DOCSLIB.ORG

Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization REPORT ON THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION Office of the United States Trade Representative Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer February 2020 INTRODUCTION For more than 20 years, the United States has expressed concerns that the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization – and in particular its Appellate Body – has not functioned according to the rules agreed by the United States and other WTO Members. This Report details those concerns and assesses the repeated failure of the Appellate Body to apply the rules of the WTO agreements in a manner that adheres to the text of those agreements. Specifically, the Appellate Body has added to U.S. obligations and diminished U.S. rights by failing to comply with WTO rules, addressing issues it has no authority to address, taking actions it has no authority to take, and interpreting WTO agreements in ways not envisioned by the WTO Members who entered into those agreements. This persistent overreaching is plainly contrary to the Appellate Body’s limited mandate, as set out in WTO rules. On a more fundamental level, this overreaching also violates the basic principles of the United States Government. There is no legitimacy under our democratic, constitutional system for the nation to submit to a rule imposed by three individuals sitting in Geneva, with neither agreement by the United States nor approval by the United States Congress. The Appellate Body has consistently acted to increase its own authority while decreasing the authority of the United States and other WTO Members, which, unlike the individuals on the Appellate Body, are accountable to the citizens in their countries – citizens whose lives and livelihoods are affected by the WTO’s decisions. The Report highlights several examples of how the Appellate Body has altered Members’ rights and obligations through erroneous interpretations of WTO agreements. Several of these interpretations have directly harmed the ability of the United States to counteract economic distortions caused by non-market practices of countries like China that hurt our citizens, workers, and businesses. The Appellate Body’s failure to follow the agreed rules has undermined confidence in the World Trade Organization and a free and fair rules-based trading system. Given persistent overreaching by the Appellate Body, no WTO Member can trust that existing or new rules will be respected as written. Indeed, WTO Members have not agreed to any substantive new rules since the WTO came into existence. The conduct of the Appellate Body has converted the WTO from a forum for discussion and negotiation into a forum for litigation. The United States has always been a strong supporter of a rules-based international trading system and remains so. The United States is publishing this Report – the first comprehensive study of the Appellate Body’s failure to comply with WTO rules and interpret WTO agreements as written – to examine and explain the problem, not dictate solutions. WTO Members must come to terms with the failings of the Appellate Body set forth in this Report if we are to achieve lasting and effective reform of the WTO dispute settlement system. CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 1 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................ 15 I. The Background and the Context of the WTO Agreement Make Clear the Type of Dispute Settlement System Agreed by WTO Members .............................................................................. 15 A. The Dispute Settlement System Structure Agreed by WTO Members ............................. 15 B. Negotiating History ........................................................................................................... 18 1. Negotiating Members Wanted a Dispute Settlement System that Would Not Add to or Diminish Rights and Obligations ................................................. 20 2. Negotiating Members Wanted the Dispute Settlement Process to Be Expeditious .......................................................................................................... 21 3. Negotiating Members Wanted an Appellate Mechanism that Would Be Limited and Used Sparingly ................................................................................ 24 4. Negotiating Members Wanted a Dispute Settlement System that Would Simply Help Resolve Disputes, Not Make Law .................................................. 24 ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................................. 25 II. The Appellate Body Chronically Violates the Rules Imposed by WTO Members, Undermining the Dispute Settlement System and the WTO Generally ............................................................... 25 A. Persons Serving on the Appellate Body Have Repeatedly Violated Article 17.5 by Disregarding the Mandatory 90-Day Deadline for Issuing a Report ........................... 26 1. The DSU is Designed to Promote Prompt Settlement of Disputes and Mandates that Appeals Be Completed in No More than 90 Days, with No Exceptions ............................................................................................................ 26 2. The Appellate Body’s Pre-2011 Practice Generally Complied with the 90-Day Deadline in Article 17.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ...................................................................................................... 27 3. The Appellate Body Routinely Violates Article 17.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding .................................................................................... 28 4. Analysis of WTO Disputes Shows the Appellate Body’s Increasing Non- Compliance .......................................................................................................... 30 5. The Appellate Body Creates Reasons for Breaching the Rule Rather than Changing Its Behavior to Ensure Compliance with the Rule ...................... 31 6. The Appellate Body’s Disregard for the Mandatory Deadline for Resolving Appeals Has Significant Implications for the Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System .................................................................. 32 B. The Appellate Body Has Repeatedly Violated Article 17.2 of the DSU and Has Allowed Former Members to Decide Cases after Their Terms Have Ended ................... 32 i C. The Appellate Body Has Violated Article 17.6 and Exceeded Its Limited Authority to Review Legal Issues by Reviewing Panel Findings of Fact, including Factual Findings Relating to the Meaning of WTO Members’ Domestic Law ................................................................................................................................... 37 1. Appellate Review of Facts is Contrary to the Appellate Body’s Limited Authority under the Dispute Settlement Understanding ...................................... 37 2. The Appellate Body Has Erroneously Treated the Meaning of a WTO Member’s Domestic Law as a Legal Issue Subject to Its Review ....................... 40 3. The Appellate Body’s Breach of Article 17.6 Has Undermined the Functioning of the WTO Dispute Settlement System .......................................... 44 D. The Appellate Body Has Violated Article 3.7 and Article IX:2 by Rendering Advisory Opinions on Issues Not Necessary to Resolve a Dispute .................................. 47 1. The Purpose of WTO Dispute Settlement Is to Resolve Trade Disputes, Not Make Law ..................................................................................................... 47 2. The Appellate Body Has Repeatedly Rendered Advisory Opinions on Issues Not Necessary to Resolve a Dispute ......................................................... 52 3. Issuance of Advisory Opinions Harms the Dispute Settlement System .............. 53 E. The Appellate Body Wrongly Claims that Its Reports Are Entitled to Be Treated as Binding Precedent and Must Be Followed by Panels, Absent “Cogent Reasons” ........................................................................................................................... 55 1. The Dispute Settlement Understanding Does Not Permit a Panel to Treat a Prior Appellate Body Interpretation as Law or Controlling “Precedent” ......... 56 2. The Stainless Steel Report Is Flawed and Does Not Support a “Cogent Reasons” Approach .............................................................................................. 58 3. The Appellate Body’s “Cogent Reasons” Approach Usurps Authority Expressly Reserved to WTO Members ................................................................ 62 F. The Appellate Body Has Violated Article 19.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding by Failing to Make the Recommendation Required in Instances Where a Measure Has Expired after Panel Establishment ................................................ 64 1. The Dispute Settlement Understanding Mandates that Panels and the Appellate Body Issue Recommendations after Concluding a Measure Is Inconsistent with WTO Obligations .................................................................... 64 2. The Appellate Body Has Treated Article 19.1 as Discretionary .......................... 65 3. The Appellate Body’s Disregard for the Mandatory Text of Article 19.1 Undermines the Effectiveness of the Dispute
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Women in the United States Congress: 1917-2012
    Women in the United States Congress: 1917-2012 Jennifer E. Manning Information Research Specialist Colleen J. Shogan Deputy Director and Senior Specialist November 26, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30261 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Women in the United States Congress: 1917-2012 Summary Ninety-four women currently serve in the 112th Congress: 77 in the House (53 Democrats and 24 Republicans) and 17 in the Senate (12 Democrats and 5 Republicans). Ninety-two women were initially sworn in to the 112th Congress, two women Democratic House Members have since resigned, and four others have been elected. This number (94) is lower than the record number of 95 women who were initially elected to the 111th Congress. The first woman elected to Congress was Representative Jeannette Rankin (R-MT, 1917-1919, 1941-1943). The first woman to serve in the Senate was Rebecca Latimer Felton (D-GA). She was appointed in 1922 and served for only one day. A total of 278 women have served in Congress, 178 Democrats and 100 Republicans. Of these women, 239 (153 Democrats, 86 Republicans) have served only in the House of Representatives; 31 (19 Democrats, 12 Republicans) have served only in the Senate; and 8 (6 Democrats, 2 Republicans) have served in both houses. These figures include one non-voting Delegate each from Guam, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Currently serving Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) holds the record for length of service by a woman in Congress with 35 years (10 of which were spent in the House).
    [Show full text]
  • Executive Branch
    EXECUTIVE BRANCH THE PRESIDENT BARACK H. OBAMA, Senator from Illinois and 44th President of the United States; born in Honolulu, Hawaii, August 4, 1961; received a B.A. in 1983 from Columbia University, New York City; worked as a community organizer in Chicago, IL; studied law at Harvard University, where he became the first African American president of the Harvard Law Review, and received a J.D. in 1991; practiced law in Chicago, IL; lecturer on constitutional law, University of Chicago; member, Illinois State Senate, 1997–2004; elected as a Democrat to the U.S. Senate in 2004; and served from January 3, 2005, to November 16, 2008, when he resigned from office, having been elected President; family: married to Michelle; two children: Malia and Sasha; elected as President of the United States on November 4, 2008, and took the oath of office on January 20, 2009. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., 20500 Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB), 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., 20500, phone (202) 456–1414, http://www.whitehouse.gov The President of the United States.—Barack H. Obama. Special Assistant to the President and Personal Aide to the President.— Anita Decker Breckenridge. Director of Oval Office Operations.—Brian Mosteller. OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT phone (202) 456–1414 The Vice President.—Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President.—Bruce Reed, EEOB, room 276, 456–9000. Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to Dr. Jill Biden.—Sheila Nix, EEOB, room 200, 456–7458.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C
    UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549 FORM N-PX ANNUAL REPORT OF PROXY VOTING RECORD OF REGISTERED MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT FILE NUMBER: 811-1685 NAME OF REGISTRANT: VANGUARD MORGAN GROWTH FUND ADDRESS OF REGISTRANT: PO BOX 2600, VALLEY FORGE, PA 19482 NAME AND ADDRESS OF AGENT FOR SERVICE: ANNE E. ROBINSON PO BOX 876 VALLEY FORGE, PA 19482 REGISTRANT'S TELEPHONE NUMBER, INCLUDING AREA CODE: (610) 669-1000 DATE OF FISCAL YEAR END: SEPTEMBER 30 DATE OF REPORTING PERIOD: JULY 1, 2018 - JUNE 30, 2019 FUND: VANGUARD MORGAN GROWTH FUND --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISSUER: 3M Company TICKER: MMM CUSIP: 88579Y101 MEETING DATE: 5/14/2019 FOR/AGAINST PROPOSAL: PROPOSED BY VOTED? VOTE CAST MGMT PROPOSAL #1a: ELECT DIRECTOR THOMAS "TONY" K. BROWN ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1b: ELECT DIRECTOR PAMELA J. CRAIG ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1c: ELECT DIRECTOR DAVID B. DILLON ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1d: ELECT DIRECTOR MICHAEL L. ESKEW ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1e: ELECT DIRECTOR HERBERT L. HENKEL ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1f: ELECT DIRECTOR AMY E. HOOD ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1g: ELECT DIRECTOR MUHTAR KENT ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1h: ELECT DIRECTOR EDWARD M. LIDDY ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1i: ELECT DIRECTOR DAMBISA F. MOYO ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1j: ELECT DIRECTOR GREGORY R. PAGE ISSUER YES FOR FOR PROPOSAL #1k:
    [Show full text]
  • Congressional Record United States Th of America PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of the 111 CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
    E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 111 CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION Vol. 156 WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010 No. 38 House of Representatives The House met at 10:30 a.m. and was As you can see by the red line here, $800 billion to that figure for the last 3 called to order by the Speaker pro tem- the worst recession since World War II months of 2009, nearly $6 trillion in re- pore (Ms. WATSON). continually destroyed value from covered wealth. f American households for seven straight The recovery of America’s net worth quarters, from June of 2007 until March is vital to the overall recovery of our DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO of 2009; 21 months of lost net worth. economy. Consumer spending makes up TEMPORE The economy was on the brink of col- 70 percent of our GDP. However, so The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be- lapse, and the tremendous losses to long as consumers’ net worth remains fore the House the following commu- every American household were di- depressed, consumer spending will nat- nication from the Speaker: rectly evident. urally suffer. When consumer spending WASHINGTON, DC, But this Congress acted. And as you suffers, businesses pull back and lay off March 16, 2010. can see from the blue line, since pas- employees. It is a tragic downward spi- I hereby appoint the Honorable DIANE E. sage of the Recovery Act, Americans ral, one that unfolded starting in the WATSON to act as Speaker pro tempore on recovered $5 trillion in net worth dur- Bush administration in 2007.
    [Show full text]
  • Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization's Appellate
    Institute of International Economic Law Georgetown University Law Center 600 New Jersey Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 [email protected]; http://iielaw.org/ THREE APPROACHES TO FIXING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION’S APPELLATE BODY: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY? By Jennifer Hillman, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center* The basic rule book for international trade consists of the legal texts agreed to by the countries that set up the World Trade Organization (WTO) along with specific provisions of its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). At the heart of that rules-based system has been a dispute settlement process by which countries resolve any disputes they have about whether another country has violated those rules or otherwise negated the benefit of the bargain between countries. Now the very existence of that dispute settlement system is threatened by a decision of the Trump Administration to block the appointment of any new members to the dispute settlement system’s highest court, its Appellate Body. Under the WTO rules, the Appellate Body is supposed to be comprised of seven people who serve a four-year term and who may be reappointed once to a second four-year term.1 However, the Appellate Body is now * Jennifer Hillman is a Professor from Practice at Georgetown University in Washington, DC and a Distinguished Senior Fellow of its Institute of International Economic Law. She is a former member of the WTO Appellate Body and a former Ambassador and General Counsel in the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). She would like to thank her research assistant, Archana Subramanian, along with Yuxuan Chen and Ricardo Melendez- Ortiz from the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) for their invaluable assistance with this article.
    [Show full text]
  • China Trade Agreement of 2020
    \\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\26-1\HNR102.txt unknown Seq: 1 17-FEB-21 15:12 A New and Controversial Approach to Dispute Resolution Under the U.S.- China Trade Agreement of 2020 Daniel C.K. Chow* The United States has hailed the 2020 U.S-China Economic and Trade Agreement (USCTA) as a breakthrough in suspending the trade war between the United States and China. Under the USCTA, China committed to purchase $200 billion of U.S. goods and services and to implement significant new protections for U.S. intellectual property rights. However, the true significance of the USCTA lies in its role as part of a larger U.S. scheme to usurp the role of the World Trade Or- ganization (WTO) in resolving international trade disputes. The USCTA is an ominous portent of the future of the WTO. The United States’ scheme has three parts: first, cripple the WTO dispute settlement process so that WTO obligations become unenforce- able; second, create a parallel dispute resolution mechanism in the USCTA to resolve USCTA and WTO disputes involving China that is under complete U.S. control; and third, induce China into violating its WTO obligations by granting the United States special privileges that can no longer be challenged by other WTO members due to the paralysis of the WTO dispute settlement system. Although proponents of the WTO have stated that the paralysis of the WTO dispute settlement system is a life or death dilemma, these proponents must realize that this is only the first step in a larger U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Canada-Renewable Energy: Implications for WTO Law on Green
    October 2014 RFF DP 14-38 PER Canada–Renewable Energy: Implications for WTO Law on Green and Not-So- Green Subsidies Steve Charnovitz and Carolyn Fischer 1616 P St. NW Washington, DC 20036 202-328-5000 www.rff.org DISCUSSION PA Canada–Renewable Energy: Implications for WTO Law on Green and Not-So-Green Subsidies Steve Charnovitz and Carolyn Fischer Abstract In the first dispute on renewable energy to come to World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement, the domestic content requirement of Ontario’s feed-in tariff was challenged as a discriminatory investment-related measure and as a prohibited import substitution subsidy. The panel and Appellate Body agreed that Canada was violating the GATT and the TRIMS Agreement. But the SCM Article 3 claim by Japan and the European Union remains unadjudicated, because neither tribunal made a finding that the price guaranteed for electricity from renewable sources constitutes a ‘benefit’ pursuant to the SCM Agreement. Although the Appellate Body provides useful guidance to future panels on how the existence of a benefit could be calculated, the most noteworthy aspect of the new jurisprudence is the Appellate Body’s reasoning that delineating the proper market for ‘benefit’ analysis entails respect for the policy choices made by a government. Thus, in this dispute, the proper market is electricity produced only from wind and solar energy. Key Words: feed-in tariff, renewable energy, subsidies, international trade, WTO, green growth, local content requirement JEL Codes: K33, Q48, Q56, Q58 © 2014 Resources for the Future. All rights reserved. No portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of the authors.
    [Show full text]
  • The TRIPS Agreement and WTO Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future
    The TRIPS Agreement and WTO Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future Peter Van den Bossche WTI Working Paper No. 02/2020 The TRIPS Agreement and WTO Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future Peter Van den Bossche1 Introduction In 2020, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS Agreement’) marked its 25th anniversary. There was, however, little reason for celebration. The COVID- 19 pandemic had plunged the world economy in an unprecedented crisis. In April 2020, the IMF predicted that global GDP would contract by as much as 3 per cent in 2020,2 and the WTO forecasted that the volume of world trade would decline in 2020 between 13 and 32 per cent depending on the how long the health crisis would last and how governments would respond to the economic impact of the crisis.3 Even the decline under the best-case ‘13 per cent’ scenario would still be the steepest decline on record.4 However, global trade and the multilateral trading system, of which the TRIPS Agreement is one of the pillars, was in crisis already before any of us had heard of the new corona virus or considered ‘social distancing’ a civil duty (rather than deviant behavior). Global trade in goods declined in 2019 by 3 per cent in value terms and global trade in commercial services grew by a paltry 2 per cent only.5 In its latest Report on Trade and Investment Barriers, the European Commission found that in 2019 the overall number of trade barriers kept increasing and noted that ‘protectionism has become ingrained in trade relations with many partners’.6 There are multiple causes for this development in international trade but the dramatic shift in the trade policy of the United States since 2017 has arguable been the most important among these causes.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report 2018
    2018Annual Report Annual Report July 1, 2017–June 30, 2018 Council on Foreign Relations 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065 tel 212.434.9400 1777 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 tel 202.509.8400 www.cfr.org [email protected] OFFICERS DIRECTORS David M. Rubenstein Term Expiring 2019 Term Expiring 2022 Chairman David G. Bradley Sylvia Mathews Burwell Blair Effron Blair Effron Ash Carter Vice Chairman Susan Hockfield James P. Gorman Jami Miscik Donna J. Hrinak Laurene Powell Jobs Vice Chairman James G. Stavridis David M. Rubenstein Richard N. Haass Vin Weber Margaret G. Warner President Daniel H. Yergin Fareed Zakaria Keith Olson Term Expiring 2020 Term Expiring 2023 Executive Vice President, John P. Abizaid Kenneth I. Chenault Chief Financial Officer, and Treasurer Mary McInnis Boies Laurence D. Fink James M. Lindsay Timothy F. Geithner Stephen C. Freidheim Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, Stephen J. Hadley Margaret (Peggy) Hamburg and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair James Manyika Charles Phillips Jami Miscik Cecilia Elena Rouse Nancy D. Bodurtha Richard L. Plepler Frances Fragos Townsend Vice President, Meetings and Membership Term Expiring 2021 Irina A. Faskianos Vice President, National Program Tony Coles Richard N. Haass, ex officio and Outreach David M. Cote Steven A. Denning Suzanne E. Helm William H. McRaven Vice President, Philanthropy and Janet A. Napolitano Corporate Relations Eduardo J. Padrón Jan Mowder Hughes John Paulson Vice President, Human Resources and Administration Caroline Netchvolodoff OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, Vice President, Education EMERITUS & HONORARY Shannon K. O’Neil Madeleine K. Albright Maurice R. Greenberg Vice President and Deputy Director of Studies Director Emerita Honorary Vice Chairman Lisa Shields Martin S.
    [Show full text]
  • R E P O R T on the Activities Committee on Finance
    1 112TH CONGRESS " ! REPORT 1st Session SENATE 112–11 R E P O R T ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE DURING THE 111TH CONGRESS PURSUANT TO Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE MARCH 31, 2011.—Ordered to be printed U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 99–010 WASHINGTON : 2011 VerDate Mar 15 2010 23:35 Mar 31, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\SR011.XXX SR011 jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with REPORTS seneagle [111TH CONGRESS—COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP] COMMITTEE ON FINANCE MAX BAUCUS, Montana, Chairman JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa KENT CONRAD, North Dakota ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JON KYL, Arizona BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas JIM BUNNING, Kentucky RON WYDEN, Oregon MIKE CRAPO, Idaho CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York PAT ROBERTS, Kansas DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada MARIA CANTWELL, Washington MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN CORNYN, Texas ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware RUSSELL SULLIVAN, Staff Director KOLAN DAVIS, Republican Staff Director and Chief Counsel SUBCOMMITTEES HEALTH CARE JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada RON WYDEN, Oregon MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan JON KYL, Arizona MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JIM BUNNING, Kentucky BILL NELSON, Florida MIKE CRAPO, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey THOMAS R.
    [Show full text]
  • La Règle Du Jeu: France and the Paradox of Managed Globalization
    La Règle du Jeu: France and the Paradox of Managed Globalization Rawi Abdelal Sophie Meunier Harvard Business School Princeton University [email protected] [email protected] To be presented at the Tenth Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, May 17‐19, 2007. We would like to thank Matthew Baldwin, Pascal Lamy, and Hubert Védrine for sharing their views with us. Thanks also to Suzanne Berger, Jean‐Francois Brakeland, Peter Katzenstein, and Nicolas Véron for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. All errors, of course, remain ours. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th‐September 3, 2006. La Règle du Jeu: France and the Paradox of Managed Globalization Abstract Globalization is often portrayed as a tidal wave that originated in the US and its policy of laissez‐faire liberalization. This paper argues, however, that globalization is not made only by striking down regulations, but also by making them. During the 1980s, French policy makers began to develop the doctrine of “managed globalization,” or what World Trade Organization (WTO) head Pascal Lamy calls today “globalization by the rules.” Central to the doctrine has been the French – and European – effort to make rules and build the capacity of international organizations such as the European Union (EU), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and WTO. These organizations then would have the authority to govern commercial and financial globalization. These organizations, however, have also used this capacity to promote liberalization.
    [Show full text]
  • Article IX of the WTO Agreement
    WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX WTO Agreement – Article IX (Jurisprudence) 1 ARTICLE IX ................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Text of Article IX ......................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Article IX:2: Interpretations by the Ministerial Conference and the General Council.............. 2 1.3 Article IX:3: Waivers .................................................................................................... 5 1.3.1 Interpretation of waivers ........................................................................................... 5 1.3.1.1 Exceptional nature of waivers .................................................................................. 5 1.3.1.2 Waivers cannot modify or add to obligations.............................................................. 6 1.3.1.3 Limited duration of waivers ..................................................................................... 7 1 ARTICLE IX 1.1 Text of Article IX Article IX Decision-Making 1. The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947.1 Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting. At meetings of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, each Member of the WTO shall have one vote. Where the European Communities exercise their right to vote, they shall have a number of votes equal to the number
    [Show full text]