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Venezuela Joins Mercosur: the Impact Felt Around the Americas

Venezuela Joins Mercosur: the Impact Felt Around the Americas

Law and Business Review of the

Volume 16 Number 1 Article 6

2010

Venezuela Joins Mercosur: The Impact Felt around the Americas

Kristin L. Brown

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra

Recommended Citation Kristin L. Brown, Joins Mercosur: The Impact Felt around the Americas, 16 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 85 (2010) https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol16/iss1/6

This Comment and Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. VENEZUELA JOINS MERCOSUR: THE IMPACT FELT AROUND THE AMERICAS

Kristin L. Brown*

I. INTRODUCTION

IN 1991, , , , and signed the Treaty of Asunci6n to create the "Mercado Comun del Sur" (The Common Market of the South), better known as Mercosur.' The treaty sets up the framework of Mercosur and outlines the parties' goal to become a common market through the adoption of a common external , a common trade policy, and the "free movement of goods, services, and factors of production between countries through, inter alia, the elimina- tion of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods." 2 When Mercosur was created, the only other major within the region was the of Nations (CAN), whose members at the time included , , , , and Venezuela. 3 The two trade blocs coexisted with relative ease, and the two even signed a pact in 2004, vowing to phase out all import tariffs throughout the course of the next fifteen years.4 During 2005 and 2006, several events occurred that would each turn out to have a dramatic impact on the political and economic landscape of . On December 7, 2005, the United States and Peru an- nounced that they had signed a bilateral free- (FTA). 5 Almost one year later, on November 22, 2006, the United States and Co- lombia signed a similar FTA.6

*Kristin Brown is a J.D. Candidate, May 2010, at Southern Methodist University. She would like to thank her family and the Supper Club for their support. 1. Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Republic, the Fed- erative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M 1041 (1991). 2. Id. at ch. 1, art. 1. 3. Comunidad Adandina, About Us: Brief History, http://www.comunidadandina. org/INGLES/quienes/brief.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2008). 4. Radl Pierri, Mercosur and Andean Community sign free trade pact, INrER PRESS SERVICE NEws AGENCY, Oct. 19, 2004, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id article=860. 5. America.gov, United States, Peru Conclude Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/December/20051207180758GLnes noM7.253665e-02.html. 6. America.gov, United States Signs Free-Trade Agreement with Colombia, Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.america.gov/stlecon-english/2006/November/20061122121011AKI lennoCcMO.6516535.html.

85 86 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16

President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, a fellow member of CAN with Colombia and Peru at the time of the signing of the FTA's, has never made much of a secret of his disdain for the United States.7 While speak- ing to the United Nations Assembly in 2006, he said that "the greatest threat looming over our Planet [is] the begemonic pretention of the U.S. imperialism that puts at risk the very survival of humankind itself." He also went on to acknowledge that President George W. Bush had been at the United Nations the day before, but Chavez only referred to him as "the devil." Chavez also played a prominent role in the final collapse of the negotiations to create the of the Americas (FTAA), a free-trade area first proposed by U.S. President George H.W. Bush that was to stretch from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego and include every country in the Americas except Cuba. 10 Chavez had fought to de- rail the agreement for years, since he saw it as an example of U.S. Imperi- alism."1 James Cooper of the San Diego Tribune noted that eventually "his desire came true, for the timeline for creating the pact came and passed." 12 In light of his previous opposition to agreements with the United States and his outspoken distaste for the nation, it was quite safe to assume that Chavez was not pleased with the new relationships that Peru and Colom- bia were creating with the United States.13 Still, he surprised many, in- cluding the other Andean Nations, when he announced at an April 19, 2006 meeting that Venezuela was withdrawing from CAN.' 4 Less than three months later, in July 2006, Venezuela was admitted as the fifth full member of Mercosur.' 5 The rapidity of this move was quite impressive, especially since just a few months before a Uruguayan official pointed out that joining Mercosur is not a rapid process, and that "Uruguay expects that in a TWO OR THREE-YEAR TERM Venezuela will adopt the tariffs and disciplines set forth in Mercosur."' 6 [emphasis added]

11. IMPACTS ON THE CAN AND ITS NATIONS Shortly after Venezuela's withdrawal, some still believed that Chavez had not been entirely serious and had only meant for his announcement

7. H.E. Hugo Chavez Frias, Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 12 L. & Bus. REV. Am. 431, 431 (2006). 8. Id. 9. Id. 10. James Cooper, U.S. Not the Only Trading Game for , SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 28, 2008, at F6. 11. Id. 12. Id. 13. Carlos Malamud, Venezuela's Withdrawalfrom the Andean Community of Nations and the Consequencesfor (Part I), REAL INsTI1TUTo ELCANO, May 30, 2006, (on file with author). 14. Id. 15. BBC News, Venezuela Signs Up to Trade Group, July 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/business/5148660.stm. 16. Simone Barbibeau, Venezuela to Enter Mercosur as Full Member, VENEZUELA ANALYSis, Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/1521. 2010] 20101VENEZUELA JOINS MERCOSUR 878 to provoke others within the political arena.'17 As it became more appar- ent that the withdrawal was a permanent move, speculation began re- garding the consequences of the change. The possibilities were numerous, including "the rebuilding of CAN without Venezuela, a with- drawal by Bolivia following Chavez's lead with the emergence of a new block formed by Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, or the definitive break- down of the entire system."'18 Although Bolivia did not ultimately follow Chavez and Venezuela and leave CAN, its government made it clear that it sympathized with Vene- zuela's position and would continue to support its ally.19 Bolivian Presi- dent suggested that Colombia and Peru had deliberately aimed to weaken CAN and outwardly expressed his disapproval of their FTFAs with the United States, even going so far as to call the Peruvian President Toledo a traitor .20 Chavez has expressed equally ardent sup- port for Morales. For example, in reaction to some violent political standoffs within Bolivia, Chavez declared he would die in Bolivia's de- fense if needed. 2' Chavez also expelled the American ambassador in September 2008, shortly after Bolivia had made a similar move, simply as a move of solidarity. 2 2 Despite this apparent fierce loyalty between the two leaders, Bolivia made no indications that it too was ready to depart from CAN in favor of Mercosur. 23 Bolivia's decision appears to be based in economic practical- ity. As of 2006, Bolivia's exports to CAN totaled US$466 million per year, which accounted for seventeen percent of its total exports.2 4 Carlos Malamud of the Real Instituto Elcano believes that "the CAN is Bolivia's main regional market, and in recent years it had made a trade surplus there, unlike in Mercosur and despite gas exports to Argentina and Bra- zil."12 5 Bolivia also lacks the luxury that Venezuela has as a result of its rich oil supply. Venezuela was tenth overall in the world in oil production in 2007, while Bolivia ranked sixty-second. 26 Every year, Venezuela's oil trade accounts for approximately eighty-seven percent of its exports.27 Despite a breakup in their relationship as CAN partners, Bolivia and Venezuela still remain tied together through their commitment to "Al-

17. Malamud, supra note 13. 18. Id. 19. Id. 20. Id. 21. Now Put it Back Together, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.economist.com/ world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story-id=12260915. 22. Back on his Old Hobby Horse, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2008, http:I/www.economist. comlworld/americas/displaystory.cfm?story-id=12262205. 23. Malamnud, supra note 13. 24. Id. 25. Id. 26. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, COUNTRY COMPARI- SON: OIL-PRODUCTION (2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/ran korder/2 l73ran k.html. 27. The Federation of Associations: Venezuela, http://www.fita. orglcountries/venezuela.html (last visited Jan. 2008). 88 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16 ternativa Bolivariana para las Americas" (ALBA), "the first attempt at regional integration not based on trade liberalization or the harmoniza- tion of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, but focused on social welfare and equity."128 The two also have ties through Mercosur, since Bolivia is an associate member that is being considered for full membership within the trade bloc. 2 9 Chavez and Morales have spoken out together regarding their desire to see reform in Mercosur, challenging "the bloc to abandon its free market neoliberal roots."130 These aspirations of inciting change within Mercosur may be attributable to both Bolivia and Venezuela's commitments to ALBA, since "[tlhe expansion of Mercosur. .. without significant reforms would frustrate the implementation of the ALBA."13' The Colombian and Peruvian reactions to Venezuela's departure from CAN to Mercosur were not quite as pleasant or supportive as Bolivia's. In contrast with Chavez's claim that his departure was a result of the FTFAs with the United States and the immediate harm that he felt would result, Colombia and Peru held Chavez completely responsible for with- drawing from the bloc. 3 2 Decision 598 by the CAN provides that: If it is not possible to conduct community negotiations for whatsoever reasons, the Member Countries can negotiate bilaterally with third coun- tries. In such event, the participating Member Countries should: a) Preserve the Andean legal system in the relations between the An- dean Community Member Countries. b) Take into account the commercial sensitivities of the other Andean countries in the trade liberalization offers. c) Maintain within a transparency and solidarity framework an ade- quate exchange of information and consultations during the course of the negotiations.33 Both Peru and Colombia claimed that all of these requirements were fulfilled when negotiating the agreements with the United States, and "that it was Venezuela which breached Decision 598 when it decided to link up with Mercosur."134 Columbia likely stood to lose the most due to the withdrawal .3 5 At the time, Venezuela was one of Colombia's main trading partners, second only to the United States, and a large amount of its exports to Venezuela were manufactured goods-making it difficult to find an alternative mar-

28. Cooper, supra note 10. 29. Council on Foreign Relations, Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12762/mercosur.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2009). 30. Jason Tockman, Chavez, Morales Seek Transformation of Mercosur Trade Bloc, VENEZUELA ANALYSIS, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/aanalysis/ 2187. 31. Id. 32. Malamud, supra note 13. 33. Comunidad Adandina, Treaties and Legislation: Decisions, Decision 598 Trade Relations with Third Countries, http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/norma- tiva/D598e.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2008). 34. Malamud, supra note 13. 35. Id. 2010] VENEZUELA JOINS MERCOSUR 89 ket for them.36 Like Bolivia, Colombia also lacks the luxury of anything like Venezuela's oil revenues to fall back on. Since the withdrawal, how- ever, there seem to have been no adverse effects on the overall health of Colombia's economy. In 2006, Colombia's GDP was US$136.132 billion, in 2007 it was estimated at US$171.607 billion, and for the year of 2008 it is estimated at US$202.437 billion.37 Although some may have predicted otherwise, the CAN has remained intact, despite the fact that Venezuela accounted for a third of the bloc's economic strength.38 The departure of Venezuela and solidification of FTAs with the United States revealed that the CAN has essentially been divided into two factions: Bolivia and Ecuador on one side, and Peru and Colombia on the other.39 There have been some positive developments, though, including the decision of to rejoin CAN as an associate member in 2006.40 The observer members, Panama and , may be showing similar intentions.4 1

III. IMPACTS ON MERCOSUR AND ITS NATIONS At the time of Venezuela's departure, CAN was involved in US$9 bil- lion in annual trade, while Mercosur was involved in US$150 billion an- nually. 4 2 Mercosur "is the world's fourth-largest trading bloc, after the (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)." 43 Despite the large volume of trade going on within the bloc, the group was not without its problems or bickering, even before Venezuela's involvement. 44 Tensions between Uruguay and Argentina were incredibly high as a result of the so-called paper mill crisis. 4 5 In the largest foreign direct in- vestment in Uruguay's history, two pulp mills were to be built, one backed by Spanish financing and the other by Finnish financing, on the banks of the River Plate that defines the border between Argentina and

36. Id. 37. International Monetary Fund. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/ weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2006&ey=2013&scsm=1&ssd= 1&sort=country&ds=.& br=1&prl.x=37&prl.y= 10&c=213%2C218%2C223%2C228%2C288%2C233%2C 293%2C248%2C298%2C299&s=NGDPRPCH%2CNG DPD%2CPPPSH %2C LP&grp=O&a= (last updated Mar. 2008). 38. France Diplomatie, The Andean Community of Nations (CAN): Overview of the Situation, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files 156/latin-and-central- america_2098/regional-integration_6048/the-andean-community-of-nations-can 6528/index.html (last updated July 18, 2008). 39. Id. 40. Mauricio Baquero Herrera, Latin American Update: Something is Going on in Latin America, 12 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 613, 621 (2006). 41. France Diplomatie, supra note 38. 42. Malamud, supra note 13. 43. Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 29. 44. Carlos Malamud, Pulp Mills Divide the River Plate, REAL INSTIruTo ELCANO, Apr. 4, 2006 http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/944/944_Malamud-Pulp- MillsArgentina-Uruguay.pdf. 45. Id. 90 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16

Uruguay.46 The Argentine government and people saw this act as envi- ronmental aggression that would result in pollution and damage, despite assurances to the contrary from the Europeans heading up the project .4 7 Mercosur was unable to contain or resolve the dispute, and Argentina eventually resorted to an appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague .48 Within this climate, Chavez truly began his journey towards becoming a full member of Mercosur, and perhaps not surprisingly, started with some controversy. Representatives from Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay joined Venezuela at the summit where Chavez announced his decision to withdraw from the CAN .4 9 Both Paraguay and Uruguay were able to piggyback off of Venezuela's announcement and attacks on imperialism by decrying "how they, too, had been 'mistreated' independently by Ar- gentina and Brazil. Echoing long held criticisms of 'sub-imperialism,' the two argued that Argentina and Brazil had long orchestrated programs that disproportionately benefitted their larger domestic markets. Thus, in their view, radical changes in regional policy were needed."15 0 Argentina and Brazil, Mercosur's largest members, were both displeased and skepti- cal about what they perceived to be "Venezuela's attempts to align with Paraguay and Uruguay, the organization's smallest members and coun- tries they have long dominated economically and politically."15 1 After the meeting, an Argentine government official asked, "'How can there be a meeting of Mercosur which excludes Brazil and Argentina?' The ques- tion was followed by a bitter complaint: 'There was no-one from our countries. No-one.' 52 The lingering discontent of Paraguay and Uruguay does not seem to have gone away, and Venezuelan involvement may not be helping. Once Venezuela became a full member, Bolivia gained a source of enthusiastic support behind its potential bid for acceptance as a full member.53 But Bolivia's acceptance as a full member could prove to be problematic. 54 A significant divergence is possible, because "Bolivia wants a special ex- emption on tariff and other issues that ha[ve] not been granted to the group's other smaller members[,]" 55 but may actually be granted to Bo-

46. Id. 47. Id. 48. Id. 49. Chris Brumnmer, The Ties that Bind? Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the Future of Global , 60 VANi). L. REV. 1349, 1388 (2007). 50. Id. 51. Id. 52. Carlos Malamnud, Venezuela's Withdrawal from the Andean Community of Nations and the Consequences for Regional Integration (Part 11), REAL INSTIT1UTo ELCANO, June 16, 2006. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/4c355804f0l8 7OdbcO0fc37baeadl996MalaudVenezuela CAN..partl.pdf?MOD=AJ PERES&CACHEID=40c55804f01870dbc00fc3170baeadl. 53. Larry Rohter, Venezuela Wants Trade Group to Embrace Anti-Imperialism, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/americas/1 9latin. html? r=2&oref slogin&oref slogin. 54. Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 29. 55. Rohter, supra note 53. 2010] VENEZUELA JOINS MERCOSUR 91 livia because "Brazil is very interested in having increased access to Bo- livian gas."56 Both Paraguay and Uruguay have been denied similar exemptions with regard to outside bilateral F[As.57 As a result of "Mercosur Resolution 32, member states individually cannot negotiate trade or economic agreements with other countries."^5 Because Para- guay and Uruguay's proposed policy solution to even out Mercosur is "bilateral cooperation, particularly with the United States in the form of [bilateral] FTAs, to dilute Brazil's and Argentina's regional influence,"59 granting exemptions to a newly inducted Bolivia while ignoring their long-standing requests would likely drive a large wedge in Mercosur. The situation became even more serious when Uruguay signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States.60 "If the TIFA does eventually lead to the creation of an FTA with the United States, the leadership of Mercosur would either have to disbar Uruguay from the bloc for violating the charter, possibly causing Para- guay to resign as well, or it could choose to rewrite its charter altogether."6' Yet another issue facing the countries of Mercosur is the question of Venezuela's full ratification into the bloc. The "Brazilian and Paraguayan legislatures have yet to ratify the bid." 62 The problems with Brazil peaked when the Brazilian Senate expressed its disapproval of Vene- zuela's refusal to renew the broadcast license for a station known for its opposition to the Chavez regime.63 Chavez responded to the criticism by calling the Senate a "parrot that just mimics Washington," a comment which prompted Brazil's political parties to declare "that Venezuela could not be admitted to Mercosur." 64 At one point, relations had soured so much that Venezuela was contemplating rejoining CAN, 65 but for now Venezuela has stayed with Mercosur. Tensions have cooled somewhat, as evidenced by the fact that the Brazilian foreign relations committee re-

56. Klonsky, supra note 29; Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 29. 57. Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 29. 58. Brummer, supra note 49, at 1388. 59. Id. 60. Katherine Hancy Wheeler, Uruguay Signs a TIFA with the U.S.: Will this Mean an Unraveling of Mercosur or is Maneuvering to be Left Out in the Cold?, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.coha.org/2007/02/ uruguay-signs-a-tifa-with-the-us-will-this-mean-an-unraveling-of-mercosur-or-is- montevideo-maneuvering-to-be-left-out-in-the-cold/. 61. Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 29. 62. Kristin Bushby, The Politicization of MERCOSUR: With a Divided Past, Is There Hope for a United Future?, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, July 1, 2008, http://www.coha.org/2008/07/the-politicization-of-mercosur-with-a-divided-past-is- there-hope-for-a-united-future/. 63. Nikolas Kozloff, Divide and Rule: Driving a Wedge Between Brazil and Venezuela, VENEZUELA ANALYSIS, Apr. 4, 2008, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/ 3325. 64. Id. 65. Alex Sinchez, Entre La Espada y La Pared: As Venezuela's desire to join MERCOSUR diminishes, Hugo Chavez flirts with a pro-free trade CAN, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, Oct. 2, 2007, http://www.coha.org/2007/10/entre-la- espada-y-la-pared-as-venezuelas-desire-to-join-mercosur-diminishes/. 92 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16 cently voted to allow Venezuela to join Mercosur, which will bring the proposal to the full Brazilian Senate. 66 Chavez seems to have indicated his intent to remain committed to making Mercosur work when he re- cently said, "Neither Venezuela alone, nor Brazil alone, nor Argentina alone can become a world power. We can only achieve that together."167

IV. THE UNITED STATES REACTION Several of the recent political and economic developments in Latin America involve issues with which the United States will likely need to determine how to respond. As of fall 2006, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela were all ruled by left-wing govern- ments.6 8 In addition, "Latin America is more independent from the In- ternational Monetary Fund (IMF). Countries such as Argentina and Brazil have paid back their debts or, as in the Colombian case, have en- ded the use of IMF's facilities for the time being."169 Such developments have no doubt delighted Chavez, who has "stressed the need for Mercosur to be 'decontaminated' from the ravages of neo-liberal economics."170 Argentina has also been highly critical of the United States' neo-liberal policies, and "still blames the American -controlled International Mone- tary Fund for its financial collapse in late 2001.1171 Chances of repairing relations between the two nations dimmed further when U.S. authorities announced the supposed cover-up of a secret $800,000 campaign contri- bution from the Venezuelan government to Cristina Ferndndez de Kirch- ner.7 2 Now that Argentina has Venezuela as an ally through Mercosur, it seems likely that Argentine relations with the United States will remain cool. Argentina continues to strengthen its ties to Venezuela and "has continued to sell more consumer products to Venezuela as well as some $4 billion in Argentine bonds to help refinance the country's debt."173 On the other hand, Venezuela's membership with Mercosur seems much less likely to impede U.S. relations with Brazil, which has had its own strug- gles with Venezuela ever since the previously mentioned verbal clashes between Chavez and the Brazilian Senate. 74 Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once remarked that Brazil's president is "one of America's closest friends and partners in the region and on the globe."175 Brazil and the United States have continued to work together on issues such as ethanol production, counternarcotics efforts, issues,

66. Reuters, Brazil Senate committee OKs Venezuela in Mercosur, REUTERS INDIA, Oct. 29, 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/oil Rpt/idINN2935204920091029. 67. Kozloff, supra note 63. 68. Herrera, supra note 40, at 61.6. 69. Id. at 613. 70. Kozloff. supra note 63. 71. Id. 72. Id. 73. Id. 74. Id. 75. Id. 2010] 2010]VENEZUELA JOINS MERCOSUR 939

protection of the Amazon, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.76 When Venezuela joined Mercosur, Chavez's anti-American sentiments came along with it. It has been suggested that "Mercosur is no longer about trade. .. The new joiners don't have much to trade, they are op- posed to free trade it seems. The organization is more and more political and to some degree anti-American."177 After Mercosur and Venezuela's role in blocking the FTFAA, "and its general disinterest in trade with the United States[J" relations between the two sides have definitely cooled.78 Mercosur is viewed as a threat to U.S. interests in South America, espe- cially because it does not allow its members to sign FIFAs with the United States, and because it is "actively recruiting a South American trade bloc that would unify all the region's nations."179 When the United States pushed to sign a TIFA with Uruguay, many questioned why it was trying so hard to reach a trade agreement with a nation that has a $13 billion GDP and a negligible volume of trade.80 "A piece of the answer might be a gradual undermining of Mercosur, cata- lyzed by Uruguay's possible eventual departure from the trade bloc."8', Even if Uruguay decided to sign an FVA with the United States down the road, the only way that Mercosur could allow it to remain a member state would be to modify its policy and allow member states to enter into outside FTAs.812 Such a change would still be of great benefit to the United States, since it would disrupt the uniformity of the bloc "and im- 8 3 pede [its] capacity to enter into important negotiations."11 "If Mercosur fails in South America, it will open up the entire region to the possibility of being cherry picked (on a one-by-one basis) by individual trade agree- ments with the U.S."184

V. CONCLUSION Venezuela's decision to join Mercosur has affected almost every nation in South America, and even countries outside the continent, such as the United States. It is difficult to tell what the future will hold, especially in light of the recent financial crisis, but it is highly likely that the relation- ships between the dynamic and variable nations of South America will continue to grow and change. Venezuela's power and influence are not likely to diminish, especially while the world continues to rely on oil. The country's role within the South American landscape will surely be some- thing to closely monitor.

76. Clare M. Ribando, Congressional Research Service, Report on U.S.-Brazil Rela- tions, CRS Report for , Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/ docs/RL33456.pdf. 77. Wheeler, supra note 60. 78. Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 29. 79. Wheeler. supra note 60. 80. Id. 81. Id. 82. Id. 83. Id. 84. Id. 94 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16

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