INQ039377/18 INQ039377 0018 Sub-Contracted Staff) at the 02 Were Sufficiently Trained

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY ARISING FROM THE DEATHS IN THE MANCHESTER ARENA BOMBING CHAPTER 7 CLOSING SUBMISSIONS ON SHOWSEC'S BEHALF Introduction 1. The nature and the scale of the atrocity that took place on 22 May 2017 - the loss of so many lives and the grievous and permanent damage done to the lives of many, many others - along with the task that the Home Secretary has set for the Chair requires (as Showsec understands) that the company's policies, procedures and its approach to the management of the crowd attending the concert and others should be very carefully examined both to determine whether there was anything it could have done to prevent or mitigate what happened and to ensure that lessons are learned for the future. 2. Where criticism is merited, then those parts of the first report may make for uncomfortable reading for the company. But Showsec - as its behaviour throughout this inquisitorial process has already demonstrated - is determined to react in a positive way. Neither the company nor its workforce will ever forget that Salman Abedi's attack resulted in the murder of 22 innocent people. 3. During these proceedings, the company and its directors have acted with conspicuous candour and openness. Where honest reflection has revealed shortcomings (as will inevitably be the case for every state and corporate entity involved in this Inquiry) Showsec has been prepared to acknowledge those failings and to address them. Against this and along with this Inquiry's obligation to provide the families with the thorough and fearless investigation they have called for, Showsec is also entitled to fairness. Fairness requiring not simply that its policies, procedures and actions be considered and judged in a way which is balanced but, crucially, in a manner which is also reflective of and proportionate to the role it played in the public areas of the City Room, the 1 INQ039377/1 INQ039377_0001 extent to which the company had counter-terrorism responsibilities and the position that it occupied in the hierarchy of security providers. 4. Primacy for securing the safety of the public in the City Room lay with the State and with the police. Showsec's role and its responsibility in terms of the security of the crowd entering and leaving the venue was subordinate to that of the State, the police and SMG. In particular, and as against the arrangements in place in May 2017, it was certainly not possible for Showsec's staff to have prevented an individual intent on carrying out a suicide attack from entering that part of the Victoria Station complex. 5. If Showsec is found wanting in any respect, then it submits that the Inquiry must also consider whether it fell short of recognised standards or whether in fact there were at the relevant time no, or insufficiently clear standards against which to judge its performance. It is argued, by way of example, that careful scrutiny of the available evidence shows that at the time of this attack there was a general lack of clarity how to compile a risk assessment that dealt with the risks of terrorism and that much of the available information was difficult to access. Further, despite the security experts referring to the availability of external advice, they were unable, when pressed, to identify where in 2017 this was to be found 1 and conceded that there were no standards in relation to counter-terrorism training at the time. 2 Nor, apparently, can either expert assist as to Showsec's standing amongst its competitors. Showsec understands the point made by the Chair that he intends to consider the standard of the training, but the company maintains that this can only be done fairly by giving some consideration as to whether there existed any contemporary standards that it failed to meet.3 6. That said, Showsec has accepted that there are areas in which it has fallen short, namely in its risk assessment and bag check procedures. However, it submits that neither of these flawed processes caused or contributed to either 1 43/137 /1-138/13 2 43/128/12-16 3 43/142/25-143/23 2 INQ039377/2 INQ039377_0002 the bombing or the extent of the casualties, nor were they reflective of a relaxed or complacent approach to security generally. 7. Showsec's position is that the evidence has established that it provided a well trained and experienced workforce to SMG on 22 May 2017. It was, in fact, a far more experienced workforce than its contractual obligations required or for which it was being paid. Showsec's training was not simply appropriate, it was thorough and consistent with the nature of the services it provided. Although Mohammed Agha may not have completed his training with the diligence Showsec was entitled to expect, Showsec's training did not stop with the induction module. The training was further supplemented and enhanced by briefings and experienced supervisors. The core message delivered via the training and briefings was the need for vigilance and prompt upward reporting. In this respect, Showsec's message to its staff was completely aligned with the national guidance. 8. In pointing out that its staff, including Mr. Agha and Kyle Lawler, were trained to know what to do when confronted by a suspicious individual, Showsec is not seeking to shift blame or to scapegoat. Why Mr. Agha and Mr. Lawler did not act in accordance with their training must be a matter for the Inquiry. Showsec's point is that if there were failures on the part of Mr. Agha and Mr. Lawler then this cannot be attributed to a lack of appropriate training. 9. Finally, whether or not there were failures on the part of Showsec and/or Mr. Agha and/or Mr. Lawler and/or SMG and/or the BTP, the fact remains (as the Chair acknowledged in his opening words at the beginning of this hearing) that Salman Abedi was plainly determined and entirely committed to killing himself and as many others as he could. Whilst his unchallenged presence at the mezzanine level raises important questions that the Inquiry will have to address, there can be little doubt that even had he been spoken to by a member of Showsec's staff or a police officer before egress, he would still have detonated his bomb. Whether the impact of that detonation might have resulted in fewer casualties is, to an extent, conjecture. 3 INQ039377/3 INQ039377_0003 The structure to the submissions which follow and some preliminary observations The Terms of Reference, the Chapter 7 List of Key Issues and the IL T's Note of 30 November 2020 10. The Inquiry's main task in Chapter 7 has been to investigate Terms of Reference (TOR) 4, which is worth setting out in full here, providing as it does the over-arching structure for the relevant issues: "i. The security provided/arranged by the owner and operator of the Arena venue, and those contracted by them to provide security, in particular the City Room's security arrangements. ii. The security provided by relevant public/State organisations. iii. The security provided by relevant private security providers. iv. The planning, preparation, arrangements and communication (if any) between the above security providers prior to the attack, including (but not limited to) their roles and responsibilities for risk identification, person and bag-checking, and responding to a terrorist and/or mass casualty incident. v. The adequacy of (a-d) (sic) above, including their compliance with relevant planning, preparation, policies, systems and practices. vi. The impact, if any, of any inadequacies in the security arrangements, including whether any inadequacies contributed to the extent of the loss of life that occurred." 11. TOR 4, created at a very early stage in the life of this Inquiry is, necessarily, broad in terms of its design. But it is now supplemented by both the 17 Chapter 7 List of Key lssues, 4 against which Dr BaMaung and Colonel Latham gave 4 15/183/24-190/13 together with amendments from CPs set out in the ILT note of 24/11/20 INQ039038 4 INQ039377/4 INQ039377_0004 their evidence and the list of potential issues the CPs' are invited to focus upon in their closing submissions as set out in ILT's Note of 30 November 2020. 12. Before seeking to adopt a structure to these submissions which both seeks to address both the broad questions identified within the TOR but also those specific issues within the List of Key lssues/ILT's Note which touch upon Showsec's part in the security arrangements at the Arena, it may be helpful to set out some preliminary observations for the Chair's consideration. Showsec's contractual and legal obligations 13. Consideration of the security arrangements at the Arena must begin with an analysis of what it was that any CP was obliged to do either contractually or pursuant to any statutory or common law duties. It follows that any assessment of Showsec's duties must start with its Stewarding Services Agreement with SMG, 5 which set out and defined the limits of its contractual obligations. In relation in particular to its statutory or common law duties the assessment must include what it was reasonable to expect a company in Showsec's position to do. 14. It is only once the scope and nature of Showsec's duties have been established that consideration can be given to whether the arrangements it had in place were adequate to discharge those duties. Showsec has accepted that there were inadequacies in its risk assessment process.

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