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A Greek Warrior Sets Sights on a New Battle Yanis Varoufakis Won Fame but Lost His War Against Greece’S Financial Overlords

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A Greek Warrior Sets Sights on a New Battle Yanis Varoufakis Won Fame but Lost His War Against Greece’S Financial Overlords THE GLOBE AND MAIL • SATURDAY, JANUARY 7, 2017 G REPORT ON BUSINESS WEEKEND • B5 THE ROB INTERVIEW ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... A Greek warrior sets sights on a new battle Yanis Varoufakis won fame but lost his war against Greece’s financial overlords. Now he has a new cause: saving Europe ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ERIC REGULY EUROPEAN BUREAU CHIEF ATHENS ................................................................ he explosive public career of TYanis Varoufakis started in January, 2015, and ended less than six months later, when he resigned as Greek finance min- ister after accusing his boss, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, of wholesale sellout – “surrender,” he called it – to Greece’s bailout overlords. The world's most famous finance minister at the time, he swung his leg over his high-powered Yamaha, true to his style, and fled the corruption and decay of Athens with a roar of the motorcycle’s engine like a Greek Mad Max. His exit meant that the high- stakes game that could have seen Greece removed willingly or unwillingly from the euro zone, and possibly the European Union, was over. The bailout negotiators in Brussels and Ber- lin celebrated the departure of the combative Mr. Varoufakis, who had wanted to replace the proposed third bailout, and the crushing austerity that would go with it, with a gentler debt-re- structuring and economic-reform effort. As Mr. Varoufakis, now some- what less famous, strides into the Roof Garden restaurant of the elegant Hotel Grande Bre- tagne on Syntagma Square, Former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis arrives to the country’s parliament building in Athens for a cabinet meeting in February, 2015. ground zero of the anti-austerity Mr. Varoufakis was pivotal in the drafting of measures designed to elicit a bailout for the country’s struggling economy. KOSTAS TSIRONIS/BLOOMBERG riots and protests that routinely turned Athens into a war zone in rather calamitous for this coun- the crisis years, I wonder two try,’ ” he says. things: Does he miss the head- Greece is still a mess and Grex- line-a-minute drama that turned it is not out of the question him into a superstar, and does when the current bailout pro- he think Grexit – Greece’s exit gram expires in 2018. There is no from the euro zone – is still pos- appetite on either side for a sible? fourth bailout. The short answers are “No” Mr. Varoufakis’s concern today and “Yes,” respectively. I am not is not merely the health of sure I believe his response to the Greece. He worries about the first. I do to the second – Grexit, survivability of the EU and the pushed off the front pages in the euro zone in the post-Brexit era. past year by Brexit, refugees and Indeed, the EU is under siege. Donald Trump, is back in the Britain is leaving. Marine Le Pen, news. But I would learn later in leader of France’s xenophobic, our lunch that Greece’s fate is anti-EU National Front, could not foremost in his mind. win the country’s spring presi- Europe’s is. dential election. In Italy, the “The European Union is in an Euroskeptic Five Star Movement, advanced state of disintegra- already the biggest opposition tion,” he says. “The metanarra- party, could easily win the next tive of Europe is fragmented. election. The grand European-in- People are no longer thinking in tegration project seems dead. terms of Europe. … Everyone has The challenge is to keep what’s a different narrative and when left more or less intact. you put them together, you get a “I’m a staunch Europeanist and picture of implosion.” I am particularly concerned He supports his point by citing about this situation. Grillo and no-growth, debt-soaked Italy, the An avid motorcyclist, Mr. Varoufakis arrives at Maximos Mansion to attend a meeting with Prime Minister Alexis Le Pen want disintegration, luxu- euro zone’s third-largest econo- Tsipras in Athens in May, 2015. KOSTAS TSIRONIS/REUTERS riate in the expectation of it,” my, where the party leading the Mr. Varoufakis says. “Me, I’m polls, Beppe Grillo’s Five Star he says. “So what we had was a wanted to default on the €28- horrified by it … I firmly believe Movement, is calling for a refer- situation where unsustainable billion ($39-billion Canadian) of that the disintegration of this endum on the euro. “We now debt had to be rolled over, and Greek bonds held by the ECB terrible European Union will lead have Italexit on the table,” he I’m a staunch Europeanist rolled over again and every time and implement the parallel-pay- to the postmodern 1930s.” says. “Italy is not sustainable in and I am particularly it got rolled over, the debt got ment plan – the nuclear option, He launched DiEM25 in late the euro zone.” deeper.” in essence. 2015 with the goal of reinvigorat- Mr. Varoufakis is about 10 min- concerned about this Mr. Varoufakis says he had His thinking was that the Troi- ing the EU on democratic prin- utes late for our lunch, which, by situation. Grillo and Le Pen “very solid agreement” with Mr. ka would back down and steer ciples, for fear that the EU, in its Greek standards, is unfashion- want disintegration, Tsipras to eliminate the need for clear of forcing Greece out of the current form, was destined to ably early. Even though I am not a third bailout – “a nightmare euro zone, even though it was become a superstate governed wearing my glasses, and am sit- luxuriate in the expectation scenario” – through a debt over- apparent that German Finance by technocrats who spew out ting in a booth at the opposite of it. Me, I’m horrified by it haul that would swap debt for Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble edicts and are supported by the end of the restaurant’s entrance, perpetual bonds and bonds in- would be happy to see Greece Troika. If DiEM25, whose advis- his shaved head and the black- … I firmly believe that the dexed to growth in gross domes- go. At one point, Mr. Schaeuble ory panel includes Julian motorbike helmet he hands to disintegration of this terrible tic product. The new deal would said a voluntary departure from Assange, economist James Gal- the maître d’ make him instantly European Union will lead to include a slew of economy- the euro zone “could perhaps be braith and English film director recognizable at a distance. Up boosting measures such as tax a better way” for Greece than Ken Loach, picks up momentum, close, he seems a bit shorter the postmodern 1930s. cuts and the launch of a “bad being railroaded into a third Mr. Varoufakis is not ruling out than I had expected (I had only bank” to rid the ailing Greek len- bailout. sending DiEM25 candidates to seen him in crowd situations). Yanis Varoufakis ders of non-performing loans. I ask Mr. Varoufakis why he the polls. Wearing black jeans, black-leath- Former Greek finance minister Syriza also wanted a primary was so confident that little I ask him why the EU should er shoes, a dark-violet shirt and surplus (the budget surplus after Greece could stand down the even be preserved. Why not blue and brown scarf, he is in debt payments are stripped out) mighty Troika. scrap the Brussels machine and full biker-chic mode. Like Mr. Athens and was plucked out of of no more than 1.5 per cent. “You know why? €1-trillion, go back to nation-states united Tsipras, who is still Prime Min- academia by Syriza, the radical- What could go wrong? A lot, as how about that?” he says. “That’s by no more than a common ister, neckties are alien to his left party that won the January, it turned out. The one who has what it would have cost the euro market? wardrobe. 2015, election with a mandate to the money – the Troika in this zone under Grexit. On bonds, we “Because the great problems Only a few patrons in the half- overhaul the loans-for-austerity case – makes the rules. have €320-billion. It’s not as if we face cannot be resolved empty restaurant give him much program led by the Troika – the What was not known at the we would have had any ability to unless we are unified as Euro- notice. A year and a half ago, he EU, the European Central Bank time is that Mr. Varoufakis was repay it if we left the euro. Add peans,” he says. “Climate change, would have been mobbed. Our and the International Monetary secretly plotting the creation of to that the Target2 liabilities it cannot be dealt with by indi- table has a magnificent view of Fund – that was pushing the an electronic parallel-payment [Greece’s deficit under the cen- vidual countries, defence, espe- the Acropolis. It had rained hard economy ever deeper into reces- system in case a standoff be- tral banks’ payment system]. cially in the post-Trumpian all week, but on this day a few sion. A political lefty who stud- tween the Troika and Greek Add to that all the cross defaults, world, the refugee crisis and ref- weeks ago, the sun manages to ied mainstream economics, and negotiators triggered a run on public and private, and the debts ugee flows. They all require a pierce the grey. “Can I call you a supporter of the African bank deposits and the closing of of the banks to various entities united response.” Yanis?” I ask. “I insist,” he says. National Congress and the Pal- the banks. in Europe and you end up with Mr.
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