DOCSLIB.ORG

China – Urumqi – Uighurs – Muslims – Rebiya Kadeer

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China – Urumqi – Uighurs – Muslims – Rebiya Kadeer Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: CHN33604 Country: China Date: 25 August 2008 Keywords: China – Urumqi – Uighurs – Muslims – Rebiya Kadeer This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. What is the current social, political and economic situation for Islamic Uighurs in Urumqi? 2. Please provide concise information concerning Rabiya Kadeer, and her visit to Sydney in early 2008. RESPONSE 1. What is the current social, political and economic situation for Islamic Uighurs in Urumqi? [Note: Uighurs may also be spelt as Uyghurs or Uygurs]. Urumqi has been described as the prosperous capital of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In recent decades the ethnic Uighur community in Urumqi has decreased from 80% of the population to some 20%. This population movement, together with economic disparity, discriminatory work practices and dilution of cultural identity, has caused resentment among the Uighurs. In light of recent incidents reportedly involving Uighurs and the Beijing Olympics, security has increased in Urumqi. Captions under photographs from BBC News note that Urumqi is the economic centre of Xinjiang province. Although Xinjiang has a degree of autonomy, there is “still a sense of dissatisfaction”. Occasional “violent” Uighur campaigns continue to call for greater independence (‘In pictures: Life in Urumqi’ 2008, BBC News, 16 June http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/7457294.stm – Accessed 15 August 2008 – Attachment 1). Radio Free Asia reported that: According to Chinese government statistics, the Han Chinese population of Xinjiang increased from just six percent of the total in 1949 to 40 percent in 2005, with Han Chinese benefiting disproportionately from government schemes to boost the economy. In the relatively prosperous regional capital, Urumqi, ethnic Uyghurs have gone from comprising 80 percent of the population to just 20 percent over recent decades, which has spurred further resentment among Uyghurs. Experts say official data underestimate the Han population by excluding thousands of “temporary” Han workers on long-term assignments in the region (‘Chinese curbs leave Uyghur youth in crisis’ 2008, Radio Free Asia, 6 February http://www.rfa.org/english/news/2008/02/06/uyghur_youth/ – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 2). The US State Department, in its human rights report for the year 2007, stated that the Han- Uighur ratio in Urumqi has moved from 20:80 to 80:20 and “was a deep source of Uighur resentment”. The report noted that discriminatory employment practices gave preference to the Han, discouraging job opportunities for ethnic minorities (US Department of State 2008, ‘National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities’ in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007 – China, 11 March – Attachment 3). A recent August 2008 news article in The Hindu describes Urumqi as “prosperous”; however, unemployment among the Uighur youth is “high”. Uighurs reportedly dominate lower income jobs and “there is a palpable difference between Uighur and Han neighbourhoods in Urumqi”. Many Uighurs leave their homes in search of jobs in other provinces (Krishnan, Ananth 2008, ‘China’s Xinjiang problem’, The Hindu, 12 August – Attachment 4). According to a Sydney Morning Herald article, dated 10 May 2008, young Uyghurs say it is difficult to find work after graduation. Although the official unemployment rate is 4%, it is said to be “much higher outside Urumqi”. Rural incomes are about 4,500 yuan ($683) per annum – four times lower than those of urban residents. The news article cites the director of an Islamic network involved in assisting unemployed youth conceding that “life is good for the urban middle-class” of Urumqi. The director explained, however, Uyghurs seeking independence are motivated by the loss of cultural identity, social inequality and the lack of religious freedom (Needham, Kirsty 2008, ‘Circle of steel around the silk road’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May – Attachment 5). On cultural identity of Uighurs more generally in the XUAR, the US State Department has reported that the government “has tightened measures that diluted expressions of Uighur identity”. This included measures to reduce education in ethnic minority languages and to have language requirements disadvantaging ethnic minority teachers (US Department of State 2008, ‘National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities’ in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007 – China, 11 March – Attachment 3). Amnesty International noted in its annual report covering the year 2007 that “Non-violent expressions of Uighur cultural identity were criminalized” (Amnesty International 2008, Amnesty International Annual Report 2008 – China, 28 May http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/asia-pacific/china – Accessed 29 May 2008 – Attachment 9). An article published by the Council of Foreign Relations, an independent US think-tank and publisher, stated that ethnic tension is fanned by economic disparity. According to the article, the Han Chinese in Xinjiang tend to be wealthier than Uighurs; some experts say that discriminatory hiring practices result in a wage gap (Bhattacharji, Preeti 2008, ‘Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region’, Backgrounder, 4 August, Council of Foreign Relations website http://www.cfr.org/publication/16870/ – Accessed 14 August 2008 – Attachment 10). The US State Department also reported: Since 2001 authorities have increased repression in the XUAR, targeting in particular the region’s ethnic Uighur population. In January XUAR Party Secretary Wang Lequan again urged government organs to crack down on the “three forces” of religious extremism, “splittism,” and terrorism, and to “firmly establish the idea that stability overrides all.” It was sometimes difficult to determine whether raids, detentions, and judicial punishments directed at individuals or organizations suspected of promoting the “three forces,” were instead actually used to target those peacefully seeking to express their political or religious views. The government continued to repress Uighurs expressing peaceful political dissent and independent Muslim religious leaders, sometimes citing counterterrorism as the reason for taking action…(US Department of State 2008, ‘National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities’ in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007 – China, 11 March – Attachment 3). Leading up to the Beijing Olympics (August 2008), and in light of incidents reportedly involving Uyghurs, news articles indicate that security is tight at Xinjiang’s airports and “riot police in open trucks were a daily sight in Urumqi”. An Agence France Presse article noted that “on a recent day at Urumqi airport” only a “handful” of travelling Uighurs were seen queuing for flights (Needham, Kirsty 2008, ‘Circle of steel around the silk road’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May – Attachment 5; Martin, Dan 2008, ‘Chinese Muslims complain of air travel restrictions’, Agence France Presse, 30 July – Attachment 6; Martin, Dan 2008, ‘China says controls tightened on Muslims in remote west’, Agence France Presse, 8 August – Attachment 7). There are reports of regular checks on train travel from Kashgar to Urumqi, “almost exclusively on travelling Uighurs”. One Uighur woman was denied a train ticket to Urumqi to commence training for a new job (Krishnan, Ananth 2008, ‘China’s Xinjiang problem’, The Hindu, 12 August – Attachment 4; Martin, Dan 2008, ‘Chinese Muslims complain of air travel restrictions’, Agence France Presse, 30 July – Attachment 6). Another article also outlines security measures undertaken in Urumqi following recent violent incidents said to involve Uighurs: Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, appeared to be on high alert Thursday [7 August 2008]. Security guards were checking bags at the entrances of hotels, department stores and discos in the busy city, where office towers and apartments (sic) buildings have been shooting up in recent years. Guards with red arm bands rode on most public buses, watchful for attackers. Small groups of police patrolled the sidewalks of the bustling Muslim quarter, where merchants cooked lamb kebabs and sliced up watermelons at fruit stands. The officers were largely ignored by the Uighur women in colorful head scarves and the men wearing skull caps decorated with elaborate embroidery or sequins, who haggled over goods or shouted into mobile phones (Foreman, William 2008, ‘Chinese Islamic group issues new Olympic threat’, Associated Press, 7 August http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5h_fA5bjMZ6-RYv11uLlSCHMCdV6QD92DQ1BG3 – Accessed 19 August 2008 – Attachment 8). Recent incidents involving Uighurs in Xinjiang include: • More than 80 Uighurs, alleged terror suspects, have been reportedly arrested during 2008 (Krishnan, Ananth 2008, ‘China’s Xinjiang problem’, The Hindu, 12 August – Attachment 4; Cody, Edward 2008, ‘Across China, Security Instead Of Celebration; Police Crack Down on ‘Hostile Forces,’ Apply New Safety Measures’, The Washington Post, 19 July – Attachment 11). • 12 August 2008: three security officers were killed
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Statement by Ms. Rebiya Kadeer, Uyghur Democracy Leader
    Statement by Ms. Rebiya Kadeer, Uyghur democracy leader European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium September 1, 2009 Good morning/afternoon/evening. Before we begin, I would like to thank the organizers. I would also like to thank everyone here today for your attendance. Since the unrest in Urumchi on July 5, 2009, the official Chinese media, led by Xinhua news agency and Chinese Central Television, has vigorously presented to the world the Chinese government’s version of events and the cause of the discontent shown by Uyghurs in the streets of East Turkestan’s regional capital. The version of the Urumchi unrest that has been presented to the world by the Chinese government follows this narrative. On July 5, Uyghur “plotters1” took to the streets and in a display of “beating, smashing, looting, and burning” killed 192 people and injured 1,7212. The riot was masterminded3 by me, Rebiya Kadeer, and the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). On July 19, Nur Bekri, the Chairman of what the Chinese government calls the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, admitted4 that Chinese security forces used live ammunition and shot dead protestors, who were referred to as “mobsters” in the official media, to control the unrest. This version of events, as is so often the case with Chinese reporting, is not true. For instance, we know that far more than 12 Uyghurs were shot by Chinese authorities. The Chinese government, through its proxies in the official media, is obscuring the truth in order to conceal a mass killing of Uyghurs by Chinese security forces. Furthermore, through its demonization of Uyghur protestors in the official media, it is attempting to justify the impending mass executions of Uyghurs as promised by Chinese officials.
    [Show full text]
  • Impact of the Xinjiang Problem on the China's
    IMPACT OF THE XINJIANG PROBLEM ON THE CHINA’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS: 1990-2010 A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY FATMA ÖZGE ATAY IN PARTICULAR FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE PROGRAM OF EURASIAN STUDIES DECEMBER 2010 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli ALTUNIŞIK Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar AKÇALI Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay TANRISEVER Supervisor Examining Committee Members Prof. Dr. Sencer İMER (Aksaray U., Dean of FEAS) Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay TANRISEVER (METU, IR) Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fırat PURTAŞ (Gazi U., IR) I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name : Fatma Özge ATAY Signature : iii ABSTRACT IMPACT OF THE XINJIANG PROBLEM ON CHINA’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS: 1990-2010 Atay, Fatma Özge M.S., Eurasian Studies Program Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. TANRISEVER December 2010, 138 pages This thesis analyses the impact of the Xinjiang Problem on the foreign policy of China.
    [Show full text]
  • Alleged Uyghur Terrorism Information for the Press
    Alleged Uyghur Terrorism Information for the Press Uyghur American Association 1 Table of Contents 1. Uyghur American Association on Terrorism ...........................................................................3 1.1 Uyghur American Association Position........................................................................3 1.2 Quotes by Ms. Rebiya Kadeer on Terrorism.................................................................3 2. Uyghur American Association on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement ................................4 2.1 Designation by the U.S. government ...........................................................................4 2.2 Independent observers on ETIM .....................................................................................4 2.3 Unaddressed concerns .................................................................................................7 2.4 Chinese government justifications for repression............................................................8 2.5 Conclusion of Uyghur American Association on the existence of ETIM.......................8 3. Uyghur American Association on the Guantánamo Uyghurs ...................................................9 4. Timeline of Events Since 2007..............................................................................................11 5. Background on the Uyghur People and East Turkestan..........................................................14 6. Uyghur American Association...............................................................................................15
    [Show full text]
  • Comprehensive Encirclement
    COMPREHENSIVE ENCIRCLEMENT: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S STRATEGY IN XINJIANG GARTH FALLON A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences International and Political Studies July 2018 1 THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname or Family name: FALLON First name: Garth Other name/s: Nil Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: MPhil School: Humanitiesand Social Sciences Faculty: UNSW Canberraat ADFA Title: Comprehensive encirclement: the Chinese Communist Party's strategy in Xinjiang Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASETYPE) This thesis argues that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a strategy for securing Xinjiang - its far-flung predominantly Muslim most north-western province - through a planned program of Sinicisation. Securing Xinjiang would turna weakly defended 'back door' to China into a strategic strongpointfrom which Beijing canproject influence into Central Asia. The CCP's strategy is to comprehensively encircle Xinjiang with Han people and institutions, a Han­ dominated economy, and supporting infrastructure emanatingfrom inner China A successful program of Sinicisation would transform Xinjiang from a Turkic-language-speaking, largely Muslim, physically remote, economically under-developed region- one that is vulnerable to separation from the PRC - into one that will be substantially more culturally similar to, and physically connected with, the traditional Han-dominated heartland of inner China. Once achieved, complete Sinicisation would mean Xinjiang would be extremely difficult to separate from China. In Xinjiang, the CCP enacts policies in support of Sinication across all areas of statecraft. This thesis categorises these activities across three dimensions: the economic and demographic dimension, the political and cultural dimension, and the security and international cooperationdimension.
    [Show full text]
  • World Uyghur Congress Newsletter No.10 Published: 10 May 2011
    World Uyghur Congress Newsletter No.10 Published: 10 May 2011 Newsletter No.10 May 2011 Official Website of the WUC | Unsubscribe | Subscribe | Older Editions | PDF Version Conference on the future of the Uyghurs in East Turkestan TOP STORY International Conference: The Future of the Uyghur People in East Turkestan FEATURED ARTICLES Uyghur Leaders Bared from Travel High Court turns down Uyghur Case for U.S. resettlement MEDIA WORK WUC on Facebook and Twitter / New Design Newsletter Interview with Alim Seystoff at Voice of America WUC PR World Press Freedom Day WUC Congratulates Dr. Lobsang Sangay PAST EVENTS 21st Anniversary of the Baren Massacre Second Grand Meeting of Friendship and Solidarity of Uyghur Youth, Sweden 7th General Assembly of the Kyrgyzstan Uyghur Union (Ittipak) Uyghur Event in Australia Conference on East Turkestan in Turkey U.S. - China Human Rights Dialogue UPCOMING EVENTS 17th session of the UN Human Rights Council Food and Culture from East Turkestan HIGHLIGHTED MEDIA ARTICLES AND REPORTS ON UYGHUR RELATED ISSUES US State Department: 2010 Human Rights Report UN Rights Panel Raps China Over 'Disappeared' Freedom House Report ""Freedom on the Net 2011" U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 2011 Annual Report MORE MEDIA ARTICLES 1 / 10 www.uyghurcongress.org World Uyghur Congress Newsletter No.10 Published: 10 May 2011 TOP STORY International Conference: The Future of the Uyghur People in East Turkestan From May 2-8, 2011 the international conference The Future of Uyghur People in East Turkestan co-sponsored by Freedom House, World Uyghur Congress (WUC), Uyghur American Association (UAA) and the International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation (IUHRDF), took place in Washington, D.C.
    [Show full text]
  • The Other Tibet
    6/7/2017 National Geographic Magazine ­ NGM.com Published: December 2009 The Other Tibet The Uygurs, Muslim people of China’s resource­rich far west, are becoming strangers in their own land as Han Chinese pour in. Like the Tibetans, who face similar pressures, some Uygurs see a chance for a better life, but others protest the disintegration of their culture, even at the risk of death. By Matthew Teague The first several seconds of the incident in Urumqi seemed almost lighthearted, considering the previous week. And they revealed nothing about what would follow. A cool front had swept over the city on this particular day in July, drawing people from their homes. Some shops stayed closed because their windows had been shattered, but food vendors pushed their carts out onto the street. A week earlier an ethnic clash had broken out here, killing almost 200 people in one of China’s most deadly protests since the Tiananmen Square massacre two decades ago. So the Chinese government had sent tens of thousands of security forces into the city, the capital of the Xinjiang Uygur Auton omous Region, to restore order between the Han and the Uygurs. The Han dominate Chinese society, but the Uygurs (pronounced WEE­gurs), a Turkic­speaking Central Asian people, claim this western borderland as their ancestral home. Han security forces stood in ranks along every street in the city's Uygur quarter. They bristled with riot gear and automatic weapons. The only sound came from loudspeakers mounted on trucks that trawled the market streets, broadcasting the good news of ethnic harmony.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights Violations Against Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of Western China by Natasha Parassram Concepcion*
    Human Rights Violations Against Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of Western China by Natasha Parassram Concepcion* he disintegration of years imprisonment. The the Soviet Union Chinese government’s Tresulted in the forma- actions against Kadeer are tion of several new and unsta- meant to punish both her ble Central Asian states, and her husband, a former located around the Chinese political prisoner, for pub- border. This instability is a licly speaking out against the major source of concern for government’s treatment of the Chinese government, the Uighurs. which fears the unrest could Despite the fact that the lead to destabilization of Chinese government signed some of its provinces. Today, the International Covenant there are five autonomous on Civil and Political Rights regions in China where (ICCPR) and ratified the UN national minority citizens are Convention against Torture allowed some form of limited and Other Cruel, Inhuman representation in regional or Degrading Treatment or government institutions. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Punishment (CAT), it continues to perpetrate massive human Region (XUAR), where approximately eight million Uighurs— rights abuses against the Uighur population, directly in violation the predominantly Muslim inhabitants—currently reside, is one of its international human rights obligations under these two of these five regions. treaties. The XUAR is a strategically important region within China, reportedly rich in oil and gas, and used by the Chinese govern- Background ment for nuclear bomb testing. In order to maintain its hold over Political and Religious History the region, the Chinese government has responded to the threat The Uighurs have resided in the Tarim basin in Western of destabilization by tolerating, to some degree, the Muslim reli- China since the sixth century.
    [Show full text]
  • These Sources Are Verifiable and Come From
    0 General aim: To give institutions a report as unbiased, independent and reliable as possible, in order to raise the quality of the debate and thus the relative political decisions. Specific aims: To circulate this report to mass media and in public fora of various nature (i.e. human rights summits) as well as at the institutional level, with the purpose of enriching the reader’s knowledge and understanding of this region, given its huge implications in the world peace process. As is well known, for some years now highly politicised anti-Chinese propaganda campaigns have targeted the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, often spreading groundless, non-verifiable or outright false information, triggering on these bases a sanctions war and causing serious damage to international relations. There is a dramatic lack of unbiased and alternative documentation on the topic, especially by researchers who have lived and studied in China and Xinjiang. This report aims to fill this gap, by deepening and contextualising the region and its real political, economic and social dynamics, and offering an authoritative and documented point of view vis-à- vis the reports that Western politicians currently have at their disposal. The ultimate goal of this documentation is to promote an informed public debate on the topic and offer policymakers and civil society a different point of view from the biased and specious accusations coming from the Five Eyes countries, the EU and some NGOs and think-tanks. Recently some Swedish researchers have done a great job of deconstructing the main Western allegations about the situation in the autonomous region of Xinjiang.
    [Show full text]
  • Islam and Instability in China's Xinjiang
    Report March 2014 Islam and instability in China’s Xinjiang By Nick Holdstock1 Executive summary On March 1st 2014 a knife-wielding group of ten people attacked passengers and passers-by in the railway station in Kunming, the capital of China’s south-western Yunnan province. Twenty-eight were killed and 113 injured. By the following day the government was describing the incident as a “separatist” attack perpetrated by “terrorists from Xinjiang”. The attack in Kunming is the latest in a series of violent incidents in China that the government attributes to radical Islamist organisations that aim to promote what it calls the “Three Evils” of “terrorism, separatism and religious extremism”. These acts have predominantly occurred in China’s far western Xinjiang region, most recently in January and February 2014. Incidents in other parts of China have been attributed to the same forces. However, a number of accounts from academic and non-Chinese media sources, as well as human rights organisations, have questioned the official explanation of many such incidents. Critics accuse the government of lacking transparency and failing to offer reliable evidence, and claim that it is failing to acknowledge the widespread and diverse grievances of people in Xinjiang. This report aims to reconcile these different narratives of dissent in a region of growing significance for China’s economy and energy security. Background who are geographically concentrated in Xinjiang. There are Xinjiang is China’s largest administrative region, but owing also significant cross-border Uyghur populations in to its mountainous and desert geography, is comparatively Kazakhstan (220,000), Uzbekistan (55,000) and Kyrgyzstan sparsely populated.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang Introduction
    A ROUTLEDGE FREEBOOK Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang Introduction 1 - Xinjiang and the dead hand of history 2 - Language, Education, and Uyghur Identity: An Introductory Essay 3 - Xinjiang from the ?Outside-in? and the ?Inside-out' 4 - Ethnic Resurgence and State Response 5 - Xinjiang and the evolution of China?s policy on terrorism: (2009-18) 6 - Conflict in Xinjiang and its resolution 7 - Reeducation Camps READ THE LATEST ON ETHNIC MINORITIES IN XINJIANG WITH THESE KEY TITLES VISIT WWW.ROUTLEDGE.COM/ ASIANSTUDIES TO BROWSE THE FULL ASIAN STUDIES COLLECTION SAVE 20% WITH DISCOUNT CODE F003 Introduction There has been significant coverage in the media in recent years on the increase of violence towards the Xinjiang Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China. This Freebook explores how the Uyghur language, Uyghur culture, Xinjiang geopolitics and Chinese state response have all resulted in and affected the violence in Xinjiang in the Twenty-First Century. The first chapter, by Michael Dillon, gives a brief introduction to Uyghur history including an overview of Xinjiang and its location, Uyghur language and culture, the religious restrictions imposed over the years and various occasions of violence starting from the 1900s. The next chapter, by Joanne Smith and Xiaowei Zang, explores the language and education of the Xinjiang Uyghurs and how this had a direct impact on their identity. This chapter further defines ethnic identity and questions its relationship to social, cultural and religious practices. Chapter three, by Michael Clarke, delves into the problematic nature of geopolitics and explores how Beijing and the West's geopolitical perspectives have influenced and constrained the Uyghur domain.
    [Show full text]
  • Religion with “Chinese Characteristics”: Persecution and Control in Xi Jinping’S China
    Religion with “Chinese Characteristics”: Persecution and Control in Xi Jinping’s China Thursday, July 23, 2015 Rebiya Kadeer, President, World Uyghur Congress I am very honored to be here today and I wish to express my profound appreciation to Representative Chris Smith and Senator Marco Rubio for inviting me to testify. Uyghurs perceive their belief in Islam not only as a personal expression of faith, but also as a statement of their cultural distinctiveness. For many Uyghurs, the incursion of the state into this private aspect of their lives and the role it plays in establishing a broader identity is viewed as part of an assimilative process. In East Turkestan, the twofold implementation of strict national and regional regulations concerning religious belief and practice mean the Uyghur people are subjected to the harshest conditions governing religious life in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This occurs even though China’s domestic laws, such as the Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, guarantee religious freedom. Rather than simply forbid religious practice, Chinese authorities have implemented regulations that progressively narrow the definition of lawful activity. As a result, many Uyghurs often discover traditional religious customs are increasingly not permitted. However, Chinese officials justify many of the restrictions through claims that outlawed practices have been imported from overseas and that it faces an organized threat to public security in the form of the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. China’s highly politicized criminal-legal system, as well as the state apparatus governing and monitoring religion, have ensured the government is the ultimate arbiter in the interpretation of religious affairs.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy
    U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy Shirley A. Kan Specialist in Asian Security Affairs July 15, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33001 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy Summary After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral ties and whether China’s support was valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests. The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize—even if it did not transform—the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush in late 2001. China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has not fought in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition. The Bush Administration designated the PRC-targeted “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) as a terrorist organization in August 2002, reportedly allowed PRC interrogators access to Uighur detainees at Guantanamo in September 2002, and held a summit in Texas in October 2002. Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China’s extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that “China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism” after “a good start,” in his policy speech that called on China to be a “responsible stakeholder” in the world.
    [Show full text]