Canadian Military History Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 3 4-26-2012 The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic: What Went Wrong? John Maker Recommended Citation Maker, John (2009) "The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic: What Went Wrong?," Canadian Military History: Vol. 18 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Maker: The Essex Regiment and Operation Atlantic The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic What went wrong? John Maker lmost two years after its near- men liked and respected him. In late Abstract: On 20-21 July 1944 the 6th annihilation at Dieppe, the Essex 1942 he became chief instructor of the A Canadian Infantry Brigade was engaged in Scottish Regiment returned to battle combat operations on Verrières Ridge south 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Battle on 20 July 1944 at Verrières Ridge and of Caen. Enemy resistance was stronger School, coordinating training at 4th was decimated for a second time. It than expected and the Canadian attack Brigade HQ for company-, battalion-, had orders to seize an objective under was met by strong German counterattacks and brigade-sized exercises and supported by armour. During the course of 1 hopeless conditions, lacked adequate the battle, two units, the Essex Scottish learning to command at senior levels. support, and had an inexperienced Regiment and the South Saskatchewan When MacDonald took command brigadier, Hugh A. Young. What Regiment were driven back. In the in May 1943, Major Fred Tilston went wrong? aftermath of the battle the Essex Scottish (later recipient of the Victoria Cross) The commanding officer (CO), Regiment and their commanding officer commented in the battalion’s war were criticized for their poor performance. Lieutenant-Colonel B.J.S. MacDonald, This article examines the battle in an diary: “It is with great relief that could not convince his superior officer attempt to understand who was to blame. the command is to be passed to an and the battalion’s supporting armour Lieutentant-Colonel B.J.S MacDonald, the Essex Scot and to one such as Major to intervene at a crucial juncture. commanding officer of the Essex Scots, MacDonald, who is well qualified Young’s failure to intervene cost the was fired for his role in the battle, but this to take over,…[with his] knowledge article posits that Brigadier Hugh A. Young Essex Scots their reputation and self- bears the greater share of responsibility for of training methods and his varied confidence, their popular CO, and the operation’s failure. experience.”2 244 of their men – dead, wounded, MacDonald appears in the unit’s or missing. Second Canadian Corps received afterwards seems completely war diary much more frequently than lost an important position astride the inappropriate. his predecessor, Lieutenant-Colonel strategic high ground south of Caen, A respected lawyer from J.H. Mothersill. He organized both and the Black Watch, which sought Windsor, Ontario, Bruce John battalion and brigade training and to restore the situation, suffered Stewart MacDonald had served as increased parades and sub-unit many casualties. The heavy losses at a militia officer in the Essex Scottish inspections to improve discipline and Verrières Ridge helped to give the from 1929 to 1939, whereupon he pride of unit, which had faltered after Essex Scots the dubious distinction volunteered for overseas service. He Dieppe. By mid-1943 retraining was of suffering the most casualties of was a company commander and, after well under way.3 any Canadian regiment during the Dieppe, second-in-command of the MacDonald “stressed the great war. It is unlikely that any member battalion. During the reconstruction responsibility that every officer has of the regiment (or any other unit) and retraining of the unit he had when he leads his men into battle.”4 could have saved the day, and the quickly developed a reputation as He sought to ensure that all ranks shabby treatment that MacDonald an excellent trainer and leader; his could command even without higher © Canadian Military History, Volume 18, Number 1, Winter 2009, pp.7-19. 7 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3 Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce MacDonald, commander of the Essex Scottish Regiment during the attack on Verrières Ridge, was removed from his position because he was seen as being nervous and not properly able to control his battalion during the battle. almost to Falaise, where the British army would eventually meet the Americans in August. Operation Goodwood, the major British armoured attack to capture Verrières Ridge, had failed. By 19 July VIII British Corps had lost about 270 tanks and many men and was organizing its withdrawal. Although Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps, assumed that these British attempts had softened up German resistance, the decision to attack the ridge with a “fresh infantry division” proved costly.8 British pressure to break the German line and Montgomery’s insistence that the advance continue forced Simonds’ hand. The 6th Brigade plan of attack involved four infantry battalions. The Cameron Highlanders of Canada would advance on the right flank against St. André-sur-Orne, where Photo courtesy of Hardy Wheeler, LCol (Ret’d), Regimental Archivist, Essex and Kent Scottish Regiment Archivist,and Kent Regimental Essex (Ret’d), LCol courtesyPhoto of Hardy Wheeler, they would probably meet enemy armour; the South Saskatchewan authority, having “each [platoon] orders to carry 21 Army Group’s Regiment would attack in the centre exercised in drill by the [officer], then advance southward from the southern towards the crest of the ridge; and by several [private] soldiers.”5 When outskirts of Caen and to establish the Fusiliers de Mont-Royal (FMRs) the Essex Scots “boarded American itself on Verrières Ridge. The next would advance on the left flank vessels for the journey to France” on day 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade towards Verrières, just below the 4 July 19446 they could reasonably moved forward with the Essex Scots ridge’s summit.9 The Essex Scots were anticipate success in battle. under command for an advance on to advance behind the South Sasks This article will examine the the ridge. The brigade commander and set up a firm base behind the planning for the assault at Verrières was Brigadier H.A. Young,“an RMC forward centre battalion and might Ridge, the attack itself, responses graduate without previous combat leapfrog the South Sasks if the latter to Brigadier Young’s report on the experience.”7 The crest of Verrières were able to consolidate on their event, and the conflicting sources that runs roughly east-west and affords objectives. make it difficult to understand what a commanding view both north and “A” Squadron of the 27th really happened. south. The German defenders could Canadian Armoured Regiment see clearly the Anglo-Canadian (Sherbrooke Fusiliers) was to support Planning the Assault advance from the north. Tactically, the attack on St. André-sur-Orne, capture of the ridge was crucial “C” Squadron was to support the n the night of 19 July 1944, in to II Canadian Corps’ southward FMRs on the left, while “B” Squadron OOperation Atlantic, the 2nd advance, as it would afford a view remained in reserve at regimental Canadian Infantry Division received south across nearby Roqancourt and and brigade headquarters (HQ) near 8 http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/3 2 Maker: The Essex Regiment and Operation Atlantic Brigadier Hugh A. Young commanded the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade during the 20 July 1944 attack on Verrières Ridge. Though he blamed the failure of the operation on his subordinates, the evidence makes it clear that he did not have a solid grip on the battle. Ifs.10 “A” and “C” Squadrons were to direct fire from rearward, hull- down positions to support the flanks and deal with any enemy armour that appeared; “B” would act at the brigadier’s discretion. Artillery was on call as needed. Sixth Brigade’s orders termed the Sherbrookes “the basis of [the] counter-attack force.”11 The decision to limit armoured support in the centre would prove disastrous. HQs of both 2nd Division and 6th Brigade underestimated the 145590 PA Library(LAC) Canada Archives and German forces facing the attackers. According to 6th Brigade’s war diary, the “presumption was that the opposition on our front was not great and that quick offensive action should break through readily the enemy screen.”12 Messages from 2nd Division to 6th Brigade portray the German 272nd Infantry Division, which held the front along the line Verrières–Fontenay-le-Marmion–St. André-sur-Orne, as inferior to the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, which reached the 6th Brigade area, they the South Sasks were ambushed by intelligence suggested the 272nd received “a poor breakfast and infantry of the German 272nd and had recently relieved on both sides little or no noon meal.”16 According lost the barrage. The Germans had of the Orne.13 “As late as 14 July this to 6th Brigade, they were not at cannily held fire for days, convincing lower-grade [division] reported on their forming-up point (FUP) until British army intelligence that this its way from the south of France.”14 1300 hours, two hours before the sector was unoccupied. The South The 272nd soon showed itself capable attack.17 The regiment’s war diary Sasks attempted to sustain forward of fierce fighting, and, as quickly indicates arrival at the FUP and the momentum: “B Coy had pushed became clear, it had support from start of digging in at 1130 hours through D Coy at the double to catch armoured battlegroups of the 1st SS and completion by 1300 hours; it up to our barrage…shortly after A and 2nd Panzer Divisions.15 maintains that the enemy began Coy on our left encountered the first shelling the FUP at 1300 hours.