CUSTOMIZED DRG COUNTRY DATA PORTRAIT ON DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DRG-LER) ACTIVITY II

Prepared under Contract No.: GS-10F-0033M / 7200AA18M00016, Tasking N009

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Aiysha Varraich and Valeriya Mechkova, University of Gothenburg, and Brigitte Seim, University of North Carolina- Chapel Hill, under a subcontract with NORC at the University of Chicago. The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DRG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009 CUSTOMIZED COUNTRY PORTRAIT PAKISTAN

(JUNE 2019)

Prepared under Contract No.: GS-10F-0033M/ 7200AA18M00016

Submitted to: Brandy Witthoft, COR

Prepared by: Laura Maxwell, University of Gothenburg Valeriya Mechkova, University of Gothenburg Brigitte Seim, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Submitted by: NORC at the University of Chicago Attention: Renée Hendley, Program Manager Bethesda, MD 20814 Tel: 301- 634-9489; E-mail: [email protected]

DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 2 TRENDS IN DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS INDICATORS ...... 3 DEMOCRACY ...... 3 GOVERNANCE ...... 5 CORRUPTION ...... 8 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ...... 10 CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA ...... 14

CONCLUSION ...... 17 APPENDIX A, VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY (V-DEM) PROJECT ...... 18 APPENDIX B, INDICATORS AND INDICES FEATURED IN THE REPORT ...... 21 APPENDIX C, REFERENCES ...... 27

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Main Democracy Trends. 1971 – 2017 ...... 3 Figure 1a. Pakistan ...... 3 Figure 1b. Select South Asian countries ...... 4 Figure 2. Accountability and Rule of Law ...... 6 Figure 2a. Horizontal accountability, Pakistan 1971 – 2017 ...... 6 Figure 2b. Rule of Law, Pakistan ...... 6 Figure 3. Rule of Law and Corruption ...... 9 Figure 3a. Corruption, Pakistan ...... 9 Figure 3b. Corruption, select countries ...... 9 Figure 4. Human Rights and Civil Liberties ...... 11 Figure 4a. Civil Liberties, Pakistan ...... 11 Figure 4b. Civil Liberties, select South Asian countries ...... 12 Figure 4c. Freedom of Expression ...... 13 Figure 5. Civil Society and Media, Pakistan ...... 15 Figure 5a. Civil Society and Media in Pakistan ...... 15 Figure 5b. Women’s Civil liberties and political participation ...... 16

USAID.GOV DRG LEARNING, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH (DRG-LER) ACTIVITY II TASKING N009: PAKISTAN | III EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This data portrait describes the development of Pakistan in terms of democracy, governance, and human rights protection. Using data from the V-Dem project1 and a few other sources, the portrait covers the period from 1971 to 2017. We highlight general trends in the three key areas, compare Pakistan to selected countries from the South Asian region, and closely examine several areas of particular concern: the imbalance between the army and government institutions such as the judiciary; state capture and corruption; and the dangers posed to civil society and media pluralism.

There are several key findings that follow from our analysis. From 2008, when Pakistan first experienced an elected civilian government, through 2014, it performed well on high-level democracy indices. However, performance on these democracy indices falters around 2014-2016, indicating a strong reappearance of the military in government issues such as in the pre-election environment, suppression of civil society, censoring of the media, and politicization of the judiciary. Further, we find that the quality of elections (measured using V-Dem’s free and fair elections index) continues to be an area of weakness for Pakistan in its democratization trajectory and for public confidence in Pakistan’s political institutions. Nonetheless, one optimistic sign is the latest poll carried out by International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Center for Insights in Survey Research, showing a 57% approval rating of the current prime minister .2

In terms of governance, the most problematic issues are the continued corruption within the executive and the pervasive influence of the military on democratic institutions. Although the analysis suggests that public corruption has remained relatively low since 2008, public perception does not align with this improvement. This disconnect between empirical trends and public opinion is concerning, as anti-corruption efforts should remain focused on the comparatively high levels of corruption in the executive and judiciary.

Finally, the primary finding within the human rights sector is that women’s participation in civil society has increased.

1 A longer description of the V-Dem project and data is available at the end of this report. For more information about the project see v-dem.net. 2 https://www.dawn.com/news/1470150

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INTRODUCTION

Using data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute and select other sources, this data portrait tracks democracy, governance, and protection of from 1971 through 2017.3 In its 71-year history as a nation state, Pakistan has had a tumultuous experience with democracy, with particular historical events and trends marking dramatic shifts in its democratic trajectory. The first event that caused dramatic change is the secession of West Pakistan in 1971 (now Bangladesh). The second factor characterising Pakistan’s democratic trajectory are the cycles of civilian and military rule, each of which would start with high expectations by the population followed by misgovernance and poor delivery (by the civilian governments) or repression (by the military).4 The final factor affecting Pakistan’s path to democratization is the military’s constant meddling in steering much of Pakistan’s policy agenda, driven primarily by security concerns. The influence of the military is seen at both the regional level, highlighted foremost by the fluctuating relationship with India, and international level, punctuated by its strategic location in the region and Pakistan’s role as ally to NATO in the war against terror.

That said, there are also trends that highlight Pakistan’s efforts towards democratization and give cause for optimism. First and foremost is the holding of regular general elections, with the election of 2018 marking the 11th general election in the country’s history. Second, Imran Khan’s victory is significant. It signifies an end to the monopoly of the two power-holding parties of the past (the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) to bring a third political party to the foray. Secondly, it marks the second democratic succession in the country’s history, which hopefully indicates democratic consolidation.5 However, major challenges to Pakistan’s democracy remain, including a weakening economy, corruption, the curbing of civil liberties, and the continued stronghold of the military on democratic institutions.

This portrait continues as follows: First, we examine key indicators of democracy and election quality, followed by a section on governance, focusing in particular on issues of corruption. The third section considers human rights issues, civil society, and media.

3 This timeframe is chosen to assess the trends in democracy, governance and human rights in Pakistan as an independent state, after its secession of Bangladesh in 1971, allowing for comparisons with independent Bangladesh. 4 The three main military dictatorships, which lasted for almost a decade each, have been General Ayub Khan (1958 - 1969), General Zia-ul-Haq (1978-1988), and the latest General Pervaiz Musharraf (1999 - 2008). The country’s shaky relationship with India has driven much of the policy agenda of the country, resulting in wars in 1965 and 1971, as well as the of 1999. 5 There have been 11 nationwide general elections to the National Assembly since 1947.

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TRENDS IN DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS INDICATORS

DEMOCRACY

Figure 1 shows ratings for the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (black solid line) along with its three main component measures. Elected officials index (blue dot-dash line) captures whether the chief executive and legislature are elected in free and fair elections with extensive suffrage (dark blue dot-dash line). measures the extent to which political and civil society organizations can operate freely in between elections (red dash line). Finally, the Freedom of expression index captures to what extent the government respects press and media freedom, as well as the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere (grey dash line). As with all indicators presented in this report, higher scores indicate more democratic situations.6 For comparative purposes, we also show the mean of the same measures for other South Asian countries of interest to USAID in Figure 1b.

Figure 1. Main Democracy Trends. 1971 – 2017

Figure 1a. Pakistan

6 Generally, the indices range from 0 to 1, unless otherwise specified.

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Figure 1b. Select South Asian countries

As Figure 1a shows, there has been a clear upward trend in electoral over the decades. The return of a civilian elected government in 2008 saw a significant improvement in democracy in Pakistan, with the PPP winning the general election after the assassination of its party leader . Not only does the year mark the start of consecutively elected civilian governments in power and an end to the military dictatorship of General Pervaiz Musharraf, but it also marks the implementation of the “Charter of Democracy.” Under this agreement, the two main political opponents, Pakistan’s People’s Party and Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz, promised to respect and abide by the results of the general elections and acknowledged the role of the opposition as part and parcel of the government, helping instill one of the basic functions of a parliamentary democracy.7 Looking at Figure 1b, it is clear that Pakistan remains at or above the regional average, lagging behind only India. 8

During this period, human rights and freedoms of expression and association have flourished, achieving some of their highest scores recorded. This is reflected in the rising scores of both indices measuring freedoms of expression and association. Although this is not concomitant with military regimes, this trend is attributed to the liberalization of Pakistani media ownership and broadcast regulations initiated by the Musharraf government (after plummeting in 1999, the rise of both indices begins at 2000). The result has been a large influx of private channels and a flurry of news outlets being established and gaining platforms across the country, many of which were critical of the

7 Text of the Charter can be found at https://www.dawn.com/news/192460 8 Universal suffrage (grey solid line) was established in 1947 and elections have been a regular feature of Pakistani elections as can be seen from the suffrage and elected official’s indexes, with the exception of the spans of military rule in the country.

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military regime itself, such as Geo TV Pakistan (Cookman 2018). (More on political liberties of freedom of expression and association are elaborated upon in the section on civil liberties below).

Though there has been a general upward trend in democracy during the span of elected governments in the past eleven years, the free and fair election sticks out when zooming in on the component indices that make up Electoral Democracy Index.

The 2008 elections introduced civilian rule in Pakistan and were largely reported as free and fair. However, this indicator is consistently lagging behind all other indices by a significant margin (with the highest score being 0.425 and the lowest 0.25). This is despite 11 years of consecutive civilian ruIe, including the newly elected government of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) in the summer of 2018. An environment of incumbency disadvantage can be attributed to the constant vote-rigging accusations forwarded by the losing political parties in previous elections. One prominent example of this is the sit-in protests carried out by the PTI after the 2013 election, accusing the PML-N of vote-rigging even though international observers concurred the general election of 2013 to be one of the fairest to be held in Pakistan. Another possible factor attributing to the low score on the free and fair elections index is the lack of a results management system by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), which provides disaggregated voting data at the polling station level. This absence makes it difficult to independently assess complaints or to identify specific polling locations that might be sites for fraud or mismanagement of the results (Cookman 2018).

Finally, it is important to point out the limited role played by political parties outside of elections. Generally, political parties in Pakistan are mainly activated prior to and during an election, after which their function is more dormant, with politicians lobbying not under party labels but through their individual personalities. Their function is not of democratic institutions; instead, they function more as reflections of the party leader (such as the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz centering around or the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf and its leader Imran Khan) or political families (such as the Bhutto family’s PPP).

GOVERNANCE

Key aspects of the quality of government in Pakistan are depicted in Figure 2 with the V-Dem Horizontal Accountability index and its constituent indices. V-Dem defines horizontal accountability as being composed of two main pillars: rule of law and checks and balances between institutions. Figure 1B focuses on the second pillar through the indicators of executive oversight and legislature investigations in practice (red dashed line and light blue dotted line). Together, these indicators demonstrate the extent of oversight and accountability of the executive through investigations by the legislature and government agencies, checks and balances, and compliance with court rulings and the constitution. On the other hand, Figure 2b shows the rule of law index (black solid line) with components for the extent to which civil liberties are constitutionally protected, the impartiality of public administration, and the transparency and rigorous enforcement of existing laws.

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Figure 2. Accountability and Rule of Law Figure 2a. Horizontal accountability, Pakistan 1971 – 2017

Figure 2b. Rule of Law, Pakistan

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Pakistan’s democratic development has largely been shaped by the constant struggle between the institutions of state (the military, professional bureaucracy) and the institutions of government (elected representatives, judiciary). Although the constitution divides political authority between the legislature, judiciary, and executive, this is not the case in practice. Pakistan’s legislative body, the National Assembly, is voted in every year through national elections but remains the weakest of the institutions, while the military remains the strongest. The judiciary is the one institution that can be said to challenge both civilian and military governments through its oversight role, albeit in a limited manner.

Since the uninterrupted presence of elected governments in 2008, the checks and balances between institutions (horizontal accountability) have generally fared well, achieving a record high score of 0.8. As Figure 2b shows, rule of law, which makes up one pillar of horizontal accountability, remains low, suggesting that laws are not implemented uniformly and transparently. The weakest institution is the legislature, reflected in the low scores of the executive oversight index (see red dash line in Figure 2a). The weak position of the legislature can be attributed to the fact that members of parliament continue to treat their roles as a part-time activity, with many not showing up to parliamentary sessions.9 Furthermore, voters are unclear about the responsibilities of legislators, rewarding them more for patronage than voting behavior in parliament (BTI 2018; Afzal 2019). One strategy for strengthening the legislature would be to have parliamentary sessions and voting open to the public, including regular questioning of the head of government. Furthermore, another cause for concern is the presence of hereditary, religious politicians, making up 19% of the legislature. This captures the legislative body in the hands of individuals who are mostly elected through vote banks they command through their spiritual followers instead of their policy platforms (Varraich 2018). The rule of law and its composite indexes of corruption are looked at in more detail below.

Although the military remains the strongest and most stable institution, the judiciary has challenged both civilian and military governments through its oversight role. The most recent case brought by the Supreme Court is that of the Panamagate, bringing an end to Prime Minister Sharif’s time in office (see Corruption section below for details). Another example of this oversight is Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry challenging Musharraf over the disappearance of people in and, more prominently, over Musharraf’s refusal to step down from office in 2007. This resulted in the lawyer’s protest movement, which eventually brought an end to Musharraf’s tenure. However, due to recent events, the judiciary’s independence has been called into question and accused of being politicized (BTI 2018). One example of this was its inaction during the establishment of the 21st amendment to the constitution in the wake of the school attack in 2014. This amendment by the parliament resulted in secret military courts that tried civilians without recourse to an appeals process. These courts were established due to government fears of reprisals if the attackers were to be tried in the normal justice system, but the courts have ceased to be operational since their ordinance ran out in 2017. Another example of the judiciary failing in its role to check the executive has been its past history of legitimizing army rule in the country (such as Ayub Khan’s military regime).

Finally, the one institution that has escaped checks and balances and oversight in general is the country’s strongest and most stable: the military. Its strength is demonstrated by the three military coups that have taken place in the country’s history, all of which are reflected in all large dips in the accountability index. These takeovers were driven by two factors: public opinion and clause 58-2B in the constitution, which gives powers to the president to dissolve elected assemblies and to call for

9 Both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan gained reputations as absentee legislators during their tenures as members of national assembly.

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fresh elections. Although the military ostensibly has moved into the background and no longer plays an overt role in day-to-day matters, it still steers the policy agendas of security and foreign policy (Afzal 2019). The latest show of power was during the election of 2018, where the ISI intimidated candidates wanting to run for office and threatened journalists and media outlets that either reported negative coverage of the military or gave press coverage to Nawaz Sharif.

CORRUPTION

Corruption remains a primary obstacle in Pakistan’s democratic development. Until 2008, the main governing political parties, the PML(N) and the PPP, had both been mired in misgovernance scandals, bringing to abrupt ends each political party’s time in office. After 2008, the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf not only presented itself as an alternative to the status quo, but also heavily campaigned on an anti- corruption platform. This strategy resonated well with the Pakistani voter and translated into an electoral victory for the PTI in July 2018’s elections.

In the figure below, we look closely at five different aspects of corruption found in Pakistan. The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt (unlike the other V-Dem variables, which generally run from less democratic to more democratic). The black dashed line displays levels of bribes and undocumented payments made by individuals or businesses in the judicial system, while the rest focus on corruption in the executive and public spheres. Two indicators focus on the executive: the frequency with which the executive and its agents steal, embezzle, or misappropriate state resources for personal use (blue dot-dash line), or grant favors in exchange for bribes or other material inducements (red dotted line). The grey dotted line displays the frequency of bribes among public sector employees, while the grey dot-dash line represents embezzlement and misappropriation among the same group.

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Figure 3. Rule of Law and Corruption Figure 3a. Corruption, Pakistan

Figure 3b. Corruption, select countries

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As mentioned in the above section, the rule of law index scores for Pakistan have remained at the lower end of the scale, hovering around 0.3 and 0.4 and showing that laws are not necessarily applied evenly across the spectrum. As a baseline, this helps to explain the corruption pattern seen in Pakistan. On the one hand, public sector corruption, which entails corruption within services provided to citizens such as healthcare and education, has remained relatively low. On the other hand, Figure 3a indicates that there was a deterioration in public sector corruption around 2014, with an uptick to 0.32. Pakistan only started to see an improvement around 2016. Overall, the public sector, which affects the common citizen the most, does not suffer severely from corruption. Although this contradicts the reported perception of citizens who find corruption to be the biggest problem affecting their society, these perceptions may be informed by the regular media exposures of corruption at the executive level as well as those sectors that are outside of service provision, such as obtaining a license or permit for opening a shop (Varraich 2011).

On the other hand, executive corruption appears to be prevalent—executive embezzlement in particular, with the worst scores occurring around 2015. This echoes the low score Pakistan receives on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, as well as the famous moniker earned by former President Asif Ali Zardari as Mr. Ten Percent.10 The embezzlement and theft index within the executive seems to follow the public corruption track: there were significant improvements between 2008 and 2011, but the indicator worsened in subsequent years. This pattern may have to do with the incumbency disadvantage present in Pakistani politics, due to which most politicians do not enact long-term policies. Instead, politicians and governments engage in extractive behavior and highly visible infrastructure projects (Afzal 2019).

Finally, the judiciary has suffered from high levels of corruption since 2008, and it is regularly accused of being politicized (BTI 2018). The most recent high-profile case is that of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the charges of corruption. This case was brought about after information about the Sharif family’s undisclosed assets was revealed in the leaked Panama Papers in 2016. In July 2017, the Supreme Court disqualified Sharif from office for life, stating a violation of members of parliament having to be “sadiq” and “amin”—honest and trustworthy (Afzal 2019). In response, the PML(N) accused the court of being politicized while PTI supporters view the decision as justice being served.

Pakistan has had an anti-corruption body, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), since 1997. Although it has had some success, the NAB has also been viewed as politicized regarding the cases it selects to pursue. In 2015, the PPP accused it of targeting it over other political parties. In 2016, several corruption inquiries against the Sharif family were used to issue a stay order against Sharif, who accused the bureau of harassment of his party’s members. Furthermore, the citizenry tends to agree the NAB is politicized and to believe the bureau itself is suffering from corruption (author’s fieldwork 2019; BTI 2018).11

Nevertheless, Pakistan remains below the regional average of corruption, faring better than Bangladesh and India (Figure 3b).

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

We now turn to the protection of human rights and civil liberties in Pakistan. In Figure 4, we first look at the V-Dem civil liberties index (black solid line), which is measured by three sub-

10 The Ten Percent was a reference to the cut President Zardari demanded from all government contracts awarded. 11 The NAB is regularly referred to as “Aunty- corruption” by people both in the urban and rural areas, as they believe the institution itself is part of the corruption problem.

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components. First, the private liberties index (black dashed line) measures freedom of movement, , freedom from forced labor, and the protection of property rights. Second, the political liberties index (blue dot-dash line) represents freedom of association and freedom of expression. Third, the physical integrity index (red dotted line) captures freedom from political killings and torture by the government.

As Figure 4 shows, civil liberties in Pakistan have had different trajectories depending on the subcomponent involved. The many differences between the performance of certain civil liberties and their changes over time are further examined below.

Figure 4. Human Rights and Civil Liberties

Figure 4a. Civil Liberties, Pakistan

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Figure 4b. Civil Liberties, select South Asian countries

After the PPP took office in 2008, the indicator for political freedoms attained its highest score on record. However, political freedoms have been curtailed in Pakistan since 2015 under civilian governments, reflected in scores dipping below that which was prevalent during the last military regime. Among the components that make up political freedom, there have been downward trends in Pakistan’s freedoms of expression and association despite civilian-elected governments being in power. Figure 4c presents this in greater detail below.

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Figure 4c. Freedom of Expression

Although are free in practice to discuss many topics, there has been a development of legislation curtailing the effective freedom of expression since the installation of elected governments, providing broad leeway for restrictions on any speech critical of the military and “the idea of Pakistan.” Although the above indices do not account for the most recent election, the lack of protection of civil liberties was reported by , detailing that legislation such as the Prevention of Electronic Act of 2016 have been used to “intimidate, harass and arbitrarily detain human rights defenders for online comments” as well as “used to carry out a number of arrests throughout the 2018 pre-election period. This includes the June arrest of journalist Zafarullah Achakzai, a reporter for the newspaper Daily Qudrat. Furthermore, supporters of different political parties were arrested for social media posts critical of the authorities (Amnesty International 2018). Much of this is attributed as being backed by the military, reinforcing the power exerted behind the scenes.

Another example of legislation that heavily curtails freedom of expression is the law. The law is vaguely applied to any expressions that may be deemed critical of religion (or the blasphemy law itself) and has resulted in a number of deaths over the years, including that of , the governor of , in 2011.12 The latest includes the 2017 lynching and murder of university student Mashal Khan in Mardan, which drew rare criticism from the government. Although the law was first introduced and promoted by General Zia-ul-Haq, it remains in force even after the end of

12 Taseer was publicly critical of the blasphemy laws and filed for a mercy petition for the Christian Asiya Bibi to not serve life imprisonment.

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dictatorships, reflecting the conservative nature of the overall populace, some parts of which take the law into their own hands through vigilante justice.

This decline in freedom of expression and association seen in Figure 4c is reiterated in two further high-profile murders in 2015 and 2016. The first is that of human rights activist , founder of T2F (The Second Floor), where open debate takes place on a range of issues from the Balochistan freedom struggle to criticisms of the military. The second high-profile murder was of social media activist Qandeel Baloch, who actively carried out commentary critical of the political and religious establishment that highlighted the bigotry and hypocrisy of the Pakistani elites. The above examples aptly demonstrate the difficulties of being an active woman in the public sphere, especially if commenting on political issues in Pakistan.

Over and above this, there are specific minorities in the country whose human rights are infringed upon on a regular basis, including the community, the Shias, and the transgender community. The Ahmadiyya community is a sect of that the Pakistani government declared as non-Muslim. As points out, members of their community continue be a major target for prosecutions under blasphemy laws as well as specific anti-Ahmadi laws across Pakistan.13 They face increasing social as militant groups and the Islamist political party Tehreek- e-Labbaik (TLP) accuse them of “posing as ” with being burnt, killing 90 people in 2010. The continues to treat “posing as Muslims” by Ahamdis as a criminal offense. They were effectively excluded from participating in the 2018 parliamentary elections: to vote, Ahmadis are required to declare they are not Muslims, which many see as a renunciation of their faith. This discrimination permeates to the executive levels of government. In September 2018, Imran Khan appointed Princeton professor and economist Atif Mian as economic advisor to the government. Following pressure from Islamist groups against the appointment of an Ahmadi to such a prestigious position, the government asked Mian to withdraw from the council ( 2018).

The Shia community, although not subject to state-sanctioned discrimination through legislation, suffer from regular discrimination as well as abductions and targeting by Islamist groups, such as the 2015 killing of an entire bus of Isma’ili women and children. All this has occurred without much action by the government.

Another minority that is regularly attacked in Pakistan is its transgender community. In 2018, the Supreme Court not only recognized transgender as a third sex, it also called for equal treatment before the law and protections of rights for the community. Although this is a positive improvement, implementation lags behind. According to the local group Trans Action, attacks continue, and as many as 57 people have been killed since 2015. Pakistan’s civil liberties remain below the regional average and have a long way to go in protecting and guaranteeing these for all segments of its society.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA

Figure 5 below takes a closer look at civil society and the media. At the outset of both the PPP government and the PML-N’s governments, there appeared to be space and a semblance for civil society to operate. However, the dip in most scores around the 2014-mark helps to reinforce the

13 The second amendment to the Constitution in 1974 declared as non-Muslims, and Ordinance XX reinforces this by detailing that Ahmadiyyas may not identify as Muslims nor can their places of worship be called mosques. If done then these may be offences punishable by law.

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invisible hand of the military establishment that controls much of the expression and movement allowed in Pakistan.

One example of this control is the latest legislation and red tape, under which non-governmental organizations (both local and international) have to undergo an extensive vetting process by the military before being allowed to operate on ground. Another example is the new centralized registration procedure for international NGOs, limiting their ability to work independently. Amnesty International reported in November 2017 that the Ministry of Interior ordered 29 international NGOs to halt their operations and leave.

The control over and censorship of the media has largely been carried out by the military as well. The most prominent examples have been the lack of protection from media censorship (blue solid line) during the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif (the PML-N). Geo TV was blocked in March and April of 2018 primarily because of its positive coverage of Sharif after his removal from office. Another example is the censoring of the newspaper Dawn in May of 2018 after the publication of an interview with Sharif. Reinforcing this type of censorship, security agencies blocked the paper’s distribution in some 20 cantonment areas. Freedom House details multiple media-related figures to have reported a system of “press advice,” whereby men claiming credibly to be from security agencies contact them to warn them against covering taboo subjects, or to dictate coverage on political issues. These figures have warned of consequences for defying the advice. Twenty-two journalists have been murdered in Pakistan over the past decade according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, which noted in October 2018 that a recent decline in fatal violence against journalists “masks [a] decline in press freedom” characterized by the military’s pervasive intimidation of journalists.

Figure 5. Civil Society and Media, Pakistan

Figure 5a. Civil Society and Media in Pakistan

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A note of optimism, however, is the significant rise in women’s participation within civil society, whether under an elected government or a military dictatorship. Examples of these groups of women are organizations such as Girls at Dhabas, which want to reclaim public space for women. These CSOs actively organize events across Pakistan, such as on International Women’s Day and cycling events in many Pakistani cities. Their aim is to highlight the importance of women being physically seen in public spaces (independent of the socio-economic class of the woman). However, this indicator plummeted in 2015, coinciding with the high-profile murders of Sabeen Mahmud in the same year and Qandeel Baluch in 2016. Incidents such as these force the caveat that many women active in CSOs choose not to reveal their identities publicly for fear of social backlash from both families and friends.

On the political front, another pertinent issue is the gender gap in voting across Pakistan. Although the women’s political participation index in Figure 5b reflects an incredibly democratic situation for female participation in the political sphere, Pakistan has the largest gender gap (19.5 percent) in self- reported voter turnout among the countries surveyed in the most recent wave of the World Values Survey. For context, the gap in India is close to zero. In the latest general election of 2018, only 45.7 percent of registered women voted in the national and provincial elections on July 25, 2018, compared to 55 percent of registered men, indicating that women’s political participation is constrained by factors that go beyond the lack of legal identification (Cheema et al. 2019). One explanation forwarded by Cheema et al. (2019) is the lack of inclusion from political parties when exercising their public outreach, in effect socializing women to become politically isolated—in effect not exercising their foremost political freedom of casting a vote.

Figure 5b. Women’s Civil liberties and political participation

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CONCLUSION

The democratic trends in Pakistan provide cause for optimism. The past 11 years of elected governments with successful transitions from one to another is a step towards democratic consolidation in Pakistan. However, there is much potential for democratic backsliding due to the extreme, behind-closed-doors influence the military exerts over the government and state. The legislature needs to be strengthened, and public confidence in this body must also increase. Corruption remains a primary concern for citizens, and although the courts and NAB have been actively bringing cases to justice, there needs to be a general overhaul in civic culture where corruption is not the norm.

The advancements made in the prevalence of women in civil society and the presence of CSOs across the country is great reason for cautious optimism, but the recent clamping down on the operations of civil society not only hinders the delivery of services that they provide in places where the state is unable to, but it also creates an environment of fear. Civil society needs to get the requisite governmental support in order to reach its full potential. Providing state funding for political parties as well as establishing strict, new rules to ensure transparent financing of political parties are some steps that can be taken to consolidate the political party system and to address the dominance of individuals by de-personalizing the parties that exist and creating a democratic environment within the parties themselves in Pakistan. Furthermore, to ensure political participation across the genders, political parties need to ensure that women are part of the outreach they carry out during pre-election periods as well as afterwards in order for this segment of the population to no longer remain “invisible.” For this to occur, the political parties need to become more active outside of election periods with regular meetings and outreach in addition to events such as annual party conventions so that they are fulfilling their role as democratic institutions in and of themselves.

Finally, there exists an urgent need to provide equal protection, both in the law and in practice, to minorities across the country. Critical parts of this include repealing discriminatory laws that have encouraged public vigilante justice, such as the blasphemy laws and those against the Ahmaddiya community. The judiciary needs to be further strengthened and to regain public confidence as an impartial institution. Pakistan has one of the youngest populations in the world and should take advantage of this on all fronts—from economic development (as a work force) to its educational development (creating and engaging in new technologies). For this young population to enjoy the full fruits of free, democratic governance, Pakistan still has much work to be done.

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APPENDIX A, VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY (V-DEM) PROJECT

Key features of V-Dem:

• One of the largest social science databases, with 450 indicators on democracy and political systems;

• World-wide coverage from 1789 to the present;

• Transparent and reliable indicators based on the knowledge of 3,000 international experts;

• Free and easy online access;

• An independent Institute producing high-quality research on democracy and policy outreach.

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. We adopt a multidimensional and disaggregated approach acknowledging the complexity of the concept of democracy as a system of rule that goes beyond the simple presence of elections. The V- Dem distinguishes between seven high-level principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, majoritarian and consensual, and collects data to measure these principles.

THE V-DEM DATABASE

V-Dem is one of the largest-ever social science data collection efforts with a database containing over 19 million data points. In 2016, V-Dem received the most prestigious award for comparative datasets in political science: the Lijphart/Przeworski/Verba Best Dataset Award presented by the American Political Science Association, Comparative Politics Section.

With the 8th version of the data released in April 2018, the dataset now covers 201 countries from 1789 to 2017. For the very first time, data from ‘Historical V-Dem’ is now integrated into the data – extending the coverage to 228 years of political development (from 1789 to 2017). Out to the total 450 indicators, 260 indicators across 91 countries are included in the historical data. The V-Dem dataset is available for download, free of charge. Users are also able to explore the V-Dem data through online analysis tools with which they can create and save their own graphs.

In addition to its more than 400 indicators, V-Dem aggregates indicators into mid- and high-level indices designed to measure important dimensions of democracy. High-level indices measure the major types of democracy and mid-level indices capture concepts such as clean elections, women’s political empowerment, and civil society participation. The database enables highly detailed analysis of virtually all aspects of a country’s political system as well as comparisons of countries on the aggregate level. Governments, development agencies, and NGOs can thus benefit from the nuanced comparative and historical data when researching critical decisions such as selecting country program priorities, informing program design, and monitoring the impact of their programs.

THE V-DEM TEAM

The V-Dem project is a truly collaborative international effort that unites thousands of social scientists working in the spheres of democracy and governance. The V-Dem project has recruited approximately 3,000 local and cross-national experts from over 170 countries to provide their knowledge on various indicators of democracy. The project is managed by leading scholars in the study of democracy: four Principal Investigators, four Program Managers, fifteen Project Managers

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with topical expertise, more than thirty Regional Managers, almost 170 Country Coordinators, and several Assistant Researchers.

METHODOLOGY

V-Dem draws on theoretical and methodological expertise from its worldwide team to produce data in the most objective and reliable way possible. Approximately half of the indicators in the V-Dem dataset are based on factual information obtainable from official documents such as constitutions and government records. The other half consists of more subjective assessments on topics like democratic and governing practices and compliance with de jure rules. On such issues, typically five experts provide ratings.

V-Dem works closely with leading social science research methodologists and has developed a state of the art measurement model that, to the extent possible, minimizes coder error and addresses issues of comparability across countries and over time using Bayesian latent variable models. V-Dem is continually experimenting with new techniques and soliciting feedback from experts throughout the field. In this sense, V-Dem is at the cutting edge of developing new and improved methods to increase both reliability and comparability of expert survey data.14 V-Dem also draws on the team’s academic expertise to develop theoretically informed techniques for aggregating indicators into mid- and high-level indices.15 The indices not only allow us to revisit familiar research questions but also open up new lines of inquiry about the types of democracy and democratic trajectories throughout the world.

V-DEM RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS

One of V-Dem’s core activities is producing high-quality research that provides insights on crucial questions such as the relationship between democracy and development, the conditions that make democracies endure, and the dynamics surrounding women’s political empowerment. As of May 2018, 66 Working Papers have been published on the V-Dem website covering a wide range of topics.

In addition to article-length working papers, V-Dem regularly produces a range of publications targeting a wider audience. The V-Dem Country Briefs outline the most important democracy development trends in a specific country. The Policy Briefs summarize key policy-relevant findings on particular topics such as how to measure accountability and the role of a strong legislature in curbing executive corruption.

V-DEM DEMOCRACY NETWORK

As part of its policy outreach program, V-Dem is cooperating with a number of international organizations that work in the sphere of democracy and development, thus creating a network of democracy experts both from academia and the policy world. We have published and contributed to a number of publications, organized and participated in conferences, workshops, and capacity- building trainings. Some of these collaborations include USAID, International IDEA, World Bank, European Commission.

14 For more details see Pemstein et al (2018). 15 See Coppedge et al (2018).

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Each May, V-Dem organizes a policy dialogue conference to enhance the cooperation between researchers and democracy practitioners. The conference features not only V-Dem researchers, but also counts among its speakers leading experts on democratization, democracy, good government and corruption from over 50 organizations.

FUNDING

V-Dem has been or is currently funded by: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Knut & Alice Wallenberg Foundation, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Sweden, the Swedish Research Council, the European Commission/EuroAID, Marianne & Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, International IDEA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-, the Danish Research Council, the Canadian International Development Agency, NORAD/the Norwegian Research Council, Aarhus University, Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Knut & Alice Wallenberg Foundation and the Quality of Government Institute, with co-funding from University of Gothenburg and University of Notre Dame.

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APPENDIX B, INDICATORS AND INDICES FEATURED IN THE REPORT

To ensure full transparency, this appendix provides detailed aggregation information for each index and indicator referenced in this analysis. For each index, we list each indicator that makes up that index, as well as the question text and answer categories that correspond to these indicators. When an index is an aggregation of other indices, the component indicators of the sub-indices are listed alongside their question texts and answer categories.

INDICATOR QUESTION TEXT ANSWER CATEGORIES

INDICATORS INCLUDED IN FIGURE 1

Electoral Democracy To what extent is the ideal of electoral Index (v2x_polyarchy) democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clean elections Index To what extent are elections free and fair? (v2xel_frefair)

Freedom of association To what extent are parties, including (v2x_frassoc_thick) opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Expanded freedom of To what extent does government respect expression index press & media freedom, the freedom of (v2x_freexp_thick) ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression? Elected officials index Is the chief executive and legislature (v2x_elecoff) appointed through popular elections? Share of population What share of adult citizens as defined by with suffrage (D) statute has the legal right to vote in (v2x_suffr) national elections?

INDICATORS INCLUDED IN FIGURE 2

Horizontal To what extent is the ideal of horizontal accountability index government accountability achieved? (v2x_horacc) Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals.

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INDICATOR QUESTION TEXT ANSWER CATEGORIES Legislature investigates If the executive were engaged in 0: Extremely unlikely. in practice (v2lginvstp, unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical 1: Unlikely. *_osp, *_ord) activity, how likely is it that a legislative 2: As likely as not. body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps 3: Likely. a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct 4: Certain or nearly certain. an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive? Executive oversight If executive branch officials were engaged 0: Extremely unlikely. (v2lgotovst, *_osp, in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical 1: Unlikely. *_ord) activity, how likely is it that a body other 2: Very uncertain. than the legislature, such as a comptroller 3: Likely. general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or 4: Certain or nearly certain. investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

Rule of law index To what extent are laws transparently, (v2x_rule) independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law? Executive bribery and How routinely do members of the 0: It is routine and expected. corrupt exchanges executive (the head of state, the head of 1: It happens more often than not in (v2exbribe, *_osp, government, and cabinet ministers), or dealings with the executive. *_ord) their agents, grant favors in exchange for 2: It happens but is unpredictable: bribes, kickbacks, or other material those dealing with the executive find inducements? it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary. 3: It happens occasionally but is not expected. 4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

Executive How often do members of the executive embezzlement and (the head of state, the head of theft (v2exembez, government, and cabinet ministers), or *_osp, *_ord) their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? Public sector To what extent do public sector corruption index employees grant favors in exchange for ordinal bribes, kickbacks, or other material (e_v2x_pubcorr_3C inducements, and how often do they steal, /_4C /_5C) embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

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INDICATOR QUESTION TEXT ANSWER CATEGORIES Public sector theft How often do public sector employees 0: Constantly. Public sector (v2exthftps, *_osp, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public employees act as though all public *_ord) funds or other state resources for resources were their personal or personal or family use? family property. 1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property. 2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property. 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property. 4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property. Judicial corruption How often do individuals or businesses 0: Always. decision (v2jucorrdc, make undocumented extra payments or 1: Usually. *_osp, *_ord) bribes in order to speed up or delay the 2: About half of the time. process or to obtain a favorable judicial 3: Not usually. decision? 4: Never.

INDICATORS INCLUDED IN FIGURE 3

Rule of law index To what extent are laws transparently, (v2x_rule) independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the Law?

Executive How often do members of the executive embezzlement and (the head of state, the head of theft (v2exembez) government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Public sector corrupt How routinely do public sector employees exchanges (v2excrptps) grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

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INDICATOR QUESTION TEXT ANSWER CATEGORIES Executive bribery and How routinely do members of the 0: It is routine and expected. corrupt exchanges executive (the head of state, the head of 1: It happens more often than not in (v2exbribe, *_osp, government, and cabinet ministers), or dealings with the executive. *_ord) their agents, grant favors in exchange for 2: It happens but is unpredictable: bribes, kickbacks, or other material those dealing with the executive find inducements? it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary. 3: It happens occasionally but is not expected. 4: It never, or hardly ever, happens. Judicial corruption How often do individuals or businesses decision (v2jucorrdc) make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision? Public sector theft How often do public sector employees (v2exthftps) steal, embezzle, or misappropriate pub- lic funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

INDICATORS INCLUDED IN FIGURE 4

Civil liberties index (D) To what extent is civil liberty respected? (v2x_civlib) Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government.

Political civil liberties To what extent are political liberties index (D) (v2x_clpol) respected? Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

Physical violence index To what extent is physical integrity (D) (v2x_clphy) respected? Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections.

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INDICATOR QUESTION TEXT ANSWER CATEGORIES

Private civil liberties To what extent are private liberties index (D) (v2x_clpriv) respected? Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

INDICATORS INCLUDED IN FIGURE 5A CSO repression Does the government attempt to repress 0: Severely. (v2csreprss) civil society organizations (CSOs)? 1: Substantially. 2: Moderately. 3: Weakly. 4: No.

Government Does the government directly or censorship effort — indirectly attempt to censor the print or Media (v2mecenefm) broadcast media? Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution of networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery. CSO consultation Are major civil society organizations 0: No. There is a high degree of (v2cscnsult) (CSOs) routinely consulted by insulation of the government from policymakers on policies relevant to their CSO input. The government may members? sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies. 1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account. 2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements

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INDICATOR QUESTION TEXT ANSWER CATEGORIES Print/broadcast media Do the major print and broadcast media 0: The major media represent only perspectives represent a wide range of political the government's perspective. (v2merange) perspectives? 1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi- official opposition party. 2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society. 3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media. CSO consultation Are major civil society organizations 0: No. There is a high degree of (v2cscnsult) (CSOs) routinely consulted by insulation of the government from policymakers on policies relevant to their CSO input. The government may members? sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies. 1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account. 2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

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APPENDIX C, REFERENCES

Afzal, Madiha (2019). “An inflection point for Pakistan’s democracy.” Democracy and Disorder, Brookings Institute. https://www.brookings.edu/research/an-inflection-point-for-pakistans- democracy/. Amnesty International. Pakistan Report 2017-2018. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and- the-pacific/pakistan/report-pakistan/. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Pakistan. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. Cookman, Colin. 2018 “Previewing Pakistan’s 2018 Elections”. https://colincookman.wordpress.com/other-writing/previewing-pakistans-2018-elections/. Cheema, A., Khan, S., Mohmand, S.K. and Asad Liaqat “Invisible Citizens: Why More Do Not Vote”. IDS Working Paper 524, UK. Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtröm, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2018. Pakistan profile. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/pakistan. Human Rights Watch. Pakistan. World Report 2019. https://www.hrw.org/world- report/2019/country-chapters/pakistan. Varraich, Aiysha. (2018). “What is religious clientelism and why should we care?” Party Politics Seminar Paper, University of Gothenburg (unpublished manuscript). Varraich, Aiysha. (2011). “Decentralisation; the road to better Quality of Government? A comparative case study of Multan and Larkana, Pakistan.” GUPEA. http://hdl.handle.net/2077/28274.

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