Nine Principles of Knowledge Organization

'" Nine Principles of Knowledge Organization Birger Hjiirland,The Royal School ofLibrarians hip, DK-2300 Copenhagen Introduction The core problem in Information Science (IS) is seen as existing in information seeking and "information retrieval", (IR), aiming at helping users become informed and to identiJY documents,which are the "best textual means to some end" (Wilson, 1968). Other problems,such as the design of information systems and knowledge organi zation (e.g. by classification and indexing) should be seen as means to that end. However, IS has ignored somc fundamental problems, which questions the possi bility of having a profession and a discipline trying to solve the above mentioned problems. Much research in IS has been based on ccrtain problematic views of knowledge, and searched for principles of knowledge organization, which are in dependent of claims of subject-knowledge. In this paper, we shall look at the prob lems of knowledge organization based on a view of knowledge as a historically developed product in which principles of organization are tied to domain-specific criteria. The article is organized as an argumentation of nine principles on the organization of knowledge. Principle # 1 Naive-realistic perception of knowledge structures ;S 110t possible in more ad vanced sciences. The deepest principle on the organization on knowledge rests upon principles developed in and by scientific disciplines. This principle is based on insights from philosophy of science. Shapere (I 984) writes: "Although in more primitive stages of science (or, perhaps better, of what will become a science), obvious sensory similarities or general presupposi tions usually determine whether certain items of experience will be consid ered as forming a body or domain, this less and less true as science progresses (or, as one might say, as it becomes more unambiguously scientific). As part of the growing sophistication of science, such associations of items are subjected to criticism, and are often revised on the basis of considerations which are far from obvious and naive, Differences which seemed to distin guish items from one another are concluded to be superficial; similarities which were previously unrecognized,or, if recognized,conside redsuperfi cial, become fundamental. Conversely,similarities which formerly served as bases for association of items come to he considered superficial,and the items formerly associated are no longer, and form independent groupings or come to be associated with other groups, The items themselves often,in the process, come to be redescribed often, forscientific purposes, in very Advances in Knowledge Organization, Vo1.4(l994), p. 91-100 unfamiliar ways". (Shapere, 1984, p. 323). This is of great importance to IS, because it implies, that classification schemes of knowledge domains cannot be regarded as independent of knowledge-claims. ".. as science proceeds, the connection between knowledge-claims, domain group ings, and descriptions (and often naming) lend 10 become lighler and lighle!" (Shapere, 1984, p. 324). But if this is correct, does it not then imply, that only subject specialists do have the Ilcccessary qualifications to search, to identify, to classify, to organize and to bring order into chaos? What role is leftfor the infor mation specialists? Almost everybody in Information Science is very reserved when considering the principles laid down by the sciences as relevant to knowledge organization in IS. From studying the field, one could get the impression, that the only thing, where there seems to be almost consensus is in the view, that discipli nary principles should be avoided! One of the very few rcscarchers, who regard the philosophy of science as important for knowlcdge organization, is Ingetraut Dahlberg (e.g. 1992). The attitude of Eric de Grolier is much more typical: "At least one general tendency, however, can be discerned: need to bypass the procrustean bed of traditional "disciplines". Correlatively, it is clear that one must begin with an analysis of what we could call the "deep struc ture" of concepts and their interrelationships" (Grolier, 1992, p. 227). " ..The rejection of a "disciplinary" basis for a new system is now rather clear: with one exception (Wahlin's "Field system") all post 1970 schemes have abandoned this feature, still present - as seen abovc- in BC2. But this leaves open the question: where to place "disciplines" themselves, as it is obvious that they are still represented in the literature, university programs and structural charts of governmental science policy administrations?.. ,," (de Grolier,1992, p. 230). I cannot find support for these statements in modern philosophy of science (e.g. Shapere, 1984). In the view of scientific realism, the discipline, with its theories, concepts etc, is a reflection of its object. From the view of social constructivism, the objects,their properties and relations are constructed by the discipline. It is not clear, whether social constructivism and scientific realism can be united. In both cases, however, it follows, that thc objects should be organized by discipline. I have elsewhere (Hjorland, 1993a) defended the view, that "a thing" is always ei ther shaped by or perceived by some "knowledge interests",typically represented by scientific disciplines. Objects, properties and relations should be organized from the point of view of a scientific field. In my view therefore, there is a deep wisdom in classification systemssuch as e.g. Dewey,which states the opposite of de Grolier: "A work on water may be clast with many disciplines, such as metaphys ics, religion, economics,commerce, physics, chemistry, geology, oceanog raphy,meteorology, and history. No other feature of the DDC is more basic than this: that it scatters sub jects by discipline" (Dewey Decimal Classification, 19th ed., Editor's In troduction, p. xxxi). De Orolier (and with him almost all contemporary researchers in IS) seems to believe, that we can disregard the discoveries of science in our search for princi ples about knowledge organization,and that the concept of "diseipline" should be avoided. That we can have "more fundamental principles", "deeper semantic struc tures", "permanent inherent characteristics af knowledge" or the like. This view is very common in Information Science. In Hjorland (l992/1993a), I have analysed the theoretical view of knowledge behind this view. In my opinion the search for such principles represents a search of illusionary goals based on a kind of rational ism close to the "immortal ideas" of Platonic idealism. Principle # 2 Categorizations and classifications should unite related subjects and separate unrelated ones. In naive realism, subject relationships are based on similarity. Two things or subjects are seen as related if they are "alike", that is if they have common properties (descriptive terms) ascribed. But, as Shapere (1989, p. 427f.) shows,then the properties ascribed to some thing (e.g. electrons) will change with the changing theoretical context in the field. First the properties ABCD is perhaps ascribed, then perhaps ABC, then ABCF, and finally HKOF. There needs to be no essential common properties between the thing asfirstand last understood in this scientific development. There is no "simi larity". No advanced indexing, subject analysis, categorization or classification can there fore be based on common properties or similarities, but should be interpreted in the light of the theoretical context! "Similarity" is therefore an unfruitful concept. What should be grouped together is documents with identical or reiatedjimctions fo r the purpose ofthe subject analysis. The concept of "similarity" therefore should be replaced by the concept of "functional equivalence" (or "isomorphism"). Elin Jacob (1994) at this conference presents a paper which takes the stand, that scientific classification is too restrictive, too constrained because of the special perspectives in the sciences, and that less domain-specific,less rigid categoriza tions arc needed. I will try to look at this question from a somewhat different perspective: Principle # 3 For practical purposes, knowledge can be organized in different ways, and with differentlevels of ambition: - "ad hoc classification" (or "categorization" if you prefer),reflects a very low level of ambition in knowledge organization. Every time you arrange flowers in your private home, YOll use a kind of "ad hoc classification" determined by your private taste, the colours of your rooms, what other things they are going to match with etc. Very much classification/catego rization/ordering is based on ad hoc principles. Scientific principles, c.g. botanical taxonomies seem unfruitful to most of such purposes. - ,,pragmaticclassification" reflects a middle level of ambition in knowl edge organization. It is a compromise between "ad hoc classifications"and "scientificclassifications". Jacobs' examples, that the amateur gardener or the horticulturist have othcr criteria for categorizing rhododendrons and azaleas than the biologist implies, that the words and concepts in horticul ture diverge (more or less) from that of the biologist. - "scientific classification"reflects a very high level of ambition in knowl edge organization. It is a highly abstract and generalized way of organizing knowledge. (E.g. classificationof animals and plants according to biologi cal taxonomies). In aI/threecases, categorizations/classifications selve human action. From a prag

Load more