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Making a Difference Hand Crew Utilization on a Wildland Urban Interface Fire Tim Walsh-Marin County Fire Department

Valley Fire-Introduction Often we work our entire careers hoping we will be at the right spot to make a difference. To make a rescue or be at the right place at the right time to save a structure from the devastation of fire happens only if you are at the intersection of opportunity and luck. Many of those that experienced the Valley Fire were not lucky. The fire burned 76,067 acres with 1958 structures destroyed within its perimeter. There were four civilian fatalities and four firefighters badly injured. For those individuals and family members that suffered, we are truly sorry. The Marin County Fire Department’s Tamampais Fire Crew found themselves at the intersection of opportunity and luck that made a difference for a few homeowners during some of the worst wildland fire behavior ever experienced.

Marin County Fire Department’s Tamalpais Fire Crew performs a firing operation at the Valley Fire on September 13. Picture by Stephen Lam-used by permission under copyright.

Valley Fire-Exposition Prior to the fire’s ignition, conditions were ripe devastation. Conditions reached a critical point of dryness that is seldom seen. The relative humidity plummeted into single digits during the week prior to the fire and on September 11, the day before the fire, the average relative humidity was only 10 percent over a 24-hour period (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Chart of 24-Hour Average Relative Humidity from the Konocti Remote Automated Weather Station days leading up to the Valley Fire. The red circle represents the day the fire started. High temperatures were also part of the drying process peaking at 101 degrees on September 11. The combination of high temperatures and very low humidity created critical fuel moistures throughout a 24-hour period. There was no decrease in fire behavior with nightfall due to the lack of overnight humidity recovery and lower temperatures (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Chart of 24-Hour Average Temperature from the Konocti Remote Automated Weather Station days leading up to the Valley Fire. The red circle represents the day the fire started. Making a Difference 3

Fuel moisture drives the fire behavior outside of wind. When fuels are critically dry, the fire will burn at such high intensity that it will create its own weather. As rising currents from a convective column draws air inward and upward, they can produce significantly powerful winds. Critically dry fuel moisture will also allow spot fires to ignite and grow rapidly based on the probability of ignition. The probability of ignition is a ratio of the number of embers that will fall out of the convective column and ignite spot fires. From September 8 through September 12, the probability of ignition averaged 90 percent in unshaded fuels. This means that 90 out of 100 embers that landed in a receptive fuelbed ignite and continue to burn, allowing the fire to expand at an accelerated rate.

As aforementioned, the temperature was high, the relative humidity was low, and the probability of ignition was at a critical level. The missing ingredient for a fire to grow at a level that will escape control is wind. The winds surfaced during the afternoon of September 12 allowing the fire to expand and grow at an explosive rate. At 1300 hours, the ten-minute average wind speed was 14 mph. By 1700, they peaked at 24 mph and only slowed to 8 mph by 2300 hours. During the same time period, wind gust were 22 mph at 1300, peaked at 36 mph at 1700 and slowed to 17 mph at 2300 (Figure 3). These conditions allowed the fire to escape initial attack and become the third worst fire based on structure loss in the history of the State of California.

September 12 Wind Speeds

40 34 36 30 27 30 30 22 28 20 20 24 25 18 20 21 14 18 19 10 Avg Wind 15 15 17 Wind Gust 0 9 10 8

Figure 3. Chart of the average and gust wind speeds for September 12, 2015. Data is from the Konocti Remote Automated Weather Station.

Valley Fire-Development

The Valley Fire started on September 12, 2015 at 1324 hours1 near the community of Cobb in Lake County, California. The initial report stated that the fire was approximately 2 acres in size burning with a moderate rate of spread. According to a CALFIRE Press Release, by 1350 hours, the fire was 50 acres in size. By 1359 hours, the community of Cobb is under evacuation orders. At 1410 hours, there is a report that four firefighters from CALFIRE Helicopter 104 have been burned and were being flown to a burn center. At 1427 hours, a very large air tanker capable of dropping 12,000 gallons of fire retardant was dispatched to the fire indicating that the fire was burning faster than a moderate rate of spread. By 1456 hours, the fire had grown to 200 acres as reported by the air attack supervisor resulting in a rate of spread of nearly two and a quarter acres per minute giving an indication of what was to follow.

At 1503 hours, the fire had grown to 400 acres resulting in a rate of spread of over 4 acres per minute2. At 1648 hours, the fire has reached the community of Harbin Hot Springs 7 miles from the point of origin. At 1715, the Air Attack Supervisor recommends evacuating the community of Middletown, which is eight miles away. An updated CALFIRE press release states that the fire is 10,000 acres by 19:30 hours, which would equate to a rate of spread of 42 acres per minute. By 2221 hours, the fire is reported to be approximately 25,000 acres equating to over 46 acres per minute of fire growth. By 0125 hours the next morning, the fire was flown using an infrared sensor with an unbelievable growth of 45,000 acres since the time of ignition 11 hours previous. This would equate to 68 acres per minute of fire growth!

1 All times were provided by CALFIRE Division Chief Linda Green Sonoma-Lake- Napa Unit 2 This information was obtained from the website www.wildlandfire.com. Making a Difference 5

Valley Fire-Recapitulation

Marin County Fire Department’s Tamalpais Fire Crew (TFC) was dispatched to the Valley Fire on September 12, 2015 at 1530 hours. The TFC is a 14-person hand crew that responds to several initial attack fires throughout the Bay Area and other parts of the state under agreement with CALFIRE and the United States Forest Service (USFS). Although this is the 11th year of operation of the TFC, this fire would place them in harm’s way and provide an opportunity for growth like no other.

The smoke column could be seen like many others that were visible from Marin as Lake County experienced a very long summer of large fire activity. As the crew vehicles dropped down the grade east of Calistoga, pine needles were pelting the vehicles from the gusting winds funneled up Highway 29. At the bottom of the grade, the smoke column made you want to stop and take note. It was two distinct columns coming from the same place. One of the columns was laid over as if pushed by a strong wind, the other stood straight up as if it was not influenced by the same wind (Figure 4).

The TFC reported that they were entering the Sonoma- Lake-Napa Unit and the Saint Helena Emergency Command Center told them to report to staging at Jellystone Park off of Bottle Rock Road. The drive would take them down Highway 175 paralleling the fire that was now burning along a ridgeline with reckless abandon. Trees standing alone were torching while stands of trees were burning through the crowns consuming the ridge. The brush was burning with 40-60 foot flame lengths consuming acres in seconds. Figure 4: The smoke column from the Valley Fire as seen from Spot fires could be seen the intersection of Highway 175 and Highway 29. Note the two different influences as part of the column is being pushed by everywhere as embers were the wind while the smoke in the background is standing flying in every direction. This straight up. was not going to be an everyday fire!

As the crew vehicles reached Whispering Pines, it was obvious that this fire was going to affect several communities in a negative way. Fire engines were parked in yards as flames were coming off the ridge and into the community. It was difficult to follow directions and not stop at an unprotected home and try to help out. The crew continued to the staging area trying to focus on the road and not the life-altering firestorm that was building before their eyes.

As the TFC pulled into the staging area, they were very much alone. There were two USFS bulldozer transports and nothing else. At this point, it felt like we should have just found a house to protect rather than wasting time sitting in a staging area. Several minutes later, a CALFIRE Strike Team from the Mendocino Unit pulled into the staging area followed by another one from the Santa Clara Unit. Everyone was antsy as no one likes to sit around when you know structures are burning. Radio traffic was nonstop and frustration was building as everyone was trying to talk at the same time. Finally, there was a request that everything in staging should head to the community of Hidden Valley Lake.

Both strike teams and the TFC headed to Hidden Valley Lake code three by retracing their route back to Middletown down Highway 175. Now the fire behavior was simply off the charts. The fire that was on the ridgeline during the drive to staging was now reaching several areas near Highway 175. Embers were swirling in every direction and you could feel the trucks being pulled towards the fire due to the inward air currents being pulled by the fire. The black smoke column was blocking out the sunlight and it was beginning to get very dark (Figure 5).

Figure 5: The Valley Fire burning along the ridgeline prior to reaching Middletown taken from Highway 175. Photograph by the Tamalpais Fire Crew. Making a Difference 7

As the TFC drove into Middletown, chaos was king as panic set in from residents trying to flee the fire. The leading edge of the fire had already jumped Highway 175 but the trailing edges were catching up due to the increase in wind speed. Day turned to night as the smoke column blocked out all sunlight. Cars were abandoned on the highway as they caught fire. The TFC orders were to report to the gas station in Middletown if it didn’t burn down prior to their arrival. Across the street from the gas station, a commercial building was burning with LPG tanks venting and 55- gallon drums exploding into the air. At the quick briefing, they were told to go into Hidden Valley Lake and “do what you can”.

The two CALFIRE Type 3 strike teams and the TFC deployed into the Hidden Valley where fire seemed to be everywhere. The TFC parked in a neighborhood and scouted the backyard as fire was burning 200 yards in the distance and heading towards the neighborhood. One of the CALFIRE Strike Teams was able to knock down the fire using a mobile attack in several locations along the fire front. The TFC loaded back into their rigs and a request came quickly for them to report to Greenridge Road.

Vehicles jammed the road as residents were evacuating from the approximately 2500 homes. Traffic was barely moving as the crew tried to make their way to their new assignment. Thankfully, due to the fact that almost every firefighter has a smart phone, another route was discovered that would avoid the traffic jam. Although phones can provide a distraction during many emergencies, in this case it was great that firefighters were using them to troubleshoot the traffic dilemma.

As the crew pulled up to the intersection of Greenridge and Stonegate Roads, multiple homes were fully involved with fire. When the TFC stopped to tie in with the Strike Team Leader near a burning home, a LPG tank vented with a deafening sound within feet of their location. The Strike Team leader asked the TFC to comb the area to pick up spot fires behind the burning homes as the strike team of engines was spread very thin. The TFC parked their trucks and deployed into a cul-de-sac at the end of Stonegate Road (Figure 6). Figure 6. A house is burning on Greenridge Road beyond where the crew vehicles were initially parked. Photograph by the Tamalpais Fire Crew. As they walked into the cul-de-sac, a home behind those burning on Greenridge Road ignited and fire seemed to spread throughout the structure within minutes. Embers were being cast everywhere and the TFC began scouting the surrounding area looking for spot fires. A home across the street had fire in the back yard and the LGP tank started venting. A single engine from the strike team was moved up into the crew’s location to keep more homes from igniting.

At this point, the Crew Superintendent (Supt) scouted the neighborhood while the Crew Foreman (Foreman) had the crew build hand line behind the homes. As the crew built the fire line, they also cut down chain link fences between the homes in case the fire made a push into the area. The crew built approximately 700 feet of hand line behind the homes starting at the Stonegate Cul-De-Sac and headed north on Greenridge Road. Almost all of the homes had some form of defensible space such as grass cut low to the ground, bare earth, or gravel yards. After the hand line was built, crewmembers prepped the structures and removed brush near the homes, moved small LPG tanks away from sheds, and removed low branches from nearby trees (Figure 7).

Figure 7. A map of the area where the Tamalpais Fire Crew worked on the night of September 12, 2015. The fire and spot fire perimeters are estimates due to darkness.

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By now, the wind had subsided and conditions seemed to improve. As the Supt continued to scout the area, it was noted that there were still burning embers in several yards where they were working. The crew was broken into two squads with four 5-gallon backpack pumps to extinguish embers and make sure the small fires were out. After they combed the area, the crew took a break while the Supt and Foremen scouted the area to the east where flames were seen below the neighborhood within a large brush field. The Supt. and Foreman drove to a ranch below the neighborhood to see if a spot fire in the brush field could be mitigated. There was fire burning all around the ranch houses and it was decided that there were too many priorities to take on another. As they were returning to the crew’s location, the Squad Boss contacted them on the radio and reported that the fire near the hand line origin was beginning to become active.

When the supervisors returned to the south end of Stonegate Road, conditions had in fact changed and the fire that was benign came back to life as the wind shifted and intensified. The brush field to the east of the neighborhood was actively burning with embers landing throughout the neighborhood. The crew and engine company now had many priorities.

Homeowner’s garden hoses were deployed house by house as the fire burned in a northwesterly direction through the brush field threatening house after house. Ladders found in yards were thrown and crewmembers sprayed down roofs as others fell more trees in the backyards. As this was a very different tactic and strategy for a hand crew, many crewmembers were put in new rolls in a very dynamic situation. At one point, one of the crewmembers asked the Foreman what to do. His reply was, “make a difference”.

Although the crew has had training on structure defense in a classroom setting, it is very different when multiple homes are threatened, embers are landing everywhere, and resources are scarce. The crew was practicing a bump and run tactic without engine support as the single engine company had plenty to do as well (Figure 8).

Figure 8. The brush field to the east of Greenridge Road begins to burn to the west threatening multiple houses. Photograph by the Tamalpais Fire Crew. As the fire continued to burn parallel to the structures, the crew was able to keep up with the ember fallout. In one case, a door was kicked in to place a dog inside a house, as the brown lawn was not safe. When they reached Overhill Road, it was discovered that a property owner did not evacuate. He decided to stay and help protect his home. Being that he had a chainsaw and garden hoses, he became an asset versus a liability.

The wind shifted again to a more easterly direction and the fire blew over the handline north of Overhill Road. As crewmembers were trying to deploy a garden hose, fire burned to within 10 feet of a structure prior to the lone CALFIRE engine company showing up to extinguish it in the nick of time.

But this wind also cast embers across the street threatening homes on the west side of Greenridge Road and beyond. The Foreman requested help but every crewmember was fighting fire in one back yard or another. A vacant lot on the west side of Greenridge Road ignited and was threatening more homes. As a last resort, he ran back to the crew vehicles and drove a Type 6 engine back to the lot. He backed it into the yard and deployed the booster line off the back of the engine.

Now the fire was burning yard to yard in a southerly direction. Crewmembers ran down the street and tore down fences to fight the fire. More garden hoses were deployed and hand tools were used to scrape line as fire burned within feet of porches and decks. Finally reinforcement arrived with more engine companies and hand crews arriving into the neighborhood. Crewmembers fell to the ground in complete exhaustion and adrenaline deficiency. A bulldozer came from the north and tied into our hand line providing necessary protection to the rest of the neighborhood.

Valley Fire-Coda

Many lessons were learned during this assignment. First and foremost, the crew was not free lancing but following leaders intent. They were making a difference. Having 14 people on a hand crew is equivalent to almost five engine companies. There is an old saying that many hands make light work. The work was not light but it was amazing what 14 people can do when they work together everyday. Factors such as trust, communication, and anticipation of expectations are not an issue as hand crews work together utilizing teamwork daily.

Crew accountability was definitely challenged with 14 people doing 14 different things at once. This is where training is the key as all crewmembers understood the buddy system and were never truly alone. Although the use of “crew” radio frequencies on fires are generally frowned upon, they are necessary for crew accountability and safety when radio communications become overwhelmed during a large wildland-urban interface (WUI) fire. 1 Making a Difference 1

If you get bored, take a break. The fire may come back to life and it would be a shame for a house to burn down because firefighters left the area. During the assignment, the winds did die down for a while and with the numerous requests over the radio for additional resources, there was a temptation to go to where more action was located. If the TFC had left the area, more homes would have burned.

Never discount the significance of a hand line. They can stop a fire in the absence of firefighters. Research by Jack Cohen has proven that many homes burn after the fire front passes. Firefighters should not leave an area where homes have been protected without putting in a hand line to keep a small surface fire from creeping into a woodpile or combustible deck. This is where hand crews can really assist engine companies and more should be utilized for this important work. Normally there are large resource orders for engine companies to protect structures but not hand crews (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Hand line can be seen running through the backyard where the brush field met the backyards. It did not hold the fire in all locations but it did in others allowing the crew to move forward with the advancing fire front. Note the defensible space that made a difference! Never discount the power of a garden hose. They are easy to move and are often in great supply. While they do not produce the flow rates needed to extinguish a large flaming front, several homes were protected by putting out ground fires or by wetting down roofs. In high-rise construction, hose cabinets are located on every floor. Maybe it is time to require garden hose connections and hose to be placed at the back of every home in the Wildland Urban Interface.

Never assume that every house will have a functioning garden hose as the crew came up short more than once. The crew does carry 300 feet of lightweight ¾ inch hose in their packs spread between crewmembers. This also became very useful where homeowners garden hose were not available.

Defensible space made the difference! The crew did not choose the neighborhood based on the defensible space but ended up there due to homes burning. When the fire became active in the brush field to the east, the crew had room to work behind the structures due to the amount of defensible space. Many of these homes would have survived the passing of the fire front without damage. Having this room to work provided a safe place for firefighters to work picking up spot fires or extinguishing small fires burning in very low grass that would have caused many homes to burn.

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The author would like to thank Santa Barbara County Fire Department’s Battalion Chief Christian Childers for his assistance with editing this document.