homogenizing nationalism that defined American cultural orthodoxy in the image of the industrializing North, and sought to reform the society and economy of the South (and the North) through reform and evolution. Although most transformational nationalist Whigs embraced a vision for the nation that promised profound changes to society, culture, and the practice of government, they also embraced a conservative political culture that emphasized moderation and compliance with national law. “There will be no need of passion or any demonstration on the part of us,” Seward promised his wife, “I want that we should show that the virtue of moderation

60 William H. Seward to Thurlow Weed, December 3, 1848, Seward, Seward at Washington, 90; Glyndon G. Van Deusen, William Henry Seward (NY; Oxford University Press, 1967), 115-122; Glyndon G. Van Deusen, Thurlow Weed (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1947), 171-174.

126 belongs to us.”61 An exception among the Northern Whig caucus, as he would remain for most of his long career in Congress, was Representative Thaddeus Stevens (PA), whose anti-slavery radicalism matched that of any incumbent politician. Stevens was a reflexive egalitarian who had been an early leader in the Anti-Mason party and had briefly been considered for a cabinet post in Harrison’s administration. Unlike most other anti-slavery politicians, Stevens viewed the races as essentially equal, and was the source of a multitude of scandalous rumors due to his bachelorhood and cohabitation with female servants of both races. Despite his radical anti- slavery views, Stevens was receptive to the Taylor administration and served on a reception committee for the President when he visited Pennsylvania. While Stevens’ anti-slavery views were far in advance of most Northern Whigs, he was neither renounced nor distanced from the rest of the caucus for his beliefs.62

Unionist Northern Whigs did not follow Seward or Stevens to their rhetorical extremes, but most of them supported the Wilmot Proviso and the Taylor plan out of either principle or instructions from their State legislatures. Around half of the members of the Northern Whig caucus were willing to accept some type of compromise on other issues as long as California was admitted as a free state. Their ends—ultimate limitation of slavery expansion, limiting of slaveholder domination over the Federal government, non-interference with slavery in the

South—were identical to their radical colleagues, but they were more willing to accept compromise on ancillary issues in order to win California’s admission. Truman Smith, among

61 Seward to Francis A. Seward, December 3, 1849, Seward at Washington, 112-113. Seward’s prediction turned out to be remarkably inaccurate. 62 Hans L. Treffouse, Thaddeus Stevens (PA: Stackpole Books, 2001[1997]), 70-79; Foner, Free Soil, 103-114; Howe, Political Culture, 181-209.

127 the most powerful and influential Whigs in Washington, firmly supported the administration’s efforts to admit California and New Mexico and found the development of a wide ranging compromise bill to be inexpedient. Northern Whig Unionists, by contrast, were more willing to support Southern demands as a matter of principle of good fellowship within the Union despite personal antipathy to slavery. Vice-President Millard Fillmore (NY)—a man of exceptionally moderate temperament and conservative politics, who nurtured a hostility to Seward and Weed than only former friends can hold—was able to outbid Seward on occasion in his expressions of support for the Taylor administration.63 As one of Fillmore’s advisors suggested to him, “none but slaveholders want affirmative action to protect themselves.”64 Daniel Webster, the most distinguished figurehead of Unionist Northern Whiggery, had opposed slavery expansion. What distinguished Whig Unionists from moderate transformational nationalists was whether their principles allowed them to support a comprehensive compromise with the South over slavery in the territories, or whether it did not. 65

With such a wide range of principles and on such an existential question, it was inevitable that some of the participants should defy easy categorization—and none defied it more aggressively than Thomas Hart Benton (D-MO). Thirty years after his participation in the

Missouri Compromise in support of the Missouri Constitution that denied citizenship to free blacks from other states, Old Bullion’s egalitarianism, convictions and hostility to John Calhoun and all his works had led him to become the leader of a faction of one—an anti-expansion

63 Holt, Rise and Fall, 414-458. 64 John L. Dox to Millard Fillmore, February 2, 1850, Millard Fillmore Papers Buffalo and Erie Historical Society, Buffalo, NY. 65 Howe, Political Culture, 210-237; Holt, Fate of their Country, 61-62

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Southern Democrat.66 Benton still supported the institution of slavery and white supremacy, but he saw no need to force its extension and considered the agitation against the Wilmot Proviso an effort to divide the Union. Benton was “not the least afraid that Congress will pass any law to affect this property [slaves]” either in the South or the territories. Tying the territorial crisis to the nationalist revolutions of 1848, Benton challenged his colleagues. “Liberty is now struggling in ancient empires, and her votaries are looking to us for the exemplification of the blessings of which she is in search, and in argument in favor of her efforts,” he thundered. “What do they see?” he asked, “they see a quarrel about slavery.” “Are we,” he asked, “[to] throw the weight of the republic against the friends of freedom throughout the world?” 67 In his public comments and speeches in Congress, Benton railed against Calhoun and Southern radicals just as he had raged against the banks in Jackson’s time. Benton’s anti-expansion views damaged him in

Missouri, and his opponents were hopeful of finally overthrowing him. Despite their predictions that Benton “has as good a chance to be made Pope as to be elected Senator,” Benton defied all odds and returned to the Senate for what would prove to be his final term.68 While the sight of the fiery Benton defending the policies of a Whig President against the expansion of slavery in the West was certainly jarring, at the same time Benton would prove the most slashing and boisterous opponent of Calhoun, Clay, and Webster—the “Great Triumvirate” with whom he had feuded during four different decades. As far as he was concerned opposition to the admission of

California was part of a plot by Calhoun to dissolve the Union. He had no intention of allowing

66 It is worth noting, in light of future events, that Benton was one of three anti-slavery Southern Senators during the crisis of 1850 along with Delaware’s Whig Senators John Wales and Preston Sturgeon. 67 National Intelligencer, June 21, 1849. 68 Calhoun to Abraham Venable, August 1849, John C. Calhoun Papers. Vol. 27, 43.

129 slaveholders to enhance their power at the expense of working people and smallholders. While

Benton’s views were hardly unique within the Democratic caucus (Martin Van Buren and many

Northern Democrats shared similar views), he was unique in that he represented a slaveholding state. That Benton, the paradigm of Southern Jacksonian orthodoxy and Calhoun, the paradigm of Democratic apostasy in the 1830s now found their positions reversed in the late 1840s is testament to the transformation of the political order that the policies of Tyler and Polk had wrought. Though Benton’s would prove to be a unique color in the kaleidoscope of principles in the crisis of 1850, his characteristic combination of principled steadfastness and bombastic rhetoric would render him one of the brightest.69

The challenge facing any political blacksmith hoping to forge a settlement to the crisis was how to bang these unwieldy elements into a majority. The acceleration of the California

Gold Rush increased the urgency of the political factions in Congress to settle controversy on their own terms. By the time of the meeting of the Thirty-First Congress, 80,000 Americans had relocated to California in search of quick riches. The political infrastructure of the territory sagged under the strain of the new immigrants, and social order broke down rapidly. Fears that

California would declare independence—promoted by proponents of immediate admission— were enhanced by the discovery of gold. Organization of California as either a state or territory would help preserve order as well as ensuring that the United States would reap the rewards, and would prevent interference by European powers or the establishment of an independent republic

69 Elbert Smith, Magnificent Missourian (NY: J.B. Lippencourt Company, 1958); Elbert B. Smith, “Thomas Hart Benton: Southern Realist,” The American Historical Review LVIII, No. 4, (Jul. 1953): 795-807; Jonas Viles, “Sections and Sectionalism in a Border State,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 21, no. 1, Jun 1934): 3-22.

130 of California. The rapid expansion of California’s population and economic importance also increased the urgency of Southern opponents of admission. For Transformational nationalists among Northern Whigs, Democrats and Free Soilers, the goal was to secure the admission of

California without the expansion of slavery.70

The Taylor administration recognized the danger that the territorial crisis posed, and from its inception planned simultaneously to settle the slave question and transform the political order around that settlement. Although the President had deemphasized his nonpartisanship during the campaign to placate longtime Whigs, he had no intention of remaining a “slave to party.”71 As far as the President was concerned, Whig policies embodied by Henry Clay’s American System had been overtaken by events and were passé. He made clear to William H. Seward that he considered the United States Bank “dead” and that future tariffs would be “only for revenue.”72

He had no sympathy for the Wilmot Proviso which he believed was “brought into Congress to array the South” against the North.73 Taylor was a staunch Unionist. While he considered the rights of slaveholders like himself to be protected by the Constitution, he favored adherence to the Union as long as slavery in the slave states was not attacked. Ultimately, he believed that

“the Wilmot Proviso…ought to be left to Congress.” Taylor’s position was not inconsistent—he

70 Hamilton, Prologue, 1-5; Bordewich, 48-52; Nathaniel Wright Stephenson, “California and the Compromise of 1850,” The Pacific Historical Review 4, no. 2 (Jun, 1935): 114-122; Delilah L. Beasley, “Slavery in California,” The Journal of Negro History 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1918): 33-44. 71 Taylor to Robert C. Wood, September 27, 1847,Letters of Zachary Taylor from the Battlefields of the Mexican War (Rochester: The Genessee Press, 1908). 72Seward to Thurlow Weed, August 27, 1847, Thurlow Weed Papers, (Rochester: University of Rochester) 73 Taylor to Jefferson Davis, September 27, 1847, Zachary Taylor Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Taylor and Davis had a complicated relationship. Davis had married Taylor’s daughter against his wishes, and relations between these two stubborn men was tense. Grief over Julia’s death settled their differences, and following Davis’s service under Taylor in the Mexican war the men became extremely close. Despite their profound political differences, they remained extremely close during Taylor’s Presidency.

131 drew a clear line between the rights of the states and Congressional supremacy over the territories. Additionally, many anti-slavery Northern Whigs remained skeptical of Old Rough and Ready.74 Taylor’s “no party” strategy obscured a deeper ambition among his advisors to found a new party around the General, but his advisors were able to provide enough evidence of orthodoxy to quell the concerns of enough mainstream Whigs to secure the nomination for

Taylor. With the exception of some alienated anti-slavery Northerners, the Whig coalition was able to maintain a tenuous hold on unity.75

Taylor recognized that passage of the Wilmot Proviso would represent an affront to the

South, and his priority was to settle the crisis quickly to remove the Proviso from the political debate. As William Freehling has noted, the President “sought to represent all those big [Whig] slaveholders in all those black belts who…wanted peace, prosperity, and union,” and “asked only that avenues toward settlement [of the crisis] not be insulting to the South.”76 He planned to leverage his personal popularity and non-partisan reputation to restore the Monrovian settlement around the single issue that he knew the majority of political leaders could support—the preservation of the Union. Taylor was confident that, by recognizing that traditional Whig issues were dead and promoting settlement of the territorial crisis by leveraging through an appeal to

Unionism, he could forge both a new national consensus and a new political party around his person. Influential Whigs like John Crittenden, John Clayton, and the Robert Toombs, and

Alexander Stephens were critical supporters in the South, while Truman Smith and the

74 Taylor owned over 100 slaves. 75 Holt, Rise and Fall, 284-320; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 38-51. 76 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 493.

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Seward/Weed machine in New York provided an influential phalanx of support in the North.

Taylor—a man who had never voted in a Presidential election until his own—may have been the ultimate political outsider, but his administration could count on the support of a number of savvy and effective insiders. For their part, the political bosses that supported Taylor believed that the General offered salvation for both the country and the Whig party.77

Taylor’s plan was comprised of two actions with multiple impacts. The central mechanism was the admission of the entire Mexican Cession as two states, California and New

Mexico. By skipping the territorial phase, Taylor planned to eliminate the threat of the imposition of the Wilmot Proviso and permanently end the slavery controversy in the West.

Congress had no authority to interfere with the domestic institutions of states. The boundary dispute between Texas and New Mexico would then be referred to the apolitical Supreme Court as a dispute between states. Taylor’s approach depended on the recognition by the South that slavery was unlikely to prosper in the Southwest, and that avoidance of the insult of the Wilmot

Proviso was sufficient recompense for the notional loss of territory. Taylor recognized that his immediate admission policy favored the North. He also was aware that the majority of the members of his party were Northern, and that his plan would strengthen their position against the

Free Soilers. As Taylor himself declared, “the people of the North…need have no further apprehensions of the future extension of slavery,” adding that “the necessity of a third party…will soon be obviated.”78 While Taylor could be assured of support from the North, it

77 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor, Vol. 2, 148-161; Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, 15-23; Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 633-634; Holt, Rise and Fall, 406-409. 78 Quoted in Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 225.

133 remained to be seen whether enough Southerners would accept it to allow it to pass the Senate.

John Calhoun recognized that the President’s plan would exclude slavery from the West without banning it outright, and as a result he “[regarded] it as worse than the Wilmot Proviso.”79 The immediate question was whether the Taylor administration could rally the disparate Unionist forces to its plan. Unionist politicians were distributed among both major parties and sections, but were strongly represented among Northern Democrats and Southern Whigs. Although

Unionists represented the largest faction in Congress, they were deeply divided by party, principles, personal rivalries and ambitions. Northerners could be assured that “the President’s platform guarantees the Freedom of every foot of soil obtained by Mexico,” as Thurlow Weed wrote in the Albany Evening Journal, “by the action of the people of that territory.” Southerners could be assured that Congress would take no action on the disposition of slavery in commonly held territory. The principles of free labor and state’s rights would be maintained, and Southern honor preserved. In principle, the only group which would be ideologically alienated from his policy would be Calhounites and more radical Southern sectionalists. However, Taylor was confident that, like Jackson during the nullification controversy, his background as a slaveholder, reputation as a patriot, personal popularity, and credible ability to successfully unleash violence on any threat of disunion would be sufficient to reassure and cow the South to acquiesce in the admission of California and New Mexico without the Wilmot Proviso. If moderate Unionists in both sections could be rallied to the President’s plan, their support along with that of Northern transformational nationalists were more than sufficient to push admission through. The key

79 Calhoun to James Henry Hammond, January 4, 1850, John C. Calhoun Papers. Vol. 27, 146.

134 would be whether important Unionist leaders—Cass and Douglas for the Democrats, and

Webster and Clay for the Whigs—would support the administration or split their caucuses. A

Supreme Court decision on the issue would “settle the controversy...precisely in the same quiet mode by which the Court…has decided a thousand other questions which have arisen between the people of different States and sections of the Union.” He was confident that the decision— whatever it might be, would be accepted by patriotic citizens in both sections of the Union. “It is the great glory…of our constitution, that they are governed only by the law, and that law made by their own servants and interpreted by men selected by them.”80 John Clayton had predicted to

Crittenden that “the policy I proposed to you last winter will be carried out,” and that “the states will be admitted—Free and Whig.”81

While Taylor’s strategy for passing his settlement plan depended upon the willingness of

Unionists to support it, it was transformational nationalists that rallied most strongly to his plan.

Unionists provided a lukewarm reception, and the administration was harmed by the absence in

Congress of a skilled legislator in whom to entrust it. Crittenden had provided the leading intellectual and strategic voice among the Taylorites during the campaign, but his election as

Governor of Kentucky and refusal to resign to serve in Washington despite the entreaties of dozens of allies seriously damaged the cohesion of Taylor’s allies, as well as Crittenden’s reputation. Taylorites were disappointed in his refusal to serve, while David Outlaw spoke for

80Ibid. 167-168. 81 Clayton to Crittenden, April 18, 1849, Clayton Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C; Rudolf Van Abale, Alexander H. Stephens (NY: Alfred and Knopf, 1946), 111-112; Howe, Political Culture; Hamilton, Prologue, 1- 24; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 229-242; William O. Lynch, “Zachary Taylor as President,” The Journal of Southern History 4, no. 3 (Aug. 1938): 279-294.

135 many pro-Clay Whigs when he stated that “since his course toward Mr. Clay my confidence in the man has greatly diminished.”82 In Crittenden’s place, Clayton emerged as the leader of

Taylor’s cabinet. As Secretary of State, Clayton served as the “premier” of the administration, influencing political and policy decisions more than any save the President himself. Crittenden had strongly supported Clayton’s appointment, and conferred constantly with the Secretary of

State over administration strategy. However, Clayton was a controversial figure. He controlled patronage and exerted tremendous influence over the state organization. Clayton came from a long line of Delaware politicians. Joshua Clayton, John’s great-grandfather, had served as

President of Delaware, while his grandfather had served in both houses of the U.S. Congress.

Clayton was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1829 at the age of 33. He distinguished himself during the formulation of the Compromise Tariff of 1833, with Henry Clay crediting him personally for the final outcome.83 Whigs were divided about the hard-working and hard-drinking Clayton’s capacity. Jefferson Davis—no friend of the Proviso—believed that “Clayton is true and talks right,” but wondered “has he the necessary nerve?”84 Truman Smith, Taylor’s most important

Northern ally, detested Clayton. Gideon Welles reported that Smith complained that

“If…Taylor…knew what I know of that rascal, he would…kick his backsides out and tell him to be gone forever.”85 Smith blamed Crittenden for Clayton’s appointment, though Smith’s displeasure would not prevent him from remaining a steadfast Taylorite. With the Whig party

82 David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, David Outlaw Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 83 Joseph P. Comegys, Memoir of John Clayton (Wilmington, The Historical Society of Delaware, 1882), 61. 84 Davis to Crittenden, January 30, 1849, Life of Crittenden, 340. 85 Gideon Welles, Diary Entry, June 12, 1849, Gideon Welles Papers (Washington, Library of Congress).

136 deeply divided at the national, state and local levels it was unclear how the new administration could satisfy the expectations of the party’s disparate factions. With requests for appointments exceeding offices and control over neither house of Congress (which necessitated horse trading with Democrats), it was inevitable that the new administration would disappoint a major portion of its supporters, let alone Whigs as a whole.86

Conflicts over patronage between factions and personalities became apparent during cabinet construction, with Unionist Whigs being disproportionally represented among those with hard feelings toward the administration. John Clayton was able to place his ally William

Meredith (W-PA) in the Treasury Department. No one leader, however, was able to dominate appointments. Even Crittenden was unable to influence the President to place his ally, Robert

Letcher, as Postmaster General. Thomas Ewing of Ohio secured the Postmastership, the most important distributor of patronage after the President in the Federal government. Stephens and

Toombs were able to secure the appointment of George Crawford as Secretary of War—an appointment that would prove disastrous. As Attorney General, Reverdy Johnson represented

Tennessee. The new Navy Secretary, William B. Preston, had been the author of a settlement plan in the House which would have admitted the Mexican Cession as a single state. Taylor hoped to appoint Truman Smith to the new Department of the Interior, but political considerations prevented the appointment.87 When his appointments were complete, Taylor’s cabinet consisted of 4 Southerners and 2 Northerners. Conspicuous by their absence were allies

86 Hamilton. Zachary Taylor, 2, 162-174; Wilentz, Rise, 634-635; Holt, Rise and Fall, 414-415; Michael A. Morrison, Slavery and the American West (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 104-105. 87 Whigs lost control of the Connecticut legislature, ensuring that a Smith resignation would result in the appointment of a Democrat to his seat.

137 of Clay and Webster. Taylor’s selections indicated unambiguously that in issues of policy and patronage the General’s followers would receive first consideration, though the complexities of

Whig divisions extended far deeper than simply between the allies of Clay and Taylor.88

As the Taylor administration took shape in Washington, the General’s allies also actively pursued a policy of party reconstruction. As early as December 1848, Clayton had approached

William H. Seward about the establishment of a “Taylor Republican” party.89 The Taylor

Republican movement was undermined at the outset by two profound problems. Divisions in the

Whig Party were deep, and efforts by the Taylorites to reorganize the party only exacerbated these divisions. At the same time, though the Taylorites rejected orthodox Whig doctrine as obsolete, it was unclear what they would promote in its place besides the General’s patriotism.

The campaign of Henry Hilliard of Alabama exemplified the Taylorite approach. Hilliard was nominated for Congress by the “Taylor District Convention” as part of the “Taylor party of this county” along with other members of the “Taylor ticket” for an election in which Taylor’s name was not on the ballot.90 Despite some successes, Clayton’s efforts to reconstruct the party and appeal to moderate Democrats proved less fruitful than expected. “A portion of the Whigs,”

Taylor complained, “would rather be defeated with Mr. Clay…than…succeed with anyone else.”91 Taylor’s closest allies noted that the General meant “to be President of the United States himself,” but Taylor’s desire to maintain an image of aloofness from conventional politics

88 Holt, Rise and Fall, 415-461 89 Seward to Thurlow Weed, December 3, 1848, Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington (NY: Derby and Miller, 1891), 90. 90 Alabama Journal, May 29, 1849, in the Abraham W. Venable Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 91 Quoted in Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 50.

138 obscured his endorsement of Clayton’s efforts. Though Taylor had appointed the sons of Clay and Webster to diplomatic posts, no patronage efforts would reconcile their to the administration, and ideological considerations over the territorial issue ran deeper than any considerations of patronage. The results for the administration were catastrophic. In Congress, the administration could depend at best upon a majority of the representatives of the minority party in the legislature, and the dedication of much of this majority was likely conditional. The hostility of a minority of the Whig caucus, including its most able legislators, could be expected to be hostile to the administration.92

While Taylor and his men continued to fixate on Clay as the greatest potential source of mischief, opposition to his administration within his party grow. Clay was “more anxious for office than for the interest of the country, or the success of the Whig party,” Taylor fretted.93

The President’s allies were nearly universal in their concern that Clay was returning to

Washington to ruin Taylor. “I regret exceedingly to see that Mr. Clay is to return to the

Senate,”94 Jefferson Davis—a friend to Taylor if not to his party—complained to Crittenden, while Albert Burnley advised Crittenden that “Mr. Clay’s election can be productive of nothing but harm.”95 Although Clay had pledged himself to support the administration, no one but

Crittenden seems to have believed this.96 The support of other prominent Whigs was more ambiguous. Webster was also known to be distrustful of the administration, though his

92 Holt, Rise and Fall, 415-424; Sara D. Bearss, “Henry Clay and the American Claims Against Portugal, 1850,” Journal of the Early Republic 7, no. 2 (Summer, 1987): 167-180. 93 Quoted in Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 50. 94 Jefferson Davis to Crittenden, January 30, 1849, in Mrs. Chapman Coleman (ed.), The Life of Crittenden (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1871) 50. 95 Burnley to Crittenden, January 12, 1849, Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 96 Crittenden to Clayton, January 7, 1849, Clayton Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

139 opposition was not assumed to the extent that Clay’s was. Patronage and the party reconstruction effort had also turned a number of potential allies into enemies. James Pearce, the eminent Whig Senator from Maryland was among those so affronted, though he and many others blamed “the selfishness and incapacity of those who should have been the able and disinterested advisors of the honest old soldier” rather than the President himself.97 Pearce’s frustration reveals much about the attitude of disgruntled Whigs to Taylor. While Pearce had as much reason as any to be offended by the appointments of the administration, it is telling that he directed his ire at the cabinet, and addressed his complaints to Crittenden—whom he knew to be

Taylor’s man. Crittenden had advised Clayton that Taylor’s role in patronage decisions should be loudly proclaimed, stating that “Old Zack is the rock upon which politically you ought to build…the active moving energetic cause of all things.” In practice, Taylor’s behind the scenes role in these decisions allowed him to maintain his reputation at the expense of his cabinet’s.98

Widespread perception that the administration’s appointments were poor and the perception that

Taylor was not involved protected the President’s reputation, but decimated the cabinet’s. At the same time, disgruntled Southern Whigs had an available alternative in Clay. “The Taylor Whigs, who desire to appropriate to themselves all the honors and offices are also by no means pleased,” that Clay would return to Washington, David Outlaw reported to his wife, “they fear there will be a lion in their path.”99

97 Pearce to Crittenden, July 14, 1849, Crittenden Papers (Washington, Library of Congress) 98 Crittenden to Clayton, July 8, 1849, John Clayton Papers (Washington: Library of Congress). 99 David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, January 26, 1849, Outlaw Papers Library of Congress, Washington, D.C; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 229-242; Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico…, 87-88.

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The unpopularity of the cabinet and Whig factional divisions led to further Whig reverses during the 1849 Congressional elections, particularly in the South.100 Defeated Representative

George Pendleton (VA) was a typical victim of the election. “By the most extraordinary combinations—between the extremes of parties, Mr. Morton has beaten me for Congress,” he reported to Berrien. “The entire Democratic party of the district, has made…a[n] original Taylor man—my successor against the vote of five sixths of the Whigs in the district of voting in the election.” Pendleton placed the blame for his defeat squarely on Clayton. “Mr. Clayton…has contributed very much to my defeat in the election.” 101 “From its inception, the Taylor administration had shaped its patronage decisions with an eye toward the 1849 state and

Congressional elections,” Michael Holt has noted, and in this it had failed miserably.102 The

Whigs took a thorough drubbing, particularly in the South. As the Thirty-First Congress prepared to convene, it was clear that the primary issue facing the session was the settlement of the territorial crisis. Within Congress, ideological, sectional and political considerations fragmented the political order into a quadrapartite division, while Whigs were additionally subdivided by the attitude toward the Taylor administration. The consequences of the 1849 election further complicated these divisions, with previously moderate officials adopting a more recalcitrant attitude as their sectional loyalty was challenged by opponents. “At a period perhaps the most momentous…in our history [when] all jealousies, sectional and personal, and the

100 Each state conducted Congressional elections according to its own rules, and Congressional elections were not synchronized with the Presidential/off year election cycle we are familiar with today. 101 George Pendleton to John M. Berrien, John M. Berrien Papers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Southern Historical Collection) 102 Holt, Rise and Fall, 435.

141 jostling of individual ambition should be resolutely disregarded,” John Bell complained, “those of every section, who are anxious to stand by the Republic…are shorn of their strength, distracted and paralyzed by their own divisions.”103

In this context, the consequences of Clayton’s effort at party reconstruction made the administration’s effort at rallying support much more difficult. “The Wilmot Proviso must never come before Genl. Taylor for his approval or rejection,” C.J. Morehead warned Clayton, “if we intend to retain our ascendency.”104 By calling for the immediate admission of California,

Taylor could ensure that the vast majority of Northern Whigs and Free Soilers would support his policies. While the majority of Southern Whigs were non-committal about Taylor’s plan, none but the Georgians, Morton and Clingman could be assured of opposing it. Northern Democrats were unlikely to oppose the admission of California in the absence of an alternative, as was

Benton. Within the Congress, only Southern Democrats and Whigs of a Southern nationalist stripe opposed the admission of California in principle, and could be assured of opposing a bill.

For the President’s plan to succeed, it was imperative that it be brought forward in the absence of a credible alternative. The California admission bill would win broad enough support to allow the President to face down any threat of disunion on the terms best for the Unionists and worse for Southern sectionalists. It was dependent most of all on maintaining the popularity of the

President and the administration’s initiative on the issue.105

103 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 30st Congress, 1st Session, 190; Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, 89-92; Holt, Rise and Fall, 460-472. 104C.J. Morehead to John Clayton, April 10, 1849, Clayton Papers (Library of Congress). 105 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2; Holt, Rise and Fall, 459-520.

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In addition to the lingering effects of the party reorganization effort and disputes over patronage, the administration was further undermined by the eruption of a scandal that imploded the cabinet’s already tenuous foundation of support. Prior to his appointment as Secretary of

War, George Crawford had represented the heirs of George Galphin, a Revolutionary War-era

Indian trader whose estate had been seized by the State of Georgia. During his tenure as

Governor, Crawford had made an agreement with the Galphin family that he would assist them in securing compensation for the land in return for half of any eventual settlement. Crawford was able to secure passage of an act directing the Secretary of the Treasury to make payment on the claim, but the payment was not executed until the assumption of power by the Taylor administration. As Secretary of War, Crawford pushed for the payment of the settlement— enlisting Attorney General Reverdy Johnson and Treasury Secretary William Meredith in securing the payment of the settlement. As compensation, Crawford received over $94,000.

Although none of the participants in the Galphin claim were prosecuted for official malfeasance, the damage to the prestige and reputation of the administration was immense. As the details of the case gradually emerged, the refusal of the President to call for Crawford’s resignation further weakened the administration’s influence and divided its friends. Robert Letcher, who had been considered for a cabinet post, placed the blame on Clayton as the President’s senior political advisor. “Clayton is in great trouble,” he warned Crittenden, “every man in the cabinet wants him out.”106 Even Albert Burnley and Alexander Bullitt, the editors of the Washington Republic, the intended national organ for the Taylor Republican movement, began to turn on the cabinet.

106 Letcher to Crittenden, November 17, 1849, Life of Crittenden, 348.

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The Taylor movement was fragmenting. Loyalty to Taylor no longer guaranteed loyalty to his administration or its policies. As Congress arrived for its first session in December 1849, the disarray in the Taylor administration was undermining its ability to effect a rapid resolution of the crisis. As Michael Holt has noted, “the success of Taylor’s plan required speed, for delay would only increase the chances that one or more…contingencies could turn against the administration.”107 While factors outside of the administrations control—particularly the long duration between the President’s inauguration and the opening of Congress and the actions of the

California and New Mexico legislatures—contributed to the administration’s difficulties, many of its wounds were self-inflicted. Swift action required excellent organization, but with the cabinet in disarray and the President’s supporters divided the ability of Taylor’s allies to execute his plan were declining rapidly.108

The controversy over the administration’s plans to form a new party, the disappointments over patronage, and the scandal involving the cabinet stole the initiative on the territorial issue from the administration. Political leaders who shared the President’s section, party, and Unionist principles but disliked the President—like Clay, Mangum, and Pearce—as well as Northern

Unionists like Webster, and Cooper stood aloof from the Taylor plan. While Taylor could count on the support of a number of powerful allies, the reliance of his plan on the maintenance of legislative initiative was crucially undermined by the opposition of so many skillful parliamentarians. The President’s allies in Congress—like Seward, Truman Smith and Bell— enjoyed formidable political skills, but none could match the legislative mastery of the

107 Holt, Rise and Fall, 466. 108 Holt, Rise and Fall, 461-470; Hamilton, Prologue, 37-40.

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President’s opponents. Worse still, the strongest legislators among Taylor’s allies—Crittenden and Clayton—were serving outside of Congress. With the President maintaining his policy of appearing above politics, his allies began to panic. Abraham Lincoln (W-Il) spoke for many

Taylorite Whigs when he warned Clayton that the President was developing a reputation as a

“man of straw.” “This must be arrested,” he warned, “or it will damn us all.” The President’s plan was further undermined by the actions of the assembled legislatures in California and New

Mexico. California moved too quickly and defined the Mormon settlement at Salt Lake outside of the jurisdiction of the new state, which meant that even if California and New Mexico were admitted as states unorganized territory (and territory populated by the widely distrusted

Mormons) would remain. The New Mexico legislature further complicated the situation when it framed a territorial charter rather than a state Constitution. As a result, the strongest argument in favor of the President’s plan—that it would instantly and permanently organize all of the territories of the Mexican Cession—was nullified.109

While the administration’s plan for the territories was being bogged down by the efforts of those sympathetic to its ends, Southern nationalist efforts to forge a united front were likewise foundering. In the Southern Address drafted by Calhoun and endorsed by a slim majority of

Southern Representatives at the end of the last Congressional session, Southern sectionalists had called on action by Southern voters to prepare common ground for the next Congressional session. In the Address, Calhoun had combined a positive defense of slavery with a declaration that the admission of California constituted a potentially fatal action on the part of the federal

109 Don. E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic (NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 270-271; Holt, Rise and Fall, 459-481; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 162-174.

145 government that would require an extreme response from the South. In response to the Southern

Address, the legislature of Mississippi in October 1849 called for the convening of a Southern

Convention to be held in Nashville in June 1850, to forge a common policy. “The course adopted by Mississippi is the only one that affords any prospect of saving the Union,” Calhoun declared, “or if that should fail saving ourselves.” Responses to Mississippi’s action varied.

South Carolina sent a delegation, but was anxious, due to past crises, not to be seen as leading the movement. Worse still, North Carolina, Louisiana and the border states simply ignored the call. With the convention scheduled to be held in the political stronghold of Unionist Whig John

Bell and within a short distance from Andrew Jackson’s Hermitage, a warm reception for the conventioneers was scarcely assured.110

The difficulties that Southern nationalists faced in organizing the Nashville Convention underscored the challenges they faced in successfully resisting the admission of California.

Despite Taylor’s difficulties stemming from party reconstruction, patronage and the Galphin scandal, by drawing his battle lines around the admission of California and New Mexico, the

Hero of Buena Vista had chosen his ground well. Holding the political initiative in their quest to solve the territorial crisis, Taylor’s administration attempted simultaneously to prepare a political settlement that would see the entirety of the Mexican Cession organized and provide the

Congress with a ready-made solution to the crisis. Despite the weak support the administration enjoyed in Congress, and the poor execution of Taylor’s plan by the territorial legislatures of

California and New Mexico, Taylor’s elegant and effective plan offered a method by which all

110 Holt, Fate; Wilentz, Rise and Fall, 635-636; Stegmaier, Texas, NM, 90.

146 but the most radical Southern sectionalists could support the settlement. In the context of a debate between the Southern sectionalists and the moderate Unionist President, reason, moderation and patriotism were on the side of the President. Unless the Unionist position was divided by the introduction of an alternative, there was little reason to believe that Taylor must lose the battle. While Zachary Taylor was no Free Soiler, the plan that his administration developed to settle the crisis overlapped significantly with the aims of them and the Northern members of his party. Only opposition from within the Unionist camp derail the administration’s preferred Jacksonesque strategy of pitting Southern sectionalists against the rest of Congress. With the Taylor administration’s support within the Southern Whig caucus shaken, however, the fate of the Taylor Plan would be decided by the willingness of powerful Southern

Whigs, most notably Henry Clay, to put aside personal feelings in the interest of a final settlement of the Mexican Cession. 111

111 Morrison, Slavery and the American West, 106-107.

Avowed Enemies

“I am glad myself that [Clay] has at last stepped out with his armor on—an avowed enemy though formidable can be met.” —Orlando Brown, May 23, 1850.1

Despite the myriad challenges facing President Taylor’s administration and the incoming

Congress, official Washington nevertheless expected that the upcoming Congressional session would settle the territorial controversy. With no common ground extant between sectional and transformational nationalists, the administration had chosen to lean to the Northern side of the debate. Taylor would rally his forces under the banner of “nonpartisan Whiggery, whole, patriotic and triumphant,” in William Freehling’s formulation, and isolate Southern sectionalists upon their most radical ground—the question of whether the admission of California justified secession.2 As Senator Dayton (W-NJ) would note during the debate, “never can it come upon a point weaker for the South than that.”3 Southern nationalists and Calhounites could be expected to vigorously oppose the Taylor plan, and to speak openly of disunion. Transformational nationalists sought to seek the admission of the whole of California as a free state in the event that the Wilmot Proviso could not be applied to the whole of the Mexican Cession, and as a result overwhelmingly supported Taylor. Upon the Whig Party’s Northern majority and unionists in both sections, the Taylor administration would seek to build its majority. Northern

Democrats, holding no affection or affinity for the Whig administration, could be appealed to on patriotic grounds and sectional interest. Southern Whigs could be appealed to on partisan and

1 Brown to Crittenden, May 23, 1850, Crittenden Papers, (Library of Congress). 2 Freehling, Road to Disunion 1, 491. 3 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 437. 147 148 patriotic grounds. With the support of these groups, the Taylor Whigs could settle the territorial issue and force Southern sectionalists to test whether their Southern brethren were willing to secede over California. California was key. Representative T.H. Avery (D-VA) observed, “the question whether slavery shall or shall not be admitted into California overrides all other questions.”1 The ability of Southern Whigs and Northern Democrats to forge an agreement on that point held the key to the settlement of the territorial controversy. It also ensured that whichever of these factions could maintain their unity could define the eventual terms of the settlement.2

While a great deal of scholarly attention has been provided to the classic speeches of the

Compromise debate—especially those of Clay, Webster, Calhoun, and Seward—and to Clay’s compromise proposal, the wide range or proposals and speeches offered in support of and opposition to those provides a unique insight into the nationalist ideals of the politicians that constituted the Congress. While the speeches of Clay, Webster, Calhoun, and Seward were important, the fate of a sectional compromise would prove to be dependent on none of these men. Consequently, the speeches and proposals of other, less celebrated, leaders provide valuable insight into the ideological underpinnings of the eventual compromise. Though

Southern Unionist Whigs were best positioned to determine the terms of the settlement at the outset of the session, other Unionists and Southern nationalists also had ideas for resolving the controversy. During the debate, nationalist ideals provided the ideological foundation for the variety of plans and legislative approaches that were offered as solutions to the crisis.

1 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 392 2 Hamilton, Prologue, 43-50; Holt, Rise, 461-476; Stegmaier, 85-88.

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Nationalist ideals impacted both strategic approaches to the problem and legislative maneuvers adopted to facilitate solutions. Transformational nationalists continued offering two proposals: the Wilmot Proviso and the unconditional admission of California. Their goal remained to redress slaveholder domination of the Federal government through the admission of free territory and checking slavery expansion. Southern nationalists also focused on issues related to the distribution of power in the federal government. The two comprehensive settlement plans offered by their number during the debates—the comprehensive reform package of John C.

Calhoun and the extension of the Missouri Compromise plan offered by Jefferson Davis and others—sought to protect the South by maintaining or obviating the value of sectional balance in the legislature. Unionists, on the other hand, provided the majority of new thinking. Zachary

Taylor, Henry Clay, John Bell, and Stephen A. Douglas all offered or facilitated settlement plans that sought the admission of California, avoidance of the Wilmot Proviso and organization of the

Mexican Cession, while differing on what constituted a proper, effective and sufficient conciliation for the South. Each of these policies was informed at a most basic level by how their proponents desired slavery and the nation to evolve. Most significantly, the principles that underlay these plans and maneuvers would neither be resolved nor extinguished by the outcome of the debates. The nationalist principles on display during the 1850 debates would define the political order of the 1850s, and as a result are of critical importance in understanding what effects the Compromise of 1850 had, and did not have, on the sectional controversy.

Because historians have generally focused on Clay, and especially his conflict with

Taylor, in their assessments of the debate, the feasibility and ideological foundations of other

150 proposals have typically been afforded only cursory examination. The popular historical consensus holds that the plans offered by Taylor and other statesmen during the crisis of 1850 were inadequate to the task of pacifying the nation, and that Henry Clay’s singular political genius was responsible for devising the only plan that was capable of peacefully settling the issue. In his magisterial biography of Clay, Robert Remini summarizes the prevailing view that

“if Taylor’s so-called plan meant to address the mounting crisis in the country over slavery and its extension into the territories, it was totally inadequate and unrealistic.” “The failure of

Presidential leadership,” in Remini’s view, “immediately opened up to Clay the unanticipated opportunity to reassume control of the Whig Party and hammer out a series of proposals satisfactory to both North and South that would address each of the issues involved in the territorial and slavery questions.”3 While this view has generally prevailed in surveys of the period since initially offered in the aftermath of the settlement, it was challenged strongly by

Holman Hamilton in his biography of Taylor and his major revision of the Compromise of 1850.

In this view, the Taylor plan was more practical than had been previously assumed, and Clay’s success in bringing about a settlement was less significant than previously assumed. Taylor’s plan to admit California and New Mexico as states provided a permanent solution to the issue of slavery in the Mexican Cession, and the presence of a Congressional majority in favor of

California admission is unquestionable. In his definitive study of the Whig Party, Michael Holt assesses Taylor’s plan as having “brilliantly charted a middle path between sectional extremes defined by the Free Soilers and Calhounites, a path that nonetheless clove to the Northern side of

3 Remini, Henry Clay, p. 731.

151 the sectional divide in terms of substantive benefits.”4 Taylor biographer Holman Hamilton notes that “hindsight teaches that the Compromise failed to attain the goal which its sponsors so eloquently claimed for it,” and argues that Taylor’s plan provided a more effective remedy for the crisis.5 To reduce the 1850 debate to a competition between the limited Taylor plan and the comprehensive Clay plan not only sells the Taylor plan short, as Hamilton and Holt have argued, but also obscures the practicality, original thinking and ideological tumult of plans offered by other politicians. The plans offered by sectional nationalists and other Unionists must also be assessed seriously if we are to understand the complexities of the debate and how the plans of

Taylor and Clay ultimately provoked such broad-based resistance. While it is crucial to acknowledge the important roles of Clay and Taylor, and of the personal issues between these leaders and others that contributed to the complexity of the debates and legislative process surrounding the settlement, differences in deeply held beliefs and assumptions about the future state of the Union were equally important in explaining how the 1850 debates evolved.

The depth of the political divisions in Congress was underlined by the failure of the

House of Representatives to elect a speaker upon convening. With neither the Democrats nor

Whigs commanding a majority of the body, the balance of power was held by the Free Soil contingent. Superficially, this should have aided the Whigs. The Whig candidate, Robert

Winthrop, hailed from Boston and had supported the Wilmot Proviso in the past, while his opponent—Howell Cobb of Georgia—was a moderate Southerner with no love for abolitionism.

Divisions within the parties, however, prevented either from uniting on a single candidate.

4 Holt, Rise and Fall of the Whig Party, 475. 5 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 407.

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Democrat Andrew Johnson could deride Winthrop as a “Boston codfish aristocrat,” but this could not prevent members of his party from supporting him.6 Toombs and Stephens, for their part, led a faction of disgruntled Southern Whigs into Cobb’s camp. Neither candidate aroused much enthusiasm. “The support of Cobb is a bitter dose to the Southern members,” Calhoun complained, “they have no confidence in him & our delegation, with great difficulty, were brought to vote for him.”7 The Taylorites loyally supported Winthrop, but were unable to bring the recalcitrant followers of Toombs and Stephens into line to win him a majority. The result was gridlock. Both candidates withdrew to allow others to step forward, but each candidacy befell the same fate as the one before. With the House unable to complete its preliminary task of organization, the federal government was effectively paralyzed. Daniel Dickinson expressed the feelings of many when he declared that “Washington is heavier than I ever knew it.”8

With no possibility of a breakthrough in sight, the members of the House finally relented on December 22 and resolved to elect a Speaker by plurality. On the final tally, Cobb’s followers outvoted Winthrop’s by a final vote of 102 to 99, with 5 apostate Southern Whigs and

9 Free Soilers throwing their support to other candidates. The unwillingness of Free Soilers to support Winthrop proved devastating to the transformational nationalists, as it effectively removed the North’s greatest asset—its ability to approve admission of California or apply the

Wilmot Proviso to any settlement bill in the House without any Southern support at all. Cobb’s

6 Quoted in David Warren Bowen, Andrew Johnson and the Negro (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 63. 7 Calhoun to John R. Matthews, December 6, 1849, John C. Calhoun Papers, 27, 131. 8 Dickinson to Mrs. Dickinson, December 22, 1849, Speeches...Etc. of Dickinson, 417; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 243-253.

153 election would prove an unmitigated triumph for the South and the pro-compromise forces. By securing the not inconsiderable power of the Speakership, Southern Unionists and sectional nationalists strongly enhanced their ability to force concessions from the North. Though Cobb could not be assured of his ability to command majority support, his ability to stack the committees with politicians favorable to the South and his control of the House calendar could ensure that any attempt to admit California without condition or to pass the Wilmot Proviso would be stymied. By ensuring that Free Soilers were not assigned to committees, he ensured that their ability to influence policy was limited to the greatest extent possible. As the political crisis progressed, the speakership would prove to be a powerful weapon that Cobb wielded expertly to extract a compromise bill. Most importantly, Cobb’s election as speaker made it nearly impossible that any bill he disapproved could be brought to the floor.9

Once the House was finally organized, the President’s annual message to Congress was presented to both houses. As was typically the case, the message was a committee effort. The completed message was disjointed and seemed hastily assembled, reinforcing perceptions that the administration was disorganized. A poorly worded passage where the President declared the

United States to be “at peace with all of the nations of the world, and seek to maintain our cherished relations with the rest of mankind,” provoked considerable mirth, although in the context of the revolutions of 1848 the distinction was perhaps not as absurd as the President’s critics imagined. The core of the President’s message, however, was held in two short statements buried amidst a general appeal to Unionism and moderation. “Should the [California]

9 Wilentz, Rise and Fall, 636; Potter, Impending Crisis, 90-91; Stegmaier, Texas, NM, 91-93.

154 constitution be conformable to...the requisitions of the Constitution of the United States, I recommend their application for…admission,” the President declared. “Preparatory to the admission of California and New Mexico, the people of each will have instituted…a republican form of government,” the President argued. “By awaiting their action,” he continued, “all causes for uneasiness may be avoided and confidence and kind feeling preserved.” By awaiting the action of the territories in determining whether slavery would be allowed, the President essentially sought to transform the slave issue from a national to a local controversy. “With a view of maintaining the…tranquility so dear to all,” he argued, “we should abstain from the introduction of those exciting topics of a sectional character which have hitherto produced painful apprehensions in the public mind.” He expected the people of California and New

Mexico to determine for themselves the future of slavery there, and cajoled the Congress to abide by that decision without the further politicization of slavery. Viewing the primary threat to the

Union as deriving from Southern nationalists, he invoked the spirit of the nation’s ideal statesman to warn Southern sectionalists against agitation. “I repeat the solemn warning of the first and most illustrious of my predecessors,” he warned, “against furnishing ‘any ground for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations.’” The solution, Taylor declared, was that

“attachment to the Union…should be habitually fostered in every American heart.” By invoking

Washington, Taylor was appealing to the members of Congress to subordinate their political, personal and sectional interests to the cause of the Union. To those who would not be persuaded by a patriotic appeal, Taylor made clear that he was equally willing to resort to force.

“Dissolution [of the Union],” the President warned, “would be the greatest of calamities.”

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“Whatever dangers may threaten it,” the old General warned, “I shall stand by it and maintain it in its integrity to the full extent of the obligations imposed and the powers conferred upon me by the Constitution.”10 In his mind (and in line with the thinking of most Southern Whigs), Taylor’s plan was not as one-sided as it seemed. By defusing and obviating the Wilmot Proviso, Taylor’s plan did include a real benefit to the South. However, Taylor left no doubt that the preservation of the Union was more important to him than any pecuniary interests over slavery. He was willing to exert the full weight of his administration, the federal government, and military force to preserve it. Southern nationalists recognized immediately that they could expect no support for their movement from the White House. “The Message is regard[ed] as affording conclusive evidence that the administration has taken sides with the North,” Calhoun concluded, “in all questions against the South.” In order to win concessions for the admission of California,

Southern sectionalists would have to overcome the Louisiana sugar planter in the White House.11

The power of the Presidency provided Zachary Taylor the opportunity to propose a plan for settlement, but his ability to settle the crisis was dependent on the willingness of Unionist

Southerners, especially Southern Whigs, to unite behind his plan. The administration could rely on the support of transformational nationalist Northern Whigs. While Northern Democrats would be expected to oppose the initiatives of a Whig administration, it was doubtful whether a large portion of Northern Democrats could oppose the admission of California and New Mexico if a vote could be forced. Northern support alone could provide a margin of victory in the

10 James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Vol. V (Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1902) 9-24. 11 Potter, Impending Crisis, 91-96; Morrison, Slavery and the American West, 105-106; Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, 23-24.

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House, but in the equally balanced Senate Southern support would be essential to the passage of legislation, and the consent of some Southerners would be needed to ensure that the settlement was accepted politically. As a result, the constituency that controlled the destiny of the

President’s plan was the constituency that superficially would most be expected to support it:

Southern Whigs. Southern Whigs and other Unionists by and large were noncommittal.

Representative Samuel Inge (D-AL) spoke for most Southern Democrats when he termed the

President’s plan the “California Proviso,” the functional equivalent of the Wilmot.12 William H.

Seward (W-NY) was thrilled to find the President “as willing to try conclusions” with Southern nationalists “as General Jackson was with the nullifiers.”13 Northern Whigs were confident that they would have the better of the California debate as long as the administration and Southern

Whigs held firm. As Samuel Phelps (W-VT) argued, California and New Mexico “have seen fit to abolish the institution….We of the North…can hardly be taxed with encroaching on the rights of the South” if they had abolished slavery of their own accord. “If…the power of the country…is exerted…for the purpose of planting amongst them an institution which they repudiated,” he argued, “a more egregious encroachment on the rights and liberties of any people cannot well be imagined than to attempt to impose [slavery] upon them.”14

With no prospect of any settlement plan originating from the divided and disorganized

House, the establishment of the terms of debate fell to the Senate. Unlike the House the Senate enjoyed a clear partisan Democratic majority. With its large number of experienced, moderate

12 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 104. 13 Seward to Weed, November 30, 1849, Thurlow Weed Papers [Microfilm Edition] University of Rochester, Rochester, New York. 14 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 93.

157 and outstanding statesmen and history as the deliberative branch of the government, expectations were high. If the controversy were to be settled rapidly, they would need to act swiftly and decisively. The Senate did neither. None of the President’s partisans introduced legislation to effect his plan, which provided an opening for Southern nationalists and other Unionists to complicate the debate by introducing a variety of new issues and approaches. Conspicuous by their silence were the longtime leaders of the Whig Party—Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.

With the President’s settlement plan in the field, the ability of Whigs to put aside personal and political differences and rally together for the good of country and party was in the hands of these men, especially Clay. In an attempt to forestall conflict, Taylor had invited Clay to dinner on December 13.15 Despite the efforts of Taylor and John Clayton, however, it was clear that

Clay would at best be cool to the administration and its initiatives. Clay’s moral authority had never been greater. As both a disappointed Presidential rival and the locus of Whig opposition to

Taylor, Clay’s endorsement of the President’s plan (or some facsimile thereof) would unify

Whigs and put to the lie his reputation for selfishness and arrogance. On the other hand, Clay’s opposition would ensure a divided Whiggery. Rather than come out for or against the President,

Clay and Webster initially were silent.16

The first proposal put forward in the Senate complicated the debate. On January 4, sectional nationalist Virginia Senator James M. Mason introduced a fateful new issue—an updated fugitive slave law. Recognizing that fugitive slaves represented an issue of principle in

15 During a brief conversation between the two men, Clay took issue with the administration’s patronage decisions in the name of disgruntled Congressional Whigs. 16 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor.Vol. 2, 265.

158 the Deep South, practical governance in the Border South, and pecuniary interest to Southern

Congressmen, Mason had cleverly crafted a bill that would maximize support from the South while maximizing controversy between Northerners. Mason’s proposal called for the extradition of suspected fugitive slaves to the South without the benefit of jury trial prior to removal. The decision to send suspected fugitives South would be rendered by a commissioner, who could extradite a suspected fugitive without the protection of a writ of habeas corpus. In addition, the commissioner could summon (Northern) citizens to form a posse to hunt suspected fugitives, on pain of a $1,000 fine for non-participation. As compensation for their services, commissioners would be paid $10 for every extradition of a suspected fugitive to the South, and $5 if the suspect was set free. Mason’s bill (as it was likely intended) provoked outrage from Northern representatives, especially transformational nationalists. Recognizing that the terms of the fugitive slave act, rather than its existence, would be the primary issue in the North, William

Seward introduced an amendment to guarantee a jury trial in the North for suspected fugitives.

While it was unlikely that Mason’s fugitive slave bill could be adopted as proposed, the idea of the passage of a strong fugitive slave bill as compensation to the South for the admission of

California proved to be influential. For the remainder of the debate, the question of the right of suspected fugitives to a jury trial in the North remained a sectional flash point.17

While the leaders of Senatorial Whiggery were conspicuous by their silence, Democratic

Unionists recognized the opportunity and seized the initiative. Denouncing the efforts of the administration to invite California and New Mexico to form state governments, they attempted to

17 Stegmaier, 95.

159 reframe the terms of the debate by introducing a series of alternative settlement plans that accomplished the opposite of what Taylor had proposed. Henry Foote (D-MS) was the first to introduce an alternative. Resurrecting several ideas from the previous session, on January 15

Foote proposed establishing territorial governments for California, New Mexico and Deseret. To offset the presumed eventual admission of some or all of the territories as free states, Foote proposed that Texas would be divided into two (presumably slave) states. Taken as a whole,

Foote’s plan represented a direct continuation of the debate from the 30th Congress. As had been the case previously, the establishment of territorial governments invited a continuation of the debate over whether Congress could restrict slavery in the territories and a resumption of debate over the Wilmot Proviso. Foote’s plan offered Southern Democrats a path out of the trap that

Taylor had laid for them, as well as providing a platform from which moderate Southern

Democrats could influence alternatives. An argument over the Wilmot Proviso put sectionalists in their strongest rhetorical position, while a debate over the admission of California was their weakest. Most importantly, Foote’s resolutions suggested that there were terms by which

Unionists could win Southern Democratic support. The introduction of Foote’s resolution was met with the predictable riposte from transformational nationalists—the Wilmot Proviso. The

Proviso was introduced by William H. Seward as an amendment to Foote’s bill, and the basic difficulty of organizing territorial governments was illustrated again. There were two essential difficulties inherent in Foote’s bill—which the Taylor plan was designed to avoid. First, the establishment of territorial governments required Congress to intervene and invited political interference on sectional grounds. Secondly, the establishment of territorial governments invited

160 future controversy, as the slavery issue would need to be re-litigated once the territories applied for statehood. These two problems would bedevil settlement plans throughout the debate.18

Like Foote’s territorial bill and Mason’s fugitive slave bill, a third Southern Democrat introduced legislation that complicated the territorial debate. Unlike the others, however,

Thomas Hart Benton (D-MO) had no particular sectional axe to grind. Rather, his bill, introduced on January 16, the day after Foote’s, proposed to settle the Texas/New Mexico boundary dispute, which he viewed as a straightforward negotiation that could easily be balanced between the sections. He would also compensate Texas with $15 million for the cession of all land west of 102 degrees. The amount of money strongly favored Texas, and the boundary strongly favored New Mexico.19 Benton’s proposal aided the debate by giving every side something to respond to and, aside from the most radical Texans and a not insignificant group of

Whigs who disputed Texas’s claim to any land at all, centered the debate over practical matters rather than rights and principles. The major complication that Benton’s bill introduced was to increase the sense of urgency in Texas to ensure the settlement of the boundary dispute by fait accompli. Rather than risk Congress legislating away their claim to the disputed territory, Texas moved quickly and increasingly brazenly to establish governance over the disputed territory—a policy that risked armed confrontation not only with New Mexico but with its Federal army garrison. As the debate continued, the Texas/New Mexico boundary dispute emerged, as Mark

Stegmaier has cogently observed, as the issue most likely to transform the territorial controversy

18 Stegmaier, 93-97. 19 Texas would retain more land, but receive less money, in the final settlement.

161 into a shooting war. At the same time, if the debate over the boundary could be reduced to one over dollars and acres, the potential for conflict would decrease dramatically.20

As Democratic assaults on the administration mounted, and accusations of impropriety around the President’s efforts to get the governments of California and New Mexico to draft state constitutions swirled, Taylor attempted to regain the political initiative. While Taylor had clearly enunciated his administration’s position on the territorial issue in private, and few in

Congress had any illusions about what he was proposing, he had not given clear public expression of his plans in regard to New Mexico. In order to regain the initiative, Taylor dropped the veil of ambiguity and threw his personal popularity behind the administration’s settlement plan. On January 21 and 23, in response to Congressional demands, Taylor sent messages that unambiguously stated the administration’s position. He directly acknowledged that his administration had requested that California and New Mexico draft and submit state constitutions in order to “put it in the power of Congress, by the admission of California and

New Mexico21 as states, to remove all occasion for the unnecessary agitation of the public mind.” In the message, Taylor asserted, in contradiction to the Southern Democratic doctrine that slavery followed the flag, that Mexican law (which outlawed slavery) remained in force in the territories. He requested that Northerners not insult the South by insisting on the imposition of the Wilmot Proviso, and denied the right of Congress to dictate “domestic institutions” to a

State.22 By moving decisively to reinvigorate his plan and forestall the continuing introduction

20 Stegmaier, 93. 21 New Mexico had initially fouled the President’s plan by framing a territorial constitution. 22 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. V, 26-30.

162 of what he considered divisive and dilatory peripheral issues, Taylor hoped that Congress could act quickly and rationally to admit California and New Mexico and end the territorial controversy, which he believed would allow the other issues to be debated rationally and deliberately. Taylor’s message was not designed to win converts, but to clarify lines. As a result, responses to the message were predictable. Abraham Venable (D-NC) spoke for most

Southern Democrats when he described the President’s message as “another gilded pill containing the deadly poison.”23 The difference between Taylor and Foote’s plans as to the disposition of the territories was critical. The stakes underlying this issue could not be higher.

The admission of California as a state would permanently remove the question of whether slavery could expand there from national politics, and render the second step of the plan, the admission of New Mexico, practically inevitable. The admission of New Mexico was equally critical, as it would transform the debate about the border between it and Texas into a question between sovereign states, and thus consign it to the Supreme Court. With Northern transformational nationalism united behind immediate statehood and Southern nationalism behind territories, the Unionists, especially Southern Whigs, were forced to choose a side. With the basic outline of the debate firmly defined, eyes turned to Henry Clay to see which side of the sectional divide he would come down upon.24

Clay had given a great deal of thought to the question of how to settle the controversy, with personal and political rivalries, patriotism, spite, sagacity and egoism playing a role in informing his course. Like Taylor and other Southern Whigs, Clay considered avoidance of the

23 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 164. 24 Holt, Rise and Fall, 474.

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Wilmot Proviso an essential concession to the South. An astute political thinker, Clay had recognized in June 1849 the centrality of the Texas/New Mexico boundary dispute to the prospects of a settlement. “More difficulty will be encountered,” he warned Thomas Stevenson,

“in fixing the boundaries of Texas than in deciding the question of the introduction of the introduction of slavery in the territories.”25 While Clay needed little inducement to inject himself into the territorial debate, he suffered from no lack of encouragement. “In Georgia the hope is extremely diffused that Mr. Clay means to crown his illustrious life with the adjustment of all of these questions,” Iverson Harris reported to John Berrien.26 These seeds found fertile ground in the mind of the always ambitious Great Compromiser. Having determined that he would “introduce some comprehensive scheme of settling amicably the whole question,” Clay requested time to speak on January 29.27

The Senate galleries were packed as Washington anxiously speculated about what the

Great Compromiser would propose to settle the controversy. From the outset of his speech, Clay made clear that he had no intention of adhering to the President’s plan. Rather, Clay proposed “a series of resolutions” which would provide “an amicable arrangement of all questions in controversy between the free and slave States.” Clay’s proposals encompassed seven distinct issues. First, Clay called for the admission of California as a state. From here, his plan diverged from Taylor. Rather than call for the admission of New Mexico as a state, Clay called for its organization as a territory without reference to slavery. He did not propose restricting the

25 Clay to Thomas Stevenson, June 19, 1849, quoted in Holt, Rise and Fall, 477. 26 Iverson Harrison to John Berrien, January 16, 1850, John MacPherson Berrien Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 27 Holt, Rise and Fall, 476-477.

164 territorial legislature from legislating on slavery, as some others suggested. However, there was a catch. Like Taylor, Clay considered Mexican law to remain in force. Like other Whigs, Clay rejected the Southern Democratic belief that the Constitution carried slavery with it. Slavery in

Mexico was illegal, and as a result if Mexican law were to remain in force in the territories, slavery would be illegal in the territories. By ensuring that Mexican law continued to govern,

Clay’s plan required affirmative action on the part of the territorial legislatures for slavery to be introduced there. “There does not exist, at this time,” he had declared, “slavery within any portion of the territory acquired by the United States from Mexico.” Clay directly stated that he

“never can, and never will vote…to spread slavery where it does not exist.” Moving on to the critical issue of the Texas/New Mexico boundary dispute, Clay proposed a settlement of the boundary that reduced claimed territory of Texas by one half, leaving it larger that Benton’s proposal but smaller than Foote’s. As compensation for Texas, Clay further proposed the assumption of Texas’s debt. Next, Clay proposed to restrict the public slave trade in the District of Columbia, while ensuring that private exchanges of slaves could still take place. At the same time, slavery in the District would remain legal, and that the interstate slave trade in the rest of the South would not be interfered with. Finally, Clay adopted the call for a revised fugitive slave law. Clay did not provide an elaborate set piece, but instead concluded the introduction of his resolutions with a simple (by Nineteenth century standards) appeal for “mutual forbearance,” and alleged that his proposals called for an equal measure of compromise on both sides.28

28 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 245-249; Holt, Rise and Fall, 475-480.

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Clay’s resolutions drew an immediate response from Southern Democrats who considered it no compromise at all, although they encompassed a significant concession to

Southern sentiments that has rarely been acknowledged then or since. Unlike the Taylor Plan,

Clay’s resolutions were deliberately conceived as a solution to the issue of the slavery, not the territorial, controversy. By increasing the scope of the settlement, Clay aimed to provide a more comprehensive settlement of all outstanding issues and thereby ensure the long-term stability of the Union. By adding the District of Columbia slave trade and the return of fugitive slaves to the broader issue of settling the territories of the Mexican Cession, Clay directly tied the settlement of the territorial crisis to the satisfactory settlement of these other issues. However, Clay also made clear that he did not expect slavery to ever expand into the Mexican Cession. While his proposal directly rejected the Wilmot Proviso, Clay made clear that he believed that slavery in the territories was illegal, and his bill ensured that this situation could only be changed by the affirmative action of the territorial legislatures. While his resolution for the assumption of

Texas’s debt was designed to appeal to Texas bondholders, his proposal for establishing the boundary of Texas, as Michael Holt has noted, would inadvertently shift 20,000 slaves into the territory of New Mexico.29 With either a “truly magnificent capacity for self-deception,” in

Holt’s words, or as an effort to duplicate the artful obfuscation that settled the second Missouri

Crisis, Clay presented his resolutions as calling for greater sacrifices from the North than the

South.30 He called upon the North to make the greater sacrifice because anti-slavery was a

29 This was likely unintentional, as few in Congress (including Clay) demonstrated much of an understanding of the geography of the American Southwest. This did not prevent them, however, from proposing boundaries. 30 Holt, Rise and Fall, 478.

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“sentiment without sacrifice…danger…hazard…peril…[or] loss.” The South, on the other hand, faced the destruction of its “social fabric, life, and all that makes life desirable.” In substance, however, Clay’s resolutions offered little to the South but an updated fugitive slave law in addition to the rejection of the Wilmot Proviso that it shared with the President’s plan. With the

Taylor Plan as the other viable alternative, Clay’s resolutions offered something that Southern politicians could point to as a concession, even if the substance of the concession was minimal. 31

While Clay’s plan offered the prospect of saving face, its provisions included a number of issues that appealed to different legislative alliances, and relied on the active endorsement by

Southern politicians in the deception that the plan favored the South. Southern Democrats and

Whigs differed on many issues, but one of the few issues that nearly every Southerner agreed upon was the unacceptability of the explicit barring of slavery in the territories. Southern nationalists, however, suspected that Clay’s proposal did just that. By declaring that the settlement plan favored the South, while taking the side of the North on the all-important question of slavery in the territories, Clay convinced many that his approach was fundamentally dishonest. Northern sectionalists saw no reason to abandon Taylor’s plan for Clay’s, while

Southern sectionalists were outraged by Clay’s duplicity. Rather than split either of the sectionalist factions, Clay’s plan divided Unionists between those who favored a resolution of the territorial issue first, those who prioritized seeking a comprehensive settlement of all issues related to slavery, and split supporters of himself and Taylor into antagonistic camps. By

31 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 249.

167 empowering the fringes and dividing the center, Clay’s resolutions made the adoption of a settlement more difficult. 32

The response to Clay’s resolutions was blistering, with Southern nationalists denouncing

Clay’s plan immediately upon its introduction. The next speakers—seven Southern Democrats and Whig John Berrien of Georgia—assailed Clay’s plan and attempted to engage Clay in defending it. Solomon Downs (D-LA) declared that “I consider the compromise no compromise at all,” a sentiment that was echoed by the others. In an effective and ruthless rebuttal, Jefferson

Davis (D-MS) criticized Clay’s resolutions. Asking whether “a measure in which we of the minority are to receive nothing, is a measure of compromise,” Davis’s criticism focused on the primary issue at stake, the settlement of the Mexican Cession. “Under the rule the Senator from

Kentucky adopts the effect would be the same” as slavery restriction. Unlike many critics of the settlement plans, Davis came with an alternative. The South, Davis argued, had “not asked that slavery should be established in California.” “We have only asked,” he continued, “that there should not be any restriction.” Despite this protestation, however, Davis indicated that he was willing to accept a restriction on slavery expansion if slavery expansion were affirmatively allowed elsewhere. “Never will I take,” Davis declared, “less than the Missouri Compromise line extended to the Pacific Ocean.”33 With his exchange with Clay, Davis not only succeeded in introducing a fourth proposed settlement that could rely on the support of many Southern

Democrats, but established a claim to preeminence among the Southern Democratic caucus.34

32 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 496-497. 33 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st session, 249-250. 34 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 498-499.

168

Davis’s exchange with Clay also resulted in another important, if seldom noted, development—it illuminated some of the nuances of Clay’s beliefs about preservation of the

Union and slavery expansion. Pressed by Davis, who rejected multiple entreaties by Clay to reserve discussion of his resolutions for another day, Clay admitted that his resolution would prove more advantageous to the South because it would open the entire Mexican Cession to possible slavery expansion. Noting that the Missouri Compromise line had been decided arbitrarily, Clay declared that “I consider it is much better for the South that the whole subject should be open on both sides of an imaginary line.”35 Davis’s probing revealed some of the contradictory impulses at the heart of Clay’s thinking about slavery in the territories, which he shared with many Unionist Whigs. Throughout his long career, Clay had long asserted that slavery was a necessary evil that would eventually be rendered obsolete by economic and technological modernization. He also believed that the eventual end of slavery could only be initiated within the slave states and must be managed in an orderly manner, preferably with federal assistance, to maintain social stability. When confronted by Southern threats of disunion, though, Clay’s priority was to accommodate the South to preserve the Union. Even then, however, he did so on the terms he considered the least friendly to the long-term expansion of slavery. Because he did not believe that slavery would expand into the Mexican Cession without affirmative policy to promote it, he was willing to open up the possibility of slavery throughout rather than define geographic limits for its expansion. At the same time, this argument called the

Missouri Compromise into question. If “the whole subject should be open on both sides of an

35 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 249.

169 imaginary line” within the Mexican Cession, wouldn’t that also be the case in the territory covered by the Missouri Compromise?36

Clay’s proposal was aimed at rallying three constituencies: Northern Democrats,

Southern Unionist Democrats and Southern Unionist Whigs. With Northern transformational nationalists almost certain to remain committed to the Wilmot Proviso or the President’s plan and many Southern nationalists openly hostile to his proposal, Southern Whigs would be the key constituency that Clay would need to rally to his plan. Aside from his proposal to organize New

Mexico as a territory, Clay’s resolutions presented as separate issues did not necessarily contradict Taylor’s recommendation. At the same time, his plan gave border Whigs something concrete that they could present as a concession—the fugitive slave law. The problem, as always, was the territorial settlement. Southern Whigs could not endorse a plan that disadvantaged slaveholders in the territories, which is precisely why they had proven resistant to

Taylor’s plan. Most Southern Whigs held their tongues, but expressed their displeasure by beginning to formulate another proposal. As Michael Holt has noted, “to endorse the plan as

[Clay] presented it would betray the South and sign their political death warrants.”37 While Clay had deliberately introduced his resolutions separately in the hope that he could avoid uniting the opponents of the various measures, his plan was problematic in that there was something within it for everyone to dislike. Rather than unite Unionists in both sections, he divided Unionists

36 Ibid. 249-259. Holt, Rise and Fall, 478. 37 Holt, Rise and Fall, 482.

170 between those who favored his plan, those who followed Taylor’s, and those who wanted another alternative.38

While Clay’s plan was damaged from the outset by his dissembling over how it impacted slavery in the territories and its intellectual linkage of controversial subjects, the efforts of its supporters would inflict additional damage over the course of the debate. The first and most critical complication was introduced by Henry Foote (D-MS), who proposed in February 5 to combine Clay’s various resolutions into a single bill. By linking the issues together, Foote seems to have believed that Clay’s resolutions could be transformed into a formal sectional grand bargain that both sections would be willing to acquiesce in. By forcing each side to support measures that would benefit the other, the combined bill would restore good feelings and tie political leaders to the permanency of the settlement. Clay disagreed. Previous experience had shown him that the combination of controversial subjects was dangerous at best, fatal at worst.

During his formal speech on his resolutions on February 5, he expressed that his “desire was that the Senate should express its sense upon each of the resolutions.”39 In addition to the legislative benefits that this would confer, it would also align with the President’s stated preference.

Instead, Foote’s “omnibus speech” had “introduced all sorts of things and every sort of passenger, and myself among the number.”40 While Foote’s motion would have immediate and long-ranging consequences for the passage of a compromise bill, it also revealed a deeper problem for Clay. With Northern Whigs overwhelmingly supportive of the President’s plan and

38 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 284-286; Holt, Rise and Fall, 482-487. 39 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 356. 40 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 365-369.

171

Southern Whigs ambivalent at best about his, Clay’s support was based predominantly among members of a Democratic Party that owed him nothing. Clay and his Democratic allies were

Unionists. But they differed fundamentally on their ideals of the proper role of government and in their opinions about the long-term future of slavery in the United States. Democrats were committed to popular sovereignty in the territories. From the outset, Northern Democrats provided the strongest base for support for an omnibus settlement, a fact which served to increase tensions between Clay and Taylor. Among Northerners, the divisions between Taylor’s and Clay’s supporters would increasingly prove less factional and more partisan and ideological.

This dynamic would play into the already extant intra-Whig dispute over patronage, causing

Michigan Whig Harry Barnes to lament to Seward that “it is expected Whigs will defeat Whigs by soliciting the aid of opposition locofoco Senators.”41

For their part, Northern Locofocos did not limit themselves to interfering in the patronage issues of their opponents. They also sought to distinguish themselves from Northern Whigs by trumpeting their moderation and adherence to the Union. Lewis Cass, the Democratic standard- bearer in 1848, believed that the “Union is in the most eminent danger,” and, “nothing can save us but a spirit of moderation from the North and South.”42 While anti-slavery Whigs and Free

Soilers could play the demagogue, Northern Democrats, he stated, must make “the preservation and perpetuation of the Union” their platform.43 In order to accomplish this, Cass would take a

41 Henry Barnes to Seward, January 18, 1850, William H. Seward Papers [Microfilm Edition], University of Rochester, Rochester, NY; Hamilton, Prologue, 62; Bordewich, 151-153. 42 Quoted in Holt, Rise and Fall, 485. 43 Gideon Welles to William Meredith, February 19, 1850, William M. Meredith Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

172 risky political stand—he would openly denounce and refuse to be bound by the resolution that the Michigan legislature had passed instructing its Representatives to support the Wilmot

Proviso. The Proviso, Cass declared, “is dangerous in itself, or profitless in its result.” “Those who oppose it cannot change their convictions of right,” he asserted, “and will not change the conviction that its feelings and interests will be sacrificed in violation of the great compact which makes us one political family.” Like other Unionists, and unlike nationalists of both sections,

Cass attributed the existence of the “political family” of the United States to its governing documents, and not to popular or cultural identity. With the Constitution—the very definition of the nation—at stake, Cass was led to question “is it worth the cost?” “To place this barren and…unconstitutional proviso on the statute book,” he thundered, “is that recompense for the wounds that would be inflicted?” For his part, Cass declared, “I will engage in no crusade against the South, from whatever motives it originates.”44

In his set-piece speech on his settlement plan, Clay appealed to his partisan opponents to back his settlement, reiterated that territorial government should be established without reference to slavery, offered a contrast with the President’s plan without directly attacking the administration, and appealed to the patriotism and Unionism of the Congress. The key to Clay’s argument was his attribution of blame for the crisis not to any inherent incompatibility of the free and slave economies or the cultures of the two sections, but rather to the perfidious influence of political parties. “The cause of all of our present dangers and difficulties,” he declared, could be

44 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 73; Bordewich, 155-159.

173 blamed upon “the violence and intemperance of party spirit.”45 By ascribing the crisis to ambitious politicians who exacerbated sectional tensions for their personal political benefit, he sought to identify Southern nationalist opponents of his plan as ambitious politicians, in contrast to the patriotic ones who supported his settlement. As Northern Democrats had proven most receptive to his proposal, Clay also acknowledged the contribution of his erstwhile political opponents. He reaffirmed his earlier statement that under his plan territorial legislatures could dispose of slavery as they saw fit. Clay also subtly but clearly underlined the differences between his plan and Taylor’s through his discussion of the multiple subjects covered by his plan. “It seemed to me to be doing very little,” Clay stated, “if we settled one question and left other disturbing questions unadjusted.”46 It was vintage Clay. Willing, as had been the case during the second Missouri Compromise, to use deliberate and politic ambiguity and obfuscation to allow different interpreters to claim differing interpretations of its meaning to different audiences, Clay was incapable of allowing a similar obfuscation to occur in the assignment of credit. Whereas some Whigs, including the editors of the administration’s own newspaper, were willing to promote the fiction that Clay’s plan essentially conformed with Taylor’s recommendation, Clay would have none of it. The ability to find enemies amongst his potential allies was one of the defining characteristics of the great statesman who popular legend held

“would rather be right than be President.”47

45 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 115. 46 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 116. 47 Bordewich, 149-154.

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Although the galleries cheered Clay’s speech and the press of both parties sung his praises, his speech had done little to change minds and less to change votes. Northern Whigs remained firmly behind Taylor, Southern Whigs remained cool to all proposals, Northern

Democrats remained supportive. While Clay’s plan had engendered sufficient support in the

Senate to ensure that it would be considered as an ultimate resolution, it was by no means alone.

Taylor’s plan continued to have partisans, the Missouri Compromise line remained popular among Southern Democrats, and a group of around 12 Senators aligned with Daniel Webster and

John Bell had begun discussions about an alternative plan. As the Senate settled into a protracted debate, the universe of possible settlements remained vast. As had been the case when Clay introduced his resolutions, his speech was followed by Jefferson Davis, who again called for the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific.

Davis’s speech extended the arguments that he had presented in his comments following the introduction of Clay’s resolutions, and represented both a statement of principle and a bid to assume leadership of the Southern nationalist faction. Davis’s argument was structured around several main points. First, he rejected the argument of Clay and many others that the climate of the Mexican Cession would preclude the expansion of slavery there. Noting that slaves were eminently capable of mining gold in California, he asserted that Henry Clay, not God, was precluding the expansion of slavery into the West. Clay “has chosen to throw his influence,”

Davis accused, “into the scale of the aggressive preponderating majority.” Rather than be allowed to share equally in the common territory, Clay’s proposal ensured that “the South should be restricted from further growth—that around her should be drawn…a sanitary cordon to

175 prevent the extension of her moral leprosy.” Also, Davis pointedly rejected the notion that the crisis had been brought about by the efforts of a fanatical abolitionist majority. Rather, the crisis had been brought about by “the cold, calculating purpose of those who seek for sectional dominion.” “It is no longer the clamor of a noisy fanaticism,” he warned, “but the steady advance of a self sustaining power.” In his analysis of the problem, Davis combined his vision of the South as a distinct nation within the country and the traditional narrative of Northern aggression that underlay Southern nationalist sentiment. Despite this, Davis did not espouse dissolution of the Union. Rather, his preferred resolution was to reform the political system to ensure the security of the Southern nation against the Northern. “It would be a blessing,” he argued, an essential means to preserve the Confederacy, that in one branch of Congress the North and the other the South should have a majority of representation.”48 To this end, he recommended delaying the admission of California and extending the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean. While Davis’s plan had the advantage of simplicity and permanence, it would require the acquiescence of the North in the overt extension of slavery into presently free territory. It was a proposition that no Northern nationalist, and few Northern Unionists could support.49

While the Senate in mid to late February concerned itself with statements of principle, actions in the House limited the scope of the possible and resulted in the creation of new,

Democratic response to the assorted Whig settlement plans. On February 13, President Taylor forwarded to Congress the newly drafted California State constitution, the essential requirement

48 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 146-157. 49 Bordewich, 146-150; William J. Cooper, Jr. Jefferson Davis, American (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 188-190.

176 for admission to the Union. In an attempt to force an unencumbered admission bill through the

House, Representative James Doty (FS-OH) attempted to force the previous question, confident that the Northern majority in the House, forced to take a side on the admission of California in an up-or-down vote, would be forced to comply. Doty’s logic was sound—Northern

Representatives would have risked political suicide to vote against the admission of California.

He did not, however, reckon on the power of the Speaker. From the chair Cobb recognized only

Southern Representatives, allowing them to filibuster the motion. Lacking the supermajority needed to overrule the Speaker, Northern Representatives were unable to break the filibuster, and the motion was allowed to expire at the end of the day. The result was devastating to transformational nationalists and the Taylor administration. As the Wilmot Proviso had been adopted in the House several times during previous sessions, it had generally been assumed that

California would face its most difficult test in the Senate. The failure of the House to admit

California as a state weakened the hand of the supporters of immediate admission, and strengthened the argument of those arguing for concessions in return for admission. The actions of the Speaker further exacerbated sectional tensions. Most decisively, by demonstrating the inability of the House to act and formulate settlements, Cobb placed the initiative firmly in the hands of the Senate. It increased the likelihood eventual settlement would likely need to pass the sectionally balanced Senate before being concurred with by the Northern-dominated House, a process that would inestimably strengthen the South. 50

50 Holt, Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, 483-485

177

While publicly the House appeared gridlocked and ineffective, behind the scenes a motley collection of Unionist House leaders were engaged in discussions that were to transform the debate. This alliance of strange bedfellows included the Speaker of the House, Howell Cobb, along with his erstwhile political opponents and quasi-southern nationalists Robert Toombs (W-

GA) and Alexander Stephens (W-GA). Joining the bipartisan Georgia alliance were Democrats

Linn Boyd (D-KY), John Miller (D-OH), William Richardson (D-IL), and John McClernand (D-

IL), the latter two allies of Stephen Douglas. Among themselves these members, with the likely connivance of Douglas, gave form to a hybrid plan that would provide the eventual basis of the settlement. Their settlement consisted of several parts. California would be admitted as a state.

The territory of Texas would be reduced and the border with New Mexico defined. Texas would be compensated by the adoption of the federal government of Texas’s debt. The slave trade in the District of Columbia would be restricted. A stronger fugitive slave law would be put in place, which would allow for the extradition of fugitives to the South without trial by jury in the

North. Finally, and most critically, the territories would expressly and without obfuscation be organized on the principle of popular sovereignty. Superficially, the proposal resembled Clay’s plan. However, it would open the territories to possible slavery expansion through popular sovereignty without Clay’s deliberate ambiguity. The bipartisan plan offered the opening of the

Mexican Cession to slavery and an ironclad fugitive slave law for the admission of California

(acknowledged by most to be inevitable) and a symbolic but ineffective law restricting public slave sales. While the bipartisan agreement in the House was not introduced formally, there is

178 no question that Stephen Douglas was well aware of its terms. In Douglas, the bipartisan plan would have an effective champion.51

The Georgian Representatives and their Northern allies were not the only group of

Unionists active in formulating an alternative settlement. A bipartisan (but seemingly Whig- dominated) group of around 12 Senators were formulating a new proposal. Led by Daniel

Webster and John Bell, they attacked the problem by defining the root cause as one of sectional power.52 Webster had been late to recognize the extent of the danger that the crisis entailed. As late as mid-January, he was insisting that “the Union is not in danger.”53 A month later, he was confident that “things will come off,” predicting that “California will come in,” then “New

Mexico will be postponed” and “no bones will be broken.” 54 While Webster’s assessment of the situation seemed laconic, he soon began working with John Bell to develop a settlement based on his assessment of the situation. For his part, Bell leaned toward Taylor’s side. “I believe

General Taylor is sound on every point,” he advised David Campbell, and predicted that “by his justice, moderation and firmness [would] stay the tide of fanaticism at the North.”55 The Whig press of Tennessee likewise burnished his credentials as a Taylor ally, declaring that “Bell is

51 Holt, Rise, 486-487. 52 It is unclear who the other participants in the development of the plan were. Bell’s role is clear as he was the one to introduce the resolution, and he indicated that up to a dozen other Senators had participated in the discussions. Webster’s role can be inferred due to an outline of the plan being floated as a trial balloon by a newspaper aligned with Webster prior to its introduction by Bell, though Webster never formally acknowledged participation in the effort. It is likely that the majority of the other participants were Southern Whigs, as Bell was adamant, publicly and privately, that the eventual settlement plan should be proposed by a Northerner, though he wound up introducing the plan himself. 53 Webster to Franklin Haven, January 13, 1850, Charles Wiltse, (ed.) Daniel Webster Papers Correspondence. Vol. 3 (Hanover: University Press of New England, ). 54 Webster to Peter Harvey, February 13, 1850, Webster Papers. 55 Bell to David Campbell, David Campbell Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, NC.

179 regarded as the right arm of the Administration in the Senate,” and “evidently has great influence with the President and his cabinet.”56 In the previous session, he had introduced a bill to admit

California as a state. While Bell did not publicly reject Clay’s proposal, he retained a number of concerns about its provisions. During the debates, Bell always spoke for himself alone, but would remain critical of Clay and generally supportive of Taylor.57

Unlike the other proposals, the Webster-Bell plan focused exclusively on the implications of California admission for the sectional distribution of power. Also unlike the other plans,

Webster and Bell identified the most crucial issue as the sectional imbalance that California admission would introduce in the Senate. Since the establishment of a Northern majority in the

Senate was likely to be permanent due to demography, the goal of their settlement was to ensure

Southern acquiescence in the eventual loss of sectional parity. In their view, it would be best for the country if the end of sectional parity in the Senate came at the hand of Southerners. To achieve this, on February 28, Bell proposed a new three-part plan. Like the Taylor plan, it focused exclusively on the territorial issue. Also like Taylor, it proposed the immediate admission of California. Unlike Taylor, it did not include the admission of New Mexico as a state as an essential component. “This proposition,” he explained “would prevent the coming in of a new State before the people of the territory shall be duly qualified to take upon themselves the charge of self-government,” an opinion, presumably informed by the large Latino population

56 William C. “Parson” Brownlow to T.A.R. Nelson, March 19, 1849, T.A.R. Nelson Papers, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville. 57 John H. Parks, John Bell of Tennessee (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Stegmaier, 105- 108.

180 of New Mexico, that was widely held in Southern Whig circles.58 Unlike Clay, it did not expressly continue Mexican law in the territories, but indirectly adopted the popular sovereignty formula of the House bipartisan plan. The crucial difference was that these two resolutions would be adjoined to a third, which would invite Texas, as stipulated in the treaty of annexation of 1845, to divide into up to two additional slave states. While this idea was nothing new, its attachment to the California and New Mexico bills was the crux of the Bell Plan. Like most

Whigs, Bell was convinced that geography made the continued expansion of slavery improbable.

Bell went a step further, however, and clearly declared that his proposal explicitly would mark the end of slavery expansion. Any new slave states created out of Texas (and New Mexico if it so chose) would be “the last of [their] race,” Bell argued, and “[would] and must close the account…of slave States then and forever, or as long as the Union lasts.”59 Whether Texas accepted or rejected division was immaterial to the larger issue. “Say that Texas refuses her assent,” Bell explained, “just credit will be due to the policy and magnanimity, or rather justice of the North, in…making it depend on the consent of the South, (of Texas,) whether this new state will be admitted into the Union.”60 Bell had no expectation that Texas would choose to divide itself into additional states. If Texas chose not to do so, however, it would sacrifice sectional parity in the Senate, and Southerners would have no one but other Southerners to blame for the loss.61

58 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 437. 59 Ibid. 437. 60 Ibid. 436. 61 Stegmaier, 105-108; Hamilton, Prologue, 89.

181

In his speech introducing the resolution, Bell repeatedly identified the problem with the territories as essentially political. Like Taylor, his primary concern was to ensure that the Wilmot

Proviso was not enacted and Southern honor would be preserved. An anti-party former

Jacksonian who had broken with the Democratic Party in 1836, Bell operated from a position of unusual political independence and long experience in Washington. A former Speaker of the

House, Bell was a staunch Unionist who charted an independent course (having previously voted against the Gag Rule) and owed nothing to Henry Clay. He based his approach on the

“necessary evil” defense of slavery and the conviction that modernization would lead inevitably to peaceful evolution away from the slave economy. He decried calls for immediate emancipation on practical, not moral, grounds. The condition of slaves, he declared, “cannot be saved, though their masters should will it, without destruction alike to the interests and welfare of both master and slave.”62 In introducing his resolutions, Bell indicated that he was open to adjustment and that the result had been a group effort. Because the crisis was primarily political, he believed that the process utilized in reaching the settlement was as important as the final terms. The identity of the makers of combinations, in his mind, was crucial. In an allusion to

Webster’s role in developing the plan, Bell declared his preference that the final compromise proposal “must come from the gentlemen…from the North, where the power exists to settle this question.” At the same time, he also believed that when the expansion of slavery was to end, it must be Southerners who would make the determination. While Henry Foote had previously suggested the division of Texas as a possible solution to the crisis, Bell was the only politician to

62 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1106.

182 tie the settlement to the explicit understanding that slavery expansion would end at a defined point. If Texas chose to divide, sectional parity in the Senate would be maintained. If not, the end of slavery expansion would have come at the hand of slaveholders. With the territorial issue settled—with either sectional parity maintained in the Senate or slave economy expansion halted by Texas—both North and South would have committed to the admission of California and settlement of the territories. Other issues were tangential and could be settled later. “These questions,” Bell predicted, “can be readily and satisfactorily adjusted, if only we can settle this great question.”63 In his address, Bell both emphasized the similarities with and difference from the President’s plan. Bell deftly indicated his overall support of the Administration (and expressly left the door open, as Clay did not, for the Administration to adopt his plan as its own) while altering a provision to make it more palatable to the South.64 As had been the case with

Clay’s plan, the Whig press, including the Washington Republic, was broadly supportive of

Bell’s effort. Bell’s plan “resembles that of the PRESIDENT,” the Administration organ noted,

“and was “regarded with a very general favor.”65 The most salient criticism of the Bell plan came from Texas, which had no interest in dividing nor in being pushed into the uncomfortable corner that Bell had drawn up for it. In sum, however, Bell seemed to have achieved his goal.

His proposal provided a platform around which Whigs as divergent as Taylor, Toombs and

63 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 438. 64 Bell’s emphasis on ensuring the ability of the residents of the territories to assume self-government also stemmed from a mistake he had made in the previous session. While introducing his California resolution, Bell, in a display of tortured logic, argued that California be admitted so civil government could be established over its feral inhabitants. When an opponent questioned why such people should be admitted into representative government, Bell’s resolution went down to ignominious defeat. Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirtieth Congress. Second Session, 253. 65 Washington Republic, March 20, 1850.

183

Stephens could rally. While the three Southern Whig plans espoused by Taylor, Clay and Bell differed in many respects, none of them prioritized the expansion of slavery. While each had left a notional opening for slavery to expand, each had placed impediments in its path. Like the

Jeffersonian Republicans, they believed that development in the South would follow a similar pattern as had been the case in the slaveholding North, with slavery becoming an increasingly minor and anachronistic appendix to a robust, modern industrial economy.66 As a result, the three Whig plans shared a common priority—to permanently arrest the sectional conflict so modernization could progress. While Southern Democrat sectionalists—most eloquently represented by Jefferson Davis—made the case that the end of slavery was neither inevitable nor desirable, none of them espoused a solution beyond the continuation of the Missouri

Compromise line and the cessation of anti-slavery agitation.

It remained to John C. Calhoun, the great (if impractical) theorist of slavery’s perpetuation to follow the case to its logical conclusion and propose reform of the essential structure of the government to accommodate the continuation of slavery. Although too ill to present his proposal to the Senate, Calhoun was confident of recovery and expected to lead the

South to a permanent solution to the slavery controversy—within the Union if possible, without if necessary. With the Southern Convention pending in Nashville representing the seriousness of

Southern intent, Calhoun was confident that the moment was nigh when the central government would resolve the issue of federal protection of slavery once and for all. With Calhoun silently in attendance, Senator James Mason (D-VA) offered Calhoun’s proposal for remaking the

66 Howe, Political Culture, 238-245.

184 central government to ensure that slavery and the free economy could peacefully coexist in the same Union indefinitely. While many analyses of Calhoun’s speech have focused on what

Calhoun meant with the (deliberately) vague proposals that he put forward in his address, it also raised interesting questions related to the state of national identity in the Union and its implications for national politics.67 The Constitution was crafted to balance the political system where each state maintained a unique identity and where cultural institutions, including slavery, spanned both sections. The Union, for Calhoun, succeeded because it played a positive role in bringing the states’ common interests together while respecting and avoiding intervention in their differences. The problem, as Calhoun saw it, was that distinct national identities had emerged in the North and South. The “cords holding the fabric of the nation together,” were fraying.

Recognizing the division of churches along sectional lines, he noted that “the agitation of the slavery question has snapped some of the most important ones, and has greatly weakened all the others.” This had resulted in “an almost universal discontentment which pervades all the states comprising the southern section of the Union.” If nothing was done to arrest this dynamic,

Calhoun argued, soon “nothing will be left to hold the states together except force.”68

Like Bell’s plan, Calhoun’s settlement approached the territorial crisis as political in nature, and his reforms sought to perpetuate what the admission of California threatened—the sectional balance of power. Unlike the Bell and Clay plans, however, Calhoun identified the admission of California as an unacceptable act for which no concession to the South could

67 See Bordewich, 158; Remini, Clay, 742-743; Dalzell, Daniel Webster, 174. 68 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session,,451-529. Styron, 344-349.

185 compensate. With the admission of California, Calhoun argued, the North would hold a potential stranglehold on the majorities in all of the branches of the United States government.

The current elected institutions—House, Senate and Presidency—could be dominated by a

Northern majority with no Southern support. The unelected branch of the government—the

Supreme Court—would in due course fall under the dominion of the North as well. “If you admit her [California] under all of the difficulties that oppose her admission,” he warned, “you compel us to infer that you intend to exclude us from then, the whole of the acquired territory.”

In order to ensure that slaveholder rights would be secured against the possibility of domination by a hostile Northern majority, Calhoun proposed to extend and perpetuate sectional balance through a vague proposal to ensure that each section held an effective veto over the actions of the central government. This reform, he argued, would guarantee the rights of slaveholders and eliminate the potential for Northern interference with Southern institutions. With Southerners ensured of an equal say in the matters of the federal government, Calhoun argued, the slavery controversy would become irrelevant. If, on the other hand, California were to be admitted without the reform of the Federal government, the South should secede. The North’s options were to reform the Constitution to ensure Southern sectional parity, separate peacefully, or go to war. The loss of sectional parity in the Senate would represent the loss of the ability of the South to resist encroachments by the Northern majority. While Calhoun viewed secession as undesirable, the reduction of the South to a minority in all branches of the central government would make it necessary.69

69 Styron, Cast Iron Man, 344-349.

186

Calhoun’s speech was learned, but it was not particularly persuasive. Northern

Democrats, the key allies in any settlement along the lines Calhoun proposed, shrugged him off.

Calhoun was “a sour and discontented man,” Gideon Welles complained to Daniel Dickensen, who “has no aspirations connected to the integrity of the Democratic Party.”70 Stephen Douglas, emerging as the pre-eminent power-broker among the Northern Democracy, thought that “the proposition of the Senator from South Carolina is utterly impracticable.”71 His primary objection was that “it would destroy the great principle of popular sovereignty” that had underpinned

Northern Democratic (and Douglas’s own) thinking on the settlement. Beyond this, Calhoun’s proposal would also undermine, if not repudiate, the very idea of popular government.

Nonetheless, Calhoun’s proposal had highlighted a basic problem with any settlement plan that

Congress could pass—that the admission of California with no offsetting slaveholding state would undermine the legitimacy of the central government with slaveholders. Events in the next decade would prove Calhoun’s concerns to be well founded. While his analysis of the problem proved cogent, Calhoun’s proposal for solving it appealed to few. No major faction of

Democrats outside of South Carolina were ready to abandon popular government as either a matter of principle or policy. While many Democratic sectionalists agreed that the admission of

California was potentially fatal to the perpetuation of the Union, their preferred remedy was the extension of slave territory into the Mexican Cession and beyond. In contrast with the plan for extending the Missouri Compromise line proposed by Davis, Calhoun’s proposition had the twin

70 Welles to Dickinson, January 28, 1850, Dickinson Papers, 422. 71 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 373.

187 disadvantages of complexity and an inherent repudiation of popular government. Davis had argued earlier in the session that “I…trust…in the intelligence and patriotism of the masses,” and

“I put no faith in politicians.”72 Calhoun’s proposal devised a structure of government to do the opposite. The ideological descendants of Andrew Jackson, most Southern Democrats were inclined towards Davis’s view. Southern Whigs—key players in three major settlement plans— were far too preoccupied with developing and debating their own proposals to endorse one proposed by their ancient enemy Calhoun. While Calhoun’s proposal would unquestionably have settled the territorial crisis, his association with the plan was toxic in the North, and his rapidly declining physical condition made it impossible for him to advance his cause himself.

While Calhoun expected to recover from his illness, very few (correctly) expected him to survive. Calhoun’s proposal was treated respectfully, but indifferently. Consequently, despite intense scholarly interest in Calhoun’s address (and its undeniably dramatic overtones), its direct impact on the debate was minimal.73

The primary impact of Calhoun’s proposal on the debate was not in the considerations of his proposal, but that it marked a shift in the debate from the introduction of new issues and plans to one of more general speechifying. A long (though memorable) series of speeches in which Senators primarily offered extended rebuttals of positions taken by other Senators followed, led off by the greatest orator in the Senate. The last of the “Great Triumvirate” to give a speech on the crisis, Daniel Webster had to this point been maddeningly silent on the issue.

Having tried his hand at compromise-building with John Bell in February, Webster avoided

72 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 52-54. 73 Bordewich, 156-162; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 302-305.

188 taking a public stand on the issue as he weighed his options. While he had participated in the development of the plan that Bell introduced, he disagreed with the provision that Bell included to request the division of Texas. At the same time, he retained reservations about Clay’s plan.

His attitude toward Taylor’s plan was more ambiguous. On one hand, his participation in the formulation of an alternative proposal indicated that he retained at least some reservations about

Taylor’s approach. On the other, as late as April he was still indicating that he supported

Taylor’s plan.74 Webster’s public silence and private mixed messages fueled rumor and innuendo about which settlement he supported. It is likely that Webster himself was not firmly affixed to any of them. What was clear was that Webster supported a compromise settlement.

What was also clear was that Webster felt no bond of loyalty to the Taylor administration.

Webster’s anti-slavery Whig opponents in Massachusetts had been the primary recipients of administration patronage. While Taylor had extended a customs post to Webster’s son, once

Fletcher had been confirmed Webster had little pecuniary incentive to support the administration.

In matters of patronage, the option to make common cause with Democrats to block

Administration appointments in Massachusetts was a viable strategy.75 Committed to no plan, and able to block his intra-party opposition from patronage, Webster enjoyed the luxury of being able to act according to his conscience. When it came time to speak, Webster was able to focus

74 Robert Winthrop to Edward Everett, April 7, 1850, Edward Everett Papers Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. 75 Holt, Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, 508-509.

189 his effort on a refutation of Calhoun’s speech and appeal to patriotism. It was a task that the leading rhetorician of the Nineteenth century was uniquely suited.76

Webster’s speech was a masterpiece of patriotic sentiment and Unionist ideology that sought to contextualize the differences between the sections but offered little to advance the debate. Webster struck the theme of his speech in the first sentence, claiming to be speaking

“Not as a Northern man or a Southern man but as a Union man,” and patriotism demanded that the Senate should “hear me for my cause.” By distancing himself from his identity as a representative of a Northern state, Webster freed himself to identify common ground between the sections (and implicitly the defining features of the nation), and by identifying himself with a positive construction of the Union as a nation, rather than a political system, he freed himself to offer criticism to both sections. While Webster included criticism of Democratic expansionism, he ultimately blamed radicals in both sections for the crisis, and his harshest words were directed against anti-slavery Northerners. Like most Unionists, Webster believed that the climate of the

Southwest would preclude slavery expansion there. Asserting that the Mexican Cession was

“fixed for freedom by…a[n]…irrepealable law,” nature, he argued that it was unjust for

Northerners to insist on imposing the Wilmot Proviso on the territory. He also bucked his section by arguing for the need for a stronger fugitive slave law. At the same time, he warned that “peaceable secession is an utter impossibility.” The country could and should continue indefinitely as one Union with two economic systems. Webster’s vision was a classic expression

76 Daniel Walker Howe provides the best analysis of Webster as a master of classical rhetoric in Political Culture of the American Whigs, 212-245; Robert F. Dalzell Jr. Daniel Webster and the Trial of American Nationalism, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 177-195.

190 of the Unionist civic nationalism. The preservation of the Union in and of itself was the ideal that predominated over any other, particularly over any principles related to slavery. Webster did not offer a new proposal, but rather crafted a largely emotional appeal for compromise in general that appealed to politicians on the grounds of patriotic sentiment, racial identity and

Nineteenth century ideals of the statesman. “Let us not be pigmies [sic] in a case that calls for men,” he chastised his colleagues. Webster’s address utilized the full breadth of his rhetorical art,77 and sought to provide to the moderate middle some of the passion that emboldened sectional radicals on both sides.78

In practical terms, Webster’s speech offered little new to the debate. However, his speech did provide a subtle revision to Unionist orthodoxy. He expressed neither support for nor criticism of the President’s plan. He did not endorse Clay’s plan, nor Bell’s. His primary legislative contribution was the proposal of a different border for Texas than those submitted by

Benton and Clay. Webster’s argument that slavery was effectively barred from the Mexican

Cession by nature was received wisdom among Southern Whigs and Northern conservatives, though Webster’s express rejection of the Wilmot Proviso did little to recommend his position to the Northern Whig caucus. If anything, his failure to recommend a territorial government for

New Mexico could easily be interpreted as support for Taylor. This may have been Webster’s intent, as he advised unsuccessful Speaker candidate (and his eventual successor in the Senate)

Robert Winthrop that he would support “Genl. Taylor’s plan, unless he himself should

77 Webster’s “Seventh of March” speech became and continues to be a textbook staple. 78 Holt, Rise and Fall, 488-489; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 307-315; Bordewich, 165-172.

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…recommend…a Territorial Government for New Mexico.”79 Because it was at best unclear after his speech which plan Webster supported, his effort did not boost the fortunes of any of the contesting plans. It did, however, reflect an evolution in Unionist thinking that would become significantly important in the 1850s. By privileging preservation of the Union over any other political principle, Webster foreshadowed the process by which Unionists through the course of the 1850s would be willing to drop any affirmative political program in order to maintain sectional unity. While this development would occur in the future, the immediate impact that

Webster’s speech would have on the debate was not in its ability to win converts to the Unionist cause, but in the response it would provoke from transformational nationalist Northern Whigs.80

Since most Northern states had instructed their legislators to support the Wilmot Proviso, and the vast majority of Northern Whigs supported it as a matter of principle as well, Webster’s open repudiation of it inspired wrath throughout the North and particularly among his party members. As the leading transformational nationalist Whig political strategist, Thurlow Weed, noted, “Gen. Taylor found a way around the Proviso…Mr. Webster dashes his brain out against it.” Instead of convincing Weed to rally behind Webster, the 4th of March speech led him to the conclusion that “we can sustain ourselves and the Administration only by standing firmly up for

Gen. Taylor’s plan for California and New Mexico.”81 As the North’s most prominent Senator,

Webster expected his reputation and rhetoric to sway the section toward conciliation. Instead, it cleared the way for others to challenge each other for the position of spokesman for the North.

79 Quoted in Holt, Rise and Fall, 488. 80 Holt, Rise and Fall, 488-489; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 307-315; Bordewich, 165-172. 81 Thurlow Weed to William Meredith, March 10, 1850, William M. Meredith Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

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With this in mind, Weed exhorted his ally William H. Seward to seize the initiative and leadership of Northern Whiggery by offering a resounding defense of Taylor’s policy.

Responding to Webster, Seward would bid for leadership of Northern Whiggery, though not in the way that Weed had envisioned.82

Like Jefferson Davis, William H. Seward sought in his speech of March 14 to refute a venerable Whig statesman and to claim leadership of his section’s nationalist movement. While

Seward’s anti-slavery reputation had provided him with considerable influence among anti- slavery Whigs, Free Soilers and anti-slavery Democrats were suspicious of him. As fellow

Senate freshman Salmon P. Chase complained, “he is too much of a politician for me.”83 These suspicions were seemingly confirmed by Seward’s close relations with the slaveholder in the

White House. While it was widely expected that Seward would provide the administration response to the settlement plans put forward, Seward instead opportunistically decided to concentrate his effort into an attack on Webster and a bid for leadership of the northern anti- slavery movement as a whole. “The unlooked for course of Mr. Webster has prepared the way for me in the North,” he gleefully apprised his wife, “but has rendered of little value the little moderation I can practice in regard to the other portion of the Union.” Instead of a pragmatic statement in support of Taylor’s plan, Seward instead crafted a speech that he believed combined vision, principle and prophesy. Seward consulted Secretary of State Clayton for help with the speech.84 Clayton, horrified, attempted unsuccessfully to dissuade Seward from making it.

82 Holt, Rise and Fall, 489-491; Van Deusen, Seward, 121-122; Van Deusen, Weed, 174-176.. 83 Quoted in Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals (NY: Simon and Shuster, 2005), 147. 84 Clayton had acted as something of a mentor for Seward since the New York Senator’s arrival in Washington.

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Seward, however, could not be deterred. “The agitation of slavery,” he declared, “is as inseparable from our political organization as the winds and clouds are from the atmosphere that encircles the earth.”85 Through an aggressive and uncompromising exposition of anti-slavery ideology, Seward was confident that he would rally the Northern public and forge a national political reputation in a single stroke. To a certain extent, he was correct. The speech he delivered would define his national reputation for the rest of his career.86

Seward’s argument was based upon three central propositions—the inequity of slavery, the inevitability of its decline, and insistence that the United States was and should remain one nation. Seward began by establishing the stakes of the present debate in transformational nationalist terms. The legislation under consideration would determine, he declared, whether

“this one great people [would] remain one political State, one nation, one Republic, or shall it break into two conflicting, and probably hostile…nations.” By equating people, nation and state,

Seward defined the polity in starkly nationalist terms, and espoused the maintenance of a single

Union representing a single people. Because failure to properly resolve the slavery issue would result in the division of the United States into two distinct and hostile nations, any compromise on the issue would be “radically wrong and essentially vicious.” The basis of any division would be the institution of slavery. Any compromise “assumes that slavery, if not the only institution in a slave state, is at least the ruling institution.” With his assault on the idea of compromise with slavery as morally wrong and identifying slavery as merely one institution in the Southern states,

Seward sought to repudiate Webster’s call for accommodation. The South was more than the

85 Thurlow Weed to Seward [No Date Given], Seward at Washington, 1, 163. 86 Van Duesen, Seward, 122-133.

194 institution of slavery, he argued, and the institution of slavery was as oppressive to the South as it was to the North. It was also doomed to eventual extinction. In a phrase that would define the popular perception of his speech, Seward attempted to refute the natural limits argument of pro- compromise leaders that the climate and conditions of the Southwest would prevent the expansion of slavery, while adopting the tone of heavenly sanction for his interpretation as

Webster had. Dismissing Southern arguments that the Constitution carried slavery with it,

Seward declared that there was “a higher law than the constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain.” Rather than rely on nature to exclude slavery, Congress should “assume the responsibility bestowed…by the Creator of the universe,” to ensure that slavery could not exist there. The choice facing the South, he argued, was whether the South would accept California and the peaceful maintenance of slavery where it currently existed until it would be peacefully supplanted by the free labor economy, or if it would provoke a conflict that it would inevitably lose. The South would decide “whether the Union shall stand, and slavery, under the steady, peaceful action of moral, social, and political causes, be removed by gradual, voluntary effort.”

The alternative would be that “the Union will be dissolved.” Then, “Civil Wars [would] ensue, bringing on violent but complete and immediate emancipation.” In that case, Seward knew

“only one country and one sovereign—the United States of America and the American people.”87

As an effort to define the essential outlines of Northern transformational nationalism,

Seward’s speech was a rousing success. As an effort to advance his cause, it was a spectacular failure. Reprinted throughout the country, Seward’s speech catapulted him into the leading

87 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 263-267; Van Deusen, Seward, 122-124.

195 position among anti-slavery Northern politicians. For the next decade, he would be identified, for good and ill, as the outstanding spokesman for Northern transformational nationalism. While

Seward may have been the great Nineteenth century practitioner of the sound bite, to other political leaders his appeal to a higher law smacked of radicalism and lawlessness. Southerners of all stripes agreed on little, but the implication that the moral evil of slavery overrode the

Constitution was something they could all find repellent. As Albert Brown (D-MS) argued, if slavery “is as you profess to believe…a deadly sin; but…so long it remains within the slave

States, it is not your sin but ours.”88 While Seward’s remarks provoked widespread anger in the

South, the response from his closest allies was hardly more reassuring. Thurlow Weed gently but unequivocally stated his disapproval. Seward’s speech “points out the most appalling evils,” he complained, “but suggests no remedies.” Seward had been “too pointedly antagonistic” to

Webster, and his denunciation would serve to give to Webster “what he had lost—a party in the

North.” It would have been better, Weed argued, if he had “shown that the President had indicated a way out.”89 Seward countered lamely that he had not failed to defend the President because his speech was “overlong,” but was happy with his speech. “I know that I have spoken words that will tell when I am dead,” he accurately predicted. Weed was not impressed. An ally of theirs had come to him, he reported, “to inquire whether anything had occurred to separate you from the administration.” “You will see,” in the current edition of the Albany Evening

Journal, he flatly stated, “that I have insisted upon your loyalty to General Taylor.” In fact, the administration’s response to Seward’s speech had been apoplectic. Freed by Taylor to attack the

88 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 260. 89 Weed to Seward, March 14, 1850, William H. Seward Papers, Library of Congress, Washington.

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New York Senator, Bullitt and Burnley, editors of The Republic, pulled no punches. Seward

“knows no positive allegiance,” they declared, “to the laws of man or God.” Despite the harsh words, however, Seward was able to repair his relations with the President within a week.90

While Seward had failed to distinguish himself as the most powerful spokesman of the administration, he had succeeded in forging a national political reputation that would define him to the voting public for the duration of his career. 91

Speaking immediately after Seward was another Northerner whose national reputation would be forged during the California debate, but who wielded a far greater influence on the resolution of the crisis than the earnest New Yorker. As we have seen, Stephen Douglas’ allies in the House had been hard at work crafting an alternative resolution that superseded the implicit anti-slavery of Clay’s settlement plan with the concept of popular sovereignty. Having found a solution that could unite the Northern Democracy with some portion of their Southern party brethren, Douglas was interested primarily in promoting Democratic unity and Unionism. While

Douglas was as much a Unionist as Clay or Webster, he differed from these elder statesmen in his lack of concern over the morality of slavery. His personal financial assets included a

Southern plantation with slaves. His vision of the future—defined largely around continued western expansion and settlement—was agnostic as to whether slavery would or would not continue in the South or expand to the west. Where Clay and Webster were committed to the preservation of the Union as the best hope for humanity’s peace and prosperity, Douglas supported the Union as the incarnation of the popular will. Douglas assailed Webster for his

90 How he accomplished this is unclear. 91 Van Deusen, Seward, 124-128; Van Deusen, Weed, 175-177.

197 attacks on Northern Democrats, which he claimed were “as unprovoked as they were unfounded and unjust,” and engaged in a running partisan argument with Webster, Seward and Joshua Hale.

Later, he again assaulted the Northern Whigs via an attack on the Taylor Plan. Douglas declared that he considered the President’s plan to be “worst of all, because it contains all the elements of mischief, without one of the advantages” of Clayton’s bill from the previous session. As the

Taylor plan enjoyed the support of the majority of Northern Whigs, the net effect was to draw a clear division between the Northern Democrats and their sectional adversaries. Because Douglas could have little hope of winning Northern Whigs to his coalition, these attacks made the case for intersectional unity among Democrats. It also opened the door for cooperation with Clay and other Unionists against the common foe.92

While Douglas did not expressly endorse the Clay plan, he left no doubt that he was open to cooperation with the Great Compromiser in defining a settlement plan. Clay, Douglas declared, had “set the ball in motion which is to restore peace and harmony to the Union.”

Because of his actions, “the tide has already been checked and is turning back.” Whether

Douglas expressly intended at this point to make Clay the front-man for the plan of the House

Democratic group is unclear. What was clear was that Douglas had specifically singled out Clay for praise after having previously attacked fellow Unionists Taylor and Webster. “The question is rapidly settling itself,” Douglas predicted confidently. “The Union will not be put in peril,

California will be admitted, governments for the territories established, and thus the controversy

92 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 373.

198 will end, and I trust forever.”93 Recalling his attack on the Taylor plan, Douglas explicitly stated what many representatives were coming to believe. “Any settlement,” he argued, “was preferable to no settlement.” It was an argument that would prove of decisive importance, as the first plan that could be brought to a vote in both Houses would benefit from its logic. Through his efforts at coalition building in the House, and his maneuvering to retain the good graces of

Clay in the Senate, Douglas had deftly positioned himself to play a leading role in the development of the terms of that settlement. As Holman Hamilton has noted, “the Little Giant landed at the spot he had picked from the very outset—nominally on Clay’s right hand but really in his lap, sharing control of the driver’s reins.”94 It would not be long before the Illinois Senator would assume control of the compromise effort wholly to himself.95

The Taylor administration’s allies were disheartened by the progress of the debate in

Congress. Truman Smith, the most important pro-administration Senator with Seward in apostasy, was pessimistic in his reading of the body. “Our Northern Democracy will cave in as usual & the South will do as it pleases except in the matter of California,” he grumbled in mid-

March.96 Smith remained loyal to Taylor and supportive of his plans. “Genl. Taylor’s platform is the best—the only safe one for all parties.”97 The inability of the administration to provide a unified message in the Senate was hampering its ability to influence the debate, and these problems were exacerbated by internal divisions among the President’s supporters. Crittenden in

93 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 375. 94 Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 320. 95 Robert W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas (NY: Oxford University Press, 1973) 277-281. 96 Truman Smith to John Wilson, March 14, 1850, John Wilson Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA. 97Ibid.

199 particular worried that the burden of defending the administration’s proposals may fall who

Smith, whom he complained was “an almost fatal defender” of the President’s policies.98 With

Seward—the most able debater among the President’s allies in the Senate—having gone off script during his set piece speech, it fell to Smith, a poor debater, to speak for the administration.

Smith largely ignored the territorial issue and the President’s plan and sought to rebuff Douglas’s overtures and reinforce partisan divisions. To do so, he adopted the President’s tone of calm inevitability and picked a fight with Henry Foote, the cantankerous pro-compromise Mississippi

Democrat. On California, Smith’s message was simple. “Every member of the Senate knows that the questions are settled already, so far as the judgment of the Senate is concerned,” he declared, before moving on to other subjects.99 The core of his speech was a series of attacks on the Democratic Party on a variety of economic policies. His speech was aimed at rallying Whigs and provoking a response from Democrats, and Foote obliged. After Foote complained that

Smith’s speech was an unprovoked attack on a “prostrate” opponent, Smith acerbically rejoined, in reference to Foote’s frequent interjections in the debate over the previous three months, that “I don’t consider the Democratic party as prostrate as long as the honorable Senator from

Mississippi is incessantly on his legs.”100 While Smith’s effort did temporarily provoke the desired partisan brawl, it failed to distract the debate from the territorial issue. It also did little to dampen the potential rapprochement between the Northern Democrats and Clay and his allies.

98 Crittenden to Clayton, February 18, 1850, John Clayton Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 99 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 480. 100 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 482.

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Most seriously, however, it represented yet another missed opportunity for the allies of the administration to make the case for the President’s plan in Congress.

If Smith had cause to be disappointed in his effort, so did Ohio’s ambitious Free Soil

Senator Salmon P. Chase. A man of piercing intellect and smoldering ambition, Chase hoped in his speech of March 26 and 27 to illustrate that the institution of slavery in the South represented a threat to freedom throughout the Union. As a Free Soiler and ex-Democrat, Chase’s transformational nationalism demonstrated a similar worldview to the earlier effort by Seward while differing in tone and emphasis. In his argument, Chase made a reasoned and legalistic argument against “slavery as a power” in the government of the Union.101 His argument had two primary points—that the crisis facing the Union stemmed from the inequitable distribution of power stemming from the slave representation issue and his rejection of the argument that climate would not prevent the spread of slavery in the west. He proposed no new settlement. In classically nationalist assessment, he argued that the dominance of the Federal Government by

“others” (in this case slaveholders) represented an intolerable political situation. In his calculation, Southerners had occupied the Presidency for 52 years, while Northerners had occupied it for 12.102 Fourteen Secretaries of State had come from slaveholding states, while 5 had come from the North. Most remarkably, no Northerner had been appointed to the Supreme

Court in the Nineteenth century. Having demonstrated that the current constitutional order had resulted in overrepresentation of Southerners in key positions of government, Chase then challenged the Southern proposition that secession may provide a remedy for injustices in the

101 Quoted John Niven, Salmon P. Chase (NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), 66. 102 Chase’s calculations assumed, incorrectly as it turned out, that Taylor would serve his full term.

201 government. “What evil,” he wondered, “that the slave states complain of would disunion solve?” It was a point that had been made by others (including Henry Clay), but complemented

Chase’s argument that the constitutional order served slaveholder interests.103

The second pillar of Chase’s argument rested on his rejection of the assumption, shared by many Unionists but rejected by many Southern nationalists and transformational nationalists, that slavery would not spread to the West due to the climate. Chase believed that such reasoning was dangerous. If the expansion of slavery into the West were impossible, he argued, why risk dissolution of the Union to formally preclude it? Echoing Seward, Chase asserted that “but for the positive prohibition of slavery by the Ordinance of 1787 every foot of land west of the

Allegheny Mountains would have been at this day Slave Soil.”104 The Northwest Ordinance had established the precedent that Congress had the power to restrict slavery in the national lands.

“If it was right and acceptable to abolish existing slavery and abolish future slavery in the North

Western Territory in 1787,” Chase argued, “the prohibition of the extension of slavery into the territory acquired from Mexico…cannot be just cause for offense in 1850.”105 “Neither soil, nor climate, nor physical formation,” he concluded, “nor degrees of latitude will exclude slavery from any country.” To those who thought otherwise, he offered a simple challenge. Can any gentleman name a degree of latitude beyond which slavery has not gone?” he wondered.”106

Chase’s argument was one of the clearest expressions of transformational nationalism during the session. He asserted that the people would reject the legitimacy of the government if

103 Bordewich, 157. 104 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 473. 105 Ibid. 478 106 Ibid.

202 it passed a sectional compromise, and as a result no compromise should be made. It was an argument that European nationalists of 1848 would have recognized. While they would have disagreed with Chase’s views on slavery, Southern nationalists understood the problem in very similar terms. While Chase’s speech persuaded few, it was not designed to do so. It was a statement of principle that explained why Northern transformational nationalists increasingly viewed the central government as dominated by a hostile other (slaveholders), and recognized that any compromise would reinforce the perception that compromise was a blow against the ability of the people of the North to govern themselves. Chase’s argument was learned and logical, but it was stiff and legalistic, and Chase was rightly disappointed. There was nothing essentially flawed in his analysis. The points Chase made were salient, and had been made in previous debates to great effect. His observations about the domination of the central government by the South, the unlikelihood that secession would solve the slaveholders’ complaints, and the applicability of slavery in all climates were correct and powerful. The problem was with the vision. There was no unifying idea animating Chase’s argument, nothing akin to Seward’s higher law, Calhoun’s concurrent majorities, Clay’s shared sacrifice, Taylor’s de-nationalization of slavery policy, Douglas’s popular sovereignty, or Webster’s Unionism at any price. While Chase had spoken effectively and at times eloquently about the slave power, this position was received wisdom among transformational nationalists and broke no new ground. Chase’s argument was reasonable, but was not animated with meaning. His most meaningful statement to posterity was a prediction, a perilous undertaking for any politician, but one which would prove Chase prophetic. “It may be,” he warned pro-compromise Senators,

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“that you will succeed here in sacrificing the claims of freedom by some settlement carried through the forms of legislation.” “But the people,” he warned, “will unsettle your settlement.”107

By the end of March, the vast universe of possible settlement plans had resolved into five approaches, though the many Congressmen remained uncommitted to any of them. Three of the plans—Taylor’s, Clay’s and Bell’s—originated with Southern Whigs and shared crucial ideological features. First, they placed little to no priority on slavery expansion. They assumed that the failure of slavery to expand into the Mexican Cession would have little to no impact on the perpetuation of slavery in the South. Secondly, they ensured that the South would not be subjected to the insult to sectional honor represented by the Wilmot Proviso, and took great pains to ensure that this would not occur. Finally—the plans were Unionist. They favored the preservation of the Union as it was—united, half slave and half free. While Northern Whig transformational nationalists rallied to the Taylor plan as furthering their agenda of restricting and eventually reforming slavery out of existence, their ideals and those of the Louisiana sugar planter in the White House varied greatly. For these Northern Whigs and Free Soilers, the end of slavery expansion was a beginning, not an end. While Unionists expected that slavery would decline over time in the South, transformational nationalists hoped to promote this end through government policy short of actual emancipation. Southern Whigs, for their part, were divided.

While most Southern Whigs believed that slavery would eventually end in the South through modernization and development, they acknowledged no right for the Federal government to

107 Ibid. 480; Bordewich, 152.

204 interfere with slavery in the South, and sought to ensure that the federal government took no affirmative action to stop the spread of slavery there. There was no consensus on which plan best accomplished these goals. Some Southern Whigs were quite publicly hedging their bets.

“If territorial governments cannot be organized, or the question adjusted in some other way,”

Daniel Breck (W-KY) declared, “the recommendation of the President of non-action will be, as the lesser evil, the safest and wisest policy.”108 Others, in the absence of a public denunciation of the other plans by the administration, did not see the issue as an either/or proposition. “In expressing myself in favor of the immediate passage of a…[territorial] bill, I do not consider that

I am opposing [Taylor’s] recommendation,” William Duer explained.109 Even the most seemingly irreconcilable Southern Whig sectionalists—like Toombs and Stephens—remained open to one of the Whig settlement plans. The settlement, Toombs predicted, “will probably be in the main on the basis of Bell’s proposition as backed by Webster.”110 While each of the three

Southern Whig settlement plans enjoyed the support of some faction (and, in the case of the

Taylor Plan, the majority of Northern Whigs), it still seemed possible that Southern Whiggery could unite around a plan based on the general principles espoused by all three. This, however, would require either Taylor, or Clay, or both to adjust their proposal.111

While Democrats had proposed three distinct plans of their own—Calhoun’s, Davis’s, and the House coalition plan—the advancing illness of Calhoun and the desire of the South

108 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 362. 109 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 453. 110 Toombs to Linton Stephens, March 22, 1850, Ulrich B. Phillips (ed.), Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb, 188. 111 Truman Smith to John Wilson, March 14, 1850 quoted in Holt, Rise and Fall, 481; Holt, Rise, 493-497; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 319-325.

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Carolinian delegation to not take too public a role in the aggravation of sectional controversy effectively eliminated the Calhoun plan from serious consideration. It is questionable whether, had Calhoun recovered, his plan would have won adherents beyond its author. Calhoun’s absence opened the field for Davis’s plan to extend the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific to win the support of Southern sectionalists, and for Davis to emerge as the faction’s most effective spokesman. While Southern Democratic moderates had been supportive of the outline of Clay’s proposal, his proposals on the continuation of Mexican law and the Texas border were unacceptable. The House coalition plan expressly placed the decision on the disposition of slavery in the territories with the territorial legislatures—which the Whig plans had left unstated—and appealed to a wider swath of Southern Democrats. What distinguished moderate

Democrats and Southern nationalists was their attitude toward the admission of California.

Southern nationalists, like Davis, were unwilling to countenance the admission of California without the assurance of the maintenance of sectional balance in the Senate. Moderates in both sections, however, were willing to accept the admission of California. As Representative

William Bay (D-MO) admitted, “California must come into the Union.” “Her admission,” he continued, “is demanded by the public voice, and there is no moral power in this Government that can keep her out.”112 Squatter sovereignty provided a way for Democrats to unite. To deny

Southerners expansion into the Mexican Cession, R.M.T. Hunter (D-VA) declared, “is to deny them the right of preserving their relative weight in the Confederacy, and of acquiring power like

112 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 185.

206 the other states, not only by growth, but by colonization.”113 What distinguished both the Davis and the coalition plans, and differentiated them from the Whig plans, was their willingness to promote slavery expansion. Whereas each of the Southern Whig plans provided a mechanism for ending slavery expansion, the Democratic proposals each opened it. 114

The death of John C. Calhoun on April 2 led to the suspension of speechifying. Zachary

Taylor’s plan to quickly admit California and New Mexico as states had failed. With a number of viable approaches to resolving the sectional controversy now before the Congress, members had a range of options with which to approach the problem. The necessity of assembling a bill to bring before the houses of Congress required the leaders of the Senate to decide which approach to bring before the body first. With the Senate no closer to consensus on what the requirements of a territorial settlement should include, the framers of the settlement would need to determine which nationalisms to embrace, which to appease, and which to confront. While the various

Unionist plans shared crucial commonalities, philosophical and personal differences among

Unionist leaders threatened to undermine the entire enterprise. While Southern nationalists and transformational nationalists remained committed to their respective visions of the nation, the crux of the debate now narrowed onto the Unionist faction, and the philosophical, partisan, and personal differences within its membership. Bringing these men together into a robust pro- compromise coalition would require strong leadership and a deft personal touch.

113 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 378. 114 Holt, Rise and Fall, 493-497.

Rule or Ruin

“[Clay] is determined to rule or ruin the party. He has only power enough to ruin it. Rule it he never can again.” - Robert Toombs, April 16, 18481

When the session resumed, the Senate moved forward with the practical business of drafting a legislative proposal to codify a settlement. A bill to establish Foote’s proposed

Committee of Thirteen was brought forward, and in a test of strength between pro-compromise forces supporting the bill and anti-compromise forces supporting a series of amendments proposed by Thomas Hart Benton to impose restrictions on the committee, the bill was passed without amendment 29-22. The debate was enlivened by a debate between Foote and Benton that ended, following a denunciation by Benton of Calhoun’s Southern address and a defense of the late Senator by Foote, in Benton rising to his feet while Foote was speaking and Foote pulling a pistol on the Missourian. While the incident provided color to an otherwise lifeless proceeding, it did little to delay the establishment of the Committee. Thirteen senators were appointed from across each party and section. Despite their small numbers, four Southern Whigs were members of the committee—Clay, Berrien, Bell, and Mangum. Despite their minority status in the Senate, Whigs constituted a majority of the Committee. The other party/sectional factions boasted three members apiece. King, Downs and Mason represented the Southern

Democrats, Cass, Dickenson and Jesse Bright their Northern allies. Pro-compromise Northern

Whigs Webster and James Cooper (PA) were joined by anti-slavery Samuel Phelps (W-VT).

1 Robert Toombs to James Thomas, April 16, 1848, Phillips (ed.), Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 103. 207 208

Significantly, the Northern Whig faction included the only two members of that caucus friendly to Clay, with Phelps the only representative of more mainstream Northern Whig attitudes. While the stacking of the committee with members more favorable to the Clay plan than the Senate or

House as a whole, the supporters of the effort increased the odds that Clay would be able to dictate the eventual terms of settlement. However, reducing the need for negotiation within the committee postponed the identification of concessions that would be required to create a comprehensive sectional settlement.

With the Committee seated, the initiative devolved upon Clay to determine the terms of the compromise and, just as importantly, the ideological factions upon which its support would rest. Clearly Clay’s plan as originally proposed could not muster the needed support to pass. In order to secure the votes needed to pass a bill, Clay would need to align himself with one of the other four plans—the Taylor plan for immediate admission, the Bell plan of territorial organization and an invitation to Texas to divide into multiple slave states, the Davis plan for extension of the Missouri Compromise line, or the House plan of popular sovereignty. Despite the support evident in both houses for each of these approaches, Clay seems to have made little effort in winning over the adherents of these plans. Though the vast majority of Northern

Whiggery aligned with Taylor and most Southern Whigs were uneasy with Clay’s plan, the

Kentuckian seems to spent little effort to win them over. While it is at best unclear whether any action on California could have won over the more radical members of the Southern Democracy,

Clay’s unwillingness to work with the Taylor administration and its Northern Whig allies ensured that a large minority of the Congress would be opposed to any plan brought forward, a

209 circumstance that makes Clay’s seeming neglect of other Southern Whigs more perplexing.

Stephen Douglas had refused appointment to the committee, objecting to the Omnibus strategy.

Bright took his place. Dickinson, Webster, Mason and Berrien were absent for most of the month accompanying Calhoun’s body to South Carolina. By May 11, Clay had determined that his bill would admit California, establish territorial governments without the Wilmot Proviso, extend the Texas boundary to include El Paso, and eliminate the public slave trade in the District of Columbia. He had yet to determine how much Texas would receive in compensation for the land cession.1 While Clay’s Omnibus proposal resembled his proposals of February, it differed in one key respect: it did not maintain Mexican law and organized the territories without reference to slavery. As a result, the plan presented had adopted a key measure of the House plan devised by Cobb, Toombs, Stephens and the allies of Stephen Douglas. While this plan superficially tracked closest to Clay’s own, the long term implications of the implicit adoption of popular sovereignty were profound. Immediately, the most significant impact was to tie the legislation, and Clay’s enduring political reputation, to the Democrats of the North. To Northern

Whigs and the supporters of the Bell or Taylor plans, it offered no concessions.2

Henry Clay had succeeded in pressing his compromise proposal forward in defiance of

Zachary Taylor, but it remained unclear whether the Omnibus could rally Unionism behind it.

While Clay had hoped that his Unionism and reputation would rally patriotic elements to his banner, and reassemble his party against its President, a significant number of Unionists remained skeptical. The Omnibus divided Northerners and Southerners, Whigs and Democrats,

1 Cass to Dickinson, Dickinson Letters, 430-431. 2 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 329-339; Holt, Rise and Fall, 498-503.

210 and Unionists, transformational nationalists, and Southern nationalists. In formulating his proposal, Clay had rejected the propositions put forward by Zachary Taylor, John Bell, and

Jefferson Davis in favor of his own plan with several modifications suggested by Stephen

Douglas. Clay had adopted Henry Foote’s idea that only a single bill that sought a settlement of all outstanding issues and secured the acquiescence of both sections could prevent civil war.

While Clay believed that the Unionist center would carry him through and rebuke the radicals in both sections, Clay’s management style and personal disputes stacked the odds against his gamble. Taylor was unreconciled, Northern Whigs supported their President, and Southern nationalists considered it a betrayal of their section. He could depend only on the Northern

Democracy, who cared nothing for him but stood to profit from an end to anti-slavery agitation.

The battle over the Omnibus would be fought between Unionists on one side and transformational and sectional nationalists on the other, but the success or failure of the bill hinged on the struggle between Unionists over competing approaches to preserving the nation into the future. 3

The crisis of 1850 was not only a crisis of the Union, but one of Unionism as a national identity, and the battle over the Omnibus Bill brought the crisis of Unionism to its peak. This crisis was driven by two dimensions—the battle between Unionists over how best to meet the challenge of transformational and Southern nationalism, and a personal struggle between rival politicians to determine who would win the glory of saving the Union. The former struggled focused around the terms under which the territories would be organized. This struggle focused

3 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 338-339.

211 around several important policy issues, such as whether a territorial phase or immediate statehood was preferable, whether territorial legislatures should be allowed to legislate on slavery, and how the boundary dispute between Texas and New Mexico should be resolved. By framing a comprehensive settlement, Clay and his allies hoped that a majority of legislators (and the President) would be driven by patriotism to set their skepticism aside and support the plan.

Zachary Taylor and his administration, however, preferred to treat each issue separately and did not fear confrontation with Southern nationalists over the admission of California. The threat of a veto hung over the Omnibus, which did nothing to push fence-sitting Unionists behind it.

Unionist Southern Whigs were unconvinced over the boundaries of Texas and doubted whether organization of territorial governments would settle the slavery controversy. While Clay could count on the continued support of Unionist Democrats, it was unclear whether Unionism alone would prove strong enough to reconcile Unionist Whigs to its terms. It would take an exceptional legislator indeed to reconcile these actors to the Omnibus Bill.4

With Henry Clay leading the effort to pass the Omnibus Bill, personal rivalries would play as much a role as ideology in the disposition of the settlement as ideology. The

Congressional debate over Clay’s Omnibus Bill would reveal that Clay repeatedly was willing to risk the defeat of the bill to ensure that his preferences were upheld, and exposed Clay’s leadership as a detriment to the ultimate settlement of the crisis. Historians have generally praised Clay’s course during the debate over the territorial controversy, a tendency which has been reinforced during the recent spate of favorable reinterpretations of the Great Compromiser’s

4 Remini, Clay, 751-752; Stegmaier, 145-146; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 338-339; Holt, Rise, 503-560.

212 career. A positive interpretation of Clay’s motives is central to these assessments. Holman

Hamilton’s negative portrayal of Clay in his biography of Zachary Taylor, and his more measured but still critical interpretation of Clay in Prologue to Conflict, as well as Michael

Holt’s nuanced but critical interpretation in Rise and Fall of the Whig Party, have been contested by recent works that appraise Clay’s course more favorably. “Whatever twinges of resentment

Clay had against President Taylor,” Mark Stegmaier has argued, "his motives for pressing compromise were pure and sincere.”5 In a similar vein, Robert Remini concludes that “despite his many failings, Henry Clay deserves enormous credit for putting together a package that sufficiently satisfied both sides of the controversy.”6 The most recent interpreter of the

Compromise, Fergus Bordewich, likewise praises “Clay’s unflagging struggle to seek out common ground,” while faulting him primarily for failing to recognize the moral dimension of the slavery issue.7 In the face of opposition of the Taylor administration and radicals of both sections, Clay would need all of the strategy, charm, self-discipline, legislative acumen and interpersonal skills that could be mustered to succeed. On each of these points, he fell short. His war with Taylor allowed the administration’s allies, hopelessly disorganized in April, to rally against his bill. By the end of June, Taylor’s allies would undertake a disciplined assault on

Clay’s plan, led by William H. Seward, John Bell and fellow traveler Thomas Hart Benton. The unity established during this time would survive the death of Taylor and the accession of pro- compromise Millard Fillmore to the Presidency, and would allow the Northern Whigs to

5 Stegmaier, 231. 6 Remini, Henry Clay, 154. 7 Bordewich, 391.

213 consummate their own unholy alliance with the Southern nationalists whom Clay had failed to persuade. In the end, Clay’s vengeful, rude, impatient and imperious conduct would wreck his

Omnibus. Events in June and July would undermine the unity of the supporters of the Omnibus, and allow what Webster called “miserable abstract questions as slavery in New Mexico” to divide its supporters. Clay’s conflict with Taylor blasted apart the ideological girders that had steadied the structure of his party. Blinded by his antipathy to Taylor, supremely confident in his own abilities, dividing his friends and uniting his foes, Clay had set the stage for a political disaster. Confronted by a provision that offended his political principles and Clay’s unwillingness to address his concerns, James Pearce (W-MD) would be forced to take matters into his own hands, and deliver the Omnibus Bill into the hands of its enemies. Clay’s confidence in himself and his ability to force his colleagues to acquiesce in his will would prove his undoing.8

On May 13, Clay rose and presented the report of the Committee of Thirteen. For the majority of the speech, Clay contented himself with a recitation of the provisions of the bill.

Throughout the address, Clay maintained a tone of cooperation and reconciliation, with one exception. “We do cooperate with the President,” Clay stated, and then explained how his plan differed from Taylor’s. With the admission of California, Clay explained, “the President’s recommendation stops.” “There,” Clay explained, we take up the subject, and proceed to act upon the other parts of the territory acquired from Mexico.”9 Even at his most conciliatory, Clay made a point to differentiate himself from the Whig administration. While The Republic

8 Hamilton, Prologue, 98-101. 9 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 569.

214 maintained that was “no necessary enmity between the PRESIDENT and the resolutions of Mr.

CLAY,” Clay had made a point to be clear that his plan represented a break from Taylor’s. “I had to attack the Administration,” Clay explained to his son, “for compromising our slavery difficulties.” 10 Once again, Clay was promoting divisions among Unionists.11

Following Clay’s speech, Taylor to choose between surrendering to Clay or breaking with him. Taylor had been driven into a corner, and he was not one to surrender quietly. Clay’s volley had blasted apart any hope for unity that the Whig caucus maintained and ensured the maximum possible opposition to Clay’s proposal within the caucus of his party. Taylor’s options were either to adopt the Democratic compromise plan pushed forward by Clay, and abandon Northern Whigs, who constituted a majority of his party in Congress, or to maintain an independent course. Interest and principle argued against the first course, and the support of the majority of Whigs and the veto power argued for the second. Taylor’s supporters were energized by the direct challenge from Clay. “True to his hates,” Orlando Brown wrote Crittenden, “he has flung down the defiance to the friends of Taylor.” For his part, Brown was relieved. “I am glad myself that he has at last stepped out with his armor on—an avowed enemy though formidable can be met.”12 Even Clay’s supporters were appalled. Clay’s attack, Conservative Northern

Whig Nathan Hall accurately predicted to pro-compromise Millard Fillmore, “will probably end

10 Clay to James C. Clay, Thomas J. Clay Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 11 Michael Holt argues that Clay’s May 13 speech was more conciliatory than is presented here, due to Clay’s invitation to Taylor to adopt the Omnibus. I am not convinced that Clay’s overture was wholly sincere, as it was followed by the criticism that the Omnibus was “More comprehensive…general and healing in character” than Taylor’s plan. Had Clay’s priority been conciliation, he would have not framed his overture thusly. Holt, Rise, 500. 12 Brown to Crittenden, May 23, 1850, John J. Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C..

215 in the dissolution if not the destruction of the Whig Party.”13 The first sign of Taylor’s response came when he fired the editors of The Republic, which had hitherto been friendly to Clay. The

President had decided in April that a change needed to be made,14 and had invited Horace

Greeley to assume editorship of the paper.15 When Greeley declined, however, he settled on

Allan A. Hall, a Department of the Treasury employee who had edited a newspaper in Tennessee closely aligned with John Bell. Bell had been openly critical of the Committee of Thirteen’s plan, and an astute observer could infer that a change in tone from the administration’s organ was forthcoming. Under Hall, there would be no ambiguity about the administration’s position on Clay’s compromise plan.16 Still, Taylor’s administration did not yet break with Clay. If Clay cared to mend the breech which the change in personnel foretold, however, he took no action to that end.17

While most historians have attributed Clay’s course during the 1850 debate to patriotism, his actions during the formulation of the Committee of Thirteen report do not comport with this interpretation. Someone motivated by the principles attributed to Clay could be expected to pursue as wide an acceptance of a settlement as possible. Clay’s course, on the other hand, alienated large numbers of politicians who were in basic agreement with his desire to preserve the Union. By forcing the administration into open opposition to his compromise plan, Clay had

13 Hall to Fillmore, May 23, 1850, Millard Fillmore Papers, State University of New York at Oswego Library, Oswego, NY. 14 The precipitating event was the defeat of Douglas’s California territorial bill. Orlando Brown to John Crittenden, April 19, 1850, Crittenden Papers (Library of Congress). 15 Holt, Rise and Fall, 569. 16 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 332-339. 17 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 332-335

216 demonstrated the tactical incompetence that had plagued his Presidential campaigns.18 The first error was his failure to openly incorporate any of the key features of one of the other settlement plans, particularly from the other Southern Whig plans. The most stark omission was his failure to include Bell’s plan for dividing Texas, a symbolic gesture that guaranteed nothing but offered the potential to allay Southern concerns about the loss of parity in the Senate. Alternately, he could have adopted Davis’s proposed extension of the Missouri Compromise line to do the same on the basis of established precedent, which would have opened less territory to slavery than the

Omnibus did. Most critically, Clay could have easily proposed the organization of New Mexico as a state, which would have placed the compromise proposal in conformity with Taylor’s recommendation and would have allowed both Clay and Taylor to claim authorship of the measure and save face. Antagonizing Bell and Davis could be forgiven, as their power to undermine a compromise was limited. Antagonizing Taylor, on the other hand, was madness.

By picking a fight with the administration, Clay was forcing Taylor to either submit to him or use the veto. It was an exceedingly hazardous gamble.19

One week after Clay’s speech, The Republic responded. Instead of putting the country first and working with the administration to develop a plan acceptable to all, Henry Clay sought personal glory and the settling of scores. He had come to Washington, Hall argued, “to lead and not to follow.” Hall reminded readers of Clay’s history of undermining his party’s administrations, his arrogance and boorishness. He also targeted Senators—like Daniel Webster and John Bell—who had proposed other ideas that Clay had ignored. Clay had come to

18 Howe, Political Culture of the American Whigs, 125. 19 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 333; Stegmaier, 137-143; Bordewich, 239-243.

217

“originate measures of compromise,” Hall argued, and “not to adopt those such as others may recommend.” While Clay claimed the mantle of patriotism, Hall was unconvinced. Clay, as always, was motivated by “the absence…of that ‘spirit of…mutual confidence and cooperation’” that the situation demanded. Clay, the administration organ argued, had placed his personal reputation and the glory of authoring a third compromise ahead of the well-being of his party and his country. Clay remained the same vain and selfish egoist who had ruined the administrations of James Monroe and John Tyler and placed his personal agenda ahead of the well-being of the

Republic. In contrast to President Taylor, Hall declared, Clay was just another politician who put himself before his country.20

Relieved from the burden of diplomacy, Clay responded to The Republic’s editorial with his most blistering attack of the session. California, he claimed, was only part of the issue. The nation, he stated, suffered from “five bleeding wounds.” Taylor’s plan would heal one, but allow the other four to “bleed more profusely than ever...even if it should produce death itself.” To justify his proposal, Clay invoked the bogey that had been conjured earlier by Calhoun. Under

Taylor’s plan, the North, “flushed with success in the admission of California alone, will contend…for the application of the Wilmot Proviso at all of the remaining territory.” With this argument, Clay blended established fact (the admission of California would result in a sectionally unbalanced Senate) with implied falsehood (that the slaveholder Taylor supported the application of the Wilmot Proviso—which Taylor’s plan was specifically was designed to

20 Washington Republic, May 20 1850.

218 avoid21), and further stretched the truth when he later declared that Taylor’s Plan would leave

New Mexico “without any government at all.”22 By emphasizing the danger that the Taylor Plan represented to the South, Clay was attempting to win Southern support and isolate Northern

Whigs and Free Soilers who would oppose him anyway. Unlike Taylor, who had sought to rally

Unionists against Southern radicals as Jackson had done, Clay would attempt to rally them against anti-slavery radicalism. He challenged Southern radicals to “tell us how they would reconcile the interests of this country and harmonize its distracted parts,” and supporters of the administration to “stand up here and meet us face to face upon the question of the superiority of one measure over the other.”23 As for the compromise bill, it provided a simple formula for resolving the territorial crisis. “The bill,” Clay declared, “admits that if slavery is there, there it remains,” and “if slavery is not there, there it is not.” The same, of course, could have been said for the Taylor plan. The critical difference, however, was that Clay’s Omnibus left the question of slavery in the Mexican Cession open, while Taylor’s plan did not.24

While Clay’s speech was a masterpiece of rhetoric, it rallied more enemies to the bill than friends. First, Clay’s attack on the administration, while personally satisfying, did nothing to enhance the possibility of the bill becoming law. It energized the administration’s allies.

"Yesterday Mr. Clay, in his eloquent speech against the President’s plan,” Seward reported, "was so bold, so arrogant, and so offensive that it will render it necessary that I shall at a proper

21 While the result of the Wilmot Proviso and the Taylor plan--a free New Mexico--would be the same, the Wilmot proviso would have been imposed by Congress and the Taylor plan by the New Mexico constitutional convention. 22 It was well known by this time that Taylor would support the admission of New Mexico as a state. 23 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session 612-614. 24 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 338-339.

219 time…vindicate and defend the Administration and the noble old chief.”25 As James H. Thomas

(D-TN) recognized, “the Administration is powerless to carry out its own plan, but it may be powerful for evil in defeating other plans for the settlement of this alarming question.” In addition to its phalanx of Northern Whig supporters in Congress, the President’s veto power meant that the Omnibus could never become the law of the land without Taylor’s concurrence.

By openly declaring war on the administration, Clay had forced into a corner the one individual with the ability to stop the compromise bill by himself. While Clay clearly hoped to force the

President to acquiesce to his scheme, he had left the proud general with no way to save face. It was a tactically inept maneuver.26 At the same time, he had offered little beyond threats of calamity to rally others to his cause. By burning his bridges with Taylor and the Northern

Whigs, and with Southern radicals suspicious of him and all his works, Clay’s bill would need the united support of Northern Democrats and Southern Whigs to pass. At best, it was an unstable legislative foundation. Through his imperious management of the Committee of

Thirteen and his antagonism of the Taylor administration, Clay had done everything possible to ensure that his bill would have no room for error.27

Responses to Clay’s speech illustrated that opposition to the compromise bill remained strong. Southern Democrats were not convinced that the bill offered anything of substance to them. “The Senator from Kentucky,” Jeremiah Clemens (D-AL) noted, “asked us the other day what was the necessity of quarreling about a matter of no practical importance [slavery

25 Seward to Thurlow Weed, May 22, 1850, Seward at Washington, 1, 134. 26 Howe, Political Culture, 125. 27 Holt, Rise, 501-510; Hamilton, Prologue, 95-101; Stegmaier, 143-145.

220 exclusion].” “If it is a matter of no importance,” he wondered, “why can he not yield?”28 Pierre

Soulé demanded additional concessions to the South, including equal rights to settle New

Mexico and Utah, the declaration that Congress had no right to interfere with slavery in the

District of Columbia, a stronger fugitive slave law, and the settlement of the Texas/New Mexico boundary in Texas’ favor. The support that Clay needed from Southern Whiggery was not developing, with at least five Senators uneasy about breaking with a Whig President.29 Northern

Whigs continued to support Taylor, with Webster, Cooper and Vice President Fillmore the only prominent supporters of Clay’s bill. Opposition to the Omnibus was comprised of a majority of

Northern Whigs (58 percent of Northern Congressmen), Free-Soilers and Southern Democrats

(64 percent of Southern Congressmen), and the President, joined by a minority of Southern

Whigs and Northern Democrats. The patronage power of the administration was also against the

Omnibus. Clay could rely on a majority of Northern Democrats, joined by an indeterminate number of Southern Whigs, a minority of Southern Democrats, and three Northern Whigs. In order to pass the Omnibus, Clay would need to win a strong majority of each sectional minority, and a strong enough minority of the sectional majority to construct a successful coalition. By the beginning of June, Seward could report confidently to his wife that the compromise bill was headed for defeat. “The North and South,” he reported, “after studying Mr. Clay’s juggle for three months, are falling back to their first positions.”30

28 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 589. 29 Holt, Rise, 495; Stegmaier, 143; Freehling, Road to Disunion Vol. 1, 493 30 Seward to Francis Seward, June 3, 1850, Seward at Washington, 137; Holt, Rise and Fall, 517-518.

221

If Clay had any concerns about the merits of his proposition and approach, they have been lost to history. Despite the constant and steady rain of criticism that had pelted Clay since the introduction of his compromise plan, he remained confident that he could and should push through his Omnibus without significant concessions to his critics. Of these, Clay considered

Zachary Taylor and his administration the most contemptible, and he intended to force the stubborn old general to either acquiesce in his plan or risk the peace of the union in thwarting him. “The breach between the administration and me…is getting wider,” he wrote his wife.

“They are blindly rushing to their ruin,” he believed, “if not the ruin of their country.”31 The denunciation of the compromise bill in the days following its introduction, including by members of the Committee of Thirteen had revealed the breadth of opposition to the bill, but Clays was heartened by the support he was receiving from unprecedented quarters. Never before in Clay’s illustrious and controversial career had he earned the endorsement of Tammany Hall. The groundswell of praise that he received from his heretofore political enemies may have blinded him to the depth of opposition that the Omnibus faced within his party. He does not seem to have recognized, for example, the threat to his bill from his own party and section. Presley

Spruance and John Wales of Delaware, Jackson Morton of Florida, and John Berrien of Georgia were openly opposed. John Bell, a member of the Committee of Thirteen, the public face of an alternative proposal, and influential moderate, criticized Clay’s “moral despotism” and repeatedly expressed reservations about the bill. Joseph Underwood of Kentucky and James

Pearce of Maryland were friendly to the Omnibus, but were opposed in principle to

31 Clay to Lucretia Clay, July 6, 1850, Thomas Hart Clay Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

222 compensating Texas for a settlement of the New Mexico boundary. Clay was either oblivious to these developments, or assumed that if forced to vote for or against the Omnibus they would support him. Clay’s focus was on the danger posed by Taylor, Northern Whigs and Southern

Democrats. At time, his confidence in the wisdom of his colleagues (but never of himself) would flag. “The Administration, the Abolitionists, the Ultra Southern men, and the timid Whigs of the North are all combined against it,” he complained to his son. “Against such a combination,” he fretted, “it will be wonderful if it should succeed.”32 He never despaired enough, however, to recalibrate his bill or his approach to marketing it. The greatest strength that the Omnibus possessed was that it was at the top of the Senate’s list of bills. Horace

Greeley, a rare Northern anti-slavery supporter of Clay, was one of many whose support of the

Omnibus was ambiguous and conditional, captured the essence of how Clay hoped that Northern

Whigs would respond. “I shall go hard for Clay’s log-roll,” he advised Seward, “if something better is not put in front of it.”33

The introduction of the Omnibus Bill and the outbreak of open conflict between Taylor and Clay focused the debate and allowed the various opponents of his plan to organize their efforts against it. While the members on the ideological sectional extremes of the debate had always been united against the effort, Clay’s course provided a rallying point for Unionists and representatives ideologically similar to Clay to rally against him. The primary beneficiary

32 Clay to Thomas Hart Clay, May 31, 1850, Henry Clay Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C; Hamilton, Prologue, 102. 33 Horace Greeley to William H. Seward, May 27, 1850, William H. Seward Papers [Microfilm Edition], University of Rochester, Rochester, NY; Remini, Clay, 752; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 372-373; Holt, Rise and Fall, 520.

223 initially was Taylor. With Bell ally James Hall firmly ensconced as the spokesman of the administration via The Republic, Taylor was able for the first time to promote a clear and distinct administration line. The Republic blamed Clay unambiguously for the continuing discord.

Taylor, Hall clarified, did not oppose fugitive slave reform or restrictions of the Washington

D.C. slave trade, but he considered these issues to be separate from and less important than the territorial issue. Clay’s plan was an “impractical remedy” to the territorial issue while Taylor’s plan of the admission of the territories as states was the “only permanent cure.” Once California,

New Mexico and Deseret organized state governments and made their own determination about whether to allow slavery, they could be admitted as states on the principle of state’s rights and without Congressional interference.34 Clay’s allies soon recognized that the break between Clay and Taylor was complete, and that Taylor would “not hesitate to advance his own plan and condemn Mr. Clay’s.”35 Taylor’s allies also understood that the General would not back down.

“General Taylor,” Orlando Brown reported to Crittenden, “was an unconquerable man.” Aiding

Taylor in his efforts to rally support against the omnibus was the fear among Northern Whigs that Clay’s plan would strengthen the Democrats at their expense. “The Democrats are seeking to save their party by the passage of the Compromise Bill,” Seward warned. “The principles maintained by us are, therefore, in great jeopardy,” he fretted, “when the all our ancient leaders cooperate when our adversaries.”36

Southern Democrats, for their part, were divided between Unionists who hoped to amend

34 Washington Republic, May 28, 1850. 35 David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, June 21, 1850, David Outlaw Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC. 36 Seward to Francis Seward, June 16, 1850, Seward at Washington. Vol. 1, 140; Holt, Rise and Fall, 508-509.

224 the Omnibus Bill to make it more palatable to the South, and Southern nationalists who held firm that the admission of California without the opportunity of admitting additional slave states to the Union was ground for secession. Some, like Henry Foote (D-MS), favored the bill and hoped to win for it greater Southern support. Jefferson Davis (D-MS), on the other hand, considered any compromise that did not open the West to the migration of slaveholders and their property to be no compromise at all. Southerners were also divided between those who opposed

California admission under any circumstance, and those who considered Mason’s fugitive slave bill as sufficient compensation. While desirous of altering the Omnibus Bill, they lacked the support to force their plans on Clay, and he was unwilling to adopt their views. Other legislators maintained a more ambiguous stance. Pierre Soulé (D-LA), for example, offered a number of amendments to the bill and engaged frequently (and crucially) in the legislative process related to consideration of the bill, but seems to have been hoping to defeat the bill rather than reform it.

Through active engagement in amending the bill, Southern nationalists were able to exploit the willingness of Clay and his allies to appease them to dramatically affect the fate of the

Omnibus.37

As part of this effort, Southerners nationalists offered a number of successful amendments that fundamentally transformed its implications for slavery in the territory. On June

5, John Berrien (W-GA) offered an amendment that expressly empowered territorial legislatures to protect slave property. The amendment passed narrowly by a vote of 30-27. David Yulee (D-

FL) successfully pressed a follow-on amendment that stated that the Constitution extended to the

37 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 499-500.

225 territories by its own force, which held significant ideological implications for Southern separatists who argued that the Constitution protected slavery. As the logic of Yulee’s amendment flowed naturally from Berrien’s, the amendment passed easily 30-24. Pierre Soulé next offered an amendment to ensure that future states formed from the Mexican Cession would be admitted regardless of their free or slave status, which formalized a previously unstated feature of Clay’s policy. By expressly declaring that states could be formed regardless of slave status, the Omnibus would pointedly reject the Wilmot Proviso and legally open the territories to slavery, as Davis and other Southern sectionalists had argued. Soulé’s amendment tested how far Northern Democrats and conservative Northern Whigs were willing to go to appease the

South, and the passage of the amendment 38-12 illustrated that they were willing to go very far indeed. Southern sectionalists’ success in amending the Omnibus is underscored by comparison to the failure of Joshua Hale’s (FS-VT) proposed amendment, directed at the Texas/New Mexico border dispute, which granted the territories the power to appeal to the Supreme Court as states could. This provision effectively would have inserted the key feature of the proposed Clayton

Compromise (and the desired effect of Taylor’s plan to admit New Mexico as a state) into the

Omnibus Bill. Hale’s amendment failed, and no roll call was recorded.38 If there was any question that Clay and the pro-compromise forces were working at cross purpose with Northern

Whiggery and the Taylor administration, the failure of the Hale amendment disabused them.39

38 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session 1134-1146; Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 902-911. 39 Hamilton, Prologue, 107-108; Bordewich, 260; Stegmaier, 181.

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With the Senate wrangling over the final terms of the Omnibus Bill, the House was occupied primarily with speeches. Any proposition that would originate in the House would likely skew more pro-Northern than a bill originating in the Senate. Anti-slavery Northerners hoped to strengthen the Northern cause in the Senate by pressing action on the admission of

California. Pro-compromise Speaker Howell Cobb (D-GA) recognized this, and expected that his best plan for pushing the Omnibus through the anarchic House was to confront members with the choice between the Omnibus and civil war. He was content for the House to mark time with speeches while the Senate continued to wrangle, and used the power of the Speakership to ensure that no action was taken on the territorial issue unless the Senate moved first. As the debate waxed and waned in the Senate, the House remained preoccupied with speeches for

“Buncombe,” Nineteenth century shorthand for home district consumption. The speeches revealed a deeply divided body where a number of plans continued to enjoy support. Thirteen speakers openly favored the Omnibus Bill, while an additional six inclined in that direction without expressing unqualified support for Clay’s plan. If the speakers in June are any guide, it also appears that Taylor’s allies continued to gain strength. Nineteen speakers openly favored

Taylor’s plan, while an additional five endorsed the Wilmot Proviso. Jefferson Davis’s plan to extend the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean was endorsed by only five speakers.

An additional nine speakers were critical of plans put forward, but endorsed no alternative approach. At best, the ability of the House to pass any legislation related to the territories was

227 unclear. With no working majority, it would fall to external events to help clarify where a majority of members could be collected.40

With the House bogged down by endless speechifying and the influence of the speaker,

Southern nationalists were hopeful that the Nashville Convention would augment their strength by adopting a hard line on the controversy. When the convention met from June 3-11, they were soon disappointed. Not all states had sent delegations, and radicals did not dominate the delegates who did arrive. Nashville was the citadel of John Bell, and while the city received the delegates with civility the pro-Union sentiments of the local political leadership were unambiguous. For their part, the South Carolina delegation determined that their state’s reputation for radicalism could do nothing but harm Southern unity, and decided to maintain a low public profile. Because of this, the champion of the ultra-radical sectionalist cause fell to

Beverly Tucker of Virginia, an eccentric judge who had previously been an influential advisor to

John Tyler and Abel Upshur. Tucker was an outright secessionist, believing that the independence of the slave states would lead to the creation of a country defined by natural geography and uniform social institutions. He was also a political elitist, who had opposed the reform of property qualifications during the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1832.

Tucker’s views on slavery were also unusual—he believed that slavery was justified as a means to prepare slaves for eventual emancipation. While Tucker would prove a forceful advocate of

40 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1110-1201; Hamilton, Prologue, 98-100.

228 the sectionalist perspective, his views of issues like democracy would limit his ability to persuade his more democratically-inclined colleagues. 41

Despite Tucker’s advocacy from the chair, and James Hammond’s tireless efforts behind the scenes, the end result was something less than Southern nationalists had hoped. The convention rejected Clay’s compromise formula. It likewise did not endorse the constitutional revision scheme put forward by the late Calhoun in March. Rather, it endorsed extending the

Mason-Dixon Line to the Pacific, the position most closely associated with Jefferson Davis.

Significantly, the convention also endorsed the idea that Congress should protect slavery in all of the territories. Most disappointing for sectional radicals, though, was the failure of the convention to expressly link the threat of secession with the admission of California. This was crucial, as it indicated that the South was ultimately unwilling to consider the loss of sectional balance in the Senate as sufficient cause for secession, and demonstrated that the South would accept future considerations (or potentially nothing at all) in exchange. Finally, the convention determined that it would reconvene after the end of the Congressional session to determine the next course of action. From the perspective of the most radical sectionalists, the Convention was a grave disappointment. Unwilling to endorse secession as the legitimate remedy for the admission of California, it failed to establish a credible set of consequences for failure to meet its demand. By voting to reconvene after the end of the Congressional session, it abdicated the ability to influence events and exert pressure on lawmakers until after political passions had

41 Carol Bleser, Secret and Sacred, (NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), 197-225; Thelma Jennings, Nashville Convention (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1980), 135-186; Sioussat, “Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Convention.”

229 cooled. Ultras like Beverly Tucker could not help but be disappointed. Other radicals, pursuing different ends, were more hopeful. By maintaining a low profile and letting leaders from other states take the lead, James Hammond believed that the South Carolinians had “laid the foundation for wielding hereafter influence among the Southern states.”42 Another winner was

Jefferson Davis, as the Nashville Convention had endorsed the measures that he had forcefully been promoting in the Senate since the beginning of the session. The Nashville Convention had provided validation to South Carolina and had enhanced the stature of Davis as a spokesman for the South writ large. In practical terms it had accomplished little. “The rump convention,”

William Freehling has concluded, “had secured unity by papering over divisions.” As a result, the “resulting resolutions were representative of no one,” and close observers could discern that there was in fact no “Southern policy” on the territories upon which the section could agree. The sum of the results of the convention proved to be less of a threat to the legislators in Washington than the threat of the convention had been before it met. Anti-slavery Northerners were not convinced that failure to appease the South would lead to civil war, and President Taylor would soon demonstrate that he continued to have no intention of backing down.43

Taylor’s steadfastness on California was equaled by the resolve of New Mexico in resisting Texas. On June 9, New Mexico, having abandoned its previous effort to be organized as a territory, overwhelmingly endorsed an anti-slavery constitution that disputed Texas’s border claim. It then petitioned Congress to be admitted as a state, in accordance with Taylor’s wishes.

Hugh Smith, the New Mexico delegate to the House, advised his constituents to “assert your

42 Quoted in Bordewich, 258. 43 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 482-486; Jennings, Nashville Convention, 135-166.

230 rights by the establishment of a state government interdicting slavery; gird yourselves up to resist its introduction into your territory.”44 While the New Mexico constitution would require some time to reach Washington, the meeting of the Convention and clear progress toward the petition for admission alarmed opponents in Washington and Austin. In Washington, Henry Foote denounced the person responsible for encouraging the constitution (meaning Taylor) as “an insidious traitor” and “an enemy to his country.”45 Furthermore, Foote continued to warn that the situation between Texas and New Mexico could spiral out of control, and that “if one battle is ever fought in such a quarrel, the dissolution of the Union will be inevitable.”46 As Mark

Stegmaier has noted, “no other topic of debate included elements that.” “If not settled, could have led directly to military action, bloodshed, and Civil War.”47 Alexander Stephens (W-GA) lobbied frenetically to convince Taylor that the Texas/New Mexico border dispute was leading the country to war. If fighting broke out between the federal army and Texas, he warned the

National Intelligencer, it would cause “freemen from Delaware to the Rio Grande to rally to the rescue” of Texas.48 He later claimed that he had warned Secretary of the Navy Preston that he would move to impeach Taylor if federal troops fired on Texans.49 While Texas governor P.H.

Bell was anxious to confront the federal army in New Mexico, though, his legislature was significantly more divided than the New Mexicans. The Texas General Assembly rejected Bell’s request to dispatch a militia to New Mexico. It then adjourned without taking action on New

44 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1408. 45 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 990. 46 Ibid. 862-63 47 Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico…, p.2. 48 National Intelligencer, July 4, 1850. 49 Myrta L. Avery (ed.), Recollections of Alexander Stephens, 26-27.

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Mexico. Unable to provoke a confrontation by presenting what he hoped was overwhelming force, Bell contented himself with sending commissioners to New Mexico to establish Texan civil administration. The commissioners were promptly expelled. Bell then recalled the assembly to consider harsher measures, but the special session would not meet until August. At most, it was highly unclear whether the political will existed in Texas to provoke a conflict with

Taylor beyond Bell and his supporters. For his part, Taylor would no more be intimidated by

Bell than he had been by the Nashville Convention or Henry Clay. “The whole business is infamous,” he declared, “and must be put down.”50 When Secretary of War George Crawford

(an ally of Stephens and Toombs) refused to sign an order to resist any Texas invasion with force, Taylor pulled rank as commander in chief and signed the order himself.51 Weed was thrilled. The lack of a New Mexico constitution “was the only weak point in our case,” he declared. “The administration stands upon a rock,” he exclaimed, “its opponents have built upon sand.”52

By the end of June, Taylor was actively meeting with Congressmen and “did not hesitate to advocate his own plan and condemn Mr. Clay’s.”53 Taylor’s confidence was based in part on the increasing discipline that his supporters were displaying on Congress, and increasing criticism directed at Clay from influential fence-sitters. The most striking display of political discipline came from William H. Seward. Back in March the New York Senator had placed his

50 Quoted in Smith, Presidencies of Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore, 153. 51 Thurlow W. Barnes (ed.),Memoir of Thurlow Weed. 52 Thurlow Weed to William Meredith, June 25, 1850, William Meredith Papers Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, 115-259. 53David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, June 21, 1850, David Outlaw Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill.

232 political ambitions ahead of loyalty to the administration during his “Higher Law” speech. By

June, Seward was on the same page with the President and was working with Southern sectionalists behind the scenes to defeat the Omnibus. In his second major speech on California, he offered a full throated defense of Taylor. From the beginning, he made it clear that “I prefer the President’s plan.” He objected to the Omnibus Bill’s potential opening of New Mexico to slavery. “New Mexico is free soil now,” he argued, “by operation of unrepealed Mexican

Laws.” The Omnibus would result in the “conquest of a free Republic, and the conversion of it…into a slave state.” This result, Seward argued, was not only morally wrong, but it misunderstood the nature of the crisis, proposed an ineffective solution, and constituted a violation of the intent of the founders. The principles underlying his analysis were expressly anti-slavery. “Slavery and freedom,” he argued, “are conflicting systems, brought together by the Union of the States, not neutralized, not even harmonized.” “Their antagonism is radical,” he declared, “and therefore perpetual.” Because the Omnibus Bill failed to recognize the nature of the conflict, it failed to offer a permanent settlement of it. “This compromise will fail of all its purposes, it will work up [perpetuate] serious and lasting evils.” Instead of aligning Unionism with anti-slavery on the basis of the maintenance of a single state, the Omnibus appeased sectionalism, which would only invite more crises. “It is a concession to the alarms of disorganization and faction,” he warned. “Such concessions,” he continued, “once begun, follow another with fearful rapidity and always increasing magnitude.” The solution, Seward offered, was to “go back to the ground where our forefathers stood.” “While we leave slavery to the care of the states where it exists,” he proposed, “let us inflexibly direct the policy of the Federal

233

Government to circumscribe its limits and favor its ultimate extinction.” Seward’s remarks demonstrated an evolution in his thinking and skills as a factional leader since the “Higher Law” speech of March. Seward not only illustrated that he could be a team player, but demonstrated that emerging cohesion of Taylor’s faction of Unionists and transformational nationalists and the broader anti-Omnibus opposition. 54

Clay’s problems with the Whig caucus were not limited to the North. Over the course of three days, John Bell (W-TN) would flay Clay and his plan and defend Taylor, while retaining the option of supporting the bill in the absence of another alternative. Bell alternately supported the idea of compromise in general, praised Taylor, indicated that he disapproved of the Omnibus and attacked Clay frequently, persistently, and thoroughly. He chastised Clay for misrepresenting the Committee of Thirteen (of which Bell was a member) in attacking Taylor during his introduction of the Omnibus Bill. Clay was “prejudicing the public mind,” for his own selfish ends, as “not a word of censure …had been proposed by the committee, or by anyone else” toward the President. “Old Zack,” Bell declared, “had a right to the expression of his views, and…had a right to adhere to them.” Rather than give in to Clay and “cease to be

President,” Taylor refused to buckle and embrace Clay’s flawed plan. The Omnibus, he believed, was more placebo than panacea. If it were to pass, he feared, “I fear there will be no peace, no permanent concord and harmony…upon the surging elements of popular opinion and sentiment, North and South.” In contrast to Clay, Bell argued, Taylor was motivated by “the highest and noblest motives of duty and patriotism. While Bell did not clearly answer the

54 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1020-1024; Van Deusen, Seward, 131- 133.

234 question of what he would do if the omnibus came to a vote, he unequivocally expressed his disaffection with the bill and its author. Bell was keeping his options open, and recommended that others do the same. “I shall…hesitate long,” he admitted, “before I will reject a measure which shall appear to be the only one which can unite a majority of both Houses of Congress in its favor.”55 But it was clear that Bell retained serious reservations about Clay’s proposal, and that he remained interested in promoting a better alternative.56

By the end of June, it was clear to both sides that the vote on the Omnibus Bill was going to be very close. Opponents of the bill spent the final days of the month marshalling their forces.

On June 28, 40 pro-Taylor Whigs and Free-Soilers attended an open caucus dedicated to planning strategy to block the Omnibus. The next day, Southern Democrats met with similar intentions. Also on the 29, Stephens, Toombs and their allies met separately to plan a last-ditch attempt to pressure Taylor into supporting the bill. Senators waffled back and forth between despair and elation as the prospects for passage waxed and waned, but the overarching trend was increasing confidence for the bill’s opponents, and increasing concern for its supporters. “Many members do not wish to vote against the President’s plan,” Webster complained. “He seems to have more feeling on the subject than I can well account for.” “I think we have got the hydra down now,” Horace Mann (W-MA) reported to Charles Sumner, “& will cut off the last of its heads.”57 Observers of Taylor had found him “dejected and haggard”58 in May, but by late June

55 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1086-1106. 56 Parks, John Bell. 57 Horace Mann to Charles Sumner, June 27, 1850, Horace Mann Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. 58 Albert Burnley to John J. Crittenden, May 8, 1850, John J. Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

235 he was reported to be in “fine spirits.”59 Clay, on the other hand, was reported to be “jaded and exhausted.”60 On June 19, he admitted that “a hundred times almost…I have been quite ready to yield.”61 For their part, Clay and his allies realized that they could not spare a single vote. Clay begged Pro-compromise Southern Whig Willie P. Mangum (W-NC), away from Washington to tend to his ailing wife, to “come back to us forthwith if you possibly can.” “We will be hard run,” he warned, “if not defeated without your vote.”62 David Atchison also pressed Mangum to hurry back, warning that “the Compromise is doubtful” and “this damned administration has set itself seriously about the unholy work of dissolving the Union of these States.”63 Further complicating issues for both sides was the overall poor health of official Washington, with numerous officials falling ill over the course of the blistering summer. Since the opening of the session, Clayton, Seward, William Crawford, George Bliss, William Duer, John C. Clark, Joshua

Giddings and John Bell had been laid up with assorted ailments, and both John C. Calhoun and his replacement had died. Clay himself was in poor health, unknowingly afflicted with a case of tuberculosis that would eventually kill him. The prevalence of disease among Washington’s political class added additional uncertainty to the already murky prospects for the Omnibus. Hot, overworked and frequently ill, the legislators found their endurance sorely tested as the struggle over the Omnibus approached its climax.64

59 Quoted in Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, 106. 60 Ibid. 61 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 968. 62 Clay to Mangum, June 25, 1850 , Willie P. Mangum Papers. Vol. V, 178. 63 Atchison to Mangum, June 28, 1850 , Willie P. Mangum Papers. Vol. V, 179. 64 Stegmaier, 158-164.

236

With the Omnibus Bill’s margin for error getting smaller and smaller, and with political momentum increasingly favoring the opposition and Taylor, Congressmen were relieved to set aside political animosity for a day to celebrate the Fourth of July. Much of official Washington, including President Taylor, gathered at the Washington Monument to hear a patriotic oration by

Senator Henry Foote. The temperature was blistering and Foote’s speech long, but it was patriotic and conciliatory. Taylor sought Foote out afterwards and praised his words, wondering

“why will you not always speak this way?”65 Hungry and thirsty, President Taylor returned to the White House and feasted on some combination of raw fruits and vegetables and iced milk.

While the contents of Taylor’s meal have passed from the realm of fact to that of myth and legend, whatever it was seems to have been uncooked and his milk cooled with ice from unboiled water, a recipe for gastrointestinal distress in the malarial swamps of Washington. By the end of the day he was feeling ill, but was well enough to make the two most momentous decisions of his Presidency over the next two days.66

July 5 was an exceptionally busy day for the beleaguered Chief Executive. In what would prove the most important legacy of his administration, Taylor signed the Clayton-Bulwer

Treaty with Great Britain, which would prove to be a landmark in American and British diplomacy and international law.67 The treaty committed the United States and Great Britain to not occupy or colonize Central America, and established the precedent that any canals constructed to ease trade would be neutral and open to all shipping. Secondly, Taylor had

65 Henry S. Foote, War of the Rebellion, (NY: Harper and Brothers, 1866), 149. 66 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor 2, 357-85. 67 Mayo W. Hazeltine, “The Clayton Bulwer Treaty,” The North American Review 165, no. 491 (October 1897): 452-459.

237 determined that he would end the ambiguity over the role of the Army in New Mexico. He was going to confront Texas. He instructed Secretary of State Clayton to draft an order that would go out in his own name that would “direct the commandant to defend the country and people against all who may attack or assert dominion over them, whether Navajos or Texans, until Congress or the Supreme Court should order otherwise.”68 Taylor intended to transmit the message to New

Mexico on July 6, and notify Congress on July 8. Finally, he met with the representatives of

Stephens and Toombs’s faction of Southern Whigs, who hoped to persuade him to abandon his plan. Taylor refused, and gave both principled and partisan reasons for doing so. Taylor made it abundantly clear that he would not be swayed by threats of secession. “If ever the flag of disunion is raised within the border of these United States while I occupy this Chair,” he declared, “I will plant the stars and stripes alongside of it, and with my own hand strike it down, if not a soul comes to my aid south of Mason and Dixon’s line.”69 In addition, Taylor advised

Louisiana Representative Charles Conrad that Northern Whigs outnumbered Southern Whigs in

Congress by a count of 84 to 29, and as the leader of the party he could not risk the defeat of the former in order to appease the latter.70 The Southern Whig representatives who visited Taylor were unsuccessful in persuading Taylor to change his mind, though Stephens was successful in provoking Taylor to declare that anyone who rose in rebellion against the Union would be hung.

68 Quoted in Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, 175. 69 Ibid. 163. 70 Clayborn, The Life of Quitman. Vol. 2, 32-33.

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Taylor went to bed that night uncomfortable from his illness, but firmly and unequivocally committed to holding the line on the New Mexico boundary.71

Taylor’s position in the Senate was bolstered further on July 8 when defacto Whig Party chairman Truman Smith (W-CT) declared his support for Taylor’s plan on Seward’s heels.

Smith was no friend of slavery, he was a transformational nationalist at heart, though more risk- averse than a Seward, Chase, Stevens, or Giddings. Like other transformational nationalists (but unlike Unionists), Smith was convinced that slaveholders did not represent the majority of the

Southern population, and he expected that the end of slavery would come naturally when these non-slaveholding Southerners turned against it. The representative of Northern Whig political professionals par excellance, Smith had avoided debating the territorial issue at length, but now came out in favor of Taylor’s approach. He was not intimidated by Southern threats of disunion.

“The dangers arising from this cause,” he suggested, have, in my judgment, been greatly exaggerated.” He made three main arguments: that Democratic policies (especially those of

James K. Polk) were the cause of the crisis, that the true source of the controversy was not differences between the sections but between different classes of citizens within the South and that Southern complaints about Northern domination of the Federal government were ill-founded and hypocritical. “If,” he argued, “the Missouri Compromise line has been overthrown, it is the policy of Mr. Polk which has done it.” “The geographical position and the physical character of the countries acquired,” he continued, made the constraint of slavery “inevitable.” Sectional balance in the Senate would end, and this development would not harm the liberties of the South.

71 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor 2, 386-388; “Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan on the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1849- 1850,” The American Historical Review 5, no. 1 (October 1899); 95-102.

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The South had been amply represented in the Federal government to this point, and the North had not used the federal government to promote itself at the expense of the South. The real

“controversy,” as Smith saw it, was “between different classes of citizens, and not between

States or sections—between slaveholders and non-slaveholders both of the free and slave

States.” “The non-slaveholders of the slave States,” he continued, “can and do go to our new possessions precisely with the same advantages enjoyed by the non-slaveholder of the free

States.” Even slaveholders, he declared, “can emigrate to the territories on an exact footing of equality with the non-slaveholders of either section: both can take their families and…can go to work by the sweat of their brows.” “Slaveholders,” he continued, “can take all of their property with them, if they will only convert it into money,” as non-slaveholders also did. Smith also discounted Southern threats as being logically inconsistent. Noting that Southern sectionalists asserted that slavery should be permitted everywhere, but were willing to accept the Missouri

Compromise formula (restricting slavery at an arbitrary geographic point), he accused the South of trying to accomplish what it accused the North of desiring. “Do honorable members,” he wondered, “mean to say that it is the purpose of the South to obtain, by an augmentation slave territory, a numerical superiority and then bind themselves together to control this Government, and to wield all its vast powers for their own benefit?”

Smith’s opinion mattered, and for him to come out so publicly and strongly for Taylor illustrated the waxing strength of the Administration. “I am not prepared to surrender absolutely,” he declared, ”what I deem a sound principle—that territory, which is free when acquired, should have the proper legal guarantee that it will remain free, but I should do so if I

240 voted for this bill.” “I decidedly prefer the President’s plan of treating the matter before us,” he continued, citing as reasons that “it is exactly equal between the two sections,” and that “it will close the door against all further controversy,” while “the present bill will not.”72 As the effective party chairman of the Whig party, Smith was personally familiar with many of the

Party’s representatives in Congress from before the session. He was known and respected by

Whig political apparatchiks throughout the nation, and most Whigs who had been elected to national office were indebted to him in some manner. Secondly, unlike Seward, Smith was no firebrand. He was a cautious and reasonable statesman, and his adherence to Taylor signaled that moderate and conservative Whigs would stand against the Omnibus. Smith also enjoyed an extensive network within the South, and his argument for the President’s plan not only provided a rationale for Southern Whigs to hold firm but also provided for them a potential argument they could use against sectionalist Democrats in the upcoming elections. While it is impossible to know for sure how effective the pro-Taylor campaign was in winning votes, there are some indications that it bore fruit. Between Seward’s speech and Smith’s, James Pearce (W-MD), who had heretofore been ambivalent and even hostile toward Taylor, had given a full-throated defense of the President regarding charges of political impropriety by his cabinet. The extent of the success of the pro-Taylor forces can be inferred from the drama that followed: all but two

Northern Whigs would stand against Clay and Webster. To conclude his address, Smith expressly invoked the President. “The Union will be preserved,” he declared, “for Zachary

Taylor has said ‘WHATEVER DANGERS MAY THREATEN IT I SHALL STAND BY AND

72 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1185.

241

MAINTAIN IT IN ITS INTEGRITY TO THE FULL EXTENT OF THE OBLIGATION

IMPOSED AND THE POWER CONFERRED IN ME BY THE CONSTITUTION.’”

Unbeknownst to Smith, however, the strength of the promises of the President were declining as he spoke. Zachary Taylor was dying.73

Taylor’s health had been precarious since the onset of his illness on July 4. By July 6

Taylor felt poorly enough that a doctor was called in, further endangering the President through application of Nineteenth century medical techniques. By July 7, the President was unable to keep food down. While his doctors remained optimistic, the President was not. “In two days I shall be a dead man” he predicted. By July 8, there was no doubt that his health was failing. On

July 9, the House had voted to censure the President for the behavior of his cabinet related to the

Galphin claim scandal, but in recognition of the seriousness of his illness and unwilling to add to his discomfort and potential martyrdom, the House later redacted it. Later that day, the President died. He was said to have declared on his deathbed that “I have endeavored to discharge all of my official duties faithfully,” declaring, stalwart to the end, that “I regret nothing.” 74 As can be expected for a politician who took unpopular stances and held to them, responses to his death varied widely. Mormon leader Brigham Young succinctly declared that “Zachary Taylor is dead and gone to hell, and I am glad of it.”75 Thomas Hart Benton, on the other hand, years later would still consider Taylor’s death to have been “a public calamity.” “No one,” he believed,

“could have been more devoted to the Union, or more opposed to the slavery agitation.” Most

73 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor, Vol. 2, 390-391; Holt, Rise and Fall, 519-520. 74 Quoted in Bordewich, 277. 75 Quoted in M. R. Werner, Brigham Young (New York: Harcourt, Brace and. Company, 1925), 378-379.

242 especially, Benton argued, his background as a Louisiana slaveholder “would have given him a power in the settlement of those questions which no President without those qualifications could have possessed.”76 In addition to his status as a slaveholder, Taylor enjoyed two advantages that were denied his successor. Taylor had been popularly elected, and had a national network of supporters and admirers. Also, Taylor was a skilled general whose ability to threaten military action was eminently credible. Irrespective of the South’s feelings toward Taylor, the President had tangible political and military strength, and a clearly expressed will to use it. Each of these advantages would not apply to the new President. No one feared Millard Fillmore.77

Millard Fillmore did not sleep the first night of his Presidency. Unlike most who have occupied the office, Fillmore had shown no ambition to the Presidency prior to his ascension.

While he was generally praised more for his genial and easygoing nature than his effectiveness or intellect, unlike his running mate he was a professional politician. Despite this, the Vice-

President had not been invited to cabinet meetings. Prior to his nomination as Vice President he had served in the House of Representatives, where he had risen to become chairman of the powerful Ways and Means Committee and had finished second in voting for Speaker. Like many New York Whigs he had gotten his start as an Anti-Mason. Along with Weed, Seward and

Greeley he had helped to build the Whig party into a force in New York. Unlike them, however, his anti-slavery principles were more limited and conditional. A firm Unionist, he was unwilling to risk the disruption of the nation to confront slavery. While he hoped that one day slavery would be abolished, he believed that it should not be topic of national debate nor Congressional

76 Benton, Thirty Years’ View. Vol. II, 765-766. 77 Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 390-391.

243 action. “God knows that I detest slavery,” Fillmore would write to Webster after the compromise debate, “but it is an existing evil for which we are not responsible, and we must endure it.”78 In principle, the distance between Fillmore and the Sewardites was minute, but when applied to the territories in practice it was a gulf. As Daniel Walker Howe has written,

“the Seward-Fillmore division was more than a personal rivalry (though it was that too); it manifested the inescapable tension within Whiggery between progress and stability, between moral urgency and social order.”79 As been the case with New York’s Democrats, the Wilmot

Proviso divided New York Whigs. Seward, Weed and Greeley wholeheartedly endorsed the

Proviso. Fillmore sided with the opposition “Silver Grey” faction, and had emerged as one of several prominent leaders of the minority faction. Relations between Seward’s “Wooly Heads”80 and Fillmore became increasingly strained following Fillmore’s defeat in the 1844 gubernatorial election, which Fillmore blamed on vote shaving by the Sewardites. The rivalry between

Fillmore and Seward intensified during Taylor’s administration, as Vice-President Fillmore and

Senator Seward competed with each other for patronage. Seward largely won the battle for influence with Taylor, though Fillmore and his allies were temporarily able to position themselves as Taylor’s loyalists after Seward’s Higher Law speech. Crucially, Fillmore had become increasingly dependent on the support of Democratic Senator Daniel Dickenson for patronage. Unlike Seward, however, Fillmore and the Silver Greys had no ideological

78 Fillmore to Daniel Webster, October 23, 1850, Papers of Daniel Webster: Correspondence. Vol. 7, 162-164. 79 Howe, Political Culture, 207. 80 The faction nicknames for New York Whigs originated from the hair of the preeminent leaders of the groupings. Seward’s allies were nicknames “Wooly Heads” due to Seward’s curly hair (as well as a racist jab at the anti-slavery Whigs). The Silver Grey nickname came from the hair color of Francis Granger, one of the state’s preeminent conservative Whigs.

244 commitment to Taylor’s plan. “The President I suppose must desire as you and I do the admission of California and New Mexico as states,” Nathan Hall, a New York ally, wrote

Fillmore. However, he continued, “with you I fear it cannot be done.” “In that event,” he advised, “I prefer the Compromise Bill to inaction.”81 Fillmore supported the Clay framework in part because he saw the alternative as nothing, a logic that would gain in strength as the debate dragged on. Fillmore would later claim that he had advised President Taylor that in the event of a tie in the Senate, that he would cast his deciding vote in favor of the Omnibus. Unlike Taylor,

Fillmore had no national base of support upon which he could draw. To influence events, he would need to draw upon the strength of others.82

The most important decision that the new President made was the composition of his cabinet. There was no question as to whether Fillmore would retain Taylor’s cabinet; none were allies of Fillmore, they were held in general disrepute following controversy over the Galphin claim, and none but Clayton had a national network of allies. Fillmore determined that he would accept the resignations of all of the members of the cabinet, and consulted with Webster and

Clay in determining replacements. Interestingly, there is some evidence that at the outset of his administration Fillmore was not as dedicated to the Omnibus as he would later be. He initially offered the position of Secretary of State to Robert Winthrop, the recent unsuccessful candidate

81 Nathan Hall to Millard Fillmore, July 9, 1850, Millard Fillmore Papers Buffalo Historical Society, Buffalo, NY. 82 Robert J. Rayback, Millard Fillmore (Buffalo: Henry Steward, Inc. 1959), 1-230. Charles O. Paullin, “The Vice-President and the Cabinet,” The American Historical Review 29, no. 3 (Apr. 1924): 496-500.

245 for Speaker of the House who was widely understood to be hostile to the Omnibus.83 Winthrop declined and suggested to Fillmore that he approach Webster instead.84 Webster would become

Secretary of State and effective premier of the administration. Taylorite John J. Crittenden, who a year previously had turned down Taylor’s request to serve as Secretary of State, was persuaded to resign as governor of Kentucky and join the administration as Attorney General. Other cabinet members included Thomas Corwin at Treasury and Charles Conrad heading the War

Department. Seward had no illusions as to who was the driving force in the administration.

“The government,” he advised, “is in the hands of Mr. Webster, and Mr. Clay is its organ in

Congress.”85 Clay bragged to his son that “my relations to the new Chief are intimate and confidential.”86 Clay and Webster were convinced that the hostility of the Taylor administration to the Omnibus was the primary impediment to its passage, and they immediately sought to mitigate Taylor’s confrontational policies with Texas. Taylor’s orders to the garrison in New

Mexico were abandoned. In his farewell address to the Senate, Webster warned of the threat of civil war and declared that the country was on “the very eve of probable hostilities.”87 The full weight of patronage would now be thrown behind the Omnibus in an effort to avert a calamity.

The immediate goal was to prevent the outbreak of violence in the disputed Texas-New Mexico

83 Later appointed to the Senate to replace Webster, he would vote with the anti-slavery bloc on all but one major issue during the debate. 84 Holt, Rise and Fall, 526. 85 Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington. Vol. 1, 147. 86 Henry Clay to James Clay, July 18, 1850, Papers of Thomas J. Clay, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 87 Congressional Globe Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1391-4.

246 territories, and the new administration would use every method of persuasion at their disposal to accomplish this.88

Despite the break in agitation provided by Taylor’s death and the construction of the new administration, the Unionist supporters of the Omnibus still struggled to take control of the legislative agenda. Over July twenty eight additional amendments were offered to the Omnibus, primarily from anti-compromise Southern nationalists. Clay remained convinced that Southern

Democratic support would provide the critical margin of victory. He continued to acquiesce in

Southern amendments in order to win their support for the bill. It was difficult to define what exactly Southern Democrats agreed upon among themselves when amending the Omnibus. For example, there was general support for dividing California into two states (with the possibility of slavery being introduced into the Southern portion), but disagreement over what this meant.

Foote proposed recommending that the state be divided at 34’, while other Southern Democrats proposed requiring it. Southerners of both parties were further agitated when, on July 27, slaves of Alexander Stephens and Robert Toombs escaped from their homes in Washington with abolitionist assistance. “This stealing of slaves,” David Outlaw (W-NC) complained, “produces more irritation, more heart burnings among slaveholders, than all other causes combined.”89

While Toombs and Stephens asserted that the slaves had been content prior to their escape, their resistance to capture argues otherwise. To Southern slaveholders of all ideological persuasions,

88 Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, 280-288; Rayback, Fillmore, 238-246; Holt, Rise, 521-525; Kenneth E. Shewmaker, “Daniel Webster and the Politics of Foreign Policy, 1850-1852,” The Journal of American History 63, no. 2 (Sep. 1976): 303-313. 89 David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, July 29, 1850, David Outlaw Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

247 it underlined the potential significance of the Fugitive Slave Bill, which many in the Deep South were otherwise ambivalent about in practice. While the escape of their slaves likely had little impact on the votes of Stephens and Toombs, that a moderate like Outlaw was outraged by the event certainly did no damage to Southern nationalist demands for greater concessions. In all probability, it increased cohesion among Southern members and underscored the ongoing threat that abolitionists posed to border state slaveholders. This physical incarnation of what

Southerners considered Northern perfidy on slavery may ironically have strengthened the emergent unholy alliance between Southern nationalists and Northern transformational nationalists in the Senate. By increasing the political temperature as the Omnibus Bill immediately prior to the final disposition of the bill, tempers became more heated among supporters of the bill, while the ideological ice between different groups of opponents continued to melt.90

Southern nationalists were not the only legislators causing heartburn for Clay. Thomas

Hart Benton remained the single most vocal opponent of the bill, and he had discovered a new angle of attack that he pressed throughout the month. “The omnibus cannot drive,” he concluded, “unless it has Texas strength to carry it along.”91 The Omnibus and attendant issues were ultimately dependent on Texas relinquishing its claim on New Mexico, and Texas’s willingness to do so was dependent on the assumption by the federal government of Texas’s debt. Benton’s attack (despite his earlier support of a similar measure) revolved around portraying the Texas debt assumption as akin to official corruption. By characterizing the

90 Bordewich, 283-288; Hamilton, Prologue, 109-111; Holt, Rise, 530-532; Stegmaier, 167-172. 91 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1462.

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Omnibus as a glorified bribe to Texas, Benton was defining the bill with one of its more unpopular provisions, as well as implicitly undercutting the threat of civil war should the

Omnibus not pass that Southerners like Stephens had been promoting. It would prove an exceptionally clever assault. Maryland Whig James Pearce and Kentucky Whig Joseph

Underwood likewise condemned the Texas boundary claim, and Pearce went so far as to declare that if Texas militias fired upon the United States Army, it would be a declaration of war on the

United States. The urgency of Clay’s case rested on the assumption that the outbreak of hostilities in New Mexico would lead to the irreversible outbreak of sectional war, but in these cases Southern Senators were unequivocally siding against “the South.” If Southerners like

Pearce and Benton (as well as the Delaware Whigs and Bell, who had attempted to make Texas the South’s scapegoat for the end of slavery expansion in his own plan) were turning against it, the proposed settlement of the Texas claims in the Omnibus package might come at too high a price to pay for the acquiescence of the Texas Senators. The Omnibus would need Southern

Whig support to pass, and it would take deft management and clear understanding of the difficulties to ensure that both Southern Whiggery and the Texas Senators would stay in line.92

As the Omnibus Bill began to move toward a vote at the end of July, it was clear that the leadership of the effort was faltering. Webster blamed Taylor and Clay for the current problems.

He had not expected Taylor to be so intransigent, but now he was certain that part of the problem was Clay. “Mr. Clay,” he complained, “is not a good leader, for want of temper.” “He is

92 Hamilton, Prologue, 109.

249 irritable, impatient, & occasionally overbearing, & drives people off.” 93 Throughout the debate,

Clay had been extremely effective at flaying his enemies and appealing broadly to patriotism.

He had done little, however, to expand the base of support for the Omnibus beyond those who were naturally inclined to support it. In some cases he had antagonized leaders aligned with him on principle but not on particulars (Taylor, Bell, Benton) while chasing chimerical votes of leaders with no intention of admitting California under any terms (Soulé, Davis). Clay’s ability to portray the dire consequences of failure to act and attacks on his enemies (real and imagined) had built a large coalition behind his bill, but all indications were that support for the bill was very shallow and conditional. Expecting a close vote, Clay would make a final effort to answer his critics and carry the day on July 22. “The nation pants for repose,” he warned the Senate. In his defense of the Omnibus (possibly because he recognized the Omnibus’ weakness among his party), he sounded his most Whiggish, asserting the harmony of sectional and partisan interests underlying it. “We have no Africans or Abolitionists in our omnibus,” he declared, “no disunionists or Free Soilers, no Jews or Gentiles.” “Our passengers,” he proclaimed, “consist of

Democrats and Whigs, who seeing the crisis of their common country…have met together…to compare their opinions upon this great measure of reconciliation and harmony.” After praising the patriotism of his allies, he rounded once again into his foes. As usual, he directed his wrath at anti-slavery Northerners, picking John Hale (FS-NH) out for particular vituperation and making fun of Representative David Wilmot’s (D-PA) weight. President Taylor’s corpse received a firm kick. In the scale, Clay argued, the North would receive the admission of

93 Webster to Franklin Haven, Papers of Daniel Webster, Correspondence 7, 121.

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California as a free state and the eventual admission of New Mexico as one also, while the South would receive the abandonment of the Wilmot Proviso, a strengthened fugitive slave bill and an end to the agitation for abolition in the District of Columbia. In defending the portion of the

Omnibus Bill that favored the South, he redirected his fire at the Omnibus’s Southern opponents.

If slavery failed to expand into the West following passage, he warned, the South “cannot blame

Congress, but must upbraid Nature’s law and Nature’s God.” Channeling the late President, he promised disunionists that in the event of hostilities between the sections over the admission of

California, he would side with the Union. “If Kentucky tomorrow unfurls the banner of resistance unjustly, I will never fight under that banner.” “ I owe a permanent allegiance to the whole Union—a subordinate one to my own State.” It was a pointed rebuke to the ideal of State and sectional identity. “If she summons me to the battle-field,” he continued, “or to support her in any cause which is unjust against the Union, never, never will I engage with her in such a cause.”94 Unlike Taylor, however, Clay’s threat of violence lacked the credibility that Taylor’s carried. While many considered Clay’s speech of July 22 his best effort of the session, yet again it remained unclear whether he had changed any minds, especially among Whig Unionists and moderate transformational nationalists. The situation remained fluid, and susceptible to influence from external events.95

From day to day, the Omnibus’s prospects for success waxed and waned. In order to reduce the grounds for objection to the bill, Clay’s allies had been busy on July 24 “reducing the size of the vehicle and taking off a wheel to fit it through,” in the words of Free-Soiler Salmon P.

94 Clay, Works VI, 529-567 95 Remini, Clay, 754-756; Hamilton, Prologue, 108.

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Chase.96 Their opponents were not idle. A functional alliance between radicals in both sections emerged clearly on July 25. Neither the supporters of the Bill nor its opponents, were confident of the eventual outcome. On July 26, Seward dejectedly reported to Weed that “The

Compromise Bill is now to pass.” Clingman reported Clay as claiming that “the administration was the only obstacle to the passage of my measures, and now I shall carry them without difficulty.”97 By the next day, however, the fortunes of the bill had begun to turn. By July 27,

Seward was confident that the bill would be defeated. “The friends of the Bill, he reported to

Weed, “give it up in despair.” “Their combination is broken,” he stated,” and they say irrevocably.” Structural factors had begun to work against the Omnibus’s supporters. Daniel

Webster and Thomas Corwin had left the Senate to join Fillmore’s administration, and their replacements—unsuccessful Speaker of the House candidate Robert Winthrop and former Taylor cabinet member Thomas Ewing—could not be expected to support the bill. The situation, however, remained very fluid. Seward discovered how much so when he proposed an amendment to the bill that would empower the President to admit New Mexico as a state at his discretion. Moderate Southern Whig Thomas Pratt (W-MD) excoriated Seward, stating that his proposal was unconstitutional (because it created a state out of the territory of Texas) and called for Seward’s expulsion from the Senate. Seward’s motion failed by a vote of 42-1. Two days later, two test votes on the Omnibus Bill ended in ties, which, due to the absence of a sitting

Vice-President, meant the bill was defeated. The vote revealed that the Omnibus balanced on a

96 Chase to B. Chase, July 24, 1850, Salmon P. Chase Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 97 Thomas L. Clingman to the Editors of The Herald, August 13, 1876, Selections from the Speeches and Writings of Thomas Lanier Clingman (Raleigh: John Nichols, Book and Job Printer, 1878), 273.

252 precipice, and any disgruntled Unionist could potentially cause the bill to fail. Despite this setback, however, the Omnibus moved forward inexorably toward a vote with the resumption of the session on July 30.98

During the marathon nine-hour uninterrupted session, the boundaries of New Mexico and the disposition of the territories were the subject of intense debate, amendment and maneuvers.

The first issue addressed was Georgia Whig John Berrien’s amendment that empowered territorial legislatures to protect or prohibit slavery. Many Northerners were dissatisfied with

Berrien’s formulation because it expressly opened the territories to slavery, and Moses Norris

(W-NH) proposed removing Berrien’s verbiage and replaced it with the formulation in the original bill that prohibited the legislature from legislating on slavery. Norris’s amendment passed easily, 32-20. While the success of a measure that was endorsed by the leaders of the

Omnibus faction was encouraging, the success of the amendment impacted the willingness of a number of Southerners to support the bill, not least John Berrien. Because of the sectionally loaded nature of the issue, either alternative was likely to cost support for the Omnibus. With the margin of support for the Bill so narrow, any defections could prove decisive.99

The next amendment was offered by Unionist James Bradbury (D-ME), who hoped to provide an elegant solution to the boundary issue. Bradbury’s idea was to refer the Texas boundary issue to a committee that would adjudicate the respective claims of Texas and New

Mexico, extracting Congress from having to make a decision that would inevitably exacerbate sectional conflict. The supporters hoped that the commission idea would win support for the

98 Hamilton, Prologue, 109; Stegmaier, 184-186. 99 Bordewich, 290-292; Stegmaier, 189.

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Omnibus from the two Texas Senators. When this effort failed, Southern nationalist Senator

William Dawson (D-GA) adopted Bradbury’s idea, but also stipulated in the amendment he offered that Texas would maintain jurisdiction over the disputed territories until the commission could determine the border, and stipulated that the territorial legislature would be prohibited from legislating on slavery. Since Santa Fe and the majority of the population of New Mexico fell within the disputed territory, the amendment expressly granted Texas effective jurisdiction over New Mexico until the commission determined otherwise. Some speculated that the amendment was an attempt to win the support of Texas’s Senators for the compromise, and that the author of the amendment was Henry Clay himself.100 The amendment passed by the narrowest of margins, 30-28.101 Analysis of the roll call, however, displayed some ominous signs for the supporters of the Omnibus. Five Southerners had voted against the bill. The transformational nationalist Samuel Phelps (W-VT), a firm opponent of the Omnibus, had cast a strategic and, it turned out, decisive, vote for the amendment as a means of making the Omnibus as a whole unpalatable. It was a clever maneuver. Even Stephen Douglas opposed the amendment, irritated by its rejection of popular sovereignty and wondering “when…will Texas ever agree to a boundary if she is to have the Rio Grande as her boundary up to the time she does agree to it?”102 The success of the Dawson amendment damaged the Omnibus in two ways.

First, it offended Unionist Northern Democrats by effectively rejecting popular sovereignty.

100 Bordewich, 293. 101 Because there was no sitting Vice-President that could break a tie, a tied vote would have resulted in the amendment’s defeat. 102 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1114-1115.

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Secondly, it offended a small group of Unionist Southern Whigs who rejected Texas’s boundary claims.103

Southern Whig James Pearce (W-MD) was a strong supporter of the Omnibus. However, he was anything but satisfied at events of the last couple of days. He took his seat on July 31 anxious to strike down the Dawson amendment. He had consulted with Fillmore prior to offering his amendment, and his motivation (and the President’s) have been a source of contention ever since.104 When Pearce gained the floor, he clearly expressed his support for the

Omnibus, but disparaged the “deformed” and “lop-eared” Dawson amendment. Pearce believed that Texas had no legitimate claim to the territory in New Mexico. Granting Texas administrative control of territory over which it had no just claim violated his political principles.

By removing this provision, Pearce stated, the omnibus would be “curtailed to its fair proportions.” Clay, worried that the passage of Pearce’s amendment would cost him the support of the Texas Senators, tried to convince Pearce to back down. “Is it possible,” he warned, “upon slight and unimportant amendments that we shall now hazard the safety, the peace, if not the

Union of the country?” Pearce did not consider the matter unimportant, and was not going to back down. Clay had been foolish to ignore Pearce’s concerns, and his opponents now saw an opportunity to pounce. David Yulee (D-FL), a fierce Southern nationalist who had been relatively quiet, then innocuously delivered a masterful parliamentary stroke. He blandly

103 Stegmaier, 189-190. 104 Fillmore biographer Robert Rayback believed that Fillmore had conspired with Pearce to introduce his Amendment with the goal to “either eliminate the Dawson Proviso or clear the way for a complete settlement by breaking the Omnibus.” Holman Hamilton and Mark Stegmaier both dispute this interpretation. Robert J. Rayback, Fillmore, 249; Stegmaier, 195; Hamilton, Prologue, 113 (fn.).

255 suggested that Pearce could remove the offending verbiage by first striking the whole New

Mexico portion of the legislation, and then restore the original version as a separate amendment.

Pearce took the suggestion. Pearce’s first amendment (to strike the New Mexico portion of the

Omnibus) passed by a vote of 33-22, with all voting Northern Whigs and Free Soilers joining a slim majority of Southern Democrats and slim minorities of Southern Whigs and Northern

Democrats to form the majority.105

With the New Mexico provision removed, and with no intention of supporting the bill,

Yulee struck. Before Pearce could move to restore the Bradbury version of the New Mexico language, Yulee offered his own amendment. Since New Mexico was out of the Omnibus, he argued, all of the provisions related to Texas should be struck out also. The brilliance of Yulee’s attack soon became apparent. Houston and Rusk, though supporters of the Omnibus, would have to support his effort to destroy the bill. The very votes that Clay had worked so desperately to win would tear down his compromise. In a stark display of cross-sectional radical cooperation,

Seward moved that Yulee’s amendment be brought to a vote. Recognizing that the Omnibus was in danger of falling apart, Pro-Omnibus Senator John Underwood (W-KY) sought an adjournment, arguing that “we are not in a condition to legislate.”106 Yulee’s amendment continued to a vote, where it passed 29-28. The two Texas Senators provided the margin of victory. It was a crushing defeat. Pearce had intended to adjust the bill to strengthen its foundation. Yulee had jumped in and filled it with dynamite.107

105 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1490. 106 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress,-1ST Session, 1479-83 107 Hamilton, Prologue, 110; Stegmaier, 197; Bordewich, 298.

256

There remained one opportunity forestall an explosion. Following the Yulee

Amendment, Pearce completed the second move in his clumsy dance and introduced an amendment which restored the Bradley version of the New Mexico portion of the bill. If the

New Mexico verbiage could be restored, perhaps the Texas verbiage could be restored as well.

Without the Texas and New Mexico provisions, the Omnibus would detonate. It was the ultimate test of Senators’ principles and priorities. The Yulee Amendment, after all, had passed by only a single vote. Pearce’s second Amendment, however, failed by a vote of 28-25. The coalition that defeated the second Pearce Amendment was nearly identical to that which had passed the Yulee Amendment, including the two Texas Senators. There was one conspicuous exception. For some reason, Henry Clay skipped the vote. Houston and Rusk had provided the margin of defeat for the Compromisers,108 but Clay’s abstention stung. His comprehensive settlement was in ruins. The remaining question was what parts (if any) of the Omnibus could get through.109

With the elimination of the Texas/New Mexico provisions, the Omnibus as Clay conceived it was dead. California and Utah, however, remained in the bill. Of these issues,

California was the most significant, and it presented transformational nationalists with a dilemma. On one hand, California could now be admitted as a free state unencumbered by the

Texas/New Mexico provisions. On the other, it remained tied to the other issues. Following the failure of Pearce’s amendment, Pro-Omnibus Senator James Atchison (D-MO) moved that

108 The motion would have passed if two the Senators had voted “aye” and one had abstained, Clay’s vote plus one Texas Senator would not have been a sufficient margin to pass the bill if the other had voted “no.” 109 Hamilton, Prologue, 110; Stegmaier, 198; Bordewich, 298.

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California be struck from the Omnibus. In a rare instance of disharmony between Northern

Whigs and Free Soilers, Whigs supported Atchison’s Amendment while Free Soilers opposed it.

The question was one of tactics. Northern Whigs were optimistic that they could admit

California as a stand-alone measure, while Free Soilers preferred admitting California as part of the reduced Omnibus while the opportunity was there. The Free Soil defection made little difference. Most Northern Whigs, all Southern Democrats and most Southern Whigs united to pass the amendment over united Northern Democratic opposition, 34-25.110

With California out, the heart of the Omnibus had been removed. Once the vote was taken, Henry Clay slowly and conspicuously stood up and walked out. His great effort at saving the Union had failed. There was nothing left for him to do. “And so,” Horace Greeley reported,

“the Omnibus is smashed.” “I even saw,” he continued, “the gallant driver abandoning the wreck between six and seven this evening, after having done all that man could do to retrieve, or rather to avert the disaster.”111

Before the opponents of the Omnibus could celebrate, however, there was one final issue that needed to be resolved—Utah. Since California had abrogated its claim to the territory (to

President Taylor’s chagrin) during the formulation of its constitution, and with little interest in its organization in either section, the Bill to organize Utah as a territory had prompted little

110 Hamilton, Prologue, 110-111; Stegmaier, 198; Bordewich, 298; 111 New York Tribune, August 2, 1850; Hamilton, Prologue, 111; Stegmaier, 198-199; Bordewich, 299.

258 comment. Shorn down to its least controversial provision (surprising, considering the general distaste that the Mormon settlement inspired in Congress), the Omnibus passed easily, 33-17.112

The opponents of the Omnibus were ecstatic. Benton was reported to be “in the clouds” after “his triumph over Clay, Webster, Cass, Foote, the Omnibus, and the devil.”113 Always willing to weigh in and eager to gloat, he summarized the situation aptly. “The Omnibus is overturned and all the passengers spilled out but one,” he crowed. “We have but Utah left,” he continued. “It alone remains, and I am for saving it as a monument of the herculean labors of the immortal thirteen.”114 The strange factional arrangements of the Omnibus votes replayed themselves on the floor. William Seward danced a little jig. Salmon P. Chase (FS-OH) embraced Pierre Soulé (D-LA).115 Some Unionists even seemed relieved. John Bell was reported as being “half sorry but two-thirds glad” over the defeat.116 Henry Foote took the floor and denounced the revelers as “shallow-minded facetious demagogues.”117 There was nothing left to do but assign the blame.118

After a night’s rest (and revelry), the Senators were in little mood to undertake constructive work and were instead ready to verbally brawl. Henry Clay returned to the Senate eager to even accounts with those he blamed for the failure of his measures. “Clay is indignant

112 Hamilton, Prologue, 111; Stegmaier, 198-199; Bordewich, 299; Newell G. Brighthurst, “The Mormons and Slavery: A Closer Look,” The Pacific Historical Review 50, no.3 (Aug. 1981): 329-338. 113 Quoted in Smith, Presidencies of Taylor and Fillmore, 179. 114 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1482-1485. 115 Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 340. 116 New York Examiner, August 2, 1850. 117 Appendix to the Congressional Globe Thirty-First Congress 1st Session 1491-93. 118 Stegmaier, 197; Bordewich, 298.

259 at his Southern allies,” Orasmus B. Matteson reported to Thurlow Weed.119 Clay proved the accuracy of this assessment by rounding into James Pearce on the floor of the Senate. “The proposition of the Senator from Maryland,” he declared for the record, led to its defeat. “That proposition had consequences,” he complained, “that are fresh in the recollection of the

Senate.”120 Pearce would have none of it. He had not been consulted, he complained, and the

Dawson Amendment had been “sprung on me, and I thought it my duty to oppose it in the best way that I could.”121 In private, Pearce was more scathing. “The compromise bill was lost by

Clay’s own blunder,” he complained, “tho’ like Napoleon, who never lost a battle, but charged every defeat on some subordinate and endeavored to make me the scapegoat falsely and unjustly, for which I will never forgive him.”122 After his exchange with Pearce and an obligatory denunciation of abolitionists, Clay praised “the majority of the committee to which I belonged

[the Committee of Thirteen], who had “done their duty…faithfully and responsibly.” It can be assumed that the members of the committee excluded from Clay’s praise knew who they were.

He then rounded into Southern disunionists. “If blood is to be spilt,” he declared, it would be

“by the fault of those who change to raise the standard of disunion and endeavor to prostrate the government.” 123 Clay had finally realized, as Taylor had months before, that disunionists could not be appeased and could only be confronted. Unfortunately, Southern Whiggery was already irreconcilably divided by the Taylor-Clay feud. The defeat of the Omnibus had transferred the

119 Orasamus B. Matteson to Thurlow Weed, Thurlow Weed Papers [microfilm edition], University of Rochester, Rochester, NY. 120 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1486. 121 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1488. 122 Quoted in Bordewich, 300. 123 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1 Session, 1486.

260 initiative away from Clay and the other Southern Whigs and into the hands of the Northern

Democrats.124

The truth was, even at its most broad, support for the Omnibus had always been very shallow. Several Senators only supported the Omnibus reluctantly, and either did not trust its efficacy or only supported it in the absence of an alternative they thought viable. David

Atchison (D-MO), one of the key players in the destruction of the Omnibus, gave a speech that explained the thinking that had led him to assist in tearing down the Omnibus Bill he had previously supported. In truth, he admitted, he had always “opposed several features” of the bill.

He much preferred the 36°30′ proposal that had been promoted by Jefferson Davis and which appealed to other Southern nationalists. However, he had “supported it as it was presented, voting however such amendments as in my opinion were calculated to make it more acceptable to the slaveholding states.”125 Like other reluctant Omnibus supporters, he supported the plan as far as no alternative presented itself, and as long as the terms remained satisfactory. As soon as the terms of the settlement shifted, or even became negotiable, he was willing to abandon the bill and revert to his original position. While Atchison’s reasons for supporting the bill and reasons for abandoning it were specific to those approaching the issue from a Southern nationalist position, the same dynamic played out in other factions. James Pearce (W-MD) and John Bell

(W-TN), Unionist Southern Whigs, behaved in a similar manner driven by different issues. As

Joseph Underwood (W-KY) observed at the time, the Omnibus “arrayed all the

124 Stegmaier, 197; Bordewich, 298. 125 Quoted in Hamilton, Prologue, 116

261 malcontents…into a phalanx against the whole.”126 As Ian Kershaw has noted about a radically different historical circumstance, major historical decisions are undertaken in the absence of better ideas at hand.127 One of the reasons that the Omnibus failed was that Senators had maintained their principles regarding the propriety of various aspects of the debate, and did not hesitate to attempt to incorporate them into the settlement. While transformational and Southern nationalists did not have the votes to defeat it on their own, Unionist divisions empowered them to bring the Omnibus down. The leading proponents of the Omnibus Bill were unable to align the provisions of the bill to the areas where Unionists were in agreement, and as a result the bill was unable to secure the unanimous Unionist support it needed to pass. As long as this was the case, the pool of strong supporters of the totality of Clay’s compromise would remain inadequate.128

There was an additional factor that contributed to arraying a majority of the Senate against the Omnibus—Henry Clay. Stephen Douglas praised Clay’s patriotism and effort, but concluded that “if Mr. Clay’s name had not been associated with the Bills they would have passed long ago.”129 Many authors have noted Clay’s myriad tactical and personal failings that contributed to the defeat of the Omnibus. Clay had repeatedly sought to dominate and embarrass the Taylor administration, which threatened to derail his bill and had turned a majority of his own party against him. His unwillingness or inability to incorporate the ideas of others left

126 Quoted in Hamilton, Prologue, 117. 127 Kershaw suggests that one of the major reasons for Adolf Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union during World War II was that he had no better idea of how to win the war, and preferred taking a gamble to inaction. Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000), 310. 128 Hamilton, Prologue, 111-117; Bordewich, 300-302; Stegmaier, 199-200. 129 Stephen A. Douglas to Charles Lanphier, August 3, 1850, Robert Johannsen (ed.), Stephen A. Douglas Papers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 191-193.

262 ideologically pro-compromise Senators like John Bell disgruntled and potentially hostile. In his desire to appease the Texas Senators, he had unwittingly alienated key voters like James Pearce, who could (and did) provide the ultimate margin of victory or defeat for his measures. As Daniel

Walker Howe generously concluded, “Clay’s political skill was unequal to his vision.”130

Holman Hamilton concludes that “Clay’s leadership was of dubious value in the Senate.”131

In addition to these tactical errors, however, Clay had committed a more overarching strategic error at the outset of the session. As John Davis (W-MA) noted earlier in the session,

“If you would have a compromise…you must have a subject that is capable of being compromised.” “You must have parties that want to enter into a compromise,” he continued.

“And you must have parties who can and will be bound by the compromise,” he declared. “Has this bill any of these elements in it?” he wondered.132 Clay’s goal was to forge a comprehensive bill that would permanently resolve the slavery controversy through a binding settlement adopted by both sections. The Omnibus Bill, however, had failed to appease either transformational or

Southern nationalists, and had not reconciled Unionists to either side of the territorial dispute.

Slavery expansion would need to either be phased out (as Taylor, Clay’s February Plan, and

Bell’s plan proposed) or would need to allowed to potentially expand (as Davis and the Northern

Democrat plans proposed). In order to achieve a truly national settlement, Unionism needed to take a side on the critical issue of slavery in the territories, but Clay had not convinced his

Unionist colleagues that his was the plan to accomplish this. Before the accession of John Tyler,

130 Howe, Political Culture of the American Whigs, 148. 131 Hamilton, Prologue, 117. 132 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 879-886

263 the consensus in Washington had been that slavery restriction was acceptable and orthodox under the Unionist ideological umbrella. Zachary Taylor had maintained this formulation, while in his speech introducing his bill John Bell had explicitly linked the territorial settlement with the end of slavery expansion (through statehood in Taylor’s case and through ending slavery expansion after Texas division/non-division in Bell’s). Clay likely sought this too, depending on the climate of the Southwest to restrict slavery expansion. However, his formulation opened the possibility of slavery expansion into free territory. By taking sides against fellow Southern

Whigs, Clay’s conflict with Taylor and the majority of Whiggery introducing divisions where consensus had reigned, and contributed to an ideological shift among Unionists from support for gradual evolution away from slavery to one an assumption of continued perpetuation. Even though five Southern Senators—Clay, Benton, Bell, Spruance, and Preston—had publically declared themselves opposed or uninterested in slavery expansion in the Mexican Cession, further discussion of a settlement scheme following the failure of the Omnibus would allow for the expansion of slavery into the territories. Whereas Unionism before 1850 had generally

(though vaguely) opposed slavery expansion in principle (if not in action), in the future Unionists would accept slavery expansion as the cost for maintaining the Union of the states.

The majority of Northern Democrats and Whigs in both sections had no overarching desire to see slavery introduced into the Mexican Cession. Clay’s Omnibus ignored this basic reality. Instead, he adopted a policy that ran against his own moral qualms about slavery and doubts about the omnibus strategy. It is difficult to conclude that his motivation in doing this was patriotic. By allowing his bill to become at odds with the principles of so many Senators,

264 especially members of his own party, he risked that the Omnibus’s support would be both truncated and weak. By ignoring the ideological overlap between Unionists and transformational nationalists, squabbling with fellow Unionists, and attempting to forge an ideological alliance with Southern nationalists, Clay’s leadership had maximized the potential for disharmony within the ranks of his allies and maximized the opportunity for cooperation between his ideologically irreconcilable foes. While Henry Clay was clearly a man of deep and abiding patriotism and heartfelt political principle, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that these factors took a back seat in 1850 to his desire to avenge himself against those who had denied him the 1848

Presidential nomination and win for himself the glory of a third Union-saving compromise. On three occasions in the debate Clay had abandoned publicly stated principles in the pursuit of his settlement. He dropped his insistence that Mexican law continue in the territories, implicitly validating the interpretation that slavery followed the Constitution. He accepted that no trial should be required for fugitive slaves, an issue that would cause no end of controversy after

1850. He broke with the Whig Party rather than follow the leadership of another. In addition, he adopted the Omnibus approach which he had initially recognized as a terrible idea. Rather than forging a rapid settlement that addressed all of the outstanding issues between the sections, Clay left a Washington where tensions and passions were higher than ever. “To no one’s sorrow,”

William Freehling aptly summarized, “the Great Compromiser then left Washington for a much needed rest.”133

133 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 527; Remini, Clay, 756-757; Holt, Rise, 532-533; Stegmaier, 200-203; Bordewich, 301-302; Hamilton, Prologue, 133-135.

265

One of the long-lasting legacies that Clay left behind him was the fracturing of the Whig

Party. As the Taylor/Clay conflict had careened along, it became clear that Northern Whiggery had arrayed itself almost unanimously against Clay, and Southern Whiggery had been divided and confused. Taylor’s death did nothing to alleviate Whig divisions. As the series of votes on the three critical amendments of the Omnibus Bill demonstrate, Clay’s support among members of his party was feeble. Of 25 Whigs in the Senate, only 5 voted with Clay on the first Pearce

Amendment, 10 on the Yulee Amendment, and 6 on the Atchison amendment. Only one other

Whig supported him on every vote. As long as Clay remained in the field, the Whigs remained arrayed against him and each other. On the critical first Pearce amendment, 12 Northern Whigs had supported Pearce while Southern Whigs opposed the amendment by a six to five majority.

On the Yulee Amendment, Northern Whigs voted 12-0 in favor, while Southern Whigs opposed it 11-1. Only on the Atchison Amendment to strike California did Whigs agree, with

Northerners voting 10-3 and Southerners 8-4 in favor. While Democrats had also been divided on the three critical amendments, their divisions were not nearly as stark. Northern Democrats had opposed the first Pearce Amendment 8-5, while Southerners had narrowly supported it 9-8.

On the Yulee Amendment, they had split more sharply. Northern Democrats opposed it 12-3, while Southerners supported it 12-5. Only the Atchison Amendment split the party cleanly, with

15 Northerners opposed (and none in favor), while 16 Southerners voted in favor (with Benton opposed). Northern Whigs were consistently dedicated to the destruction of the Omnibus (34 votes in favor against 3 opposed to the three amendments), while their Southern colleagues were divided (14 voted in favor and 21 against). With Northern Democrats and Whigs arrayed against

266 each other on nearly every vote, the only path to victory under Clay’s strategy was through the same Southern Whigs whose partnership he had repeatedly undermined. After dominating the early stages of the debate by authoring the majority of settlement plans, Southern Whiggery entered August 1850 hopelessly divided. It would never again have the opportunity to so dominate a national debate. With the Omnibus defeated and Clay having left town, exhaustion overtook official Washington. The Omnibus Bill, Benton declared, was “cats and dogs that had been tied together by their tails for months, scratching and biting.” With the Omnibus torn apart, the creatures, “being loosed again, every one ran off to their own hole and were quiet.”134

With Southern Whiggery demoralized and divided, the initiative passed to the second pillar of Unionism in Congress—the Northern Democrats. Unlike the Southern Whigs, they had achieved a rough consensus on their preferred solution to the territorial issue—popular sovereignty. Unlike the Southern Whigs, their personal rivalries had not seeped into the territorial debates. Also unlike the Southern Whigs, they could rely on the abilities of a legislative acrobat who cared greatly about settling the crisis and cared little over whether he received the preponderance of credit for it. Like Clay, Stephen Douglas was vain, energetic, brilliant, magnetic and fixated on being elected President. Unlike Clay, he was more interested in power than credit, and did not bring an omnibus of grudges and rivalries into the debate.

Douglas was supremely confident that he could succeed where America’s greatest legislator had failed. Now, Douglas predicted, “We shall…take up the bill for New Mexico & pass it just as I

134 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1829; Stegmaier, 201-204; Hamilton, Prologue, 116- 117.

267 reported it four months ago.”135 It was a remarkable boast, and an accurate prophesy. Crucially, however, it remained to be seen whether any bills passed would win enough support between the sections to constitute an actual compromise.136

135 Douglas to Charles H. Lamphier, August 3, 1850, Stephen Douglas Papers, 294-96. 136 Johannsen, Douglas, 293-295.

Faction Rules the Hour

“Faction rules the hour—passion had taken the place of reason” -David Outlaw, September 5, 18501

“The Compromise Bill was defeated by a union between the Free Soils & [disunionists]

& the administration of Gen’l Taylor,” Stephen Douglas explained. “All of the power and patronage of the Govt was brought to bear against us,” he continued, “& at last the allied forces were able to beat us.”2 While Douglas surely overestimated the effect that patronage had in breaking up the Omnibus (Fillmore, not Taylor, was President when the bill was slashed to pieces, and his influence was thrown behind the measure), he correctly assessed the combination of forces that had denied Clay the glory of the third compromise. With Clay having fled the scene, heightened prospects of fighting between Texas and the Federal garrison in New Mexico, and a legislature in disarray, the odds of a peaceable settlement of the territorial controversy in

1850 seemed long. The old heroes of the Senate—Clay, Webster, Benton, and Cass—had disqualified themselves from asserting control by absence or the consequences of the positions they had taken in the debate. Young radicals like William Seward, Jefferson Davis, Salmon

Chase and David Yulee were ready with solutions, but their ideas were grounded in the new nationalist theories of their sections and were largely inimical to peaceful settlement. With several Southern Whig-sponsored plans having already failed, three viable alternatives remained—the extension of the Mason-Dixon line to the Pacific ocean (favored by Southern

1 David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, September 5, 1850, David Outlaw Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC. 2Stephen A. Douglas to Charles H. Lanphier, August 3, 1850, in Johannsen (ed.), Letters of Stephen A. Douglas, 192-193 268 269

Democrats), the admission of California as a state unlinked to any other issues (favored by

Northern Whigs, Taylor followers and Free Soilers), and the imposition of popular sovereignty in the territories (favored by Northern Democrats and some Southern Whigs). In the leadership vacuum that emerged in the wake of the Omnibus’ crash, one leader found himself ideally positioned by role and temperament to fill the vacuum.

If a man and an hour can be said to have met in 1850, Stephen Douglas was in the ideal position to assume leadership of the territorial settlement effort. As Sean Wilentz had observed,

“personally and politically, Douglas epitomized the moderate to conservative nationalist

Democratic politicians who had emerged in the North in the 1840s, at odds with Barnburner

Jacksonian radicalism.”1 Most importantly, he was the Chairman of the Committee on

Territories. He had authored or approved the language of the majority of the measures that were incorporated into the Omnibus, and was intimately familiar with the legislative minutia included within them. Douglas reassured his supporters in Illinois that he had the situation under control.

“The difference between Mr. Clay’s Compromise Bill & my two Bills was a wafer,” he reported.2 Through his chairmanship, Douglas had a great degree of influence over what legislation would be considered and in what order. Unionist Democrats largely agreed on the popular sovereignty policy. As a result, he began with a solid base of support for his efforts.

Northern Democratic unity in the Senate was replicated in the House, where Douglas could rely on the support of Unionist Democratic Speaker Howell Cobb (D-GA). On the other hand, while the opposition to the Omnibus had proven itself formidable, its members agreed on nothing aside

1 Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 642. 2 Douglas to Lanphier and Walker, August 3, 1850, Johnson (ed.) Letters of Stephen A. Douglas, 192-193.

270 from their hostility to Clay and his bill. Neither Southern nor Northern extremists could expect to advance positive legislation due to their deep ideological divisions. While they could unite on tactics to derail a compromise they both detested, there was no positive ground upon which they could meet. At the same time, the withdrawal of Clay and the end of the Omnibus liberated the more moderate Southern Democrats and Northern Whigs from being forced to swallow the unpalatable whole. Stephen Douglas—37 years old and burning with the Presidential fever that had afflicted Henry Clay for so long—had different motivations.3

Douglas’s fearsome ambition and his finely tuned partisan political considerations would allow him to ram a compromise through Congress where Clay had failed. Douglas had always been involved in Clay’s effort to pass the Omnibus, but had worked quietly behind the scenes, avoiding becoming associated publicly with a legislative mechanism he disliked. In assuming the leadership of the pro-compromise forces, Douglas would forge coalitions and divide his enemies as effectively as Clay had divided his allies. Unlike Clay, Douglas had entered the debate with no powerful enemies. He listened carefully to allies to adjust the legislation to maximize support. He used leaders of both parties who were not famous but who occupied critical legislative ground to bring their compatriots to his bills. He comported his proposals within Democratic ideology, allowing his plan to win support among Southern Democrats who had opposed the Omnibus. Most importantly, Douglas always remained cognizant that a compromise that would pass the Senate would also have to pass the House, and he worked hard to ensure that his Northern Democratic allies were given political cover to support the

3 Johnannsen, Douglas, 288-294; Bordewich, 303-305; Hamilton, Prologue, 118-121; Stegmaier, 203.

271 compromise without exposing themselves to accusations of doughfacery by their Northern Whig and Free Soil opponents. He coordinated closely with allies in the House, most importantly

Speaker Cobb, to build support for his plan as the only one that could pass. The critical difference between Douglas’s approach and that of Clay was that Douglas went to great length to ensure that his bills alienated the minimum number of Unionists as possible, relying on their belief in sectional compromise as a matter of principle to bring them into the fold. Douglas gambled correctly that providing as little offense to as few Unionists as possible would allow him to leverage enough Southern nationalist and Transformational nationalist votes to push his bills over. He was also able to leverage the desire of Unionist Whigs to preserve the Union at all costs to push through a popular sovereignty policy that would unite Democrats at the expense of their partisan opponents. For Douglas, a successful compromise would be not only a way to save the Union, but a weapon to be deployed in the struggle for political supremacy.4

Historians have long recognized the critical role that Douglas played in the passage of the

Compromise of 1850, though they have differed as to whom should receive primary credit for the final bill. Allan Nevins, in Ordeal of the Union, assigns “principle responsibility for the enactment of the great compromise” to Clay, Webster, Fillmore, and Douglas.5 Holman

Hamilton, on the other hand, considers Douglas to have been “equally responsible” for both of the major legislative enactments of the session—the Compromise of 1850 and the Illinois

Railroad Bill.6 The most recent writer on the Compromise, Fergus Bordewich, credits Douglas

4 Johannsen, Douglas, 283-294. 5 Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, (NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947) 344. 6 Hamilton. Prologue to Conflict, 184.

272 with having “more genuine reason for self-satisfaction than any other Senator.”7 Robert Remini, on the other hand, assigns most of the credit to Clay. “The role Clay played in the final compromise,” he argues, “required months of deliberation so that Douglas could, in the end, manage each part of the package.”8 Michael Holt assesses the impact of Douglas on the final

Compromise to be very significant. Noting the differences between Clay’s compromise proposal in January and the one that was adopted, Holt illuminates the role that Douglas’s allies in the

House had on transforming the terms of the Compromise that eventually passed. While

Douglas’s impact on the compromise debate is undeniable, how his particular ideological vision and understanding of slavery shaped the eventual Compromise, and defined the politics of the

1850s, is more obscure. While Douglas’s contribution to the passage of the Compromise, the effect that he and his allies had on the enduring terms of the settlement have only recently been recognized.9

The passage of the Compromise of 1850 represented not only a personal triumph for

Unionist leaders like Stephen Douglas and Howell Cobb, but also a critical moment in the development of Unionist thought that would have repercussions through the 1850s. While many

(if not most) of the Unionist political leaders did not agree with all of the terms of the

Compromise, the law having been adopted they nevertheless would be bound by it as long as they hoped to preserve the Union. The willingness of these leaders to set aside their doubts and

7 Bordewich, 355. 8 Remini, Edge of the Precipice, 153. 9 F.H. Hodder, “The Authorship of the Compromise of 1850,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22, No. 4 (Mar. 1936): 525-536; Edward McMahon, “Stephen A. Douglas: A Study of the Attempt to Settle the Question of Slavery in the Territories by the Application of Popular Sovereignty, 1850-1860,” The Washington Historical Quarterly 2, no. 4 (Jul. 1908): 309-332.

273 political differences in the cause of the Union would mark the beginning of a process by which

Unionists would find themselves at the end of the 1850s endorsing no affirmative principles but the Union. While transformational nationalists and Southern nationalists actually provided the margin of victory on most of the votes in passing the bills encompassing the Compromise, they in no way considered themselves bound to its terms. In a similar manner, Unionists who had abandoned the Omnibus, especially Southern Whigs, would be able to support the Compromise despite their doubts about popular sovereignty. Indeed, the Compromise of 1850 would be held up by these nationalist radicals as affirmation of their reasons for contesting the legitimacy of the federal government. Unionists in both sections, on the other hand, felt compelled to support even those aspects of the Compromise (like the fugitive slave bill in the North and the admission of California in the South) that they themselves found distasteful. Their ability to benefit politically from the Compromise of 1850 was dependent on the end of sectional agitation. At the same time, the passage of the Compromise as individual measures ensured that only a very small contingent of supporters agreed fully with its provisions, whereas the majority of supporters for the individual measures were either conditional supporters of the whole, or outright opposed to it. While the Omnibus approach was tactically problematic, it had provided the benefit of forcing a definitive sectional compromise, as any majority it commanded would have been publically committed to all aspects of the settlement. Bringing the terms of the settlement before

Congress in individual bills proved an effective parliamentary strategy, but it undermined the

274 ideological foundation of the Unionists who represented its core base of support by allowing politicians political space to assign a wide range of intentions and interpretations to it.10

In addition, the final terms of the settlement that emerged during the drafting and refinement of the individual bills was informed by a process of debate among Unionists as to what terms could be acceptable to preserve the Union. As Manisha Sinha has noted, “the final shape of the Compromise proved to be more favorable to the South than Clay’s proposals,” and as a result commitment to the settlement in the North was compromised.11 The process of crafting the bills forced Unionists to directly confront—as transformational nationalists and

Southern nationalists did not—the extreme limits of what they were willing and able to accept.

The two most controversial facets of the Compromise of 1850—the establishment of territorial governments with the slavery issue left to the territorial legislatures and the fugitive slave law— came out of a process in which Northern Unionists, predominantly Democrats, accepted these terms as worth supporting if they would ensure the preservation of the Union. The legislative process that resulted in the Compromise of 1850 resulted in a momentous ideological shift that wedded Unionism to popular sovereignty in the territories as part of an overarching commitment to avoiding confrontation with the South and preserving the Union through concessions to the

South on territorial issues.

With Clay having left Washington, Stephen Douglas slid smoothly into the role of leader of the Unionist compromise effort. If Douglas had any doubts about his ability to succeed where

Henry Clay had failed, he kept them to himself. His style of leadership differed radically from

10 Bordewich, 306-307; Stegmaier, 205-207; Hamilton, Prologue, 135-136. 11 Manisha Sinha, The Counterrevolution of Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 98.

275

Clay’s. His most important decision—one that would have been unthinkable for Henry Clay— was to enlist James Pearce (W-MD) to revise the Texas/New Mexico bill. Douglas’s calculus was brilliant. As Taylor and Clayton had recognized from the outset, New Mexico and

California were the primary issues, and the Texas/New Mexico boundary issue was the key to a settlement. Embarrassed by his role in destroying the Omnibus and furious at Clay, Pearce was more motivated than any man in Congress to settle this particular issue. At the same time, he was a member of one of the critical caucuses (Southern Whigs) whose votes would be needed to pass the bill. If Pearce could devise a bill that could win the support of Southern Whigs and the

Texas Senators, it would not only allow for the passage of the provision that had wrecked the

Omnibus, and it would also ease the way for passage of the other measures. The Omnibus had divided Southern Whigs and united Southern Democrats against it. Pearce was tasked with devising a bill that would do the opposite. With Texas/New Mexico disposed of, the Senate could then deal with the other immediately pressing danger—California. Douglas knew he had the votes to pass a California statehood bill if he could convince moderate Southerners and pro- compromise Northerners that a settlement was underway. Once those issues had been tackled, the less controversial segments of the compromise could be brought forward. The key was the

Texas boundary, New Mexico territorial government, and Texas debt issue.12

Douglas and Pearce wasted no time in diving into negotiations with Unionist Texas

Senators Rusk and Houston on the Texas/New Mexico settlement bill. The collapse of the

Texas-New Mexico provisions of the Omnibus that initiated the gutting of the bill had occurred

12 Bordewich, 306-307; Stegmaier, 205-207; Hamilton, Prologue, 135-136.

276 primarily due to opposition of the Bradbury version of the bill by the Texas Senators and the opposition of a number of Southern Whigs to the terms. Pearce himself objected to compensating Texas for territory that he did not believe belonged to it, but was willing to acquiesce because “it cannot be denied that a feeling of great discontent prevails in Texas.”13

Working rapidly, Pearce met repeatedly with Houston and Rusk to find a formulation of the boundary, compensation and terms of governance that would be acceptable to all parties. The personalities of Rusk and Houston were also critical in the success of the negotiations. While

Governor Bell of Texas continued to agitate the issue and draw a sectional hard line, Rusk and

Houston were men of a strong Unionist, and highly principled, bent. Rusk was facing reelection following the upcoming Texas legislative elections, but had determined that he would be willing to accept terms that might cost him his seat for the greater good of the Union. Houston—hero of the Texas war of independence, former President of Texas, and not facing reelection—was less politically vulnerable, but was equally as Unionist and principled as his colleague.14 Together,

Pearce, Douglas, Houston and Rusk revised the legislation to an acceptable middle ground. At the same time, Fillmore and Webster worked to forestall a breach with Texas to buy time for

Congress to adopt a settlement, and provide cover for Northerners to accept the settlement that the Senators were devising. In his own message to Governor Bell, Fillmore was conciliatory but firm. However, he left no doubt that the Army would meet force with force. “If Texas militia march into any of the other states or into any territory of the United States, there to execute of

13 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 31st Congress 1st Session, 1540-39. 14 Houston’s dedication to the Union would eventually see him removed as Governor of Texas for refusing to cooperate with secession in 1861.

277 enforce any law of Texas,” he cautioned, “they become at that moment trespassers.”15 While the message would not arrive in Texas in time to have any impact on the maneuvering in Austin, it did arrive in Congress, and had the desired effect. Assured that the Administration was not going to cave in to Texan threats, moderate Northerners could now consider supporting the

Pearce Bill with confidence that they were not betraying their section. Webster also believed that Fillmore had proven himself “a man of business, a man of intelligence & wide awake.”16

The terms of the settlement devised by Douglas, Pearce, Rusk and Houston, were fairly straightforward. The idea of a commission was scrapped, and the boundary of Texas and New

Mexico was defined. Texas would be compensated $10 million for relinquishing the claim to

New Mexico’s territory. The establishment of a territorial government for New Mexico was to be voted on once the Texas/New Mexico boundary bill had passed. New Mexico’s application for statehood would be disregarded, and its free soil state and territorial constitutions would be scrapped. Like the Omnibus, the territorial bill would make no reference to slavery, and would thereby tacitly open the territory to slavery.17 Within a week of the defeat of the Omnibus, and before any serious effort could be mustered on the part of its opponents to pass alternative legislation, the Pearce Bill was ready for the consideration of the Senate.18

After a perfunctory debate, the Pearce Bill moved rapidly toward a vote. Having so recently covered the main points during the blistering Omnibus debate, and having discussed the

15 Richardson, Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 5, 67-73. 16 Webster to Franklin Haven, August 20,1850, Webster Papers [microfilm edition]. 17 Taylor would have admitted New Mexico as a state under the anti-slavery Constitution submitted in July, while Clay’s would have rendered slavery illegal through the continuation of Mexican law. As it happened, both New Mexico and Utah would pass slave codes--establishing the legal foundation for slavery in the territories--under the territorial governments established by the bills. 18 Bordewich, 306-309; Stegmaier, 206-214; Hamilton, Prologue, 136-137.

278 underlying issues for eight months, Senators were anxious to vote and be done with it. “Upon this question,” Robert Winthrop (W-MA) summarized, “we are brought at last to the alternative of drawing the line, or drawing the sword.”19 Fatigue also played a significant role in the uncharacteristic lack of debate. Joseph Underwood (W-KY) spoke for many when he declared

“nothing will induce me to enter again into a discussion or an extended argument about this question, which has been so fully discussed when previous bills were before us.”20 Indeed, the early votes on the Pearce Bill, especially the critical third reading, largely resembled the votes that had been taken on the previous provisions in the Omnibus. This time, however, the Pearce

Bill passed by a vote of 27-24, with the votes of Rusk and Houston providing the majority.

Unlike the case during the Omnibus votes, the Unionist coalition had held. Because the Pearce

Bill dealt only with issues related to the boundary (and did not require direct affirmation of popular sovereignty by reluctant Whigs), it was able to win broad Unionist support. Several previously absent voters returned to support the Bill for the final vote on August 9, and several anticompromise Whigs absented themselves. The Pearce Bill passed 30-20. “Hail the return of

Government from its long aberration back to its just sphere of action and usefulness,” the

National Intelligencer rejoiced.21 For the first time in the session, one of the key segments of a settlement plan had passed the Senate. 22

The Pearce Bill was significant beyond the immediate settlement of the Texas/New

Mexico portion of the controversy. Under Pearce and Douglas’s leadership, two critical voting

19 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1556. 20 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1556. 21 National Intelligencer, August 10, 1850. 22 Bordewich, 306-313; Stegmaier, 214-219; Hamilton, Prologue, 136-138; Holt, Rise and Fall, 532-537.

279 alignments had been forged. First, Southern Whigs had united for the first time on a critical issue in the session behind the Pearce Bill. This time, only Underwood (KY) had joined Jackson

Morton (FL) in voting against it. Southern Whig divisions had been critical in stunting the momentum of the Taylor administration and in crashing Clay’s Omnibus, but Douglas’s deft use of Pearce as leader of the Texas/New Mexico effort ensured that Southern Whig concerns were reflected in the legislation. The Pearce Bill realigned Southern Whigs behind the compromise effort, and brought them for the first time into ideological unity with other Unionists. Also for the first time in the session, the Pearce Bill cracked the solid phalanx of Northern Whig opposition to any compromise, with 6 Northern Whig Senators joining the previous lone factional supporter of Clay, James Cooper (W-PA). Samuel Phelps (W-VT), Truman Smith (W-

CT), John Clarke (W-RI), Albert Greene (W-RI), Robert Winthrop (W-MA), and John Davis

(W-MA), previously supporters of the Taylor plan, all voted for the New Mexico boundary bill, while others tacitly supported the bill by abstaining or pairing up with supporters of the bill.

Whereas Clay had divided the supporters of the compromise and provided a platform for unity among its diverse critics, the Pearce Bill had achieved the opposite.23

With the New Mexico boundary issue safely settled, Douglas next attacked the issue that had initiated the controversy, California.24 While the Texas/New Mexico boundary issue was the more critical issue in terms of urgency and the potential to spark armed conflict, it was largely a question of real estate and price. California represented the larger ideological challenge, a

23 Stegmaier, 216-220; Hamilton, Prologue, 130-141; Holt, Rise and Fall, 537. 24 The sequence of the bills is presented out of order here for the purpose of thematic clarity. The vote on California occurred on March 13, after the passage of the Pearce Bill but before the New Mexico territorial bill.

280 question of principle with serious implications for the distribution of power in the Federal government. Douglas’s bill proposed the admission of California under the boundaries defined in the free soil state constitution. It rejected the Southern nationalists’ demand to divide the territory and open the Southern portion to slavery. Southerners in both parties continued to argue that the admission of California would transform the relation of the Federal government and the

South. “The admission of California with her present constitution and boundaries shall result in producing an excitement which it may be impossible to contain,” John Berrien (W-GA) reminded his colleagues.25 Jefferson Davis (D-MS) was characteristically more blunt. “For the first time we are about permanently to destroy the balance of power between the sections,” he cautioned. “Northern aggression,” he predicted, “will require the minority to decide whether they will sink below the conditions to which they were born, or maintain it by forceable resistance.”26 As had been clear since the last session, Northerners would overwhelmingly support the admission of California and Southerners would overwhelmingly oppose it. The question would be whether Northern or Southern defections would predominate. The most dramatic moment came when the usually taciturn Samuel Houston came out in favor of the admission of California. Arguing that California’s admission to the Union was a matter of principle, he called on fellow Southerners to come to terms with the South inevitable minority status. “If we are men,” he challenged his colleagues, “let us meet the difficulties which have come upon us like men, and dispose of them.”27 Four border state Unionists—John Underwood

25 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1498. 26 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1533. 27 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1537.

281

(W-KY), Presley Spruance (W-DE), John Wales (W-DE), and Thomas Hart Benton (D-MO), joined by Samuel Houston (D-TX)—broke with their colleagues and voted with the North. Two

Southern Democrats, four Southern Whigs, and two Northern Whigs missed the vote. When finally confronted with California as a standalone measure, it was clear that the support for passage in the Senate had always been present.28 The victory of the passage of California belonged to Douglas—unable to appease Southern radicals fearful of the loss of their section’s institutional check on federal action—he forced the issue on a straight vote on the issue, and prevailed. The logjam that had paralyzed Congress for two sessions was broken.29

In thirteen days, Stephen Douglas had achieved what Congress had been debating for eight months. His success was the product of many factors. Voting on each issue individually was unquestionably a better tactic than the Omnibus approach that Clay had reluctantly adopted.

Douglas did not have to contend with a hostile administration. Fillmore and Webster failed in their attempt to impose support of the bills a test of Whig Party orthodoxy, but the support and patronage of the administration, along with Pearce and Douglas’s persuasion, was enough to sway enough Northern Whigs to support the critical Pearce Bill. The removal of Clay and his political and personal baggage from the debate was also critical. The key issue, however, was how the order of the bills helped to allow the political principles of the Senators to work in favor of the measures, rather than against them. By taking the Texas/New Mexico boundary bill first and the California Bill second, Douglas built upon the insights gleaned from Taylor and Clay’s failures. Clay had recognized that the Texas/New Mexico boundary bill was the most explosive

28 Wales, Spruance, and Benton would have supported California admission under any circumstances. 29 Stegmaier, 261; Bordewich, 314-315; Holt, Rise and Fall, 537.

282 issue, but was not inherently a point of principle and could be settled. As Taylor recognized,

California was a matter of principle, and the votes existed in both houses of Congress to pass it if it could be brought to a vote. Since the Texas/New Mexico boundary issue was something that

Northerners could honorably compromise on, passage of that bill provided political cover for

Southern representatives who favored California admission (or were ambivalent about it) to openly support that act. Robert Winthrop explained the logic of connecting the Pearce Bill and

California admission Bill in a pair of letters to political allies. The Pearce Bill, Winthrop stated,

“was the one thing needed for the public peace.” “If we can now admit California,” Winthrop wrote in another letter, “we shall have nothing to regret.” Winthrop considered this approach to be entirely consistent with his previous support of the Taylor Plan. “”I shall stand upon Old

Zack’s system,” he declared, “this Boundary Bill [The Pearce Bill] (if it passes the House) will remove any obstacle to its adoption.”30 Through his canny management of the bills, Douglas was able to build coalitions on the two critical issues of the session by leveraging the principles of the members.31 The passage of the remaining portions of the compromise moved rapidly.

The vote on the New Mexico Territorial Bill on August 14 was anticlimactic. It passed easily, with 27 in favor and only 10 opposed, with a staggering 23 abstentions. The District of

Columbia slave trade bill also passed easily, passing 31-20, with 9 abstentions. The partisan composition of the abstainers (4 Northern Whigs,1 Northern Democrat, 3 Southern Democrats, and 1 Southern Whigs) suggests that pairing was likely.32

30 Quoted in Holt, Rise and Fall, 536. 31 Stegmaier, 262-263; Holt, Rise and Fall, 537. 32 Stegmaier, 263; Hamilton, Prologue, 141.

283

The most controversial of the secondary issues was the fugitive slave law, which evoked a brief recurrence of the verbal pyrotechnics that had illuminated the early parts of the session.

Salmon P. Chase (FS-OH), William Dayton, (W-NJ), and Winthrop spoke out against the bill.

David Yulee (D-FL) provided another of his blistering assaults on the North, taking note of a well-publicized anti-slavery meeting in New York and wondering “how is it possible that any law of Congress can reach the evil this bill proposes to correct when we have such evidence of the callousness of the northern community upon the subject.”33 Yulee was seconded by Unionist

Democrat Daniel Dickenson (NY), who stated that he viewed the anti-slavery conventions as

“exhibitions of folly and wickedness with loathing and disgust,” and called on Northerners to honestly apply the fugitive slave law.34 No roll was called on the final vote on the bill (it was passed via voice vote), but on the critical third reading it was supported by 27 with only 12 opposing, with 21 Senators abstaining. Fifteen Southern Democrats, 9 Southern Whigs and 3

Northern Democrats had supported the reading, while 3 Northern Democrats, 8 Northern Whigs and Salmon P. Chase opposed.35 One of the Northern Senators who had skipped town was

Stephen Douglas, who left ostensibly to settle a debt in New York. In reality, he has a particular pecuniary reason to avoid this vote—his wife owned a plantation and 150 slaves in Mississippi, and he was concerned that it would become a political issue for him. “I do not wish it brought out before the public,” he complained, “as the public have no business with my private affairs.”36

With Utah having been organized as a territory as the rump of the Omnibus, the key portions of

33 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1622-23 34 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1630. 35 Bordewich, 319-330; Hamilton, Prologue, 141. 36 Douglas to Charles Lanphier, September 5, 1850, Johannsen (ed.), Letters of Stephen A. Douglas, 189-90.

284 the Omnibus Bill had been approved by August 23. The action now shifted to the House, where the pro-Southern bills would need the support of the Northern majority if the compromise were to succeed.37

While the Senate was deliberating and passing the compromise bills, members of the

House (and their patrons) were not idle. The politics of the House differed in a number of important respects from those in the Senate, and there was no guarantee that the legislation which had passed the Senate would meet the same reception in the House. There was no reason, for example, that the Northern majority could not pass the California admission bill alone, as transformational nationalists hoped. At the same time, there was no guarantee that the fugitive slave bill could win support from the majority. Counter intuitively, the large Northern majority

(and the likelihood of widespread Northern opposition to the bills) could also potentially strengthen the hand of a united South. If enough Northerners opposed the bills, Southern votes would be required to ensure passage. If Southerners could agree on a single platform they could force additional concessions. While the large Northern majority in the House superficially rendered it more likely to adopt a sectional line than the Senate, there were institutional factors that favored the compromisers. The office of the Speaker, which had no analogue in the Senate, was a particular advantage. Speaker Howell Cobb (D-GA) had repeatedly used his power to shape the debate to favor the compromisers, and could be expected to do so in the future. The power of the Speaker was immense—he could limit debate, rule motions in or out of order, recognize speakers, and set the legislative agenda. While his rulings could theoretically be

37 Stegmaier, 273-274; Hamilton, Prologue, 142-150; Holt, Rise, 538-539; Bordewich, 328-330.

285 overturned by a two-thirds vote, it was unlikely in the deeply divided body that either side could muster a sufficient majority to accomplish this. Secondly, the members of the House were usually beholden to a higher authority within their parties, and more vulnerable to persuasion and coercion than their colleagues in the Senate. Elected by a majority of their state legislators,

Senators came to Washington assured of the support of the professional politicians of their state party. Senators (along with the President) held the power of patronage, which resulted in their seats being occupied by the Party boss or close lieutenants of them. In the House, only a handful of members were truly independent.38 They were subject to discipline from their state party, and their ability to win appointments for their supporters required the consent of their Senator and the

President. As a result, they were much more vulnerable to influence and persuasion from the

President and their Party. In addition, they were also more vulnerable to ouster by angry voters if they were perceived as “betraying” their section or principles. The composition of the House presented new challenges for the compromisers to overcome, and new opportunities for transformational and Southern nationalists to disrupt the compromise.39

Aware of the challenges posed by the composition of the House, participants on every side did not wait for the Senate to complete its business to begin preparing to respond to the bills.

Starting on August 8 (before the passage of the Pearce Bill), Southern Representatives met in caucus to try to forge a common sectional position on the issues. Meeting over the course of

38 Examples would include Thaddeus Stevens (W-PA) and Thomas Clingman (W-NC), who held views outside of the mainstream of their organizations but were able to maintain their position by strength in their districts. 39 Stegmaier, 273-274; Hamilton, Prologue, 151-156; Hamilton, “The Cave of the Winds,” 331-353; Bordewich, 332-333; R.P. Brooks, “Howell Cobb and the Crisis of 1850,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 4, no. 3 (December 1917): 279-298; Donald A. Debats, “An Uncertain Arena: The Georgia House of Representatives, 1808- 1861,” The Journal of Southern History 56, no. 3 (Aug. 1990): 423-456.

286 three days, the caucus succeeded in appointing Robert Toombs to draft a series of resolutions, which were narrowly passed by the group by a vote of 15-12. However, the majority of the 90

Southern Representatives did not vote on Toombs’s resolutions at all, and an attempt at forging

Southern unity again failed. Emboldened by the support of the Texas senators for the Pearce

Bill, Southern Whigs saw no reason to fight the Texas/New Mexico territorial bill if Texas’s representatives endorsed it. With Southern Whigs largely united behind the key bills, and

Southern Democrats divided, hopes for disruption of the compromise bills rested increasingly with the North. Anti-slavery Northern Whigs likewise tried to establish a common position around the passage of the California Statehood Bill, attempting to pass the Taylor plan without

Taylor. For his part, William Seward fretted that the failure of the House to check the compromise bills would result in an electoral reverse at the polls for New York Whigs. “These bills cannot pass the House without disgracing the New York delegation,” Seward warned Weed,

“and perhaps ruining the hopes of the State.”40 Northern Whig hopes for the House rested in its ability to pass the California Statehood Bill without the other measures, and to force Millard

Fillmore to sign of reject it. Led by Howell Cobb, the Compromisers sought to prevent the

Northern Representatives from being confronted with any such choice.41

In order to pass the compromise bills in the House, Cobb identified early on two key tactics that he would need to employ. First, he would need ensure by all means that no vote on the California Bill be held before the passage of other Bills. This would save Northern

Democrats from the inexpedient position of having to vote against California to preserve the

40 Seward to Weed, August 2, 1850, Seward at Washington, Vol. 1, 151. 41 Stegmaier, 262-264.

287 compromise. Secondly, he would need to tightly control the debate until the Senate could pass all of the pieces of the package, and limit the options of available solutions. Biding his time would also allow the President to use the power of patronage to strengthen the Bill, and also allow the influence of those with pecuniary interests in the settlement of the crisis (especially

Texas bondholders) to continue to bring their weight to bear. Once the bills had passed the

Senate, the House would move swiftly to complete the legislative process and send the Bills to the President for signature.42

While the Senate continued to legislate on the compromise bills, Cobb kept the House busy with unrelated business, used strategic adjournments, and seemingly single-handedly kept the California statehood bill at bay. Cobb, Joshua Giddings (FS-OH) complained, “exerts more influence upon the destinies of the nation than any other member of the government except the

President.”43 Cobb’s effort was not without a price—he lost 40 pounds over the course of the session and was exhausted.44 However, he was convinced that the compromise was the correct policy. “In the end,” he predicted, “we shall do what is right and proper.”45 To accomplish this, he would replicate the tactic that Douglas had utilized in the Senate, and defuse the Texas/New

Mexico boundary issue first. Also like Douglas, he would carefully choose a lieutenant to guide the Texas/New Mexico boundary bill through the process. Cobb’s choice for this role was Linn

Boyd (D-KY), a border state Unionist with little stomach for radicalism. Unlike Douglas, however, House leaders would combine the Texas/New Mexico boundary, settlement, and

42 Stegmaier, 264-275 43 Quoted in Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 170. 44 Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, 264. 45 Quoted in Hamilton, Prologue, 154.

288 territorial bills into a single package, dubbed the “Little Omnibus.” The California, fugitive slave and District of Columbia slave bills continue to be handled separately. By combining the bills, Cobb and his allies hoped to defuse all of the contentious issues related to New Mexico in one movement, while starting the debate on the issues where something of a sectional consensus had emerged. The major contingency, however, was that the territorial government issue was now wrapped up with the boundary issue. Once the Senate had completed the passage of the individual bills (defining the terms of the debate), the previously gridlocked House (in accordance with the wishes of the Speaker) moved into action. “I think we have talked enough,”

Linn Boyd announced, “in God’s name let us act.”46

As the passage of the Little Omnibus could be expected to be contentious, Cobb and

Boyd plotted a complex strategy to enhance its prospects. First, Cobb would need to limit amendments to the Bills to prevent another maneuver like Pierre Soulé’s successful effort to destroy the Omnibus. Since, as the Omnibus votes had proven, it was both simple and potentially catastrophic for revisions to the popular sovereignty language to derail the bill, control over the floor was essential. “If I throw this bill open to amendments,” Linn Boyd admitted, “it will be destroyed by amendments.” By avoiding amendments, Cobb and Boyd would force the Representatives into an up or down vote on the issue in its totality, and limit the opportunities for other plans (especially the Taylor Plan) to sneak through. Secondly, speed was of the essence. The more that the House debated and delayed the action, the more likely it would be that an alliance of convenience could derail the bill through an opportunistic manner. As had

46 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1695-1704; Stegmaier, 279-281; Holt, Rise and Fall, 534-539; Hamilton, Prologue, 118-133.

289 been the case previously, the power of the Speakership would be exerted to the fullest to prevent the disruption of the bill. Finally, the power of external influences—especially the President’s power of patronage and the influence of the Texas bond lobby—would be allowed to operate to the greatest practicable extent. The sum of all of these efforts would be to create an environment where Representatives on the fence would have every reason to support the Bill.47

Pro-compromise political leaders in the administration, Senate and House worked together to win over or neutralize as many Representatives as possible ahead of the vote on the

Little Omnibus. Fillmore and Webster mobilized the entire cabinet to support the effort. Anti- slavery Whigs complained about the pressure being applied by the administration and its allies to their fellows. “The Administration hits back upon the progressive Whigs in New York through its papers and patronage,” complained E.B Spaulding (W-NY), adding “I come in for my full share of it.”48 Influential Senators also joined the administration in pressuring recalcitrant

Representatives. George Badger (W-NC), John Berrien (W-GA), William C. Dawson (W-GA), and Willie Mangum (W-NC) were reported to be threatening to oppose a revision to the tariff if the compromise bills failed.49 Stephen Douglas was able to influence Representatives through the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, Thomas Bayley (D-IL).50 In addition,

Robert Toombs (W-GA) played an important role in dividing and confusing Southern sectionalists. While Toombs had breathed fire and issued threats as effectively as anyone during the first nine months of the year, he considered the Bills passed by the Senate to be “as good as

47 Stegmaier, Texas New Mexico, 279-281; Holt, Rise and Fall, 534-539; Hamilton, Prologue, 118-133. 48 Quoted in Holt, Rise and Fall, 539. 49 Francis Blair to Martin Van Buren, September 30, 1850, Van Buren Papers, New York Public Library, New York. 50 Hamilton, Prologue, 121.

290 they need to be for the South.”51 The net effect of these efforts was to pressure moderate

Representatives to assent to (or at least not oppose) the compromise measures, and to threaten radicals with career extinction if they did not do likewise. At the same time, the continued agitation over Texas and New Mexico provided urgency to the argument for the Little Omnibus.

With Fillmore standing firm against Texas, fear that armed conflict could explode any moment continued. Southern radicals were hopeful that the outbreak of fighting could restore their deteriorating political situation in Washington. “The insolence of the military men may probably precipitate the events…by which we could bring on the one general conflict,” William Gilmore

Simms hopefully reported to Beverly Tucker.52 Pro-compromise Southerners also used the threat of conflict to spur support for the compromise bills. Disunion, Francis P. Blair warned, would leave the slave states “naked to all dangers, which they now only pretend to fear from the

Union.”53

Speculation in Texas bonds rose and fell based on the prospects of the compromise. The

New York Evening Post commented on the brazenness of the bond lobbyists. ”Speculators and agents of all sorts of schemers crowd the lobbies,” it complained.54 These concerns were not unwarranted. Among the representatives of Texas bondholders present in Washington was former House member and South Carolina governor James Hamilton. While no record exists of conversations held between Hamilton and his colleagues and members of the House and Senate in and around the capital, their influence was the source of complaints. Beverly Tucker,

51 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1208. 52 Quoted in Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, 243. 53 Quoted in Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, 243. 54 New York Evening Post, September 19, 1850.

291

Southern sectionalist and chairman of the Nashville Convention, blamed the Texas bond lobby for turning the votes of several Southern Representatives. “I really do believe,” he declared,

“that this whole difficulty about the boundary of Texas was gotten up by Hamilton, Thompson,

Clay, the Texas Senators & others interested in the bonds of Texas.” “The ten millions of money,” he believed, “to be paid to the Texas creditors carried the day.”55 As far as he was concerned, the compromise itself “did not offer a quid pro quo to the South, but only to men who were in a position to betray the South.”56 In addition to Texas bondholders, lobbyists for the railroads, especially proponents of a Southern route to the Pacific, were active in promoting the compromise. They were anxious to have the territories of the Mexican Cession organized so that they could legally secure the land (preferably cheaply) to build the rails. With the Speaker tolerating the presence of lobbyists in the Capitol and even on the floor of the House chamber, every opportunity for lobbyists to influence Representatives to support the compromise were being allowed. 57

The net effect of the efforts of the Administration, the bond lobby, and the political environment in August and September was to put the opponents of the compromise into disarray.

Millard Fillmore and Daniel Webster’s decision to declare war on anti-slavery Northern Whigs had the same effect that Henry Clay’s assault on Zachary Taylor had on Southern Whiggery: it divided the Whigs of their own section and united the Whigs of the opposing one. Like Taylor’s

55 Beverly Tucker to James Henry Hammond, August 14, 1850, James Henry Hammond Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 56 Beverly Tucker to James Henry Hammond, August 9, 1850, James Henry Hammond Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 57 Stegmaier Texas, New Mexico, 280; Jere W. Roberson, “The South and the Pacific Railroad, 1845-1855,” The Western Historical Quarterly 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1974): 167-172.

292 earlier effort to reconstruct Whiggery, Fillmore’s effort failed to carry the majority of the caucus.

Like Clay, Fillmore succeeded in uniting the majority of the Whig caucus against him. In

Fillmore’s case, however, the inroads that he made into the Northern Whig caucus proved critical. While the transformational nationalist majority of Northern Whiggery remained hostile

(and became more implacably so in the face of Fillmore’s assaults), a sufficient minority of

Northern Whigs of Unionist bent were persuaded by Fillmore’s patronage campaign and

Pearce’s work on the Texas/New Mexico bill to switch sides. At the same time, the endorsement of the Pearce Bill by the Texas Senators provided room for cover for Southern Democrats who favored compromise but were afraid of running afoul of their faction’s sectionalists. It was one thing to risk being grouped with Southern apostates like Clay and Benton, but another thing entirely to align with Rusk and Houston. As we have seen from Beverly Tucker’s complaints, the influence of the Texas bond lobby also drew Southern Democratic votes into line with the compromise. If Clay’s Omnibus Bill violated the principles, offered little reward and a mortal threat to the political careers of most Northern Whigs and Southern Democrats, the Pearce Bill reversed this dynamic. It violated no principles save for those of the most rabid Southern nationalists and staunchest defenders of the Wilmot Proviso (who were unlikely to ever support any bill) and assuaged the consciences of Unionists enough to allow the environmental factors of influence and patronage to take hold.58

As difficult as the political environment had become for the opponents of the compromise, it had improved for Unionists. The composition of the House made its members

58 Stegmaier, 275-291.

293 more susceptible to the influence of lobbyists and patronage, and the two most powerful offices for shaping the dynamic in the House—the Presidency and the Speakership—were firmly in their hands. Unionist Northern Democrats were unified in purpose and principle—they had rallied behind the idea of popular sovereignty and relished the prospect of contesting the next elections on the contrast between their patriotism and the demagoguery of “Bill Seward” and his Northern

Whig radicals. Their unity, if not their optimism, was shared by Southern Whigs. Ravaged by their caucus’ successive civil wars, Southern Whigs welcomed any solution that could extricate them from the controversy that had torn their party and caucus to ribbons. While Southern Whig leaders had little faith in the legislation and less confidence in their own political futures, the

Pearce Bill had offered them an honorable way out of the whole controversy, and in the absence of another viable alternative they rallied upon it. Throwing their weight behind Millard Fillmore,

Southern Whigs could only hope for the best in the near term. With no obvious path for reconciliation with anti-slavery Northerners, Southern Whigs could only support the President and bide their time to determine whether the Whig Party could be restored as a viable entity.59

While the passage of the compromise bills in the Senate had clarified the situation, it remained to be seen whether the formula would prove equally viable in the House. The election of Speaker Cobb and his ability to fend off consideration of the Taylor Bill and the Wilmot

Proviso boded well for the compromisers, a simple mathematical reality remained. The North constituted a majority of the House, and the majority of the North was Whig and Free Soiler. If the Northern Whigs could maintain their unity as had been the case during the votes on the

59 Holt, Rise, 538-551.

294

Omnibus Bill in July, and large numbers of Southerners continued to oppose the Texas/New

Mexico settlement, the Little Omnibus Bill could easily be defeated. The 82 Northern Whigs and 9 Free Soilers constituted 37 percent of the body. If they could remain united, they would require a combination of only 32 Northern Democrats and Southern nationalists to join with them and consign the linchpin of the whole compromise scheme to history. When, on September

2 Cobb made consideration of the Little Omnibus Bill the special order of business for the next day, the fate of the Union was placed in the balance.60

The battle over the Little Omnibus engaged every lever of influence and power against the members of the House of Representatives. For three days, Representatives were subjected to a marathon of cajoling, influence peddling, lobbying, and parliamentary acrobatics as the political elite tried to shape the future of the nation through a somewhat innocuous bill about boundaries and debt. Senators Douglas, Foote and Cass were ubiquitous in the gallery and hallways, as were Secretary of State Webster and other members of the Fillmore administration.

Henry Clay returned to Washington to assist in promoting the settlement. They were joined by a veritable army of lobbyists. Northern anti-slavery was represented by Seward and Chase and

Southern sectionalism by Davis and Yulee, who could offer little beyond inspiring words.

Despite the extreme political and financial pressure brought to the fight by the Compromisers, however, the House remained closely divided. During the first day, Cobb assigned Linn Boyd to preside over the debate over his own bill. Limiting the time available for comment, the Speaker then moved quickly to a showdown. The height of the drama came on September 4, as the

60 Stegmaier, 291-293; Bordewich, 334-340; Hamilton, Prologue, 156-158.

295

House leadership attempted to move the Little Omnibus to the Committee of the Whole for consideration. Initially, things went badly for Cobb. Robert McLane (D-MD) moved that an amended version of the Pearce Bill be brought forward for consideration without the other provisions of the Little Omnibus, and when this passed by a vote of 101-99 it appeared that the compromise bills in the House might suffer the same fate as the Omnibus in the Senate. Cobb, however, had prepared a contingency. Sitting silently in the Speaker’s chair, he studiously ignored the efforts of dozens of Congressmen to be recognized until Hiram Waldon (D-NY) rose with a motion to reconsider. Using a clever parliamentary trick, Joseph Root (FS-OH) moved that the New Mexico issue be tabled, which resulted in a 103-103 tie (and thus failure to table), with Cobb’s vote providing the margin of defeat.61 With the anti-compromise forces thwarted by the narrowest of margins, the motion to reconsider the McLane amendment passed by a vote of

104-98. A second effort at introducing the amended Pearce Bill failed by a vote of 104-98, with

2 New York Whigs, 2 Kentucky Democrats, and 1 Georgia Democrat switching sides between the first vote and the last. By the time the dust settled and the Little Omnibus was brought forward for a final vote, a majority of 107-98 had emerged in its favor, with 6 Democrats and 9

Whigs not voting.62 The final tally demonstrated that Pearce and Douglas’s efforts had succeeded—the Little Omnibus was a truly bisectional bill. The majority was compromised of

56 Northerners and 52 Southerners. The opposition, on the other hand, was also bisectional, but with a distinct Northern slant (67 Northerners and 30 Southerners). Indeed, on close examination, a distinct sectional nature can be discerned. While a majority (63 percent) of

61 A motion to table or adjourn is always in order. 62 Stegmaier, 291-293; Bordewich, 340-344; Hamilton, Prologue, 158-159.

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Southerners supported the Little Omnibus by a tally of 52-30, the majority (54 percent) of

Northern Representatives opposed it 67-56. The vote on the Little Omnibus demonstrated both how closely matched the two sides were, and how important every vote or bloc of voters was in accomplishing the final result. Despite the closeness of the final tally, the result was an unmitigated triumph for the Compromisers. The anti-slavery men, reported Joshua Giddings

(FS-OH), were “sternly silent amid the moral pestilence that appeared to surround them.”63

Cobb and his allies rejoiced. “The ‘Wilmot’ is dead—Seward & co crushed to atoms & the peace of the Country and ‘Union’ of the States preserved,” Linn Boyd crowed.64 Because the votes on the Omnibus were so narrow, all factions and nearly every representative played a role in the outcome. Taken together, however, the majority was forged because the Unionists of the

North and the Unionists of the South had succeeded in making common cause across section and party better than the nationalists of the North and South. The bill comported with the principles of the strongly Unionist factions—Northern Democrats and Southern Whigs—and they had provided the vast majority of the votes for the bill. Significantly, and in startling contrast with the votes surrounding the Omnibus, only one Southern Whig had broke ranks and joined the opposition—the North Carolina radical Thomas L. Clingman (W-NC). This time, Southern

Whiggery provided the most cohesive bloc of votes for a bill that they saw as integral for their partisan and individual political survival, with 96 percent of Southern Whigs who voted supporting the Little Omnibus. Likewise, 70 percent of voting Northern Democrats supported the bill. Southern Democrats, on the other hand, split nearly evenly on the bill, with three of

63 Giddings, History of the Rebellion, 329; Stegmaier, 293; Bordewich, 344; Hamilton, Prologue, 159. 64 Quoted in Hamilton, “Linn Boyd and the Dramatic Days of 1850.”

297 their number switching sides during the crucial vote on the McLane Bill on September 4 from an anti—to pro-compromise position. The Little Omnibus (and the Pearce Bill upon which it was based) had split the most radical sectionalists in the Southern Democratic caucus away from their more moderate colleagues, with the result that they were able to make common cause with their party members in the North. The willingness of 26 Southern Democrats to split from the 29

Southern die-hards that maintained opposition to the bill reveals the limits of Southern nationalism.65 Northern Whigs, on the other hand, maintained stronger proportional unity than their Southern Democratic opponents, with 66 percent of those who voted opposing the bill.

While this speaks to the comparative strength of transformational nationalism among Northerrn

Whigs and Free Soilers, the defection of 23 Northern Whigs to support of the Little Omnibus underscores the division within the Whigs caucus between transformational nationalists and conservatives, embodied by the conflict between Seward and Fillmore. That the defection of two

New York Whigs during the debate on the McLane Bill secured the survival of the Little

Omnibus at its most critical moment was especially galling. In the case of Northern Whigs, the cause of the division can only be assumed to be the efforts of Fillmore, his administration and his

Southern Whig allies. While Fillmore and the Northern Whigs defectors secured the loyalty of

Unionist Southern Whigs with their efforts, the outcome did nothing to repair the schism in the

Party. “Seventy thousand square miles of free territory made slave & a gratuity of $10,000,000”

65 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 508-509.

298 marveled John Otis (W-ME). “This done by Northern Whig votes,” he complained, “who could have defeated it.”66

With the Texas/New Mexico boundary issue defused, the House then proceeded to consideration of the oft-delayed California bill. Unlike the Little Omnibus, there was little question that there were sufficient votes in the House to admit the state. With the most important

Southern concession out of the way (and popular sovereignty implicitly imposed on New Mexico through the establishment of a territorial government without reference to slavery), Cobb had determined that California could be settled. The pronounced numerical superiority of the North virtually guaranteed passage of the bill. With the outcome of a vote on California in the House never really in doubt, the Representatives were freed from parliamentary considerations to vote their conscience. Southern sectionalists (and some Unionists) remained unreconciled to the advisability of losing the South’s sectional parity in the Senate, and hoped to lead a large

Southern protest vote against it. The presence of Senate luminaries and lobbyists was distinctly reduced, and the consideration of the Bill was primarily composed of attempts by the

Representatives to justify their actions to their constituents back home. The vote on the

California statehood bill was decisive—156 in favor and 56 opposed. All 123 Northerners who voted on the bill voted in favor, joined by 27 Southerners. The opposition was entirely comprised of Southerners, with 45 Democrats and 9 Whigs. While the vote on the California

Bill was decisive, it was both sectional and partisan in nature. 100 percent of Northerners supported the bill, while 67 percent of Southerners opposed. Of the 27 Southern supporters of

66 Quoted in Holt, Rise and Fall, 535; Stegmaier, 294; Bordewich, 344; Hamilton, Prologue, 159-160.

299 the Bill, 16 were Whigs while 11 were Democrats. The easy success of the California Bill in both the House and the Senate suggests that the support for the bill as a stand-alone measure was always present in the Congress. As would increasingly be the case with the consideration of the separate compromise bills, the California bill was met with a large number of abstentions, with 5

Democrats and 9 Whigs recording no votes on the issue.67

The Utah bill (the surviving remnant of Clay’s Omnibus) elicited little debate, but resulted in a close vote and more abstentions than the previous bills. Despite the general antipathy members of Congress felt toward the Mormon population in Utah, the primary consideration of Representatives when voting on the Bill was sectional. As had been the case with New Mexico, the Utah territorial bill organized the territory with no reference to slavery, the formulation consistent with popular sovereignty. This indirect imposition of popular sovereignty added a partisan dimension to the Bill as well. On the final vote, the bill passed 96-

85, with 38 Representatives not voting. Forty-one Northerners (30 Democrats and 11 Whigs) and 55 Southerners (31 Democrats and 24 Whigs) voted in favor, while 70 Northerners (13

Democrats and 47 Whigs) and 15 Southerners opposed (all Democrats). Voting Southerners broke 79 percent in favor of the bill, while only 39 percent of voting Northerners supported it.

Of the 38 abstainers, 17 were Democrats and 21Whigs. As had been the case with the New

Mexico bill, the passage of the Utah bill depended on the acquiescence of Unionists and moderate sectional and transformational nationalists.68

67 Stegmaier, 298; Bordewich, 344; Hamilton, Prologue, 161. 68 Stegmaier, 295; Bordewich, 344; Hamilton, Prologue, 161.

300

With the territories of the Mexican Cession finally organized, the House now turned to the adoption of the ancillary legislation related to slavery. The most important of these was the fugitive slave bill. As had been the case with the territorial measures, the success of the bill depended upon the acquiescence of the House’s Northern majority to pass. Unlike the Senate debate, however, the members of the House, directly elected by their constituents, had their political careers directly at risk. Nevertheless, the bill passed 109-76 with 42 not voting. As can be expected, the vote was highly sectional. Thirty Northerners (24 Democrats and 6 Whigs) and

76 Southerners (55 Democrats and 21 Whigs) voted in favor, while 76 Northerners (51 Whigs, 9

Free Soilers, and 15 Democrats)69 opposed. Democrats also supported the bill in higher proportions than Whigs, and comprised the majority of Northern supporters of the Bill. Sixteen

Democrats and 25 Whigs abstained.70 Northern Democrats had been most supportive of the compromise all along (and would be its strongest defenders thereafter). The support of Southern

Democrats—both Southern nationalist and Unionist—can be considered a given considering the unanimity of Southern votes in favor of the bill in every roll call and the lack of ambiguity in the sectional interest of the bill. Southern Whig supported the bill because the fugitive slave issue directly impacted the Border States where Southern Whiggery was strongest. Northern Whig abstentions were also critical. After the bill was passed, Thaddeus Stevens rose to suggest that a page be sent into the lobby to announce that “the fugitive slave bill has been disposed of, and that they may now come back into the hall.”71 It is clear that a unanimous South and portion of

69 Independent George Wright of California also voted “No.” 70 Pennsylvania’s Lewis Levin of the North American Party also abstained. 71 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress 1st Session, 1802.

301

Northern Democrats combined to pass the fugitive slave bill over the opposition of Northern

Whigs and Free Soilers, with a large number of strategic abstentions and pairing offs of Northern

Democrats and Whigs.72

With the final substantive portion of the compromise complete, the House turned to the outlawing of the public slave trade in the District of Columbia. The large Northern majority in the House made the passage of the bill a virtual certainty. Even more than the California statehood bill (which had attracted the support of 27 Southerners), the slave trade bill was purely sectional. The D.C. slave trade was a source of embarrassment for Northern politicians and a frequent focus of anti-slavery propaganda, though there is little evidence that the issue was a priority to any on either side. As subsequent experience would demonstrate, the bill specifically excluded private sales from prohibition, and in the end the bill as written would have little to no impact on the sale of slaves in the District. Nonetheless, the idea of Congress restricting the sale of slaves (even within a territory where its dominion was clearly delineated) was considered bad precedent by most Southerners. The final vote was 124 in favor (120 Northerners and 4

Southerners) and 60 (all Southerners) opposed. Whigs supported the bill in much larger proportions than Democrats, though this is explained better by the sectional tilt of the parties than by any partisan imperative. With the passage of the D.C. slave trade law, the House had concurred with the broad outlines of Douglas’s bills. The conference bill was uneventfully concurred with by the Senate. The only remaining drama occurred when President Fillmore was presented with the Fugitive Slave Law. Concerned about the provision that suspected fugitives

72 Stegmaier, 295; Bordewich, 344; Hamilton, Prologue, 161.

302 could be detained and sent South without benefit of trial, Fillmore consulted Attorney General

John J. Crittenden to verify that the law was constitutional. Crittenden declared that it was, and

Fillmore signed.73 The interconnected portions of the Compromise of 1850 were now the law of the land. Opponents of the Compromise began preparing to overturn the results in the next cycle of elections, and supporters elated in their victory. But what, exactly, had been won?74

After months of debate, argument, recrimination, threats of violence and bitterness, official Washington exploded in celebration. A friend of James Buchanan related the effects of the revelry to him. “This morning,” he reported, “Mr. Foote has diarrhea [sic] from ‘fruit’ he ate—Douglas75 has a headache from ‘cold’ &c.” “No one is willing,’ he continued, “to attribute his illness to drinking or frolicking—yet only last evg. all declared it was ‘a night on which it was the duty of every patriot to get drunk.’” He added, with considerable understatement, “I have never before known so much excitement about the passage of any law.”76 The authors of the Compromise were satisfied that they had defused the crisis and permanently resolved the slavery issue. “Hail Liberty and Union and Democratic Peace,” declared the National

Intelligencer.77 A satisfied Henry Clay wrote to his son that “every measure which I proposed in

Feby [sic] last has substantially passed; and the Country seems to be disposed generally to give me quite as much credit as I deserve.”78 Daniel Webster declared “faction, disunion, and the

73 Smith, Presidencies of Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore, 200-201. 74 Stegmaier, 295; Bordewich, 344; Hamilton, Prologue, 161. 75 It is worth noting that several of the most prominent leaders of the Compromise effort (Webster, Douglas, Mangum, Toombs) were among more notorious drinkers in Washington. 76 Jonathan M. Feltz to James Buchanan, September 8, 1850, James Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 77 National Intelligencer, August 10, 1850. 78 Clay to James Clay, September 20, 1850, Thomas J. Clay Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

303 love of mischief are put under, for the present, and I hope for a long time.”79 Stephen Douglas declared that “no man and no party has acquired a triumph, except the party friendly to the Union triumphing over abolition and disunion.”80 Alexander Stephens tried to cool the passions of his sectionalist colleagues, declaring that “I do not consider the admission of California an agitation upon the South.”81 David Outlaw was cautiously optimistic. “There is no danger I think,” he advised his wife, that “the fugitive slave law will be repealed.” “I have no doubt,” he continued,

“if a bill should pass, it would be vetoed by the President.”82 President Fillmore himself sounded a more cautious and weary note. “The long agony is over,” he declared to Governor Hamilton

Fish of New York. “Though the several acts are not in all respects what I could have desired,” he continued, “yet I am rejoiced at their passage.”83

Fillmore’s wariness was seconded by a number of fellow Unionists who had supported the bill. While there had been a large number of enthusiastic supporters of the Compromise from the beginning, the key constituency that allowed for its passage were those who were skeptical of the Bills but believed that some action, however flawed, was preferable to none. Dayton of Ohio had ably summarized this point of view when he called on Congress to “make an end of this matter of slavery for the present at least; we have had, and the country I am sure has had enough of it.” “The crisis is not over,” John Bell scoffed, “until the North cease to vex the South upon the subject of slavery; and that can never be, while the animating principle of party organization

79 Webster to Harvey, October 2, 1850, The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster. Vol. 18. 385. 80 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1830. 81 Quoted in Holt, Rise and Fall, 612. 82 David Outlaw to Emily Outlaw, December 2, 1850, David Outlaw Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 83 Millard Fillmore to Hamilton Fish, September 9, 1850, Letters of Hamilton Fish, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C; Stegmaier, 299-314; Bordewich, 348-361; Hamilton, Prologue, 166-168.

304 and cohesion continues without change or modification.”84 Senator William King (D-AL),

President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, expressed this view at the close of the session. “Whether the actions of Congress will allay that excitement [the slavery controversy], restore harmony and bring about a better state of feelings, in the country, remains to be seen,” he cautioned. Having reservedly wagered their political careers on the settlement and the Union, the reluctant supporters of the Compromise could only hope for the best. “You can say to those ‘Union- saving” gentlemen,” complained Democratic editor William W. Holden, “that there is at least one Editor, as sound a Democrat as ever trod the earth, who never will, so help him God, vote a

‘cheerful’ acquiescence in that ‘Compromise.’” “Portions of it I approve—portions of it I never will,” he continued. “I will, however, stand by it for the sake of Good and the Union and I will stand by it in good faith,” he promised. William Holden would never like the Compromise, but like many he was willing to give it a chance. 85

Southern nationalists were among those who were not reconciled to the Compromise.

“They have fired cannons in Washington,” complained the Charleston Mercury, “and displayed lights as if for a great victory.” “Well, it is a victory,” the editorial continued, “over justice and all sound statesmanship.”86 Jefferson Davis, on the other hand, considered the Compromise to be “dedicated to free soil” due to its failure to directly repudiate Mexican law. Davis characterized the bills thusly: “Give me my negro fugitive & I will allow you to kick me out of

84 Memphis Daily Eagle, September 27, 1850. 85 William W. Holden to Abraham W. Venable, December 24, 1851, Abraham Venable Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Stegmaier, 299-314; Bordewich, 348-361; Hamilton, Prologue, 166-168. 86 Charleston Mercury, September 10, 1850.

305 my own land.”87 James Mason (D-VA), believed that the “pseudo-compromise” would one day

“be found fatal either to the Union…or to the institution of slavery.”88 While Southern nationalists largely agreed that they had been beaten, and that Southern disunity was the root cause of the defeat, they believed that the loss of sectional parity in the Senate would further delegitimize the Federal Government, and in the long run the Southern people would come around to their point of view. While they acknowledged the setback and the challenges ahead, they were unbowed and confident of eventual victory. James Henry Hammond embraced patience. “The true crisis is not yet met,” he wrote in his diary, “and he who husbands his strength now can expend it to much more effect a few years hence.” “The fruit is not yet ripe,” he concluded.89

Northern transformational nationalists were likewise unwilling to accept the finality of the Compromise. “We are not among those who rejoice,” Thurlow Weed tersely noted in the

Albany Evening Journal.90 Like Southern nationalists, they interpreted the defeat as being caused by the weakness of the members of their own section. Referencing the common pejorative of “Doughfaces” for Southern-leaning Northerners, Horace Mann (W-MA) explained the defeat in culinary terms. “Dough,” he declared, “if not infinite in quantity, is infinitely soft.”

“The north is again decisively beaten,” he concluded. Other Northern Transformational nationalists were more optimistic. The South had done too good of a job intimidating the North,

87 Jefferson Davis, Speech at Fayetteville, July 11, 1851, in James T. McIntosh and Haskell L. Monroe, Jr. and Lynda Cosswell Crist, Papers of Jefferson Davis. Vol. 4 (Baton Rouge: University Press of Louisiana, 1995), 203. 88 Virginia Mason, The Public Life and Diplomatic Correspondence of James M. Mason (NY: Neal Publishing Company, 1906), 84-85. 89 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 511 90 Albany Evening Journal, September 9, 1850.

306

Thaddeus Stevens warned Thomas Clingman. It would not work again, he warned.91 For

Northern Transformational nationalists, the fight was far from over. As an ally advised William

H. Seward, “we must make war upon this administration to save the Whig party from contempt and scorn.”92

The rapid passage of the Compromise of 1850 following the defeat of the Omnibus Bill suggests several problems that had prevented the settlement of the territorial crisis to that point.

The first lesson was that no majority existed for the passage of a comprehensive compromise measure in the Congress. In each House of Congress, two broad majorities could be conjured— one composed of a united North joined by some Unionist Southern Whigs and Democrats, and a second of Southerners joined by Northern Unionists. The three efforts to decisively resolve the territorial crisis—Taylor’s, Clay’s and Bell/Webster’s, were aimed at invoking one of these coalitions. The former (targeted by Taylor and Bell) was the stronger alignment, and the measures that aimed for this alignment (California, D.C. slave trade) passed both Houses of

Congress easily. The first disadvantage of this approach was that it gave moderate Southerners, especially Southern Whigs, an effective veto over the legislation, though the strongly Unionist

Southern Whigs were among the most likely Southerners to cross over anyway. The second disadvantage was Howell Cobb’s position as Speaker of the House, where he would have to be outmaneuvered to bring any bill he disapproved to a vote. The second coalition—targeted by

Clay—was the more unstable alignment. Its major disadvantage was that it gave an array of

91 Thaddeus Stevens to Thomas L. Clingman, Selections from Clingman Speeches, 274. 92 Seth Hawley to Seward, September 1, 1850, William H. Seward Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C; Holt, Rise and Fall, 551-554.

307 actors an effective veto over any legislation. As a result, votes using this alignment (the

Omnibus, the Pearce bill, the New Mexico and Utah territorial bills, and the fugitive slave bill) were typically close. However, once Speaker Cobb–a Unionist who believed in slavery expansion—adopted this approach, it made success of the first alignment much more difficult.

In the end, Douglas was able to succeed because he could leverage the power of the Taylor/Bell coalition on some issues and the Clay coalition on the more controversial provisions. By separating the most controversial measures from the rest, Douglas and Cobb were able to maximize the ability of each issue to draw in as many votes (and abstentions) as possible. The price of this approach, however, was that the coalition of supporters who supported every aspect of the Compromise of 1850 was very small indeed. Twenty-five Congressmen voted yes on all five measures, of whom 22 were Northern Democrats, 2 Southern Whigs and 1 Northern Whig.93

The relatively easy success of the Douglas bills begs the question of why a settlement of the controversy had proven so difficult prior to August and September of 1850. While the ideological divisions of the Thirty-First Congress were profound, the eventual passage of the

Compromise measures as separate bills proved that they were not insurmountable. Southern nationalism and transformational nationalism were mutually incompatible philosophies, but

Unionism was not inherently incompatible with either. The question before the Unionist political leadership in Washington was deciding which could leverage or divide to secure the votes needed for a settlement. The Taylor administration had come down clearly in favor of aligning with the transformational nationalists—his plan proposed to accommodate the goal of

93Stegmaier, 295-301; Holt, Rise, 541-543; Hamilton, Prologue, 161-165.

308 transformational nationalism of restricting slavery expansion while shearing it of its most insulting tactic (the Wilmot Proviso), while challenging Southern nationalism to a battle of wills over secession. Daniel Webster and John Bell essentially took the same approach, while transferring responsibility of ending slavery expansion from the Federal government to Texas.

Clay’s initial approach also effected the goals of transformational nationalism (by expressly invoking Mexican law in the territories to stop slavery expansion shorn of the insult of the

Wilmot Proviso). However, Clay facilitated, and Douglas and Cobb consummated, a shift to an attempted appeasement and division of Southern nationalism through the opening of the Mexican

Cession to slavery through the principle of popular sovereignty. As a result, the conflict between

Taylor and Clay, originating in resentment, personality conflict and the vagaries of Whig politics, took on an ideological dimension with profound consequences for the nation.

Unionism, which since the time of Jefferson had combined support for the maintenance of a single Union with two economic systems while restricting the expansion of slavery where it did not exist was transformed by Clay, Douglas and Cobb into an ideology that, for good or ill, was wedded to the concept of popular sovereignty.

The Omnibus approach was clearly a significant contributing factor to the failure of

Clay’s approach to settling the crisis, but this conclusion underestimates the importance of Clay and Douglas’s leadership approaches in shaping the differing outcomes, as well as in the flaws in the eventual settlement. The Omnibus approach was unquestionably problematic, as numerous observers then and now have noted. However, it was not without advantages, the most significant of which is that its structure fostered a sectional compromise in the truest sense.

309

Clay’s close identification with the Bill and inept management of it contributed as much to its defeat as its form. Clay had publicly underscored differences between his plan and Taylor’s, had refused to consider incorporating other Whig ideas (New Mexico statehood, inviting Texas to divide) into his plan, had alienated the large majority of the members of his own party and marginalized those Whigs who did support him. He failed to heed the counsel of key participants and attempted to force members to support the Omnibus on the threat of civil war.

The success of Douglas—particularly in working with James Pearce to formulate the Texas/New

Mexico boundary issue and his coordination with Howell Cobb to ensure that the legislative environment of the House favored the Compromise Bills—proved critical in ensuring that the close votes that had resulted in the destruction of the Omnibus would not affect the individual bills. While several political leaders played key roles in the final form of the Compromise of

1850—Clay, Foote, Pearce, Cobb, and Boyd particularly, Stephen Douglas was the leader most responsible for the Compromise of 1850, for good or ill. While Douglas, for his own political reasons, would publicly credit Clay until the end of his life for the Compromise of 1850, it was as much his vision as anyone’s. The ideal of popular sovereignty, developed by Dickinson and endorsed by Cass, and promoted most effectively by Douglas, became the new territorial policy of the United States. With the expansion of slavery now dependent on the will of the population of the territories, the sectional dispute had been democratized in a way that had never been the case previously. Douglas’s triumph in 1850 established a new order of sectional politics which transformed the American political order, the relations of the sections, and the viability of the two major political parties. Stephen Douglas and his Unionist principles would prove a great

310 beneficiary and ultimate victim of the new order that he had done so much to conjure into being.94

94 Johannsen, Douglas, 295-303; Hamilton, Prologue, 166-168.

311

A Momentary Quiet

“A momentary quiet has hushed the voice of agitation, but there is no peace. There can be none as long as slaveholders and abolitionists live under a common government.” - Columbus [Georgia] Sentinel1

With the Compromise of 1850 now the law of the land, legislators turned their attention to managing the popular politics of the Compromise and understanding how the Compromise would operate in fact. In the immediate term, supporters of the Compromise, especially

President Fillmore, dedicated themselves to finality—the idea that the Compromise of 1850 was a definitive settlement of the slavery issue, and that support for the Compromise should be a litmus test for national political leadership. Transformational and Southern nationalism persisted, however, and Unionists in both parties and sections increasingly adopted the

Compromise of 1850 as their model of sectional compromise and forbearance. In this reading,

Congressional moderates, inspired by the patriotism of Clay and the eloquence of Webster, hammered out a difficult but just package of legislation. The deaths of Calhoun in 1850 and

Clay and Webster in 1852 added an element of tragedy and generational change to the process.

As the nation continued to lurch from crisis to crisis during the 1850s, the example of the

Compromise of 1850 came increasingly to be seen as a better time, when the forces of moderation and patriotism had triumphed over agents of sectional radicalism, for seemingly the last time. As temperatures rose in the blast-furnace of 1850s sectional politics, the cool

1 Reprinted in Charleston Mercury, January 23, 1851, Quoted in Ulrich B. Philips, The Life of Robert Toombs, (NY: Macmillan Press, 1913), 102.

312 moderation of the compromise faction was melted away, and the sectional radicals of 1850 became moderates themselves with the rise of sectionalists made of sterner mettle.2

While historians debate the extent to which the Compromise of 1850 quenched slavery agitation between 1851 and 1854, there is little debate among scholars that the Kansas-Nebraska act supercharged the conflict. Stephen Douglas consciously mirrored the verbiage of the

Compromise of 1850 in his framing of the Bill. “All will be willing,” he confidently predicted,

“to sanction and affirm the principle established by the Compromise measures of 1850.”3 The bill succeeded, as Robert Bonner puts it, due to “a toxic mix of northern Democratic factionalism and southern Whig defensiveness about their proslavery ‘soundness.’”4 The opening of previously free territory to slavery outraged Northerners. Southern sectionalists rallied to

Douglas’s bill as a way to restore sectional parity in the Senate. Anti-slavery Northerners rallied together to oppose the act. While the proto-Republicans were unable to stop the Kansas

Nebraska Bill, their electoral success in the North threatened for the first time to provide a path for a purely sectional candidate to win the Presidency. The post-Kansas-Nebraska political order was three pronged, with one party dominating the North and the others attempting to maintain a national organization. The conflict between pro-slavery and anti-slavery immigrants in Kansas turned increasingly violent, and “Bleeding Kansas” further accelerated sectional agitation and

2 Gienapp, Origins, 13-69, 488-551; Richard Harrison Shyrock, Georgia and the Union in 1850 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1926); Wilentz, Rise, 645-667; Holt, Rise and Fall, 553-615; Foner, Free Soil, 196-318; Freehling, Road to Disunion Vol. 1, 511-535; Mark. W. Summers, The Plundering Generation (NY: Oxford University Press, 1988); Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson (eds.), National Party Platforms (Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 1961) 20-21. 3 Stephen A. Douglas to D.M. Johnson and L.J. Easton, December 17, 1853, Letters of Stephen A. Douglas, 268- 271. 4 Bonner, Mastering America, 207.

313 added to the increasing sectionalization of the Democratic Party, which finally divided in 1858.

The final break came when President James Buchanan tried to push admission of Kansas with an pro-slavery constitution through Congress. The Democratic split into two sectional factions formalized the quadripartite division of the political system apparent during the 1850 debate.5

The victory of transformational nationalist Abraham Lincoln over Unionist Stephen Douglas in the North and that of Southern nationalist John Breckenridge over Unionist John Bell in the

South formalized the electorate’s final repudiation of Unionism. The only question which remained was whether the debate between Southern nationalism and transformational nationalism could be resolved in Congress, or whether the solution would transcend politics.6

Despite this, interpretations of the Compromise of 1850 were generally positive in the aftermath of the Civil War. Jefferson Davis, while considering the Compromise as “bear[ing] the imprint of a sectional spirit…widely at variance with the general purpose of the Union,” praised Henry Clay as having “perhaps shone then with the brightest light his genius ever

5 Wilentz, Rise, 633-768; Foner, Free Soil 1-260; Gienapp, Origins, 13-103, 413-448; Varon, Disunion, 235-266, Johanssen, Douglas, 403-406, Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 275-292, Morrison, Slavery and the American West, 126-218; Holt, Rise and Fall, 673-986; Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 235-268; Nicole Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 9-87; Roy F. Nichols, “The Kansas-Nebraska Act: A Century of Historiography,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43, no. 2 (Sept. 1956): 187-212; Joseph H. Parks, “The Tennessee Whigs and the Kansas Nebraska Bill,” The Journal of Southern History 10, no. 3 (Aug. 1944): 308- 330; James L. Huston, Calculating the Value of the Union (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003) 153-189; John V. Mering, “The Slave-State Constitutional Unionists and the Politics of Consensus,” The Journal of Southern History 43, no. 3 (Aug. 1977): 395-410; Robert G. Gunderson, “William C. Rives and the ‘Old Gentleman’s Convention,’” The Journal of Southern History 22, no. 4 (Nov. 1956): 459-476; Thomas B. Alexander, “Persistent Whiggery in the Confederate South, 1860-1877,” The Journal of Southern History 27, no. 3 (Aug. 1961): 305-329. 6 Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 768-788; Foner, Free Soil, 111-316; Etcheson, 190-225; Varon, 267; Huston, 190-233; Morrison, 219-279; Fox-Genovese and Genovese, Mind of the Master Class, 649-718; Bruce Levine, Half Slave and Half Free (New York: Hall and Wang, 2005), 225-242; McCardell, The Idea of a Southern Nation, 277-334.

314 emitted.”7 Alexander Stephens characterized the Compromise to have been “an agreement on the part of the slave-holding states to continue in the Union in consideration of…renewed pledges on the of the non-slaveholding states…to abide by the constitution,” and declared that

Clay “had the respect and the confidence of the entire country.”8 In his history of the Congress,

Republican politician James G. Blaine praised Henry Clay for the “spirit of compromise which had been so distinguishing a mark of his statesmanship” and declared Daniel Webster to have been “a great magazine of strength for the Union” during the crisis.9 Pro-Republican historians like Hermann von Holst, considered the Compromise of 1850 a triumph of moderation over sectional radicalism, reconciling the slave-power thesis with a romantic view of Clay and

Webster’s work. Holst argued that while the “slaveocracy made it simply impossible for their moderate opponents to be silent, because silence was identical to unconditional submission,” 10 he nonetheless praised the efforts of the “union savers” in attempting to develop a settlement.11

To what extent did the Compromise of 1850 contribute to the outbreak of Civil War in

1860? Historians have been of two minds. One school of thought holds that the Compromise of

1850 was essentially a success. The sectional conflict, it argues, was mitigated by the

Compromise, and the national debate over slavery did not resume in earnest until Stephen

Douglas’s ill-advised Kansas Nebraska act reopened the territorial debate in 1854. The years

7 Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. Vol. 1 (NY: D. Appleton and Company, 1881), 15, 585. 8 Alexander H. Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States. Vol. 2 (Philadelphia, National Publishing Corp. 1870.) 233, 197. 9 James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, 1 (Boston: Han, Avery and Company, 1884), 91,94. 10 Herman Van Holst, The Constitutional and Political History of the United States. Vol. 1 (Chicago: Callahan and Company: 1884), 16. 11 Ibid. 3.

315 from 1852-1853 were indeed the quietest of the 1850s on the slavery issue. “Following the

Compromise of 1850,” William Gienapp declares, “a period of sectional calm seemed at hand” until it was disrupted by ethno-cultural forces, though he does acknowledge the damage caused by the 1850 debate.12 While “the sectional settlement enjoyed widespread popular support,” he continues, “the fight over its passage scarred the main parties.”13 Donald Fehrenbacher agrees, stating that “the issue of slavery in the territories…had seemingly been permanently laid to rest.”

“Four years later,” he continues, “Douglas himself reopened it by devising the Kansas-Nebraska

Act.”14 J.G Randall concurred, blaming the outbreak of renewed sectional conflict in 1854 on the errors of the new generation of political leaders.15 Mark Stegmaier concludes that “the popular sovereignty formula …became an agreement that satisfied majorities of both sections at the time in regard to Utah and New Mexico.” “Certainly,” he continues, “this represents

‘compromise’ in the true sense.”16 While the Compromise of 1850 provided a workable settlement to the crisis, the blunders of the next generation of leaders, especially Stephen A.

Douglas, led the nation into the Civil War.

While it is important to recognize the positive impact that the Compromise of 1850 in preventing civil war at that time and in achieving its goal of removing slavery from the national political debate, it is difficult to agree that the Compromise of 1850 provided a lasting and meaningful path to preventing civil war in the medium or long-term. After all, within a decade

12 Gienapp, Origin, 444. 13 Ibid. 14. 14 Donald Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, 273. 15 Randall,” The Blundering Generation,” 3-28. 16 Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico…, 321.

316 of the passage of the Compromise, the Union was indeed dissolved and the Civil War ensued.

While slavery had receded from Congressional politics during the period between the passage of the Compromise and the introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, it remained critical on the state and local levels and was a source of great contention in both parties conventions in 1852.

As Sean Wilentz has noted, “within two months of the settlement of 1850, the clash of southern and northern ideas of democracy would break out anew, over that part of the truce known as the

Fugitive Slave Act.” 17 The fugitive slave issue continued to rankle in both sections throughout the decade. The core of the settlement—the popular sovereignty formula—could only achieve sectional harmony so long as there was no prospect of it being applied. Having failed to solve the issue of whether the territories of the United States were to be slave or free, the sectional conflict that the Compromise had contained would inevitably be renewed as soon as the prospect of the organization of additional territories became necessary, which in the case of Nevada came in 1864. The Compromise, Wilentz further concludes, was “a truce that delayed, but could not prevent, an even greater crisis over slavery.”18 Holman Hamilton likewise argues that “the

Compromise of 1850 was a temporary success.” “The compromise formula demanded statesmanship,” he continues, “and especially Presidential statesmanship,” but Presidents Millard

Fillmore, Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan were not able to provide it.19 William Freehling argues that the settlement convinced Southerners that the Fugitive Slave Law was insufficient protection, and that the opening of additional territory to slavery was essential to its

17 Wilentz, Rise, 645. 18 Ibid. 637. 19 Hamilton, Prologue, 186.

317 preservation.20 David Potter offers a nuanced view, determining that while “the great problems of slavery and union had not been solved,”21 the Compromise had “averted a crisis and it had reached a settlement of issues which four preceding sessions of Congress had been unable to handle.” “It remained to be seen,” he continues, “whether the American people, North and

South, would…convert this settlement into a compromise.”22 The question of whether the

Kansas-Nebraska Act inaugurated a new crisis or continued the unsettled crisis of 1850 remains.

What is clear is that following the Compromise of 1850, Southern nationalists and transformational nationalists had not abandoned their visions, and Unionism continued to contest these competing ideological poles.

While these differing views of the Compromise of 1850 superficially vary widely, the differences are more of interpretation rather than any dispute over the basic facts. To determine whether or not the Compromise of 1850 was a success, we must first understand what the goal of a territorial settlement was. John Tyler’s pursuit of Texas annexation was informed by his desire to strengthen the hand of the South in the Federal government, and to organize a pro-slavery party under his leadership in the process. That Texas annexation and additional expansion at the expense of Mexico was pursued by Tyler’s Democratic successor was no coincidence. The desire to acquire new territory open to slavery expansion was a key motivation for Southern

Democrats in supporting the Mexican War. The first attempt at settling the slavery issue in the newly acquired territories—the Wilmot Proviso—sought to permanently exclude slavery from

20 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 536-541. 21 Potter, Impending Crisis, 117. 22 Ibid. 120.

318 the territory. John Crittenden and John Clayton devised the Taylor Plan to admit the Mexican

Cession as states sought to permanently settle the controversy by fait accompli as delivered by the residents of the territory. Webster and Bell attempted to do the same, with the future expansion of slavery to be determined by Texas rather than Congress. Henry Clay attempted to do likewise, declaring that his goal was “an amicable arrangement of all questions between the free and slave States growing out of the question of slavery.”23 We can presume that the final form of the Compromise—associated with and endorsed by him—reasonably resembled the

“amicable arrangement” that Clay had in mind. Did the compromise succeed on these terms?

In a number of respects, the Compromise of 1850 was remarkably successful. On the most pressing and immediate issues related to the crisis, the Compromise legislation performed remarkably well. California was admitted as a free state. The South did not secede (and never came particularly close), and, in a stunning unintended consequence, California proceeded to send a parade of Pro-Southern Democrats to Washington as Senators and Representatives. On the second major point of the controversy, the settlement of the Texas and New Mexico boundary proved satisfactory to Texas and the threat of armed conflict was eliminated.

Considering that the threats of secession and armed conflict during the session usually originated around these two measures, the permanent settlement of these by the Compromise of 1850 should not be taken lightly. The settlement of the Texas and New Mexico boundary issue dramatically decreased the likelihood the outbreak of war, and the failure of secession to follow the admission of California demonstrated unequivocally that the South was not ready to declare

23 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 244.

319 independence over the expansion of slavery. Following the Compromise of 1850, these questions would never again recur. It is to the credit of the authors of the compromise that they succeeded in achieving their goal of permanent settlement of these immediate controversies.24

While the Texas/New Mexico boundary bill and California admission bills were generally successful, the territorial bills as a whole were more problematic. At the time of their acquisition, slavery was illegal in the territories of the Mexican Cession. The Wilmot Proviso,

Taylor Plan, and Clay’s initial proposal all acknowledged and maintained this with varying degrees of artifice. Bell explicitly called for the end of slavery expansion during his introduction of his plan, though it did leave the possibility of organizing additional slave states out of currently slave territory. The Omnibus Bill, however, proposed opening the Mexican Cession

(excepting California) to slavery by asserting U.S. law without reference to slavery. This formulation was maintained in the final Compromise of 1850. The adoption of implicit popular sovereignty represented a departure from previous precedent. For the first time, territory where slavery was explicitly illegal was opened to slavery. This had real consequences for slavery expansion—the territorial legislatures of both New Mexico (in 1854) and Utah (in 1858) did adopt slave codes, effectively legalizing slavery within territories where slavery had been illegal at the beginning of 1850. Transformational nationalists took this as affirmation for their view that the federal government was dominated by the slave power, while Southern nationalists saw

24 The District of Columbia slave trade bill could also be considered a success, as the slave trade was never resumed there following the passage of the bill. However, due to the comparative unimportance of the bill and ambiguities involved, we will not adjudicate it a success or failure. D.C. slave traders simply moved across the Potomac river to Alexandria, private sales of slaves continued unabated, and the question of emancipation in Washington replaced the slave trade as an ongoing source of sectional agitation.

320 it as validating their view that slavery followed the Constitution. There was some substance to these interpretations. It is not a coincidence that no territorial settlement prior to the

Compromise of 1850 opened free territory to slavery, and that every territorial settlement between 1850 and the Civil War introduced the possibility of slavery expansion into territory that had been free. The Compromise of 1850 shifted the ideological orientation of Unionism from the slow, evolutionary and gradual anti-slavery of Monroe and Clay to the progressive proslavery of the 1850s.

The second systemic failure of the Compromise of 1850 was its role in damaging the legitimacy of the federal government in both sections. The resilience of the Union in the face of sectional stress prior to the 1840s had rested to a great extent upon the acceptance by the governed that they and their interests were represented adequately in the national government.

Conversely, the political appeal of both Southern and transformational nationalists depended on the promotion of the idea that the distribution of power in the national government was unfair, necessitating the revision of the political order before it could become legitimate. To some extent, it was inevitable that any settlement would damage the legitimacy of the government in one section or the other. The problem with the Compromise of 1850 was that it damaged federal legitimacy in both. The admission of California damaged the legitimacy of the central government by removing the South’s assurance of sectional parity in the Senate. With Northern majorities in both houses, the South became more dependent on the office of the Presidency for representation of sectional interests, and, due to the two-thirds rule, increasingly dependent on sectional dominance of the Democratic Party as the agent of those interests. For many

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Southerners of both parties, the central government could only be legitimate if Southern interests were adequately represented, and in practice this meant through a President that was friendly to the section’s interests. With Whig Presidential nominations made by majority (thus favoring the

North) and Democratic nominations requiring a 2/3 majority (which favored the South), in practical terms this meant that the central government’s legitimacy in the South increasingly rested on the occupancy of the White House by pro-Southern Democrats. At the same time, increasingly intransigent Southern demands on Northern Democrats alienated Northerners from that party, damaging the legitimacy of the central government in the North. This tendency was exacerbated by the implosion of Whiggery as a national party. Democratic dominance of the federal government from 1852-1854 combined with the pro-Southern policies of Franklin Pierce and the Kansas-Nebraska controversy of 1854 increasingly understood by Northern voters as

Southern dominance of the central government. The Slave Power thesis was seemingly verified by the progressive action of Democrats in Washington to strengthen slavery at the expense of

Northerners. This vicious cycle damaged the legitimacy of the federal government in the North, and increasingly strengthened the Republican Party. As Michael Holt has written, “the ability of the rival parties to offer Northern and Southern voters alternatives on the slavery issue had been one of the major props of the [Second Party] system itself.” “Clear party differences on the sectional issue,” he continues, “had been one of the reasons voters had been loyal to the two parties.” The Whig/Democratic convergence on the Compromise of 1850, he argues, led “those who wished to continue political battles over slavery [to] look elsewhere.”25 When this occurred

25 Holt, Political Crisis, 98.

322 in 1860, there existed no federal institution aside from the unreliable (and undemocratic)

Supreme Court that could potentially check Republicans within the bounds of existing law. By

1860, the legitimacy of the federal government had been seriously undermined in both sections.

In the North, it was damaged enough that Northern voters directly rebuked Southern dominance of the federal government by electing a Republican President. In the South, the election of a

President who was not pro-Southern proved sufficient evidence for seven states to determine that the legitimacy of the federal government was so diminished as to necessitate a new nation.

While Abraham Lincoln and his allies took pains to reassure the South that he would not promote abolition of slavery where it existed (even offering to support a Constitutional

Amendment to that effect), the central government’s legitimacy was undermined so drastically that civil war ensued.26

The territorial issue was the battleground upon which questions of national identity and ideology met the interests of the populations of the North and South, and it was this issue that the framers of the Compromise of 1850 strove to adjust. The results of the Compromise of 1850 on quelling the territorial crisis were at best mixed. On one hand, the territories that were organized by the Compromise of 1850 were not the battlegrounds of the political crisis of the 1850s. By the time that New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah and Colorado petitioned for admission to the

Union, the slavery question had been settled. On the other hand, the most significant political conflicts of the next decade all involved slavery in the territories, the very question that had dogged the political leaders of 1850. Whereas the settlements encompassed in the Northwest

26 Richards, Slave Power, 190-215.

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Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise held for decades and until the acquisition of new territories, the Compromise of 1850 was superseded within four years by the Kansas-Nebraska act and a new and more destructive round of sectional agitation. Historians have disputed whether the Compromise of 1850 or the Kansas-Nebraska Act was the primary accelerant of the sectional conflict. However, it does seem clear is that the territorial policies of Compromise of

1850 shared more in common with the Kansas-Nebraska Act than with either the Missouri

Compromise or the Northwest Ordinance, and that the studied non-action of Congress on slavery in the territories of the Mexican Cession left the territorial issue open for additional political agitation. By embracing the concept of popular sovereignty it encouraged both sides of the slavery debate to anticipate renewed hostility at a future date. By forging an “uneasy truce” rather than a peace, in Sean Wilentz’s phrase, the framers of the Compromise had themselves guaranteed future conflict. At some point another state or territory would petition Congress for admission or organization. As William Freehling has noted, Southern sectionalists fully intended to use the popular sovereignty formula to reverse the policy of the Missouri Compromise when this happened. Stephen Douglas’s decision to overtly apply the popular sovereignty formula that had implicitly been established in the Mexican Cession was certainly ill-advised and represented a terrible misreading of public opinion in the North, but it did not represent a change in policy.

The policy that free territory could be opened to slavery by the vote of the inhabitants was an innovation of the Compromise of 1850. What changed was the application of popular sovereignty to territory organized under a previous policy. Popular sovereignty failed to localize the debate over slavery in the territories, which continued unabated until 1861. By leaving the

324 question of slavery in the territories perpetually open, the authors of the Compromise of 1850 ensured that the sectional conflict would continue. At best, the Compromise of 1850 succeeded in transferring the conflict from New Mexico to other venues.27

While the territorial bills fell short of effecting a permanent settlement of the crisis, the

Fugitive Slave Bill was an unmitigated disaster. Although the Fugitive Slave Law was the first of the bills that eventually comprised the Compromise to be introduced, there was surprisingly little refinement or adjustment of the law between then and its passage. This in itself was problematic, as even its author believed that “even this law will be of little worth in securing the rights of those for whose benefit it is intended.”28 When James Mason (D-VA) had originally introduced the law, he was still aligning himself with John Calhoun, and the law seems to have been deliberately designed as an extreme measure that could be moderated as part of an eventual compromise. The issue that the law was meant to solve was fairly straightforward—Northern anti-slavery politicians opposed returning fugitive slaves, conservative Northern politicians wanted political cover to take them out of the fugitive rendition process, Southern sectionalists were angry in principle at Northern recalcitrance, and the loss of fugitives into the North was a significant issue in the border states. Mason’s solution was extreme, but the desire of Northern

Unionists to take some concrete action to appease the South enticed them to support the Fugitive

Slave Law largely as Mason had originally proposed it. The refusal of the Senate to record a roll-call on the bill, however, underscores the recognition of the political class that the Act would prove politically toxic. They were correct. Despite the limited number of fugitives who were

27 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 536-544. 28 Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 233.

325 actually sent South by the law (only 322 “fugitives” were tried, 90 percent of whom were sent

South between 1850 and 1861), nearly every instance of a slave rendition attracted attention.

The Fugitive Slave Law was a powerful and constant affirmation of the Slave Power thesis, maintaining and strengthening anti-slavery in the North and undermining the legitimacy of the central government. The broad and intense opposition to the Fugitive Slave law in the North also strengthened Southern nationalism, reinforcing the sectionalist narrative that the North could not be trusted to meet its Constitutional obligations to the South. The primary goal of the

Compromise of 1850 was to resolve the institutional sources of sectional agitation. Instead, the

Fugitive Slave Law accelerated them. The Law was both ineffective and controversial. Its adoption as constructed must be considered a dramatic failure of foresight by the Unionists who acquiesced in its terms. It did nothing to alleviate sectional tensions, and much to render the sectional conflict perpetual.29

Taken together, the impacts of the Compromise of 1850 can be adjudged to be successful in resolving the immediate crisis over the territories of the Mexican Cession, and a failure in the higher goal of resolving the overarching goal of resolving the sectional controversy. The success of the Compromise of 1850 in settling the Mexican Cession should not be underestimated. The issue had bedeviled the political order in Washington from the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso in 1846 through the final passage of the Compromise in 1850. Had no

Kansas-Nebraska Act been proposed, it is possible that the territorial aspects of the settlement

29 Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, 645-667; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, 536-537.

326 may have held until the next territory in the Mexican Cession was organized.30 Outside of the

Mexican Cession, however, the Compromise of 1850 and its precedents probably did more harm than good. The Fugitive Slave Law perpetuated sectional tensions throughout the decade, and did little to address the issue of fugitive slaves fleeing North to freedom. The solution that the

Compromise of 1850 used to determine the fate of slavery in the territories—Congressional inaction based on implicit popular sovereignty—proved disastrous when applied outside of the

Mexican Cession. While it is important to recognize that the Compromise of 1850 was not a total failure—particularly in its settlement of the Mexican Cession and defusing of the Wilmot

Proviso—to judge it a success as many historians have is to ignore this central shortcoming: the

Compromise of 1850 could only hold so long as no other state or territory sought entry into the

Union. This was utterly impractical. Southern sectionalists sought to rebalance the scale of power through expansion. Northern Democrats supported expansion on principle. Northern

Whigs and Free Soilers were uninterested in expansion, but anxious to organize the existing territories and to bar slavery from them. Finality could only be final if the stasis of 1850 could be maintained, and only the most conservative segments of the collapsing Whig Party had any interest in maintaining the status quo. Two of the three differing visions for national identity—

Southern nationalism and transformational nationalism—remained dedicated to altering the national distribution of power. If Stephen Douglas had not tried to organize Kansas, some other state would have sought admission before the decade was out, and popular sovereignty practically guaranteed that sectional crisis would ensue anew. At best, it was a deeply flawed

30 As it happened, Nevada was the next territory organized from the Mexican Cession in 1864.

327 law that failed to secure enough confidence to prevent its being superseded by the Kansas-

Nebraska overt popular sovereignty formula within four years. At worst, it exacerbated sectional tensions, eroded the legitimacy of the central government, redirected federal slavery policy from peaceful, gradual emancipation to slavery perpetuation, and contributed, ultimately, toward the collapse of the political system in 1861. There is truth in both of these assessments, but on the whole it is difficult to conclude that the Compromise of 1850 did more good than harm.

When we compare the performance of the Compromise of 1850 to its analogues—the

Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise—the limits of the Compromise become clear. The Northwest Ordinance, passed in 1787, outlawed slavery in the northern territories of the United States31, and slavery expansion was limited to territories formed out of the existing slave states.32 The system that the Ordinance established—that the territories of the North would be free and the territories formed where slavery already existed would be slave—held until 1819 and the Missouri controversy. Because slavery already existed within the territories of the

Louisiana Purchase, the Southern portions of the territory were claimed to have inherited slavery in the same manner as the slave territories under the Northwest territorial system, and it was not until the organization of the Missouri territory (due west from free Illinois) that the system broke down. The Missouri Compromise followed the same basic principle of the Northwest Ordinance

(recognizing slavery where it existed and restricting it where it did not), but added a formal geographic delineation to the free/slave division and excepting Missouri from that delineation

31 Including the present states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming. 32 The present states of Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi.

328 due to the presence of slavery in the territory. In both cases, it was clear without any additional action from Congress which territory would be slave and which would be free. When we compare the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise, the continuities outweigh the discontinuities. Aside from applying to different regions, the underlying principle of both was the same. Both Compromises expressly restricted slavery expansion geographically, and excepted only those territories where slavery already existed from that restriction. In addition, both the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise established a system for addressing territorial developments that did not require maintenance of the status quo. New territories could be and were organized without disrupting the Union. Both sections accepted the legitimacy of the formula established by the law, and this consensus was only seriously disrupted when facts on the ground forced reappraisal of the system.33 Unlike the two previous systems, it was impossible to determine whether a territory would be slave or free under its provisions. While under previous compromises (especially the Missouri), partisans in each section could clearly understand the implications of the action (regardless of whether they liked it or not), under the

Compromise of 1850 the value of deliberate ambiguity in territorial legislation ran out. Any deviation from the terms could be (and were) interpreted as evidence that the legitimacy of the federal government was compromised. With transformational and Southern nationalists contesting the legitimacy of the Compromise and the government that promoted it, no true settlement of the territorial controversy was possible if there was disagreement about what the settlement meant. In contrast, critics of the Missouri Compromise in both sections understood

33 In the case of the Northwest Ordinance, the contradiction was the prevalence of slavery in Missouri, in the case of the Missouri Compromise, it was the addition of legally free territory via the Mexican Cession.

329 exactly what the settlement meant and recognized that it was indeed a bisectional compromise.

This was never the case with the Compromise of 1850. By any standard, the Compromise of

1850 was the least successful of the three great territorial compromises in American history.

The additional complicating factor in any assessment of the Compromise of 1850 is the

Kansas-Nebraska Act. As we have noted, historians who view the Compromise of 1850 positively generally blame the Kansas-Nebraska Act for the resumption of sectional controversy.

Historians who view the Compromise negatively downplay the differences between Kansas-

Nebraska and the Compromise. While we cannot definitively test the impact of the Compromise of 1850 on the political system without the Kansas-Nebraska Act over the long-term, we can compare the policies of the Compromise of 1850 and Kansas-Nebraska for continuity and discontinuity, as well as look at the period between 1850 and 1854 to see whether sectionalism as a federal issue had in fact been tamed. The Compromise of 1850 differed from its predecessors not only in its circumstances (the previous Compromises involved territory where slavery was either not illegal or where slavery was affirmatively legal) but also in its outcome.

The Compromise of 1850 took territory where slavery was illegal, and made slavery legalization possible (with the exception of California). In this, the Compromise of 1850 represents a break from the territorial policies of the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise. The

Kansas-Nebraska Act, rather than representing a break with the Compromise of 1850, was a continuation. Stephen Douglas had deliberately worded the bill to reflect the language, as well as the principles, of the Compromise of 1850, and deliberately sought the direct repeal of the

Missouri Compromise and its replacement with the Compromise of 1850 as national territorial

330 policy. The Kansas-Nebraska Act represented the application of the form and function of the

Compromise of 1850 in a different territorial context. To the extent that the Kansas-Nebraska

Act represented a break in policy, it was that it formally repealed the Missouri Compromise, not the Compromise of 1850. By establishing the precedent of the Federal government opening free territory for slavery, the Compromise of 1850 not only ensured that the slavery issue would be re-disputed every time a new territory approached eligibility to enter the Union, it also undermined the ideological foundations of the very Unionists who maintained political stability.

Committed to the Union as it was, and dedicated to the stability of the Union as it was, Unionists were undermined whenever the debate over slavery led, as it inevitably did, to questions about whether the Union as it was treated their section fairly. Unionist fortunes were tied closely to their ability to build consensus between the sections. Debates over slavery in the territories resulted in precisely the opposite effect.

The policy of popular sovereignty introduced by the Compromise of 1850 and consummated by the Kansas-Nebraska Act proved unforgiving to Unionists. The most significant casualty of the post-1850 political environment was the Whig Party. Millard

Fillmore’s attempt to make support for the Compromise of 1850 party policy not only failed, but it cost him his post. Northern Whiggery, dominated by anti-slavery transformational nationalists, rallied behind Winfield Scott and cast Fillmore and his Southern Whig supporters aside. Southern Whigs abandoned Scott in droves, and the Whig Party’s last Presidential campaign ended in ignominious failure. The fall of the Whig Party also marked the end of two party politics in the period before the Civil War, precipitating the political crisis of the 1850s.

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The Kansas-Nebraska Act provided the impetus for the rise of the purely sectional Republican

Party, and pushed the Democratic Party into evolving into the de-facto Party of the South. Over the course of the 1850s, sectionalism did not wane, it waxed. Southern nationalists were not appeased by the opening of New Mexico and Utah to slavery, and continued to perceive the

South as a distinct nation that depended on a friendly President to protect itself from a hostile

North. Northern transformational nationalists continued to believe that the progress and homogenization of the nation required the end of slavery expansion and gradual evolution away from slavery. Unionists, on the other hand, had to adjust their policies from peaceful evolution to popular sovereignty, a switch that did not always comport with the wishes of their constituents. Rather than undermining radicals in both sections, it left them essentially as they were. Unionists, on the other hand—still divided on policy—were increasingly reduced to appeals to patriotism and acceptance of events. Whereas prior to the Compromise of 1850,

Unionism could account for the future of slavery under their policies, afterwards it was unclear where Unionism would lead aside from prolonged sectional controversy. Their ideological opponents North and South, on the other hand, could describe exactly where their policies would end. In the end, the coming of the Civil War marked the effective end of the Unionist vision.

The conquest of the Confederacy and the end of slavery restored the United States as one Union, but this new Union was the one of the transformational nationalists.34

Was there a better alternative available in 1850 that could have passed Congress? In addition to the Clay/Douglas plan, four additional approaches were suggested and received a

34 Foner, Free Soil, 301-318; Freehling, Road to Secession 2,

332 high level of scrutiny. Southern Democrats offered two comprehensive proposals of their own—

Calhoun’s plan to fundamentally transform the political system, and Davis’s plan to extend the

Missouri Compromise through the Mexican Cession. Both of these plans had the potential to permanently settle the controversy. Of these plans, Calhoun’s proposal can be dismissed as impractical. While it did offer a permanent solution to the controversy, it was never formalized into legislation and was largely ignored even by Southern sectionalists. Davis’s plan, on the other hand, enjoyed widespread support among Southern sectionalists.35 The primary problem with Davis’ extended Missouri Compromise plan was that it had virtually no support in the

North, although one suspects that in the absence of an alternative plan this may have not been the case. While we cannot dismiss the Davis Plan as un-passable, the odds of the proper circumstances aligning to allow it to pass the Northern-dominated House seem slim.

The two alternative Southern Whig plans, on the other hand, had greater political potential to win votes. From the votes taken on the Compromise of 1850, it seems probable that both the Taylor and Bell plans had the potential to pass both Houses of Congress under certain circumstances. The easy passage of the California admission bill in the House and Senate suggests that the votes for this measure were always available if the measure could be brought to a vote. At least three Southern Senators (Benton, Spruance, and Wales) would have supported the admission of California under any circumstances and with no concessions from the North, and Northern dominance of the House ensured that sufficient votes existed there pass any

35 The adoption of the Missouri Compromise line by Southern sectionalists was intriguing because many of them roundly denounced the Missouri Compromise as a sell out before the debate, illustrating the importance of context (in this case the fact that the Mexican Cession was free territory) to the ideological dimensions of the debate.

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California admission bill that could be brought forward for a vote. Given the problems in both

Houses in passing a Texas/New Mexico boundary bill, the key question for both efforts would have been the New Mexico boundary. Both the Taylor and Bell plan deferred the boundary question to the Supreme Court, but dealt with the rest of the question in different ways. Taylor’s plan to admit New Mexico as a state was less likely to succeed—Southerners of both parties opposed it,36 and it seems likely that any advantage that might be gained through the expected support of Southern Whigs would be offset by Northern defections. Bell’s plan, on the other hand, had a greater opportunity for success. By leaving the question of slavery expansion in the hands of Texas, it balanced Southern Whig needs of preserving sectional honor with Northern desires to end the slavery controversy by tying the division of Texas with the understanding that these would be the final slave states admitted to the Union. While the Taylor plan as originally devised37 had the greater chance of permanently solving the sectional crisis, the failure of

California to include the lands of Utah in its boundaries, the failure of New Mexico to quickly submit a state constitution to Congress, and the election of Howell Cobb to the Speakership effectively ended the possibility that Taylor’s Plan could pass the House. Bell’s plan, on the other hand, had a greater chance of success. It offered the possibility of additional slave states without extending slavery to free territory, avoided the nettlesome problem of the Texas/New

Mexico boundary, and offered a concession to the South by Texas to divide to maintain sectional parity that was at least face-saving and potentially parity saving as well. While it was unlikely

36 Although, it should be noted, at least two Senators--Spruance and Wales of Delaware--very likely would have supported a New Mexico statehood bill. 37 Originally, Taylor intended to admit the whole Mexican Cession as two states. The exclusion of Utah from the territory of California and New Mexico’s initial framing of a territorial constitution derailed this plan.

334 that a majority of Southerners would have supported the Bill, the support of Southern Whigs would have been sufficient to pass it. Like the Taylor Plan, but unlike the Compromise and the two Southern Democrat plans, the Bell plan was also consistent with previous territorial policy.

As had been the case with the Northwest Ordinance, the Bell Plan allowed for the admission of additional slave states where slavery existed, and restricted it where it did not. Of the four primary alternative settlement plans, Bell’s plan offered the greatest potential for avoiding the disruptions that the Compromise of 1850 introduced into the political system.38

The primary impediment to the Bell plan (and, as it turned out, the fatal one) was the unwillingness of Henry Clay to endorse any plan but his own. One of the more perplexing aspects of the debate over the Compromise of 1850 was Clay’s willingness to abandon fundamental aspects of his plan—such as the effective restriction of slavery in the territories through the continuation of Mexican law—but his unwillingness to adjust the form of his plan through the adoption of aspects of other plans. As Clay kept his own counsel during his drafting of the Omnibus Bill as chairman of the Committee of Thirteen, his reasoning has been lost to history. What is peculiar, though, is that despite the deep divisions among the Southern Whigs leaders, the plans that they offered were more similar than not. All three plans allowed for the admission of California. All three called for the organization of New Mexico, though they differed as to the form this should take (state for Taylor, territory for Bell and Clay). While

Taylor and Bell were opposed to the inclusion of the D.C. slave trade and fugitive slave provisions in the formal settlement, they did not oppose their passage as separate measures.

38 Parks, John Bell of Tennessee, 258.

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While Taylor in particular deserves a large measure of blame for conflict between himself and

Clay, Clay’s conflict with Bell, Pearce, and Crittenden suggests that the primary responsibility for the final form of the Compromise lies with Clay. Clay’s original proposal had offered a permanent settlement of the crisis, his adoption of the popular sovereignty formula and the

Mason’s fugitive slave proposal into his Omnibus introduced the settlement’s fatal flaws. The failure of the Compromise of 1850 to permanently settle the controversy lies primarily with its author.

While it makes a satisfying coda to the life and political career of Henry Clay to see the

Compromise of 1850 as the apex of his career, it is hard to see how Clay’s performance during the Compromise of 1850 added to his formidable legacy. While recent positive reevaluations of

Clay’s career are a welcome corrective to the Jacksonian parody of the man that was perpetuated through most of the 20th century, it is important that his actions at the end of his life be assessed with the same rigor as those during its height. He was an ideological visionary who was able to see the country not only as it was, but as it could be in a way that few of his contemporaries were able. He was a deeply patriotic man who in two instances—during the Missouri Compromise and Nullification crisis—was able to conjure out of seemingly nowhere plans that not only averted crises but permanently stabilized them. Though profoundly self-confident and ambitious, he had proven himself, on occasion, willing to work even with avowed enemies

(Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, John C. Calhoun) to further national goals. Clay’s ideas and principles are still vividly alive in contemporary politics, and it is necessary and just that he be remembered for his invaluable contributions to American politics. This Clay, however, was

336 not the Henry Clay of 1850. Where the earlier Clay was charming, this Clay, by all accounts, was arrogant and disputatious. While the younger Clay was willing to share the stage with others to advance his political goals, the older Clay conjured disputes where there were none.

Where the young Clay constructed combinations, the older Clay broke them apart. Where the young Clay advocated the end of slavery, the older Clay permitted its extension. The Henry

Clay of 1850 was not the Henry Clay of legend. While it is indisputable that Clay was a patriot who worked for the preservation of the Union, his persistent efforts to show up Taylor, his unwillingness to adopt ideas associated with others, his lack of attention to allies, and his abandonment of Washington following the defeat of the Omnibus he advanced his own agenda at the expense of the country. While other leaders contributed to the personal animosity that complicated the debate, Clay was by far the worst offender. By breaking with the Whig Party and making concessions to the Democrats, Clay contributed to the destruction of the Party that had once formed around him. The aspects of the Compromise that had contributed to its failure were incorporated into the bill on his behest, were not part of his original vision for the compromise and were antithetical to his long held principles about slavery. For Henry Clay, the

Compromise of 1850 represented a compromise of principle. While the restoration of Henry

Clay’s reputation is welcome and deserved, the idea that his efforts in 1850 saved the Union are not accurate.39

Alongside Clay, Stephen Douglas has been widely praised for his role in the Compromise of 1850. In his case, this praise is both accurate and deserved, though he, more than Clay,

39 Remini, Henry Clay, 754; Bordewich, 390-392; Stegmaier, 229-234; Hamilton, Zachary Taylor. Vol. 2, 338-339; Holt, Rise, 503-560.

337 deserves the blame for the settlement’s greatest limitation. By pushing for the adoption of popular sovereignty through inaction, he advanced the ideological goals of himself and his party, and defined Northern Democrats as their section’s supporters of the Union par excellance.

Along with Howell Cobb, Stephen Douglas was the instrumental man in the passage of the

Compromise of 1850. His skill and legislative acumen was underscored by the swiftness by which he shepherded the sections of the recently defeated Omnibus through the Senate following its defeat. While Clay had given the Compromise of 1850 form, it was Douglas who provided its vision through the idea of popular sovereignty. As passed, the Compromise of 1850 was a document anchored by Northern Democratic principles. The attempt by Millard Fillmore to associate Northern Whiggery with it not only failed but contributed to the dissolution of the

Whig Party. Through the Compromise of 1850, Stephen Douglas, more than any individual, authored the politics of the 1850s. The problem, of course, is that the politics of the 1850s ended in civil war. Douglas’s performance during the crisis of the 1850 established him as the successor to Henry Clay as America’s preeminent legislator. Like Clay, however, Douglas’s greatest ambition—the Presidency—eluded him due to the very policies that he more than any other promoted. If the failure of the Compromise of 1850 was primarily due to the ambiguities inherent in popular sovereignty, then Douglas deserves blame as well as praise for his efforts during the debate.40

The impacts of both ideology and personality on the course of the debate over the settlement of the Mexican Cession had implications for the territorial policy that emerged from

40 Johnannsen, Douglas, 288-294; Bordewich, 303-305; Hamilton, Prologue, 118-121; Stegmaier, 203.

338 it. The ability of transformational nationalists and Southern nationalists to derail the Omnibus

Bill, and to thus to forestall an affirmative sectional compromise that would have threatened the viability of their visions for the future of the nation can best be explained by ideology. While these leaders detested each other, they were able to cooperate effectively against the common ideological foe. At the same time, the ideological distance between antagonists Henry Clay and

Zachary Taylor on matters of the Union were so minimal as to be insignificant. Nevertheless, the rivalry between these men had significant effects on the emergent legislation, not least of which was the adoption of popular sovereignty in the final bills. While it is tempting to view the influence of these factors as being equivalent, however, it seems that ideology constrained personality more than personality constrained ideology. While personal antagonisms could (and did) divide members of the same nationalist factions over issues of policy, there were a paucity of instances where members of Congress abandoned clear nationalist principles out of personal considerations. For instance, the close personal relationship of Zachary Taylor and Jefferson

Davis had no appreciable impact on the latter’s willingness to promote his vision. The politicians that were ridiculed as having “sold-out” their section through application of lobbying and patronage at worst were convinced to skip votes. Because the Compromise was eventually passed as separate bills, there were few votes recorded where legislators actually cast votes against their previously stated principles. The 1850 debate was predominantly a contest of principles, and the patchwork of bills that defined the Compromise were passed as a result of, not in spite of, the beliefs of the members of Congress.

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Despite the failure of the Compromise of 1850 to avert sectional conflict and the Civil

War, the story of its passage soon entered the realm of political myth. Supporters portrayed the

Compromise of 1850 as a triumph of patriotism and statesmanship over radicalism and faction, and would continue to do so as the slavery controversy accelerated throughout the 1850s. As they increasingly were pushed out of public life by their Southern nationalist and transformational nationalist opponents, their recollections of the events of 1850 grew increasingly rosy. In a speech in 1859, Stephen Douglas provided the best description of the romantic view of what he and his allies had accomplished. “All the Union men of the North and

South,” he declared, “Whigs and Democrats for the period of six months were assembled in caucus every day, with Clay in the chair, Cass upon his right hand, Webster upon his left hand, and the Whigs and Democrats arranged on either side.”41 They had worked together and forged a settlement between the sections that had preserved the peace with justice for both sides.42 Henry

Foote, in his memoirs, declared that “had there been even one such man in the Congress as

Henry Clay in 1860-61, there would, I feel sure, have been no Civil War.”43 By the twentieth century, the myth of the Compromise of 1850 was firmly established. Despite excellent scholarship exposing the limitations and failures of the Compromise, the view of the

Compromise of 1850 as a model of selfless patriotism in politics has enjoyed a resurgence. In the context of the gridlock of contemporary Washington, historians like Robert Remini and

41 As we have seen, every one of Douglas’s assertions was either untrue or debatable. 42 Speech by Douglas at Cincinnati, September 9, 1859, quoted in Rhodes, History of the United States, I, 173 (note). 43 Foote, Casket of Reminiscences, 30.

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Fergus Bordewich look to the members of the Thirty-First Congress and see what they believe should be now.

Interpretations of the Compromise based on contemporary politics are inherently flawed.

While contemporary Americans may wish that official Washington was more effective at finding common ground, the Compromise of 1850 suggests that bipartisanship is just as capable of resulting in bad policy as hyper-partisanship. Henry Clay’s willingness to work with Democrats was admirable, but the one of the effects of that willingness—the further division of the disintegrating Whig Party—destabilized the political system. Politicians who supported the

Compromise despite doubts as to whether it would work had their doubts validated in the most unpleasant way imaginable. Support for the Compromise proved hazardous to the political health of its supporters, thinning the ranks of moderates in Congress. Members, Henry Clay included, discarded long-held principles to support the Compromise of 1850, and nevertheless the settlement failed. During the politics of the 1850s, those who had adhered closest to their principles (Northern Democrats, sectional and transformation nationalists) prospered, while those who compromised them suffered. If there is a lesson to be learned from those who sacrificed their principles and their political careers to support the Compromise, it may be that sometimes it is better policy and politics to stand on principle.44

Despite its success in settling the territorial crisis in the Mexican Cession and preventing

Southern secession in 1850, the Compromise of 1850 failed to permanently settle the slavery controversy, and did not halt the slide to civil war that had started with John Tyler’s sectional

44 Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, vii-ix; Freehling, Road to Disunion. Vol. 2, 19-24; Emory Thomas, The Confederate Nation 1861-1865 (NY: Harper and Row, 1979) 299-301.

341 politics. Divided by party, section, and ideals of national identity, the political leadership of

1850 developed and considered a variety of differing approaches to settling the controversy before settling on a flawed plan for which no majority existed. Henry Clay’s unwillingness to set aside personal and political animosities divided the Whig Party and contributed to the failure of the Omnibus package. His faith in the climate of the Southwest to restrict slavery expansion and adoption of popular sovereignty into his plan contributed to its eventual failure. Stephen

Douglas’s political skills allowed him to pass the Bill as individual measures, but the popular sovereignty principle he promoted contributed to the perpetuation of sectional conflict throughout the 1850s. The Compromise of 1850 exacerbated sectional conflict because it established the principle that free territory could be opened to slavery, and established a system of justice for the rendition of fugitive slaves that did little to alleviate the problem and undermined rule of law in the North. By undermining the legitimacy of the federal government in both sections, ensuring that sectional conflict would be resumed when territories tried to gain admission to the Union, and in leaving the future of slavery in the territories ambiguous and contestable, the Compromise of 1850 contributed more to the slide to civil war than it prevented.

Following the Compromise of 1850, Unionism, Southern nationalism and transformational nationalism would continue to battle for the hearts and minds of political parties and country.

While the Compromise did nothing to reconcile these three visions of the nation, it allowed each of them to believe that their side would triumph in the end. As Thomas Hart Benton declared after the passage of the final bill, “History will tell that I was right in everything I said.”45 The

45 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Thirty-First Congress, 1st Session, 1829.

342 most fundamental failure of the Compromise of 1850 was that it left each group of participants believing the same of themselves.

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