The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic: What Went Wrong? John Maker

Canadian Military History

Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 3

4-26-2012 The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic: What Went Wrong? John Maker

Recommended Citation Maker, John (2009) "The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic: What Went Wrong?," Canadian Military History: Vol. 18 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/3

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The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic What went wrong?

John Maker

lmost two years after its near- men liked and respected him. In late Abstract: On 20-21 July 1944 the 6th annihilation at Dieppe, the Essex 1942 he became chief instructor of the A Canadian Infantry Brigade was engaged in Scottish Regiment returned to battle combat operations on Verrières Ridge south 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Battle on 20 July 1944 at Verrières Ridge and of Caen. Enemy resistance was stronger School, coordinating training at 4th was decimated for a second time. It than expected and the Canadian attack Brigade HQ for company‑, battalion‑, had orders to seize an objective under was met by strong German counterattacks and brigade-sized exercises and supported by armour. During the course of 1 hopeless conditions, lacked adequate the battle, two units, the Essex Scottish learning to command at senior levels. support, and had an inexperienced Regiment and the South Saskatchewan When MacDonald took command brigadier, Hugh A. Young. What Regiment were driven back. In the in May 1943, Major Fred Tilston went wrong? aftermath of the battle the Essex Scottish (later recipient of the Victoria Cross) The commanding officer (CO), Regiment and their commanding officer commented in the battalion’s war were criticized for their poor performance. Lieutenant-Colonel B.J.S. MacDonald, This article examines the battle in an diary: “It is with great relief that could not convince his superior officer attempt to understand who was to blame. the command is to be passed to an and the battalion’s supporting armour Lieutentant-Colonel B.J.S MacDonald, the Essex Scot and to one such as Major to intervene at a crucial juncture. commanding officer of the Essex Scots, MacDonald, who is well qualified Young’s failure to intervene cost the was fired for his role in the battle, but this to take over,…[with his] knowledge article posits that Brigadier Hugh A. Young Essex Scots their reputation and self- bears the greater share of responsibility for of training methods and his varied confidence, their popular CO, and the operation’s failure. experience.”2 244 of their men – dead, wounded, MacDonald appears in the unit’s or missing. Second Canadian Corps received afterwards seems completely war diary much more frequently than lost an important position astride the inappropriate. his predecessor, Lieutenant-Colonel strategic high ground south of Caen, A respected lawyer from J.H. Mothersill. He organized both and the Black Watch, which sought Windsor, Ontario, Bruce John battalion and brigade training and to restore the situation, suffered Stewart MacDonald had served as increased parades and sub-unit many casualties. The heavy losses at a militia officer in the Essex Scottish inspections to improve discipline and Verrières Ridge helped to give the from 1929 to 1939, whereupon he pride of unit, which had faltered after Essex Scots the dubious distinction volunteered for overseas service. He Dieppe. By mid-1943 retraining was of suffering the most casualties of was a company commander and, after well under way.3 any Canadian regiment during the Dieppe, second-in-command of the MacDonald “stressed the great war. It is unlikely that any member battalion. During the reconstruction responsibility that every officer has of the regiment (or any other unit) and retraining of the unit he had when he leads his men into battle.”4 could have saved the day, and the quickly developed a reputation as He sought to ensure that all ranks shabby treatment that MacDonald an excellent trainer and leader; his could command even without higher

Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce MacDonald, commander of the Essex Scottish Regiment during the attack on Verrières Ridge, was removed from his position because he was seen as being nervous and not properly able to control his battalion during the battle.

almost to Falaise, where the British army would eventually meet the Americans in August. Operation Goodwood, the major British armoured attack to capture Verrières Ridge, had failed. By 19 July VIII British Corps had lost about 270 tanks and many men and was organizing its withdrawal. Although Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps, assumed that these British attempts had softened up German resistance, the decision to attack the ridge with a “fresh infantry division” proved costly.8 British pressure to break the German line and Montgomery’s insistence that the advance continue forced Simonds’ hand. The 6th Brigade plan of attack involved four infantry battalions. The Cameron Highlanders of Canada would advance on the right flank against St. André-sur-Orne, where Photo courtesy of Hardy Wheeler, LCol (Ret’d), Regimental Archivist, Essex and Kent Scottish Regiment Archivist,and Kent Regimental Essex (Ret’d), LCol courtesyPhoto of Hardy Wheeler, they would probably meet enemy armour; the South Saskatchewan authority, having “each [platoon] orders to carry 21 Army Group’s Regiment would attack in the centre exercised in drill by the [officer], then advance southward from the southern towards the crest of the ridge; and by several [private] soldiers.”5 When outskirts of Caen and to establish the Fusiliers de Mont-Royal (FMRs) the Essex Scots “boarded American itself on Verrières Ridge. The next would advance on the left flank vessels for the journey to France” on day 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade towards Verrières, just below the 4 July 19446 they could reasonably moved forward with the Essex Scots ridge’s summit.9 The Essex Scots were anticipate success in battle. under command for an advance on to advance behind the South Sasks This article will examine the the ridge. The brigade commander and set up a firm base behind the planning for the assault at Verrières was Brigadier H.A. Young,“an RMC forward centre battalion and might Ridge, the attack itself, responses graduate without previous combat leapfrog the South Sasks if the latter to Brigadier Young’s report on the experience.”7 The crest of Verrières were able to consolidate on their event, and the conflicting sources that runs roughly east-west and affords objectives. make it difficult to understand what a commanding view both north and “A” Squadron of the 27th really happened. south. The German defenders could Canadian Armoured Regiment see clearly the Anglo-Canadian (Sherbrooke Fusiliers) was to support Planning the Assault advance from the north. Tactically, the attack on St. André-sur-Orne, capture of the ridge was crucial “C” Squadron was to support the n the night of 19 July 1944, in to II Canadian Corps’ southward FMRs on the left, while “B” Squadron OOperation Atlantic, the 2nd advance, as it would afford a view remained in reserve at regimental Canadian Infantry Division received south across nearby Roqancourt and and brigade headquarters (HQ) near

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Brigadier Hugh A. Young commanded the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade during the 20 July 1944 attack on Verrières Ridge. Though he blamed the failure of the operation on his subordinates, the evidence makes it clear that he did not have a solid grip on the battle.

Ifs.10 “A” and “C” Squadrons were to direct fire from rearward, hull- down positions to support the flanks and deal with any enemy armour that appeared; “B” would act at the brigadier’s discretion. Artillery was on call as needed. Sixth Brigade’s orders termed the Sherbrookes “the basis of [the] counter-attack force.”11 The decision to limit armoured support in the centre would prove disastrous. HQs of both 2nd Division and 6th Brigade underestimated the 145590 PA Library(LAC) Canada Archives and German forces facing the attackers. According to 6th Brigade’s war diary, the “presumption was that the opposition on our front was not great and that quick offensive action should break through readily the enemy screen.”12 Messages from 2nd Division to 6th Brigade portray the German 272nd Infantry Division, which held the front along the line Verrières–Fontenay-le-Marmion–St. André-sur-Orne, as inferior to the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, which reached the 6th Brigade area, they the South Sasks were ambushed by intelligence suggested the 272nd received “a poor breakfast and infantry of the German 272nd and had recently relieved on both sides little or no noon meal.”16 According lost the barrage. The Germans had of the Orne.13 “As late as 14 July this to 6th Brigade, they were not at cannily held fire for days, convincing lower-grade [division] reported on their forming-up point (FUP) until British army intelligence that this its way from the south of France.”14 1300 hours, two hours before the sector was unoccupied. The South The 272nd soon showed itself capable attack.17 The regiment’s war diary Sasks attempted to sustain forward of fierce fighting, and, as quickly indicates arrival at the FUP and the momentum: “B Coy had pushed became clear, it had support from start of digging in at 1130 hours through D Coy at the double to catch armoured battlegroups of the 1st SS and completion by 1300 hours; it up to our barrage…shortly after A and 2nd Panzer Divisions.15 maintains that the enemy began Coy on our left encountered the first shelling the FUP at 1300 hours. of many enemy posts.”20 The Attack on Verrières The artillery barrage began at Despite ferocious German Ridge, 20-21 July 1944 1435 hours and 25 minutes later the resistance, elements of the South three battalions of 6th Brigade crossed Sasks reached their objective. The hat long 20 July began at 0115 the start-line.18 “It was a spectacular sources disagree, however, about Thours when the Essex Scots, on sight seeing this advance over a front how quickly they reached their final little sleep and no food, were ordered of some 4000 yards.”19 All three units objective. The post-battle entry in 6th to prepare to move. Their advance reported “FOREST” as they reached Brigade’s war diary states that by began at 0800 hours, and, once they the intermediate report line. However, 1700 hours the South Sasks reported

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two companies on their objective.21 platoon driving right over top of fire causing heavy casualties.”29 According to the day’s operations people it didn’t shoot.”25 As the In the face of such overwhelming log, however, at 1650 hours the German counterattack intensified, firepower, some officers ordered the Sasks were still 200 yards from the the Saskatchewan infantry went to exposed infantry to withdraw to the objective, and “A” Company did ground in the waist-high grass, which cover of the waist-high grain. Then not radio success until 1725 hours. hid it from the panzers, who could “the tanks, once they had no easy At 1732 hours “D” Company also now traverse the ridge at will and fire targets, sprayed the wheat fields with reported success. The Camerons on anything that moved. The enemy’s machine gun fire and turned circles sent back their codeword, MAPLE, continuing mortar fire inflicted further through the wheat in an effort to at 1650 hours. Sixth Brigade’s war crush the men or flush them into the diary stated: “the situation on the open so they could be fired upon.”30 front of these two [battalions] was According to 6th Brigade’s very satisfactory, consequently at operations log, the South Sasks about 1730 hours the Essex Scot were urgently requested assistance at 1750 ordered to move to their [position] hours and again five minutes later: with all possible speed.”22 “We are being attacked by tanks. According to the log, the Essex We need help from the tank counter Scots were ordered forward at 1727 attack coming from the SOUTH.”31 hours, a mere two minutes after the This was the last message received South Sasks’ leading elements had from the beleaguered battalion for reported POPLAR and before their the next two hours, presumably “D” Company reached the objective. because of the destruction of the HQ Therefore the brigade war diary’s carrier vehicle, along with the loss account, with the South Sasks reaching of the acting CO. When the Sasks their objective and consolidating for a casualties; acting CO Major G.R. finally were in touch again, they half-hour, allowing Brigadier Young Matthews – already wounded and reported enemy shelling and further time to assess the situation before he furiously sending support requests casualties.32 Requests for assistance ordered the Essex forward, seems to brigade – and battalion Intelligence started arriving 23 minutes after the erroneous. Young ordered the Essex Officer Lieutenant D.S. Pedlow both lead South Sask elements reached the to advance only as the Sasks were “received an almost direct hit” in the objective, but before the Essex had reaching their objective. The two- battalion HQ carrier vehicle, which reached its consolidation position. minute interim did not permit proper also knocked out communications.26 The Essex’s orders entailed forming analysis of the situation. It appears The beginning of a heavy rainstorm a firm base for the South Sasks, which that brigade HQ could have known further complicated communication necessitated time to create a firm base only that the Sasks’ “A” Company and observation, but consolidation before the Germans counterattacked had arrived at the objective. Had continued. “The 6-pounders, mortars, the Sasks and forced them back. Young waited a half-hour he would carrier and pioneer platoons were The Essex Scots started moving at have seen the situation deteriorate: ordered forward to help prepare 1727 hours. They reported reaching 18 minutes after the two forward a battalion ‘fortress’ but these also their objective and starting to dig in at companies arrived 6th Brigade heard came under attack from infantry and 1820 hours, a half-hour after the start from the Sasks only that “We are armour appearing over the ridge of the German counterattack which being attacked by tanks.”23 from the southwest at 1750 hours.”27 had decimated the Sasks in plain sight, The enemy “started to lay down The battalion war diary reported that just several hundred yards forward.33 heavy mortar and artillery fire “The tanks attacked “D” Company During the counterattack, one of the accurately fired onto [the Sasks’] with HE [high explosive] and MG Sasks’ two surviving senior officers, positions.”24 tA that point the first [machine gun] fire.”28 Then an enemy Major L.L. Dickin, went back to inform enemy tanks appeared, knocking counterattack from the southeast Essex CO MacDonald that the Sasks out some of the battalion’s anti- overran “B” Company and destroyed could not survive on the objective tank guns and firing on the exposed the remaining anti-tank guns that they had so recently occupied. As infantry. One Sask officer, Major were moving to their consolidation a result, they would retire behind John Edmondson, commander of positions. “The tanks came right up the forward Essex positions which “B” Company, recalled, “One tank to the crest of the hill and started were not yet fully consolidated. came right into my left forward to lay down [heavy] HE and MG Dickin and Edmondson then went

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to inform Young of the situation company commanders’ decision to Even though many South Sasks in hopes of receiving armoured or withdraw doubtless saved lives. remained with the Essex Scots to help artillery support. Underestimating According to the South Sasks’ war mount a defence large numbers of the opposition, Young gave orders diary and 6th Brigade’s operations Sasks continued to withdraw directly to hold the position on the slopes of log, the battalion’s companies were through the Essex positions. the ridge and offered no armoured in retreat before the Essex Scots had The forward Essex companies, 131378 PA LAC support. reached their objective: now struck by tanks and artillery, Returning to the unit, Dickin began to withdraw. Verbal reports The remainder of “B” [Company] and Edmondson found remnants began to come in that elements then withdrew through the grain field of the South Sasks withdrawing of “A” and “B” Companies were through “C” [Company] area. Major through the Essex forward positions coming back.36 The Essex reported J.S. Edmondson then reported the back to their FUP.34 Some stayed on to 6th Brigade: “[Tanks] south of the [position] of the line of the forward the slopes to assist the Essex Scots, [crossroads].”37 Then, more ominous, troops to [Brigade Command Post] but the unopposed Panzers again “There are two tanks in front of our at Ifs. The Essex Scottish who were pinned them to the ground. Many “D” [Company], We need [anti- in reserve, then came forward and of the Sasks who had fallen back tank support] immediately.”38 “D” started to dig in…the remainder of were wounded or withdrawing to Company was one of the reserve the S Sask R then withdrew through more defensible positions. Staying Essex companies, and this message the Essex Scottish, with the exception up front would almost certainly suggests that the forward companies of some of the boys.35 have spelled annihilation, and the had already been turned back and urgently needed artillery, armour, or anti-tank weapons. What could the unsupported and exposed South Sasks and Essex Scots do against strongly-entrenched enemy troops, panzers and a constant shower of mortar and artillery shells? The tanks of the Sherbrooke

LAC PA 131373 PA LAC Fusiliers’ “A” and “C” Squadrons did little to address the centre battalions’ predicament. “C” Squadron reported efforts to reach a good firing position near Beauvoir Farm, but “things became too hot,” so it withdrew.39 Sergeant Olivier of “C” Squadron, in a Firefly tank, maintained that as he took up a position on the high ground overlooking St. André in support of the Camerons he observed three panzers near Verrières village and fired on them. The rain and smoke prevented him from seeing whether he scored any hits. He did notice the Panzers returning fire, so he moved his tank behind a hill under cover of smoke.40 His fire appears to be one of the few significant instances

Sherman tanks of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers were positioned behind Verrières Ridge but Brigadier Young never gave the order to commit them to battle.

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Canadian infantry on the move south of Caen.

of support near the centre all day. of the St. André crossroads stand up to halt and dig in behind the reserve Although 6th Brigade’s pre-attack and converge for a moment as if to Essex companies, which then became plan designated “B” Squadron as a consult and then double to the rear. the forward units. At 2000 hours he counterattack force, no such move Some of the forward elements of the toured these companies and tried to ever occurred, or was ordered. The Essex Scottish were withdrawing. settle his justifiably unnerved men. reserve squadron moved out only to To me they were in a precarious The CO claims that he, reinforce success on the right, behind position and had to seek cover from talked to nearly every man. I satisfied the Camerons. the intense enemy fire.41 Meanwhile, back on the ridge, the myself with the positions held, the Essex’s “A” and “B” Companies had MacDonald ordered McIntyre forward ones…I told the men they begun to withdraw, not necessarily to gather up his men and dig them were now the forward companies out of control as Brigadier Young in behind “D” Company. Only a and must hold on at all cost. Some and some historians have since portion of “B” Company dug in. The were shaken a bit by the S Sask R suggested. According to MacDonald rest of “B” had, on McIntyre’s orders, and A and B Coy withdrawals, but and Captain D.W. McIntyre (“B” returned to the FUP to evacuate seemed reassured and steadied by 44 Company commander), the men had casualties. That these men later my visit.” been unable to consolidate because appeared in the rear does not prove As MacDonald ordered, these two they had been ordered forward that “B” Company retreated in companies held their ground just during a counterattack and the panic.42 “The B Company withdrawal short of their assigned objective. enemy had directed all kinds of fire appears to have been well handled and They did not allow further enemy on them. McIntyre consulted with the controlled otherwise.”43 MacDonald penetration that night, despite “A” Company commander and they later admitted, however, that “A” constant shelling. jointly decided to withdraw, chiefly Company, having lost all of its MacDonald returned to the FUP because they were being attacked by officers and most non-commissioned near Ifs to see if he could arrange mortar, machine gun and tank fire, officers (NCOs), retreated in some food and hot drinks for his men in and had lost communication with disorder. Clearly only parts of the the forward areas and to find the battalion HQ. Essex forward companies actually men from “A” and “B” who had Edmondson perhaps observed “broke” and “collapsed,” while the withdrawn. While en route he learned this party as he set off to report to remainder withdrew in an orderly from Young that 100 Essex Scots were Young: and controlled manner. MacDonald attempted to keep at the FUP. MacDonald was surprised When we set off, I noticed small control of his battalion by ordering at that number but he understood figures far down the slope in front the lead (now retreating) companies that “A” and “B” Companies had

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suffered many casualties and that brigade HQ had ammunition. Young tow.49 German tanks and infantry McIntyre had detailed about 30 appears to have again encountered maintained constant machine gun and men to evacuate the wounded. these men and went to division to small arms fire. MacDonald returned Presumably many of those in the rear acquire ammunition and weapons for to Ifs, as he had received orders at were walking wounded and so might them. The men received new supplies 0930 hours to meet with the brigadier appear to Young to be improperly out at 0400 hours, complete with orders and apparently intended to request of battle. from both MacDonald and Young armoured support. When he arrived MacDonald found about 50 men to return to the line. Lieutenant A. Young was absent, so he decided at the FUP.45 Sometime after 2100 McCrimmon, previously left out to acquire such support by himself. hours, according to MacIntyre, “The of battle, led about 14 men to the The tanks in “C” Company’s area, C.O.…ordered me to get in his carrier front at 0300 hours, reorganized “A” he reported, “were so positioned that and go to the rear and pick up my Company, and took command.47 our [anti-tank] guns and PIATs could thirty men who had been evacuating Meanwhile, the Essex forward not get at them. There were many of casualties and collect the remnants of companies spent the night in their our own tanks in the vicinity, but “A” Company who had previously wet slit trenches and kept watch on they did not appear to be taking any been withdrawn and were without the blood-soaked slopes in front of action. I asked one tank commander an officer.”46 them. During the night rain, mud, personally for help, but he flatly At the FUP, MacDonald marched and non-stop mortaring had made refused.”50 the men he found to brigade HQ many weapons unusable. “The Back in “C” Company’s sector, the to refit them for battle and supply men worked continuously on their enemy had moved into position in the ammunition. According to him, [weapons], even tearing off their dark for an armoured counterattack brigade was unable to replenish the shirts for rags in a futile attempt to on the morning of 21 July. The men, so he ordered them to stay in keep them in order.”48 reinforced enemy again struck at the rear, have a good meal and a At first light, eight enemy tanks the weakest point in the line, the decent night’s sleep, and be ready to were loitering around “C” Company’s 6th Brigade’s shaken centre held by return to the line in the morning, once area, with infantry and snipers in the harried Essex Scots. The enemy

Knocked out tanks remain on Verrières Ridge after the battle. The open nature of the terrain is apparent from this photograph.

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tanks started harassing the forward remained in its intermediate position confidence and stated “their feeling troops at about 0900 hours, and the until 2200 hours, when it was relieved that I have been unjustly punished for attack continued throughout the by the Royal Regiment of Canada. something I could not help.”55 morning as more enemy troops and The Essex war diarist, Fred tanks arrived. The barrage cut off Responses to Young’s Report Tilston, had written on 22 July: “C” Company, No.17 Platoon and battalion HQ from the rest of the rigadier Young’s report on the It is not a pleasant picture to realize unit. Many men were captured, with Boperation blamed the retreat that so many of the [battalion] the Germans marching them into and casualties on Lieutenant-Colonel have been lost, especially when the captivity.51 MacDonald’s failure to control his action was not successful and many Some men started withdrawing men, his nervousness and seeming of the casualties could have been in the face of the continued German breakdown, his unsuitability for avoided by better planning and the attacks. Further, those from “A” command, and the men’s resulting observance of the procedure that our and “B” Companies with orders to lack of confidence in him. But Young [training] had led us to believe would return to the front remained at the himself acted questionably during be followed before going into battle. FUP. Young ordered MacDonald and especially after the battle. His All of the rules of man management to intercept the men who were attack plan was flawed, and the were either violated or ignored, by coming out and re-form them on battalion COs knew it. However, the sudden move ordered after mid- an intermediate position. At about Foulkes and Simonds agreed with night, the loss of sleep by all ranks, a 1100 hours he also told MacDonald Young’s conclusions and relieved poor breakfast and little or no noon to take the men from “A” and “B” MacDonald of command. meal before battle, and the general or Companies with him to start digging MacDonald very strongly detailed picture and plan, if known, in on the intermediate position, protested the adverse report and was not given to the junior [officers] which surprised MacDonald, who cited five reasons why the attack or troops.56 had thought these men already at the failed. First, there was a lack of front, as per his orders. Although some communication from the outset, Higher command, of course, had Essex Scots were moving rearward unexpected and overpowering ordered the untimely moves, botched as a result of the German pressure, enemy action and bad weather. “man management,” and failed to pass

Photo courtesy of Hardy Wheeler, LCol (Ret’d), Regimental Archivist, Essex and Kent Scottish Regiment Archivist,and Kent Regimental Essex (Ret’d), LCol courtesyPhoto of Hardy Wheeler, “elements of two [companies] were Second, both the South Sasks and on crucial intelligence. MacDonald still in the forward area,”52 and the the two forward Essex companies commented that “psychologically battalion continued to hold the line. had to withdraw in the face of heavy everything was wrong and as far As ordered, the Essex CO formed enemy armoured counterattacks. from what might have been imagined the battalion on the intermediate Third, these enemy assaults caused as the proper preparation for their position and passed word through many casualties. Fourth, according to first battle.”57 to the forward companies to MacDonald, a series of contradictory MacDonald had little faith in withdraw to that point. The German orders from Young made absolute Young’s plan: “insofar as inspiring counterattack, along with the Essex compliance next to impossible. Fifth, confidence is concerned I must withdrawal, created a salient between the brigadier refused to permit the admit that I lacked confidence in the Camerons on the right and the men from “A” and “B” Companies the [brigadier’s] plan, which did fail FMRs on the left. The Essex held its whom he found at his command to a large extent.”58 Officers of the new position and received orders post to return to battle, despite South Sasks echoed MacDonald’s to secure and prepare a start-line MacDonald’s orders.53 misgivings. Lieutenant-Colonel Clift, for the Black Watch, which was to Following his dismissal, temporarily replacing Brigadier Lett attack through the Essex in order to MacDonald asked his company of 4th Brigade, stressed the need for reoccupy the forward positions that commanders to determine whether armoured support. “I had asked, the Essex had occupied the previous the other ranks indeed lacked and was granted, a tank squadron night. At 1800 hours the Black Watch confidence in him. The entire battalion, in direct support, because of the counterattacked the Germans (this apparently without his urging, signed long assault, the rising ground at time with armoured support) and a petition in support of him.54 Many the objective, and the chances of a recaptured the “lost” ground, thereby of the men approached him and quick tank cum infantry attack by stabilizing the front. The Essex reassured him of their continuing the enemy.”59 However, on 19 July,

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the acting CO, Major Matthews, MacDonald doubtless appeared Here the historian has before him had informed his officers that there anxious and annoyed, but he and the record of information received would be no supporting armour. the South Sask officers had good and sent out, of orders given and “The only support we could count reason to be so. Every one of the received. Every entry is timed. The on was indirect support of the commanding officers who went record is strictly contemporary; it Armour.”60 Young’s removal of tanks to see Young for help was excited, is almost wholly impersonal; and was confirmed in 6th Brigade’s final which the inexperienced brigadier it is maintained, not for historical orders.61 interpreted as nervousness and purposes, as the unit or formation Young had accused MacDonald hysteria, instead of a reasonable war diary is, but as an instrument for of being nervous and uncontrolled. reaction to a desperate situation. In fighting the battle…If a division’s log MacDonald claims that after arriving his post-battle letters to Foulkes and is available, you can write the history at brigade HQ as summoned at 0930 Simonds, MacDonald states that of that division’s part in the fight hours, he awaited the brigadier until Young was unduly impatient with with confidence; if it is missing, you 1100 hours. During this time, the him. John Edmondson, acting CO are hamstrung.65 Essex Scots were under attack and of the South Sasks, also recounted needed their CO, yet he waited for the brigadier’s impatience and Young undoubtedly read and Young to return. MacDonald had: annoyance. The South Sask major approved the brigade war diary describes brigade HQ that day as prior to its filing and even added no food for a day and a half, “in a state of confusion because they some sections himself, yet it does practically no sleep for two nights didn’t know what was going on. not correspond with other evidence. and had been soaked to the skin with They seemed to change their mind The war diary maintains that, as a water and mud for 5 or 6 hrs, and from moment to moment.… the result of the South Sasks’ second call was consequently thoroughly chilled Brigade Commander offered no help for help, the reserve squadron of the and cold. I was indignant at the to alleviate the immediate desperate Sherbrooke Fusiliers, as well as an lack of tank support, the casualties situation.”63 Later, when Lieutenant- additional troop from “A” Squadron from artillery fire, the lack of food Colonel Gauvreau of the FMRs near St. André, was “ordered across” and drink, the men from A and B 66 arrived to report the situation on the to help the Sasks. However, the coys who still had not reported, left flank, Young remarked that he was Sherbrooke Fusiliers’ war diary and concerned about the fighting “somewhat excited.”64 It is clear that and the ops log make no mention condition of our weapons. I felt that Young was unduly impatient with of any such orders. Additionally, unless something could be done, we his battalion commanders in that he Sherbrooke after-action reports never would have difficulty in resisting told Edmondson to calm down, and mention moving out in support of any determined counterattack… then accused MacDonald of losing the centre; certainly the South Sasks [Brigadier Young] was apparently control, subsequently claiming that and the Essex Scots never saw tanks not suffering from any of these he was not fit to command. However, in close support. Furthermore, there physical discomforts or worries and the tactical shortcomings exposed in are numerous timing inconsistencies was very composed. He refused to this attack were not MacDonald’s or between the 6th Brigade’s operations see that anything was wrong, or that Edmondson’s, but Young’s. log and its war diary. The war diary I had any basis for my complaint paints an orderly picture of the and misgivings respecting support. Conflicting Sources advance in which brigade HQ took It seemed sufficient to him that we a half-hour to assess the situation had an armoured regiment standing perations logs, war diaries, and before committing the Essex Scots. around in the hills, whether they did Oa formal inquiry offer a wealth According to the log, however, anything to help us or not, while the of conflicting information about brigade could have had no more than Panthers harassed us at will with the assault on Verrières Ridge. The three minutes to decide. 88mm and MMG fire, and obviously operations logs recorded events as Young wrote in the war diary, intended to support an attack on they happened, the war diarist wrote “the chief difficulty experienced by all our position…My feelings were his piece after the battle, and the Court four [battalions] was the devastating less nervous than frustration and of Enquiry in the Field gathered mortar and [artillery] fire which suppressed anger at his impatient verbal testimony under oath. C.P. descended upon them immediately attitude toward me and my inability Stacey ranks the operations log as the they reached their objectives.”67 While 62 to move him. most reliable source by far: artillery and mortar fire inflicted numerous casualties, infantry of both

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the South Sasks and the Essex Scots had to withdraw chiefly because, once they had lost their anti-tank weapons, they could not deal with the attacking enemy tanks. In the ops log almost every request for assistance mentions the presence of German armour. Testimony gathered during the inquiry suggests that enemy armour was the prime reason for difficulty.68 Numerous witnesses stated, and the court concluded, that enemy armour caused many losses. Company Sergeant-Major W.J. Foster of “C” Company of the Essex Scots testified, “During the hours of darkness 8 Tiger Tanks moved into Imagery Joint ZK 1000 Center Forces Canadian the rear of our position with 4 on our right flank. These tanks continually harassed our position.”69 According to D.W. MacIntyre, commander of “B” Company, “at 1800 hours 20 July 44 my company occupied a forward position in support of the South Sask Regt. On our left I observed a number of Tiger tanks after they had been firing at us for some time.” He added, “At 1930 hours I started to withdraw…a Major Fred Tilston, who would later be awarded the Victoria Cross for number of my men had to carry his actions in the Rhineland, spoke for the Regiment when he wrote in the Essex Scots’ war diary after the battle: wounded which meant other men It is not a pleasant picture to realize that so many of the had to carry two or more weapons…I [battalion] have been lost, especially when the action was know all my weapons that were not successful and many of the casualties could have been avoided by better planning…All of the rules of man missing were, with the exception of management were either violated or ignored,…and plan, if one P.I.A.T., destroyed as a result of known, was not given to the junior [officers] or troops. enemy action.”70 Clearly the forward This, of course, was an indictment of Young and support for units “did not drop their weapons MacDonald. and run.”71 Major T.E. Steele, “D” Company Commander testified that Sasks’ “A” Company testified that tanks overrun “B” Company… (who) in the morning, “I observed 7 enemy they were “prevented from digging started to infiltrate back through tanks to my rear right. I suspected in by enemy fire and six tanks.”74 us and then they were shelled by these tanks to be there during the Captain G.E. Colgate, in command of German 88mms… The two forward night as we had been heavily fired the South Sasks’ Anti-Tank Platoon, platoons in my company were over- upon…at approximately 1555 hours testified, “Some of the guns were still run by tanks.”76 we were heavily counterattacked…”72 moving into position when they were Regarding any material Acting Company Sergeant-Major R.R. fired upon by enemy tanks. They deficiencies, the court ruled “that the Case, commanding the Essex Carrier tried to return fire but in doing so deficiencies were caused by enemy Platoon, testified that, “my own we lost 4 T.16 Carriers through tank action and could not have been carrier was completely destroyed by fire.”75 Lieutenant S.M. Carter states, avoided. There is no suggestion in an 88mm shell (the Tiger tank’s main “We had been digging in for about 15 the evidence that arms or equipment armament).”73 Company Sergeant- minutes when we were attacked by was deliberately discarded or Major J.W. Coldwell of the South about half a dozen tanks… I saw the thrown away, or that the unit or any

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individual was neglectful and on the later reoccupation of the forward battalion attacking that day.83 Such contrary it would appear that care position. a contention would sustain Young’s had been taken that this should not iv) That I must not withdraw complaint that MacDonald had lost 77 happen. the [forward troops], but should control. The court was slightly more continue to hold the intermediate MacDonald acknowledged that critical of the South Sasks: “the position. the Black Watch had regained the excessive loss of stores was largely so-called lost ground that evening. due to the manner in which the v) That I should hold the But he pointed out that the Black withdrawal was carried out. Whether intermediate position and so Watch did not secure any ground or not the unit withdrew at too early a secure the [start-line] for the RHC that the Essex had not already held stage, is not a matter for this court to attack at 1800 hours.81 the previous night. MacDonald decide.” The court added, “The losses claimed that had brigade offered were partly due to the counter-attack Sixth Brigade’s war diary further any significant support, such as by tanks. The anti-tank guns all being contends that at the end of 20 July, aggressive tank action, artillery fire, destroyed before they even got into the Essex Scots were “in the process or a proper resupply, his unit could position, left the unit with PIATs only of being reformed to their original have held its forward positions as as anti-tank weapons. There was no objective.”82 This statement implies long as necessary. He added,“The armour support for the infantry.”78 that the Essex was not on its objective area eventually reoccupied by the Even so, the brigade war diary and that it needed re-forming. Neither RHC was only that part of the front claims that when Edmondson visited implication is entirely accurate. The finally held by the Essex Scottish the brigadier at 1900 hours Young Essex Scots’ forward companies were prior to the final withdrawal, and this told him, “orders would be issued where the brigadier ordered them to reoccupation was accomplished with to the armour to cover him with be, and they held the line all night all the real artillery and close tank protective fire.”79 Edmondson denied long. support which was denied to us.”84 receiving any such assurance or So the question remains: why support, and no such assistance ever Conclusion did the Essex suffer a defeat that materialized. day? This article has outlined two Young also denied that t is not difficult to understand possible reasons. First, as Brigadier MacDonald tried to reorganize the Iwhy Young filed an adverse Young claimed, Lieutenant-Colonel men of “A” and “B” Companies report against MacDonald. It was MacDonald had lost control of his and further claimed that he himself easier for him to claim that this battalion and become too nervous made good ammunition and weapon battalion commander failed, not he to exercise proper command and deficiencies with 2nd Division. As we himself. Reg Matthews, the South control. Or, second, failure was the have seen, however, MacDonald tried Sasks’ acting CO, had been killed result of a series of unavoidable to re-equip his men, but brigade was in action. The writer of the entry circumstances, unattributable to unable to accommodate his request. in 6th Brigade’s war diary refers to one man alone. These include the The war diary claims that the brigade MacDonald’s excited state but wrote confusion of battle; the dislocation commander’s “orders were made very after it was clear that the battle was caused by the withdrawal of the clear to [MacDonald] but he seemed a failure. Any such references do not South Sasks directly through the to have lost complete control.”80 appear in the ops log or in the words Essex’s consolidation area; the However, MacDonald contended that of MacDonald’s men. Edmondson’s subsequent retreat of its own forward the orders were not clear to him and account of the confusion at 6th companies; and the lack of effective were contradictory: Brigade HQ suggests little to communication both to lower-level commend in its actions and decisions. commanders and to brigade, coupled i) That I should continue to hold The brigade’s war diary repeatedly with incessant and well-supported my [forward position]. refers to the South Sasks’ retreat as enemy infantry and tank attacks. ii) That I should organize an a “withdrawal to reorganize,” but These factors combined to make intermediate position with these implies that the Essex withdrawal exercise of command and control remnants of A and B Coys. was “out of control,” since “patrols impossible for MacDonald who iii) That I could withdraw my were established to stop any further nevertheless continued to issue [forward troops] to the intermediate rearward movement of the Essex orders and attempted to resupply and position for reorganization and Scots,” the only non-6th Brigade reorganize his men as per orders from brigade HQ.

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Brigade HQ’s failure to provide 3. Ibid., 10 June 1943. 52. 6th Bde WD, 21 July 1944. armoured support was compounded 4. Ibid., 14 March 1944. 53. MacDonald Papers, Ltr to Lt.-Gen. Guy 5. Ibid., 14 January 1944. Simonds, 12 August 1944; and MacDonald by deteriorating weather, which 6. Ibid., 4 July 1944. Papers, Ltr to Foulkes. halted the planned artillery and 7. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians 54. Ibid., Petition of Other Ranks and Officers in Normandy (Toronto: University of Affirming their Confidence in Lt.-Col. aerial support, and the early loss of Toronto Press, 2003), p.141. MacDonald. the infantry’s anti-tank weapons. 8. Ibid., p.147. 55. Ibid., Ltr to Foulkes, p.2. Enemy infiltration into the forward 9. HQ 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade 56. ESR WD, 22 July 1944. War Diary [6th Bde WD], July 1944. 57. MacDonald Papers, Ltr to Foulkes, p. 3. positions also precluded substantial Appendix 7, “Confirmatory Notes Comds 58. Ibid. artillery assistance, which would Conference 200200B HRS,” LAC. 59. Edmondson and Edmondson, p. 49. have caused as many friendly as 10. Ibid., 60. Ibid., p.50. 11. Ibid. 61. 6th Bde WD, 20 July 1944, “Confirmatory German casualties. The provision of 12. 6th CIB War Diary, 20 July 1944. Notes Comds Conference 200200B adequate armoured support, which 13. 2nd Canadian Infantry Division (2 CID) HRS.” MacDonald repeatedly requested Intelligence Summary No. 4, 19 July 1944, 62. BJS MacDonald Papers, Ltr to Maj-Gen para. 5. Chas Foulkes, LAC MG40 E480. and which, by his account, met with 14. Ibid. 63. Edmondson and Edmonson, p.57. Young’s incredulity and annoyance, 15. Copp, Fields of Fire, p.150. 64. 6th Bde WD, 20 July 1944. would most likely have reduced 16. ESR WD, 22 July 1944 65. C.P. Stacey, “Fables and Foibles: History 17. 6th Bde WD, 20 July 1944 and the Human Animal,” in Terry Essex casualties and greatly increased 18. ESR WD, 20 July 1944. The 6th Bde WD (20 Crowley, ed., Clio’s Craft: A Primer of chances of success. One need look July 1944) suggests that the attack opened Historical Methods (Toronto: Copp Clark simultaneously with the barrage at 1500 Pitman Ltd, 1988). no further than the Black Watch, hours. 66. Ibid. which launched its attack shortly 19. 6th Bde WD, 20 July 1944. 67. 6th Bdde WD, 20 July 1944. after the Essex pulled out, with 20. John S. Edmondson and R.D. Edmondson, 68. Court of Enquiry, p. 1. “The Pawns of War: A Personal Account 69. Ibid., p.3. support from “the tanks of the 6th of the Attack on Verrières Ridge by the 70. Ibid., p.6. and 27th Armoured Regiments, and a South Saskatchewan Regiment, 20 July 71. Ibid. formidable artillery programme.”85 1944,” Canadian Military History 14, 4 72. Ibid. (Autumn 2005), p.53. 73. Ibid. Most of the evidence suggests 21. 6th Bde WD, 20 July 1944. 74. Ibid., p.8. that Lieutenant-Colonel MacDonald 22. Ibid. 75. Ibid., p.9. could have done little more than he did 23. 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade Intelligence 76. Ibid. Log [6th Bde IL], Serial No.41. 77. Ibid., p.12 to maintain control and to recapture 24. South Saskatchewan Regiment War Diary 78. Ibid., p.13. any lost ground. All indications [SSR WD], 20 July 1944, p.12. 79. 6th Bde WD, 20 July 1944. suggest that Young, through his plan 25. Edmondson and Edmondson, p.54. 80. Ibid. 26. SSR WD, 20 July 1944, p.12. 81. MacDonald Papers, Ltr to Foulkes, p.1. of attack and especially through his 27. Copp, Fields of Fire, p. 150. 82. 6th Bde WD, 20 July 1944. mismanagement of both infantry 28. SSR WD, 20 July 1944, p. 12. 83. Ibid. and armour, bears the greater share 29. Ibid. 84. MacDonald Papers, Ltr to Foulkes, p. 3. 30. Edmondson and Edmondson, p.54. 85. C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The of responsibility for the operation’s 31. 6th Bde IL, Serial No. 42. Operations in North-West Europe, 1944- failure. He was, therefore, careful in 32. Ibid., Serial No.50, 20 July 1944. 1945 (Ottawa: National Defence, 1960), 33. 6th Bde WD, 20 July 1944. p.176. post-operation documents to infer 34. Copp, Fields of Fire, p.150. that enemy artillery and mortar fire 35. SSR WD, 20 July 1944, p.12. and MacDonald were the problems, 36. B.J.S. MacDonald Papers, Letter to Maj- Gen. Chas. Foulkes [date unknown], p.2, not enemy armour. The Essex Scottish LAC MG 40 E480. Regiment suffered a defeat on the 37. 6th Bde IL, Serial No. 48.. slopes of Verrières Ridge because of 38. Ibid., Serial No. 47. John Maker is completing his doctoral 39. Ibid. dissertation at the University of Ottawa, inadequate support from Brigadier 40. Ibid. which details the Canadian Army’s Young and the headquarters of the 41. Edmondson and Edmondson, p. 57. efforts to maintain morale amongst 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade. 42. Court of Enquiry, 2 August 1944, Canada’s soldiers stationed in Britain MacDonald Papers. during their long period of inactivity from 43. MacDonald Papers, Ltr to Foulkes, p.2. 1939-1943. His work has been published 44. Ibid. in Canadian Military History and Histoire Notes 45. Ibid. Sociale, and he is co-editor (with Mark 46. Ibid., p.5. Humphries) of a soon-to-be published 47. Ibid., p.4. volume of translations of the German 1. Essex Scottish War Diary [ESR WD], 48. ESR WD, 21 July 1944. official history of the First World War 3 December 1942, and 4th Canadian 49. MacDonald Papers, Ltr to Foulkes, p. 2. (Wilfrid Laurier University Press). Infantry Brigade Operational Instructions, 50. Ibid. Library and Archives Canada [LAC]. 51. ESR WD, 21 July 1944. 2. Ibid., 28 May 1943.

19 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 13 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3 Canadian War Museum EO-1536 Canadian War

Soldiers of the 58th Battalion on their way to the trenches, June 1917.

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