See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233306539

Irish‐German relations 1929–39: Irish reactions to Nazis

Article in Cambridge Review of International Affairs · September 1997 DOI: 10.1080/09557579708400178

CITATIONS READS 0 131

1 author:

Mervyn O'Driscoll University College Cork

36 PUBLICATIONS 46 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Anglo-French nuclear diplomacy View project

Ireland and European integration View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Mervyn O'Driscoll on 07 January 2015.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. This article was downloaded by: [University College Cork] On: 07 January 2015, At: 06:00 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Cambridge Review of International Affairs Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccam20 Irish‐German relations 1929–39: Irish reactions to Nazis Mervyn O'Driscoll a a Lecturer in European Politics , University of Wolverhampton Published online: 13 Sep 2007.

To cite this article: Mervyn O'Driscoll (1997) Irish‐German relations 1929–39: Irish reactions to Nazis, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 11:1, 293-307, DOI: 10.1080/09557579708400178 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09557579708400178

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions IRISH-GERMAN RELATIONS 1929-39: Irish Reactions to Nazis Mervyn O'Driscoll Lecturer in European Politics, University of Wolverhampton

Even before the creation of the Irish Free State during the Irish War of Independence (1918-21) Ireland made attempts to establish diplomatic links with the Weimar Republic. Irish envoys were present in Berlin from 1921 to 1923. Their function was both to demonstrate Irish independence from Great Britain, and to seek diplomatic recognition for the nascent Irish Free State. They failed to gain official recognition from the Weimar government, and Irish representation lapsed during the inflationary winter of 1923-4, due to the unstable Weimar economic and political situation. Eventually, however, Irish-German diplomatic relations did commence, toward the end of the Weimar period. On 8 January 1929, Professor Daniel A. Binchy was appointed as Irish Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Weimar Republic3 and the German Consulate-General in Dublin was upgraded to a Legation.4 As a newly-emergent nation state, the Irish Free State was sensitive to its treatment by Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 larger states and this was compounded by its ambiguous position as a Dominion in the British Commonwealth. Professor Binchy had previous experience with the Nazis. He first encountered Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party in November 1921 while a student at the University of Munich, when as a matter of curiosity a fellow student took him to a meeting of a 'new freak party' in the Burgerbraukeller. Binchy's judgement was that Hitler, a "commonplace-looking man", was "a natural born orator" who seemed to "take fire" as he launched into his

Summer/Fall 1997, Vol XI, No. 1 293 Mervyn O'Driscoll

address.5 Despite Binchy's dismissal of the content of Hitler's speech (as an extremely repetitive and conspiratorial attack of Marxists, "the October criminals", and Jews), he acknowledged Hitler's magical power over his "audience of down and outs" and ex-soldiers. Portentously, one of Binchy's colleagues commented, "No lunatic with the gift of oratory is harmless."6 Nine years later, when Binchy attended a celebration of the success of the Nazis in the September 1930 elections, he noted that the content of Hitler's speech had not changed.7 Now, however, the Nazi party had risen to become the second largest party in the Reichstag. Binchy loathed the Hitlerite movement and was extremely critical of it. He attacked its ideology in print in March 19338 following his resignation as Irish Minister in Berlin, which made him an unpopular figure in Nazi circles and the German Foreign Office.9 After reading Mein Kampf. he astutely stated that "[ajnything [Hitler] tells us about himself is merely introduced as a peg on which to hang some political or ethnological dissertation." Binchy proceeded to give a detailed critique of the various contradictions and "absurdities"11 that permeated the political tract. In Hitler's mind, Binchy observed, the Jews "are equally responsible for the curse of parliamentary government and for the dictatorship of the proletariat which has abolished it."12 Binchy understood that anti-Semitism was fundamental to the movement and was troubled by the potential consequences if the Nazis were to gain the power to implement a policy based on it. Notwithstanding the astuteness of his diplomatic reporting, however, Binchy internalised the prejudices of the German haute bourgeoisie and

Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 he never foresaw the downfall of the Weimar Republic. When Hitler acceded to the Chancellorship in January 1933 Binchy optimistically concluded:

before being entrusted with the Chancellorship [Hitler] has had his wings firmly clipped by the President. He has had to accept as colleagues most of the 'Government of Barons' which he was hysterically denouncing a few months ago. In addition he has the Chief of the Conservative

294 Cambridge Review of International Affairs Irish-German Relations 1929-39

Nationalists, whose meetings were consistently broken up by the Nazis during the last election campaign, as well as the chief of the Stahlhelm, with which his Brown Army has had many a skirmish. He can hardly expect these men to swallow his programme. 4

Hitler proceeded to confound such complacent haute bourgeois attitudes, however, and acquired unlimited dictatorial powers in the following months. And Binchy's successor as Irish Minister in Berlin, Charles Bewley, made more serious errors of judgement and held more dangerous attitudes and pro- Nazi prejudices than his predecessor. Bewley switched to Berlin from his position as Irish Minister to the Vatican in July 1933. A Germanophile attracted to the ideas of the Nationalist Socialists, he was incapable of deep and sustained analysis of the Third Reich. Many of the threads of his "incipient fascism" were in place by 1933. Indeed, his previous conduct in Berlin as an Irish Consul 1922-3 should have rendered him ineligible for a diplomatic post in Germany. According to available evidence from the night of 19 January 1922, Bewley had visited the Tauenzien Palast in Berlin and made a variety of anti-Semitic remarks about another Irishman, Robert Briscoe, who happened to be Jewish.16 The Irish Minister of External Affairs at the time, George Gavan Duffy, dealing with the fallout from this particular affair, wrote that Bewley was "mad on the Jewish question" and that the incident was "inexcusable".17 Bewley escaped official punishment, however, and the Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 incident was ignored because in the tense domestic situation in the Irish Free State, which then was spiralling toward civil war, Bewley happened to be on the pro-government side on the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Robert Briscoe, on the other hand, was, as an anti-Treatyite, perceived to be "an undesirable person". Such incidents as Bewley's outburst were not considered important in the confusing immediate post-independence phase: there were many more pressing matters. Furthermore, the Irish foreign service was only semi-professional in nature at this early stage in the Irish state's history. Bewley retired from his post in

Summer/Fall 1997, Vol XI, No. 1 295 Mervyn O'Driscoll

Berlin in February 1923 when the Irish Free State downgraded its presence in Berlin19 and he re-entered the Irish legal profession. On 31 August 1933, Bewley fulfilled his life's ambition when he presented his credentials to President Hindenburg. He was now the Irish Minister to the Third Reich. In his speech on that occasion he translated "rather freely" one passage of the text which the Department of External Affairs in Dublin had given him, in order to make reference to the "national rebirth of Germany"; he evidently "thought that some such reference would be favourably accepted." Thus commenced the process whereby Bewley ingratiated himself to the highest ranks of the Nazi party. He regularly attended the annual Nazi pilgrimage at the Nuremberg rallies in September,22 unlike the diplomatic representatives of most other nations, including the United States, Britain and France.23 As a foreign diplomat, high Nazi officials attempted to win his sympathy for their cause and "he evidently thrived in the labyrinthine implications of dinner- and house-party intrigue under the Nazi regime."24 Consequently he provided insights into the personalities of Robert Ley (the Nazi labour leader) and Alfred Rosenberg (the Nazi theorist and ideologue) in his memoirs.25 Bewley was on such close terms with Hermann Goring, "the Second Man in the Third Reich", that when in the 1950s he wrote Goring's apologetic biography, Hermann Goering and the Third Reich, he was on such close terms with Goring's wife and family that he had access to their personal documentary sources and private recollections. The extent to which Bewley compromised himself as an

Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 objective reporter of German developments was evident in his diplomatic reports to the Department of External Affairs in Dublin. Despite acknowledging the Nazi persecution of Christian churches, especially the Catholic Church,27 and of the Jews, he found these acceptable sacrifices to a movement dedicated to preventing the spread of Communism.2 The Catholic Church in Germany provoked the Nazis in Bewley's estimation.29 "He blamed the antagonism of the Catholic Centre Party to National Socialism [during the late Weimar period] for

296 Cambridge Review of International Affairs Irish-German Relations 1929-39

the ultimate antagonism between Nazism and the Church."30 This was only one example of Bewley's low-quality reporting. Bewley also increasingly adopted official Nazi explanations and views, and became intolerant to any criticism of the regime, even from reputable Irish sources. Following the Night of the Long Knives on 30 June 1934, when Hitler's arbitrary tendencies were revealed in the cold-blooded murder without trial of Ernst Roehm and nearly 200 others, Bewley accepted Hitler's methods as justified. He denounced Roehm's "proclivities" in contrast to the laudable "puritanical and ascetic personalities of Hitler"32 and accepted that "a foreign power" was involved in an imminent "second revolution".33 Then, following the Kristallnacht (Night of the Broken Glass) on 9-10 November 1938 - when at least 100 Jews were murdered, and practically all the synagogues and about 7,000 Jewish shops in Germany were destroyed in response to a pogrom initiated by Goebbels and conveniently based on the pretext of the assassination of the Legation Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris - Bewley stated that he was unaware of any cases of "deliberate cruelty on the part of the [German] Government...to ward the Jews."3 Eventually, in mid-1939 Bewley was forced to retire when his unprofessional behaviour forced his political superior in Dublin to recall him from Berlin. By comparison, Eamon de Valera, the Irish Minister of External Affairs and An Taoiseacb (Prime Minister), was considerably more objective in his assessment of the Third Reich. Neither de Valera nor the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Joseph Walshe, relied on Bewley's Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 assessments of Nazism. De Valera's first encounter with Hitler in 1933 was symptomatic of the course of Irish-German relations thereafter. De Valera himself was portrayed as a half- caste Jew by the Deutsb-Wocbenscbau?6 Similar deprecatory remarks were made about the character of Irish republicanism, Unking it to a Jewish world conspiracy and drawing particular attention to the Jewishness of one of the government party's elected representatives, Robert Briscoe. Thereafter a protest was made to Bernhard von Bulow, the Staatsekretdr of the German Foreign Office, that papers such as the Deutsche-Wbchenschau

Summer/Fall 1997, VoL XI, No. 1 297 Mervyn O'Driscoll

which published such incorrect and distorted statements about the Irish Free State should be forced to withdraw them and to guarantee that such statements would not be repeated.37 Negative official perceptions of the Third Reich were given further credence following the dismissal of Dr Georg von Dehn from his position as German Ambassador at Bucharest in late 1934. His dismissal stemmed from his actions as the first German envoy to the Irish Free State sometime previously. Dehn, despite his personal Protestant faith, moved in Irish Catholic circles in deference to the Catholic beliefs of the vast majority of the Irish population. As one of his final acts as German Minister to Ireland, before taking up his new post in Bucharest, he paid a farewell courtesy call to the Papal Nuncio, Paschal Robinson, during which he was photographed for the Irish papers kissing the Nuncio's ring. Once the Nazis in Berlin were informed, Dehn was recalled from his new post in Bucharest and forcibly retired from the German diplomatic service.39 The German Foreign Office explained that Dehn's behaviour in regard to this particular incident was inappropriate at a time when Germany's relations with the Holy See were strained and "amounted to public criticism of the policy of the German Government", especially since as a Protestant he had no need to kiss the Papal Nuncio's ring.40 The Irish Government was upset by this cavalier treatment of the former German Minister to Ireland, and by implication the Catholic Church and the Irish Free State, on such intolerant religious grounds. De Valera regretted that Dehn should have been dismissed for appearing "to go too far in

Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 observing the local customs'' of the Irish Free State due to a desire on his part "to do his country's work more efficiently".41 This incident demonstrated to the Irish Government the practical effects of Nazi religious policies not only on Dehn, but also on other innocents in the Third Reich. Dehn's dismissal was motivated by anti-Catholic and anti-religious Nazi prejudices. As Hitler's totalitarian rule grew more severe, and in line with Catholic opinion in other parts of the world, de Valera and the Irish Department of Affairs increasingly

298 Cambridge Review of International Affairs Irish-German Relations 1929-39

disapproved of Nazi domestic policies, even though the regime served as a bastion against Soviet Communism. The Irish Government was particularly concerned about the suppression of the German Catholic Church and this attitude acted as the underlying motive for the unofficial Irish Government policy of limiting co-operation with Germany. In 1935 the Irish Minister in Berlin was advised to discourage even such things as the requests of German university professors to conduct a series of lectures in the Irish Free State "in view of the general trend of things in Germany, especially the attitude of the State toward Christianity." As for "the official supply of information on Irish affairs to the German press" in 1937, Walshe informed Bewley in Berlin that de Valera would not permit it "until such time as the religious question in Germany becomes less acute." The situation of the Catholic Church in Germany was "steadily disimproving" according to both de Valera and Walshe. De Valera's displeasure at Nazi religious policies was again displayed in May 1939 following a suggestion by the Deutsher Akademischer Austauschdienst, in association with the German Foreign Office, that an annual travelling scholarship should be awarded to the Irish student gaining the highest marks in German in the Leaving Certificate Examination. It would consist of two weeks in Northern Germany, and two weeks in middle and Southern Germany, of which one or two weeks of the whole period would be spent in a State Youth Camp. When the matter was brought to de Valera's attention he advised that the offer should be refused because Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015

...in the present position of the Catholic Church in Germany, the Government should not take the responsibility of sponsoring a scheme for sending Catholic children to German Youth Camps.45

The Nazi strategy of de-Christianising and 'National Socialising' German youth, through the destruction of denominational youth organisations, their replacement by such

Summer/Fall 1997, VoL XI, No. 1 299 Mervyn O'Driscoll

groups as the Hitler Youth, and the extensive use of State Youth Camps, was widely criticised in Ireland. The President of the Irish National Teachers" Organisation (INTO) remarked in April 1939 that the youth movement's philosophy in other countries was "Snap the child from his mother's arms and give him a gun."46 The editor of the Irish Press criticised the attempt to erode the influence of the family and religion on children in totalitarian societies, and the cultivation of neo-paganism and militarism as a replacement through the use of state youth movements.47 Earlier in 1934 Irish sources had also responded negatively to a request of the German Minister in Dublin for "the names and addresses of the marxist and Jewish organisations and, if possible, of the anti-communist, fascist, national socialist and anti-semitic corporations in the Irish Free State"48 because "Hitler is apparently not satisfied with driving the Jews out of Germany. He wants to keep his eye on them in all parts of the world." Again in September 1937 the Irish felt aggrieved with the Nazis. At an exhibition at the Nazi Congress in Nuremburg the Irish Free State was highlighted in red, along with the Soviet Union, on a large world map representing the progress of Communism. The Irish Press took exception to this characterisation of the Irish Free State. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Walshe, went much further, telling the German Minister in Dublin, Dr Wilhelm von Kuhlmann, that:

If official Germany chooses to brand Ireland as a country which is indifferent to the growth of

Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 Communism, she must expect some retort...at least as long as her zeal to keep Communism out of Europe is accompanied by a teaching which retains the very worst element in that creed.51

De Valera disapproved of German domestic policies but as an Irish nationalist he sympathised with Germany's external position. His attitudes toward the Nazi regime's foreign policies were a derivative of his views about the League of Nations. De Valera thought that the League of Nations had potential as a

300 Cambridge Review of International Affairs Irish-German Relations 1929-39

peacemaker between nations but that the Covenant on which it was based was not capable of dealing with an evolving states system. It was not flexible enough to incorporate newly emergent states and to care for repressed nationalities. He was conscious of the League's origins as an imposition of the victorious allies on the losers, and as a guarantor of the Treaty of Versailles, which had been unduly harsh in its punishment of Germany.52 Similarly, Irish nationalist representatives had been ignored by the allies when they visited Versailles in 1919 to propel the case for Irish statehood into the international arena. In addition the Irish could feel some empathy for the treatment of the Germans by the Allies, since the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 was imposed under threat of violence against Ireland by the United Kingdom. De Valera therefore believed that he understood the irredentism and feelings of repression of the German nationalists. Just as de Valera revised and undermined the Anglo-Irish Treaty during the 1930s and made the Irish Free State a republic in all but name, .so too he felt Germany was attempting to secure her just national rights which the Treaty of Versailles had removed unrightfully from her. The Irish Government supported the appeasement of German ambitions in the 1930s. It believed that such a policy was morally correct, and that it was a rectification of injustices committed against Germany, similar to the way in which the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1938 was a recognition of legitimate Irish national claims. The "alternative to reconciliation with Germany was the prospect of a second European war against Germany,"54 which would probably involve Ireland. There was Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 also the underlying belief that if Britain recognised Germany's right to remilitarise the Rhineland, and to reoccupy the Sudetenland and Memel, then Britain could be persuaded to concede the Irish Free State's right to Northern Ireland.55 The Irish Government granted recognition to Germany's absorption of Austria in 1938 although it was unhappy with the methods Hitler used and the treatment of Austrian Catholics by the Nazis afterwards. Nevertheless, the Department of Foreign Affairs "formally acknowledged" the notification of the absorption of Austria into the Third Reich in March 1938 and

Summer/Fall 1997, VoL XI, No. 1 301 Mervyn O'Driscoll

de Valera then recognised German jurisdiction over Austria when he "addressed Notes to the German Government regarding the reimposition of visa requirements for holders of German and Austrian passports."56 The best evidence for Ireland's appeasement policy toward the Third Reich came during the Munich Crisis of September 1938. De Valera and J. V. Dulanty, the Irish High Commissioner in London, encouraged Chamberlain in his attempts to pacify Hitler. As de Valera stated on 25 September in his broadcast to the United States from Geneva at the height of the crisis:

The war of sheer aggression...is not the war that we need to fear the most. The most dangerous war is that which has its origin in just claims denied or in a clash of opposing rights - and not merely opposing interests - when each side can see no reason in justice why it should yield its claim to the other. If by conceding the claims of justice or by reasonable compromise in the spirit of fair play we take steps to avoid the latter kind of war, we can face the possibility of the other kind with relative equanimity.58

De Valera's policy was to concede Hitler's just nationalist demands, and if Hitler then presented illegitimate nationalist demands or a. fait accompli his true character would be revealed. As he stated: "To allow fears for the future to Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 intervene and make us halt in rendering justice in the present, is not to be wise but to be foolish."59 De Valera sent letters of encouragement to Chamberlain during the latter's itinerary around the European capitals on his mission to find a solution to the Sudetenland Crisis. Walshe assured the German Minister to Eire, Herr Eduard Hempel, on 15 September "that the Irish Government understood the necessity of obtaining full rights of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans."61 As the crisis , worsened De Valera even considered appealing directly to Hitler and Mussolini in an effort to preserve peace if

302 Cambridge Review of International Affairs Irish-German Relations 1929-39 Chamberlain failed on his mission to Berchtesgaden. In London, Dulanty, along with the other Dominion High Commissioners, pressured the British Governments to intervene and bring about a peaceful solution to the Czechoslovakian question. On 3 November 1938, an official statement from the Irish Government Bureau announced the renewal of the Irish Trade Agreement with German Reich, noting that both the Sudetenland and Austria were included in the term "German Reich." Eire thus extended de jure recognition to Germany's absorption of both of these regions. On the other hand de Valera, the Irish Government, and the Irish Press did not believe that Germany had a legitimate national claim to the rump state of Czechoslovakia following Germany's march into Prague on 15 March 1939. The Irish Government did not extend de jure recognition to the new German Protectorate of Moravia and Bohemia, and the new state of Slovakia, which Hitler's forces had, in effect, appropriated.66 In conclusion, while Bewley was sycophantic in his admiration of the Nazis, he acted unprofessionally and without official Irish sanction. The impression that Hitler and Nazism created on his predecessor, Binchy, and in Dublin, on the Taoiseach, was in general extremely negative. Nonetheless, de Valera's disgust at Nazi domestic policies toward religion, education and the Jews was not translated into opposition to the Third Reich's revisionist foreign policy in the 1930s. De Valera was an appeaser. He recognised a parallel with Hibernia Irredenta. Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 During the Second World War, Irish neutrality was maintained for national self-preservation motives. It was not a demonstration of common cause with Germany, despite de Valera's offer of condolences to the German people on Hitler's death in 1945. On the contrary, Irish authorities secretly colluded with the Allied authorities through most of the war, most notably in the sensitive area of intelligence. Bewley of course pursued his own eccentric course and returned to Axis Europe once the Second World War began. He resided in Rome and the South Tyrol for most of the war. Substantial suspicion

Summer/Fall 1997, VoL XI, No. 1 303 Mervyn O'Driscoll

exists that he collaborated extensively with Axis intelligence and propaganda services. Binchy, on the other hand, pursued academic interests. He was elected a fellow of an Oxford college. Later he was seconded to the press section of the Foreign Office for war service, and appointed to report on Italian affairs. As one commentator has stated:

The Foreign Office felt that he was too biased to be asked to report on the Germans. The contrast between the attitudes to the Germans of the first two Irish Ministers to Berlin, while speaking for itself in one sense, tells perhaps more about the persons concerned than it does about policies.67

The stark contrast in the calibre of Irish diplomats posted in Germany before 1939 highlights the shortage of qualified Irish diplomatic candidates during that period. The early stage of development of the Irish state and the Irish foreign service to some extent accounted for this. Irish policy toward Germany was not considered a high priority until the Second World War. Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015

304 Cambridge Review of International Affairs Irish-German Relations 1929-39 Notes

1 M. O'Driscoll, "Irish-German Diplomatic Relations, 1922-39: An examination of Irish Diplomats' Performances in Berlin, 1922-39" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University College, Cork, Ireland, 1992), pp. 1-61. 2 13 November 1923, O Dubáin to Ministry of External Affairs, D/FA D/PG/IFS Berlin 1922-4, National Archives, Dublin [hereafter NA], p. 1. 3 8 January 1929, Decision of the Executive Council, Item No. 5, D/T S.5736A, NA. 4 22 November 1928, Amery to McGilligan, D/T S .5736A, NA. 5 D. A. Binchy, "Adolf Hhler", Studies, XXII (March 1933), p. 29. 6 Binchy, p. 30. 7 Binchy, p. 30. 8 Binchy. 9 9 September 1933, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA 5/88B, NA, pp. 1-3. 10 Binchy, p.31 11 Binchy, p.38. 12 Binchy, p. 39. 13 Binchy, p. 40. 14 Binchy, p. 46. 15 Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, pp. 28-34; Keogh, Ireland and Europe, pp. 55-7, 100-2. 16 21 January 1922, Briscoe to Chartres, D/FA D/PG/IFS Berlin 1922-4 (Germany Subject File 1922, Charles Bewley), NA. See also Robert Briscoe (with Alden Hatch), For the Life of Me (Boston and Toronto, 1958), p. 259. 17 29 March 1922, Duffy to Chartres, D/FA D/PG/IFS Berlin 1921-2 (1922 Berlin Office), NA. See 18 May 1922, Bewley to Department of Trade, D/FA D/PG/IFS Berlin 1922-4 (untitled folder), NA and Duggan, Ireland and the Third Reich, p. 33, for further examples of Bewley's anti-Semitism.

18 29 March 1922, Duffy to Chartres, D/FA D/PG/IFS Berlin 1921-2 (1922 Berlin Office), NA; 27 March 1922, Minister of Trade to Minister of External Affairs, D/FA D/PG/IFS Berlin 1922-4 (Germany Subject File 1922, C. Bewley), NA. Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 19 10 February 1923, Bewley to Ministry of External Affairs, D/FA D/PG/IFS Berlin 1922-24 (Germany 1923, Consuls No. 2), NA. 20 W. J. McCormack, ed., Charles Bewley: Memoirs of a Wild Goose (Dublin, 1989). 21 4 September 1933, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA 217/28, NA, p. 2. 22 See his annual reports in D/FA Confidential Report Series 19/50 and 19/50A, NA. 23 16 September 1936, Bewley to Secretary, D/FA Confidential Report Series 19/50, N/A. 24 McCormack, p. 291. 25 McCormack. See also 26 February 1934, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA Confidential Report Series 19/50, NA. 26 C. Bewley, Hermann Goering and the Third Reich (Devin-Adair, USA, 1962), p. X.

Summer/Fall 1997, Vol XI, No. 1 305 Mervyn O'Driscoll

27 10 February 1935, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA Confidential Report Series 19/50A, NA; 17 April 1934, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA Confidential Report Series 19/50. 28 McCormack, p. 125. 29 24 August 1936, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA Confidential Report Series 19/50A, NA. 30 Keogh Ireland and Europe, p. 55. 31 16 July 1934, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA Confidential Report Series 19/50, NA. 32 2 Jury 1934, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA Confidential Report Series 19/50, NA. 33 16 July 1934, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA Confidential Report Series, NA. 34 H. Krausnick and M. Broszat, Anatomy of the SS State, trans. Dorothy Long & Miriam Jackson (London, 1982), pp. 57-8. See also K. D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins- Structure and Consequences of National Socialism (Harmondsworth, 1985), p. 456. 35 9 December 1938, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA 202/63, NA, p.10. 34 Hearne to McCauley, 29 July 1933, D/FA Letter Book: Berlin 1932-33, NA, Dublin. 37 Horst Dickl Die Deutsche Aussenpolitik und die Irische vom 1932 bis 1944 (Wiesbaden, 1983), p. 33. 31 21 August 1930, Binchy to Walshe, D/FA EA 231/4B, NA. 39 Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, pp. 22-3. 40 19 Feb 1935, Bewley to Walshe, D/FA 18/10, NA. 41 26 February 1935, D/FA 18/10, NA. 42 26 April 1935, Walshe to Bewley, D/FA Letter Book: Berlin 1934-5, NA. 43 30 June 1937, Walshe to Bewley, D/FA Letter Book: Berlin 1936-7, NA. 44 10 March 1939, Clissman to Secretary of the Department of Education, D/FA 238/59, NA. 45 2 May 1939, Walshe to Secretary of Department of Education, D/FA 238/59, NA. 46 Irish Press, 13 April 1939. 47 Irish Press, 13 April 1939. 48 25 April 1934, Dehn to Browne, D/FA 17/197, NA. 49 2 May 1934, Brown to Roche, D/FA 17/197, NA.

Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015 50 Irish Press, 10 September 1937, p. 9. 51 23 September 1937, Walshe to Bewley, D/FA Berlin Letterbook 1936-7, NA. 52 Eamon de Valera, Peace and Wan Speeches by Mr. de Valera on International Affairs (Dublin, 1944), pp. 5-14. 53 Dermot Keogh, "Origins of Irish Diplomacy in Europe 1919-1921", Études Irelandais 7 (nouvelle série, December 1982), pp. 145-64. 54 De Valera, Peace and War, p. 66. 55 Dickel, Die Deutsche Aussenpolitik und die Iriche Frage, p. 33. 56 4 June 1938, Rynne to Leydon, D/FA 207/10, NA.

306 Cambridge Review of International Affairs Irish-German Relations 1929-39

57 Deidre McMahon, "Ireland, the Dominions and the Munich Crisis", Irish Studies in International Affairs I, 1 (1979), pp. 30-7. 58 De Valera, Peace and War, p. 72. 59 De Valera, Peace and War, p. 72. 60 McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s, New Haven/London, 1984, p. 198. 61 15 September 1938, Hempel to Foreign Ministry, in Documents in German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. ii, doc 483, pp. 781-2. 62 2 January 1939, Hempel to Foreign Ministry, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, vol. iv, doc 483, p. 357. 63 McMahon, p. 31. 64 3 November 1938, 'Statement Issued by the Government Infonnation Bureau," D/FA 232/1, NA. 65 12 December 1944, Boland to Walshe, D/FA 205/161, NA. 66 See D/FA 205/161, NA. 67 Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, p. 34. Downloaded by [University College Cork] at 06:00 07 January 2015

Summer/Fall 1997, VoL XI, No. 1 307

View publication stats