Queensland's Home Waterwise Rebate Scheme
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CASE PROGRAM 2010-65.3 Queensland’s Home WaterWise Rebate Scheme (Epilogue) Would South East Queensland’s “world-class water-savers” stay true to their conservation ideals when storage dams were overflowing? This was a key question for Queensland Premier Anna Bligh and her Government as they contemplated the latest version of the 50- year strategy for the state’s water supply security. The strategy was first drafted during the record-setting “Millennium Drought” and at a time of healthy budget surplus. It was prepared by the Queensland Water Commission (QWC), the independent statutory authority established in 2006 to carry out radical reform of water supply and distribution in South East Queensland. The QWC took control of water supply systems previously owned by 18 different local governments, and committed the state to fast-tracking the $9 billion development of a new “water grid” of pipelines to link existing and new dams with plants to manufacture water by recycling and desalination. It also launched the highly successful “Target 140” which more than halved the pre-drought daily water consumption, with a combination of usage restrictions and the promotion of water-efficient and water-storage appliances through the Home WaterWise Rebate Scheme (HWWRS). Water consumption continued at low levels even after the drought was declared officially over in May 2009, and above-average rainfall drenched the region. By May 2010, most of the dams in South East Queensland were full to overflowing, while the recycling and desalination plants continued to pump out product. However, the state budget was $2 billion in deficit. There were suggestions that the water grid was a “white elephant” which was loading residents with excessive costs for what had been a low-priced commodity delivered locally. The grid had been designed to ensure the state’s growing population could expect access to 230 litres per person a day, with greater restrictions a once in 25-year occurrence. One third This case was written by Janet Tyson, Australia and New Zealand School of Government, for Dr Anne Tiernan, Griffith University, as an epilogue to the case studies 2008-65.1 and 2008-65.2 which detail the policy development and implementation of the Home WaterWise Rebate Scheme. Cases are not necessarily intended as a complete account of the events described. While every reasonable effort has been made to ensure accuracy at the time of publication, subsequent developments may mean that certain details have since changed. This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence, except for logos, trademarks, photographs and other content marked as supplied by third parties. No licence is given in relation to third party material. Version 17-05-2010. Distributed by the Case Program, The Australia and New Zealand School of Government, www.anzsog.edu.au. of all water would be supplied by recycling and desalination, with power stations and major industry routinely using recycled water.1 By 2010, over half of the planned 450 km of pipeline had been built to enable water to be transferred anywhere within the South East Queensland network. The $2.4 billion Western Corridor Recycling Project was in action, though as yet contributing little to overall supply. Only one of four originally proposed desalination plants had been built, yet the need for them had increased after the Federal Government vetoed construction of a major new dam at Traveston Crossing on the Mary River, on environmental grounds. However, the concept of desalination had become “deeply unpopular” with concerns over energy consumption and efficiency. The State Government had refused to take ownership of the $1.2 billion desalination plant at Tugun on the Gold Coast until problems including rusting pipes and faulty valves had been fixed to its satisfaction. More than a year after the plant began producing water, the contractors admitted they would not meet the June 2010 deadline for repairs to be completed: their best estimate was “before the end of 2010.” 2 The best way to delay further construction of desalination plants, residents were told, was to maintain their WaterWise ways. Water wise and water wary The Queensland Water Commission had borne the brunt of criticism about the water reform program, from difficulties with construction to concerns about the new governance of water distribution and retail. Changes to bulk distribution, now under the control of a water grid manager, were introduced from 1 July 2008, while changes that would confine the retail sale of water to three local government groups were to be introduced from July 2010 – along with further, and very unpopular, increases in the costs to users. By contrast, there was almost universal community acceptance and support for the QWC’s demand management program, “Target 140 (litres per day)”, reducing daily per person water consumption to less than half its pre-2006 levels of 300 litres or more. Residents had rushed to take advantage of subsidies available through the Home WaterWise Rebate Scheme (HWWRS), to install water-efficient home appliances, and water storage tanks, sales of which had soared. The Department of Natural Resources and Water, administering the HWWRS, had been almost overwhelmed by initial demand for rebates. From March 2008, following a departmental review, the scheme was fine-tuned to restrict subsidies to plumbed- in tanks. However demand for water-saving devices remained steady while daily personal use – at times a matter of civic pride - often dipped as low as 128 litres. Consumption stayed low when the region began to get significant rain in June and July 2008, with many residents resisting the opportunity to splash out after the QWC lifted restrictions from the extreme level 6 of 140 litres per person per day to the “high level” of 150 litres per person per day. At the same time, people continued to express suspicion about the processes and quality control for water at the $2.5 billion Western Corridor Recycling Plant, due to open on 3 December 2008. Two years earlier, 62 percent of Toowoomba residents had voted to reject 1 Australian Associated Press: Main points in South East Qld Water strategy 26-03-2008, accessed Australia/New Zealand Reference Centre (ANZRC) 3-5-10 Accession no:74C1176866032 2 Ardern,L, ‘No end to desal dramas’, Gold Coast Bulletin, 24-03-2010, accessed ANZRC 28-4-2010, Accession number 20100324B007658222 2 “poo water” being added to their water supply.3 The recycling system was designed to treat sewage and waste water to levels of purity that would allow it to be used to top up dams in the region, and therefore become drinking water – although its primary purpose was to supply industry such the power generation plants at Swanbank and Tarong. Premier Anna Bligh was a very visible promoter of the development, paying “countless hard-hat visits”, while her deputy Paul Lucas, had publicly toasted the future of recycled water “like it was sweet nectar.”4 But opposition politicians and others continued to highlight concerns, helped by problems with spillage and leaks.5 In November, as the region continued to get significant rain, and dams continued to fill, Anna Bligh assured voters that plans to mix recycled water into dam supplies would only proceed if storage levels again fell below the critical 40 percent level. She rejected opposition claims that this made the pipeline a waste of money and said its use by industry vindicated the project. “$2.5 billion in our major recycled water project is money well spent,” she said. “All of that adds up to good sense, good policy.”6 On 9 December 2008, Bligh announced that the Home WaterWise Rebate Scheme would end on 31 December, six months early, and despite some complaints about lack of consultation, particularly from water tank suppliers, the decision stood. In the mid-year Fiscal and Economic Review it was reasoned the scheme had run its course, and successfully achieved its outcomes. As well as the newly opened recycling plant, other supply sources such as desalinated water from the Tugun plant were about to come onstream, the government argued. Water storage tanks had been installed in 36 percent of houses in the region, and 237,000 rebates had been paid out. Few of the proud owners of new storage tanks, thanks to the HWWRS remembered that, back in the 1960’s, water tanks had often been forcibly removed as a health hazard, the breeding grounds for mosquitos carrying diseases like malaria and dengue fever. While most of today’s tanks incorporated mosquito-proof valves, there were still issues about keeping long- term water storage clean, and tanks continued to be promoted for water storage. All new houses were required to have internally plumbed storage for 70,000 litres of water. Water surplus and budget deficit Axing the HWWRS scheme early would save an estimated $18 million. This was an important consideration as the global financial crisis had already whittled down the government’s June budget surplus prediction from $809m to $54 million. By early 2009, in the wake of the global crisis, the state was looking at a deficit of $1.6 billion. It was, however, still raining, and over the catchments of South East Queensland’s dams. When Premier Bligh called an early election, after the state’s credit rating was downgraded, the opposition made much of the troubles with new water infrastructure. “This government can’t do a project without it breaking down…The water grid is in tatters: they’ve got a rusting desalination plant on the Gold Coast, and now they’ve got a leaking recycled water pipeline,” a spokesperson declared, suggesting this raised “real questions about the safety of the 3 Chambers, G ‘Mayor supports “poo water”plan’, Gold Coast Bulletin 16-12-2009, accessed from ANZRC 28/04/2010, accession number 20091216B002463127 4 Johnstone, C, ‘Costs cloud clear water enterprise’, Courier-Mail, 30-04-2010.