International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanities

ISSN 2277 – 9809 (online) ISSN 2348 - 9359 (Print)

An Internationally Indexed Peer Reviewed & Refereed Journal

Shri Param Hans Education & Research Foundation Trust

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IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print)

Relevance of governance model of in the development of

Ishta Vohra The present paper begins by looking at the development strategies of Gujarat to analyse the politics of governance of the state. This is done to stir a subsequent debate amongst us over the relevance of this model for India, and the course of governance strategies by the BJP led NDA government. It is important that in making policy suggestions, or talking of policy strategies, one be aware of the politics of governance of the State. This is required so to be aware of, to gauge, and anticipate its governance and policy measures.

The governance model of Gujarat provides an interesting starting point for the debate for two reasons – 1) one can analyse the scope of compatibility between capitalist development and Hindutva through study of the state: Gujarat is known to generate remarkable economic growth through ‘maximum governance, minimum government’, while also bearing the tag of being the laboratory of Hindutva. The state has been under the rule of BJP since 1998. 2) Secondly, one of the appeals of PM Modi amongst voters during the 2014 General Elections campaigning had been the highly celebrated model of governance of Gujarat, attributed to his leadership as its Chief Minister from 2001 to 2013.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GUJARAT In analysing the culture of efficiency of a ‘minimum government and maximum governance’ environment, that translates into high economic growth and development in Gujarat, its development trajectory has to be understood in the context of its economic, political, and social history. The State of Gujarat, carved out during bifurcation of the Bombay State on May 1 1960, had limited resources in hand, despite the strong financial presence of the Gujarati community. The loss of Bombay City was felt both emotionally and financially, and stirred Gujarat’s political leadership to outshine the economic glory of . After deliberation between the political leadership and policy-makers over the kind of economic trajectory the State should follow, it was agreed that prioritising industrialisation would fetch faster and desirable economic outcomes needed for its development.

Innovations of State bureaucracy Gujarat’s bureaucrats worked diligently to place the State on the path of industrialisation from the start. Despite the strict license regime, they had a trick or two up their sleeves to grab investment opportunities, creatively strategising ways to bypass obstructions. So, for example, they would infiltrate the corridors of power in , and hobnob with its politicians and bureaucrats to squeeze out details regarding companies interested in investing in Gujarat, to be able to get in touch with them and offer lucrative incentives. Companies unsure about investing

International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 549 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print) in Gujarat would be sent personal invitations with a bag of opportunities to think over (Sinha 2005).

Private investors were provided with all possible lures, from both supply and demand side. Tax incentives, subsidies, land holdings, power supply, and other infrastructure facilities were put in order by the State. The Chief Secretary and Finance Secretary of government of Gujarat, and Managing Directors of its various State Industrial Development Corporations (SIDCs) would meet weekly over an informal cup of tea in the Gujarat Industry Commissioner’s office to discuss ways of strengthening Gujarat’s investment opportunities. During these discussions, a plan was drawn for gathering “industrial intelligence” for easy dissemination to investors. By 1977, these meetings formalised into Industrial Extension Bureau (iNDEXTb), which sought to coordinate actions of various agencies involved with processing of industrial investments in Gujarat to ensure single window clearance of proposals. Importantly, the “i” and “b” were kept in lowercase to convey that egos and red-tapism of bureaucrats would be kept at minimum (ibid 137).

Officials also hit upon a novel idea of hoodwinking a reluctant Centre into giving out licenses to private firms interested in setting up shop in Gujarat. Permissions would be sought for setting up state Public Sector Units (PSUs), which would then be converted into joint sector projects upon partnership with private firms. Gujarat’s leadership and administration made friends with the business class to accelerate the industrial sector, unlike other states that eyed them with suspicion and disdain. As the case of Gujarat State Fertilizer Corporation, the first joint venture in Gujarat shows, the first chief minister Dr Jivraj Mehta, on suggestions of his bureaucrats V. Isvaran and K.R Srivastva, had felt that with some scrutiny “Gujarat industrialists could be trusted in such a venture, given that government-business ties in Gujarat have been cordial” (Erdman 1973:42). The government of Gujarat gave assurances of a free hand to the businessmen to get them to participate in the venture. No unnecessary interference from the government’s side, no compulsory auditing by CAG, or prying by the State. The government’s direct role was kept limited, though it could have dictated control over the management of these enterprises. Partnership with private enterprise roused joint sector units with efficiency to produce superior results. Entrepreneurial ambitions were instilled in the work culture by employing private sector managerial workforce at these units, along with appointing entrepreneurs to Trust Boards. Business acumen and ethics were also encouraged at PSUs by employing former private sector officers at managerial positions.

Therefore, the State of Gujarat had been pursuing Capitalist Development through industrialisation on a priority by forging alliance with the capitalist class from the beginning.

The State established support for its economic goals by boosting a hegemonic coalition of three socio-economic groups – Gujarat’s foremost economic elites belonging to Brahmin-Bania castes who were erstwhile traders turned industrialists; traditional Patidar farmer capitalists International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 550 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print) turned agro-based industrialists; and newly turned entrepreneurs of small scale industries. Together, the three groups consolidated their hold over industries, agriculture and the service sector by 1970s in collaboration with, and assistance from an interventionist State. A foresighted State provided support and resources not just to the traditional economic groups in the society but also to lower castes and classes from 1960s onwards. Subsequently, by 1970s, economic nationalism also found legitimacy among the new entrepreneurs arising from ranks of artisans’ castes, some groups of Kshatriya castes, and other lower castes and classes, who moved beyond traditional careers and ventured into chemical and petrochemical industries, to reap advantages of capitalist development and “thus contributing to the creation of the Golden and Silver Corridors of industrial development” in Gujarat (Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 235-236). The State also made these economic groups politically relevant for ensuring their long term commitment towards its goal.

Notably, State came in partnership with the market to pursue goals for itself. This was unlike a State-controlled or self-controlled situation. The State would keep a check on private players, but not arbitrarily interfere, to ensure they were contributing to the overall industrial growth of Gujarat and not merely profiteering. The State was in charge charge through its competent bureaucracy composed of meritocrats at the top of their fields. The bureaucracy maintained communication with the capitalists to ensure smooth cooperation, as opposed to having a state- controlled or self-controlled form of relation to stimulate the entrepreneurial instinct of businessmen in directions that would reap benefits for Gujarat’s economy as much as their businesses. Even as the bureaucracy worked ‘autonomously’, it remained ‘embedded’ in the society – to provide institutionalised channels for continuous negotiations over economic goals and policies with capitalists.1

Economic liberalisation in 1991 didn’t reduce relevance of the State and its instruments; on the contrary, they became even more crucial, no longer performing covert operations. Given that it was already in a position of economic vibrancy, Gujarat took full advantage of the reforms. When economic reforms were announced, Gujarat was following its Industrial Policy 1990- 1995. It came up with the New Industrial and Incentive Policy 1995-2000: the Best Now Becomes Better. In 1994, it drew the Gujarat 2000 AD and Beyond plan (Mahadevia 2005: 296). The policies outlined State support to private entrepreneurs in market development, promotion of products, patent registrations etc. Gujarat began giving green signal for Build-Own-Operate- Transfer projects (BOOT), offering concessions and tax breaks to private enterprise for building infrastructure (ibid 303). Privatisation enabled a stronger Capitalist-State cohesion. The pattern of State involvement evolved with new norms of economic activities. From custodian and demiurge responsibilities of undertaking production for the economy on its own during the License-Raj days, the State was now performing the role of husbander, and being the midwife in

1 Peter Evans (1995: 12) has used the concept of ‘Embedded Autonomy’ to make sense of these characteristics of bureaucracy which successfully bring about industrial transformation of the state. International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 551 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print) managing and facilitating private entrepreneurship.2 The roadmap was re-energised by future political leadership, who channelized the various roles of such a Capitalist-cohesive State.

POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN GUJARAT

A Capitalist-cohesive State needs strong leadership to ensure the conditions for pursuit of its goals. A strong State leadership needs to reign over the rule of bureaucrats to instill and ensure continuity of bureaucratic aptitude, through close co-operation with them; and also check the bureaucracy from getting corrupt. Its strength is further devoted in ensuring consensus over the goal of rapid growth amongst different social groups in the society, some of whom might not otherwise be enamored by this idea, while many others may remain disinterested because they do not appear to be immediate beneficiaries of the growth sought. Consensus becomes crucial to the safeguard of economic growth, ensuring stability and permitting undivided state attention towards economic activities (Atul Kohli 2004).

The state [leadership] adheres to strict disciplining tendencies in its way of rule, to combat possible oppositions and divergences from this goal. Building consensus requires instruments of both coercion and coax, till the point that people either become one with the goal or get reduced as irrelevant. The state leadership builds such a consensus through the rhetoric of ideology– which could have nationalist, regional religious or ethnic overtones.

Since it is tedious to permanently maintain harmony within society, on those occasions it shows cracks, the State takes charge to weld them through invocation of sentiments in the favour of popular ideological leanings to unite consensus once again for the survival of the Capitalist- Cohesive State model.

Consensus building in Gujarat The political leadership of Gujarat created consensus for capitalist development (which its bureaucracy accelerated) through constant espousal of rhetoric of economic nationalism that was available after the loss of Bombay city. It was possible to mobilise sentiments, given that the decade before Gujarat became a State, not one Central PSU had been set up by the Government of India in this region. This was also why Chief Minister Dr. Mehta insisted on economic self-reliance from the beginning. It helped that Gujaratis pride on their mercantile tradition.

There was also a long standing grudge, that Central leadership of Congress Party neglected regional sentiments in not giving due to Gujarati leaders like Sardar Vallabhai Patel and Morarji

2 According to Peter Evans (1995), state involvement is a given in developing economies, always requiring that push towards industrialisation. He lists four roles in which state gets involved with its country’s overall or specific economic sectors. The roles may be undertaken singularly or in combinations.

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Desai, mobilised regional nationalist fervour and helped strengthen the consensus around economic development for Gujarat.

Even as the political scene in Gujarat was marred by incessant turmoil, these were mere power tussles between different factions of the original Congress Party during the first three decades and it did not cause any ideological shift in the goals of the State. Continuity was maintained as officials were sparred unnecessary shufflings (Sanghvi 1996: 301-304). Later BJP governments shared the enthusiasm for private entrepreneurship.

What helped immensely was the absence of opposition from industrial workers and labourers. The culture of trusteeship that Mahatma Gandhi sowed in the Majoor Mahajan Sangh of workers meant that confrontations with state were resisted, and differences were resolved non-violently. It is also true that no political party was willing to take up issues of the subalterns, be it workers, Dalits or Muslims.

Later, the period beginning after the 1980s saw the arrival of rhetoric of Cultural Nationalism in Gujarat’s changing socio-political contours, which helped in devising consensus for capitalist development. The erstwhile Brahmin, Bania, and Patidar entrepreneurs consolidated themselves into a Savarna bloc over the fear of losing their economic and political clout to KHAM – which was the post-Emergency strategy of the Congress (I) in Gujarat to seek votes. Between 1980 and 1985, the Savarnas fought the pro-reservations policies in education of the Solanki government tooth and nail, allegedly supported by the growing ABVP presence in university campuses.

Hindutva, thus, became a prominent theme around which the otherwise disunited capitalists came together to safeguard their economic interests (Desai 2011).

Soon enough, the various wings of Sangh Parivar, through their relief and development initiatives for Dalits and Adivasis, were able to create a united Hindu bloc in Gujarat. There was dilution of prevailing animosity between the Savarnas, and Dalits and Adivasis, as anti- reservation angst got diverted and turned communal, with Dalits and Muslims pitted against each other in the job market. It is also observed that the anti-reservation protests by Savarnas were gradually toned down and Dalits and OBCS were consolidated to ‘wage a holy war’ (Sud 2012: 140).

Rise of cultural nationalism in Gujarat – of RSS, its political wing BJP – also occurred under favourable conditions created by the Mandal-Mandir politics at the national level. Gujarat was the hub of the yatra mobilisations undertaken at national level in later half of the 1980s with an overwhelming OBC and Dalit participation.

In 1987, BJP came to power for the first time, in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. During 1990 Assembly elections, BJP allied with ’s Janata Dal, and BJP’s

International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 553 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print) own was appointed Deputy Chief Minister. In 1995, Keshubhai Patel became the first chief minister of Gujarat without any links to Congress, and someone affiliated to the RSS (ibid 171).

HOW DO THE PRESENT CONDITIONS IN INDIA COMPARE WITH THAT OF GUJARAT? For such a model to emerge, the State has to be always present and alert. Unlike neo-liberalists who wish away the state, the development of Gujarat has been strongly helmed by a State that undertakes different responsibilities depending upon circumstances to pursue goals of economic growth and larger development – be it the role of a regulator, facilitator, husbandry or dirigste etc.

In achieving this kind of State, the political leadership helms the governance strategies. The task of creating enthusiasm and discipline in the bureaucracy, getting them to be innovative, and free of political pressure, making alliances with the required social class – the capitalist class in case of Gujarat, mingling with the corporate sector, and ensuring free flow of information between the State and business elite, creating pro-business conditions by removing supply-and-demand constraints and thereby mobilizing capital and labor for industrial production, and also, importantly, playing the role of the safety valve in society by creating and maintaining consensus.

In Atul Kohli’s assessment, India has shown tendencies of such kind of State at some points of time, like the phase under Nehru’s leadership,where Nehru reigned in a way that he prioritized industrial growth and spearheaded all state instruments in that direction. He used his personal charm to convince people for industrial development, holding together multiclass interests rather than indulging in petty political tussles, or overbearingly interfering in the functioning of bureaucracy.

In contrast, despite competent bureaucrats in India, the State under Indira Gandhi during 1967- 1977 was fragmented in multiple interests, fuelled by populist policies, which led to divergence from the aim of high economic growth that has been envisaged by her father Jawaharlal Nehru.

The onus, then, comes on the human representation of the head of the State – the State leadership – how they utilize their apparatus. Indira Gandhi’s rule was too political to carry out economic goals, what with her personal interference in state institutions that demoralized and degraded their merit, or her frequent political dramas against federal state heads. Her time in power is notorious for the way her favorites found their way to lucrative administrative and political postings, and the industry nearly stagnated.

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This economic situation in India changed somewhat in the 1980s as Ms. Gandhi moved away from populist mentality towards a pro-business attitude; and 1990s when national politics also turned more pro-capitalist, with a greater emphasis on economic growth, closer cooperation with business, and further taming of labour.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi’s government during the 1980s and the 1990s reduced regulations and licensing requirements for the software industry, reduced import duties, and promoted exports with aggressive marketing in overseas markets. State intervention helped create industrial parks and software technology parks with a communications infrastructure, provided core computer facilities, and engaged in a type of intervention generally more supportive than regulatory. This strategic state-business alliance was an essential component of the remarkable performance of the software industry, which grew at a rate of more than 50 % per annum during the 1990s (Kohli 2005: 284).

Over the last decade or so, India’s various governments have cut corporate taxes, provided a variety of supports to business, especially for exports, sought to tame labour, dispensed, and opened up sectors such as power and telecommunications that had previously been limited to the public sector. While champions of liberalization may see all these measures as evidence of a growing free market in India, it remains the case that India’s state is still heavily interventionist.

The focus of the Indian State has been on industrial and service sector for long now. Its present leadership is showing signs of a governance model that is easing the State-corporation alliance. The attitude is reflected in the way the bureaucracy has been disciplined through Aadhar enabled attendance system. 47,000 government employees who moved to the biometric system are already working 20 minutes longer than they did in September when the system was introduced. “This average increase of 20-minutes per day means an approximate gain of 16,000 man-hours. This gain is equivalent to an additional workforce of almost 1900 employees every day. ”3 Files are moving up faster, unnecessary vacations are being cut down. Regular presentations are being sought by the Prime Minister. Accountability has been increased, Senior bureaucrats of different ministries have been put in direct touch with the Prime Minister, even bypassing the concerned Minister in Charge. The State is also not wary of questioning the validity of old institutions, like, the Planning Commission that is seen as inhibiting growth and progress of the federal states of the country. Private expertise is also being encouraged in bureaucratic functioning to instil technological and entrepreneurial acumen, something that regularly happened in Gujarat.

The kind of State being illustrated here does not tend towards a laisses-faire behaviour; rather it actively involves itself in creating business. In Gujarat, Chief Minister Modi had shown traits of being pro-business, not necessarily pro-market. Minimum government does not imply minimal government. Unlike Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s NDA government at the Centre, which went beyond disinvestment to actually selling off some state entreprises, Mr. Modi does

3 http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/hard-working-babus-may-get-flexi-hours-back/article1-1303109.aspx International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 555 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print) not believe in privatisation. Instead he tries to make them profitable by giving the bureaucrats a free hand, and keeping politicians away, as evident from the turnover stories of various PSUs in Gujarat, prominent amongst them being the Gujarat Alkali and Chemicals Ltd. Similarly, as the recently concluded Gyan Sangram – a first of its kind summit of Public Sector banks showed, the government promised state-owned banks a ‘political interference free’ environment for their functioning , but in return asked them to strengthen themselves by putting an end to lazy banking and devising innovative techniques of earning investments.

The ‘Make in India’ initiative, that intends to make the country a manufacturing hub; or the Land Acquisition ordinance that is allegedly favouring corporates on the issue of obtaining land; or the changing labour laws that further stifle the rights of the labour market - suggest the underlying alliance of interests of the State and the corporate sector, for the purpose of State’s belief in an industrially led growth for the country.

Consensus building in India To ensure the continued support of the masses to such an idea of development, where the State is creating conducive conditions for the corporate sector (Prime Minister Modi is regularly making statements that he wants to make India the easiest place to do business), its political leadership has also been simultaneously devising governance strategies that ensure consent for this kind of regime, and may, in fact, divert attention away from this camaraderie.

So, for example, the Swachch Bharat Abhigyan, that has caught everyone’s attention for the manner in which the Prime Minister has initiated self-governance on the part of the people for ensuring cleanliness, nominating celebrities, and urging them to take forward the human chain. Mr. Modi is an expert in generating public attention through interesting schemes, which can then inspire and include people. In Gujarat, Chief Minister Modi had institutionalised the practice of investing his government’s attention to a relevant issue every year – girl education, e- governance, tourism, Healthy child. No doubt, the ideas are impactful governance innovations. At the same time, they also ensure unison and mass attachment of people to his leadership. In fact, so engrossed have people and mainstream media been with the campaign’s novelty, that we are not debating the other actions of the government that were taken during the same time- like, the cut-down of the health budget by Rs 6,000 crore, the deregulation of the pharma industry, or the premium tatkal services that introduces bidding system in obtaining travel tickets.

The declaration of Sardar Patel’s birth anniversary as ‘Unity Day’ is another measure to improve consensus for the State by invigorating patriotic sentiments; or, marking Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s birthday as ‘good governance day’ that diverts loyalty of the people from the earlier political leadership to the present one. Moreover, the re-appropriation of legacies of Mahatma Gandhi, Sardar Patel, Bahadur Shastri and Ambedkar by the present State also works towards legitimising its governance policies.

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CORRELATION BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND HINDUTVA So far, it was said that use of cultural rhetorics help in consolidating economic interests. Interestingly, the use of rhetoric of cultural and economic nationalism are not restricted to pursuing capitalist development. Just as, a call can be made around cultural nationalism to consolidate economic interests, emphasis on high economic growth becomes helpful for Hindutva politics. Similarly, a Capitalist Cohesive State, in using repressive and authoritarian techniques of discipline for the larger society is not merely seeking economic goals, but is also creating conditions conducive for right-wing tendencies to permeate and affect its character and intent. In the case of Gujarat, its political culture of authoritarian leadership, regard for economic nationalism, and a growing situation in 1980s where Savarnas would do everything to retain their clout made way for Rightist politics. Post 1995, presence of BJP government in Gujarat not only emboldened Hindutva forces, but also initiated the institutionalisation in state machinery, filling up posts of district and block boards and committees, including Police Advisory Committee and Social Justice Committee, with Sangh Parivar supporters (Sud 2012: 171).

It is noteworthy that between 1995 and May 2014, chief ministers of State – Keshubhai Patel, Suresh Mehta, Shankersinh Vagela, Dilip Parekh, – have either been RSS members or industrialists (ibid 33). Rhetoric of cultural nationalism was becoming available along with economic nationalism in creating and mending consensus amongst different sections of the Gujarati people. It is these two pivotal tools that Mr. Narendra Modi had been able to use for repairing any cracks - through an overlap, interchangeably and even separately- thus wearing the hats of Vikas Purush and Hindu Hriday Samrat together.

Such a heady mix of rhetorics has been on full display at ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ where the State strengthens its coalition with corporates, just as it becomes a forum to propagate zeal for cultural nationalism through kite flying festivals for the eager diaspora. The just concluded 13th Pravasi Bhartiya Diwas was another occasion where economic interests and nostalgia for cultural roots amongst diaspora were juxtaposed.

State tourism is promoted through exhibition of symbols of Hindu heritage. Advertisements highlight Navratri festival, temple architecture and sacred histories, while avoiding mention of Gujarat’s syncretic food habits, language and architecture nurtured through assimilation of diverse Hindu, Islamic and Parsi cultures at its trading ports since medieval times. It was only during the run-up to the 2014 General Elections that Gujarat tourism ministry also produced advertisements that mention its Islamic heritage.

Chief Minister Modi was able to depoliticise Gujaratis from questioning both capitalism and Hindutva in the name of development in the state. He refuses to be called a politician, claiming to only serve people. Mr. Modi’s supporters in Gujarat, and now at world over, see his development model to be apolitical and are always up in arms against his critics. Development

International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 557 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print) projects like Samaras — a village assimilation scheme in Gujarat — require villagers to choose between political freedom or economic prosperity, with financial assistance offered to those villages that debunk elections in favour of unanimously elected panchayats. Social cohesion between Hindu castes and classes, who would otherwise seek reserved panchayat posts, also gets encouraged (Shah 2009: 176-177).

He also made good use of the rhetoric of ‘Gujarati Asmita’, first linked to the honour of Somnath temple by K.M Munshi, and later employed by Chimanbhai Patel to reprimand the Narmada Bachao Andolan. In the beginning of the Narmada Dam project in 1960s, states of and were the ‘Other’ accused of being jealous of Gujarat’s accomplishment. By 1990s, social and environmental activists critical of the project were painted as ‘hurting Gujarati asmita’ in protesting against its development. After the 2002 riots, the category got further moulded to also reinforce Muslims as the ‘Other’.

Similarily, there is the phenomenon of Moditva– the clever packaging of agendas of development, economic nationalism and Hindutva together around Mr Modi which interconnects their respective values (Kanungo and Farooqui 2008: 225-245). The strategy bombarded election campaigning in Gujarat in 2007,4 and more recently in 2014 General Elections. The end implication then — development = patriotism = Hindutva = Modi — can be termed “Moditva”. Moditva also defines the opposition sharply: “You are unpatriotic if you criticise Modi’s development… if you choose Muslim Congress… if you oppose Modi.”5

Reasons for correlation It is, therefore, important that one deliberates over possible correlation between Capitalism and Hindutva, which is an important character of this governance model, and can help in explaining its relevance to the present Central government.

Such overlapping of rhetorics of ‘development, Gujarati and now Bhartiya Asmita and Hindutva’ in practices and policies of the leadership help in consolidating consensus for Hindutva politics through stealth, amongst those who prioritise economic growth. Many remain oblivious to the agenda or simply unruffled by the prospects of Hindutva-isation of society as long as economic gains are in sight. It also becomes crucial to see how Gujarat was purposely projected as a ‘Vibrant’ centre for conducting business in the aftermath of severe criticism of the Gujarat riots 2002 by the corporate community. A similar plan of action to deflect anti-State sentiments and bridge cracks in legitimacy for leadership was employed in China after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown on students, which resulted in the development of Shangai as the ‘dragonhead’ of China’s economy.

4 With ease he spoke for Gujarat’s development while goading people to approve killing of terrorists like Sohrabbudin during campaigning. He made both issues of Gujarati Asmita, linked them to his own pride, and conveyed — ‘Gujarat is Modi, Modi is Gujarat.’ 5 Hindutva appeared insidiously during name calling. In referring Rahul Gandhi as “shehzada”, he portrayed India being controlled by outsiders the way Delhi Sultanate was under the Mughals, and Congress(I) as Muslim appeaser. International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 558 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print)

One must remember there was a meeting of paths of these two separate ‘elite revolts’ of economic liberalisation and Hindu nationalism in the 1990s, heralded by the middle class and upper castes against the failings of the Nehruvian State to ‘reinvent India’ (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 119-139). Eager to have a taste of goodies that economic reforms were promising them, but unwilling to share with subaltern groups that had begun reasserting themselves in the democratic set-up, they turned to Hindutva to be the fix to Mandal politics. Even in Gujarat, Hindutva was able to exert itself amongst Brahmins, Banias and Patidars when their fortunes were threatened by KHAM. They decided to forego their own internal differences and stood united as a Savarna bloc (Desai 2011).

Also, increased consumption in the new middle class brought on by rising economic prosperity has been making it more god-fearing, in an attempt to either balance out everyday consumerism with spirituality or to hold tight to roots in global societies. The logic of liberalism and capitalism prioritises the individual. However, supremacy of the individual has been at the cost of severed community relations. In these times of high divorce rates, non-committal relations and nuclear families, the individual may be finding undemanding companionship in religion.

The growing religiosity of people in the country, where majority population is Hindu, gives opportunity to Hindutva to seep into the state structure (like when Prime Minister Modi uses Vedic lexicon to address bureacurats as karmayogis, or he revers river Ganga as Mother in his official statements, or when state leaders hold official yagnas, or allot Vedic names to policies, schemes or institutions, dilute boundaries between religion and state in public imagination, and persuade people to identify being Hindu as integral to their national identity.6 There is a suggestion that this growing inclination towards religion is promoting a ‘State- Temple-Corporate’ nexus where the three are in cahoots over land deals and end up, again, subtly propagating Hindu Banal Nationalism in public conscience (Nanda 2009).7 A state entrenched in, or attached to Hindutva leanings provides land to religious organisations at throwaway prices for building their own educational institutions, training schools for priests, or charity hospitals. Businessmen volunteer to build the infrastructure on behalf of the temple trust, or contribute to maintenance. They may or may not be religious, interested only in business. The State, in-turn, makes these investments worthwhile for the other two players by conferring these institutions “deemed universities” and recognising new courses, like Vedic Sciences. Such course outline in the academic curriculum is said to eulogise the Vedic past in the conscience of the people, even as its scientific foundations are being debated.

6 Religion becomes the soft spot from where project of Hindutva gets pushed into society. At the same time, Hindutva’s understanding of ‘who is a Hindu’ extends beyond religious identity. Hinduism is expressed as ‘a way of life’, a cultural connotation that emphasises on Bharat being a civilisation, and its natives following Vedic customs, traditions, rituals, language, arts & literature since ancient times. 7 Meera Nanda (2009) improvises on the term ‘Banal Nationalism’ coined by Michael Billig. ‘Banal Nationalism’ is the sense of national solidarity built around everyday mundane objects or activities. So, for example, French tricolour is printed on bread loaves, that helps in instilling a sense of nationalism in people consuming it. See Billig, Michael (1995): Banal Nationalism (London: Sage)

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Moreover, these institutions also become sites for the unconscious construction of the idea of a Hindu Nation through simultaneous invocation of devotion to religion and allegiance to the State. During the inauguration of the Sanipani Vidyaniketan temple established by the Ambanis on the behest of their family guru Ramesh Oza on 85 acres of land close to Porbandar airport donated by Chief Minister Modi, first a prayer was held before the temple idols, followed by singing of the national anthem. Student priests then recited Vedic verses to the audience before performers pleased them with Gujarati folk dance. Speeches were made with liberal douses of references to god and Mother India simultaneously, and one could not differentiate between the two (ibid 142-143).

Hindutva and Capitalism assist one another. Roused communal emotions not only bring together the Hindu brethren, but consequently deter the polarised religious communities from unionising, which suits the interest of their employers. There was much surprise over revelations that SCs attacked Muslims during the 2002 carnage in localities of Ahmedabad populated by ex-textile mill workers from these two communities. After the closure of mills during 1980s, SCs and Muslim workers were embroiled in furious competition over new job opportunities in the market. This antagonism led SCs towards Hindutva forces (Breman 2002). It helped that closure of mills had diluted the spirit of the working class. Earlier, the Majoor Mahajan Sangh would actively raise working class solidarity amongst these workers.

It has also been suggested that there are underlying similarities in principles of Hindutva and capitalist development that allow for the two facilitating one another. Both have ambitions to hegemonise societies. This is not saying that the two are purposely compatible, or that there cannot be tensions between the two projects, but that their alliance manifests during particular historical circumstances out of deeper commonalities that arise out of their hegemonic nature (Gopalakrishnana 2006). Capitalism thrives on the shoulders of a rational individual making choices unaffected by social realities. In doing so, there is nil acknowledgment of social divisions emerging from class, caste, gender and other differences. By negating such social divisions, depoliticisation of society is achieved that weakens rise of identity politics. This also reduces scope for political intervention from the state. State’s role is anyways expected to be a facilitator for the market from the margins. The stage becomes set for capitalism to establish its hegemony. The philosophy of Hindutva believes that social divisions result from people’s own moral inaptitude, which will be mended by an individual by taking the moral high ground and embracing everyone, rather than seeking political solutions to these divisions. Dalits and Adivasis are promised a long desired membership into Hindu fold, without thoroughly attacking the Varna system, and this again minimises the struggle of identity politics by reducing the challenge to a desirous united Hindu bloc. The State is rendered apolitical. So, both expect a “similar relationship between the state, society and individual” that would establish and preserve their respective hegemonies.

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One also need not be baffled how the Swadeshi approach of economics (that RSS has vaguely outlined) works along with the global character of capitalism. This very vagueness assists Hindutva forces to work with capitalism. The security – of national, political and economic nature - is the foremost concern in the Hindu Rashtra. And capitalist development is acceptable as long as it assures a strengthened nation-state through its economic prowess. The previous NDA government at the centre was equally keen for capitalism liberalism.

LIMITATIONS OF THE GOVERNANCE MODEL FOR INDIA

Finally, keeping Gujarat in mind once again, there are other important dimensions to such a governance model that need introspection in discussing its relevance for India.

Human Development Index in the Capitalist Cohesive Development State of Gujarat has not improved at the same rate as it has gained economic prosperity. In fact, Gujarat’s track record on this front has been dismal from the start. This tells us something about what kind of human development governance can be expected under this model. Gujarat’s HDI, which was above the national average in 1980s and 1990s, worsened in the 2000s and came down to the national average. Its performance in terms of national inequality did rise above national average in the 2000s, but is not as good as that of Tamil Nadu.8 Yet, to be fair to the model, there are economists who are reading figures and telling us to wait for the latest statistics, since the point of state-directed development is to trigger a trickle-down effect, which, according to them takes time and has started to happen in Gujarat over the last few years (Bhagwati 2011), (Debroy 2012), (Panagriya 2014).9

On the issue of social justice, the model tends to create unease for the religious, (in addition to the economic minorities), given the ability with which right wing politics co-exists with economic development. The initiative for adoption of villages by MPs- Saansad Adarsh Gram Yojana, that was started by Prime Minister Modi, saw him adopting Jayapur village in Varansai – an all-Hindu settlements, something that other BJP MPs also did subsequently.10 The demarcation in the living standards of majority religion Gujaratis and minority religion Gujaratis also raises questions about the biases in the governance strategies. While Sachar Committee Report on Muslims lists West Bengal and as states worse than Gujarat when it comes to the social and economic conditions of Gujarat, and recent Planning Commission statistics show that poverty levels of Gujarati Muslims are lowest in the country, the underlying unease emerges from the way religious minorities are supposedly asked to choose economic

8 http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-gujarat-model-of-development-and-other-growth-stories-1973622 9 Not all economists agree with this assessment of Gujarat’s social sector. See – Hirway, Indira (2012): “Prof. Jagdish Bhagwati on the Gujarat Economy.” Macroscan. Feb 6. Viewed on 5 April 2014 (http://www.macroscan.net/index.php?&view=article&aid=1285) 10 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No-Muslims-in-Modis-adopted-village/articleshow/45076802.cms; http://www.news18.com/news/uttar-pradesh/pm-narendra-modis-adopted-village-has-not-a-single-muslim-636129.html; http://scroll.in/article/690439/Like-Modi,-many-BJP-MPs-adopt-all-Hindu-settlements-under-model-village-scheme

International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 561 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print) growth over their claims to social justice in Gujarat, pitting the demands of social justice in opposition to demands of economic justice.

Moreover, Gujarat is just one state of the Indian Union and to infer the governance strategies from its experience is too simplistic. Gujarat fared so well because of its geographical, political and social past that encouraged mercantile trade and alter industrialisation. Governance of India would have to take into account the regional variances, and target different sectors to encourage economic development depending upon the requirements of the region. Also, it is not like Gujarat is the only state that has been doing well. Madhya Pradesh has been improving its development indices by focusing on the agricultural sector, Maharashtra and have an equally bright industrial growth, Bihar and Tamil Nadu have been registering good HDI as well.

Also, governance model of Gujarat has been inspired by the East Asian tiger economies (from Solanki, to Patel, to Modi had been keen to make Gujarat a mini-Japan). The truth of the Easy Asian economies is that their economic rise has been at the cost of political freedom of the citizens. This kind of governance raises the question over the kind of, and how much liberty is allowed by a repressive and depoliticising State to the different sections of its people. Prime Minister Modi’s disinclination to speak to media became apparent when he barred his ministers and bureaucrats from speaking to journalists, and instead letting official government spokespersons do the talking on their behalf. This had been the practise during Mr. Modi’s three terms as chief minister of Gujarat, where members of his cabinet would not speak to the press unless they had obtained permission from him. Even the customary press briefings after the state cabinet meetings – which in other states are addressed by ministers – are either not held at all in Gujarat or are addressed by spokesmen of the state government. As a result, Mr. Modi's Twitter account has become the most important source of information for journalists, after the Press Information bureau press statements. This is a step towards developing a single-window system for the flow of information, where there is no room for discussion and debate with the government. In his refusal to take media persons along on official tours, there is once again clamping down on information. All these trends of disregard and subservience of the fourth pillar of democracy are inimical to democracy itself. Prime Minister Modi's penchant for the ordinance is equally worrisome: Eight ordinances in 225 days works. Not that he is exceptional in bypassing the parliament to pass executive orders compared to his predecessors, but that he resorted to them in the absence of "circumstances”, which make it necessary to take immediate action, is worrisome. Other than in exceptional circumstances, passing ordinances without going through the processes of consultation and revision in the parliament is not good governance and circumvents democratic processes. Similarly, silence on issues of attacks and insult of religious minorities, rape victims etc doesn’t befit a democracy like India.

Finally, this model requires a strong authoritarian political leadership. Chief Minister Narendra Modi found appeal for his assertive demeanour and cultural, economic and nationalist rhetorics

International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 562 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print) in the political culture of Gujarat, with its tradition of strong leaders playing instrumental roles in national politics, be it Sardar Patel, K.M Munshi, Morarji Desai or Chimanbhai Patel. Gujaratis have taken pride in the powerful demeanours of their leaders, rather than being critical of their authoritarianism. These leaders are celebrated by Gujaratis for having stood up against the ‘Other’ - one who has from time to time been detrimental to national, and Gujarati pride. Sardar stood up to the princely states refusing to cede to India, Desai clashed with the patronising Nehru-Gandhi family, Munshi found the enemy in Muslim invaders who attacked Hindu pride by destroying the Somnath temple, Patel went at war with those opposed the symbol of Gujarat’s economic prosperity, Narmada Dam. Acceptance for such political culture has enabled Mr. Modi’s own authoritarian style. His style of working has been hailed dictatorial. But people haven’t minded it, seeing him as someone who has invested himself in the service of Gujarat, taking it to new economic heights, and saving it from potential threats. They voted for him in 2007, and again in 2012 despite acknowledging his dictatorial temperament (Jaffrelot 2008:15).11 Today, the omnipresence of Mr. Modi is being criticised for making the political democratic system subservient to an individual. One must not forget that earlier too, the dictatorial reign of Ms. Indira Gandhi was celebrated as a necessity by people. Infact, Mr. Nehru has also been analysed as a strong leader who ensured his single-handed controlled over the ideation and execution of governance strategies for the country. Indians have endorsed and justified authoritarian leaders as the only recourse for the country in absence of leadership vacuum and chaotic politico-economic conditions. Yet, this faith in an authoritarian leader within India has tended to be temporary, only till the time a strong opposition has not renewed the spirit of democratic protests and behaviour in the political system. Authoritarian leadership is not the essence of India’s political culture, as evident from its Constitution.

REFERENCES

1. Corbridge, S and J Harriss (2000): Reinventing India. Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).

2. Bhagwati, Jagdish (2011): “Debunking Populist Myths that Undermine Prosperity – Lessons from and for Gujarat” Paper presented at Swarnim Gujarat lecture series, Mahatma Mandir, Gandhinagar, Gujarat, 24 December.

3. Breman, Jan (2002): “Communal Upheaval as Resurgence of Social Darwinism”, Economic and Political Weekly, 37 (16): 1485-1488

11 Christophe Jaffrelot (2008) cites The Indian Express-CNN-IBN-CSDS Gujarat Poll survey conducted in first week of November 2007 that showed 34 % of the interviewees (among them 37 % of BJP voters) considered Modi’s style “dictatorial”. 48 % of those who disapproved of his “dictatorial style of leadership” were ready to vote for his party; and amongst those who approved of his style, 61 % were going to vote for him. See - Kumar, Sanjay (2007): “Dictating the trend”, Indian Express 27 Nov. International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity ( IRJMSH ) Page 563 www.irjmsh.com IRJMSH Vol 6 Issue 1 [Year 2015] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print)

4. Mahadevia, Darshini. “From Stealth to Agression: Economic Reforms and Communal Politics in Gujarat”.The Politics of Economic Reforms in India, ed., Jos Mooij. Sage, 2005.

5. Debroy, Bibek (2012): Gujarat-Governance for Growth and Development (New Delhi: Academic Foundation).

6. Desai, Radhika (2011): “Gujarat's Hindutva of Capitalist Development”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 34 (3):354-381.

7. Evans, Peter (1995): Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press).

8. Erdman, Howard L (1973): Politics & Economic Development in India: The Gujarat State Fertilizer Company as a Joint Sector Enterprise (Delhi: D.K. Publishing House).

9. Gopalakrishnana, Shankar (2006): “Defining, Constructing and Policing a ‘New India’: An Exploration of the Relationship Between Neoliberalism and Hindutva during the NDA Regime.” Economic and Political Weekly, 41 (26): 2805-2813.

10. Hirway, I, S.P. Kashyab and A Shah, ed. (2002): Dynamics of Development in Gujarat (Ahmedabad: Centre for Development Alternatives).

11. Jaffrelot, Christophe (2008): “Gujarat: The Meaning of Modi’s Victory” Economic and Political Weekly, 63 (15): 12-17.

12. Johnson, Chalmers (1982): MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (California: Stanford University Press).

13. Kanungo, Pralay and Farooqui Adnan (2008): “Tracking Moditva: An analysis of the 2007 Gujarat elections campaign”, Contemporary Perspectives, 2 (2) July-December 2008:222-245.

14. Kohli, Atul (2004): State Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialisation in the Global Periphery (New York: Cambridge University Press).

15. Nanda, Meera (2009): The God Market: how Globalisation is making India more Hindu (Noida: Random House India).

16. Panagriya, Arvind (2014): “Here’s Proof That Gujarat Has Flourished Under Modi.” Tehelka. 13(11) Mar 29. Viewed on 4 April 2014 (http://www.tehelka.com/heres-proof- that-gujarat-has-flourished-under-modi/).

17. Sanghavi, Nagindas (1996): Gujarat: Political Analysis (Surat: Centre for Social Studies).

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18. Shah Ghanshyam (2011): “Goebbel’s Propaganda and Governance: The 2009 Lok Sabha Elections in Gujarat” in Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy(ed) India’s 2009 elections (New Delhi: Sage Publications India) 167-191.

19. Sinha,Aseema (2005): Divided Leviathan: The Regional Roots of Development Politics in India (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press).

20. Sud, Nikita (2012): Liberalisation, Hindu Nationalism and the State: A biography of Gujarat (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).

21. Yagnik, Achyut and Suchitra Sheth (2005): The Shaping of Modern Gujarat (New Delhi: Penguin Books)

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