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Petitioner, V filed °EC 0 8 2020 In The Supreme Court of the United States Morgan Joseph Langan, Petitioner, v. United States, State of Arizona, Respondents. On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Morgan Joseph Langan Post Office Box 741 Cornville, Arizona United States of America (928) 649-1921 [email protected] Petitioner RECEIVED DEC 1 4 2020 VS8S&38SH& 1 QUESTION PRESENTED Does the State of Arizona possess the transcen­ dental sovereignty to take away petitioner’s vested rights in private property by a mere legislative act that usurps the power of the judicial branch and alters the nature of our republican and free government as guar­ anteed under Article IV § 4 of the Constitution for the United States of America? 11 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Morgan Joseph Langan was the plaintiff in the United States Court of Claims and Appellant in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Respondents the United States and the State of Ari­ zona were the defendants in the Court of Claims pro­ ceedings and appellees in the court of appeals proceedings. RELATED CASES United States District Court, District of Arizona-Case No. CV-15-08120-PCT-DGC (SEALED) Supreme Court of the United States Case No. 15-9808 Morgan Joseph Langan v. ZB, National Association, et al. United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona Case No. 3:18-bk-01019-DPC and Adversary No. 3:18-ap-00048DPC. In re: MORGAN JOSEPH LANGAN United States Court of Federal Claims Case No. 18-900C MORGAN JOSEPH LANGAN v. THE UNITED STATES. United States Court of Federal Claims Case No. l:18-cv-01603-LKG Morgan Jo­ seph Langan v. United States and State of Arizona United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Case No. 2020-1057 Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Question Presented.................................................. 1 Parties to the Proceeding........................................ 11 Related Cases........................................................... n Table of Contents..................................................... in Table of Authorities................................................. v Petition for a Writ of Certiorari............................. 1 Opinions Below........................................................ 1 Jurisdiction............................................................... 1 Constitutional Provisions Involved........................ 6 Statement of the Case.............................................. 10 Reasons for Granting this Petition......................... 13 I. The special acts of the State of Arizona legislature have barred petitioner’s right to petition this government for a redress of grievances................................................. 16 II. Arizona Citizens are entitled to the rights, privileges and immunities available to Citizens in the several states..................... 18 III. A republican form of government consists of three co-equal branches of government..... 19 IV. Each State shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records and judicial pro­ ceedings of the State of Arizona................ 21 IV TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Page V. Petitioner was required by contract to de­ fend title to his land and property; State laws impaired this obligation. The law al­ lowed a party not named in the contract to determine title to private property, absent judicial review.............................................. 22 Conclusion 26 APPENDIX Court of Appeals Opinion filed May 6, 2020 ..App. 1 Court of Appeals Order filed May 21, 2020 . App. 11 District Court Memorandum Opinion and Order filed September 24, 2019 App. 13 District Court Memorandum Opinion and Order filed August 16, 2019 App. 25 Court of Appeals Denial of Rehearing En Banc filed July 21, 2020 App. 45 V TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Federal Equity Rules of 1912, James Love Hop­ kins ........................................................................... 3,5 Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (1836) Joseph Story........................................................... 2 Commentaries on the Constitution (1938) Jo­ seph Story. Justice Story’s words are used ex­ tensively throughout this petition..................... 2 Suits in Chancery, Henry R. Gibson, Second Edi­ tion 1907.................................................................. 4 The Federalist Papers Nos. 78, 80, 83................... 2 Cases: Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).......... 8 Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987). 8 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532(1985)............................................................... 8 Gelboim v. Bank ofAmerica Corp. et al. 13-3636- cv (L) 2nd Circuit (Decided 5/23/2016)............. 23 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1 (1794).... 17 Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638 (8th Circuit)........ 9 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933 (2017)............ 7,13 Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 2003)........................................................................ 9 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555 (1983)...................................................... 8 1 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI On petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Morgan Joseph Langan petitions this Court to review the judgement of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. OPINIONS BELOW The Court of Federal Claims Ca'se No. 18-1603C, opinion filed August 16, 2019 is not published, repro­ duced at App. 25-44. Motion for Reconsideration was denied September 24,2019 and reproduced at App. 13- 24. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Case No. 20-1057 decided May 6,2020 reproduced at App. 1- 12; Petition for Rehearing En Banc denied July 21, 2020, reproduced at App. 45, 46. JURISDICTION A timely filed petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir­ cuit on 21 day July, 2020 A.D. This petition is timely filed under the Court’s 150 day COVID-19 extension. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) and original jurisdiction under Article III § 2 Subsection 2 in this case in which a State is a party under the judicial power that extends to this contro­ versy to which the United States is a party. 2 EQUITY JURISDICTION Petitioner invokes this Courts’ exclusive equity jurisdiction to provide relief in this exceptional case in which the law provides no remedy. The State of Arizona created laws that eliminate substantive rights guaran­ teed by the constitution and that impair the obliga­ tions of private contracts. As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist, No. 80, “there is hardly a sub­ ject of litigation between individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust, or hardship, which would render the matter an object of equitable rather than of legal jurisdiction.” Hamilton elaborated in Federalist, No. 83, that “the great and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief in ex­ traordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules.” Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, echoed Hamilton, in Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (1836) writing that “cases must occur to which the an­ tecedent rules cannot be applied without injustice, or to which they cannot be applied at all.” Justice Story identifies in § 856 Commentaries on the Constitution (1838) that a case is “a suit in law or equity, instituted according to the regular course of judicial proceedings; and involves any question arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, it is within the judicial power confided to the Union.” Additionally, Justice Story confirms in § 860: “Agreements to convey lands, claimed under the grants of different states, may afford another example of the necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the federal courts.” The State of Arizona granted parcel numbers 3 associated with the land subject to this case that are in conflict with land patent #791 granted by United States of America prior to the formation of the State. Joseph Story provides the context for the contracts foundational to this case in his Commentaries § 860. “It has also been asked, and may again be asked, why the words, “cases in equity,” are found in this clause? It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a court of equity, to relieve against what are called hard bargains. These are contracts, in which, though there may have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a court of law; there may have been some undue, and un­ conscionable advantage taken of the necessities, or mis­ fortunes of one of the parties, which a court of equity would not tolerate” Chief Justice Taney stated in Bennett v. Butter- worth, 11 How. 669, 674,13 L. Ed. 859: “The Constitu­ tion of the United States, in creating and defining the judicial power of the general government, establishes this distinction between law and equity, and a party who claims ... an equitable (title), must proceed ac­ cording to rules which this court has prescribed (under the authority of the Act of August 23,1842), regulating proceedings in equity in the courts of the United States.” Quoted from and as promulgated in Hopkins Federal Equity Rules, 1912, where the Rule applicable to this case is found on page 3, paragraph 2: “And the Federal Courts may not lawfully transform by order or amendment... an original suit
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