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MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA “At the Heart of the Plan Is the Principle

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MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA “At the Heart of the Plan Is the Principle MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Israeli Defense Forces to Increase Integration, Agility and Lethality OE Watch Commentary: In early February, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an extensive four-day military exercise simulating a multi-front conflict. The exercise came a week after Israeli Defense Minister Bennett approved the ‘Momentum Plan,’ intended to increase the agility and lethality of the IDF. The accompanying excerpts from Israeli sources examine the military exercise as well as the new ‘Momentum Plan.’ As the first article from the Times of Israel points out, the drills included multiple parts of the IDF including, “Northern Command, Southern Command, Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Intelligence Directorate, and Telecommunications and the Cyber Defense Directorate.” While the IDF said that the exercise was “not tied to a new, specific threat,” it was likely tied to the risk of simultaneously facing multiple old threats: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and attacks from Syria. The drill was called a “headquarters exercise” as it focused on the Armored Corps Operate Near the Gaza Border. Source: Israeli Defense Forces via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Armored_Corps_Operate_Near_the_Gaza_Border_(14753318081).jpg, administrative facets of war, like interdepartmental planning CC BY 2.0 and communication. The military exercise came a week after Israeli Defense Minister Bennett approved the Momentum Plan. As stated in the second article from Jerusalem Post, the Momentum Plan, created by IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi, will provide the IDF with an additional two billion Israeli Shekels ($584 million) over several yars. Moreover, Bennett stated, “At the heart of the plan is the principle of defeating the enemy quickly and powerfully, in the face of many complex arenas.” In 2019 the IDF spent approximately 11.6 billion Shekels (~$3 billion) on equipment such as “the new Sa’ar 6 missile ships, active protection systems for the Eitan armored personnel carrier” in addition to upgrading the cyber and digital capabilities of the army. As stated by the article from I24 News, the Momentum Plan will create a new multi-dimensional combat unit intended to destroy enemy forces on all fronts. The new unit will test new fighting techniques and tactics before the tactics are introduced to the rest of the IDF. The Israeli news site Arutz Sheva noted the unit will include paratroopers, reconnaissance units, combat engineering units, Israeli Air Force pilots, and special forces from the Duvdevan and Oketz units. Over the next decade, the IDF intends to further expand the integration of different branches of the military into single combined units in order to neutralize opposing militaries’ capabilities more rapidly.End OE Watch Commentary (Fesen) “At the heart of the plan is the principle of defeating the enemy quickly and powerfully, in the face of many complex arenas.” Source: Judah Ari Gross, “IDF launches drill simulating multi-front war,” Times of Israel, 2 February 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/ idf-launches-drill-simulating-multi-front-war/ The Israel Defense Forces on Sunday launched a large-scale exercise simulating a war on multiple fronts, with units throughout the military taking part, the army said. The four-day drill will be held as a “headquarters exercise,” the IDF said, meaning it will focus on the more administrative aspects of such a war… The purpose of the exercise is to test and improve the communication between different parts of the military, wartime operations, and interdepartmental planning, the IDF said. ...Northern Command, Southern Command, Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Intelligence Directorate, and Telecommunications and Cyber Defense Directorate will take part in the drill. ...The military said it was planned in advance and is therefore not tied to a new, specific threat. OE Watch | March 2020 54 MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Continued: Israeli Defense Forces to Increase Integration, Agility and Lethality Source: Anna Ahronheim, “Defense Minister Bennett approves Momentum multi-year plan,” Jerusalem Post, 26 January 2020. https://www. jpost.com/Israel-News/Defense-Minister-Bennett-approves-IDFs-Momentum-multi-year-plan-615410 Defense Minister Naftali Bennett approved on Sunday the IDF’s multi-year Momentum Plan, formulated by Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Aviv Kochavi to make the military “more flexible, smarter and deadlier.” “At the heart of the plan is the principle of defeating the enemy quickly and powerfully, in the face of many complex arenas.” Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry said Sunday that NIS 11.6 billion has been purchased from Israeli companies over the past year to increase the IDF’s lethality. Among the most prominent procurement projects...include weapon systems for the new Sa’ar 6 missile ships, active protection systems for the Eitan armored personnel carrier, ammunition for infantry units, as well as technological projects for the IDF’s “digital army”... Source: “IDF unveils new, revolutionary multi-faceted combat unit,” I24 News, 01 January 2020. https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/ diplomacy-defense/1577894720-idf-unveils-new-revolutionary-multi-faceted-combat-unit The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have revealed a new version of a combat unit...to serve as a testing ground for new fighting techniques and tactics This multi-dimensional unit is part of IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kohavi’s multi-year Tenufa (Momentum) Plan “Its members are meant to know how to operate in all fronts of the war...and the ability to locate, attack and destroy the enemy in all regions and on all levels,” the military said. Source: Kobi Finkler, “IDF launches new combat unit,” Arutz Sheva, 1 January 2020. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News. aspx/273960 Soldiers for the unit will be drawn from... paratroopers... reconnaissance units, the Armored Corps, army engineers, Air Force pilots, and Special Forces units include Duvdevan and Oketz. ...the new unit is based around the IDF’s new “operating concept for the next decade – to hit the enemy in a shorter period of time, and to neutralize its capabilities.” Part of the new unit’s purpose is to help the army establish a framework for integrating various forces from various branches of the IDF “and to build them…into a unified force... THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR by LESTER W. GRAU and CHARLES K. BARTLES At any given time, assessments of the Russian Armed Forces vary between the idea of an in- competent and corrupt conscript army manning decrepit Soviet equipment and relying solely on brute force, to the idea of an elite military filled with Special Operations Forces (SOF) who were the “polite people” or “little green men” seen on the streets in Crimea. This book will attempt to split the difference between these radically different ideas by shedding some light on what the Russian Ground Forces consist of, how they are structured, how they fight, and how they are modernizing. DOWNLOAD AT: https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251/download OE Watch | March 2020 55.
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