The German Retirement, 1917

CHAPTER VI

THE GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 The remaining part of this Section relates to the two great campaigns in which Great Britain carried the main burden of war on the Western Front through the year 1917. The subject of the present chapter is the work of the medical service with the I Anzac Corps in the British spring offensive-that is, during the Battle of Arras and in the attacks on the Hindenburg Line. The failure of the Allies at Gallipoli was felt this year in the locking up of half a million effectives facing Turkey and Bulgaria, in Palestine and Macedonia,l and in The general the isolation of Russia. This power though even now building her Phoenis pyre of revolution, still had cannon-fodder in plenty and generals, not unable, to lead them though, unfortunately, to a martyrdom that was neither inspired nor inspiring. The armies of Roumania and Serbia like that of Belgium had survived defeat (in some part at least) and were still a force behind the Russian and the Balkan fronts respectively. The fact that in this way some hundred German divisions were still held, though precariously, in the East, made possible a renewal in 1917 of the Allied offensive in the West. Italy, also, though she would not move until she felt safe in doing so, itched to prove by right of conquest her claim to possess Trieste; and hoped incidentally to aid the general Allied cause. From the fighting on this front in -1916 the Allies claimed a

1 General Ludendorff (My War Memories 1914-1918, p 209) contends that the Allied operations in the Middle East were solely for aggrandizement and hampered them in their conduct of the war. His estimate of the Gallipoli Campaign on the other hand II) wholly opposed to that of the extreme "Western" school of strategy whore protagonists, it seems clear, failed to observe that the year igij could not be decisive but must be devoted by each side to the achievement of strategic advantage in pre aration for the decisive struggle by attrition on the Western Front. See Vd f pp. 312-1.

104 1916-171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 105 total credit balance in respect of man-power and of morale. France had survived Verdun, Britain and The Western in 1917 France had pushed back their enemy on the Somme. The German leaders, losing hope of victory on land, were led to attempt a complete sea blockade of Great Britain by submarines, to take effect from February ISt, rapid and complete success being guaranteed by Admiral von Tirpitz. Meanwhile her field armies would push with vigour on the East while maintaining iii the West a strictly defensive battle, to further which an iniportant strategic move was designed and special tactical methods devised.2 Britain and France were indeed still in a position to strike a blow of immense strength : only now was Britain reaching zenith in her ability to supply “effectives” and munitions. Such a blow, it had been proposed,3 should be delivered in the spring of 1917 by all the Allied powers, and it was expected to have decisive results. Thus 1917was confidently designed by both sides to be the year of victory-to be achieved by the Entente powers on land, by the Central powers on the sea. Each belligerent held a second string to his bow, the Allies in the success of the British naval blockade of Germany, Germany in the release, by the expected collapse of Russia, of her Eastern force for a Western offensive in 1918. The conference of the Allied military leaders at Chantilly had proposed a vigorous resumption of the Somme offensive in the spring and new offensives by Russia and forMilitary 1017 Italy in May. The first would continue the process of “wearing down” the enemy’s line of resistance by means of repeated assaults covered by bombardment of unprecedented ferocity, with a view to a strategic break- through when opportunity should arise. General Haig obtained agreement also to his suggestion that afterwards an offensive might be undertaken to drive the Germans from the vital position of their right flank in Flanders. The preparations for the

3 Essentially, defence by means of counter-attack the troops disposed in depth, the front line thinly manned. and sheltered from the terrific bombardments (which were the Allied reply to barbed-\\ire and machine-guns) in deep dugouts or concrete stronghold.. The nature oi the tactical methods emplo>ed for offence and defence were of great iniporiance in the work of the regimental stretcher-bearers. JAt a conference, in which Britain, France, Italy, and Russia were represented, held in Xovember at Chantrlly. 106 THE WESTERN FRONT 11916-17 concerted spring advance by the British and French on the fronts from Arras to the Oise were immediately begun. In December, 1916,however, these plans sustained a dramatic amendment. Both the British and French nations--especially the latter, worn by its long sustainment of the chief burden- were eager for methods that should involve “no more Sommes.” Unhappily for the Allied cause there appeared at the height of this reaction a will-0-the-wisp of quite exceptional brightness and allure in the form of a supposed shortcut to victory. On the strength of a striking success in the counter-offensives at Verdun, achieved by adopting an unlimited objective and without initial “wearing down,” the commander of the French Second Army, General Nivelle, had inspired French politicians with the belief that like methods applied on a grand scale might achieve the desired “knock-out blow.” On December 13th he superseded General Joffre in command on the Western Front, and in February, through the action of Mr Lloyd George (who had replaced Mr Asquith as head of the British Coalition Government) he was given what was in effect the supreme command of both British and French forces in France and a free hand to carry through a battle plan that was to end the war. For a combined French and British advance on the Somme, to be made in steps, each covered by sustained bombardments, there was substituted a French whirlwind push, to attain victory by the new methods in the Champagne. To this a British offensive on the Ancre and Scarpe would give support. The French attack was timed for April Ist, the British for the end of March. The French-and to less extent the British- armies were reorganised on more strongly “offensive” lines : a new drill and training were put in hand. Six new British divisions were sent to France, and the British front was extended 20 miles southwards to a point opposite the town of Roye. The formation of a sixth -4ustralian Division was again mooted-this time by the Army Council-and authorised, and on February 15th the nucleus of its 16th Infantry Brigade and the “16th Australian Field Ambulance” were formed from the contents of the Command Depots.‘ The new plan for the British spring offensive involved an

‘See )p. 475-6 Jan.-Feb., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 107

assault bv the First, Third. and Fifth Armies. The First and Third Armies would attack the northern side of The British Offensive the Gemian bastion, from the key point, Vimy Ridge, southwards to the apex of the German salient created by the Allied advance on the Somme. The Fifth Army would attack the southern side of this salient from the old battlefield on the Ancre, its right flank hinging on the Fourth Army’s left at Le Transloy. During January and February ex- tensive local raids were undertaken to “maintain pressure” and as a prelude to the general offensive. In these the I Anzac Corps took its part. From where it stood the Corps would also be responsible for the right wing of the great attack, being transferred for that purpose to the Fifth Army, which then comprised the II, V, XI11 aid I Anzac Corps. Whatever hope of success may have lain in these ambitious plans was gravely prejudiced by a clever move made by the German High Command to abandon the un- LineThe favourable positions into which its troops had been forced on the Somme, and alsdyresort to a shorter and more secure front-to release formations and save man-power, and thus promote an offensive defence. Dur- ing the winter the Germans had created, behind the Somme front and farther north, one of the most remarkable defensive lines that warfare has seen. Its southern element, the “Hindenburg” or “Siegfried” Line, stretched with accessory switches across the chord of the great Vimy-Soissons salient. In the waterlogged country of Flanders a complete line of shell-proof f erro-concrete 108 THE WESTERN FRONT [Jan.-Apr., 1917 blockhouses (nicknamed by the British infantry "pill-boxes") was built along the whole front.5 Against this fortress system or its northern continuation- wide trenches, broad belts of barbed wire, machine-gun strong- posts, and deep dugouts-the Australian Imperial Force was to be thrown several times during the remainder of the war. In its first great fight in 1917 it thrust deeply into them; in its last battle in the war it broke through one of the strongest sectors. The present chapter relates to the first of these impacts, preceded, as it was, by the retirement of the First German Army to its new front followed closely by the British Fifth Army. Though the existence of this new German line far in rear of the old was known to the British General Staff in January it was not taken seriously into account. Early in February however the intention of the enemy to abandon his present front was suspected; on February 23-24 a retirement on the Fifth Army front was disclosed by patrols. The In- volvements of the move soon became clearo; pursuit across the morass of the Ancre battlefield must be slow, and, with nothing to strike at, the British full dress offensive codd not now include a main stroke by the Fifth Army. The French offensive had been postponed until April 17th. The date for the British was now fixed for the 7th, with the bastioii of Vimy Ridge in front of Arras as the chief objective; the assault would be made by the First Army (Horne) and Third (Allenby). The ultimate r6le of the Fifth Army would depend on the rate of its advance following up the enemy; its immediate task was that of vigorous pursuit, its advanced troops harassing the enemy while the main force dragged itself clear, through and across the mud field. In this task for the next focir weeks it was very strenuously occupied. The German plan of retirement-the code name for which was ap- propriately " Alberich ''''-was designed to cover five weeks, mainly for preparation and destruction, the actual withdrawal " Alberich " of the infantry occurring in the last few days. The first day of preparation was February 9; but the pressure of British winter activity forced the Germans to a pre- viously unintended preliminary withdrawal to the first, and later to the second reserve lines (R.1 and R.11). These were respectively in front of and behind Grhillers. a distance of about three miles. The general retirement over the whole salient was arranged for March 16th. In this second phase the whole force would retire along prepared routes to the Hindenburg Line. As it turned out the line was not ready, and the

5"Hindenburg Line" was the Allies' name for the whole srstem. The Germans called the main line from the neighbourhood of Soissons to that of Arras the "Siegfried Line." To bar any attempt to adQance from Arras they burlt &rth. wards. from between QuCant and Bullecourt, a switch known to the,,British as the Drocourt-Queant switch and to the Germans as the "Wotan Lme. #The ccmment of the I Anzac Corps Chief of Staff (General C. B. B. White) was, "I am afraid it 15 a very clever thing the Germans have done.'' Altrtral~afi Ofiriol History, rot. II', p 69 'The malignant awari in Wagner's opera Dse Rheinuold Feb., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 109

villages in front of it were therefore still to be held as outposts until it was quite complete. A third phase was thus added to the actual withdrawal. The most important feature of the pursuit was the fact that, till roads should be repaired and railways pushed forward, the advanced British force had now to leave farther and farther be- Fifth Army’s hind it the artillery, the railheads, supply depots, pursuit workshops, reserve and rest areas, billets, medical bases-all the vast paraphernalia of static trench warfare. The enemy on the other hand was moving into an area prepared to give him the greatest assistance and his pursuer the greatest hindrance. The British advance had to conform closely to the German plan of retirement. Save for the fact that the raids in February induced the German army group commander to order the fore- stallment of the time-table, a1- ready men- tioned, the re- tiring formations were not seriously incom- moded by Bri- tish or French action.8 The first stage of the pursuit was carried out by the Divisions in the British line, the boundary between I Anzac Corps and its northern neighbour being, at first, the Albert-Bapaume road. The progress of the main force was in a great measure determined by the condition of this highway. On February 23rd the 4tt1, Division had sustained 37 casualties in an attack on “Stormy Trench. These were evacuated along the well established routes. On the 24th this formation was First Phase: taken out of the line9 and the Anzac front was Feb. 25-Mar. 17, held by the Ist, rind, and 5th Divisions, in that I Anzac Corps order from the right. Medical arrangements were adjusted between the assistant-directors concerned. 011 the same date the British pursuit began. The battalions in line moved forward as a whole, feeling their way across the old battlefield by their own scouting and raiding parties, with constant outpost bicker-

BThe analogy between this retirement of the German force and the Evacuation of Gallzpoli 1s interesting both in the methods employed and in the ease and safety with which it was accomplished. The German losses entailed by this apparently formidable operation were comparatively insignificant. See Vol. I, Chapter %%. 8 For rest, and training in the new infantry tactics and drill, and to reorganise for offenslre. Of medical personnel only the Bn. stretcher-bearers were concerned in this special training; their hisposal with the companies became general, and their distinction from the other combatant troops was made less marked. 1 III THE WESTERN FRONT [Feb.-Mar., 1917

ings and occasional serious engagements. The course of the fighting, and the problems of the medical service were largely determined by the fact that the right flank of the I Anzac Corps (5th Division) and the whole Fourth Army were held stationary by the enemy, the Ger- man retirement (and British advance) swinging on Le Transloy. The first two weeks of February were frosty and clear; thereafter rain or snow often fell, the spring thaw began, and fogs sometimes lay heavy, day and night. On February 24th the 1st Division occupied with little opposition “The Maze,” “Chord line,” and “Gird” trenches-the scene of the bitter struggles of November. On February 27th, by active fighting involving over a hundred casualties, the Germans were forced by the 1st Division from the villages of Le Barque, Thilloy and Ligny-Thilloy. By the 28th the corps had advanced within a mile and a half of Bapaume. On March md the first German reserve line at Loupart Wood was uncovered by the capture by the 2nd Division of *‘Malt Trench.” On the 10th this Division occupied Grkvillers, the enemy having evacuated his first - reserve line and, on the whole Fifth Army front, retired to his second ’.reserve line running through and around Bapaume. A projected advance by the whole of the Fifth Army was forestalled by his general retirement to the Hindenburg Line on March 16th and 17th.

“A.A.M.C. Order No. 51” of the Deputy Director for February 4th had directed that :- the four main dressing stations of the divisions now in the line are the four advanced positions occupied by their field ambulances iii the forward area.

The position of these, when the advance began, and of the other collecting, clearing, and evacuating stations, and the routes of clearance, are shown in map at Page 93. The Medical situation February 24th vast “Corps Rest Station” at Bellevue Farm had been replaced by Divisional rest stations.1° The Corps Mumps Station, however: at Bkcourt Chiteau, and the Corps Scabies Station at Buire, retained their titles as “Corps” establishnients and they also were on a considerable scale. Throughout the advance of the I Anzac Corps at the Hindenburg Line the field ambulances mostly worked with their sections in tandem, each unit clearing through its own advanced posts and stations to its own main dressing station by its own routes. The collecting and clearing of the casualties sustained in the small initial clashes with rearguards was a routine matter, but - IO 1st Division had a rest station at Millencourt, 2nd and 4th at BCcordel, and 5th at Bcllevue Farm. Feb., 1917J GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 111 with the sharp fights that resulted when the battalion lines advanced across the Ancre valley it became a Medical Opera- most difficult problem. At the end of February tions-First Phase the great frost broke; and with the mud the work of the bearers came closely to resemble that described of November and December of 1916.’~Further- more the repair of roads and extension of the narrow and broad- gauge railways could not keep pace with the advance of the battalion fronts. As these drove deeper and deeper into the morass of the old German trench area, not only the road- and rail-heads available for the mechanical transport of casualties but the regimental aid-posts also fell far behind, so that “bearer carries” lengthened inordinately. The first result of this initial extension of the lines of clearance was that regimental bearers could not collect to the aid-posts and ambulance bearers were obliged to clear the field in front of these.12 The direction of the flow of casualties, and hence the position of new relay and treatment stations, was determined by the swing forward of the left front of I Anzac across the line of the Bapaume road, while the right remained relatively immobile. In front of Flers the conditions were such as to prevent any rapid opening up of new lines of communication. All routes of advance by road and rail converged on the main road from Albert to Bapaume, creating a bottle-neck through which must flow the whole impedimenta of the army. For a time the urgent and relentless drive to advance paralysed all efforts at improvement in the medical situation. Where and when available the light railways13 were an immense

11 The resemblance is made the closer through the coincidence of the inost potent causal factor-the forcing through of enormaus weights of heavy artilleiy and shells required for the type of warfare then in vogue. ”The clearance of casualties in the central sector (1st Division) was considered by the bearers of the 3rd Field Ambulance (Bazentin-le-Petit) to have Leen one of their worst experiences in the war. “My worst time” (says one) “was early in 1917 in front of Warlencourt where we often had calls well beyond the aid- posts. There were no duckboard tracks and with six hearers to a squad, one to each handle and two in between. it often took three hours froin one relay-post to another With a heavy man in the stretcher the hearers often bogged, one I recall. hogged ‘almost to the waist, could not be released till night, owing to sniping. The physical strain was shocking, the mental anguish of the patient hardly greater than that of the bearers. (Private 0. R. Dunstan, 3rd Fld. Amh. who server1 as 0. R. Kollosche.) i3The British light railways gauge 60 cm. was some two inches narrower than the German and the rolling stock much less substantial-far too light indeed for the iervice required of it at this time. 112 THE WESTERN FRONT [Jan.-Mar., 1917 relief to the bearers; for the patients, however, even for liglltly wounded and sick, this form of transport was at this time dis- tressing. The small open trucks were hand-pushed, the track bumpy, and the service very irregular, being largely monopolised for amm~niti0n.l~

c bmXm court

.*- *“J- - MarlCOUrf =-Ty.Ms Broad-Garige Railzwags arid I Arrzac Corps Light Railways, Jan. 1917.

It was not till the general advance that motor ambulance waggons were of service much beyond tlie original lines. On March 2nd there was made the formal and carefully prepared assault by the 7th Brigade (2nd Division) north of tlie Bapaume road against “Malt Trench”-a At Malt Trench strongly defended outlier of the enemy’s first reserve (Loupart Wood) line, The casualties in this tough little fight were relatively high, totalling 238 ; the wounds were caused chiefiy by bullets at close range, and were therefore very severe, with a large proportion of killed. For this action the regimental medical officers (26th, 27th and 28th Battalions) formed aid- posts close behind the battalion fronts. In the 26th Battalion

“the regimental aid-post” (says the R.M.O., Capt. F. L. Bignell) “was formed in a miken road ZOO yards behind the front line and consisted of- a shelter eight feet square formed of broken timber. A reserve 11 In his diary of March I the D.D.11 S. records. “Found Colonel Sutton (A D h1.S 2nd Division) waiting to see me about cvacuatlon from Martinpinch The trucks on the Decaiiville are a great strain on the men. trucks often not avail able and no tiiiiing oi trains The C 0. Corps Light Railways (Colonel A. C Fewtrell) said trucks were vcrj scarce and timing difficult, as ammunition went up at all sorts of times.” I I. t

Mar., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT. 1917 113

R.A.P. was in ‘Little Wood’ about 500 yards in rear of this. During the day 117 cases passed through ; the stretcher-bearers carried the cases to the first relay station at the side of the Bapaume road, 1,000 yards.”

The casualties were cleared by the 5th Field Ambulance, by bearer relay and ambulance waggon, stretcher cases being sent to the advanced dressing station, still at Contalmaison. Walking wounded went by light railway to Bazentin. Following this operation vigorous efforts were made to improve the medical situation. Fortunately the battle casualties were few, averaging, after March 2nd, only 42 daily for the whole corps; a minor recur- rence of trench foot occurred in the 1st Div- ision, but in general the “sick” evacuation was small. As a result of combined Corps and Divisional action (by the D.D M.S. and A.D’s.M.S.) the medical stations were moved up, and the claim that battle casualties should have con- sideration in the struggle for transport was accepted by Gen- eral Staff of I Anzac. Early in March the C.R.E. I Anzac began to extend the broad-gauge line15 of the corps from Con- talmaison to Pozihres, with Bapaume (still in German hands) as the next objective. By the second week in March G.H.Q. became convinced that the Fifth Army could not reach the Hindenburg Line in time

:SThe II Corps also zt this time used this railway, and the competition for medical sites at railhead and ior use oi rolling stock was acute. Ultinlately the I Anzac Corps scneme was thrown out and the civilian French railway along the valley oi the Ancre was used to provide the rail connections for the new area. 114 THE WESTERN FRONT [Mar., 1917

to participate effectively in the British offensive on April 9th. Steps were therefore immediately taken to reduce its strength, which was greater than was justified by its present r61e of merely following the enemy. Most of its heavy artillery was transferred to the First Army; it was decided that on March 16th the II Corps should be withdrawn for a rest, and the XI11 Corps also was transferred on March 18th to the First Army, leaving the Fifth Army Commander with only the V British and I Anzac Corps. Even of these a portion could be relieved as the line shortened; on March 7th the 1st Australian Division went into reserve for rest and training, the pursuit being carried on for I Anzac by the 5th and 2nd Divisions alone. At this stage the D.D.M.S. directedlBthat “The A.D.M.S. 2nd Australian Division will establish an advanced dressing station iii the iieighboui hood of Le Sars or at whatever place is best suited, and will also establish a dressing station at Pozieres on a site suitable for the reception and evacuation of wounded by road and by railway.”

Nissen huts and equipment were brought up to Pozikres and a “main” dressing station was foriiied there by the A.D.M.S. 2ntl Division and was opened on March 17th by the 5th Field Ambulance. On March 12th the A.D.M.S. 5th Division formed a new “advanced” dressing station near the old froiit line, at Factory Corner. The second phase-the main advance to the Hindenburg Line-began when early on March 17th it was discovered that the Germans were withdrawing from their position at Bapaume. Second Phase : This indeed was the main withdrawal and occurred Advance to the on the date long since planned, extending along a HmdenburgLke very wide front, from Arras in the north almost to Soissons, and affecting not only the Fifth but the Fourth British and Sixth French Armies. At thls stage the maln bodies of both sides went temporarily out of the picture, that of the Germans withdrawing behind the Hindenburg Line, that of the British taking up a strong defensive position immediately beyond Bapaume and the old Somme battlefield. Meanwhile the Allies’ advanced guards followed the German rearguards across a wide, new No-Man’s Land of

1a.h D D.:l S. “Medical Instruction No. I” of March 4th. By desire of General White (Chier of the General Staff I Anzac Corps), from March J onwards, Colonel Manifold conveyed his wishes to the Assistant-Directors by ”Instructions,” not as heretofore bJ;,“Orde::.” The decisions of the Assistant-Directors were conveyed to units as Orders. When the I Anzac Corps entered the Somme Battle in 1916. the Deputy Director obtained from Surgeon-General W. G. Macpherson, the D D.G.M S. at G.H.Q., suggestions regarding the issue of instructions (Su8 Appendix No. 3 of this :folumr and Appendix No. 4 of Vol. I ) Mar., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 115 from seven to twenty miles, until about March 26th they brought up against stiong resistance from a line of villages within artillery range of the Hindenburg Line, some of which could not be taken until, by April nnd, the artillery of the main force came up.17 The advanced guards of I Anzac, which moved The Advanced out from either side of Bapaume on March ISth, Guards consisted of two strong brigade-columns of the 5th and and Divisions complete with field artillery, light horse, supply units, and medical detachments. The 15th Brigade (General Elliott) composed the right, the 6th (General Gellibrand) the left. These columns advanced, with a vigour and Clan that gained the commendation of the army commander, on a front of seven miles, the inter-column boundary line being slightly to the left of the Bapaume-Cambrai road. In spite of the German retreat preventing the Fifth Army from playing its in- tended part in the coming British offensive, General Gough informed his Corps Commanders that he wished to attack the Hindenburg Line and get behind -the flank of the Germans facing the Third Army. The ultimate results of this decision were momentous for the Australian force, and its immediate effect was felt iii every service of maintenance-in none more than in those concerned with the The German Retireitlent to the evacuation and treatment of Hitidoibrirg Line in the Spririg of casualties. 1917.

This phase of the war stands out clean and exhilarating in the annals of the A.I.F. in France. The troops were freed, for the moment, from the dark shadow of “attrition.” To the up- lift in morale and in physical well being. that came with the

“As a tactical precaution in his retreat the enemy systematically-in some instances wantonly-hlew up roads, bridges, houses, and destroyed also wells and trees along the high roads. The rubble from the houses was a godsend to the road repairers. The emotional outbursts in the Allied press were largely propaganda. If half the indignation that is wasted on “atrocities” were directed against the supreme atrocit), scientific warfare, humanity and civilization might begin to see some daylight. 116 THE WESTERN FRONT [Mar., 1917 spring and with the prospect of a rest and reinforcements, the German retreat gave an impetus that sent men’s spirits soaring as they had not done since the beginning of the Somme offensive, when the A.I.F. along with the British New Armies had thrilled to the hopes and the high emprise which preceded that first great effort-and passed with it. The medical interest attaching to this brief and picturesque interval, in which the casualties of I Anzac were practically con- fined to the two brigade-columns,18 derives Clearance- Communications mainly from the fact that during it the medical units concerned built up a system of treatment and transport which served the corps well in the hard fighting that followed. The withdrawal of the Germans from Bapaume had brought immediate improvement in one respect; on the 18th the light railway was extended to Warlencourt and casualties went by it to the main dressing station at Bazentin. Petrol tractors now came into use on it, and reduced the time of passage- from its railhead to main dressing station by three to four hours. But with the advance from Bapaume the depth of the corps area, already extended, was further increased by as much as ten miles. The administrative departments now Move UP Of had on their hands three sets of troops: first medical treatment statione the advanced columns and men engaged forward in railway construction and road repair; second the main defensive line of the corps, near Bapaume; and third the divisions passed back to reserve near Fricourt, Bazen- tin, and Albert on or behind the old battle area, and to rest and

“See Table on fi. 12R Mar., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 117

training still farther back round Warloy, Millencourt, and the Ancre villages. From the front to rear the total distance was, in a direct line, some twenty miles. When the advanced guards moved off on March 18th “advanced dressing stations” had been formed in Bapaume by each of the field ambulances responsible for clearance from the columns and from the main defensive line in front of Bapaume. The 15th Field Ambulance opened in the town on the 18th with accommodation for sixty stretcher cases and forty-five A.M.C. personnel. The diary of the 6th Field Ambulance records of March 20th- ‘“A’ Section moved up to Bapaume and commenced to take in wounded. Horsed-waggons working in front two miles past Beugnitre bringing wounded into A.D.S. Walkers sent to head of Decauville at the Butte, where Captain Fraser opened a depot with tents, stoves, etc. The Albert-Bapaume road blocked till noon, and during the night trains delayed through derailment.”

But till the end of March these “advanced” stations were separated from their “main” stations by the slough of the old battlefield, bridged only by the old Roman road between Albert and Bapaume, along which must pass almost the whole traffic of the army. The main stations themselves were connected with the casualty clearing stations by roads which had in many parts broken down with the spring thaw. The journey to the C.C.S’s at Edgehill “took longer than on the Somme in 1916.” During the next four weeks the history of the medical service of the Corps, like that of its fighting formations, is largely one of struggle to secure access to traffic routes; a struggle for the most part not against the elements and effects of enemy action but against the imperious drive to force the heavy artillery and ammunition through in time for the great British offensive. But with the advance of the broad and narrow gauge railways and the opening of the Albert-Bapaume roadie that followed the advance of the forward troops on March 17th, the static elements of the army-concerned with supply and ammunition railheads, engineering workshops, medical stations, rest and training areas-began to shift forwards. The movement

1sFor some three weeks this thoroughfare served two Army Corps; both the outer flanks-the right of the I Anzac and the left of the II British Corps-were devoid of traffic routes. 118 THE WESTERN FRONT [Mar., 1917 may be compared not inaptly to that of an amoeba: preceded by the advanced guards as by a pseudopod the army oozed forward in pursuit of its prey. The treatment stations that had served the old front line moved up; new transport routes were formed: the “rest and training” area passed from “army” to “lines of communication,” and was replaced by the old “reserve” area. The move proceeded with accelerating speed, involving the main dressing stations and, later, the casualty clearing stations, until ultimately the whole Fifth Army medical system lay in front of the old Somme battlefield. In terms of movement the crux of the medical problem at this tinie, like that of every service concerned in movement and maintenance, lay in the Bapaume bottle-neck.20 Leaving the main body of the force halted for a fortnight in the defensive line in front of Bapaume (R.111) we follow now the fortunes of the medical detachments with the advanced guards. The medical detachment that accompanied the Right Brigade Column was taken from the 15th Field Ambulance. With some ten miles to traverse. it comprised “ A ” Section complete with Right Column- light transport, and the bearers of ‘‘ B ” and “ C ” collecting and Sections. Betweeii March 17th and 20th the clearance column covered six miles and captured eight villages, with a loss of only 65 casualties (47 wounded). On the zIst Beaumetz was occupied. The Germans counter-attacked and retook it, but on the n3rd it was recaptured with casualties amounting to 85 (62 wounded). Further advance was held

*OThe $awl in the Bapaume road was only soma ao feet wide; off this was mud. Till sanity was restored by Field-Marshal Haig’s order on hlarch 18, that repair of roads should precede their excessive use, an obstinate vicious circle obtained- the more the half-made roads were broken up by tractors and lorries, and the advance thus delajed, the more relentless was the drive to force them through at all costs. The following from The Story of the Fsfth Australian Diz~isron, $. 193 pictures the situation south of the Bapaume road: “The great problem was how to convey, across the trackless waaSte of shell-hole country that intervened, water, food, and ammunition for the forward troops. For at least three miles the whole area was a morass of mud in which waggon loads of brick and stone rubble sank completely out of sight in a few minutes . . . at filst glance the work seemed hopeless. For a few critical days the success of the whole Division had depended entirely on the engineering and pioneering and transport services. . . .” The dates of the opening up of the road and railway connection between the old and new areas and the new front (which determined the moves of the medical treatment stations) are epitomised as follows: By Maich i8 the Albert-Bapaume road was rendered fit for horse and light motor transport, but it was not till the beginning of Aprd that this artery was service- able for heavy traffic. On March a8 the broad-gauge railway was opened to Achiet- le-Grand, and on April 3 to Bapaume. 18th-qth Mar., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 119 up on the line of villages Hermies-Doignies-Lagnicourt.21 now occupied as outposts of the Hindenburg Line. The medical detachment reported to the headquarters of the column at Riencourt-les-Bapaume on March 18th. A relay post was established at Bancourt and bearers got in touch with the forward battalions. The tent sub-division arid transport of “A” Section at once moved to FrCmicourt and on the 19th opened there a “forward A.D.S.” Every available man was put on to make a route round an immense mine crater in the road, which for a time blocked all motor traffic. On March 20th an additional “advanced dressing station” was formed at Beaulencourt, clearing by bearer relays via the Transloy-Bapaume road to the central A.D.S. in Bapaume. By the 2rst the R.A.P’s were at Beugny; all hands were put to work to make a route for motor cars on the shell-cratered road, and by March 22nd the aid- posts were being cleared by the Ford cars. On the 24th the “forward A.D.S.” was pushed up from Fremicourt to Beugny, a good treattnent post was improvised, and the battle casualties from the fighting at Beaumetz were easily dealt with. These were brought in from the RAP’S by bearer relays and horsed ambulance, and went by Ford cars to FrCniicourt, and thence by the Sunbeams and Daimlers to Bapaume, or through to the light railhead loading post formed by 6th Field Ambulance at Le Sars and The Butte. The fi-rst halt of the Left Column (6th Brigade) Left was made on the outskirts of Vraucourt, which was Column captured on March 18th. A night attack on Noreuil on the 19th failed, with 296 casualties. On March 20th the 6th Brigade was relieved by the 7th.

This column was accompanied by the bearers and light transport of the 5th Field Ambulance, who cleared chiefly by wheeled stretchers and horse waggon down the Noreuil- Bapaume road to the A.D.S., which lay first at Le Sars but after March 20th in Bapaume. In the attack on Noreuil the tent division moved up and formed a “forward A.D.S.” in Vauls, which was served by ambulance bearer relays, and cleared by motor ambulance waggon to the central A.D.S. in Bapaume.

=On the right of this column the advanced guards of the Fourth Army were furnished by the Cavalry Corps 120 THE WESTERN FRONT [zznd-27th Mar., 1917

On March 26th, just before daylight, the two brigade columns combined to capture and, by hard fighting, to hold the strong outpost village of Lagnicourt. Iii this action the 7th Brigade sus- Capture of tained 240 casualties (162 wounded), and the 15th Lagnicourt: 156 (126 wounded). From this date the brigade March 26 columns ceased to fun$ion as independent units, and were absorbed in the advanced line of defence.”

Clearancc. Each brigade cleared its own wounded, the 15th through Beugny, the 7th through Vauls. Captain Bignell, the R.M.O. of the 26th Battalion (7th Brigade), wrote:-

“The R.A.P. was formed in an old German gun-pit about 1,000 yards from Lagnicourt. Early in the day it was roofed by wire-netting and branches; later a decent shelter was built by the Pioneers . . . 120 cases came thropgh. The ambulance bearers were in two relays, one from the R.A.P. to Shelter Crater about half a mile from Vaulx. The second relay from Shelter Crater by wheelers to the A.D.S. near the Corps line [Le. the main defence line] now situated behind Vaulx.”

After the capture of Lagnicourt the 4th Division relieved the 2nd. From now onwards movement and action centred on the left sector fronting the junction, near Reliefs and Queant, of the Wotan line (Drocourt-Queant Moves. March 26-Aprfi 2 switch) with the main Siegfried Line-an area which, as zero day of the great British offensive drew near, became charged with tremendous if still vague possibilities. The medical duties there now fell on Colonel Barber. On March 27th the 13th Field Ambulance replaced the 6th in the advanced dressing station (railway yard, Bapaume) and took charge of evacuation from the front line. The main dressing station at Pozieres (5th Field Ambulance) also was administered by the A.D.M.S., 4th Division. On March 22nd the first broad-gauge train ran from Pozieres railhead with casualties to the C.C.S. at Edgehill, and next day “A” Section 5th Field Ambulance Evacuation to was detailed for special duty, under the C.C.S. March 17-~~~i12D.M.S., Fifth Army, with the “Fifth Army Advanced Operating Centre” which was established at the Pozieres dressing station for the treatment of abdominal and urgent chest wounds, serving both Corps.22 On

22 The C.C.S. personnel forming this centre comprised $ree op.efatmg surgeons and twelve other ranks R A.31 C. and four army norslng sisters The centre was housed in a Kissen hut and some large marquee tents. Fifteen A A.hI C. bearers were attached. Most of the cases were severely shocked and the death rate was heavy. 24th Mar.-3rd Apr., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 121

March 28th the “Special Operating Centre” of the Fifth Army also opened at Pozieres for the treatment of urgent wounds of other typesz3 For the time Pozieres became the pivot for distribution of casualties to the casualty clearing and rest stations for both the Army Corps. Patients marked for the two “operating centres” came from the advanced dressing stations at Bapaume by a special service of motor ambulance convoy cars, thus allowing the divisional transport to be used for clearance in front of the advanced stations. On March 26th the A.D.M.S. 5th Division transferred his main dressing station (15th Field Ambulance) from Bernafay to Bapaume, leaving behind one section for the treatment of the slightly wounded and sick. On April and, when the advanced troops were ready to assault the villages of the outpost line, the main defensive line of the corps was advanced from near Bapaume to the old German third reserve line (Ytres-Beugny line), and the front of the advanced brigades became the “advanced line of resistance.” Roads had been repaired and railheads advanced with great vigour. Concurrently, the medical treatment stations began to move into the new area. Battle casualties now came to Bapaume by the field ambulance transport and after treattneilt went to Pozieres by motor ambulance convoy, returning lorries, and (after April 3rd) by light railway, for which a loading post was formed behind Bapaume. Evacuation by this route meant a ride of from three to five hours in open unprepared trucks exposed to rain and snow. On April 1st the advanced dressing station was moved up from Bapaume to Vaulx and was replaced by a main dressing station (13th Field Ambulance) with a “walking wounded station” (4th Field Ambulance) adjoining it. The main dressing stations at Bazentin and PoziGres were now converted into “entraining centres” respectively for the transmission of cases to the rest stations at Becordel, Bellevue Farin and Millencourt, and to the casualty clearing stations, which were still at Edgehill. A site for a divisional rest station was found in Avesnes-les-Bapaume, On March 24th by order of the D.D.M.S. a forward treatment centre for gassed cases was formed behind Bapaume.

p These tno centres octed in effect as an advanced casualty clearing station- conforming closely in their functlon If not In their structure, to that of these units a9 now laid down in British Army Manuals. 122 THE WESTERN FRONT [Mar.-Apr., 1917

This grew to be a large station, accommodating 50-100 cases in marquee tents.24 It remains to follow the third phase of the “pursuit” to the Hin- denburg Line. At the end of March the Fifth and part of the Third Phase Third Armies were still held off the German front Capture of (the Hindenburg Line) by the line of outpost vill- Outpost Line, ages, and on April 2nd both Armies launched an at- April 2-9 tack to eliminate this buffer zone. On the I Anzac Corps front Noreuil covered the Riencourt re- entrant; 011 the V Corps front the villages of Ecoust and Longatte covered the Bullecourt salient. On the right the captured village of Lagnicourt had stood sentinel to a formidable row of fortified villages reaching southwards to the Fourth Army front, a distance of eight to nine miles. The significance of the events that now occurred differed very greatly on the two sectors of the corps front. On the left the next stage of the advance was to lead, through the capture of Foreuil. to the terrible,, First” and “Second battles of Bullecourt; on the right, it resulted in a series of highly successful battalion actions which, though hard fought and sometimes costly, suggest, in com- Northern Sector of Gemta)i Retirement, parison with those showing ..lrea of I Anzac Advaiice, Fcb - battles, the mimic af- April 1917, fairs of Deace time training. h4eanwhile engineers and pioneers opened up routes, by roads atid rail, for the heavy artillery and other machinery of warfare. The forward brigades ceased to be known as the advanced guards and more active control was now taken by the divisional commanders. To take first the operations on the right division’s front-the capture of these villages was effected by a series of individual operations undertaken between April 2nd and 11th by the 5th and Right Divisional 1st Divisions. On April 2nd the 5th Division captured Front Louverval and Doignies; on the 8th and 9th the 1st Division took Boursies, Demicourt, and Hermies,

x The subject of chemical warfare will lie examined in detail in I’d. III 2nd-9th Apr., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 123

The nature of the fighting in the right sector was peculiarly congenial to the Australian aptitudes, temperament and training. In each of these miniature battles the problems of collecting to aid-post and clearing to the advanced dressing station called for skill and soldier-craft, in particular for close co-operation of regimental medical officers with the battalion and company commanders on the one hand and with the field ambulance bearer division officers on the other-as well as for individual enter- prise and resource. On April 2nd the 55th and 56th Battalions (5th Division), attacking at 5 a.m. captured Louverval and Doignies at a cost of 395 casualties (294 wounded). The regimental aid-posts were cleared by 4.30 p.m. to A.D.S. at Beugny and thence to M.D.S. at Bapaume (15th Field Ambulance)-gassed cases going to the special centre at Avesnes. From Bapaume all casualties went to Pozihres for distribution, having travelled from the front, in all, about fifteen miles. On April 6th the right sector was taken over by the 1st Division. The 2nd Field Ambulance with headquarters at FrCmicourt relieved the 15th Field Ambulance at the advanced dressing station at Beugny and cleared the seven miles of front, via a motor relay and urgent treatment post at FrCmicourt, to the main dressing station in Ba- paume (3rd Field Am- bulance) . The problenl Right Sector., April 9. of equipment and supplies was still very difficult. The only stores handed over in the forward posts were 60 stretchers and some 110 blankets. The collecting and clearance of casualties in the next action -the triple attack on Boursies, Demicourt and Hermies, on April 8th-9th-illustrates the medical problems in all these small 124 THE WESTERN FRONT [22nd Mar.-9th Apr., 1917 operations.2s The marginal sketch shows the position of the aid-posts in this attack and the routes of clearance to advanced dressing station at Beugny. From personal diaries which record the attack on these villages a picture of the marching and fighting of this time can be constructed : .4 Medical Orderly.26 “hlarch 22rrd to dpril 3rd hilletted at Ribe- mont (on the Ancre) a typical Somme village, dirty and miserable to look at. Houses for the most part of mud and straw made into a plaster and filled in between laths. April 3rd. Departed from Ribemont in the good old fashion, packs up. After padding the hoof ten miles reached Montauban. April 4/11. The country through which we had to pass is the old forward area. Moved along duckhoards for some miles, many missing-in such cases had to plough through the mud-snow storm during the march: find it diflicult to even imagine more adverse cir- cumstances. Near Gueudecourt (of painful memory) the duckboards finished and remainder of trip had to be got over somehow. The Germans had to retire from the area as it was untenable owing to mud-a regular sea of it. Reached Haplincourt after hours of struggling (not marching) having traversed twelve miles of country.27 “April Sth. Went into action near Doignies. Established aid-post in srinkeii road to right of Doignies, and not far from Hermies. betting on for midnight, and as our battalion attacks at dawn we prepare for the stunt.”

The “stunt” in question was the attack on Hermies undertaken on April 9th by the and and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Brigade, whose R.hi.0’~took over from those of the 55th and 56th. The following abbreviated extract from the diary of a bearer officer supplies the link between the R..q.P’s and the 2nd Field Ambulance A.D.S. at Beugny. ..I Brarer Oficer.?B “7/4/17. Packed my things and set out [from L:apaurne] in the cold driving snow for 2nd Field .Ambulance. .At E~~igny

=The closest analogy to these operations in the experience of the A.I.F. is to be found in some of the fighting in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign. See Vol. I, pp 5-67-99 28 Lance-Corporal R. Morgan, 2nd Battalion. This and the following quotations are somewhat abbreviated The bearer division of the and Field Ambulance (Lieut -Col IV. E. Kay). moving up to Bapaume. had a very similar experience Abbreviated from diary kept by lfajor L. May, who with a bearer section of the 3rd Field Ambulance was attached to the and The regimental medical officers oi the and and 3rd Battalions were Captain H 11. North and Malor F. T. Beamish. and of the jjth and j6th Captain H. A. Wyllie and Captain C. S. Elliott. (Captain North had been acting as R 31 0 of the 2nd Battalion since Ninember in FI~CCof Captain R. L Henderson, who had been invalided. On this day Henderson returned and North went to the 3rd Battalion. replacing Major Bcaiiixh who was evacuated tick.) 7th-9th Apr., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 125 was the A.D.S. and after a short rest here we went on to LebucquiGre (Ambulance Bearers’ Headquarters). It is a little empty village, the houses all destroyed and broken, so that it was hard to find a decent room. Willcocks and I went along to VClu and saw the 4th Bn. and Mackay their M O., and then went across to Major Beamish (3rd) who was in railway cutting with his battalion; they live in small dugouts scooped out of the embankments. This was the real thing at last-all the rails torn up and removed. sentries up on watch, and we had to peer up over the edge carefully, though there was no shooting at all. Had a fossick round and left a squad of men there in a dugout away from the cutting in a wood. And then back to Lebucquiere about 2.30. “S/4/17. Wakened about 3.30 by bombardment. . . . I went along to Mackay and went out with him to select his R A.P. for Hermies and Its taking. . . . My men repaired the road with broken bricks. . . . Capt. hieckay and North came along and after tea I took 18 bearers with me and disposed them iii relays with good cover in sunken roads. 2nd Battalion did not move up till g p.m. Walked 8 kilos. to do the rounds and it was dark when I returned, to find Capt. Lee of 1st Field Ambulance there with 25 more bearers. He took charge and I went round the R..A.Ps again. Then at 1.30 am. went up to find the 2nd Battalion M.O. Found them in a sunken road near where I had left my bearers. . . . Had a burst of machine-gun fire but got home safely after 4 a m. About 6.30 a.m a terrible barrage started in the north which we found to be the beginning of the Great Offensive. [Battle of Arras.] “9/4/17. To-day the 1st Brigade attacked Hermies and took it. I had no sleep nor laid down at all. This morning went round and saw that the relays and R.A.P’s were running well and spent the rest of the day seeing the wounded and loading them. Three died here. Our fellows fed the wounded Fritzes and gave them cigarettes. The other prisoners were made to carry stretchers and load waggons. while the hcarers robbed them of buttons, badges, etc. . . . Cases poured in all day and now at 7 p.m. all is cleared. We had horsed ambulances at Vdu to carry and unload here for tea, etc. . . and three cars from here to Beugny.”

The affair is characterised by the Official Historian as “a completely successful action.”?O The brunt of the fighting fell on the and Battalion attacking from the north through Doignies and this unit sustained 181 casualties. the 3rd 72. The proportion of killed to wounded was I in 3. and Battalion wounded were cleared from their aid-post by bearers of the and Field Arnbulance3O through waggon loading post just south of Doignies.

20.4ystialiai Oficiol History, Yol. II-, p. 24i The account continues (p. Zjl): ‘*Itis significant that. of important operations. the attack upon IIerinies was the first. within the experience of Australi:,n iniantry. to deverop iron1 start to finish almost precisely in accordance with plan 30 Under Capt. G. C \Villcocks 126 THE WESTERN FRONT [Apr., 1917 In this action casualties were cleared to advanced dressing station at Beugny (2nd Field Ambulance) to which four officers and 102 bearers were attached from the other two units; 500 casualties passed through the A.D.S. in forty-eight hours. After receiving A.T.S, food and urgent treatment cases went by Sunbeam cars to Bapaume (3rd Field Ambulance) which was “just able to cope with the work.” On April 9th on the initiative of the Deputy-Director, the A.D.M.S. 1st Division (Colonel R. B. Huxtable) moved the main dressing station (3rd Field Ambulance) to Beugny and the A.D.S. to Lebucquiere. Both stations were shelled but without much harm, and they were soon able to offset the inordinate length of the evacuation route. The M.D.S. was indeed com- mended by the D.D.M.S. to the Corps Commander for his inspection as a model of comfort and order. “There is no doubt” he observed (Official Diary April ~2nd) “that for a main dressing station much more tentage is required than the regulation three operating tents. The A.D.M.S. 11th British Division was very agreeably surprised when he saw the number of tents we had put up, and they were not one too many. Reception tent, two dressing tents, evacuation tent, buffet, walking wounded reception and dressing tents, tents for gassed cases treatment, store tent, blanket and stretcher tent; and in this bitterly cold weather we have to keep a dump of 1,000 blankets as one could not depend [for their return] on C.C.S., who had only recently moved up without much transport.”

The special features of collecting and clearance in the right division’s sector were, first, the long bearer carries over rolling downs country or along the valleys that sloped up from the Siegfried Line. Each relay of bearers carried from 1,500 up to 2,000 yards ; but by adopting the “shoulder high” method such “carries” were easily negotiated by squads of A second feature was the use of horsed, and even light motor, ambulance waggons (Fords) far up in the €orward area, at times even to the aid-posts. This was possible for example, at an early stage on the right of Lebucqui&-e, and at Hermies and Doignies after the roads were clear. Heavy motor ambulance waggons also pushed forward far along the Bapaume-Cambrai road in advance of Eeugny, and often came under shell-fire. In this sector the

31See Chapte,: =I and Arrstraliait Oficrai Hutor?. Vol. XII, Plate 293. During this period carriage ~houlderhigh became unrversal throughout the I Anzx Corps Mar -Apr, 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT 127

“advanced line of defence” extended to nearly eight miles, astride of the Bapaume-Cambrai road. By April 11th this front was consolidated some 1,000 yards from the Hindenburg Line.

I11 the left (4th) Division’s sector, the Hindenburg Line was, throughout, much closer and the fighting more cramped. On April 2nd Noreuil was captured by the 50th and 5Ist Battalions Left Divisional with 570 casualties (413 wounded), and on the same Front date the V Corps on the left took Ecoust and Longatte. These captures uncovered the proposed Fifth Army objective-the Bullecourt salient and the sharp re-entrant angle between Bullecourt and the Queant bastion, which guarded the junction of the “Wotan Line.” By April 4th, both corps had “dug in” some 1,000 yards from the broad triple belt of barbed-wire, and faced at striking distance the great Siegfried Line. Zero day for the Battle of Arras had been fixed for April 9th. In the attack on Noreuil (launched just before dawn) casualties were cleared from the aid-posts to a waggoii loading post in the long valley of the little Hirondelle stream Medica1 ammge- leading down past Noreuil and thence to mente, 4th Division, April 2 advanced dressing station (4th Field Ambu- lance) now in a distillery behind Vaulx-Vrau- court and so by the ambulance cars eight miles to Bapaume. On April 5th, on account of shelling, the advanced station was moved back some half mile from Vaulx to the open fields; and on the Gth for the same reason3? the main station was moved about two miles forward from Bapaume to “a very good site” selected by the A.D.M.S. (Colonel Barber) at cross roads near Beugnitre. Here, two miles from Vaulx, a fine tented station was laid out to accommodate roo-rso stretcher cases, with a walking wounded station adjoining. These were served respectively by the motor ambulance convoy, and by buses and returning supply lorries. For an assault 011 such a position as the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt a minimum of ten davs’ bombardment would be required. Enormous efforts were made to Siegfried Line to be attacked bring up guns and ammunition in time. The railway had reached Achiet-le-Grand on March Sth, and some bombardment began on April 4th. By

310~,And 6 twenty-nine heavy shells fell into this station of which nineteen were “duds Some of the latter had burred themselves beneath marquee tents. Only one man nas nounded 6 128 THE WESTERN FRONT [Feb.-Apr., 1917

April 6th light and medium artillery was massed in the Noreuil valley,33 and heavier guns and howitzers behind Vaulx, and all “worked overtime.” But on April gth, when the Battle of Arras opened, the wire was still uncut.

A.1.F. Battle Casualties on the Somme, during the German retirement, 25th February-9th April, 1917.

Killed Died of Died of Prisoners Total 1917 in actioii Wounds Gas \Vounded (;Rased of War Casualtles 25 Feb.-17 hlar. 407 256 I 1,577 18 52 2,311 18 Mar.-& Mar. 238 62 - 824 300 5s 1,479 27 Mar.-2 Apr. 341 68 I 883 68 85 1,446 3 Apr.-g Apr. 290 ro8 I 548 35 19 1,001 Totals .. .. 1,276 494 3 3,832 41 211 6,237

-~_____ “This valley sloped from the German lines not as did most toward them On this feature the medical route of clearance for ;he Bullecour; battles was based. The guns were placed for the most part about 600 yards in front of the waggon loading post-described in the next chapter. The relatlon of medical positions to those of artillery (and of sui~ply)was a matter of constant concern. The artillery behind Noreuil were field guns and j.S-inch howitzers behind Vaulx were the naval guns and the heavy howitzers The upper end of the valley was subjected to one of the heaviest bombardments with “irritant” shell gas (phosgene and “di-phosgene’ experienced by the A.I.F.