Vasilis Vourkoutiotis. Making Common Cause: German-Soviet Secret Relations, 1919-1922. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. vi + 200 pp. $69.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-230-00644-7. Reviewed by Wolfram von Scheliha Published on H-German (November, 2007) Eighty-five years ago, in the small Italian re‐ the treaty, German leaders found Soviet territory sort of Rapallo, Germany and Soviet Russia agreed a useful place to train military staff and develop to establish diplomatic relations and renounce all armament projects. German companies construct‐ mutual territorial and fnancial claims following ed military aircrafts as well as tanks and pro‐ World War I. Although harmless in its contents, duced all kinds of materiel, including chemical the Rapallo treaty has become a symbol of an weapons. In return, the Red Army supported the anti-western alliance with the potential to under‐ German military and shared technological know- mine the peace. To use a contemporary metaphor, how. This cooperation has been well examined at Rapallo the two pariah states of the postwar pe‐ over the past decades, and our knowledge of riod were suspected of having formed an "axis of events has been expanded with documents from evil." This perception is still alive today. At the six‐ the opened Russian archives.[2] In his new book, tieth anniversary of the German surrender in Vasilis Vourkoutiotis aims to explore the establish‐ World War II, the late Stanislaw Lem called the ment of this secret Russian-German cooperation German-Russian venture to construct a new gas and the ways it accorded with official political re‐ pipeline through the Baltic sea (thus bypassing lations between the two nations. In his fve-chap‐ Poland and other East European countries) a ter work, Vourkoutiotis examines the stages of the "new Rapallo".[1] establishment of the relations during the period What fuels the Rapallo myth is the fact that in 1919-22, tracing them from the frst exploratory the 1920s, Germany and Soviet Russia secretly co‐ talks held under rather adventurous circum‐ operated in military affairs. By the terms of the stances to the launch of secret military coopera‐ Versailles treaty, the Reichswehr had been radi‐ tion "under the umbrella of Rapallo" (p. 137). cally reduced to an army of 100,000 soldiers and In the frst chapter, Vourkoutiotis depicts the strongly restricted in its development of military chaotic situation in eastern Europe following the technology and hardware. As a way to circumvent breakdown of the Russian and German monar‐ H-Net Reviews chies, which led to some unusual coalitions be‐ the Foreign Office, and make important contacts tween the various parties to the conflict. One with the military. On the other side, General von could easily get the impression that almost every‐ Seeckt made his own arrangements, and estab‐ one was somehow at war with everyone else. It is, lished a task group "Russia" (Sondergruppe R), led therefore, not surprising that both defeated Ger‐ by Oskar von Niedermayer, "the German many and the political outcast Soviet Russia found Lawrence of Arabia," who, in the summer of 1921, it useful to identify common interests and see traveled to Moscow.[4] what could be done about them. Vourkoutiotis de‐ Vourkoutiotis emphasizes the tensions be‐ scribes in detail the various attempts of both sides tween and within the two countries. He points out to initiate contact. He describes Karl Radek's fa‐ that in Soviet Russia, Georgii Chicherin, the Peo‐ mous "political salon" in his cell at Berlin-Moabit ple's Commissar of External Affairs, was in charge prison, which later blossomed when he lived of the secret negotiations, while the People's Com‐ more comfortably under house arrest, where he missar of War, Leon Trotsky, and Vladimir Lenin received high-ranking visitors to discuss the possi‐ had less involvement. In Germany, in contrast, the bilities of political, economic, and military cooper‐ moving parties behind the cooperation were Gen‐ ation. Behind the plans for the latter stood Gener‐ eral Seeckt and the Reichswehr, while the German al Hans von Seeckt, the most influential military Foreign Office did not grasp for a long time what leader in the frst years of the Weimar Republic. was going on. In light of this state of affairs, Seeckt hoped to forge a common military front Vourkoutiotis concludes that the Rapallo treaty against Poland along with a collaboration in ar‐ "provided the necessary diplomatic camouflage" mament affairs. for secret military collaboration. Both Germany Vourkoutiotis explains that Soviet intentions and Russia, he is convinced, made "common cause were ambiguous. From the standpoint of Russian against the West, with implications to be felt in raison d'état, cooperation with Germany was con‐ the decades to come" (pp. 172-173). sidered useful, but in terms of ideology, the Bol‐ The main strength of the book is Vourkoutio‐ sheviks continued to support their German broth‐ tis's examination of both Russian and German er revolutionaries. Seeckt, however, pursued his archival sources. For this reason, he is able to ana‐ plans and sent Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Em‐ lyze how interest in constructing mutual relations pire's former minister of war, as his emissary to grew on both sides. The book also benefits from Moscow. Enver, who had also visited Radek in his the author's consistent focus on contemporaneous "salon," was hiding in Berlin at the time, as he was developments in general trends in international wanted by the Entente for "war crimes" (as Vourk‐ relations. Thus, his study possesses a depth that outiotis puts it [p. 36]). It would have been worth contributes to a proper understanding of the un‐ mentioning that Enver, a member of the Young derlying reasons for Soviet-German secret rela‐ Turk government, was one of the persons respon‐ tions of the time. Vourkoutiotis employs a promis‐ sible for the Armenian Genocide. Enver was, how‐ ing, productive approach, and readers will learn ever, not the only channel of communication. In some interesting details from this study. November 1919, Viktor Kopp, an old companion However, it must be said that the book has of Leon Trotsky, arrived illegally in Berlin. Only a substantial shortcomings. Spelling mistakes, an‐ few months later, he became the Soviets' autho‐ noying as they are, occur in every book and they rized representative to negotiate the problem of may not be noteworthy even if such a distin‐ POWs. This appointment provided Kopp with the guished historical fgure as Aristide Briand (not necessary cover to conduct all kinds of activities: Briande, pp. 130, 196) is concerned; and it may be heat up the revolution, discuss trade matters with 2 H-Net Reviews nitpicking to note that Vourkoutiotis confuses For‐ consider J. David Cameron's intriguing argument eign Minister Walter Simons with State Secretary that by furthering cooperation with Soviet Russia, Ernst von Simson (pp. 161-162) and that he con‐ German foreign policy aimed at transforming an flates in the index Hugo Haase, the leader of the aggressive Bolshevik regime into a more moder‐ Independent Social Democratic Party (and for a ate one.[5] A number of standard references are short time a member of the Council of People's omitted, in particular: Vasilii Chernoperov's stud‐ Deputies) with Colonel Otto Hasse, a member of ies on Viktor Kopp,[6] Hans-Jürgen Steidt's book Sondergruppe R (and from 1923-25 chief of the on Oskar von Niedermayer,[7] and the biography Truppenamt, as the General Staff was called at of Walther Rathenau by Christian Schoelzel, one that time [p. 197]). Still, one cannot avoid raising of the frst researchers to explore the papers of an eyebrow when reading that Simons "proposed the assassinated foreign minister held in the Mili‐ sending an emissary (a Second State Secretary tary Archives in Moscow.[8] named Ausamt)" to Moscow (p. 108), drawing In his work, Schoelzel convincingly demon‐ upon a Russian source. "Ausamt," however, is not strates that Rathenau, then Minister of Recovery, the name of a person, but rather a Russian acro‐ had been informed by Wirth about the secret mil‐ nym for "Auswärtiges Amt" (Foreign Office). The itary relations as early as the summer of 1921.[9] source likely refers to Gustav Behrendt, head of Vourkoutiotis alleges nevertheless, without refer‐ the Eastern division in the Foreign Office. It is re‐ ring to a source, that Seeckt informed the Foreign markable that Behrendt is mentioned only once Minister "immediately upon the signing of Rapal‐ throughout the entire book, and then referred to lo" (p. 143). It has also been established that the as only "another member of the foreign ministry" Foreign Office (Maltzan) had been briefed on mili‐ (p. 131). A closer look at this diplomat would have tary contacts that summer, before Niedermayer's been illuminating, since he had a rather reserved first trip to Moscow, but Maltzan likely had ob‐ attitude toward Soviet Russia. Behrendt had a tained such knowledge from informants much contentious relationship with his subordinate Ago earlier. For this reason, Chicherin advised Lenin von Maltzan, who was in charge of the Russian in August 1921 that "the most influential persons unit. When Reich Chancellor Joseph Wirth headed up to the Chancellor were won to the project."[10] the Foreign Office briefly in 1921, he sacked Thus, Vourkoutiotis's claim that the Foreign Office Behrendt and replaced him with Maltzan. This was unaware of the military plans must be modi‐ move was quite certainly politically motivated. It fied. It is rather likely that leading diplomats con‐ was Wirth who, with the assistance of Maltzan, doned the activities but, with respect to the tense pushed Walther Rathenau to sign the Rapallo relations to the Entente, preferred not to get in‐ treaty.