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The American Philosophical Association CENTRAL DIVISION ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM HILTON ST. LOUIS AT THE BALLPARK ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI FEBRUARY 18 – 21, 2015 ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN ASIAN TRADITIONS OF THOUGHT J. Baird Callicott and James McRae, editors MANIFESTO OF NEW REALISM Maurizio Ferraris Translated by Sarah De Sanctis Foreword by Graham Harman WHY BE MORAL? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers Yong Huang SEXUAL VIRTUE An Approach to Contemporary Christian Ethics Richard W. McCarty RELIGION Philosophical Theology, Volume Three Robert Cummings Neville WHOSE TRADITION? WHICH DAO? Confucius and Wittgenstein on Moral Learning and Reflection James F. Peterman KLEE’s MIRROR John Sallis AVAILABLE MARCH 2015 HOW TO ESCAPE Magic, Madness, Beauty, and Cynicism Crispin Sartwell ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL CONCEPTS OF FRIENDSHIP Suzanne Stern-Gillet and Gary M. Gurtler, SJ, editors GOOD WHITE PEOPLE Visit our table The Problem with Middle-Class White Anti-Racism at the conference. Shannon Sullivan EMPLOTTING VIRTUE Offering A Narrative Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics a 20% / 40% Brian Treanor discount with free shipping to WONDER the contiguous A Grammar Sophia Vasalou U.S. for orders AVAILABLE MAY 2015 placed at the conference. Important Notices for Meeting Attendees SESSION LOCATIONS Please note: the locations of all individual sessions will be included in the paper program that you will receive when you pick up your registration materials at the meeting. To save on printing costs, the program will be available only online prior to the meeting; with the exception of plenary sessions, the online version does not include session locations. In addition, locations for sessions on the first evening (February 18) will be posted in the registration area. IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT REGISTRATION Please note: it costs 25 percent less to register in advance than to register at the meeting. Online advance registration is available until midnight Eastern time on February 4 at www.apaonline.org. Please note: there is a $5 charge for replacement name badges and meeting programs. 3 Wednesday Evening, February 18: 6:00–9:00 p.m. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18 REGISTRATION 3:00–10:00 p.m., registration area (second floor) PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA 5:00–10:00 p.m., Manchester Room (fourth floor) EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING 7:00–10:00 p.m., Salon G (second floor) WEDNESDAY EVENING, 6:00–9:00 P.M. MAIN PROGRAM SESSIONS I-A. Invited Symposium: Conservation and Continuous Creation Chair: Scott Ragland (Saint Louis University) Speakers: Sukjae Lee (Seoul National University) John Whipple (University of Illinois at Chicago) Julia Jorati (Ohio State University) “Conservation and Persistence” I-B. Invited Symposium: The Epistemology of Higher-Order States Chair: Julia Staffel (Washington University in St. Louis) Speakers: Daniel Greco (Yale University) Aaron Bronfman (University of Nebraska) Lisa Miracchi (New York University) I-C. APA Committee Session: Buddhahood as a Type of Knowing How Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian- American Philosophers Chair: Dan Arnold (University of Chicago) Speakers: Ashby Lynne Butnor (Metropolitan State College of Denver) “Drinking Tea and Eating Rice: The Meaning of Practice-Enlightenment in Dogen’s Zen” Constance Kassor (Smith College) “Tibetan Buddhists on Knowing-How: Intellectualists, Anti-intellectualists, Both, or Neither?” David Tomlinson (University of Chicago) “When Knowing-How Is Seeing Nothing: A Buddhist Theory of Consciousness without Content” 4 Wednesday Evening, February 18: 6:00–9:00 p.m. (cont.) I-D. Submitted Symposium **Short session: ends at 8:00 p.m.** Chair: Christina Conroy (Morehead State University) Speaker: Sam Cowling (Denison University) “Advice for Eleatics” Commentator: Kevin M. Morris (Tulane University) I-E. Colloquium: Modality 6:00-7:00 p.m. “Defeating Extreme Modal Skepticism” Chair: Andrew Howat (California State University, Fullerton) Speaker: Lars Enden (University of Washington) Commentator: Allison Thornton (Baylor University) 7:00-8:00 p.m. “Necessitism and the Abstract/Concrete Distinction” Chair: David Sanson (Illinois State University) Speaker: Daniel Rubio (Rutgers University) Commentator: Reina Hayaki (University of Nebraska–Lincoln) I-F. Colloquium: Metaethics 6:00-7:00 p.m. “Metalinguistic Moral Disagreement” Chair: Nora Grigore (University of Texas at Austin) Speaker: Renee Bolinger (University of Southern California) **Graduate student travel stipend recipient** Commentator: James Dreier (Brown University) 7:00-8:00 p.m. “Quasi-realism and the Problem of the Schizoid Attitude” Chair: Julia Driver (Washington University in St. Louis) Speaker: Kenneth Shields (University of Missouri) **Graduate student travel stipend recipient** Commentator: Mara Bollard (University of Michigan) 8:00-9:00 p.m. “Moral Error Theory and the Law of Excluded Middle” Chair: Luke J. Kallberg (Saint Louis University) Speaker: Christopher Tomaszewski (University of Connecticut) Commentator: Daniel Wodak (Princeton University) 5 Wednesday Evening, February 18: 6:00–9:00 p.m. (cont.) GROUP PROGRAM SESSIONS GI-1. International Ernst Cassirer Society Topic: Cassirer and the Neo-Kantian Legacy Chair: Steve G. Lofts (University of Western Ontario) Speakers: Frederick Beiser (Syracuse University) “The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau Revisited” Lydia Patton (Virginia Tech) “Cassirer and the Human Sciences (Geisteswissenschaften)” Fabien Capeillères (Université de Caen and CEPA Paris I) “A Priori and Transcendental Dimensions of Symbolization in Philosophy of Symbolic Forms” Simon Truwant (KU Leuven, Belgium) “The Hierarchy Among the Cultural Domains and the Forms” 6 Thursday Morning, February 19: 9:00 a.m.–noon THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19 PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA 8:30 a.m.–5:30 p.m., Manchester Room (fourth floor) REGISTRATION 8:30 a.m.–5:30 p.m., Registration area (second floor) EXHIBITS 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m., Grand Ballroom, Salons A, B, and C (second floor) THURSDAY MORNING, 9:00 A.M.–NOON GROUP PROGRAM SESSIONS GII-1. International Society for Buddhist Philosophy Topic: Buddhist Approaches to the Philosophy of Language Chair: Xiaoxing Zhang (Paris-Sorbonne University) Speakers: Frederique Janssen-Lauret (University of Campinas, Brazil) “Parts and Persons: Early Buddhist Language of Personhood and Its Ramifications for Contemporary Ontology” Nickolas Montgomery (Indiana University) “Truth and Reference in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī” Rafael Stepien (Columbia University) “On Anti-Language Language in Linji, or Sticks and Stones May Break His Bones, but Words Will Kill the Buddha” Joshua Hall (Muskingum University) “Buddhist Dancing Gestures and the Philosophy of (Non-Verbal) Language” GII-2. International Ernst Cassirer Society Topic: Cassirer and the Neo-Kantian Legacy Chair: Fabien Capeillères (Université de Caen and CEPA Paris I) Speakers: Sebastian Luft (Marquette University) “Cohen’s Idea of a Philosophy of Culture and the Question of the Human Subject” 7 Thursday Morning, February 19: 9:00 a.m.–noon (cont.) Pierre Keller (University of California, Riverside) “Kant and the Proud Name of Ontology: Between Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms and Heidegger’s Being and Time” Steve G. Lofts (University of Western Ontario) “Response to Dr. Pierre Keller: The Project of Ontology after Cassirer and Heidegger” GII-3. Society for Analytical Feminism Chair: Robin S. Dillon (Lehigh University) Speaker: Asha Bhandary (University of Iowa) “Dependency Care and Multiculturalism” Commentator: Serene Khader (Brooklyn College, CUNY) Speaker: Robin Dembroff (Princeton University) “What is Sexual Orientation?” Commentator: Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba) Speakers: Jeanine Weekes Schroer (University of Minnesota Duluth) Melissa M. Kozma (University of Wisconsin–Barron County) “The Integrity Privilege: The Hows and Whys of Who Gets to be a Social Justice Hero” Commentator: Clair Morrissey (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) GII-4. Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust Topic: Genocide: Aesthetics and Art Chair: James R. Watson (Loyola University New Orleans) Speakers: David Pettigrew (Southern Connecticut State University) “Cinematic Witnessing of the Genocide in Bosnia 1992–1995: Towards a Politics of Responsibility” Osman Nemil (Emory University) “Filming Catastrophe and the Antinomies of Moving Images” André Mineau (University of Quebec at Rimouski) “The Holocaust in the Arts: The Politics of Empathy” 8 Thursday Morning, February 19: 9:00 a.m.–noon (cont.) GII-5. International Society for Neoplatonic Studies Topic: Recent Work on Proclus Speakers: Van Thuy (University of Michigan) “Proclus on Henosis: Knowing the One by the One” David Morphew (University of Michigan) “Proclus on Plotinus’ Theory of Matter-Evil” Umer Shaikh (University of Michigan) “How to Think about Proclus on the Self-Caused” GII-6. International Society for Environmental Ethics Speakers: Frank Jankunis (University of Calgary) “Geoengineering vs. Business as Usual” Joao Salm (Governors State University) “A Call for Deeply Ecological Restorative Justice” Karen Emmerman (University of Washington) “Inter-animal Conflicts of Interest and the Possibility of Moral Repair” Ben Almassi (Governors State University) “Intergenerational Restorative Justice and Environmental Moral Repair” GII-7. George Santayana Society Topic: Does More Health Care Lead to Better Lives? Speakers: Griffin Trotter (Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University) “Is Health
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