The German Retirement, 1917

CHAPTER VI THE GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 The remaining part of this Section relates to the two great campaigns in which Great Britain carried the main burden of war on the Western Front through the year 1917. The subject of the present chapter is the work of the medical service with the I Anzac Corps in the British spring offensive-that is, during the Battle of Arras and in the attacks on the Hindenburg Line. The failure of the Allies at Gallipoli was felt this year in the locking up of half a million effectives facing Turkey and Bulgaria, in Palestine and Macedonia,l and in The general the isolation of Russia. This power though even now building her Phoenis pyre of revolution, still had cannon-fodder in plenty and generals, not unable, to lead them though, unfortunately, to a martyrdom that was neither inspired nor inspiring. The armies of Roumania and Serbia like that of Belgium had survived defeat (in some part at least) and were still a force behind the Russian and the Balkan fronts respectively. The fact that in this way some hundred German divisions were still held, though precariously, in the East, made possible a renewal in 1917 of the Allied offensive in the West. Italy, also, though she would not move until she felt safe in doing so, itched to prove by right of conquest her claim to possess Trieste; and hoped incidentally to aid the general Allied cause. From the fighting on this front in -1916 the Allies claimed a 1 General Ludendorff (My War Memories 1914-1918, p 209) contends that the Allied operations in the Middle East were solely for aggrandizement and hampered them in their conduct of the war. His estimate of the Gallipoli Campaign on the other hand II) wholly opposed to that of the extreme "Western" school of strategy whore protagonists, it seems clear, failed to observe that the year igij could not be decisive but must be devoted by each side to the achievement of strategic advantage in pre aration for the decisive struggle by attrition on the Western Front. See Vd f pp. 312-1. 104 1916-171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 105 total credit balance in respect of man-power and of morale. France had survived Verdun, Britain and The Western in 1917 France had pushed back their enemy on the Somme. The German leaders, losing hope of victory on land, were led to attempt a complete sea blockade of Great Britain by submarines, to take effect from February ISt, rapid and complete success being guaranteed by Admiral von Tirpitz. Meanwhile her field armies would push with vigour on the East while maintaining iii the West a strictly defensive battle, to further which an iniportant strategic move was designed and special tactical methods devised.2 Britain and France were indeed still in a position to strike a blow of immense strength : only now was Britain reaching zenith in her ability to supply “effectives” and munitions. Such a blow, it had been proposed,3 should be delivered in the spring of 1917 by all the Allied powers, and it was expected to have decisive results. Thus 1917was confidently designed by both sides to be the year of victory-to be achieved by the Entente powers on land, by the Central powers on the sea. Each belligerent held a second string to his bow, the Allies in the success of the British naval blockade of Germany, Germany in the release, by the expected collapse of Russia, of her Eastern force for a Western offensive in 1918. The conference of the Allied military leaders at Chantilly had proposed a vigorous resumption of the Somme offensive in the spring and new offensives by Russia and forMilitary 1017 Italy in May. The first would continue the process of “wearing down” the enemy’s line of resistance by means of repeated assaults covered by bombard- ment of unprecedented ferocity, with a view to a strategic break- through when opportunity should arise. General Haig obtained agreement also to his suggestion that afterwards an offensive might be undertaken to drive the Germans from the vital position of their right flank in Flanders. The preparations for the 3 Essentially, defence by means of counter-attack the troops disposed in depth, the front line thinly manned. and sheltered from the terrific bombardments (which were the Allied reply to barbed-\\ire and machine-guns) in deep dugouts or concrete stronghold.. The nature oi the tactical methods emplo>ed for offence and defence were of great iniporiance in the work of the regimental stretcher-bearers. JAt a conference, in which Britain, France, Italy, and Russia were represented, held in Xovember at Chantrlly. 106 THE WESTERN FRONT 11916-17 concerted spring advance by the British and French on the fronts from Arras to the Oise were immediately begun. In December, 1916,however, these plans sustained a dramatic amendment. Both the British and French nations--especially the latter, worn by its long sustainment of the chief burden- were eager for methods that should involve “no more Sommes.” Unhappily for the Allied cause there appeared at the height of this reaction a will-0-the-wisp of quite exceptional brightness and allure in the form of a supposed shortcut to victory. On the strength of a striking success in the counter-offensives at Verdun, achieved by adopting an unlimited objective and with- out initial “wearing down,” the commander of the French Second Army, General Nivelle, had inspired French politicians with the belief that like methods applied on a grand scale might achieve the desired “knock-out blow.” On December 13th he superseded General Joffre in command on the Western Front, and in February, through the action of Mr Lloyd George (who had replaced Mr Asquith as head of the British Coalition Government) he was given what was in effect the supreme command of both British and French forces in France and a free hand to carry through a battle plan that was to end the war. For a combined French and British advance on the Somme, to be made in steps, each covered by sustained bombardments, there was substituted a French whirlwind push, to attain victory by the new methods in the Champagne. To this a British offensive on the Ancre and Scarpe would give support. The French attack was timed for April Ist, the British for the end of March. The French-and to less extent the British- armies were reorganised on more strongly “offensive” lines : a new drill and training were put in hand. Six new British divisions were sent to France, and the British front was extended 20 miles southwards to a point opposite the town of Roye. The formation of a sixth -4ustralian Division was again mooted-this time by the Army Council-and authorised, and on February 15th the nucleus of its 16th Infantry Brigade and the “16th Australian Field Ambulance” were formed from the contents of the Command Depots.‘ The new plan for the British spring offensive involved an ‘See )p. 475-6 Jan.-Feb., 19171 GERMAN RETIREMENT, 1917 107 assault bv the First, Third. and Fifth Armies. The First and Third Armies would attack the northern side of The British Offensive the Gemian bastion, from the key point, Vimy Ridge, southwards to the apex of the German salient created by the Allied advance on the Somme. The Fifth Army would attack the southern side of this salient from the old battlefield on the Ancre, its right flank hinging on the Fourth Army’s left at Le Transloy. During January and February ex- tensive local raids were undertaken to “maintain pressure” and as a prelude to the general offensive. In these the I Anzac Corps took its part. From where it stood the Corps would also be responsible for the right wing of the great attack, being transferred for that purpose to the Fifth Army, which then comprised the II, V, XI11 aid I Anzac Corps. Whatever hope of success may have lain in these ambitious plans was gravely prejudiced by a clever move made by the German High Command to abandon the un- LineThe favourable positions into which its troops had been forced on the Somme, and alsdyresort to a shorter and more secure front-to release formations and save man-power, and thus promote an offensive defence. Dur- ing the winter the Germans had created, behind the Somme front and farther north, one of the most remarkable defensive lines that warfare has seen. Its southern element, the “Hindenburg” or “Siegfried” Line, stretched with accessory switches across the chord of the great Vimy-Soissons salient. In the waterlogged country of Flanders a complete line of shell-proof f erro-concrete 108 THE WESTERN FRONT [Jan.-Apr., 1917 blockhouses (nicknamed by the British infantry "pill-boxes") was built along the whole front.5 Against this fortress system or its northern continuation- wide trenches, broad belts of barbed wire, machine-gun strong- posts, and deep dugouts-the Australian Imperial Force was to be thrown several times during the remainder of the war. In its first great fight in 1917 it thrust deeply into them; in its last battle in the war it broke through one of the strongest sectors. The present chapter relates to the first of these impacts, pre- ceded, as it was, by the retirement of the First German Army to its new front followed closely by the British Fifth Army. Though the existence of this new German line far in rear of the old was known to the British General Staff in January it was not taken seriously into account.

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