West Coast Lifelines Vulnerability and Interdependency Assessment

Supplement 7: Communications Lifeline Assets

West Coast Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

August 2017

IMPORTANT NOTES

Disclaimer

The information collected and presented in this report and accompanying documents by the Consultants and supplied to West Coast Civil Defence Emergency Management Group is accurate to the best of the knowledge and belief of the Consultants acting on behalf of West Coast Civil Defence Emergency Management Group. While the Consultants have exercised all reasonable skill and care in the preparation of information in this report, neither the Consultants nor West Coast Civil Defence Emergency Management Group accept any liability in contract, tort or otherwise for any loss, damage, injury or expense, whether direct, indirect or consequential, arising out of the provision of information in this report.

This report has been prepared on behalf of West Coast Civil Defence Emergency Management Group by:

Ian McCahon BE (Civil), David Elms BA, MSE, PhD Rob Dewhirst BE, ME (Civil) Geotech Consulting Ltd 21 Victoria Park Road Rob Dewhirst Consulting Ltd 29 Norwood Street 38A Penruddock Rise Christchurch Westmorland Christchurch

Hazard Maps

The hazard maps contained in this report are regional in scope and detail, and should not be considered as a substitute for site-specific investigations and/or geotechnical engineering assessments for any project. Qualified and experienced practitioners should assess the site-specific hazard potential, including the potential for damage, at a more detailed scale.

Cover Photo: Telecommunications cabinet hit by fallen power pole, Kaikoura earthquake 2016. Photo from Chorus. West Coast Lifelines Vulnerability and Interdependency Assessment

Supplement 7: Communications Lifeline Assets

Contents

1 OVERVIEW ...... 1

2 ASSET DESCRIPTION ...... 5

2.1 CHORUS ...... 5 2.2 ...... 6 2.3 SPARK ...... 6 2.4 2 DEGREES ...... 7 2.5 KORDIA ...... 7 2.6 TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS FORUM...... 7

3 VULNERABILITIES ...... 8

3.1 EARTHQUAKE VULNERABILITIES ...... 8 3.2 TSUNAMI AND MAJOR STORM VULNERABILITIES ...... 10 3.2.1 Tsunami ...... 10 3.2.2 Major Storm ...... 12 3.3 OTHER VULNERABILITIES ...... 14 3.4 SUMMARY ...... 14

4 UPGRADES AND IMPROVEMENTS ...... 15

Figures Figure 1.1: Telecommunication Fibre Optic Network Figure 1.2: Northern West Coast Telecommunication Buildings, Cabinets, and Cell phone and Microwave Towers Figure 1.3: Southern West Coast Telecommunication Buildings, Cabinets, and Cell phone and Microwave Towers Figure 3.1: Primary Fibre Optic Cables Serving the West Coast Figure 3.2: Tsunami Scenario Inundation Area - West Coast Figure 3.3: Major Storm Scenario Inundation Area - West Coast West Coast

Tables Table 3.1: Telecommunication Vulnerabilities Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7 Communications Lifeline Assets

1 OVERVIEW

This supplement provides a summary of the communications assets with descriptions of the assets managed by the different providers. It explores the vulnerability of the assets to three major disasters: major earthquake, major storm and a large tsunami. Details of the earthquake, storm and tsunami scenarios used to probe asset vulnerabilities are provided in Supplements 2, 3 and 4 of the report. It is important to note here that the scenarios are NOT real events nor are they predictions and should not be used as such. The scenarios have been prepared only to probe the lifeline assets to identify vulnerabilities and to give an indication of the general magnitude of the sorts of natural disaster that could conceivably happen.

The report looks at recovery rather than the immediate response during the first week following a disaster. Vulnerabilities that impact on the immediate response have been included for completeness. However the focus is on vulnerabilities that delay recovery. These are summarised, and upgrades and improvements are suggested for addressing them.

Communications lifelines include telecommunications, radio and satellite. On the West Coast telecommunication equipment is owned by a number of operators:  All the fixed line network including fibre optic and copper cables, and cabinets are owned and operated by Chorus. These, plus some UHF radio links, provide Plain Old Telephone Services (POTS), throughout the region.  There are three telephone exchange buildings. is the primary exchange. The buildings are owned and operated as follows: o Westport: Owned and used by Chorus, and Spark leases space in the building. o Greymouth: Owned and used by Spark, and Chorus leases space in the building. o Hokitika: Owned by Westland District Council, and Chorus and Spark lease space in the building.  The microwave tower network is owned and operated by Kordia.  Cell phone towers are owned and operated by Spark, 2 Degrees and Vodafone. All cell phone towers are linked into and rely on the Chorus fibre optic network.

The telecommunication network provides land line or POTS to all households on the West Coast. Local POTS calls can be made independently of the fibre optic network provided the exchanges are functioning. There is cell phone service in West Coast’s populated areas between and Fox although coverage can be patchy between centres. There is no cell phone coverage between Fox and Makarora. Cell phone calls, text messaging and paging rely on the fibre optic network.

Final 1 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7 The West Coast telecommunications fibre optic network is shown in Figure 1.1 and buildings, cabinets, and cell phone and microwave towers are shown in Figure 1.2 and 1.3.

The communications assets are important as they are required for:  Voice communication and messaging, e.g. text messaging,  Almost all financial transactions (apart from cash and cheques),  Access to the internet, and  Monitoring and control of some infrastructure assets, e.g. some water and wastewater treatment plants and pump stations.

Figure 1.1: Telecommunication Fibre Optic Network (Source: Chorus 2017)

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Figure 1.2: Northern West Coast Telecommunication Buildings, Cabinets, and Cell phone and Microwave Towers1

1 Three exchange buildings not shown. Information on microwave tower locations from Kordia. Information on Buildings, Cabinets, and Cell phone from the following website: https://gis.geek.nz/celltowers.

Final 3 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7

Figure 1.3: Southern West Coast Telecommunication Buildings, Cabinets, and Cell phone and Microwave Towers2

Satellite phone technology has become simpler and is now similar to cell phones to operate. There are two satellite phone operators providing service to ; Iridium and Inmarsat. Iridium has 66 satellites orbiting the globe. Inmarsat has three satellites in fixed positions on the equator; the closest satellite to New Zealand is over Papua New Guinea. Iridium is the main service provider on the West Coast.3

CDEM hold a register of satellite phone holders on the West Coast.

There is wide coverage over the West Coast by a number of Very High Frequency (VHF) operators. Radio communications are highly complex with many independent operators all having their own frequencies and operating several hundred radio repeater sites, some of which are shared. Radio

2 The three exchange buildings not shown. Microwave tower locations information provided by Kordia. Information on Buildings, Cabinets, and Cell phone from the following website: https://gis.geek.nz/celltowers. 3 Information on Satellite providers provided by Wright Satellite Connections Ltd, 8-10 Fitzherbert Street, Petone 5012. Telephone 04 576 2251

Final 4 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7 operators include councils, contractors, transport companies, forestry operators, the Department of Conservation, Electronet, KiwiRail, the dairy company, and emergency services. A new digital network, which can be accessed by cell phone is also being developed. As well as these there are the Chorus UHF multi-access radio service to provide POTS to remote customers, aviation frequencies, which communicate with the Christchurch control tower, and marine radio which operates through the Kordia microwave tower network.

Until recently there has not been a single reliable radio network that covers the whole West Coast. The Police radio network covers the West Coast. However it relies on a chain of repeater sites to operate, including sections of fibre. If part of the chain is broken communications between the sections is lost.

CDEM in partnership with Electronet is in the process of installing a “Controllers Net” radio network, which will allow radio coverage of West Coast through one robust system. Either Greymouth or Hokitika can act as the hub for the system. Every effort has been made to make the mountain radio repeater sites as resilient as possible. Structures are built to a high standard and loose items such as battery packs are well secured. Each site is standalone and powered by solar energy. There is no reliance on the fibre optic network.

2 ASSET DESCRIPTION

Descriptions of the assets are provided on the basis of the communications operators.

2.1 Chorus

The West Coast area is connected to the national fixed line network by two core fibre optic cables (refer Figure 1.1):  Between Greymouth and Nelson: a fibre optic cable is routed from Greymouth to Stillwater crossing the Grey River at Cobden to the northern bank and crossing back over the river at Stillwater. The fibre is subsequently routed along the main road of the Grey Valley to (SH 7) thence to over the Rahu Saddle (SH 7) and north to Nelson via Murchison (SH 65 & SH 6). There is a branch line from Reefton to Inangahua; and

 Between Greymouth and Christchurch: a fibre optic cable from Christchurch over Arthur’s Pass (SH 73), then via Moana and Stillwater progressing down the southern bank of the Grey River into Greymouth.

Final 5 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7 The two fibre optic cables form the West Coast fibre link of the National Backhaul network for the . The South Island National Backhaul network is made up of three other links:  The East Coast link through Kaikoura (this route has been temporally restored after suffering significant damage and breaks in the Kaikoura earthquakes),  The Molesworth link via Awatere, Hanmer and Waipara, and  The Vodafone “Aqualink” off the East Coast linking Christchurch and .

Two regional fibre optic cables connect communities on the West Coast to Greymouth:  Greymouth to Karamea. From the Greymouth exchange a cable crosses the Cobden Bridge and follows SH 6 to Wilson Lead Road (4km south of Buller River). The cable follows Wilson Lead Road to State Highway 67A at , then SH 67 over the Buller River Bridge through Westport and up the coast to and via the Karamea Highway to Karamea; and

 Greymouth to Fox. A fibre optic cable follows SH 6 from the Greymouth exchange to Ruatapu. From Ruatapu to Kakapotahi it follows the coast on Westpower power poles before re-joining SH 6 from Kakapotahi to Fox.

The two regional cables are mostly buried but in many sections of the route the cable is above ground and attached to power poles.

South of Fox properties are connected to the telecommunications network via ultra-high frequency (UHF) multi-access radio as discussed earlier.

The existing copper wire network provides connection to West Coast households and businesses and is being replaced with fibre optic cable through programmes such as the government’s Ultra-Fast Broadband initiative.

2.2 Vodafone

Vodafone relies on Chorus to provide fixed line services for its 25 cell phone towers between Karamea and Fox (refer Figure 1.2 and 1.3). Some of Vodafone’s telecommunications equipment is co-located with other providers on the same tower.

2.3 Spark

Spark provides cell phone service through 23 cell phone towers between Karamea and Fox and like Vodafone relies on Chorus’s fibre optic network to operate. Spark also operates Fleetlink; a combined radio and telecommunications system used in vehicle fleets. Fleetlink has good coverage, especially in tracts of Lewis Pass and Arthurs Pass. Fleetlink also relies on the fibre optic network. However in a major natural disaster event when the fibre optic network may be disrupted the repeater sites can operate in isolation allowing communication locally between vehicles.

Final 6 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7 2.4 2 Degrees

2 Degrees operates seven cell phone towers which are connected to the Chorus fibre optic network.

2.5 Kordia

Kordia operates a network of microwave radio towers throughout New Zealand. The network was previously operated by Broadcasting Communications Limited (BCL) but is now operated as a State Owned Enterprise under the name of Kordia reporting to the Minister of State Owned Enterprises and the Minister of Finance.

The microwave tower network is connected into the Chorus fibre optic network in Blaketown. The microwave tower network transmits one way digital terrestrial television signals, two way HF radio service and a two way UHF and VHF maritime service.

On the West Coast Kordia operates 5 microwave radio towers sites comprising towers and supporting infrastructure. The three main sites are Mt Rochfort near Westport, Reefton and Paparoa (Sewell Peak) near Greymouth (refer Figure 1.2) with two smaller sites at Blaketown (refer Figure 1.2) and Mt Hercules (refer Figure 1.3).

Generally, the Kordia infrastructure can be expected to be relatively robust in the face of a natural disaster although the interconnection with the fibre network in Blaketown may be vulnerable to earthquake induced liquefaction or to a tsunami wave. The three main sites all have generators with 10 to 14 days fuel and additional fuel can be flown in if the access road is damaged.

The Kordia network could be utilised in an emergency for telecommunications if suitable linkages were made, for instance between the Chorus fixed line network and those of Kordia on Sewell Peak. If such a connection was provided the capacity would be much reduced as the capacity of fibre optic cables is in the order of 1,000 times greater than the microwave radio tower network.

2.6 Telecommunications Carriers Forum

The Telecommunications Carrier Forum (TCF) has been established to set policies and make decisions on network sharing. Part of the TCF is the Telecommunications Emergency Forum (TEF), which swings into actions after a major event such as the Kaikoura earthquake (Nov. 2016), and the Port Hills fires (Feb. 2017). TEF is made up of representatives from the main telecommunication companies. Its primary function is to determine opportunities to co-ordinate the efforts from the different providers in an emergency e.g. after a natural disaster.

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3 VULNERABILITIES

3.1 Earthquake Vulnerabilities

To assess the vulnerability of telecommunications assets earthquake damage scenario events have been prepared and presented in Supplement 2. Vulnerabilities of the telecommunications network identified by probing with the scenario events include:  Severing of cables particularly at entrances to buildings and tunnels, at bridge abutments and across fault traces where significant displacement can be expected. The primary cable routes and the trace are shown in Figure 3.1. It shows that the Christchurch to Greymouth cable route crosses 33 bridges, passes through the Otira Gorge where major landslides could be expected in an Alpine Fault event (AF8 scenario4) and then runs close to and parallel to the fault trace for approximately 12km. The Greymouth to Nelson cable route crosses 37 bridges between Greymouth and Springs Junction and a further 14 bridges between Springs Junction and Murchison. Much of the cable between Karamea and Fox is mounted on power poles. Where major landslides occur the cable is likely to be severed. Pole mounted cables can be less vulnerable to severing as stretching caused by lateral movement of the poles can be taken up over the cable length between poles. Where there is movement at bridge abutments the cable may sever where no provision of cable slack is provided. In a major earthquake event like the AF 8 scenario there could be multiple locations where the cables are severed. It could take some time, perhaps more than a week, to locate and repair sufficient cable breaks to re-establish telecommunications to outside the region.  Many cell phone and microwave towers are on high ground. Towers are built to a high standard. However sites or the access road to them may be vulnerable to earthquake induced landslides or dropouts.  Cell phone and microwave tower sites require power to operate, which may be lost for a period after a major earthquake. The microwave tower sites have generators and fuel can be flown in. The cell phone towers have batteries providing backup power for up to 12 hours.

4 Project AF8 commenced in July 2016 and is a risk scenario-based earthquake response planning project focused on the South Island Alpine Fault. The project is funded by the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management’s Resilience Fund.

Final 8 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7

Figure 3.1: Primary Fibre Optic Cables Serving the West Coast

After a major earthquake event the TEF would convene and look at multiple options to get telecommunication up and running again. Options available could include:  Repair to the least damaged fibre optic cable to connect the West Coast with the rest of New Zealand. This may include installing temporary over ground cable to link lengthy damaged sections;  Setting up temporary cell towers with satellite link; and  Exploring options to link into alternative networks such as the Kordia microwave tower network.

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3.2 Tsunami and Major Storm Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities of the telecommunications network to a tsunami or a major storm event resulting in flooding include:  Damage to cables buried in areas where dropouts occur due to heavy rainfall, e.g. roads through steep terrain.  Damage to cables installed on bridges and cables buried in areas susceptible to scour by fast flowing flood waters or tsunami wave.  Partial or complete failure of components in active roadside cabinets inundated by dirty or salty water.  Damage to exchanges. The exchanges in Greymouth and Hokitika are located on the first floor and the standby generators are located on the ground floor. In Westport the exchange equipment and standby generator are located on the ground floor. Ground floor equipment at all three sites might be vulnerable to inundation and access might not be possible until flood or tsunami waters recede.  Damage to regional fibre cables installed on power poles between Karamea and Fox, which might be vulnerable to strong tsunami flow forces in low coastal reaches. Failure is most likely from loss of poles due to scour, but impact on to the cables from debris is also possible.

To assess the vulnerability of telecommunications assets to tsunami and major storm events, scenarios for 1:500 year events have been prepared and are presented in Supplement 4: Tsunami and Supplement 3: Storm Scenario . The projected inundation areas for the tsunami and major storm based on these scenarios are shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 respectively.

3.2.1 Tsunami

The tsunami depth of about a 500 year return period at the shore varies around the West Coast coastline from 6m to almost 10m. Figure 3.2 is based on Figures 1.2 and 1.3 and shows the coastal telecommunication assets that may be affected by a tsunami. The effect of a tsunami is not only inundation but also scouring as the multiple wave fronts flow in and back out again. Scour damage is expected where water depth is 2m and greater. Points to note about Figure 3.2 include:  All assets on the coast at an elevation of 10m or less have been identified;  Inundation estimates are shown for the following areas: o Karamea: The Spark and Vodafone towers shown near the inundation footprint in the insert for Karamea are at an elevation of around 40m so not affected by a tsunami. However the Chorus cabinets to the north and south shown in the insert are at very low elevations and likely to be affected; o Karamea to and Mokihinui to : The fibre optic cable is mounted on power poles that could be toppled by a tsunami wave, and in the Hector – Granity area the cable could be severed by buildings debris carried in the wave. A cable could be installed overland to re-establish communications;

Final 10 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7

Figure 3.2: Tsunami Scenario Inundation Area - West Coast

o Westport: One Chorus cabinet is shown in the inundation area. The telephone exchange is just outside the inundation area; o Charleston to Rapahoe: The fibre optic cable is mounted on power poles that could be toppled in low lying areas by the tsunami wave, or impacted by building and other debris A cable could be installed overland to re-establish communications between Greymouth and Westport either passed the damaged section or through the Lower Buller Gorge; o Rapahoe: One Chorus cabinet is shown in the inundation area; o Greymouth: One Chorus cabinet in Cobden and two in Blaketown are shown in the inundation area. The microwave tower network is connected into the fibre optic network at a cabinet in Blaketown. One Vodafone tower is shown in the inundation area near the Greymouth CBD;

Final 11 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7 o Kumara Junction to Hokitika: Some damage could occur to power poles supporting the fibre optic cable. Overland cables can be installed in any affected sections to re- establish telecommunications between Greymouth and Hokitika; o Hokitika: One or possibly two Chorus cabinets in Tudor Street are in or very close to the inundation area. The telephone exchange building is in the CBD where the water depth could be 4 to 5m in depth. This would inundate the ground floor completely (where the generator is) and partially inundate the first floor where exchange equipment is located. The depth of inundation and the amount of debris likely to be carried in the tsunami flow is such that structural damage to the building could be expected; o Hokitika to Ruatapu and Ross and Bold Head: Damage could be expected to the power line route and the fibre optic cable could be broken. Overland cable may be installed in break sections to re-establish communications between Hokitika and communities to the south.

The extent of tsunami inundations is only a guide to provide an idea of the likely magnitude and impact. It can be seen that assets affected in the tsunami scenario include sections of cable on power poles in low areas in close proximity to the sea as well as around 16 cabinets, 5 buildings, including the Hokitika exchange, and perhaps one or two towers. On their own the assets may be repaired quite quickly. However a tsunami of this size will inundate many other parts of the New Zealand coast line and there may be hundreds of damage assets; cables, cabinets, buildings and towers. The impact will be to considerably increase the time required to get all assets operational again due to the large resource requirement, and potential limited availability of spare parts and lead time to get additional spare parts.

3.2.2 Major Storm

In the 1:500 year storm event presented in Supplement 3: Storm Scenario the inundation areas are larger than projected in the tsunami scenario. However water depths are less. Assets in the three main centres that could suffer storm water inundation damage include:  Westport: Major flooding could cover much of the urban area inundating all telecommunications assets although in some areas the water may be only shallow. The generator and the exchange equipment on the ground floor of the exchange building could be damaged.  Greymouth: On the north side of the river the low areas of Cobden could be inundated possibly including two Chorus cabinets. The Greymouth CBD and the area through to the hospital and Blaketown could be flooded inundating two or possibly three cabinets in Blaketown. If the Greymouth floodwall is overtopped as projected in the scenario scour damage could occur at the floodwall breach damaging buildings near to the breach. In the scenario it is assumed the breach would topple a Spark tower and the exchange building would be inundated damaging the generator but the exchange equipment on the first floor would not be affected.

Final 12 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7  Hokitika: The cabinets and towers are above the projected scenario flood level. However the exchange building would be inundated damaging the generator but the exchange equipment on the first floor would not be affected.

Figure 3.3: Major Storm Scenario Inundation Area - West Coast West Coast

Elsewhere in the region the fibre optic cables could be damaged by landslides and where bridge abutments are washed out.

Because the West Coast Region alone is hit by the scenario storm, telecommunication companies could probably connect the region to the rest of New Zealand within a few days and restore communications to all of the region within a week albeit with temporary repairs in some areas. Thus recovery would be relatively quick.

Final 13 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7 3.3 Other Vulnerabilities

Cell phone and microwave towers are vulnerable to high winds, particularly where wind speed is accelerated by local topography. Cables on poles are vulnerable to any trees that are blown over crossing pole line and breaking the cable. Heavy snow may also cause damage. However for these events it is considered that repairs can generally be quickly implemented or work-arounds employed to maintain service while repairs are made.

Spark recently announced the phasing out of telephone exchanges and the analogue landline phone system over the next 5 years replacing exchange buildings with roadside cabinets. On the West Coast this will mean if the two fibre optic cable links are broken there will be no telecommunication within or to outside the region except via satellite phones, i.e. no landline, cell phone, or data. There will be no local calls as the local exchanges will no longer be there. It is conceivable that after an Alpine Fault earthquake when both of the two fibre optic cables to outside the region could be cut, it would take more than a week to repair one. Thus while CDEM may have good communication to outside the region during this period, for example via satellite phones, the loss of the fibre optic cable links will significantly restrict communication for the majority of the West Coast community including loss of banking facilities.

3.4 Summary

A summary of telecommunication vulnerabilities is provided in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Telecommunication Vulnerabilities No. Description 1 Some fibre optic cables are installed in locations where there is a risk of lateral ground movement e.g. bridge abutments, liquefiable soils etc, without an allowance of cable slack to compensate for movement. 2 Damage to telecommunications assets such as cabinets, cables, cell towers and buildings may be wide spread after a major natural disaster. As a result the time to re-establish communication may be unacceptably long due to the high demand on available telecommunications industry and supporting companies’ resources. This is particularly so with an Alpine Fault earthquake or a large tsunami which is expected to impact a large part of the New Zealand coast. 3 Generators are required where power is unavailable for an extended period as may occur after a major natural disaster. Generator and fuel needs for all the communications networks is not documented and may not be well understood.

Final 14 August 2017 Communication Lifeline Assets Supplement 7 4 UPGRADES AND IMPROVEMENTS

Faced with real devastation the telecommunication companies may decide not to rebuild what was there. For example they may elect to abandon the exchange buildings and many road side cabinets in favour of routing all communications to major exchanges, such as Christchurch, via the fibre optic cables. It is noted that Spark has already signalled they are considering phasing out exchange buildings and the analogue system on the West Coast over the next five years.

Assuming that exchange buildings and the analogue system will be phased out potential upgrades and improvements that could reduce the recovery period for telecommunications systems include:  Implementing options before an event to improve the resilience and redundancy of the telecommunications network such as: o Putting hardware in place to allow telecommunications to be channelled from the West Coast through the Kordia microwave tower network in the event that both fibre optic cables sustain multiple breaks requiring significant time to repair; o Assessing the viability of installing additional fibre optic cable to improve redundancy e.g. between Westport and Inangahua to provide some redundancy for Westport; o Where practical integrating cable slack into the fibre optic cable network at locations known to be at risk of lateral ground movement; and o Assessing spare parts requirements for network repair after a major storm, tsunami or earthquake event and insuring these are in stock at strategic locations.  Introducing as standard practice installation of additional cable length at locations where there is risk of lateral ground movement e.g. bridge abutments, liquefiable soils, slips etc.  Identifying alternative locations for assets such as cell phone towers, generators, buildings and cabinets in the path of tsunami or flood water and move the assets when the opportunity arises. It is often impractical to move cabinets. However options can be looked at to protect the contents of cabinets from water inundation. Also priority can be given to replacement of copper networks with fibre networks in flood prone areas so reducing the need for cabinets.  Assess generator and fuel needs to keep the communications networks operational after a major disaster.

Final 15 August 2017