The British and Peace in Northern Ireland: the Process and Practice of Reaching Agreement Edited by Graham Spencer Index More Information

Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-04287-2 - The British and Peace in Northern Ireland: The Process and Practice of Reaching Agreement Edited by Graham Spencer Index More information

Index

9/11. See Al Qaeda attacks on US Ahern, Patrick (Bertie) 10 Downing Street. See Prime Minister’s aspiration to rejoin Commonwealth, 100 Office on government with Sinn Fein,´ 328 involvement in negotiations, 167, 195–6 ‘acts of completion’ and John Major, 74 issues relating to, 152–3 and Tony Blair, 146, 150, 187, 246–7, Joint Declaration (2003), 166 262–3, 311, 326 talks on, 149 Al Qaeda attacks on US (9/11), impact of, 238, Tony Blair calls for, 149, 296 283, 311–12 see also cessation of conflict; Alliance Party, 58, 74, 141, 150, 265 decommissioning ambiguity Adams, Gerry abandonment of, 289–90 and Albert Reynolds, 210–11 Anglo-Irish Agreement, 48–9 assessment of, 144, 197, 242–3 clarity and, 88, 263–4, 295, 312–13, 320 and ceasefire, 256, 267–8 ‘constructive ambiguity’, 22, 263–4, 281, choice of political solution, 269–70 313–14 and David Trimble, 148–9, 169, 197–8 Good Friday Agreement, 295 and decommissioning, 233, 238, 242, 284, importance of, 3, 14–15, 93 287, 288–9, 321–2 religion and, 282 desire for peace, 191–2 Sinn Fein´ and, 205 and Good Friday Agreement, 232 specificity in relation to, 281 ‘Groundhog Day’ reference, 229–30, 260 talking as source of, 294 and IRA, 306, 308–9 as theme, 14 and John Hume, 30–1, 129, 184, 210–11, understanding of, 82 245, 254–5 unionist parties and, 205 and Joint Declaration, 158, 164, 167 see also pragmatism and principle, Jonathan Powell writes speeches for, 325–6 balancing of leadership abilities, 87, 94–5, 171–2, 309, Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) 315 ambiguity, 48–9 and Martin McGuinness, 279–80 breakdown of negotiations, possibility of, meeting with DUP, 316–17 47–9 on negotiating with British, 90 British approach, key factors, 35–6, 38–9 negotiational approach, 92, 99, 110, 154, collaboration and cooperation, emphasis on, 242–3, 287–8, 297–8, 302–3, 305, 33 306–7, 318, 320, 321, 323 communique´ post-conclusion, 51 and Northern Bank robbery, 283, 315–16 comparison of British and Irish approaches, on reduction of British Army presence, 43 318–19 consent principle, 1–6, 44, 111 sense of history, 295–6 ‘constitutional status’, use of term, 49 and Tony Blair, 311–12 devolution, 65 US visit, 130–1, 139–40, 210–11 early British proposals, Irish response to, 42

335

© in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-04287-2 - The British and Peace in Northern Ireland: The Process and Practice of Reaching Agreement Edited by Graham Spencer Index More information

336 Index

Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) (cont.) attacks by paramilitary groups. See loyalist final draft, 45, 49–50 organisations; Provisional Irish Garret FitzGerald, and see FitzGerald, Republican Army (PIRA) Garret historical continuity within, 98–9 Belfast Agreement. See Good Friday Intergovernmental Conference. See Agreement (1998) Intergovernmental Conference Belfast Harbourmaster’s speech (October Irish constitutional claims, 63–8 2002). See Blair, Tony Irish Government’s consultative role, 48, Blair, Tony 51–2 achievement summarised, 199–200 Irish note, British response to, 43 and Bertie Ahern, 146, 150, 187, 246–7, Margaret Thatcher, and see Thatcher, 262–3, 311, 326 Margaret calls for ‘acts of completion’, 238–9, meetings, 44–5 296 negotiational process, 45 charisma, 228 negotiations, 29–30, 33–8, 39–40, commitment to peace process, 187 41–52 and decommissioning, 190–1 Northern Ireland Civil Service and, 29 emphasis on maintaining momentum, operation of. See Intergovernmental 188–9, 192, 227 Conference and Good Friday Agreement, 192–9, 233 opposition to, 63 Harbourmaster’s speech (October 2002), order of construction, 44 149, 281–2, 289–90 origins of peace process, 1–2, 6 Hillsborough talks (April 2003), 149 peace process after, 51–2, 114 and Ian Paisley, 281–2 preliminary discussions, 40–1 John Major compared, 187–8, 192–3, 197, presentation post-conclusion, 51 199–200, 227, 275–6 Provisional IRA (PIRA) attacks, effect on and Mo Mowlam, 97 negotiations, 52 and multiparty negotiations, 75 security cooperation, British focus on, 64 negotiational style, 187–8 significance of, 37–8 ‘peace train’ metaphor, 221 Sinn Fein,´ aim of marginalising, 116 Royal Agricultural Society speech (May success of, 36 1997), 188–91 Sunningdale Agreement contrasted, 48 and Sinn Fein,´ 189, 190 timescale of negotiations, 44–5 speechwriting, 324–5 unionist opposition, 46–7, 50, 52–3, 64–5, strength of mandate, 188 68 transition from Major Government. See Anglo-Irish relations transition between governments background to, 9 and unionists, 189–90 cohesion, 331–2 Bloody Friday and origins of peace process, consultation and cooperation 4–5 emphasis on, 33 Bloody Sunday and origins of peace process, proposals for, 27–8 4–5 dialogue, contrasting approaches, Bloomfield, Sir Kenneth 257–8 on drafting of documents and speeches, 9, and European Union, 51–2 17–32 Falklands War, 38–40, 41 involvement in peace process, 66, 151 joint authority. See joint authority bombings. See loyalist organisations; Joint Declaration. See Joint Declaration Provisional Irish Republican Army (2003) (PIRA) see also Anglo-Irish Agreement; British Army, reduction of presence, 294, negotiations 318–19 Armstrong of Ilminster, Robert Armstrong, British Commonwealth. See Commonwealth Lord of Nations (Commonwealth) on Anglo-Irish Agreement, 9, 33–53 British Government involvement in negotiations, 1–6, 98–9 acknowledges stalemate situation, 299–300

Index 337

belief in military victory, 87–8, 109–10, Campbell, Alastair, Irish Diaries, 212 256 Catholic community. See nationalist clarity in negotiations, preference for, 295–6 community; republican movement consent to international involvement in ceasefires. See loyalist organisations; peace process, 225–6 Provisional Irish Republican Army constitutional issue, perspective on, 57–8 (PIRA) contact with PIRA. See ‘link, the’ cessation of conflict cost of conflict, 109 acknowledgement of stalemate situation, drafting of documents and speeches. See 299–300 drafting of documents and speeches IRA acknowledges, 153–4 Government of Ireland Act 1920. See verification as issue, 152–3 Government of Ireland Act 1920 Chastelain, General John de imbalanced relationship with nationalists British consent to appointment, 225 and unionists, 206–7 IICD chairman, 95–6, 144–5, 288 ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest’ influence, 225–6 statement. See ‘Whitbread’ speech press conference, 149–50, 169, 218, 286, objectives for peace, 151–2 304, 308, 315, 317–18 policy shortcomings, 1922–72, 209 reports on decommissioning, 149–50 relations with Irish Government. See ‘Chiffon’. See ‘link, the’ Anglo-Irish relations Chilcot, Sir John transition between governments. See drafting of text, 265 transition between governments on negotiational approach, 10, 79–100 see also Northern Ireland Office (NIO); permanent secretary, 66, 101, 128–9, United Kingdom 154 ‘British presence’ speech. See ‘Whitbread’ Chile, parallels with Northern Ireland, 148 speech civil rights campaign, student marches, 121 British withdrawal civil servants Harold Wilson considers, 4 analytical approach, 258–9 talks about, 315 dialogue between, British and Irish Brooke, Peter contrasted, 257–8 ‘British presence’ speech. See ‘Whitbread’ educational background, influence of, 96 speech importance of role, 6–7 commitment to political settlement, 68, 69, Martin McGuinness on trusting, 292 102, 112–13, 114, 260–1 trust-building, 258 secretary of state, 13–14, 22–3, 24, 30, 67, see also drafting of documents and 83, 114, 122, 202, 209, 255 speeches; Northern Ireland Civil see also Brooke/Mayhew talks Service Brooke/Mayhew talks (1991–3) civil unrest pre-1969, 120–1 commencement, 124 Clinton, Bill Dublin meeting (September 1992), 125–6 hosts Irish investment conference, 139 leaks to media, 125 and Tony Blair, 188–9, 195–6 progression, 125 US president, 134–5 three-strand structure, 124–5 visits Northern Ireland, 140, 273–4 Brown, Gordon collusion by security forces. See Cory and Brian Cowen, 282–3 Collusion Inquiry and Mo Mowlam, 97 Combined Loyalist Military Command Bush, George W. (CLMC). See loyalist organisations Hillsborough talks (April 2003), 149 commemorations, Haass recommendations, involvement in peace process, 152 332–3 Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth), Cabinet Official Committee on Northern Bertie Ahern aspires to rejoin, 100 Ireland, establishment of, 66 communities, conflicts within. See Cahill, Joe, allowed US visa, 85 intercommunal conflicts Callaghan, James (Jim), contingency planning conflict, end. See ‘acts of completion’; for intervention, 79 cessation of conflict

338 Index

consent principle Darlington conference (1972), drafting of Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1–6, 44, 111 documents and speeches, 27–8 centrality of, 26, 27–8 decommissioning ‘constitutional guarantee’, 57, 58, 68, ‘collective act of reconciliation’ proposal, 69–70, 72, 77 232–3 Downing Street Declaration, 111 creative problem-solving, 95–6 Dublin Summit agreement on, 60–2 devolution and, 195, 196–7, 244–5 emphasis on, 14–15, 110–11 difficulties, 180–3, 218 Frameworks for the Future, 111–12 Downing Street talks and proposals (1999), Good Friday Agreement, 112, 230 233–4 importance, 214–15 first act of, 144–5 Irish acceptance, 57 Good Friday Agreement, 116–17, 230, 289 Joint Declaration, 153 Hillsborough Castle talks and declaration republicans and, 215 (1999), 232–3 Sunningdale Agreement, 2–3 importance of, 327–8 Whitbread speech, 70–1 International Independent Commission on Constitution. See Irish constitutional claims; Decommissioning (IICD). See Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 Chastelain, General John de Constitutional Convention (1974), drafting of Irish Government’s negotiational stance, 90 documents and speeches, 28 issue of, 152–3 ‘constitutional guarantee’. See consent Joint Declaration, 167–8, 169–70 principle language differences as to, 273 ‘constitutional imperative’. See Irish Mitchell Principles, 182 constitutional claims Mitchell Report (1996), 180–1, 182 constitutional status, change in murder of Robert McCartney, effect of, 284 Anglo-Irish Agreement, 49 Northern Bank robbery, effect of, 284 British position, 41–2 PIRA commitment, 285 consent principle. See consent principle progress, 149–50 see also sovereignty, transfer of progress reports, 234 consultation and cooperation significance of, 290 Anglo-Irish. See Anglo-Irish relations strategic approach to negotiations, 288–90 Northern Irish, unionist opposition, 60 talks, 140 Cooke, David unfulfilled promises, 220 on drafting of Joint Declaration, 12, Washington Three conditions, 180–1, 182 147–74 Weston Park proposals (July 2001), 237 involvement in peace process, 66, 83, ‘demilitarisation’. See ‘normalisation’ 101 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Cory Collusion Inquiry, Weston Park boycotting of talks, 71, 141 proposals and, 162–3 and decommissioning, 284, 287, 288 Council of Ireland and devolution of justice and policing, establishment of, 1–2 296–7 opposition to, 3 district councils, 126, 127, 128, 142 counter-terrorism. See security electoral support, 141, 149–50, 243 courts End to Drift, An, 52–3 Anglo-Irish Agreement and ‘Diplock’ and Good Friday Agreement, 76, 149, 153, courts, 63–4 198, 205, 240–1, 281 devolution, 152–3, 164, 165, 166, and Irish Government, 265 167, 168–9, 170, 209, 293, 296–7, and Joint Declaration, 150, 170 300–1, 332 meeting with Bill Clinton, 140 Cowen, Brian multiparty negotiations, 74–5, 76–7, 252–3 and decommissioning, 167–8 negotiational approach, 281, 315, 319 and Gordon Brown, 282–3 negotiational strength, 172–3, 281, 297–8 involvement in peace process, 167 negotiational tactics, 278 Weston Park proposals, 161–2 and Northern Ireland Executive (1998), ‘Crossroads’ speech, drafting of, 23–4 192–3, 197–8

Index 339

power-sharing, 87 Divis Street Riots (1964), Ian Paisley and, and reduction of British Army presence, 294 120–1 relations with, 286, 293, 302–3, 304 documents returns to talks, 125–6, 174 dialogue in relation, 216–17, 259 and Sinn Fein,´ 278, 306–7, 316–17, 326–7 drafting of. See drafting of documents and and UUP, 87, 150 speeches withdraws from talks, 75, 125, 141, 248 in negotiations, 216–17, 322–3 see also Paisley, Ian; Robinson, Peter see also single text negotiation Devlin, Patrick (Paddy), 2–3, 4 peace process as text-driven process, 224 devolution Downing Street. See Prime Minister’s Office Anglo-Irish Agreement, 53, 65 Downing Street Declaration (1993) Constitutional Convention (1974), 28 consent principle, 111 deadlock as to, 197–8, 229–30, 233, 239–40 exchange of letters, 130–1 decommissioning and, 195, 196–7, 244–5 Irish constitutional claims, 71–3 devolved government. See Northern Ireland and Joint Declaration, 159–60 Executive loyalist paramilitary response, 131 DUP and, 296–7 publication, 130 Framework for Accountable Government in drafting of documents and speeches Northern Ireland, A, 138 ambiguity, 22 integration and, 60 anticipating responses to texts, 86, 261–2 Irish Government and, 33–4, 36, 65 background to, 9, 12, 13–14 Joint Declaration, 166 civil servants’ role, 22 justice and policing, 152–3, 164, 165, 167, civil servants’ role in speech-writing, 21 168–9, 170, 209, 293, 296–7, 300–1, clarity as to likely effect, 93–4 332 concealment and transparency in relation, Mitchell Review and, 247–8 260–1 as objective, 66–7, 283–4 Constitutional Convention (1974), 28 power-sharing and, 126–7, 209–10 constitutional White Paper (24 March ‘rolling devolution’, failure of, 38–40 1972), 26–7 SDLP and, 57 continuity and change, balancing of suspension. See direct rule emphases, 262 unionist support, 29–30, 60 contribution to peace process, 32 see also new institutional framework ‘Crossroads’ speech, 23–4 d’Hondt procedure, use of, 234–5 dialogue and text in relation, 216–17, 259 dialogue difference between draft and final text, alteration of text, 292–3 223–4 ambiguity and clarity in relation, 281 equivalence in responding to texts, 255 background to role of, 14 exchange of views, facilitation by text, between civil servants, British and Irish 273–4 contrasted, 257–8 expression, limits of, 94 collapse of the Executive, after, 277 fiftieth anniversary speech, 25–6 with PIRA. See ‘link, the’ Future Development of the Parliament and private dialogue, 277–8, 280–1, 292–3 Government of Northern Ireland, The text in relation, 216–17, 259 (consultative document) (1 January see also exploratory dialogue; negotiations 1971), 26 ‘Diplock’ courts, Anglo-Irish Agreement and, Future of Northern Ireland, The (discussion 63–4 document) (November 1972), 27–8 direct rule inclusiveness and, 254–5 commencement, 27 interpretation by British and Irish reintroduction, 138, 148–9, 235–6, 258–9, contrasted, 256–8 268, 274–5 interpretation by republicans and unionists district councils contrasted, 265–8 Sir Patrick Mayhew visits, 128 introduction, 17–18 views on British Government intentions, Joint Declaration, 153–67 126 language and meaning, 272–3

340 Index

drafting of documents and speeches (cont.) and Good Friday Agreement, 329 language tone, 274 support for peace process, 113 language, use of, 160, 272–3 exclusively peaceful means, principle of length of text, 93 and decommissioning, 290 meaning of words, 272–3 Sinn Fein´ and, 290–1 means to end, texts as, 269–70 Executive. See Northern Ireland Executive Northern Ireland Civil Service, 18, 19 exploratory dialogue Northern Ireland Government, 19–20 announcement of, 134 Northern Ireland Ofﬁce, 22–3 conditions for, 133–4 ‘On the Runs’ (OTRs) issue, 270–1 loyalist organisations, 136–9 O’Neill/Lamass meeting communique,´ Sinn Fein,´ 135, 137–8, 139–40, 141 21–2 timing of commencement, 135 persuasiveness, 262 political analysis and, 253–4 Falklands War and Anglo-Irish relations, political developments and, 254 38–40, 41 ‘Pottinger’ speech, 20 Faulkner, Brian pragmatism and principle, balancing of, ﬁftieth anniversary speech, 25–6 262, 271–2 leads Northern Ireland Executive (1974), private agreements, 259–60 121 private dialogue and, 292–3 on Sunningdale Agreement, 1–3 process, 252–3 Fianna Fail´ Queen’s Speeches, 20–1 and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 68 reform declaration (1968), 24–5 and constitutional claims amendment, secretary of state’s input, 274–5 69–70 speeches foundation, 56 context of, 325 opposition to consent principle, 60 cooperation in writing, 325–6 opposition to partition, 56–7 value of, 261, 305 Fine Gael speechwriters, 324–5 and constitutional claims, 57 strategic approach, 93 foundation of, 56 tactical approach, 93 Fitt, Gerard (Gerry), 24–5, 26–7, 121 during talks, 265 Fittall, William tone of language, 274 on drafting of documents, 13–14, too much text, 269 252–76 transparency and concealment in relation, principal private secretary, 161, 162–3 260–1 FitzGerald, Garret videoconferencing, 30 Anglo-Irish Agreement, 29–30, 33–5, 36, ‘Whitbread’ speech, 30–1 37–8, 40–1, 46, 47–8, 98–9, 116 Dublin Summit (1980), agreement on consent constitutional reform attempts, 62 principle, 60–2 and Margaret Thatcher, 34–5, 39, 40, 41, 43, Dungannon, Sir Patrick Mayhew visits, 127 45–6, 50 New Ireland Forum. See New Ireland Forum economy forgiveness. See reconciliation Census 2001, 151 Framework for Accountable Government in ‘peace dividend’ from Good Friday Northern Ireland, A (1995), 138–9, Agreement, 78 179–80 unionist concerns, 59 Frameworks for the Future (1985), 111–12 elections for representation at multiparty fugitives. See ‘On the Runs’ (OTRs) negotiations (1996). See multiparty Future Development of the Parliament and negotiations Government of Northern Ireland, The Elizabeth II, Queen, Martin McGuinness (consultative document) (1 January toasts, 263 1971), drafting of, 26 End to Drift, An (1987), 52–3, 64–5 Future of Northern Ireland, The (discussion European Union document) (November 1972), drafting Anglo-Irish relations and, 51–2 of, 27–8

Index 341

Good Friday Agreement (1998) Guzman,´ Patricio, Nostalgia for the Light ambiguity, 295 (film), 147 background to negotiational challenges, 14 Brooke/Mayhew talks. See Brooke/Mayhew Haass, Richard, recommendations on parades, talks symbols and commemorations, 332–3 comprehensiveness, 230 Harbourmaster’s speech (October 2002). See consent principle, 112, 230 Blair, Tony decommissioning. See decommissioning Haughey, Charles difference between draft and final text, and consent principle, 60–1, 62, 63 223–4 and constitutional claims amendment, ‘double referendum’, 76, 77, 142–3 69–70 Downing Street Declaration. See Downing and Margaret Thatcher, 38–40, 60–1 Street Declaration and New Ireland Forum, 62–3 early talks, 69–71 Heath, Edward, and Sunningdale Agreement, effects of, 76–8 2–3, 47 and European Union, 329 Hill, David, on ‘constitutional issue’, 10, framework text for negotiations, 114, 55–78 118–19 Hillsborough talks (April 2003), and Joint implementation difficulties. See Declaration, 149 implementation of Good Friday history Agreement Haass recommendations on parades, implementation proposals. See Weston Park symbols and commemorations, proposals 332–3 interpretational differences between parties, high politics approach to peace process, 295 147 key agreements, 75–6, 142–3 and memory, parallels with Chilean multiparty negotiations. See multiparty ‘Disappeared’, 148 negotiations 1996–8 peace process as historical narrative, 90–1 naming of, 223 sense of, 287–8, 305 negotiations process. See negotiations Holmes, Sir John new institutional framework. See new private secretary, 275–6, 324–5 institutional framework on transition between governments, 12, Northern Ireland ministers, provision for 177–200 removal, 231 Hume, John policing, 76, 230 on Europe, 329 preliminary developments, 63–8 and Gerry Adams, 30–1, 86, 129, 139–40, prisoner releases, 76, 230 184, 210–11, 245, 253, 306–7 responses to, 55, 76, 149, 295, 323 and Irish Government, 29–30, 34, 191, and Sunningdale Agreement, 3, 209–10, 254 221 and John Major, 254–5 three-strand structure, 67, 74–5, 89, 115 negotiational role, 92 transition between governments, 192–9 and New Ireland Forum, 62–3 see also implementation of Good Friday Nobel Peace Prize, 108 Agreement and power-sharing, 26 Goodall, Sir David and SDLP, 87 on Anglo-Irish Agreement, 9, 33–53 sense of identity, 96 British negotiator at Intergovernmental strategic approach, 25–6, 87 Conference, 40 and US involvement, 85 Government of Ireland Act 1920, Irish unity willingness to compromise, 87 provisions, 57 hunger strikes and origins of peace process, 5 Gow, Ian, 49 Great Hatred, Little Room (Jonathan Powell), implementation of Good Friday Agreement 258, 270–1, 275, 304 alternative approaches, possibilities for, Greysteele massacre (1993), effect on peace 244–8 process, 129–30 background, 13

342 Index

implementation of Good Friday intercommunal conflicts Agreement (cont.) challengers’ objectives, 105–6 bilateral negotiations (April 2000), 236–7 differences between incumbents and Civil Service perspective, 250–1 challengers, 106 and continuation of PIRA activity, 238–9 features of, 103–4 and continuation of violence and disorder, incumbents’ objectives, 105 243–4 introduction, 101–3 decommissioning. See decommissioning preconditions to settlement Downing Street talks and proposals (1999), all-party confidence in peace process, 233–4 108–9, 112–13, 114 ‘Groundhog Day’, description as, 229–30 conflict not best chance of achieving Hillsborough Castle talks and declaration goals, 107, 109–10, 113 (March 1999), 232–3 cost of continuing conflict is introduction, 229–30 unacceptable, 106–7, 109, 113 lack of comprehensiveness, 239–40 external stakeholders’ support, 109, 113, language sensitivities, 231–2 114 lessons from, 248–50 grievances capable of peaceful resolution, literal approach, 231–2 107–8, 110, 113 Mitchell Review (September 1999), 235–6 meeting of in Israeli–Palestinian dispute, public statements, use of, 232 113–14 Sinn Fein’s´ approach, 242 meeting of in Northern Ireland, 109–13 unionist opposition, 240–2 prospective all-party acceptance of deal, Way Forward, The, 233 108, 110–12, 114 Weston Park proposals (July 2001), 237 process of settlement, importance of, 114 willing participation, need for, 231 settlement of, 10–11 inclusiveness threat of violence, leverage from, 116–17 author’s early political experience, 120–1 Intergovernmental Conference background to, 11 establishment of, 40 Brooke/Mayhew talks. See Brooke/Mayhew meetings, 43–4 talks operation of, 64 contacts with paramilitary organisations, intergovernmental relations. See Anglo-Irish 128–33, 143–4, 145–6 relations see also ‘link, the’ International Independent Commission on and convergence of differences, 262–3 Decommissioning (IICD). See district councils, visits to, 126–8, 142 decommissioning exploratory dialogue. See exploratory international involvement in peace process dialogue British Government’s consent to, 225–6 importance of, 331 scope post-Joint Declaration, 152 introduction, 120 see also European Union; United States multiparty negotiations. See multiparty Irish-Americans negotiations fact-finding group visit, 129–30 Northern Ireland Executive as model, 121 shift in thinking after 9/11, 284–5 Northern Ireland Office, work of. See support for Anglo-Irish Agreement, 48 Northern Ireland Office withdrawal of support for PIRA, 283 Political Affairs Division, work of. See Irish Civil War, political consequences, 56–7 Northern Ireland Office Irish constitutional claims prison regime reforms, 122 amendment US involvement, 134–5, 139–40 achievement of, 77 Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) initiatives for, 62, 69–70 establishment, 290 offers of, 40–1, 71 proposal for, 152–3 support for, 69–70 institutional reform. See new institutional Anglo-Irish Agreement, 63–8 framework background to ‘constitutional issue’, 10, 55 integration with United Kingdom, unionist Belfast Agreement. See Good Friday support for, 60 Agreement (1998)

Index 343

British objective of amendment, 41–2, 46 Joint Declaration (2003) British perspective, 57–8 achievement in international context, 174 ‘constitutional imperative’, 31–2, 69, acts of completion, 166 110–11 aims, 147, 167 Downing Street Declaration, 71–3 assessment of, 170–1 drafting of constitution of 1937, 56–7 background, 12, 148–53 Frameworks for the Future, 111–12 British negotiation critiqued, 169–74 multiparty negotiations 1996–8, 74–6 chronology, 174–5 nationalist perspective, 56–7 consent principle, 153 negotiations during 1980s, 60–3 devolution, 166 negotiations during 1990–2, 69–71 and Downing Street Declaration, 159–60 Sunningdale Agreement, 3, 31–2 drafting of, 153–67 Supreme Court ruling, 69 hypothetical impact of, 170 unionist perspectives, 58–60 introduction, 147–8 Irish Diaries (Alastair Campbell), 212 key issues, 152–3 Irish Free State key personalities, 167 accepts partition, 56–7 lessons learned, 169 creation, 56–7 negotiation with Sinn Fein,´ 173 Irish Government Northern Ireland Office and, 153–7 contact with loyalist organisations, 146 other issues, 153 and decommissioning, 90 phases in negotiations, 168–9 and DUP, 265 place within peace process, 148–9 opposition to consent principle, 60 political manoeuvrings, 150 relations with British Government. See publication, 149 Anglo-Irish relations revision of draft, 163 relationship with nationalists and unionists, single text negotiation, 166–7 compared with British Government’s, sufficient consensus principle, 173 206–7 varied approach to issues, 167–8 Irish Labour Party, 57, 60, 62, 63, 68 and Weston Park proposals (July 2001), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) 161–3 ceasefire, 144–5 justice system. See courts; policing ceasefire talks, 143–4 contact with, 146 King, Tom, 22–3, 24, 30 and Joint Declaration, 150–1 Irish Republic language Constitution. See Irish constitutional claims drafting of documents and speeches, 160 cost of conflict, 109 in negotiations, 90 see also Irish Free State; Irish Government leaks to media, use of, 125, 129–30 Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP). See ‘link, the’ Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) breaking news of secret exchanges, Irish Supreme Court, constitutional claims 130 ruling, 69 ‘Chiffon’, code name, 129 Irish unity existence, 80, 128–9, 218, 253 nationalist support for, 58 intelligence assessment, 80 see also Irish constitutional claims reliability, 80 Israeli–Palestinian conflict, preconditions for Loyalist Commission, establishment, 145 settlement of, 113–14 loyalist organisations ceasefire (October 1994), 73, 133–4 Jeffrey, Sir William (Bill) Combined Loyalist Military Command on implementing Good Friday Agreement, (CLMC), 130–1, 133, 134, 140–1, 13, 229–51 145 involvement in peace process, 161, 162–3 contact with, 130–3, 144, 145–6 joint authority cost of conflict, 109 ‘consultative structures’ agreement, 36 decommissioning of weapons. See Irish proposals, 34–5, 36 decommissioning

344 Index

loyalist organisations (cont.) district councils visits, 128, 142 and Downing Street Declaration, 131 Orange Order meeting visit, 131 exploratory dialogue, 135 Washington Three conditions as to fugitives. See ‘On the Runs’ (OTRs) decommissioning, 180–1, 182 Greysteele massacre (1993), 129–30 see also Brooke/Mayhew talks and Joint Declaration, 150–1 McGuinness, Martin reactive nature of violence, 109 and ceasefire, 256, 267–8 response to PIRA ending of ceasefire, 140–1 choice of political solution, 269–70 US funding for peace projects, 145–6 and decommissioning, 167–8, 242, 287, 288–9 Maccabe, Chris deputy first minister, 146, 192–3 on inclusiveness in peace process, 11, desire for peace, 191–2 120–46 exploratory dialogue, 137–8 involvement in peace process, 66, 101, 155, and Gerry Adams, 279–80 156, 172–3 and Good Friday Agreement, 303 Maginess, Brian, 18–19 ‘Groundhog Day’ reference, 260 Major, John and Ian Paisley, 198 and Albert Reynolds, 92–3 leadership abilities, 94–5, 171–2, 309 announces exploratory dialogues, 135, meetings with, 92, 137–8, 162–3 136–7 negotiational approach, 99, 154, 242–3, calls 1997 general election, 142 287–8, 297–8, 306–7, 318, 320, 323–4 and decommissioning, 180–3, 312–13, and Northern Bank robbery, 283, 284, 327–8 315–16 defeat in 1992 general election expected, on peace negotiations, 141 253–4, 264 and PIRA, 308, 315, 321 Downing Street Declaration, 130–1 on reduction of British Army presence, end of Government, 179–87 318–19 and Gerry Adams, 130–1 on self-determination, 129 and Hugh Smyth, 133, 134 sense of history, 305 and Joe Cahill visa, 85 toasts queen, 263 and John Hume, 254–5 and Tony Blair, 197, 305 momentum of peace talks, 303 on trusting civil servants, 292 and multiparty negotiations, 74 verbal abilities, 163 and PIRA, 302 McMichael, Gary, unofficial talks with British on talking with PIRA, 130 Government, 131–3 Tony Blair compared, 187–8, 192–3, 197, media 199–200, 227, 275–6 leaks. See leaks to media and Tory right wing, 87–8 negotiations and, 286–7, 326–7 transition to Blair Government. See minorities, conflicts involving. See transition between governments intercommunal conflicts and unionists, 179–80 minority participation in government Mallon, Seamus Good Friday Agreement, 78 critiques British Government policy, 170–1, Parliamentary Committees proposals, 25–6 172 see also power-sharing elected MP, 65 Misunderstanding Ulster (David Trimble), on Good Friday Agreement, 1–2 170–1 resigns as deputy first minister-designate, Mitchell, George 234–5 chairs multiparty negotiations, 74, 141, on Sunningdale Agreement, 221 142–3, 221 Mandelson, Peter consent to appointment, 225 secretary of state, 250 decommissioning principles, 182 suspends Northern Ireland Executive, 236 decommissioning report (1996), 180–1, 182 Mason, Roy, 79 influence, 225–6 Mayhew, Sir Patrick Review on implementation of Good Friday announces exploratory dialogues, 136–7 Agreement, 235–6

Index 345

Molyneaux, James background to British approach, 10, 12–13, and 1994 ceasefire, 327 14 and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 47–8 ‘bicycle theory’. See momentum below and Frameworks Document, 179–80 ‘big picture’. See strategic approach below and Irish Government, 265 big problems, dealing with, 291–2 and Margaret Thatcher, 47–8 body language, 323–4 meetings with, 29–30 ‘bottom line’, 226–7, 308 sense of identity, 96 breaking point, judging of, 215–16 and Sir Patrick Mayhew, 124–5 bureaucratic process, 83 Mowlam, Marjorie (Mo) ‘carrot and stick’ approach, 303–4 and Gerry Adams, 308 catastrophic events, effect of, 99 and Martin McGuinness, 308 ‘Catholic’ analysis, 225 Maze Prison visit, 142–3 change, attitudes to, 320–1 negotiational approach, 326 change in political context, 264–5 secretary of state, 83, 97, 102, 142, 187, 250 changes in direction and emphasis, 317–18 multiparty negotiations (1996–8) charisma, 228 Belfast Agreement. See Good Friday choreographing of, 217–18, 286 Agreement (1998) clarity Blair Government and, 75 preference for, 295–6 commencement, 184 shift to, 295 elections for representation, 74, 140–1, 184 clear objectives preparatory talks, 141 adjustment of, 226 progress, 75 advantages of, 98 Sinn Fein´ and, 184–7 keeping in view, 303 ‘strands’ of negotiations, 74–5 cohesion, 331–2 sufficient consensus principle, 74 ‘common ground’, 224–5 Murphy, Paul competitiveness, 219–20 Joint Declaration, 158 comprehensiveness and convergence in negotiational skill, 286 relation, 262–3 secretary of state, 149, 153–4 concessions, use of, 220–1 verbal abilities, 163 confidentiality, tactical use of, 94 contextual understanding, importance of, narrative. See historical narrative 96 nationalist community controlling pace of, 321–2 British Government’s relationship with, as cooperative task, 312 compared with Irish Government’s, deciding to continue, 84 206–7 detail, importance of, 282–3 ‘Catholic’ analysis of peace process, 225 differences in approach, 82–3 constitutional issue, perspective on, 56–7 different types of talks, strategy across, language sensitivities, 231–2 89–90, 125 participation in government. See minority discipline, 212 participation in government disorientation as tactic, 278 sense of identity, 96 dissident factions, danger of, 324 support for Irish unity, 58 distraction, use of, 291 see also nationalist parties drafting of text. See drafting of documents nationalist parties and speeches moral stance, 281–2 egotism, 219–20 negotiational stance, 90–1 embassies, role of, 85 participation in government. See minority empathy, 310 participation in government end planning, 209 negotiations end point, keeping in view, 303 acknowledgement of issues, 96 facilitating of, 86 ambiguity. See ambiguity familiarity with opponents, 219 analytical approach, 258–9 final moments, importance of, 314 as argument-winning, 310 firmness, 205–6

346 Index

negotiations (cont.) over-negotiation, 308–9 flexibility pace, control of, 321–2 conditions for, 296–8 parties’ priority points, 217 need for, 98 party discipline, 212 formality, degree of, 292, 302–3, 319 pausing, 84 friendship, 310–11 personal relationships, 311 goals, importance of clear, 84 as philosophical exercise, 310 ‘going down to the wire’, 314 PIRA attacks, effect of, 283–5 hearing and listening, difference between, planning and spontaneity in relation, 316 319 political thinking and party political historical understanding, advantages of, 99 thinking distinguished, 88 history, sense of, 287–8, 305 practical approach, 215 humour, use of, 221–2 pragmatic approach, 215 imbalance between nationalists and pragmatism and principle, balancing of, 88, unionists, 206–7 212–13, 290, 330 improvisation, 316–17 pre-emption, 318–19 inclusiveness. See inclusiveness pre-meeting planning, 292 independent chairs, 113 precise wording, 320 informality pressure, degree of, 311–12 degree of, 292, 302–3, 319 private agreements, 259–60 role of, 305 process, importance of, 84, 114 instinct, 318 process of talks, 125 interim positions as objective, 303 progressing of, 14 interpretative differences, 82 reconciliation as joint task, 312 meaning of, 83–4 keeping ahead, 318–19 prospects for, 88 language, skill in use of, 90 repetition, 320 latitude, 291 reporting back, 315 leaks to media, 129–30 responses, managing, 84–5 listening, 208–9, 228 right amount of talking, gauging, 207 listening and hearing, difference between, rightness to talk, 300, 302 319 shifts in position, 330–1 location, use of, 293–4, 309–10 ‘single text negotiation’, 115, 166–7, as logical exercise, 310 322 long-term strategy, 307–8 skill, 210–11 ‘mechanics of’, 322 speediness, 83, 207–8 media, use of, 286–7, 326–7 spontaneity, 218–19, 228, 316 metaphor, use of, 221 stalemate, 299 minimum demands, adherence to, 227 stalling tactics, 321–2 momentum, 83, 207–8, 284 stereotypes, 91–2 moral integrity, 83 strategic approach, 215, 275–6, 281 moral stance, 281–2 strategic use of statements, 87 neutral territory, use of, 293–4 strategy across different types of non-verbal communication, 323–4 negotiations, 89–90, 125 number of persons, 304 strategy and tactics, confusion between, observers, 208–9 98 officials and politicians, relationship sufficient consensus principle. See sufficient between, 92–3 consensus principle one-to-one conversations, 226 surprise, effect of, 315–16 organisations with paramilitary arm, suspension of, 125–6 difficulties with, 206 switching between strands, 89 outcome ‘symbolic leadership’, 79–80 accuracy of predictions, 87 symbolism, understanding of, 267–8, long-term change, 86, 87 286–7, 328–9 over-analysis, dangers of, 275–6 symmetry, 217–18

Index 347

tactical approach, 308–9 Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, talk and text in relation, 216–17, 259 ‘constitutional guarantee’, 57 text, use of, 322–3 Northern Ireland Executive (1974) ‘the link’, 80 appreciation of, 28, 121 third party, role of, 91 compromise and decision-making, 2–3 time management, 99 failure of, 1–2, 3 toughness, 211–12 as model of inclusiveness, 121 transition between ministers and Northern Ireland Executive (1998) governments, during, 97 d’Hondt procedure for nominating trust, 82, 94 ministers, 234–5 unfulfilled promises, 220 dialogue after collapse of, 277 US involvement, 85 establishment, 234–5 videoconferencing, 85 removal of ministers, Good Friday see also dialogue Agreement provision, 231 New Framework for Agreement, A (1995), restoration, 153, 236–7, 241, 300–1 139 suspension. See direct rule new institutional framework Northern Ireland Government British Government objective, 151–2 constitutional White Paper (24 March Good Friday Agreement, 75, 76–7, 78, 230, 1972), 26–7 252–3 drafting of documents and speeches, 19–20 New Ireland Forum Queen’s Speeches, 20–1 establishment of, 33–4, 42 Northern Ireland ministers. See Northern failure of, 62–3 Ireland Executive (1998) proposals by, 50 Northern Ireland Office (NIO) new political institutions. See new institutional and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 63–4 framework approach to talks process, 66–7, 83 ‘normalisation’ calibre of ministers, 102 consent principle, 152–3 consent principle, defence of, 61–2 Good Friday Agreement, 76 contact with loyalist organisations, 130–3 Joint Declaration, 165 contact with PIRA, 128 Northern Bank robbery, effect on peace contacts within political parties, 128 process, 283–5, 315–16 cooperation with Irish officials, 101–2 Northern Ireland drafting of documents and speeches. See Census 2001, 151 drafting of documents and speeches constitutional position. See consent experience and expertise, 65–6, 101 principle; Irish constitutional claims initiative on political settlement, 65–7 death toll, 151 and Joint Declaration, 153–7 institutional reform. See new institutional ministerial longevity, advantages of, 97–8 framework negotiations. See negotiations local government. See district councils permanent secretary, 201 post-conflict relationship with UK, 100 personnel changes, 161 Northern Ireland Assembly (1998) Political Affairs Division, 122–4 difficulties, 149 political analysis by, 253–4 suspension (October 2002), 149 political discussions within, 22–3, 28–9 Northern Ireland Assembly (2003), elections, role in relation to Government policy, 201 149–50 ‘Stormontgate’ (October 2002), 149 Northern Ireland Assembly (2007), trust-building, 258 inauguration, 146 unionist suspicion of, 178 Northern Ireland Civil Service videoconferencing, 30 and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 29 Northern Ireland Parliament, and partition, 57 and direct rule, 27 Northern Ireland Prison Service, prison regime drafting of documents and speeches, 18, 19 reforms, 122 perspective on Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) implementation, 250–1 establishment, 141 political discussions within, 28–9 and Joint Declaration, 150

348 Index

Omagh bomb (August 1998), effect on peace partition of Ireland process, 144–5, 315–16 nationalist perspective, 56–7 ‘On the Runs’ (OTRs) political consequences, 56 agreement on, 254–5 see also Irish constitutional claims drafting of documents, 164 Patten Review. See policing issue of, 259, 270–1, 274–5 peace process Joint Declaration, 152–3, 162 ambiguity and, 3, 14–15 O’Neill, Terence approach by present study, 1, 7 ‘Crossroads’ speech, 23–4 choreographing of, 286, 304 meeting with Sean´ Lamass, 21–2 chronology of, xiv–xxii Northern Ireland finance minister, 19 closing down, possibility of, 268–9 Northern Ireland prime minister, 20–1 commitment to peaceful means, 214 ‘Pottinger’ speech, 20 content and structure of present study, as reformer, 24–5 7–15 relations with ministers, 21 context and detail in relation, 204–5 resignation, 23–4 context and text in relation, 222 speech-writing ability, 19–20 continuation Orange Order perception of, 298 Parades. See parades prospects for, 100 Sir Patrick Mayhew visits meeting, 131 continuing process, sense of, 300–1 continuity, 95, 209–10 Paisley, Ian control, degree of, 227 and 1994 ceasefire, 327 creativity, 95–6, 204 and decommissioning, 287, 288, formal and informal mechanisms, timing of 323–4 usage, 102–3 desire for peace, 281–2 ‘high politics’ approach to history of, Divis Street Riots, 120–1 147 first minister, 146 historical context, 1–2 and Good Friday Agreement, 265 importance of process, 114 humour, 154 inclusiveness. See inclusiveness and Martin McGuinness, 198 international involvement, 152, meetings with, 29–30, 316–17 225–6 meets Bill Clinton, 140 interviews, author’s approach to, 7–9 moves amendment of Northern Ireland key developments, 102 Constitution Act 1973, 57 key principles, importance of, 214–15 and Paul Murphy, 155 as metaphorical process, 89 sense of identity, 96 momentum, 227, 303 and Tony Blair, 170, 311 moral dimension, 203–4 verbal abilities, 163 as narrative process, 90–1 withdraws from talks, 125 and political development, 203–4 Palestinian–Israeli conflict, preconditions for positional approach, 90–1 settlement of, 113–14 and reconciliation, 301 parades reduced Anglo-Irish involvement, Haass recommendations, 332–3 334 regulation of, 296–7 religious influence, 282 paramilitary activities stalemate, 210 ending of, Joint Declaration provision, studies of, 6 152–3, 164, 171 success in political terms, 222 organisations with paramilitary arm, surprise, effect of, 95 difficulties negotiating with, text and context in relation, 222 206 as text-driven process, 224 punishment beatings, 214 turning points, identification of, 95 see also loyalist organisations; Provisional use of term, 202 Irish Republican Army (PIRA) see also Anglo-Irish relations; exclusively Parliamentary Committees, minority peaceful means, principle of; participation in, 25–6 negotiations

Index 349

Phillips, Sir Jonathan Overseas Adviser, 177–8 drafting of documents, 159 unionist relations with, 178 involvement in peace process, 153–4, 155, Prior, James (Jim), ‘rolling devolution’, 38–40 157, 158, 161, 162–3, 167 prisoner releases on role of dialogue, 14, 277–301 agreement on, 167, 254–5 Pilling, Sir Joseph drafting of documents, 164, 168–9 drafting of documents, 158 Good Friday Agreement, 76, 230 involvement in peace process, 66, 157–8 issue of, 152–3 on negotiational approach, 12–13, 201–28 prisons. See Northern Ireland Prison Service permanent secretary, 101, 153–4 Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) political director, 156–7 boycotting of talks, 141 reference to, 249–50 and Combined Loyalist Military Command, policing 130–1 devolution, 152–3, 164, 165, 166, 167, contact with, 136, 146 168–9, 170, 209, 293, 296–7, 300–1, electoral support, 74, 145 332 exclusion from talks, 128 Good Friday Agreement, 76, 230 inclusion in talks, 11, 74, 120, 136–7, Patten Review, 152–3, 162–3 140–1, 142 political institutions, development of new. See visit to US, 134–5 new institutional framework see also Smyth, Hugh ‘Pottinger’ speech, drafting of, 20 Protestant community. See unionist Powell, Enoch, 31–2, 49, 60 community Powell, Jonathan Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) anecdotes by, 229–30 abandonment of armed struggle, 210–11 and Blair/Ahern meeting, 268 acknowledges end of conflict, 153–4 chief of staff, 145–6, 153–4, 156–7, 158, acknowledges stalemate situation, 299–300 159, 167, 187, 227, 246–7, 275–6 and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 50–1, 52 and ‘creative ambiguity’, 249 belief in military victory, 110 and decommissioning, 287 Canary Wharf bomb (February 1996), 73, on dining at home, 174 140–1, 180, 183, 206–7 drafting of documents, 158, 160 ceasefire Great Hatred, Little Room, 258–9, 270–1, breaking of, 75 275, 304 declaration (August 1994), 73, 131 Joint Declaration, 158, 162–3 ending (February 1996), 73, 140–1, 180, meetings with Sinn Fein,´ 162–3, 279–80, 183, 206–7 283–4, 287 renewal (July 1997), 75, 142–3 on negotiating Good Friday Agreement, 14, unionist response, 327 302–29 claims to governance of united Ireland, 56 negotiational strength, 169 contact with British Government, 128 and Northern Bank robbery, 283–4 cost of conflict, 109 and personnel continuity, 161–2 decommissioning of weapons. See speechwriting with Sinn Fein,´ 325–6 decommissioning on talks with terrorists, 300 fugitives. See ‘On the Runs’ (OTRs) power-sharing and Good Friday Agreement, 238–9 devolution and, 126–7, 209–10 and Joint Declaration, 150–1 Executive. See Northern Ireland Executive murder of Robert McCartney, 283 (1974) negotiations (‘the link’). See ‘link, the’ local promotion of, 128 Northern Bank robbery, 283–5 negotiations, 87 possibilities of defeating, 87–8 proposals for, 27–8 secret meeting with British Government unionist opposition, 60 (1972), 4–5 pragmatism and principle, balancing of, 88, Shankill bomb (1993), 129–30 212–13, 215, 262, 271–2, 290, and Sinn Fein,´ 287 330 and Sunningdale Agreement, 4 Prime Minister’s Office support for, 33–5 and Irish Government, 178–9 suspension of operations, 129–30

350 Index

Provisional Irish Republican Army proposes elections to multiparty (PIRA) (cont.) negotiations, 140 Teebane bomb (1991), 123 ‘rolling devolution’, failure of, 38–40 Tony Blair challenges on ‘acts of Royal Agricultural Society speech (May completion’, 149 1997). See Blair, Tony and ‘Whitbread’ speech, 81 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). See punishment beatings policing attitudes to, 290 effect on peace process, 214 sanctions drafting of documents, 168–9 Real IRA issue of, 152–3 and Joint Declaration, 150–1 Sands, Bobby, 5 Omagh bomb (August 1998), 144–5, secret exchanges. See ‘link, the’ 315–16 security reconciliation British proposals, 39, 45–6, 64 act of, proposal for, 232–3 collusion by security forces. See Cory meaning of, 83–4 Collusion Inquiry process of, 301 improvement after Good Friday Agreement, prospects for, 88 78 Rees, Merlyn Irish proposals, 34, 36, 40–1 secretary of state, 79 ‘normalisation’. See ‘normalisation’ on Sunningdale Agreement, 4 unionist concerns, 58 reform declaration (1968), drafting of, 24–5 Shankill bomb (1993), effect on peace process, Reid, John 129–30 secretary of state, 149, 153–4, 250 single text negotiation Weston Park proposals, 161–2 Good Friday Agreement, 115, 322 religion and ambiguity 282 Joint Declaration, 166–7 republican movement Sinn Fein´ ambiguity and clarity, 295, 313–14, and ‘acts of completion’, 296 320 Adams and McGuinness as duo, 279–80 ‘Catholic’ analysis of peace process, 225 and ambiguity, 205 change, attitude to, 320–1 and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1–6, 37–8, consent principle and, 215 50–1, 116 defeat, attitude to, 287–8 ban on contact with, 127 desire for peace, 306 commitment to peaceful means, 214 interpretation by, 265–6 date of British withdrawal, adherence to language sensitivities, 266–7 demand for, 227 moral stance, 281–2 and decommissioning, 220, 286, 288–90 religious inﬂuence, 282 dialogue with, 202 sense of history, 287–8, 305 see also ‘link, the’ united Ireland, aspiration for, 306–7 and Downing Street Declaration, 71 violence, attitude to, 91 and DUP, 278, 306–7, 316–17 see also Irish National Liberation Army electoral support for, 29–30, 33–5, 40–1, 46, (INLA); Provisional Irish Republican 184 Army (PIRA); Sinn Fein´ exclusion from peace talks, 74–5 Reynolds, Albert and exclusively peaceful means principle, and Downing Street Declaration, 71 290–1 and John Major, 92–3 exploratory dialogue, 135 Robinson, Mary future progress, 298–9 and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 63 and Good Friday Agreement, 76, 77, 295, proposes constitutional claims amendment, 323 69–70 and hunger strikes, 5 Robinson, Peter internal authority, 99–100 DUP leader, 192–3 and Joint Declaration, 150, 173 ﬁrst minister, 192–3 long-term strategy, 307–8

Index 351

media, skill in using, 286–7 Anglo-Irish Agreement contrasted, 48 and multiparty negotiations, 184–7 effect if had been successful, 47 negotiational control, 321–2 failure of, 3, 4, 36 negotiational discipline, 212 and Good Friday Agreement, 3, 209–10, negotiational flexibility, 297–8 221 negotiational focus, 275 Irish constitutional claims, 31–2 negotiational skill, 210–11, 308–9 opposition to, 2–3 negotiational stance, 90–1, 94–5, 278–80, origins of peace process, 1–2 308 symbols negotiational toughness, 211 Haass recommendations, 332–3 non-verbal communication, 323–4 ‘symbolic leadership’, 79–80 participation in peace talks, 73, 75 understanding of, 267–8, 286–7, 328–9 and PIRA, 287 power-sharing, 87 text. See documents; drafting of documents and reduction of British Army presence, 294 and speeches reporting back on negotiations, 315 Thatcher, Margaret respectability, growth in, 210–11 agrees to further talks with Irish response to PIRA attacks, 283 Government, 67–8 and SDLP, 65, 68 Anglo-Irish Agreement, 35–7, 38–9, 41–3, secret contact with. See ‘link, the’ 45–6, 47–9, 50, 51–2, 98–9 socialist united Ireland, aspiration for, 296 and Charles Haughey, 38–40 speechwriting with Jonathan Powell, 325–6 and consent principle, 63 ‘Stormontgate’ (October 2002), 149 and Garret FitzGerald, 34–5, 39, 40, 41, 43, strategic approach to negotiations, 281, 288 45–6, 50 symbolism, understanding of, 267–8, 286–7 and New Ireland Forum, 62–3 united Ireland, aspiration for, 296 Thomas, Sir Quentin unofficial contact with, 123–4 drafting of documents, 99 written records of negotiations, 275 involvement in peace process, 66, 83, 97, see also Adams, Gerry; McGuinness, Martin 123–4, 137–8, 141, 154, 315 Smyth, Hugh on settlement of intercommunal conflicts, meets John Major, 133, 134 10–11, 101–19 unofficial talks with British Government, transition between governments 131–3 background to, 12 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) decommissioning, 180–3 and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 37–8 Good Friday Agreement, 192–9 and devolution, 57 introduction, 177 and Downing Street Declaration, 71 Labour victory assumed, 179 and Joint Declaration, 150 Major’s and Blair’s achievement and Sinn Fein,´ 65, 68 summarised, 199–200 and Sunningdale Agreement, 1–2 and multiparty negotiations, 184–7 and unionist parties, 65 negotiations during, 97 see also Fitt, Gerard (Gerry); Hume, John Prime Minister’s Office. See Prime sovereignty, transfer of, British reservations as Minister’s Office to, 41–2, 49 transition, 187–8 speeches, drafting of. See drafting of unionist influence at Westminster, 179 documents and speeches unionist ‘veto’ on Major’s policy, 179–80 Stormont. See Northern Ireland Parliament Trimble, David ‘Stormontgate’ (October 2002), effect on clarity of vision, 212–13 peace process, 149 commitment to peace process, 174 ‘strategic or economic interest, no’. See critiques British Government policy, 170–1, ‘Whitbread’ speech 172 sufficient consensus principle and decommissioning, 149–50, 195, 218, Joint Declaration, 173 286 multiparty negotiations, 74 on dining at home, 174 Sunningdale Agreement (1973) first minister, 149

352 Index

Trimble, David (cont.) Government of Ireland Act 1920, provisions and Gerry Adams, 86, 148–9, 164, 197–8 of, 57 and Good Friday Agreement, 232, 233, see also Irish constitutional claims 236–7, 238–9 unionist community and Joint Declaration, 159, 163 and Anglo-Irish Agreement, 64–5, 68 and Loyalist Commission, 145 British Government’s relationship with, Misunderstanding Ulster, 170–1 compared with Irish Government’s, and Mitchell Review, 236 206–7 negotiational approach, 174, 217 constitutional issue, perspective on, 55, negotiational difficulties, 281 58–60 negotiational skill, 281–2 cooperation with Ireland, opposition to, negotiational toughness, 211–12 60 Nobel Peace Prize, 108 devolution, support for, 60 and Paul Murphy, 163 economic concerns, 59 political cost of peace, 192–3 and Good Friday Agreement, 55 reporting back on negotiations, 315 and Irish constitutional claims, 60 resigns from Executive, 168 literalness, 231–2 and Sinn Fein,´ 278 Orange Order, 131 on sufficient consensus principle, 173 political concerns, 59–60 on Sunningdale Agreement, 154 power-sharing, opposition to, 60 on talks with terrorists, 171 Protestant identity, concerns as to, 58–9 and UUP, 198, 205 security concerns, 58 verbal abilities, 163 sense of identity, 96 truth and reconciliation. See reconciliation support for Union, 55, 59 United States and, 134–5, 225 Ulster Defence Association (UDA). See violence, attitude to, 91 loyalist organisations unionist parties Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) and ambiguity, 205 and Combined Loyalist Military Command, ambiguity and clarity, 295, 320 130–1 Anglo-Irish Agreement, 29–30, 37–8, 46–8, contact with, 130–2, 133–4, 136–9 50, 52–3, 64–5 electoral support, 74–5, 120, 141, 145 change, attitude to, 320–1 exclusion from talks, 75, 76, 128, 142–3 End to Drift, An, 52–3, 64–5 inclusion in talks, 74, 120, 134, 140–1 Good Friday Agreement, 76, 77, 295, and Ulster Political Research Group, 145 323 Ulster Freedom Fighters. See loyalist interpretation by, 265–6 organisations and Joint Declaration, 150 Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG), literalness, 266–7, 281, 320 establishment, 145 moral stance, 281–2 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) negotiational approach, 90–1, 314 boycotting of talks, 141 negotiational discipline, 212 decline, 87 negotiational toughness, 211–12 discussions with, 29–30 and reduction of British Army presence, Dublin visit (September 1992), 125–6 294 and DUP, 87, 150 and SDLP, 65 and Irish Government, 265 and Sinn Fein,´ 73 and Joint Declaration, 150 and ‘symbolic leadership’, 79–80 political cost of peace, 192–3 symbolism, understanding of, 267–8 see also Molyneaux, James; Trimble, David United States, and, 134–5 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). See loyalist united Ireland. See Irish constitutional claims; organisations Irish unity Ulster Workers’ Council strike and origins of United Kingdom peace process, 3 general election 1974 and Sunningdale ‘Ulsterisation’ policy, impact of, 4 Agreement, 3 unification of Ireland general election 1997, 142

Index 353

see also transition between governments paramilitary activities. See loyalist government. See British Government organisations; Provisional Irish integration with. See integration with United Republican Army (PIRA) Kingdom Northern Ireland’s post-conﬂict relationship Washington Three conditions. See with, 100 decommissioning United States Weston Park proposals (July 2001) Al Qaeda attacks (9/11), impact of, 238, implementation of Good Friday Agreement, 283, 311–12 237 Catholic bias, unionist perception of, 225 and Joint Declaration, 161–3 consulate general’s role in peace process, ‘Whitbread’ speech (9 November 1990) 134–5 consent principle emphasised, 70–1 funding for loyalist projects, 145–6 context, 81–2 Gerry Adams visit, 130–1, 139–40 drafting, 30–2 Haass recommendations, 332–3 non-inclusion of ‘political’, 81 independent chairs of 1996–8 talks, 113 origin, 80–1 involvement in negotiations, 85, 225 purpose, 53 involvement post-Joint Declaration, 152 renunciation of interest, 44 Joe Cahill allowed visa, 85 timing, 81, 129–30 shift in thinking after 9/11, 284–5 unionist response, 68 unionist relations with, 134–5, 225 Whitelaw, William (Willie) see also Bush, George W.; Clinton, Bill; new proposals for talks (1991), 123 Irish-Americans; Mitchell, George secret meeting with PIRA (1972), 4–5 secretary of state, 27 videoconferencing, Northern Ireland Ofﬁce Wilson, Harold use of, 30 considers British withdrawal, 4 violence and Sunningdale Agreement, 47 attitudes to, 91, 290 ‘Ulsterisation’ policy, 4