Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

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Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Serious and Organised Crime Strategy October 2013 Introduction 3 Introduction 1.1 This pamphlet provides deals with serious crime which a high level summary of the new demands a national coordinated Government strategy to deal response, notably other fraud and with the challenges we face from child sexual exploitation. serious and organised crime. The 1.4 Organised crime is a strategy is published to coincide threat to our national security. with the launch of the new It costs the United Kingdom National Crime Agency (NCA) at least £24 billion each year, and is the product of extensive leads to loss of life and can consultation with law enforcement deprive people of their security agencies, the intelligence and prosperity. Crime groups agencies, local authorities, the intimidate and corrupt and can private sector and academia. It have a corrosive impact on reflects changes to the threats our communities. Cyber crime we face and the lessons we have undermines confidence in our learned from our previous work. communications technology 1.2 The full strategy is and online economy. Organised available online at www.gov.uk/ immigration crime threatens government/publications/serious- the security of our borders. We organised-crime-strategy and regard human trafficking as hard copies through the Home a pernicious form of modern slavery. Financial crime can Office.1 undermine the integrity and 1.3 Organised crime includes stability of our financial markets drug trafficking, human trafficking, and institutions. and organised illegal immigration, 1.5 Overseas, organised high-value fraud and other crime undermines good financial crimes, counterfeiting, governance and the stability of organised acquisitive crime and countries of strategic importance cyber crime. The strategy also to our national security. 1 [email protected] Organised crime groups overseas 4 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy can facilitate or engage in terrorism. 1.6 The aim of the strategy is to substantially reduce the level of serious and organised crime affecting the UK and its interests. Our approach 5 Our approach 1.7 Our serious and Security and Counter Terrorism organised crime strategy uses the (OSCT)2. framework we have developed for 1.9 Our immediate priority is our counter terrorist work and has the work set out under Pursue to four main objectives: prosecute and relentlessly disrupt • PURSUE: prosecuting and serious and organised criminals disrupting people engaged and reduce the threat they pose. in serious and organised 1.10 Like other threats to criminality; our national security, serious • PREVENT: preventing and organised crime requires a people from engaging in response across the whole of serious and organised crime; government, close collaboration with the public and with the • PROTECT: increasing private sector and with many protection against serious other countries. and organised crime; 1.11 The diagram on the • PREPARE: reducing the following pages illustrates the impact of this criminality four parts of the strategy, the where it takes place. strategic objectives for each one 1.8 The strategy lists our and provides a short description strategic objectives under each of some of the associated of the four areas of work. We programmes. Tactical objectives need to meet these objectives to (e.g. priority crime groups) will achieve our aim. The strategy also be set by the NCA with law identifies many of the projects enforcement counterparts. and programmes relevant to each 1.12 A full list of the objective. More details about the departments and agencies projects and programmes will responsible for dealing with also be available from responsible organised crime is at Annex A. departments or the Home Office coordination team in the Office for 2 [email protected] 6 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Our approach 7 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy The NCA will develop an authoritative intelligence picture of Establish strong, effective and collaborative organisations organised crime and work with the police and others to lead, Develop our capabilities coordinate and support our response. New local organised crime partnership boards will provide support to local policing Attack criminal finances on all aspects of this strategy. New NCA and law enforcement capabilities will be developed to deal with developments in Ensure that effective legal powers are available organised crime, notably the move online. We will legislate on aspects of organised crime. We will increase work against ursue Internationally, improve our own capabilities and our foreign national offenders and refocus the NCA’s international cooperation with others network to deal with all crime types. Prosecute and disrupt people engaged in serious and organised criminality Reduce threat Raise awareness of the reality and consequences We will have a new preventative programme including more and better education and communications about organised Intervene to stop people being drawn into different types of crime, local coordination with existing work on troubled serious and organised crime families and gangs, and wider use of interventions (e.g. Serious Crime Prevention Orders). We want to work more closely with Develop techniques to deter people from continuing in the regulators of professions whose members may, wittingly or serious and organised criminality not, facilitate organised crime activity. We will promote effective lifetime offender management as a framework for revent Establish an effective offender management framework to both Pursue and Prevent and involving the NCA, regional support work on Pursue and Prevent police units and police forces. Aim Prevent people from engaging in serious and organised crime Reduce level of serious and Protect our borders We have changed roles and responsibilities at the border and on immigration enforcement. We are building new border organised Protect national and local government capabilities. We will increase work to cut fraud against government and in particular local government procurement. crime Improve protective security in the private sector We will share more threat reporting with at risk parts of the private sector notably on fraud and cyber crimes. Protect people at risk of becoming victims We will provide more information to the public on these issues Improve our anti-corruption systems and also on child sexual exploitation. We will work to restrict rotect circulation of illegal child abuse images. We are revising Strengthen systems for establishing identity responsibilities for the investigation and reporting of corruption. Reduce Increase protection against serious and organised crime vulnerabilty We will continue to develop emergency service interoperability to better deal with terrorism and other crimes. We will establish Ensure major serious and organised crime incidents are a new unit to coordinate our national response to major cyber brought to a rapid and effective resolution attacks including cyber crime. Ensure communities, victims and witnesses affected by A theme in this strategy is to provide support to communities serious and organised crime have the support which they need affected by organised crime. This is part of all the four main areas of our work. Specific new initiatives are also planned to repare support victims and witnesses. Reduce the impact of this criminality where it takes place 8 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy PURSUE 1.16 We will continue to build police Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) in England and 1.13 We are building Wales. These units also need organisations with new roles to be supported by better data- and responsibilities to deal with sharing between government serious and organised crime. departments and agencies. They will have new capabilities. We will expand the existing We want to see more cross- Government Agency Intelligence government collaboration at Network (GAIN) for this purpose. every level. We are also making changes to our legislation 1.17 Developments in to make our powers more organised crime, notably the effective. We are reshaping our emergence of cyber crime, international work to refl ect the mean that we need to continue changes in the threats we face. to improve the NCA and police capabilities. Funding has been 1.14 The NCA will formally made available for this purpose, begin work in October 2013. It within England and Wales. We will develop and bring together want to see much more sharing intelligence on all types of serious of capabilities between the and organised crime, prioritise police networks which deal with crime groups according to the organised crime and terrorism. threats they present and, in conjunction with police forces lead, coordinate and support the operational response. 1.15 Police forces will continue to conduct most law enforcement work on serious and organised crime. They should be supported by new local organised crime partnership boards, including local authorities and agencies, to ensure all available information and powers are used against this threat. These local partnerships will be informed by new serious and organised crime local profi les. Police and crime 1.18 We will amend existing commissioners will be involved in legislation to seek to create new this work. powers to seize criminal assets. Our approach 9 We will also take measures to 1.20 Success in Pursue will better deal with people who mean that: actively support and benefit from • at home, relentless disruption serious and organised
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