Fordham Law Review Volume 87 Issue 5 Article 8 2019 Professionals, Politicos, and Crony Attorneys General: A Historical Sketch of the U.S. Attorney General as a Case for Structural Independence Jed Handelsman Shugerman Fordham University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons Recommended Citation Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Professionals, Politicos, and Crony Attorneys General: A Historical Sketch of the U.S. Attorney General as a Case for Structural Independence, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1965 (2019). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss5/8 This Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. PROFESSIONALS, POLITICOS, AND CRONY ATTORNEYS GENERAL: A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL AS A CASE FOR STRUCTURAL INDEPENDENCE Jed Handelsman Shugerman* INTRODUCTION When you get to the White House there are two jobs you must lock up— Attorney General and director of the Internal Revenue Service. —Joe Kennedy, Sr. to John F. Kennedy, perhaps apocryphally1 Historically, the office of the U.S. Attorney General has been identified as “quasi-judicial” or having “quasi-judicial” aspects.2 Other parts of the Department of Justice (DOJ) have also been described as quasi-judicial, such as the Office of Legal Counsel and the Solicitor General.3 A glance at a list of past attorneys general seems to confirm this judicial aspiration in practice.