ANALYSIS GULF

POST-NUCLEAR: THE FUTURE FOR IRAN IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD

Introduction by Fatima Ayub ABOUT By virtue of their confined political environments, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and their most important neighbours often remain impenetrable to domestic and Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani came into office in August foreign observers. And yet, the evolving politics 2013 riding a wave of public excitement and high hopes. of Peninsula countries, their relationship to He has been described as a moderate palatable both to one another and to the wider region, pose the conservative Iranian establishment and to a sceptical some of the most significant and unanswered public – the latter still smarting from the 2009 presidential questions for the changing geopolitics of the elections, which were marked by widespread violence and Middle East. Gulf politics are entering the fraud. Rouhani’s predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, left most unpredictable and volatile era since office with a troubled economic legacy; his policies had badly their establishment. undermined Iran’s business dealings in the Middle East and beyond. Understanding these new trends as they unfold will be critical if Europeans and other The centrepiece of the Rouhani presidency thus far has international actors intend to rely on the Gulf been the attempt to reach a deal on the nation’s nuclear states as financial and political partners in the power programme between the P5+1 powers (the five region. In the coming decade, the Gulf states United Nations Security Council permanent members plus will be irrevocably caught between aging, Germany) and Iran. As the negotiations extend into 2015, archaic governing models and new political and this essay series looks at how Rouhani has fared in reshaping social forces beyond their control. In bringing Iran’s relations with its neighbours. This issue of Gulf together commentary and analysis from those Analysis assesses Iran’s relationships with several key actors observing these countries from inside and out, in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Israel, the smaller Gulf this series sheds light on key political debates Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Turkey, and Hezbollah. and developments in the Gulf that have wider resonance for the region and the world. If the nuclear negotiations build on the progress made since 2013 and conclude successfully, the resolution of a decade-long standoff over the intent and scope of Iran’s nuclear programme – and the eventual dismantling of stiff 2 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS American and European sanctions against Iran – will be an American andEuropeansanctionsagainstIran–willbean American support for Saudi interests seemed safe, andIran seemed forSaudiinterests American support Ever sincetheIslamic Revolution produced analternative The renewed outreach and tentative bridge-building between The renewedoutreachandtentativebridge-buildingbetween Iraqand Syria(ISIS)enough forhas notproved catalyst Indeed, itwillrehabilitate Iran’s standing withtheWest. Iran and Western powers has elicited mixed reactions in mixedreactions haselicited powers Iran andWestern Union was Iran’s first trading partner. That position now Kirk Sowell, Saudi Arabia made cautiously optimistic noises optimistic Kirk Sowell,SaudiArabia made cautiously However, it is far less clear how the Islamic Republic can IslamicRepublic the how clear less isfar it However, But summer2013 Gulf. Their fraught timeforthe was aless But not all Iran’s relationships are so hostile. Indeed, before But notallIran’srelationshipsaresohostile.Indeed, before as intelligence director and was remembered as pragmatic; director andwasremembered as intelligence stage- it carefully considered his victory, even ifthey about alive and recent hints at new openings, such as the meeting alive andrecenthintsatnewopenings, suchasthemeeting antagonism manifestsitselfinthedestructiveproxyconflicts argued beforeinGulf Analysis,most criticalline the fault ofmost hasbeen programme ofIran’snuclear and nature General Assembly in New York, have been quickly followed General AssemblyinNewYork, havebeenquickly followed concern to the Israeli security establishment. But as we have concern totheIsraelisecurityestablishment. Butaswehave ever since Saudi Arabia intervened to preserve the al-Khalifa ever sinceSaudiArabiaintervened topreservetheal-Khalifa of Iranian political and economic dominance. Only Bahrain of Iranianpoliticalandeconomicdominance. OnlyBahrain regional rapprochement. regional rapprochement. where ithasamixedrecord–withsomerelationshipsmore Saudi Arabia when Rouhani was first elected, writes Saudi Arabia expert Saudi writes first elected, Rouhani was when But East. Middle wider the Arabia and Saudi to revolution rampant internal discord over Syria seemed tobewaning, Syriaseemed discordover rampant internal managed. Rouhani was known to the Saudis from histenure Saudis the known to managed. Rouhaniwas model ofIslamist governance, theSaudi monarchy has monarchs when it looked like the 2011 uprising might to all ofthe Gulfstates in the shape of the Islamic State in the more aggressive sanctions of the last decade, the European the moreaggressivesanctionsoflastdecade,European Iraq,and mostnotablyinLebanon, region, throughout the This IslamicRevolution. 1979 the since that haspersisted Certainly, thescope East. Middle wider the and Gulf the its neighbours but between Saudi Arabia and Iran, ariftArabia and Saudi between but neighbours its andIsrael between not lies geopolitics Eastern Middle in sought to constrain any Iranian attempt to “export” to sought toconstrainanyIranianattempt smaller Arab states in its orbit, the GCC has consistently GCC the orbit, its in states Arab smaller his countryandtheregion. agent of transformation for as apossible he wasconsidered politically and economically integrate with its neighbours, its with integrate economically and politically unqualified victoryforRouhaniandhisforeignpolicyteam. produce an Islamic Republic-style state on its border. produce anIslamicRepublic-stylestateonitsborder. presents aunifiedfrontwithRiyadh, deeplyindebtedasitis Saudi Arabia serves as a centre of gravity in the Gulf for the Saudi ArabiaservesasacentreofgravityintheGulffor Syria, butalsoinYemen. Inthisrespect,theoldrivalriesare fraught than others. The emergence of a common threat acommon of emergence The others. than fraught failed to present a united front against the purported threat failed topresentaunitedfrontagainstthepurportedthreat belongs to China, followed by India and Turkey. Though Turkey. and India by followed China, to belongs by areturntorecriminations. between theIranianandSaudiforeignministersatUN

– and especiallyAmerican –rapprochement withIran was Israel Europe haveinvestedbillionsinmilitarybases, economic Iran is successfully playing for time in its quest to develop for timeinitsquest playing Iran is successfully whether about varying degrees to sceptical also are Israelis Iran, Brotherhood friendlier tothe Turkey, and otherstates Israeli analysisandopinionis dividedintotwocamps.The Iran’s politicalrehabilitationintheWest. Butwhilethe Ultimately, theconcerninSaudieyesisthatUSmight King Abdullahand Crown Prince Salman are becoming Kingdom is looking to shore up the sources of stability within of stability sources Kingdom islookingtoshoreupthe Kingdom despairsofAmerica’sdistractedengagementin Rouhani’s electionheraldsanewmomentorsimply Leader areperformingagood cop/badcoproutineanddo President Rouhani in September 2013,afterthe weeks Rouhani inSeptember just President Nonetheless, since last summer,SaudiArabia has appointed since Nonetheless, and foreign policy organs. Is allowing for a more moderate a more for organs. Isallowing policy foreign and among the Saudi political and security establishment: that that establishment: security and political Saudi the among fear deeper an even lies Brotherhood. Andtherein Muslim Muqrin bin Abd al-Aziz as deputy crown prince, whileprince, crown deputy as al-Aziz Abd bin Muqrin US and the fear islikelyexaggerated: against it.Again,the and its focus has been more on the Islamist threat closer to more onthe Islamistthreat has been and itsfocus change of window dressing. The extension of the talks into of the change ofwindowdressing.Theextension carefully managed vetting process ofIranian elections call between the United States’ President Barack Obama and President States’ United the call between phone “the” with dramatically order, most in short evaporate genuine rapprochement isalong wayoff, irrespective of of a new Iranian ambassador to Riyadh – are superficial; Riyadh–are to Iranianambassador of anew nuclear weapons. Shlomo Brom, a researcher atTelAvivnuclear weapons.ShlomoBrom,aresearcher within theGCCsuchas Qatar couldform a new alliance not afantasticpipedreambutanimminentpossibility. welcoming view ofthenewIranian presidentwould was more isolated than ever. The Kingdom’s cautiously responsible forcounterterrorism. Botharesignsthatthe mid-2015 is confirmation of the establishment view that view establishment the of confirmation is mid-2015 means that no candidate can stray too far from the confines far fromthe too can stray no candidate that means trade its Gulf partners foranIraniantrade itsGulfasitwas one aseasily three decadesandthatlegacyisunlikelytounravelquickly. ties, and political influence in theGulfstates over thelast the region, it has not actively undermined the negotiations, the undermined region, ithasnotactively the increasingly infirm.increasingly Moreover,effectively moved it key stability andfutureoftheIslamic Republic? security key the controls who Leader, Supreme the by set its borders and in the region. Other gestures – invitationsfor its bordersandintheregion.Othergestures Bandar chief intelligence veteran from portfolios security state visits between Tehran and Riyadh, appointment or the visits between state home, thatposedbyradicalSunniIslam. presidency itself a decision of Ali Khamenei to preserve the to preserve of AliKhamenei a decision itself presidency university, writes thatin theeyesofIsraeli observers the perceived tohave traded itsformer alliesinEgyptfor the latter’s inauguration. All at once, the prospect ofWestern first argues that the Iranian president andtheSupreme Iranianpresident thatthe first argues bin Sultan to Mohammad bin Nayef, whowasformerlybin SultantoMohammadNayef, not subscribe to the notion that Rouhani might constitute a Andrew Hammond points out that while Saudi Arabia may departure from Ahmadinejad’s legacy. Others in the policy have failed to forge a united front against a rising Iranian community take a more expansive view, arguing that while threat, the Gulf littoral states will nonetheless look to the US Rouhani does not represent revolutionary change, he might for affirmation before pursuing closer ties. pursue managed reform and new directions both at home and in the region. The latter view does not carry much weight Though the United Arab Emirate (UAE) aligns most in the government; if anything, Prime Minister Binyamin closely to Saudi Arabia in regional policy – and especially Netanyahu prefers a narrative that places Iran alongside in opposing the Muslim Brotherhood – Dubai in particular ISIS on the extremist spectrum. has a lucrative economic relationship with Iran. Within the Emirates, Dubai has lost sway to Abu Dhabi. Nonetheless, For Israelis, assessing whether the launch of serious and it is no surprise that Rouhani’s administration has tried to sustained diplomacy between the P5+1 and Iran will be prioritise the rejuvenation of economic ties with the UAE. effective depends on whether one believes Rouhani is a And the UAE in turn has been more conciliatory towards pawn or an agent in his own right. The dominant camp in Iran at a time when elsewhere in the region it is embarking government hold to the view that the Joint Plan of Action on a more punitive and interventionist foreign policy. agreed on in November 2013 yielded too many concessions to Iran, and opposes almost any realistic nuclear deal and In this respect, Qatar is even more intimately tied to Iran. especially its presumed corollary: Iranian regional and The country’s current wealth and the soft-power empire it global re-integration. So too has the international and has built with it derives from shared ownership with Iran regional response to ISIS strengthened concerns about US- over the world’s largest gas field. Maintaining a healthy Iranian cooperation to constrain the mutual threat. relationship with Iran to prevent any threat of seizure of the North Dome field is of paramount strategic importance But while political opinion is divided on the merit of the to Qatar, which has long sought to chart a foreign policy nuclear talks, there is near consensus in Israel on Iran’s independent of Saudi Arabia. For this, it has been the target negative regional role, especially its support to non-state of unprecedented public anger from its GCC partners. armed actors hostile to Israel such as Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as concern that Iran has outmanoeuvred In Oman, Iran has its strongest Gulf ally. Here geopolitics the West militarily and strategically in Syria. Rouhani is trumps everything – Oman shares sovereignty with widely viewed as not being in the driver’s seat of Iranian Iran over the Straits of Hormuz, the main chokepoint security policy. for approximately one-fifth of all petroleum traded on global markets. Moreover, Oman constantly seeks to keep The leadership-majority camp in Israel, sceptical of progress conservative Saudi influence in its religious and social fabric in nuclear talks, is therefore aligned with Saudi views on at bay and maintains a polite political distance as well. This this issue. Though quiet cooperation with the Saudis has was illustrated in Muscat’s secretly hosting direct talks increased, any prospect of public normalisation between between Iran and the US last year that ultimately yielded Israel and the Gulf is off the table unless Israel makes a breakthrough in the nuclear negotiations; the capital genuine compromises for the creation of a Palestinian state was also the site of the penultimate meeting of the P5+1 (and normalisation is not quite incentive enough for this negotiators with Iran in November 2014. Nonetheless, Oman Israeli government to contemplate such a step). is not wholly immune to the sensitivities of its neighbours, or indeed of the US, and like the UAE, it will wait for If the nuclear talks collapse, expect the Israeli government American approval before embracing the deeper economic to re-up its case for enhanced sanctions and US-led military and commercial ties that the Rouhani administration has threats against Iran. If an agreement is reached, Israel can be been offering. expected to complain but nevertheless will have to live with it. In the meantime, Israel was relieved that 24 November Kuwait, too, is engaged a balancing act when it comes to Iran. saw an extension of talks and not a deal, and busily got back With a large Shia minority, the government is disinclined to to work preventing further progress in P5+1 relations with engage in any of the sectarian baiting that has become more Iran, this time with a Republican US Congress in tow. prevalent throughout the region in the last three years. At the same time, it has more closely adhered to Saudi Arabia’s policies in Bahrain, Syria, and Egypt. Numerous Kuwaiti The smaller GCC states officials and clerics are tied to funding jihadist and sectarian positions. Nonetheless, Emir Sabah al-Sabah was the first In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the smaller GCC states have Kuwaiti ruler to visit Tehran in May 2014, and a bilateral had, on the whole, a less antagonistic relationship with Iran. agreement over trade and movement between Iran and Even though the raison d’être since the establishment of the Kuwait was signed in September 2014. GCC has been collective defence against Iran, in reality that role has been outsourced to the US and most of the GCC states have had functional if somewhat distant relationships with the Islamic Republic. In his chapter on the GCC states, 3 4 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS As anon-statepoliticaland paramilitaryorganisation, Another relationship unlikely towitnessmuchchange A regionalpowerinitsownright,Turkeydoesnotsuffer Awakening of2011buthavegrowninitswake. Atthe Hezbollah Turkey Even the grip of sanctions has not diminished the strength the grip ofsanctionshasnotdiminished Even the Turkey in supporting the Syrian refugee community, more Syrian refugee the Turkey insupporting Iran successfully supporting the regimeofBashar al-Assad supporting Iran successfully Republic was broken in the late 1990s, Turkey has forged Hezbollah relates totheIslamic Republic asa demandeur But Turkey expert Ziya Meral argues in hiscontributionthat argues ZiyaMeral But Turkeyexpert Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan raised eyebrows when eyebrows raised Erbakan Necmettin Minister Prime a departurefromearlierpolicyonSyria, butTurkey’s a successfulnuclearagreement. briefest the only saw roots its shares party and Development ruling Justice withwhomTurkey’s Muslim Brotherhood boost to agreed Erdoğan Recep Minister Prime former and above $14billion.InaJune2014Istanbul, Rouhani visitto rose from$1billionto two the and 2013,trade between total growing securityfearsover theexpansionofISISmaydo countering Kurdish separatist movements ontheirborders. separatist Kurdish countering of the Ankara–Tehran economic ties, and between 2002between and ties, economic Ankara–Tehran of the mostnotablyin cooperation, of tradetiesandsecurity on the rise of new Islamist political players. ForTurkey Islamistpoliticalplayers. ofnew rise on the Turkey andIran Arab world, in the revolutions the of outset relationship. Rouhani’s presidency may not have heralded diplomatictheir in dramatic breakdown a not suffered whose government Turkey opposes. With the threat of threat the With opposes. Turkey government whose rise initsfortunesTunisia,Egypt,andLibyabefore andsought tocapitalise page same onthe ostensibly were more to shape its relationship with Iran with going forwardthan its relationship more toshape ties with then-president Mohammad Khatami’sgovernment ties withthen-president the wider Middle East. The tensions preceded the Arab mutualbenefit the and lastdecade the over trustbuilt the these figuresstillfurther. in the coming years is that between Hezbollah andIran. Hezbollah isthatbetween comingyears in the in 2002. in 1996.Butitwasthesubsequentsecularistgovernment Iran. Islamist links with and economic political impressive instability on its own borders and the huge economic cost to cost economic huge and the borders own on its instability in particulartheoutcomeshavebeenextremelypoor; serious falloutwithTehranmighthavebeenexpected. he made Tehran his first foreign destination after election led byAhmetSezerthatdeveloped securityandeconomic Somewhat surprisingly, then, thetwocountrieshave a massiveexpansion have seen countries two then, the Since Islamic the with engaging of taboo secularist the Since Syria, Turkish and Iranian aimshave beenatoddswith from thesame regional paranoia as itsGulfcounterparts. from trade has not created aligned political priorities in priorities political aligned hasnotcreated from trade being beaten back with varying degrees of suppression.varyingIndegreesof with back beaten being What followsthenucleartalks? Arabia.Neither Hezbollahnorfight Iranown the to wants Western desire to make the struggle against ISIS the point against ISISthe struggle to make the Western desire talks, nuclear extended now ofthe outcome the Whatever Western, anti-Israel causeofHezbollah.WhentheLebanese Tehran,vigorouslyhavemost opposed not eventhose but In Syria, Hezbollah fights as much to protect its ownfuture as muchtoprotect In Syria, fights Hezbollah Iran’s commitment tothesurvival oftheAssadgovernment. Irantransferringcan continue Lebanon. armsto Lebanon Khatami’s time. Yet the critical difference between then and then between critical difference the Khatami’s time.Yet Hezbollah hasbeenfightingSunnijihadistfactionsthatIran Hezbollah and theSupreme Leadership since its creation Despite the fallinsupportforHezbollahduringthe the Despite Despite much speculationaboutanewtrajectoryofWestern Despite and Iran have managed to divorce the nuclear negotiations nuclear the divorce to and Iran have managed as itdoestosupport Iranian strategic aims. On one level, after the war, Iran in turn channelled the funds directly are thecriticallink in the relationship. The war with Israel subsidies of state Mohammad Khatamiandthesuspension Rafsanjaniandadministrations ofAkbarHashemi against ISIS, but their prominent role is designed to ensure against ISIS, but theirprominentroleisdesigned government refuseddirectoffersofrebuildingassistance deems to be a threat to Lebanese Shia communities near Shiacommunities Lebanese to athreat be to deems efforts inthewar-tornsouth. election raised questions about whether a more moderate amore whether about questions raised election Rouhani’s that writes Daher Aurelie Hezbollah on expert of departure for greater regional cooperation will continue will cooperation regional for greater departure of cooperation by rival local groups that in turn hasbeen inturn that rivallocalgroups by cooperation for charityandreconstruction organisation asittookcredit repositioning prevails in the region vis-a-vis Iran. The regime. On another, its fighters have been most present in most present have been regime. Onanother,itsfighters and SyrianwarandbothHezbollah now is,ofcourse,the French agent. bilateral thanasanindependent rather welcome amonghardlinersinRiyadh,Jerusalem,oreven relations, theearly phaseoftheRouhani presidency has managed to derail the P5+1 process. To date, both the P5+1 the both To date, P5+1 process. the derail to managed this post-Rouhani electionmoment ofuncertainty and the border and to areas strategically important to the Assad important tothe border andtoareasstrategically the theto was apoliticalboon which Hezbollah, through between loyalties political and religious the group, the to their interests in any future power-sharing agreements in 2006ties withthen- to strengthen proved an opportunity itself and the Hezbollah leadership as was witnessed during witnessed as was Hezbollah leadership and the itself in Syria. is an arena in which theISIS threat has ledtogreater that ensure control inorderto to that itneeds zones specific president Ahmadinejad, whoactively embraced theanti- presidency in Iran would create more distance between distance more create inIranwould presidency prospect of an Iran prospect may notbe less internationallyisolated from the alarming downward spiral inIraqandSyria,for spiral downward alarming from the better andforworse. been characterisedbeen continuitychange.morethanby The blessed by the external actors,includingIranandSaudi external bythe blessed to bump up against competing goals and interests in Syria. Despite Iran’s attempts to reach out to the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia and Iran: stabilise its relationship with Turkey, the headline tensions Rouhani fades as Riyadh with Saudi Arabia and Israel remain despite some efforts focuses on containment to mend ties with the former. The ongoing conflagration in Syria will remain the major stumbling block to improved Kirk H. Sowell relations in the neighbourhood, as neither the backers of the regime nor the opposition display any sign of changing their objectives. When Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran in A future nuclear deal should strengthen Rouhani domestically, June 2013, the initial reaction within the Kingdom of Saudi enable greater engagement with the West on regional files, Arabia was cautious optimism. Developments at the time in and accelerate nascent Iranian regional outreach. But the the region showed some encouraging signs for the Saudis presidents in both Washington and Tehran will continue – the United States’ position on opposing Iranian nuclear to face serious domestic political challenges on this issue, and regional ambitions appeared solid, President Bashar al- ensuring that movement will be slow – as witnessed by the Assad’s resilience looked shaky, and relations within the Gulf decision on 24 November to again postpone deadlines. Such Cooperation Council (GCC) felt more united. challenges are likely to increase in the coming months of negotiations as hawks in both capitals will feel vindicated But each of these elements appeared to shift over the in their criticism of tentative diplomatic re-engagement. following year. The decision by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel shows more interest in derailing detente than in using the United Arab Emirates to withdraw their ambassadors it to address its own concerns with Iran, while for Saudi from Qatar in March 2014 was the culmination of a growing Arabia suspicion still dominates. But managing the regional conviction that the regional balance of power was shifting response to the nuclear talks whatever the outcome, at a against them, and that Qatari support for political Islam time when Western powers are again militarily deployed in was a serious threat. Rouhani’s reformist outreach, the US- the neighbourhood, will be a key challenge for the duration Iran provisional nuclear deal last November, and Turkey of Rouhani’s presidency. and Qatar’s prioritisation of political Islam over the fight against Iran were all worrying developments. Above all, Saudis feared that the US was conspiring to reset its regional relations with Iran and to accept Iran’s regional role in exchange for a compromise on the nuclear issue.

Saudi Arabia’s view of Rouhani has evolved from one of guarded but nonetheless clear optimism, to fear and anger against the US in late 2013, to a more measured approach in 2014. The Saudis have begun to accept that the nuclear negotiations track is, for the time being, sufficiently tough on Tehran, but they despair of American indifference to the threat of Iranian regional expansion, which the Saudis, in contrast to the US, view as the key issue.

A brief moment of optimism

Saudi views on Rouhani’s presidency, determined by senior royals and expressed most directly through official media, have evolved. Domestic newspapers are not royally owned in most cases, but they are tightly regulated. One of the key papers owned by a Saudi royal is the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat, the flagship publication of Saudi foreign policy. Its chairman is Faysal bin Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, the son of Crown Prince Salman.

In an environment in which official thinking is not often openly put forward, there is no better weathervane for the opinions of the Saudi elite than the writing of Abd al- Rahmad Rashid, a long-time editorialist (and former editor) for Asharq Al-Awsat. On 17 June 2013, Rashid penned the article, “Greetings to Our Old Friend Rouhani”. Rashid wrote that Rouhani, when he was director of Iranian intelligence 5 6 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS “The Phone Call That Shook the Middle East”. Now it was the “The PhoneCallThatShooktheMiddleEast”.Nowitwas Wrong on Iran?” He suggested two possibilities. The firsttwo possibilities. suggested Wrong onIran?”He 5  4  3 2  1  Okaz Then, on 27 September, ObamaandRouhani spokeby September, Then, on27 Iran in exchange for Iran’s nuclear weapons: “Iran agrees to Iran inexchangeforIran’snuclearweapons: “Iranagreesto Caught off guard: Saudi Arabia Caught offguard: SaudiArabia Keys”. He praised Rouhani’s choice of a key as the symbol asthe ofakey Rouhani’s choice praised He Keys”. Rouhani presidencyapositivepreviewinAlRiyadh Rouhani’s ability, andperhaps hisintentions, tochange On 22 September 2013,al-RahmadAbd Rashid askedthe a periodgreater of calmin which Saudi-Iranian relations On 20June,Turkial-Dakhil,awriterwhoalsohasTV On 21November,Rashidwrote,“WhereDidObamaGo and the trap will tighten ever more the closer it gets to its to gets it closer the more ever tighten will trap the and and so what Obama has done has set the stage for a new age age new a for stage the set has done has Obama what so and against Iranwithoutweapons, whethernuclearortraditional, Gulf that was cornered: “Without the support of the United Gulf thatwascornered: “WithoutthesupportofUnited give up nuclear weapons in exchange for a free hand in the give upnuclearweaponsinexchangeforafreehandthe question: “Rouhani: Lamb or Wolf?” closely with Saudi Arabia. While he warned against excessive closely withSaudiArabia. Whilehewarnedagainstexcessive endorsed the popular theory that the US was trading Syria to endorsed thepopulartheorythatUSwastradingSyriato question with a telling qualification: “Personally, Idoubt “Personally, qualification: atelling with question countries oftheMiddleEastcannotdefendthemselves optimism, he noted that “Rouhani’s promises remind us of optimism, henotedthat“Rouhani’spromisesremindusof of conflictintheregion.” of his campaign: “he would win in the first round and open of hiscampaign: “hewouldwininthefirstroundandopen were developing.” were more work to promise campaign Rouhani’s recounted region”, while the US would back away from its alliance with region”, whiletheUSwouldbackawayfromitsalliancewith nuclear goal.” nuclear goal.” minister, Naef bin Abd al-Aziz, agreeing to drop support for minister, NaefbinAbdal-Aziz, agreeingtodropsupportfor the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, and that indeed was the presidencyofMohammadKhatami, andthatindeedwas the “SaudiHezbollah”andtobeginsecuritycooperation. the Arab gulf states. The second possibility was that the US the Arabgulfstates.ThesecondpossibilitywasthatUS the Gulf and the West. We see a regime trapped in a corner, the GulfandWest. Weseearegimetrappedincorner, toward acts inhostile ears its to up is which regime this the pastperiodtomoderationofnew.” thegeneration,strongof measurenew a the of minds the in the 1990s, signed an accord with the late Saudiinterior late anaccordwiththe 1990s,signed in the , gave the, gave Al-Arabiya Saudi-owned onthe programme phone. This changed Rashid’s reading: he described it as it described he reading: Rashid’s changed This phone. people’s desire for change, moving from theextremism of States, and we have supported a firm line against Iran, the Iran,against firmline States,and wehavea supported the sours onRouhani  03&issueno=12620. June 2013,availableathttp://classic.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=7327 Abd al-RahmadRashid,“GreetingstoOurOldFriendRouhani”, =12725&article=745063#.VHwovsn4Z2R September 2013,available athttp://classic.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issueno “The CallthatShooktheMiddleEast,”Abdal-Rahman Rashid, com.sa/new/Issues/20130620/Con20130620612738.htm. Fahim Hamid,“Rouhani’sKeys”,Okaz,20June2013,availableathttp://www.okaz. 2013, availableathttp://www.alriyadh.com/845289. Turki al-Dakhil,“Rouhani’sPromises…DoYou BelieveThem?”,AlRiyadh ssueno=12717. 2013, availableathttp://classic.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=744207&i Abd al-RahmadRashid,“Rouhani:Lambor Wolf?”, on thesame day, Fahim Hamid wrote of“Rouhani’s 2 In an op-ed in Saudi Arabian dailyArabian Saudi in op-ed an In 5

Asharq Al-Awsat,22September 4 Rashid answered the Rashid answered the

Asharq Al-Awsat,30 Asharq Al-Awsat,17 3 , 20June . Dakhil . Dakhil 1

“Putin’s Games, Obama’s Speeches”, Dakhil wrote: “It is , Riyadh attempted to obtain a role in the negotiations, Arabi, Riyadhattemptedtoobtainaroleinthenegotiations, Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz on 28 March 2014. In the run-up Abdullah binAbdal-Azizon28March2014. Intherun-up Fears converge: Iran, Qatar, Fears converge: Iran, Qatar, US-Iran: TradingArabcountriesfornukes? 7  6  9  8  Quds Al-ArabiQuds ,the Saudisrejected Zarif’s visit. Saudi The dramatic announcement on 5 March that Saudi Arabia, The dramaticannouncementon5MarchthatSaudiArabia, Iran’s intervention in Arab countries, which, it was claimed, Iran’s interventioninArabcountries, which,itwasclaimed, Bahrain, and the UAE were withdrawing their ambassadors Bahrain, andtheUAEwerewithdrawingtheirambassadors agreement with Iran. The agreement provided forasix- agreementprovided withIran.The agreement On 24November2013, theP5+1reachedalandmarknuclear Obama visited Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi Arabia’s King Obama visitedSaudiArabiatomeetwithArabia’sKing and Russia’shostility.” against ourinterestsinthegulf, andwhatisneedednow itsagenda Russiafacilitates will, Iranharboursthe anew, Minister MohammadJavad Zarif madeatour oftheGulf al-Faysal. Iranrebuffedtheeffort. When Iran’s Foreign a proposalputforwardbyformerintelligencedirectorTurki and theMuslimBrotherhood goals.” Heconcluded, “Indeed theworld isbeing formed even more aggressive in the region. Allofthisexpressed region. inthe aggressive more even economic sanctions. economic sanctions. clear that Iran and Russia are movingslowlytowardtheirclear thatIranandRussiaare change intermsofAmericanweakness. Inapiecetitled thehost,framed show end.talkDakhil, an the to coming continued unabated. diplomats emphasisedthattheywere concerned about opinions oftheObama-Rouhaniphonecall.AlRiyadh nuclear programme in exchange for a mild easing of specific nuclear programmeinexchangeforamildeasingofspecific would “agree to allow Iran to complete its nuclear programme would “agreetoallowIrancompleteitsnuclearprogramme month package of further limitations and reversals in Iran’s month packageoffurtherlimitationsandreversals inIran’s to the visit, Saudi commentators converged on a conclusion: to thevisit, Saudicommentatorsconvergedonaconclusion: to enrich uranium as well as its intention to continue doing to enrichuraniumaswellitsintentioncontinuedoing in November, Saudi Arabia was left out. left SaudiArabiawas in November, so. AccordingtoLondon-basedpan-ArabdailyAl-QudsAl- same result: Iran would feel empowered and would become and wouldbecome empowered feel would result: Iran same highlighted a speech by Rouhani that reiterated Iran’s right highlighted aspeechbyRouhanithatreiteratedIran’sright political consciousness and steadfastness in the face of Iran political consciousnessandsteadfastnessinthefaceofIran protect itsinterestsintheregion,butthiseraseemedtobe Saudi’s coreconcern: Iran’sregionalexpansion. Saudi Arabia had for a long time depended on the US to US onthe depended Saudi Arabiahadforalongtime Saudi viewsoftheagreementwereasnegativetheir from Qatar was months in the making. The decision wasdecision The making. the in months was Qatar from but with a guarantee not to use them”. This would lead to the but withaguaranteenottousethem”. Thiswouldleadtothe “Iran RejectsParticipationbyGulfStatesin Nuclear Negotiations”, 10 December2013,availableathttp://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=112584. 750941&issueno=12777. November 2013,availableathttp://classic.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article= Abd al-RahmadRashid,“WhereDidObama GoWrongonIran?”AsharqAl-Awsat,21 http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/mobile/20140303/Con20140303681427.htm. Turki al-Dakhil,“Putin’s Games,Obama’sSpeeches”, Quds Al-Arabi “Saudi Sources:RiyadhRefusestoAcceptVisit fromIranianForeignMinister”, , 28November2013,availableathttp://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=108715. 8 9 Okaz, 3March2014,available at

7 AccordingtoAl- Al-Quds Al-Arabi 6 Al- ,

taken based on concerns about Qatar’s support for the for the Syria file, by Mohammad bin Nayef (a functionary Muslim Brotherhood and, especially from Saudi Arabia’s took over as intelligence director, but media commentary point of view, Qatar’s relationship to Iran. uniformly reports that bin Nayef was the true successor).14 Given his responsibility for counterterrorism at the interior Iran’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood is ministry, this change implies increased concern on the complicated. The two are in conflict in Syria, but Iran has part of the Saudi leadership about the threat of domestic been close to the Egyptian and Jordanian branches of the blowback from Saudi jihadists returning to the kingdom Brotherhood, and even more so to the Palestinian Hamas. from Syria. To many, the two forces of political Islam seem symbiotic. As the Saudi-aligned Lebanese writer Radwan al-Sayyid put Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy in 2014 seemed aimed at it in Asharq Al-Awsat after Egypt banned the Brotherhood doing just enough to stay in the game, in contrast to the full- last autumn: “Iran is a nationalist state that uses Shiism to throttled push to overthrow Assad over the previous two project its interests, to destroy Arab and Muslim societies. years. In the south, the Saudis worked with the Jordanians And the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood uses jihadists to and the US to shore up a “Southern Front” under a new justify their legitimacy.”10 Syrian commander.15 The aid has been sufficient to ensure that “accepted” rebels could hold quasi-parity with the al- With the united Gulf front disappearing, Saudis saw the Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, but insufficient to shift formation of a new coalition: Iran with Qatar and Oman, the balance of power against Assad. And in the north, the plus a “significant rapprochement with Turkey”, as Asharq Saudis backed “Harakat Hazm” with weapons, but the Al-Awsat put it on 19 March. “Iran, with its ‘Rouhani’ face, Saudi-based training programme for them had produced an seeks to use the current environment to create an Arab- underwhelming 150 fighters as of October (this in a conflict Islamic front, centred on itself, with Turkey, Qatar, Oman, in which many individual rebel groups have thousands Iraq, and India, and seeking to include Kuwait. And against of fighters).16 The Saudis also appear to have backed off that is a front including Saudi Arabia, the Emirates [which support of Zahran Alloush’s “Army of Islam”, which through in fact is much less hostile to Iran than the Saudis], Bahrain, early 2014 was the primary Saudi-backed Salafist group.17 Pakistan, and Jordan.”11 The de-escalation in Syria, combined with a prioritisation Rouhani had visited Oman one week earlier, and an Okaz of pressuring Qatar’s pro-Islamist policies and full support op-ed showed how in Saudi eyes he had gone from “old of Egypt’s anti-Islamist drive under Abdel Fatah al-Sisi friend” to Safavid expansionist. The writer suggested that suggests a theme – a prioritisation, at least in the short term, Rouhani’s efforts to split the GCC showed that he truly of defeating Sunni Islamists over the regional sectarian headed a “Safavid government” – a term that Saudis use to struggle with Iran. compare Iranian foreign policy to the pre-modern Safavid imperial state which imposed Shia Islam on Persia.12 Another key change was the elevation of Prince Muqrin bin Abd al-Aziz to the position of deputy to the crown prince, After months of false starts and misleading leaks about which is especially notable now because he was Bandar’s Saudi-Qatari reconciliation, in November the two polar predecessor as director of intelligence. Considering the opposites of the GCC finally reached an agreement on the fragile health of both King Abdullah and Crown Prince return of ambassadors to Doha in exchange for what the Salman, Muqrin’s ascension answered a key question about Saudis believed to be firm concessions in terms of Qatar’s internal stability – and about the efforts to put off the issue Islamist activism. The deal was sealed in an unofficial of succession to the “third generation” of Saudi princes who summit in Riyadh on 16 November hosted by King Abdullah might be king, one of them being bin Nayef. But the move bin Abd al-Aziz.13 also appears to have foreign policy implications, as Middle East Online suggested Muqrin was behind the move toward

A more balanced role in 2014

14 “From Bandar bin Sultan to Mohammad bin Nayef: Where is Saudi Arabia Going?”, Two changes in the Saudi leadership structure in early 2014 Al-Akhbar, 21 March 2014, available at https://www.al-akhbar.com/node/203050. related to broader changes to Saudi regional policy. One was 15 “The Opening of a New Southern Front with Saudi-Jordanian-American Coordination”, Al-Haqiqa, 25 May 2014, available at http://www.alhkeka. the replacement of Bandar bin Sultan as intelligence chief in com/?p=7516. 16 “Return of First Syrian Brigade from Saudi-American Training Programme”, Al- February, and in particular as the Saudi royal responsible Khaleej Affairs, 11 October 2014, available at http://alkhaleejaffairs.com/main/ Content/%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84- %D9%81%D9%88%D8%AC-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A- %D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A- 8%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA %D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85% 10 Radwan al-Sayyid, “The Banning of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D- and The Evidence for It”, Asharq Al-Awsat, 27 September 2013, available at http:// 9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89- classic.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=744724&issueno=12722. %D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7. 11 “Rouhani and His View of the Gulf”, Asharq Al-Awsat, 19 March 2014, available at 17 There does not appear to have been a clear break, but there has been a notable drop- http://www.aawsat.com/home/article/59471. off in Arabic sources referencing Alloush’s group as “Saudi-backed” after about the 12 Abdullah al-Sultan, “Rouhani and the Hard Trial”, Okaz, 17 March 2014, available at middle of the year. Lacking adequate means of military support, Alloush was even http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20140317/Con20140317684767.htm. forced to tacitly accept a partial ceasefire with the Assad government in October. 13 “Riyadh Summit Ends Split with Qatar and Brings About Return of Ambassadors”, See “Delegation from Duma Visits the Capital with Blessing from Jaysh al-Islam Okaz, 17 November 2014, available at http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/ Leader Alloush”, Rai al-Youm, 19 October 2014, available at http://www.raialyoum. issues/20141117/Con20141117735273.htm. com/?p=167383. 7 8 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS “Islamic State” organisation. “Islamic State” A thawbutnorapprochement Ambassador to Iran Abd al-Rahman al-Shihri met withAmbassador toIranAbdal-Rahmanal-Shihrimet Abdullahian in Jedda, framed as a discussion around the two around the as adiscussion framed in Jedda, Abdullahian Whatever theSaudismayhave hopedtogetoutofthe 21  24 23  22 20 19  18  Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal had held anunexpected Saudal-Faisalhadheld Minister Foreign This came just three weeks after Rafsanjani publicly called after Rafsanjani publicly weeks three This camejust The 69th United Nations General Assembly meeting, which NationsGeneralAssembly The 69thUnited Iranian mediaheralded,butSaudididnot. UN, Saud al-Faisal held an unprecedented meeting with his with meeting an unprecedented held al-Faisal Saud UN, Hussein Sadiqi, whopreviously served asambassadorto On 23 July, Iran appointed a new ambassadorinRiyadh,On 23July,Iranappointedanew approach. a more“moderate” and one of his duties in that capacity involvedcapacity interactingthat in duties his of one and counter “extremism” in the region, mostly inIraq,light mostly region, inthe “extremism” counter counterpart, Iranian Foreign MinisterZarif, that a meeting exchange, itdoesnotappeartohave turnedoutwell of recentadvancesbyjihadiststhere. conference with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Minister Foreign German with conference countries’ commoninterestinfightingtheSalafi-Jihadist Saudi 26 August, On Saudi-Iranian thaw. the of culmination with a general assembly speech that focused on condemning focused that speech assembly a general with meeting the up followed al-Faisal Saud rapprochement, were widelycirculatedinSaudisourcesonline. with Iran’sArabneighbours. Picturesofthetwomeeting, relations friendly for more out spoken past in the has who with KurdsandShialeadersinIraq2004. meeting with IranianForeign MinisterHosseinAmir meeting Deputy the Syriangovernment. the formerthe Iranian president, Akbar Rafsanjani, Hashemi took place the week of September 23, set tobethe took placetheweekofSeptember seemed including one of Shihri kissing Rafsanjani on the forehead, one ofShihrikissingRafsanjanionthe including served as ambassador to Kuwait and the UAE, Sadiqihasalso and the as ambassadortoKuwait served has held. headed theGulfRegion section in Iran’s foreign ministry, Saudi ArabiaduringMohammadKhatami’spresidency. Similarly, butalongadifferenttrack, inlateAprilSaudi for greater cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabiato Saudi Iranand between cooperation greater for from theirpointofview. Afterraisinghopesofareal by Muqrin has not surfaced recently, the pragmatic linepragmatic the recently, surfaced not has Muqrin by    ‘Extremism’ intheRegion”, “Rafsanjani CallsforCooperationBetweenIranandSaudiArabiatoCounter net/newsdetails.aspx?id=1175817. 25 April2014,availableathttp://bit.ly/1pg8AVP. For example,see“SaudiAmbassadortoIranKissesHashemiRafsanjani”, February 2014,availableathttp://www.middle-east-online.com/?id=171923. “Saudi ArabiaandIraninSecretNegotiationsMusqat”, News/2014/8/935239.html. in theRegion”, “Prince SaudAlFaisalMeetswithAbdal-Luhayan toDiscusstheExtremistThreat http://www.alriyadh.com/Contents/16-04-2004/Mainpage/POLITICS_22817.php. “Sadiqi DeniesPlantoOfferExileSadr”, com/?p=156107. Silent?”, Raial-Youm Islamic State?AndWhydidIranAdvertisethe MeetingandtheSaudisKeep “Meeting ofCrisisManagersinNewYorkto Lead toaNewAllianceAgainstthe alriyadh.com/222500. Wishes toSaudiAmbassador”, July 2014,availableathttp://bit.ly/1r9KaPe;“PrinceAl-WalidbinTalalGivesBest “Iran NominatesOldAmbassadorNewtoRiyadh”, Elaph,26August2014,availableathttp://www.elaph.com/Web/ , 22September2014,available athttp://www.raialyoum. Rasd 24 Al Riyadh 25 , 6July2014,availableathttp://www.rasd24. Threeweekslater, inapress 23 18 And then in New York, at the York, at in New Andthen , 5February2007,availableathttp://www. Although talk of a direct role talk ofadirect Although Al Riyadh 21 In addition tohaving , 16April2004,availableat Middle EastOnline Al-Arabiya, 23 19 24 22 Al Marsd , 26 20 ,

An West was not really threatened by Iran – and nonetheless it by Iran – andnonetheless threatened was notreally West Yet ameasured Saudireaction tothefailure ofnuclear 30  27 26  25  29  28 The initialhesitantoptimismwithwhichRiyadhgreeted Threeseparate columnists, writing on27–28 November Rouhani’s electionhasfaded. Saudipolicyinanycase Riyadh seemsincreasinglyscepticalthattheAmerican announced a new effort on 30 October, saying that the that saying October, 30 on effort new a announced administration will holdfasttoitsfavouredIran policy, and explain the unsteady reaction to changes in Iran, are changes which reaction to unsteady the explain This mayhelp and cautiously. gradually very only changes command, whichisalreadyinSaudiArabia. al-Khalifa Khalid Minister Foreign Bahraini capability. establishment is convinced that, while Irangainssome that,while isconvinced establishment emphasised that Saud al-Faisal had met with John Kerry (in John Kerry with al-Faisal hadmet that Saud emphasised operates within a set framework thatinitsbasicparameters within aset operates demanding thatIran withdraw its“occupying forces” on 24 November suggeststhat Riyadh is not returning to of thenegotiations. was negotiatingandmakingdealswithIran. the was threatened, Arab gulf the irony that,while the noted room from the extension, the 5+1 group has the upper hand. upper 5+1 grouphasthe extension, the room fromthe Saudi the suggest media official in the royal rebuke,op-eds negotiations to achieve a breakthroughandtheirextension to achieve negotiations joint command,basedinSaudiArabia,wouldcoordinate themselves inatestingperiod. the panicked response of late 2013of late after Obama’s panicked response infamous the the US secretary of state had informed him of the contents the him of informed had state of secretary US the took morefromIranthanitoffered. is instead trying to speed up the GCC’scommondefence the up tryingtospeed is instead in state ofthenegotiations,concludingthatcurrentdeal phone call with Rouhani. In addition to the absence ofa absence the to Rouhani.Inaddition callwith phone Saud’s plane in Vienna where the talks were being held) and held) being talks were the in Viennawhere Saud’s plane Steinmeier, Saud al-Faisal used even stronger language, stronger even used al-Faisal Saud Steinmeier, from Syria. between the naval command based in between Bahrain, and theair by the Onlookers!”, emphasised Iran’s by theOnlookers!”, emphasised regional agendaand   86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%81. 5%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9% %A7-%D9%80-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%8 %D9%89-%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%B5/%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86%D8 www.aawsat.com/home/article/231631/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B7%D9%81 Continuing theAttrition”, %D9%88%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%9F and“Vienna,Tehran, AA-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AD- %A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8% 9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A/%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8 %D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B9%D article/230941/%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86- Awsat, 27November2014,availableathttps://www.aawsat.com/home/ See “ExtensionofTalks...IsThereaWinnerandLoser?”AsharqAl- raialyoum.com/?p=158576. IRGC andHezbollah”,Raial-Youm “Saudi ForeignMinistertoUNGA:NoSolutioninSyriaWithoutWithdrawalof at http://www.alriyadh.com/997044. l3.php?id=118954. Yemen,” “Saud al--Faisal:IranMustWithdrawOccupationForcesfromSyria,Iran,and Yusuf al-Kuwilit,“DealsbytheOnlookers!”, ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2410224&Language=ar. Kuwait NewsAgency,23November2014,available athttp://www.kuna.net.kw/ “Secretary KerryInformsSaudiForeignMinister ofContentTalkswithIran”, ea160466-7890-11e4-a33c-00144feabdc0.html. Financial Times,30November2014,available athttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ Simeon Kerr,“GulfStatesLaunchJointCommand toCounterISISandIran”, Asharqread tothe Al-Awsat, gave aneutral-to-positive Al Riyadh Alama Online,14October2014,availableathttp://www.alamatonline.net/ 26 op-ed that did criticise the extension, op-edthatdidcriticisetheextension, “Deals 28 Asharq Al-Awsat,28November2014,availableathttps:// , 28September2014,availableathttp://www. Al Riyadh , 24November2014,available 27 AndGulfmedia 30 29

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November 2014 that that substantial progress achieved in Israel’s response to the nuclear talks justifies their further extension, the Israeli Rouhani’s Iran government’s perception of Rouhani did not change. It still Shlomo Brom believes that it reflects Iranian delaying tactics aiming to achieve further sanctions relief and more concessions from the P5+1 on the nuclear deal.

Observers in Israel, both inside and outside government, The proponents of this perspective believe that the Iranian were as surprised as observers elsewhere when Hassan regime is not prepared to make real changes in its policies on Rouhani won a landslide victory in the first round of Iran’s four key fronts: its nuclear programme; its negative attitude presidential elections on 14 June 2013. Their surprise was towards the West; its regional policy aimed at expanding rooted in a firmly held belief that the real decision-maker Iran’s influence or so-called hegemony, in part through in Iran was the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who, they the use of armed proxies and terrorism; and its oppressive thought, determined all domestic as well as foreign policy domestic policies. Rouhani is a loyal servant of the regime issues. After Khamenei’s troubled experience with the that selected him for the presidency. The only difference presidency of Mohammad Khatami and the crisis that between him and Khamenei is a smiling face. Netanyahu followed the 2009 elections, it was generally assumed is the chief exponent of this line. In his speech at the UN that Khamenei and the organs of power that he controls, General Assembly on 1 October 2013, he called Rouhani “a particularly the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), would deliver wolf in sheep’s clothing, a wolf who thinks he can pull the 1 a victory for a conservative candidate more to their liking. wool over the eyes of the international community”. Though this time, it was thought, they would do so more subtly than in 2009, so as to limit the chances of a repeat of The other response, which is more common among 2009’s widespread protests against the result of the elections. government experts and think tanks, is more nuanced and even a bit more hopeful.2 In this reading, Rouhani’s election In Israel, there were two lines of thought on the result reflects the Iranian people’s opposition to the policies of the of Iran’s elections. The first was that Khamenei and the regime and may present a real opportunity for domestic conservatives were surprised by the size of Rouhani’s victory change and for a resolution to the crisis over Iran’s nuclear in the first round and that the magnitude of the win ruled out programme. However, it does not constitute revolutionary their plan to manipulate the results in a second round. When regime change. The proponents of this view agree that the votes were counted, they had no choice but to accept the Rouhani is an organic and effective member of the regime result so as to avoid another public outcry against perceived – but they believe that, precisely because of his status as an fraud, as happened in 2009. insider, he stands a better chance of changing some of the regime’s policies than did his predecessors. Khamenei has The second line of thinking was that the result was actually faith in his loyalty and his intentions and does not perceive masterminded by Khamenei himself. In this scenario, him as a threat to the regime. The decision to extend the Khamenei decided to change course after the unsuccessful nuclear talks did not give new impetus to this school of presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which was thought because it was not clear whether the talks had characterised by poor economic management and biting achieved real progress. economic sanctions against the Iranian nuclear programme. Khamenei understood that these dead-end policies had On the other hand, according to this view, Rouhani is sincere caused a serious rift within the Iranian public, creating a in his desire to change the relationship between the regime threat to the long-term survival of the regime. So, Khamenei and the West, because he believes that a change is essential wanted a more moderate president to implement this for the survival of the Islamic Republic. The republic change of course. cannot survive without public support, and that support cannot endure unless the regime delivers more economic prosperity and more personal liberties. As a confidant and Rouhani: President or pawn? an old hand of the regime, he knows he cannot deliver on all fronts in parallel because the system may suffer an These two scenarios reflect the two competing responses overload. Therefore, he will first focus on the more pressing in Israel to Rouhani’s election: the first that nothing has problem: the economy and the sanctions. For that reason, really changed in Iran, and the second that Rouhani’s it can be assumed that Rouhani will not change the Iranian election represents an opportunity for real change. Israeli government’s attitude towards Israel. officialdom consistently puts forward the first view; the idea

is most prominently promoted by Prime Minister Benjamin 1 Tom Watkins, “Netanyahu: Iranian president is ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’”, CNN, 2 Netanyahu and by his minister of defence, Moshe Ya’alon. October 2013, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/01/world/meast/israel- netanyahu-iran/. They argue that the only thing that is new in Iran is the 2 For example, an article published by INSS, a think tank that has a continuous dialogue with the government, reflects a more positive and hopeful position on serious impact that sanctions are having on the Iranian Rouhani’s election: Ephraim Kam, “Hassan Rowhani’s Election as President of Iran: economy. The regime is being forced to make cosmetic Initial Assessments”, INSS, 16 June 2013, available at http://www.inss.org.il/index. aspx?id=4538&articleid=5140. The same institute has published a number of articles changes to its policies towards the West in an effort to have defending the Joint Plan of Action and arguing for giving a chance to the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. 9 the sanctions lifted. After the P5+1 and Iran agreed on 24 10 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS A typical example of these two paradigms at work is theis work at paradigms two these of example typical A Responses tonucleardiplomacy 4  3 Iran to produce any enriched fissile material. However, in However, material. fissile enriched any produce Iran to Israel’s policies towards Rouhani’s Iran since the elections elections the Rouhani’sIransince towards policies Israel’s In time, thishighlychargedrhetoricwaspartiallyreplaced Iran at anycostsoastoavoidtheramificationsofmilitary Iran with breakout capability, and that, eventually, Rouhani Iran capability, andthat,eventually, with breakout Israel alsointerpreted theagreementasanindicationthat since concessions real any make to have not Iran would P5+1 and Iran in November 2013, the so-called Joint Plan agreement was extremely negative: the agreement wasthe negative: was extremely agreement as awolfinsheep’sHowever, clothing”. theyhave also achievementsinterimof the agreement the improved and action againstIran’snuclearprogramme. ones the Iranians, shrewd especially against the and helpless and panicky reactions were onlyhurtingitsprospects a relatively large inventory of low-enriched uranium. largeinventoryoflow-enriched With a relatively described as a total sell-out. It was argued that lifting even lifting that It wasargued sell-out. as atotal described chances of reaching an acceptable final nuclearchancesfinal ofreaching deal. acceptable an official Israeli position is that any such deal should not allow should deal any such is that Israeli position official cash in on this in the next stage of the nuclear negotiations. nuclear the of stage next in the in onthis cash Iran would that said Israeli government enrich uranium.The of Action. The Israeli government’s initial reaction tothis of influencing the policies of the US and theother P5+1 reaction totheinterim nuclear agreement between the which urged the Israeli government to recognise the positive the Israeli governmenttorecognise the which urged extremeandmorenuancedassertions.Onereason with less with to reachanagreement is desperate smile. TheWest who States, isweak United by the West, led that the a feeling with without makinganyrealconcessions. what his smiles with West from the in getting succeed would whenever itdecidedtodoso. Under not concluded. were a finalagreement even if regime members. It wasalso a result ofdomestic Israeli criticism, that doesnot allowsome enrichment inIran wouldbe the tough policies of Ahmadinejad couldnotachieve–and policies the tough leave would that a final deal to agree to willing P5+1 was the to amilitary nuclearcapability Iran breakout could these, the agreement,Iran also receivedconfirmation of itsrightto that wouldleadtotheeventualcollapseofsanctions impossible. So Israel’s real purpose is to curb enrichment curb to is purpose real SoIsrael’s impossible. it was allowed to retain its existing centrifuges as well as aswell centrifuges itsexisting toretain allowed it was a momentum create Iran sanctions againstwould the of some have mostly been dominatedbytheparadigmof“Rouhani have mostlybeen possibly Netanyahu himself, understands that anagreement himself, understands Netanyahu possibly community,and politicalandsecurity Israeli the practice, paradigm of“let’sgiveRouhaniachance”. for the shift was a growing awareness that Israel’s extreme that awareness a growing was shift for the been occasionally influenced and moderated by the otherthe by moderated and influenced occasionally been  news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.559781. defend ourselves”, See, forexample,BarakRavid,“Netanyahu: Iran nucleardealendangersIsrael,wewill index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6047. nor a‘HistoricFailure’”, INSS,27November2013,availableathttp://www.inss.org.il/ For example,AmosYadlin,“TheGenevaAgreement: Neithera‘HistoricAgreement’ Haaretz, 24November2013,availableathttp://www.haaretz.com/ 3 Thatwascoupled 4 The Assad regime no matter what the cost in termsofinnocent the cost no matter what Assad regime Iran’s roleinregionalarmedconflicts 7  6  5  Iran with a breakout capacity would be concluded. For that concluded. be would capacity a breakout Iran with Iran’s Syria policy is not much discussed in Israel,because discussed Iran’s is notmuch Syria policy Iranian nuclear programme negotiations. It might be that Itmightbe negotiations. programme Iranian nuclear Israel’s attitudeandactionshave alsobeeninfluenced Rouhani is setting Iran’s Rouhani is setting foreign policy.Iran’s intervention Rouhani, Iran continues itsdetermined support for the During the last rounds of the negotiations inVienna, negotiations lastroundsofthe the During Netanyahu’s mainconcernwasthata“bad”dealleaving Plan of Action agreement in 2013 had been very negative, very in2013hadbeen Plan ofActionagreement Netanyahu seemsemotionalwhenhetalksaboutthe and thatIsrael canonlyencourage theUSCongress to according to the dominant paradigm, Khamenei rather than dominant paradigm,Khamenei according tothe and limit inventories of enriched material inIranalevel to enriched and limitinventoriesof and its proxies. From this perspective, many in the Israelithe perspective,in proxies.this Frommany its and area first The East. Middle the in parties other with and derailagreement.likelyoff the theThemilitaryoptionis of relief from Jerusalem. of relief estimate ofseveralmonths. civil war in the context of the conflict between Israel andIran conflict between of the context civil warinthe Syrian the to consider is atendency for Israel, there desirable be would in Syriathat outcomes on the in Israel consensus its Iranhascontinued isSyria,where causing tension continued itstraditionally hostilerelationship withIsrael nuclear programme if Iran has signed an agreement with reason, he campaigned mainly intheUSagainstsuchadeal reason, he campaigned weakRouhani’s andhelpless.Theof scope influenceover the agreement. and iscontinuingtoabideby other powers US andthe the table. ItwouldbeunimaginableforIsrael toattack Iran’s to nuclearweaponry. Thatmeansextendingtheestimated that wouldpreventIranfrominitiatingarapidbreakout that, duringthetenmonthsofinterimagreement,Iran the extensionwasalmostwelcomed.Itreflectedview indicating that he prefers extension toabaddeal.Whenthe extension prefers indicating thathe sign off on an agreement that is perceived as bad in Israel, bad as is perceived that on anagreement off sign intervention in the ongoing civil war. Although there is no is there war. Although civil ongoing intervention inthe security community believe that Iraniswinning. that believe community security human lives and suffering. Here again, the West seems West the again, Here suffering. and lives human he is reacting out of frustration and fear that the P5+1 will he isreactingoutoffrustrationandfearthatthe has compliedwellandthatthesanctionsregimeheld parties decided on extension, one could almost hear the sigh the hear almost one could on extension, decided parties breakout time to two to three years, fromitspresent years, tothree totwo time breakout by Iran’s activities elsewhere. Iran under Rouhanihas better thanmostinIsraelexpectedayearago. syrian-border-bashar-assad-king-of-jordan.html. available athttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/israel-strategy- Ben Caspit,“IsraelrecognizesAssad’sstaying power”, hagel-visit-israel-iran-nuclear-talks.html. available athttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/susan-rice-chuck- Ben Caspit,“IsraelmakesitscaseonIranian enrichment”, headlines&wpmm=1. relief/2014/11/24/8a4ba206-73e6-11e4-a5b2-e1217af6b33d_story.html?wpisrc=nl- com/world/middle_east/israel-greets-extension-of-iran-nuclear-talks-with- Washington Post,24November2014,availableathttp://www.washingtonpost. William Booth,“IsraelgreetsextensionofIran nucleartalkswithrelief”,the 6 Whereas the response to the Joint to the response Whereasthe 5 Al-Monitor Al-Monitor , 21January2014, , 9May2014, 7 Under in Syria is considered as validation of this paradigm and conspiracy theories as is Saudi Arabia, where such theories Rouhani is unlikely to affect Iran’s policy towards Syria. The are spreading widely. Nobody in Israel believes that the rise of ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, later also US is going to replace its traditional allies with the Islamic called IS) and the US military intervention against it has Republic of Iran. However, the rise of ISIS raises the concern not affected Israel’s basic approach. Though some may now of Israel that the US will be willing to make concessions on view a disintegrated Syria ruled in part by jihadist groups as the nuclear file of Iran and its support for anti-Israeli terror a greater threat than an extension of the Assad regime’s rule, organisations to facilitate better co-operation with Iran in it does not make most Israelis more sympathetic towards the fight against IS. Anyway, the shared concern in both Iran. On the contrary, there is concern that the growing co- places is reflected in reports of a dialogue between Israel operation between the US and Iran will lead the US to make and Saudi Arabia regarding possible co-operation against more concessions to Iran on the issues important to Israel the common threat of Iran. – Iran’s nuclear programme, Iran’s expanding influence in the Middle East, and Iran’s assistance and operation of its On co-operation with Saudi Arabia, Israel’s foreign minister, anti-Israeli proxy groups, Hezbollah and Palestinian groups. Avigdor Lieberman, said in April 2014: “For the first time there is an understanding there that the real threat is Another cause of tension is Iran’s continued efforts to supply not Israel, the Jews, or Zionism. It is Iran, global jihad, weapons to non-state actors engaged in or threatening Hezbollah [the Shiite Lebanese militant group], and al- terrorism against Israel. That includes its attempts in Qaeda. There are contacts, there are talks, but we are very collusion with Syria to supply weapons to Hezbollah that close to the stage in which within a year or 18 months it could serve as game changers in Lebanon. As a result, Israel will no longer be secret, it will be conducted openly.”10 It initiated air attacks against these weapons shipments. The seems that Lieberman wanted to exploit for political gain last of these attacks took place in Lebanon as recently as the new “spirit” in the Saudi approach by exaggerating February 2014, and it was preceded by an attack in Syria the implications of this new atmosphere. Secret Israeli one month earlier. contacts with Gulf states are not new, and the probability of formal open talks between the sides is still very low. The Even worse from Israel’s point of view was Iran’s resumption developments since this statement was given only fortified of its attempts to smuggle weapons to the Palestinian the feelings in Israel of a broad scope of shared interests organisations in the Gaza Strip, which also necessitated the with Saudi Arabia, which, with the ascent of IS, is playing violation of Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai. In fact, Iranian the role of an important regional player also in the fight weapons-smuggling to the Gaza Strip almost stopped at against Islamic extremism. Israel is also pleased by Saudi one point because of the worsening relationship between Arabia’s strong stance against the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran and Hamas after Hamas refused to support the Assad is exploiting these shared antipathies to claim that IS and regime and its leadership had to leave Damascus. But soon Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, enough, Iran strengthened its relationship with other armed are of the same brand. groups in the Gaza Strip, especially the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and resumed supplying arms. On 5 March 2014, Unless progress is made in the Israeli-Palestinian the Israeli navy captured a ship in the Red Sea coming from negotiations, concerns over the public backlash in Arab Iran bearing a load of long-range rockets. The intention was public opinion will constrain any substantive co-operation to offload the rockets in Sudan and smuggle them through between Arab states and Israel. This is one key reason that Egypt to the Gaza Strip.8 After violence erupted in the the Arab League, and Saudi Arabia in particular, was willing Gaza Strip between 8 July and 26 August, Iran continued to push the Palestinian leadership to restart the now defunct to pledge support to the groups fighting Israel in Gaza and negotiations: these states would like to see this obstacle to even threatened to smuggle weapons to these groups in the co-operation with Israel removed. At the same time, interest West Bank.9 in future co-operation or normalisation with Arab states does not seem to be enough to make the Israeli government willing to change its position on negotiations, although New realities and choices there were resumed calls by important public Israeli figures to accept the Arab Peace Initiative, originally called the The sense that Iran is duping the US and the West with Saudi Peace Initiative, as a basis for dialogue with the regard to its nuclear programme and its Syria policies has Arab world on settling the conflict with the Palestinians.11 generated the impression that Israel shares with the Gulf Normalisation is not valued so highly in Israel. As yet, there states, and especially with Saudi Arabia, a common concern has been no debate in Israel about the implications for the and a sense of betrayal and disappointment with the Obama relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel of recent Saudi administration. The Israeli system is not as susceptible to

10 Gianluca Mezzofiore, “Israel ‘holding secret talks with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’ 8 “Israel halts ‘weapons shipment from Iran’”, BBC News, 5 March 2014, available at says Lieberman”, International Business Times, 14 April 2014, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26451421. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/israel-holding-secret-talks-saudi-arabia-kuwait-says- 9 Ariel Ben Solomon, “Iran vows to send arms to West Bank in response to drone”, the lieberman-1444735. Jerusalem Post, 24 August 2014, available at http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli- 11 The last case was a call by Shabtai Shavit, a former director of the Mossad, in an Conflict/WATCH-Iran-displays-Israeli-drone-allegedly-shot-down-near-nuclear- article he published in the Israeli daily Haaretz on 22 November 2014, available at facility-372206. http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.2491235. 11 12 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS From Israel’s point of view, the real test ofRouhani’s test real the pointofview, From Israel’s US and the other Western powers to resume and expand and toresume powers Western other the and US of its threats circumstances, Israelwillresume Under those Rouhani presidency. attacking the Iranianattacking the the nuclear programmeandwillpush reason and ifthe negotiations newextensionofthe after the even is notconcluded P5+1. of the If anagreement agreement gestures towards opening a dialogue with Iran. with Having said a dialogue towards opening gestures even if theyare unenthusiastic about it, then Israel will meeting Israeli personalities and in risking publication of the Israeli policycommunitycanagree isreasonable, to doanythingaboutit. Butifanagreementismadethat to Iran,Israelmayfeelvindicatedbutwillfinditdifficult the sanctions regime. If an agreement isconcluded butis that nothing has really changed in Iran willbevindicated. these discussions,somethingthatwasonceentirelytaboo. bolderinthat, Saudipublicfigureshavelatelybecome is deemed to be Iranian intransigence, then Israel’s opinion then Iranian intransigence, be to deemed is have toreconsideritsperceptionofandattitudethe perceived by Israel to be a bad agreement and a capitulation and agreement a bad be Israel to by perceived presidency willbethenegotiationsonfullnuclear

The UnitedArabEmirates,Qatar, Andrew Hammond Arabs withIraniancitizenship. EthnicPersiansaccount After all, the GCC was formed in 1981 in direct response to After all,theGCCwasformedin1981directresponseto Arabia –thetorchbearerofGulfhawkishnessonIran. UAE: Reigning in Dubai, UAE: ReigninginDubai, 1971, the diversity of interests within the UAE’s seven ruling UAE’s seven within the diversityofinterests 1971, the front weakens Oman, andKuwait:TheGulf Hassan Rouhani’s ascendancy and the resulting breakthrough Hassan Rouhani’s ascendancyandtheresultingbreakthrough Dubai andIran tripled between2005 and2009 to$12 Despite a territorial dispute with Iran over the Trucial the Iran over with dispute aterritorial Despite a direct military threat, but as the US tries to pivot towards a directmilitarythreat, butastheUStriestopivottowards China, it wants to encourage the Gulfcountries toresolve the China, itwantstoencourage strained,otherwisewere on (GCC) CouncilCooperation years, even whenrelations betweenthestatesofGulf recent Inmore hardened. also have policies states’ Gulf aligning withSaudiArabia geostrategic allies. A growing fear of US disengagement with geostrategic allies.AgrowingfearofUSdisengagementwith extension ofthenegotiations into 2015 gives some Gulf elaborate military presence in theregion in defence ofits of itsEmirati citizenry are Iranians, Arab-Iranians, or or otherwise influence the talks. The shift has allowed the hasallowed shift talks.The the influence or otherwise to delayefforts in engaged actively has only SaudiArabia revolution and the Iran–Iraq war, which had repercussions revolution andtheIran–Iraq war,whichhadrepercussions economic socialand historical ofthe grain the ran against million, and8,200 Iranian businessesaswell as1,200 trading companies operate in the state. Trade betweencompanies operateinthestate.Trade trading their own differences, both among themselves and with Iran. their owndifferences,bothamongthemselves andwithIran. towards Iran.WashingtonwillprotectitsGulfalliesfrom the regionisatcore oftheGulfstates’ current position the threat thatGulfrulers feltinthewake oftheIranian the European UnionsanctionedtheIslamic Republic, the the pastdecadeofinternationaltensionoverIran’snuclear the Gulfstates’ smallsize, andahistoryofmigration. During the GulflittoralstatesandIranarecomplicatedbyproximity, ties betweenIrananditsGulfneighbours. Relationsbetween the Islamic Republic. Dubai, in particular, has developed in nuclear talks were unexpected developments. The developments. unexpected talkswere in nuclear in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as Shiite communities pressed in SaudiArabiaandBahrainasShiitecommunitiespressed strong commercial ties with Iran, and a sizeable portion Iran,andasizeable with ties strong commercial smaller Gulf states to break a pattern of tense relations that smaller Gulfstatestobreakapatternoftenserelationsthat fold,yet the to toadjustIran’sreturn time more states policy towards Iran the Gulf states drew closer to Saudito closer drew states Gulf the Iran towards policy programme, astheUnited Nations, theUnited States, and States since the United Arab Emirates’ independence in independence ArabEmirates’ United the since States for approximately 10 percent of Dubai’s population oftwo ofDubai’spopulation 10percent for approximately families has militated against a hostile relationship withfamilies hasmilitatedagainstahostilerelationship an developed US the years, ensuing Inthe rights. more for billion.1 The Emirate of Sharjah was most concerned with Qatar: A balancing act the islands dispute, but Abu Dhabi has more recently assumed responsibility for the issue in its role as the seat of Ever since Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa replaced his father in a the federation. bloodless 1995 coup, Qatar’s guiding philosophy has been to establish its independence from Saudi Arabia. This means This move in part reflected a new activism in UAE foreign that Doha is not interested in Saudi instructions on how to policy, borne of its burgeoning economic power after the deal with Iran. Its disinclination to fall in line with Saudi death of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan in 2004 and policy has been starkly evident in the foreign policy arena the succession of his son, Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan. In over the past decade, as Qatar supported Hezbollah in its 2010, the UAE ambassador to Washington, Yousef al- war with Israel in 2006 and Hamas in its conflict with Israel Otaiba, when asked about a potential military strike against in Gaza in 2008. In 2007, the Qataris even invited Iran’s Iran, suggested the UAE would be supportive: “If you are President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to attend a GCC summit asking me, ‘Am I willing to live with that versus living with a in Doha, without telling the other rulers in advance.6 Qatar nuclear Iran?’, my answer is still the same: ‘We cannot live made Doha and its pan-Arab channel Al Jazeera an open 2 with a nuclear Iran.’” Dubai came under pressure from Abu house for Islamists, Arab nationalists, and other opposition Dhabi and the US to fall into line over Iran, amid reports figures. Meanwhile, Qatar bought itself superpower support that Dubai was offering a continued lifeline to Tehran as by hosting US CENTCOM and other US forces after they a sanctions buster. Abu Dhabi’s $20 billion bailout of quit Saudi Arabia in 2003 and, for a time, allowing an Israeli Dubai after its spectacular fall during the financial crisis trade office to operate in Doha. in 2009 provided Abu Dhabi with new leverage to demand that Dubai rigorously enforce sanctions on commercial A policy of non-aggravation with Iran fitted with Doha’s 3 transactions and smuggling. desire, then, to set itself apart from Riyadh and to reflect what it considered the populist sentiment on the Arab In April 2014, Iran appointed Alireza Bahrami as the new street. Arab Islamist movements, such as the Muslim consul general in Dubai covering Dubai and the Northern Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Palestinian territories, and Emirates of the UAE. Bahrami has visited the rulers of the Ennahda in Tunisia, do not in general share Saudi Arabia’s different emirates in an attempt to rejuvenate economic and or Wahhabism’s distaste for Iran, though Brotherhood 4 commercial ties. And Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif claques in the Gulf itself have taken a more hawkish went to Abu Dhabi in April to activate previously signed position because of the prevailing political and ideological deals. “Trade could go through the roof if Iran opens up. environment. Qatar’s own soft approach to its neighbour is There are already hundreds of companies registering in largely explained by its shared ownership with Iran of a vast Turkey with Iranian partners,” a government adviser in Abu natural gas field. Qatar’s wealth and the polity it has created 5 Dhabi says. There have also been discussions between Iran since 1995 is entirely dependent upon the shared North and the UAE on resolving the islands dispute. Despite Iran’s Dome Field, which, as Western diplomats in Doha point out, efforts, there is little likelihood of substantial changes until could be seized by Iran with ease. In US diplomatic cables the nuclear talks reach a breakthrough and the sanctions released by WikiLeaks, Qatar’s foreign minister of the day, regime is slowly dismantled – which could clearly take time, Hamad bin Jassim, bluntly tells his American interlocutors given the US Congress’s hawkishness. Yet it was instructive that Qatar has no particular love for the Iranians but has to that when the UAE published a “terror list” of proscribed be pragmatic in dealing with them.7 groups in November 2014, Lebanese Hezbollah did not feature, though it was on a similar list published by Saudi Qatar’s leadership has sought to present itself as a mediator Arabia earlier in the year – a sign of the lower status that between the US and Iran. Doha has even welcomed conflict with Iran and its proxies has now acquired for Abu Oman’s mediating role between the US and Iran because Dhabi. The focus was almost entirely on groups believed to it believes that any rapprochement will be a drawn-out be linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, including research process, which would in future offer more opportunities centres and advocacy groups based in the West, and Salafi for Qatar to present itself as a country that can facilitate jihadists fighting in Syria. The UAE’s enthusiastic embrace dialogue. Doha’s actions in receiving Taliban members of the US campaign against the Islamic State group has also released from Guantanamo in return for a US hostage being helped push the Iranian issue further down the agenda. freed in Afghanistan also illustrates how Doha has sought to position itself as a constructive regional partner. It is a sign of this independence from Iran that Doha’s anti-Assad policy in Syria has not led to any notable increase in tension

1 “UAE Foreign Policy: Nuclear power for Peaceful Purposes”, UAE Ministry of Foreign with Tehran. Affairs, available at http://mofa.gov.ae/mofa_english/portal/b074766a-5507-43c7- 9beb-3155a52e25b5.aspx. 2 Ian Black, “UAE ambassador backs strike on Iran’s nuclear sites”, the Guardian, 7 July 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/07/uae-envoy-iran- nuclear-sites. 6 See, for example, Simon Henderson, “Unwanted Guest: The Gulf Summit and 3 Kambiz Foroohar, “Dubai Helps Iran Evade Sanctions as Smugglers Ignore U.S. Laws”, Iran”, The Washington Institute, 7 December 2007, available at http://www. Bloomberg, 25 January 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/unwanted-guest-the-gulf-summit- =newsarchive&sid=av5smtYe_DDA. and-iran. 4 “Iranian, UAE Officials Confer on Ways to Develop Ties”, Fars News Agency, 23 April 7 “Qatar: Balancing Geographic Interests with Iran, Strategic Interests with 2014, available at http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930203001337. U.S.”, WikiLeaks, 9 July 2009, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ 5 Comment to author, April 2014; name withheld. cables/09DOHA442_a.html. 13 14 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS “The majority doesn’t care, there is a minority that is worried, isaminoritythat “The majoritydoesn’tcare,there Western diplomatbasedinDohasays, “themovetobring 10  9  8  2013 that Muslims should not pray with Ibadis. A UAE spy Ibadis. AUAE not praywith should 2013 Muslims that Iran into the mainstream has been welcomed in Qatar”. Iran into themainstreamhasbeenwelcomed Oman: Disinclinedtodistanceitself Rebellion in 1975. And even after Iran’s in 1975.Andevenafter Islamic Revolution Rebellion But everyone knows that Iran will not give up on the nuclear on the up give not Iran will that knows everyone But and Iran, which was essential for Muscat because it shares and Iran, because for Muscat which wasessential assume that Qatar wouldbeable toreturn toits preferred to reasonable it’s player, global and regional an accepted a UAE attempt to find out what the “weakest link”inthe “weakest the what out tofind attempt a UAE Oman’s leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, assumed power with Iran. in anopening and athirdgroupwhoareinterested Iran, with one Qatariobserversaid: Of hiscountry’sdealings a large segment of Oman’s population are of the Ibadi ofthe are ofOman’spopulation segment a large “isolation- of policy asimilar hascontinued Qaboos the not careabout do million non-Qataris,they are overtwo and Iran’s courting of the country has consequently been Gulf states, have sought to bring a resistantQatar Gulf states,havesought in line with Gulf chainwasdoingwithIran. denomination, including theSultan himself. Oman has turned had world the from off Oman cut to determination of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in ending the Dhofar the ShahPahlaviinending Reza of Mohammad over ninemillionfollowersonTwitter,toldDubaiTVinover recent years, Saudi Arabia, and to some extent the smaller the years, SaudiArabia, extent recent andtosome ring wasdiscoveredinOman2011,whatclearly rise of –whichwasonereason forthe Yemen neighbouring weapon option asareligious and nationalist tenet offaith much morepronounced. the Western trend of isolating Iran. But were Iran to become Iran to Iran. were isolating But of trend Western the the prominent cleric Sheikh Mohamed al-Arefe, whohas al-Arefe, Mohamed Sheikh cleric prominent the the insurgentHouthimovementandconflictbetween the bogeyman for Oman that it is for theother Gulfstates, in 1979, Oman saw itself as a bridge between the Gulf Arabs Gulf the between a bridge as itself in 1979,Omansaw in recent years, irritated at its close ties to Iran. to For example, ties close its at years, irritated in recent in view oftheinroads that Wahhabi Salafism has made in in aUK-backed coupin1970againstafather whose issue either.” issue sovereignty over the Strait ofHormuz with Iran. over the sovereignty Iran is not time helpduringthe still gratefultoIranforitsdecisive striven tokeepSaudi-drivenWahhabism atbay, especially position ofmaintaining comfortable equidistance between lite”. IncontrasttoSaudiArabia’s majorityWahhabism, Saudi ArabiaontheonehandandIranother. Saudi Arabia has made more sectarian noises about Oman about noises more sectarian made Arabia has Saudi Salafis andHouthisinYementoday. for Iran. majority wholiveinQatar, As forthemostofwhom both citizens and the colonial poweragainsthim. both citizensandtheHowever, Seminar, June2014;namewithheld. Comment toauthor,June2014;namewithheld. 2011, availableathttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12320859. “Oman uncovers‘spynetwork’ butUAEdeniesanylinks”, 8 Among the ruling elite, however, as asenior however, ruling elite, Amongthe 10 Admittedly, Qaboosis BBC News,31January 9 In Alawi said that a nuclear-armed IranwouldnotconstituteAlawi saidthatanuclear-armed Washington andTehran –behind Riyadh’s back –that WikiLeaks documents, Oman’sForeignMinisterYusufbin 13 12  14  11 Iranian investment projects, until he announced abridge announced untilhe projects, Iranian investment High Altitude Area Defense missile system (THAAD), missile system which Area Defense High Altitude Baghdad duringtheIran–Iraq War, soitwasnosurprise Oman andIran heldjointnaval measures inApril, abold proposal. Still, the stall to continues blowback of Omani fear to buildabridgeIran, agreement briefings and theweekly over down shut has been UAE and Qatarthe Bahrain between projects of talk similar far; too a bridge against bothSaudiArabia and Iran. Since 1980, Oman has ties butsignificantbusiness quiet developed Qatar have and Yemen”. Muscat sponsored the ceasefire talks between Tehran and a destabilisingforce fortheregion, instark oppositionto deal. Inthe deadlinefora second approached their teams 2014asthe hostfortalksinNovember again the granted the US military access to itsair granted theUSmilitaryaccessbasesandports.And, came to an end. Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Mahmoud an end.FormerPresident to came effort tocontainIran. Since 2007,on Iran talks haveslowed controlled –and regularly usedtheplatform toannounce extensive smuggling. operator ownsthemajorityofsharesinOman’sNawras mobile (for example,Qatar’s Ooredoo decade past over the was sealed during aRouhanivisitinMarchand massive was sealed that deal pipeline a gas in Oman,including projects of worth move inthecurrentenvironment. made sure to offer its services to the US so as to protect itself US soastoprotect its servicestothe made suretooffer telecommunications company)and, like Qatar, Omanalso that it also sponsored the backchannel talksbetween backchannel the that italsosponsored the positions ofSaudiArabia and theUAE. the yearsofnuclearcrisis, and Oman has alsobenefitted is intended to link the GCC states’ defence systems inan systems defence GCCstates’ tolinkthe is intended to Muscat to went John Kerry State of in 2012, Secretary US supplying natural gas to an Omani liquefaction plant during plant an Omaniliquefaction to natural gas supplying holding weekly press briefings withOmanijournalists – hospital project. hospital project across the Strait of Hormuz as a sign of “peace and “peace of a sign Hormuz as of Strait the across project unprecedented in a country where the media is tightly led tolast November’s nuclear breakthrough. Muscat was Saudi anger. Oman immediately denied that therewasany denied Saudi anger. Oman immediately Since Rouhani came to power, Iran has announced $4 billion announced Iran has power, to Rouhani came Since first raised the possibility of a bridge project in 2005, but in2005, project ofabridge possibility the first raised further discussions on the sale of the $2.1 of the billion Terminal sale on the discussions further friendship between Iran and Oman, other GCCcountries other Oman, Iranand between friendship from the sanctions as the authorities turned a blind eye to a blindeye turned authorities sanctions asthe from the   https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MUSCAT1067_a.html. “Oman –FM’sViewsonIranIssues”,WikiLeaks,7December2009,availableat bridge-over-hormuz.html. March 2014,availableathttp://me-confidential.com/7930-oman-and-iran-to-build- Jaber Ali,“OmanandIrantobuildbridgeover Hormuz”,MiddleEastConfidential www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8bdf1daa-aaba-11e3-be01-00144feab7de.html. gas dealduringvisittoOman”, Months.html; SimeonKerrandNajmehBozorgmehr, “Iran’sHassanRouhaniseals News/World-News/Iran-Oman-Natural-Gas-Pipeline-to-Begin-Operation-in-18- OilPrice.com Joao Peixe,“Iran–OmanNaturalGasPipelinetoBeginOperationin18Months”, Single/333533. News, 9April2014,available athttp://www.tasnimnews.com/English/Home/ “Iranian CommanderCallsJointNavalDrill withOman‘Successful’”, , 12September2013,availableathttp://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy- 13 For Saudi Arabia, bridge projects are always projects ForSaudiArabia, bridge 12 TheIranian began ambassador inMuscat Financial Times,13March2014,availableathttp:// 14

11 Oman and Tasnim , 7 The gas pipeline arrangement, or any bridge project, will The May visit was the first official trip made to Iran by a still need the US’s blessing to go ahead. US objections were, sitting Kuwaiti ruler since the Islamic Revolution, and the alongside pricing, also a factor in preventing the conclusion emir took a senior delegation with him for two days of of the gas deal in 2007. Oman has long been ahead of the meetings. A joint statement by the emir and Ayatollah Ali other Gulf states in developing ties with Iran, and less Khamenei said the visit was a “turning point”, and a series of minded to heed Saudi threats and admonitions, yet it must memoranda were signed regarding security, transportation, still heed the position of the US. It’s clear, though, that Oman customs co-operation, sports, tourism, and the environment. will have much to gain if and when sanctions are eased. A writer in one Kuwaiti paper hailed “amazing results” and cited comments that the emir was reported to have made in Tehran describing the Supreme Leader Khamenei as Kuwait: Gas-powered diplomacy “the guide of the whole region”.16 The Iranian Chamber of and new outreach Commerce and Industry chief, Gholam Hussein Shafei, said Kuwait was set to become a complement to Dubai in Iranian Like Oman and Qatar, Kuwait sees no point in making an trade policy. enemy of Iran. But it is more responsive to Saudi fears and concerns than is Oman or Qatar. This has placed a constant Again, the key interest here is gas. Like Oman, Kuwait has brake on the ruling al-Sabah family’s willingness to further a growing interest in Iranian supplies. Kuwait’s alternative democratic reforms. Kuwait also has a sizeable Shiite supplier is Qatar, which might seem the natural candidate population, estimated at 35 percent of its citizenry, but they – but, in fact, using Qatar as a supplier would be almost as are for the most part merchant families close to al-Sabah. politically sensitive as using Iran because of the Saudi and They have not been politicised in the manner of the Bahraini Emirati conflict with Doha over its support for political Shia. However, Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood Islamists Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Kuwait has formally are a strong force in Kuwait, particularly among the segment aligned itself with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and is a major of the population that is of Saudi Arabian Bedouin origin. financial backer of the Sisi regime in Egypt. However, Kuwait recently signed a supply deal with Qatargas, and a In the decade following the end of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq gas-supply arrangement with Iran has become a distinct and the empowerment of Shiites there, a more sectarian prospect in the medium term. Kuwait also has fitful discourse has emerged between the two sides in Kuwait. ongoing negotiations with Iran on the development of Kuwaitis have been identified as key funders of jihadist the Dorra/Arash gas field which straddles their common fighters in Syria, a Kuwaiti businessman is behind the marine boundary. Egyptian anti-Shiite channel Safa, and a Kuwaiti cleric in London runs the anti-Sunni channel Fadak. So, it was not Finally, the emir’s trip raised concerns in Bahrain that in Kuwait’s interest to allow ties with Iran to deteriorate, Saudi Arabia was trying to negotiate with Iran at its expense. for fear of exacerbating sectarianism. However, tensions During the week of the Kuwait emir’s trip, Bahrain’s prime rose in 2011 when the ruling family feared that the uprising minister and crown prince issued a joint statement rejecting in Bahrain would force democratic concessions in Kuwait. any external involvement in Bahraini affairs. Bahrain’s Al Kuwait and the UAE played a minor role in the Saudi Khalifa family government knows that the opposition led intervention in Bahrain and Kuwait, signing up to the by the Wefaq party is waiting for rapprochement between narrative that Iran was behind the protests. In March 2011, Iran and the P5+1 group, and then between Iran and Saudi Kuwait ordered the expulsion of three Iranian diplomats Arabia, to find an exit from the crisis on the island. over an alleged spy network, and Iran responded by expelling Kuwaiti diplomats. Post-Rouhani: Waiting on Washington Despite this disharmony, Kuwait comes second to Oman in seeing great potential for improved commercial ties with Given the fragile nature of the small Gulf states’ Iran since Rouhani’s inauguration. Sheikh Sabah visited problematique with Iran, it is not surprising that the united Tehran in May 2014 in an apparent effort to mediate front collapsed rapidly after Rouhani’s election and the between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Arab media reported that subsequent progress in nuclear talks, in spite of Saudi efforts the emir had a message from Saudi Arabia for Iran’s leaders, to the contrary. Behind the issue of Rouhani’s election is though Iranian officials denied that any such discussion the wider issue of the US’s reappraisal of its priorities in came up.15 Kuwait’s foreign minister also made comments the region: the administration’s view is that the problems suggesting that Gulf countries’ links with Iran should be on that Gulf states have with Iran, beyond their US-guaranteed a bilateral level, not as a bloc, suggesting that the visit was national security, are their own concern and Washington a chance for Kuwait to pursue its own interests as much as will not intervene to solve them. After years of baiting the Saudi Arabia’s. US and/or Israel to handle Iran for it in the way that it saw

15 “The issue of mediation was not raised”, IRNA, 13 June 2014, available at http:// 16 “Nata’ij bahira li-ziyarat sumuww al-amir li-Tehran” (Amazing results in the Emir’s /visit to Tehran), al-Nahar, 8 June 2014, available at http://www.annaharkw.com _عوضوم__دوب_زیمآ_تیقفوم_ناریا_هب_تیوک_ریما_رفس__مخفا/تلود/www.irna.ir/fa/News/81188440 annahar/Article.aspx?id=463446&date=08062014. 15 .دوبن_حرطم_یرگیجنایم 16 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS Abdullah, a UAE-based political scientist. “Thereisachange political Abdullah, aUAE-based With the exception of Oman, the Gulf states remain wary of remain wary states Gulf Oman, the of exception With the 19  18  17  The smaller Gulfstateshave responded withremarkable Islamistmovement as amore immediate threat. The Iran. The keyissuehereisnotsomuchconcernsoverregional as Big Brother. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the UAE Arabia andthe time, Saudi same the Brother. At as Big about Iran’s natural gas wealth. Asanenergyanalystandabout Iran’snaturalgaswealth. and TehranovertheIslamicStategrouponlyheightens to thisreality,andallindicationsarethatRiyadhwill adjust and have much togain from an easing ofsanctions, but green light. dependent onIranforastrategicenergysourcewillmake question ofIransuggests,however,thatperhapsthemost change.” saysAbdulkhaleqcoming ofRouhanianditispositive,” off Saddam Hussein in Iraq,Saudi Arabia finds ithard to was prepared to publicly ridicule Saudi schemes for aGCC schemes Saudi ridicule publicly to prepared was what isthepointofGCC?Itwasinlightnuclear writers are continuing to promote an image of Saudi Arabia Saudi of an image promote are continuingto writers redux intheair. resist. The convergence ofinterestsbetweenWashington whole want a cautious and gradualimprovementinrelations, want acautious whole military backing is even worse.” even military backingis them very nervous. But a situation without US support and support US without a situation very nervous.But them take partin,giventhesenseofpost-9/11“war-on-terror” to refuse could states Gulf other nor Riyadh neither that these concerns, whileUSmilitary actions are something they will belookingasmuchtoWashington asRiyadhfora will they two decades after theyformed theGCC, ishowfickle and in style, it is very different to Ahmadinejad. A change in A change toAhmadinejad. different itisvery in style, suspicious theyare. salient feature ofrelations amongGulfstates, more than style could lead to a change of substance or be indicative of or be substance of a change to lead could style speed. “SomethingishappeninginIranwiththesurprise hegemony, as in the pre-Islamic Revolutiondays,butmore hegemony, asinthe union last December. perceiveMuslimBrotherhoodthe transnationalandthe former big oil negotiator says: “A situation where theyare breakthrough that Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi Yusuf breakthrough thatOmaniForeignMinister Comments toauthor,April2014. Interview withauthor, June2014. https://uk.news.yahoo.com/oman-says-opposes-union-gulf-states-120124278.html. “Oman saysitopposesunionofGulfstates”, 17 Without fear of Iran to hold the huddle together, huddle the hold Iran to of fear Without 18 For thesame reason, Saudi regime 19 AFP, 7December2013,availableat The smaller Gulf states as a as states Gulf smaller The

Turkey andIran:Preservinga lucrative partnership While efforts suchand regionaldevelopments dobring the Ziya Meral 2  1  Javad Zarif, visited Turkey. In January 2014, a much larger larger much a 2014, January In Turkey. visited Zarif, Javad Turkey and Iran have once again found themselves facing themselves found again once andIranhave Turkey Turkish delegationtravelled toIran, includingtheprime Iranian president affirmed the desire of both countries to ofbothcountries desire the Iranian presidentaffirmed Iraq. These developments have ledtosomesuggestions Islamic State(hereISIS) anditsimplicationsfor both Khamenei, parliamentary chairman Ali Larijani, and former Khamenei, parliamentarychairmanAliLarijani,andformer Rouhani visited Turkey in June 2014 with a large delegation Rouhani visited TurkeyinJune2014withalargedelegation Rouhani’s electoralvictory torepairthedamagecaused His visit wastheoutcomeofaseriesmeetings. Cemil Rouhani in Iran, and Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad minister, Rouhani inIran,andIran’sforeign amid the acute reminders about theurgency ofinstating a a been has there Infact, closely. interest mutual of areas and soughttowork closely, whichonly revealed deeper a series oftrade agreements andfacilitatednegotiations Çiçek, the speaker of the Turkish parliament, visited Iran in Çiçek, thespeakerofTurkishparliament,visited Iranin culture, transportation, and security. During his visit, the countries’ security policies as wellas interests in Syria and continue to walk a tightrope between the prospects of major continue towalkatightropebetween theprospectsofmajor differences andconflictsofinterestsproducedprimarily during thelastten years, reveals a pattern ofsimilar of Iranian leadership, from Rouhani to Supreme Leader Ali of Iranianleadership, fromRouhanitoSupremeLeader Ali on the price of Iranian gas. Decisions were taken to aim at aimat to taken were Decisions ofIraniangas. price on the work closelyonareasofmutualconcern. working relationship. Hassan President after countries fromboth push renewed mutual economic benefit. ItarguesthatIranandTurkeymutual economic momentswhen bothcountries facedshared challenges ministers, and some 200 businesspeople. The visit yielded visityielded The 200businesspeople. andsome ministers, cabinet five Erdoğan, Tayyip Recep time, the at minister that included ministers and businessmen, pursuing high- that Turkey andIran couldexplore and co-operate on two countries closer, this essay argues that a brief look at the two countriescloser,thisessayarguesthatabrieflookatthe increase their trade volume to $30 billion in 2015 and to inlater the years ofMahmoud Ahmadinejad’spresidency, increasing Turkish-Iraniantradevolumeandatopeninga history of relations between the two countries, particularly particularly countries, two the between ofrelations history level engagement on issues from the economy to tourism,to economy the engagement onissuesfrom level groupthatcallsitself formofthe inthe challenges parallel president Hashemi Rafsanjani. In November 2013, Turkey’s president HashemiRafsanjani. InNovember 2013,Turkey’s September 2013. He met with representatives from all levels September 2013. Hemetwithrepresentatives fromalllevels free tradezone. with met Davutoğlu, Ahmet minister, foreign former page-in-syria-but-ties-strategic.aspx?PageID=238&NID=67565&NewsCatID=510. June 2014,availableathttp://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-iran-on-different- “Turkey, IranondifferentpageinSyriabut ties ‘strategic’”, to-establish-a-free-trade-zone. available athttp://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2014/04/22/iran-and-turkey-set- “Iran andTurkeysettoestablishafreetrade zone”, 2

Daily Sabah 1

Hurriyet DailyNews , 22April2014, , 9 diplomatic fallout caused by opposing policies and interests Turkish borders be used in the invasion of Iraq. Similarly, in the Middle East and the benefits of maintaining good Tehran had not only limited its engagement with the PKK bilateral relations. but was also facing its own Kurdish insurgency in the form of the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), which had close relations with the PKK.5 The two countries’ shared The road to the AKP’s rediscovery of Iran concern over Kurdish militancy would become much more important after the US invasion of Iraq. Both countries saw After coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development the possibility that an independent Kurdistan could emerge Party (AKP) launched an ambitious foreign policy and in Northern Iraq as a potential threat, though Turkish policy sought to maximise its engagement with its neighbours. But on this eventually changed dramatically. a stark gap remained between the vision and the reality, and Turkey’s policy on Iran was no exception. In addition, both countries were facing troubling economic conditions. The AKP was desperately aware that it would The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the 1980 coup only be able to survive its domestic challenges from the in Turkey had put the two countries into an ideological Kemalist establishment by saving the Turkish economy deadlock. When Iran found itself occupied with the war in from its crisis. The quickest option to do this was to attract a Iraq, Turkey chose to stay out of the conflict. Even so, Iran’s surge of foreign direct investment and to push for smoother, relations with Syria and its support for the Kurdish militant closer trade relations with its neighbours, including Iran. organisation, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), created Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit in 2004 and Turkey’s in Turkey deep resentment and a sense that its security was positive response to Ahmadinejad’s election set the scene under threat. Iran’s support for various Islamist groups in for a Turkish-Iranian rapprochement. Turkey caused deep suspicion within the Turkish state’s staunchly secular elite. Equally, Iran has seen as hostile Turkey’s hosting of Iranian opposition groups, its support Outcomes of rapprochement in 2002–2011 for the policies of the United States, and its NATO presence. Turkey–Iran co-operation efforts between 2002 and When the government of Necmettin Erbakan took office 2011 produced tangible outcomes in three areas: security, in Turkey in 1996, the Iranian regime for the first time economy, and diplomacy. The security agreements saw a Turkish government that reflected an Islamist between Iran and Turkey were a major trust-building vision. The feeling was mutual: the first official foreign trip accomplishment. As a result, the two countries have actively that Erbakan undertook as prime minister was to Iran in shared intelligence on Kurdish militant groups and also co- 1996. The Kemalist establishment, which would go on to ordinated military operations on both countries’ borders impeach Erbakan’s government in 1997, reacted with shock with Iraq, which have enabled them to seriously weaken and criticism. Kurdish militant groups.6

However, even after Erbakan’s departure, the need for Economically, Turkey and Iran have seen historic levels engagement with Iran on energy and security matters of activity. In 2002, Turkish-Iranian trade volume was a endured. The staunchly secularist president, Ahmet Necdet mere $1 billion, made up overwhelmingly of Iranian oil/ Sezer, made a reluctant visit to Iran in 2002. The president gas exports to Turkey. Today, it stands above $14 billion.7 travelled with a business delegation at the invitation of Iranian energy resource exports to Turkey rose sharply from Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami to urge co-operation 2005, even as sanctions tightened on Iran. Turkish exports on security concerns over Kurdish militancy and to try to to Iran reached a peak in gold sales from 2011 onwards as build further economic engagement aside from the gas part of a “gold for gas” deal that allowed Iran to bypass imports from Iran that had created a trade imbalance.3 sanctions on transactions in foreign currencies.8 Turkey also Sezer’s trip was the initiative of Turkey’s visionary foreign opened up its banking structures to accommodate payments minister, Ismail Cem, who was seeking to expand Turkey’s made to Iran by other countries. In addition to recorded engagement in previously neglected areas, including Iran.4 trade, economic relations also included off-the-record

The AKP was founded in 2001, and had Islamist roots in the party of the former president Erbakan. It won a surprising victory in Turkey’s elections in 2002, and Iran once again saw a possible opening for engagement with Turkey. Tehran 5 James Brandon, “Iran’s Kurdish Threat: PJAK”, Terrorism Monitor, 15 June 2006, was heartened by the fact that merely a year after elections, available at http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/Articles/Jamaats%202%20 Terrorism%20Monitor.pdf. the Turkish parliament voted “no” to the US request that 6 See Bayram Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkish-Iranian Relations: Prospects and Limits”, Insight Turkey, April 2012, pp. 143, 152–153; James Brandon, “PJAK Faces Turkish-Iranian Storm”, the Jamestown Foundation, 8 November 2007, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4531. 7 “Info notes: Turkey-Iran bilateral relations”, Turkish Embassy, Tehran, 2 February 3 “Sezer delays visit to Iran”, Radikal, 17 June 2002, available at http://www.radikal. 2014, available at http://tehran.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=200934. com.tr/haber.php?haberno=40721. 8 For a briefing on how US sanctions came to stop the loophole that enabled such high 4 “Information Note on Foreign Minister Ismail Cem’s Visit to Iran 12–13 February gold sales to Iran, and thus caused their decline, see Seda Kirdar, “US Gold Sanctions 2001”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.mfa. on Iran and its Possible Consequences”, TEPAV, April 2013, available at http://www. gov.tr/information-note-on-foreign-minister-ismail-cem_s-visit-to-iran_br_12-13- tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1366125253-3.US_Gold_Sanctions_on_Iran_and_Its_ february-2001-.en.mfa. Possible_Consequences.pdf. 17 18 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS At theinternational level, Turkey’s policiesofmaximising 2011–2014: Arockierpath 10  9  Therefore, Turkey joined Brazil in offering an alternativean offering in Brazil joined Turkey Therefore, (with Brazil) pursued a negotiating track with Iranto with track anegotiating Brazil)pursued (with Turkey always stayed away from condemning Iran’s from condemning human away stayed Turkey always reason that this newamitywasthe not todisrupt The desire Iran could provideachancetomoveforwardnucleartalks Turkey–Iran relations were booming and, after decades of decades boomingand,after were relations Turkey–Iran Turkey andIran’snewfoundtrusthaveallowedthemto Turkey nuclear deal. In the end, only Iran benefitted from onlyIranbenefitted end, Inthe deal. nuclear Turkey It didnot, though, take longfor cracks toappear inthe Iran’s positive perceptionsofTurkeywereagaingiving activities in the region, Turkey’s foreign policymakers Turkey’sforeign region, inthe activities genuinely thoughtthattheir newfound friendship with government. Atthedomestic level, Iran–Turkey relations competition in post-SaddamIraq.competition relationship However, the closer future. inTurkey,aswellfromasubstantialportionemerge engagement. Hundreds ofIranian companies were setup of Shiites. sceptical are who orientation Sunni of Turks religious of wave of sanctions, which would obviously also affect Turkey. also affect obviously would wave ofsanctions,which anew prevent thus and countries P5+1 the Iranand with opposition, even on political and itsclampdown rights issues work together, which led to new diplomatic opportunities. diplomatic new to led which together, work resolve the nuclear dispute.nuclearNonetheless,resolveTurkey Iranthe and remainworriedan Iranian-styletheocracy deeplythat will mutual mistrust, a sense was sinking in that the two could two the sinking inthat was mistrust, asense mutual way to suspicion. Iran was unsettled by Turkey’s decision Turkey’s by unsettled Iranwas suspicion. to way manage effectively and calmly their increasing influence and influence increasing their and calmly effectively manage though Turkey was generally vocal abouthuman rights issues though Turkeywasgenerally in the region. As Turkey pursued arangeofpeace-brokering in theregion. As Turkey pursued to allow NATObuild aradarto allow topart systemasofitsearly- aside, eveninthe process. Turkeywas graduallypushed the its (Western) partners. This was enhanced when Turkey when enhanced was This partners. (Western) its its geo-economicinterests andasserting itsdiplomatic in Turkey, whichenabledIran tocarry outinternational seemed, against all the odds, to be set on a path to a much to on apath set be to odds, the all against seemed, process forhandlingthenuclearissuein2010. havereactions elicitedstrong from secular circles,who hosting offurtherP5+1negotiationsinIstanbul. presence in the region was already causing tension with causingtension wasalready region in the presence from the start in the ill-fated but well-intentioned Brazil– butwell-intentioned ill-fated startinthe from the between the two countries has had a high cost for Erdoğan’s business activities. blossoming Turkey–Iranrelationship. Thiswasvisible iranian-funded-firms-tops-list-for-ninth-month.html. October 2012,availableathttp://www.todayszaman.com/news-295988-number-of- “Number ofIranian-fundedfirmstopslistfor ninthmonth”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8685846.stm. “Iran signsnuclearfuel-swap dealwithTurkey”, 9

BBC News,17May2010,available at Today’s Zaman 10 , 21

As a NATO member state, Turkey did not have the option the didnothave Turkey state, As aNATOmember 13 12  15  14  11

For Iran,of Iran’s Assad’s Syriaformedanimportantaspect They believed that theycouldinfluence Bashar al-Assad Turkey had pursued closer relations with Syria and was Syria.in situation the with case the particularly was This Iran tooquelled theharshstatementsemerging fromits Turkey, its Syria policy was more than a simple geopolitical more thanasimple was Syria policy Turkey, its Iran in the process of raising concerns over the Syrian the over ofraisingconcerns process Iran inthe However, the Arab Awakening and the geopolitical rivalries geopolitical Arab Awakeningandthe However, the However, there were troubles there too; new US sanctions Both countries sought to frame the public euphoria thatBoth countriessoughttoframethepubliceuphoria By 2013, thediplomaticcharmbetweentwocountries Patriot missiles on itsborders. Patriot missiles airspace or land be used for aggression against Iran. against In turn, for aggression used or landbe airspace and the pressure it faced, Turkey’s pursuit to strengthen its strengthen to Turkey’s pursuit faced, it pressure and the a firstforTurkishstateofficials. and only economic relationships proved to be long lasting. long be to proved relationships economic only and also a question of national security andof managing the ofnationalsecurity also aquestion gripped the region during the unrest’s initialdayswithin unrest’s duringthe region the gripped continually assured Iran that Turkey would never let its let never would Turkey Iranthat assured continually defence was understandable, including the deployment ofunderstandable,deployment was the defence including calculation; with a border with Syria of some 900 km, Syria ofsome it was aborderwith calculation; with other backer, Russia, itwasalsocautioustonotalienate on, Assad Turkeychallenging graduallywentfrom publicly warning missile shield in 2011 as well as by Turkey’s own asbyTurkey’s in2011aswell shield missile warning regime’s brutality. reach fromTehrantotheshoresofMediterranean, made clear. meaning the survival of Assad’s regime was paramount.For survival meaning theofAssad’sregime just as Turkey was cautious to not burn bridges with Assad’s to notburnbridges just asTurkeywascautious to oppose the organisation. Given the realities of the region of the realities organisation. Given the the to oppose their own self-declaredtheirown modelsofIslamand governance. that emerged from it would again trouble the relationship. the trouble again itwould from emerged that topple him. to actively supporting theopposition groups seeking to went But, as time anddemocratisation. towards reform its diplomacy in the Middle East wasnotbasedonaSunni East its diplomacyin the Middle etra aed; oh auol ad roa visited Erdoğan and Davutoğlu both agenda; sectarian hardline cadres. had worn off. What remained wasmutuallyshaken trust, preoccupied with preserving newly normalising relations. normalising newly preserving with preoccupied pursuit ofmissiledefencesystems, asIranian officials Shiite shrines and met with Shiite clerics in Iraq,was clerics which Shiite with met and shrines Shiite burden ofthehumanitariancosts ofthe conflict. However,   Missile-Shield. article/20110908/DEFSECT01/109080310/Iran-Ups-Criticism-Turkey-s-NATO- France-Presse Mohammad Davari,“IranUpsCriticismofTurkey’sNATOMissileShield”, Light oftheArabSpring”, and HooshhangAzizi, “Rivalry andCooperationintheIran-Turkey Relationsinthe For acomparisonofhowIranandTurkeyapproached theArabSpring,seeRezaSolat assurances-to-iran-on-nato-missile-shield.html. 2012, availableathttp://www.todayszaman.com/news-267694-turkey-gives- “Turkey givesassurancestoIranonNATOmissile shield”, ref:C52E64FEA90AB8. January 2014,availableathttps://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ “Iran’s NuclearDiplomacy:AResponsefromTurkey”,RUSIAnalysis,27 ID=71829. 29 March2011,availableathttp://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&Article “Turkish PMbecomesfirstSunnileaderto visit shrineofImamAli”, 11 , 8September2011,availableathttp://www.defensenews.com/ 13 Turkey alsostrove todemonstrate that Discourse: AnIranian Quarterly 12 Foreign Minister Davutoğlu 14 Today’s Zaman , Summer–Fall2012. World Bulletin , 5January Agence , 15 15

had an impact on trade figures, and Iranian energy sales Turkey has already scaled down a lot of its grander Middle proved to be sometimes unreliable and more costly for East plans and shifted its regional policy to a much more Turkey than gas from Russia and Azerbaijan. self-protecting framework. For Turkey, two key realpolitik concerns now drive its Iran policy: maximising trade and Turkey’s security apparatus once again gave signals about becoming a neutral energy route between producers and the possible risk of Iranian agents seeking to create chaos consumers while meeting its own energy needs. and tensions in Turkey, along with Assad’s agents. In fact, in 2012, the Turkish intelligence agency clamped down on an Maintaining this lucrative friendship, however, continues alleged Iranian spy ring in Turkey.16 In May 2013, a terror to be risky for the AKP government. Turkey continually attack at the Turkish town of Reyhanli near the border with faces pressure from the US over its economic dealings with Syria killed 53 people, the largest single terror attack in Iran. While a possible deal on Iran’s nuclear weapons would Turkey’s recent history. The attack is assumed to have been mean more economic opportunities for Turkey, the long undertaken by networks controlled by the Assad regime. process of untangling sanctions and residual pressure from Iranian support for the Assad regime, and active fighting Israel and sceptical political views in the US and Europe on forces in Syria and Turkey’s direct involvement from 2012 Iran’s long-term intentions would always complicate the onwards in programmes arming Syrian opposition groups, economic relations. put both countries in a proxy conflict with each other. The Turkish public remains deeply mistrustful of Iran, The expansion of IS in Syria and Iraq brought all of these thanks to a mixture of Kemalist and Sunni misreadings. issues to surface once again: while Iran publicly and directly Numbers of Turks visiting Iran, academic and policy experts engaged in fighting against IS, Turkey refrained from an on Iran, and Turks who speak Farsi remain too minuscule to overt and direct clash while facing serious security risks record. In June 2014, the Pew Research Center found that caused by IS, which was visible in the case of Turkish 75 percent of Turks held unfavourable views of Iran, and diplomats held captive by IS in Mosul. Turkey refused to only 11 percent of Turks held positive views of Rouhani.17 do so even when fiercely pressured by the US to join the This limits the degree to which the Turkish government can campaign against IS and risked facing a serious backlash push closer relations. to its domestic Kurdish issues as Kurdish-governed towns were attacked by IS. From Iran’s perspective, too, the Turkish government has proven to be more independent in asserting its interests in Meanwhile, Iran and Turkey gradually agreed on the need the region and more reluctant to sever its relations with the for a change in Iraq’s central government and preventing a US, the EU, and NATO than the harsh public statements break-up of the country. Yet, Turkey’s close relations with by Turkish politicians about the West would suggest. The the Kurdistan Regional Government and support for direct Iranian public has generally positive views on Turkey. The oil exports from the region continued to cause tensions with rate of Iranian tourists to Turkey is in the millions and, due to the central Iraqi government and thus with Iran’s interests the Azeri population in Iran, many Iranians can understand in Iraq. and speak Turkish easily. But the Iranian security and political establishment maintains a deep scepticism of Turkey. Iran, just like Turkey, wants to maintain good Limits of the Rouhani Era economic relations with Turkey for its own survival, at the same time as trying to ensure that the implications of both Despite the positive impressions from the first year of countries’ desire to shape the future of Syria and Iraq do not the Rouhani presidency and the willingness of the AKP critically harm the bilateral relationship. government to bury the negative legacy of the Ahmadinejad years, the last ten years have revealed the range and limits of These mean that the two countries will continue their risky, future co-operation. All the core issues that soured Turkish- complicated, yet essential engagement. The driving engine Iranian relations are still alive today. for closer co-operation and avoiding fallouts over regional concerns will not be a mythical ideological affinity between It is clear that Iran and Turkey will remain at odds with one the governments of both countries, but realities of their another over Syria and Iraq within their larger geopolitical interdependence in a volatile region. conflict of interests, even though the threat of IS to interests in Syria and Iraq and to national security have once again brought the two countries somewhat closer to face a shared threat.

16 “Iranian agents captured”, Hurriyet, 2 September 2012, available at http://www. 17 “Iran’s Global Image Largely Negative”, Pew Research, 18 June 2014, available at hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21362929.asp. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/06/18/irans-global-image-largely-negative/. 19 20 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS – while also opening opportunities for both to become more – whilealsoopeningopportunitiesforbothtobecomemore The futureoftheIran- Aurélie Daher Aurélie Daher Anatomy ofIranian-Hezbollahrelations Hezbollah relationship Ali Khamenei. At first glance,first theJune2013At PresidentHassan election of For two years, the involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah of Lebanese involvement the years, For two The relationship between Hezbollah and theIranian , the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon (IRL)and inLebanon Resistance Islamic , the Lubnân fi Khomeini. Ever since, the core leadership ofHezbollah, leadership core the since, Ever Khomeini. Leader oftheIranian Revolution, AyatollahRuhollah world tothe itsexistence officially announced Hezbollah Hezbollah deals withmore than one interlocutor and has Rouhani, widely seen as a moderate and a reformist, could Rouhani, widelyseenasamoderateandreformist,could authority. After Khomeini’s death in1989, transferred authority. AfterKhomeini’sdeath they agreement with the new Iranian government on the nuclear agreement withthenewIraniangovernmentonnuclear ameaningful toreach determined administration seems actions shouldbeunderstoodasbeingmotivatedbyitsown acknowledged thisreality: al-Muqâwama al-Islâmiyya could useitasapotentialstepping-stonefornegotiation could finditselfunderpressure,somesay,sincetheWest of Homs. Many observers believed this intervention was the of Homs. Manyobserversbelievedthisinterventionwasthe which is mainly made up of Shiite clerics, has upheld this hasupheld clerics, ofShiite up ismainlymade which regime hasnowlastedfor 30years, andinthattime, its was an Open Letter promulgated on 16 February 1985. In would be felt in Syria as well as in Lebanon. Such a scenario, would befeltinSyriaaswellLebanon. Suchascenario, ofsuchamove effects The agreement. within abroader war in Syria. The rise of ISIS has only consolidated this trend war inSyria.TheriseofISIShasonlyconsolidatedthistrend regime’s increasinglossesonthebattlefield,butHezbollah’s result ofadirective fromTehranissuedbecauseoftheAssad their allegiance toIran’s their allegiance current SupremeLeader, Ayatollah the of authority the acknowledged Hezbollah publicly letter, the the militarymother-organisationofHezbollah,hasbeen institutionalised to different degrees. The first act by which by act first The degrees. different to institutionalised issue. If talks between the United States and Iran do make andIrandomake States United the Iftalksbetween issue. in thenearfuture,especiallysincePresidentBarackObama’s interests asmuchthoseofIran. scope and strength has fluctuated. Inpart,thisisbecause hasfluctuated. andstrength scope suggest that ties between Tehran and Hezbollah will weaken that tiesbetweenTehranandHezbollahwillweaken suggest however, is extremely unlikely. If anything, the alliance Ifanything,the unlikely. isextremely however, has been disputed. Belatedly, theparty’s leadership links with different centres ofpowerinIran,whicharelinks withdifferentcentres useful playersintheeyesofWest. progress beforethenewdeadlineofJune 2015, Hezbollah fighters on the side of Bashar al-Assad’s troops inSyria ofBasharal-Assad’stroops side onthe fighters between Iran and Hezbollah is being strengthened by theby strengthened being is Hezbollah and Iran between backing the Syrian army in the region of Qusayr, to the south backing theSyrianarmyinregionofQusayr, tothesouth , at that time embodied by the Supreme the by embodied time Wilayat al-Faqih,atthat

And duringhisvisittoBeirutin2003, Iranian the president Ali AkbarAli Mohtashemi; a radical conservative oneled After Khomeini’sdeathin1989,threedifferenttrends 1997, and his five-day visit to the countrywas thefirstby andhisfive-dayvisittothe 1997, 1989 directly affected Hezbollah’s evolution inLebanon. Hezbollah’sevolution 1989 directlyaffected 3 2  1 

Iranian State hasnotbeentraumaticforHezbollah.Firstly, Iranian presidency under Rafsanjani and Khatami. But,in Khomeini was preoccupied by the war with Iraq Khomeini waspreoccupied and sohad Hezbollah continuedtoenjoylarge room for manoeuvre, Hezbollah appeared to have lost some support within the Hariri was officially invited to Iran as early asOctober toIranasearly Hariri wasofficiallyinvited Rafsanjani itsownparapolitical and Khatamibydeveloping Rafsanjani believed Iran’s national interest should takeshould interest national Iran’s believed Rafsanjani in presidency Iranian the to accession Rafsanjani’s Neither SupremeLeader AyatollahKhomeininorhis appearing tograntHezbollahpreferentialtreatment. and underhisleadership,Iranwasmoreinclinedtoopen Iranin1997, of president became Khatami Mohammad Musawi andHassanNasrallah. and 1996, Ayatollah Khamenei and President RafsanjaniPresident and Khamenei Ayatollah 1996, and general, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, and encouraged the rise the Subhial-Tufayli,andencouraged Sheikh general, country’s sovereignty. This weakened theonce-privileged emerged on the Iranian political scene: a radical scene: Iranianpolitical onthe emerged compensate for thesuspensionofstatesubsidies under drastic cuts to Iran’sdrasticcuts to financial supportto Hezbollah. The of amoreof pragmaticconservative Abbasal-by group led reality, the relative loosening of its bond with the head of the of head the its bondwith of relative loosening reality, the revolutionaryformerrepresentedby interiorone minister networks –andbecomingmoreself-sustaining. normalise relationships with the West caused him to make him to caused West the with relationships normalise mainly in itsmanagement andexecutionofdecisions. the head of a Lebanese cabinet since the Iranian Revolution. the since cabinet a Lebanese of head the secretary- organisation’s first the by represented tendencies the organisation. in Iran’s of theradical political lifebroughtabouttheeclipse institutions – including social, educational, andmediainstitutions –includingsocial,educational, successor, Ali Khamenei, intruded much in the party’s affairs. much inthe successor, AliKhamenei,intruded held discussions with the mainpoliticalfactions without discussionswiththe held little interest in the Lebanese question. And Khamenei had And Khamenei question. Lebanese in the interest little position ofHezbollah.Lebanon’sPrimeMinisterRafik up toother political actors in Lebanon and to respect the like others” in Lebanon. like others” party, just “a political to become urged explicitly party was precedence overexportingtherevolution. Hisdesireto faith in the ability of the Hezbollah leadership to maintain to leadership Hezbollah the of ability in the faith by President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani AkbarHashemi by President embodied one apragmatic and Khamenei; Ayatollah by became allies and succeeded in marginalising Mohtashemi. became alliesandsucceeded

Khomeini”. chapters “IranandLebanonintheRevolutionary Decade”and“IranLebanonafter Relations: IranandLebanonintheLast500 Years I useherethepresentationofIraniantrends giveninHouchangChehabi(ed.), Daher, France, 2014),chapter 3(hereafter:Daher,Hezbollah Aurélie Daher, Hezbollah Le Hezbollah:MobilisationetPouvoir . 3 Secondly, Hezbollah’s leadership could 2 Within Hezbollah, this new phase WithinHezbollah,thisnew (London:I.B.Tauris,2006), (Paris:PressesUniversitairesde ). 1 Between 1989 Between Distant Strengthening relations post-2006 government’s actions, the Iranian regime decided to bypass the government by channelling significant aid through In 2005, the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah Hezbollah’s social and charity institutions. This served changed again, but, this time, to the party’s advantage. to bolster Hezbollah’s popularity within its community 6 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election as president in August and beyond. opened the door to an ideological convergence between the Supreme Leader, the leadership of Hezbollah, and the new president, who was formerly a soldier in the Iranian Stepping into the Syrian turmoil Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Unlike his two predecessors, Ahmadinejad sought to portray Iran as a As Syria’s uprising evolved, it was reconfirmed that symbol of the struggle against the US and Israel. Providing Hezbollah and Iran shared the same interests in the Levant. Hezbollah with strong backing represented a perfect As soon as protests began, rumours started to spread embodiment of this struggle. In the history of Hezbollah’s about the participation of IRL and even IRGC fighters in relationship with the Iranian regime, therefore, the year battles on the side of the Syrian regular army. In September 2005 marks the return of the Iranian president to the 2012, Mohammad Ali Jafari, the chief commander of the “sacred trio” of the Iran-Hezbollah alliance, with all three IRGC, admitted that a “certain number of the Quds Force 7 –Hezbollah’s leadership, the Supreme Leader, and the members and IRGC were present in Syria and Lebanon”. Iranian President – once again sharing the same ideological He insisted that the IRGC were there only as “advisers” affinities. This position has been sharpened by increased and were providing no more than “intellectual assistance, international focus on Iran’s nuclear activities and the threat advice, and experience” and he responded to allegations of Israeli military strikes, which increased Hezbollah’s use that Hezbollah was participating in Syrian “repression” by for Iran as a deterrent against Israeli action. saying: “The Resistance and Hezbollah are independent forces [from Iran]”.8 The war of July 2006 in Lebanon soon provided the Iranian regime and Hezbollah with the opportunity to showcase Only in May 2013 did the party explicitly acknowledge the this ideological convergence and to push forward both participation of IRL fighters in Syria. For three weeks, in the their interests. The Israeli army performed poorly against town of Qusayr (located in the north-west of Syria near the Hezbollah during the 33-day conflict, significantly boosting Shiite Lebanese region of Baalbek al-Hermel), members of Hezbollah’s regional standing, as well as that of its backers, the IRL fought alongside the Syrian army to drive the rebels Iran and Syria, in contrast to Egypt and Arab Gulf States, from one of their main strongholds. Many observers thought which appeared to tacitly back Israel. So, the international this intervention in the Syrian conflict must be the answer to community decided to bet on a reinforced United Nations an Iranian directive. But this is not the whole story: there is Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in South Lebanon, with as much evidence that the IRL actively sought involvement France, Italy, and Germany agreeing to participate in the to protect its own interests as there is that it was obeying newly reorganised force. But in doing so, they also presented an Iranian order. The IRL is not fighting across the country Hezbollah and Tehran with new means of putting pressure but in a specific, defined zone, mainly to secure a territory on the West. With European troops in a region where the IRL in Syria close to the Lebanese border through which Iranian had influence, Hezbollah and the Iranian government could armaments could be transported to Lebanon. Given the directly threaten the peacekeepers. Moreover, UNIFIL was decision-making methods within the Hezbollah leadership unable to prevent the movement of arms in South Lebanon, and the way the Wilayat al-Faqih principle operates, the much less to disarm the IRL. idea may very well have come from within Hezbollah’s Decision Council, who would subsequently have sought a In the wake of Israeli military offensives against Lebanon, “good for agreement” approval from the Iranian Supreme Hezbollah consistently made significant financial resources Leader. This hypothesis could be corroborated by Hassan available to rebuild whatever the Israeli army had destroyed. Nasrallah’s unusual visit to Iran in April 2013, where he At the end of the war, an Iranian delegation met the Lebanese met Khamenei almost a month before the IRL joined the prime minister in late August and asked to take part in Qusayr battle. the reconstruction process. Iran’s proposal would have

provided much-needed financing worth several hundred 4 millions of dollars. But the Lebanese government’s official 6 Although the party did not declare the origins of the funds that it distributed directly to authorisation was withheld, even though expert teams from damaged people, it is difficult to imagine that the source was anyone other than Iran. In an interview published in the daily Al-Akhbar at the end of August, Riad Salameh, other countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Canada, and director of the Lebanese central bank, declared that “the cash distributed by Hezbollah 5 to the families who have lost their homes during the war against Israel probably Belgium) were already at work. Dissatisfied by the Lebanese comes from foreign funds”; he estimated that the indemnification program planned by Hezbollah would certainly cost “at least $150 million”. He also noted that “it seems

that money was shipped, because it doesn’t come neither from the Central Bank […] nor from the banking sector, since there was a bill shortage at that time […] and the 4 Al-Safir, 26 August 2006. bank sector is forced to declare each amount it withdraws” (Al-Akhbar, 31 August 5 The Iranians complained about this deliberate marginalisation, but refused to give 2006). Besides, the party has never denied that the Iranian authorities – and religious up. In late September, several Iranian institutions – the Reconstruction Committee, associations linked to the Supreme Leader’s office in particular – have always financed the Iranian Red Crescent, and the Imam Khomeini Resupplying Committee – drew some of its social institutions, especially those affiliated with existing institutions up a detailed programme to rebuild Lebanon. Under political pressure from the in Iran, such as Jihâd al-Binâ’, a replica of the Iranian Hay’at I’âdat al-I’mâr, or Shiite population, the Lebanese prime minister ultimately agreed to a limited Hay’atImdâd al-Imâm al-Khomeiny, which carries the same name in Lebanon. Iranian participation through the restoration of one bridge and a small part of the 7 L’Orient-Le Jour (online version), 16 September 2012. road network. 8 Ibid. 21 22 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS What nextforHezbollah? Hassan RouhaniandtheriseofISIS: When the news of HassanWhenof newsthe Rouhani’s victory madewas 12  11 10  9  Even so, Rouhani’s electionmade thoseopposedtothe To Hezbollah’s leadership, his message was that Iran would To Hezbollah’sleadership,hismessage IRL’s mission in Syria hopefulthattheIRL’s activity Revolutionary GuardCorpssoldiers. Rouhani sent messages to both Bashar al-Assad and Hassan Bashar al-Assad to both messages Rouhani sent But these predictionsButthese provedinaccurate. be to Indeed, Describing theelectionas“apopularandpoliticalepic”,he Nasrallah reaffirming his support. He said that close ties saidthatclose He hissupport. Nasrallah reaffirming and Westernsupporters. area to prevent the infiltration of suicide bombers ready to ready bombers suicide infiltration of prevent the area to although the radical Ahmadinejad has been replaced by the the radicalAhmadinejadhasbeenreplaced although alleged that 1,200 IRL fighters had been replaced by replaced been had 1,200IRLfighters that alleged continue to provide support to “back the steadfast nation steadfast “backthe to support provide to continue deepening proxy nature of the conflict,deepening proxytheSyrianpitting natureofthe the reflected forAleppo, battle inthe including country, of Lebanon”. of attacksin southern Beirut. At thesametime,Hezbollah official in Iran in June 2013,HassanNasrallahsalutedofficial inIranJune newspapers, for example, predicted that IRL would fighters predicted for example, newspapers, Lebanese Some terminated. or even down scaled be would regime anditsregionalbackersagainsttheopposition’sGulf weaken in the near future. In public, Western governments moderate, open-to-the-West Rouhani, thereisinreality trust that this extraordinary people has placed in you.” hasplaced people trust thatthisextraordinary the new Iranian president: “Congratulations for thegreat increased, with widened involvement alongthissameborder increased, withwidened in generaland theUS and French administrations in soon be withdrawn. be soon in the region, especially the Zionist regime”, he “lauded the “lauded he Zionist regime”, the region, especially in the strike Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, following anumber said that Rouhani was “thecarrier ofgreat hopesfor his has expandeditssupportoftheSyrianregimeacross he predictedthat“Syriawillovercomeitscurrentcrisis”. leave Syrian territory. But the IRL’s recent successes against IRL’s successes the recent Syrian territory. But leave the IRLparticular continuetosaythattheywantsee will relationship Iranian-Hezbollah the that chance little people andfor thefriends ofthispeople”. Amonthlater, Since this initial action in Qusayr, the IRL’s activities have IRL’s activities in Qusayr,the initial action this Since Syrian nation for its resistance against Westernplots”,and Syrian nationforitsresistance between Syria and Iran would “be able to confront enemies to able “be Syria andIranwould between article/819594/rohani-se-dit-contre-les-ingerences-etrangeres-en-syrie-.html. in Syria, beacon-of-hope-Rowhani-316708; “Rouhani speaksoutagainstforeigninterference available athttp://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hezbollah-welcomes-Iranian- “Hezbollah welcomes‘Iran’sbeaconofhope’Rohani”, See,forinstance, News.aspx/172475. Arutz Sheva,3October2013,available athttp://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/ Dalit HaleviandAriSoffer,“Syria:Rebels Down DroneasRegimeCasualtiesMount”, syria-hezbollah/. 2013, availableathttp://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-rouhani-affirms-support-for- “Iran’s RouhaniaffirmssupportforSyria, Hezbollah”,TheTimesofIsrael L’Orient-Le Jour,17June2013,availableathttp://www.lorientlejour.com/ L’Orient-Le Jour,30August2013. 11 In October 2013, InOctober an Israelinewspaper 12 Jerusalem Post,16June2013,

, 16July 10 9

As mentioned above,theIRLpresenceinSyriaismainlyAs mentioned 13 14 

2006 – to expand its diplomatic room for manoeuvre and itsdiplomatic roomformanoeuvre 2006 –toexpand The IRL’s successfulcampaign in Syria provides Iran with ISIS –helpthatHezbollahwouldinevitablyprovidethe Iran initsreconciliationwiththeWest. US would accept Bashar al-Assad remaining in power. In inpower. Basharal-Assadremaining wouldaccept US helping to maintain Iran’s interests in Syria,while interests Iran’s to maintain helping facto Hezbollah may prove a useful force in the fight in Syria.All fight in the force may proveauseful Hezbollah Bashar al-Assad’s regime falls. Thus, the IRL notneed falls. Thus,the does Bashar al-Assad’sregime President Obama to Ali Khamenei is said to have implied to have implied to is said Ali Khamenei Obama to President acknowledged thatitwouldwelcomethe“constructive another advantage. Rather than handicapping Tehran advisers toaidtheSyrianarmy). also making it unnecessary,fornow,Tehran to commit actors solicited to help find a solution to the Syrian question. to the find asolution to help actors solicited are already indirectly working with Hezbollah inLebanon indirectlyworkingwithHezbollah already are Moreover, Tehran has more than one good reason to reason good one than hasmore Tehran Moreover, a limitedsafehavenwillsuffice,aslongitisequipped presenceif toreorganisetheir willbeable and Hezbollah governments, particularlygiventhatWesterngovernments cooperation of Iran” at the Geneva II conference. II Geneva the at Iran” of cooperation conference, Tehran would have officially been oneofthe officiallybeen Tehranwouldhave conference, confined toawell-definedarea.Oneofitsaimsiskeep carrying out retaliation operations in Lebanon. But even But inLebanon. operations retaliation out carrying were itnotforUNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-Moon’slast- radical Sunni jihadist groups donot really displease these now preventing theconsolidation and growth ofISIS. In with logistical amenities that can enable its weapons tobe itsweapons thatcanenable with logisticalamenities from them andtoprevent border acrossthe regions minute cancellation of Iran’s minute cancellation in the invitation toparticipate maintain a strong relationship withitsLebanese protégé. more importantly, it wants to recreate on the Syrian side of on theSyrianside more importantly,itwantstorecreate jihadi extremists.And, just asin Iraq where theUSmilitary the Iranian leader that in exchange for Iranian fighting Iranian thatinexchange help the leader sent inNovember2014 letter” by the moresince“secret transferred from Iran. transferred to have established itself across theentireterritoryofSyria; itself to haveestablished IRL the in which zone and secure an accessible frontier the its capacityfor negotiation. In January 2014, Washington in itsdiscussionswiththeWest, itallows–justlikein onlymilitary (Iranhassent cause tothe soldiers its own its own interests in Syria before those of Assad, itisstill of those inSyriabefore own interests its is indirectly working alongside Iranian backed militias, Iranianbacked alongside working indirectly is constrained inthefightagainst that theUSisless indicates intervention against ISIS wagedsince September 2014 support public Beyond extremists. against fight in the is unlikely that Hezbollah will formpartofanybargainby will thatHezbollah is unlikely light of the balancing role that the IRL inSyria,it the is playing balancing rolethat the of light Syria, neither wanting to fully own the Syria crisisnorfully own the Syria, neither wantingtofully September2013 Washington reluctantwas engageto in Sunni jihadist groups away from the Lebanese Shiite for “a real Syrian democracy”, the West’s primary focusis primary West’s the democracy”, Syrian for “areal back rebelsin the their fightagainstAssad. But themilitary  January 2014. Interviews withIRLfighterscomingbackfrom battleinSyria,October2013and L’Orient-Le Jour,6January2014. 13 If the IRL in this way is defending is defending IRLway inthis Ifthe 14 And de Though not exactly official, the fact that Iranian war aircrafts are bombarding ISIS positions in Syria and Iraq alongside the US-led Coalition is a telling illustration of how the West and Iran are de facto allies in fighting a jihadist radical Islam in the Middle East.15 Indeed, US Secretary of State John Kerry made it explicit in September, reportedly telling the US Security Council that “there is room for everybody, including Iran, in an anti-IS coalition”.16

Given the growing weakness of the Assad regime, including its significantly diminished role in Lebanon, the tight bond between Iran and Hezbollah that existed under Ahmadinejad is likely to be stronger still. After the end of the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990) and the instalment of Syrian tutelage over the country, Damascus was closely involved in the daily management of Lebanese affairs, and even intruded directly or indirectly in the relationships of political parties with foreign governments. Iran-Hezbollah ties were no exception.17 The 2008 assassination of senior Hezbollah member Imad Mughniyeh in the Syrian capital – allegedly by the Israeli Mossad, with help from high-ranking Syrian security officers – was interpreted by some observers as a warning from the Syrian regime both to Hezbollah and to Iran in response to Syria’s perceived marginalisation within the “axis of resistance” alliance. Today, however, the situation is drastically different. Iranian “advisors” lead and train Assad’s loyalist forces and the IRL is playing a critical role in the regime’s position on the ground. With Damascus now in the position of the indebted party, its room for manoeuvre and its capacity of being a nuisance to the Tehran-Hezbollah relationship will be seriously diminished. While the strength of the Iranian relationship with Hezbollah is therefore currently undoubtable, questions exist over the extent to which these two powers might eventually be willing to engage in dealmaking in Syria. This is particularly brought into focus by the growing threat posed by ISIS – a fight that neither Tehran nor Hezbollah want to own on behalf of the Assad regime. In Lebanon, Hezbollah and Iran appear to now believe that a degree of power sharing with regional backing is necessary to combat extremists. In Syria, US-led military action targeting ISIS but not the regime appears on the one hand to officially vindicate the position that ISIS, not Assad, is the priority. Down the road, however, and with growing international recognition of the role played by Iran and its regional allies like Hezbollah, this equation could perhaps also shift towards a compromise that combines the push against ISIS with meaningful political transition and change in Syria that has Iranian and Hezbollah endorsement.

15 Akbar Shahid Ahmed, “Iran Bombing Islamic State In Iraq, U.S. Official Confirms”, Huffington Post, 1 December 2014, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2014/12/01/us-iran-iraq_n_6251894.html. 16 Patrick Cockburn, “Nothing will stop ISIS but a Syrian truce”, The Independent, 3 December 2014, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/ nothing-will-stop-isis-except-a-syrian-truce-9746373.html. 17 For more details, see Daher, Hezbollah, chapter 3. 23 24 ECFR DECEMBER 2014 www.ecfr.eu GULF ANALYSIS About theauthors Aurelie Daher Aurelie European atthe isapolicyfellow Hammond Andrew Africa programme attheEuropean CouncilonForeign Fatima AyubisapolicyfellowintheMiddleEastandNorth Kirk H. SowellisaprincipalofUticensisRiskServices, a East, the United States and South Asia. She holds an M.A. in East, theUnitedStatesandSouthAsia. SheholdsanM.A.in Eastern politics. Follow himonTwitterat@Ziya_Meral. Twitter at@UticensisRisk. Twitter @thecynicist. is a London-based researcher focused on Turkish Ziya Meral isaLondon-basedresearcherfocused University’s JohnsHopkins fromthe Studies International Illusion ofReforminSaudiArabia.FollowhimonTwitter Relations. Shehasabackground inpoliticalanalysis, Shlomo Brom Shlomo National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. He was He AvivUniversity. Tel at Studies Security National and Power. She holds a PhD from Sciences Po. Her work Po.Her holdsaPhDfromSciences She and Power. affairs, religion,andhumanrights, Eastern and Middle at @hammonda1. and ismost recently the author ofIslamic Utopia: The himon Follow riskfirm. political East-focused Middle Council onForeignRelations.Hewasformerlyajournalist General StaffoftheIsraeliDefenceForces. research and advocacy with experience in Europe, the Middle research andadvocacywithexperienceinEurope, theMiddle with Reuters basedinEgypt, theUAE, andSaudiArabia, is a PhD candidate in Politics at the University ofCambridge. at the in Politics is aPhDcandidate previously director of the Strategic Planning previously directoroftheStrategic Division in the School of Advanced International Studies. Follow her onSchool ofAdvancedInternationalStudies.Followher focuses onHezbollah, Shiites, andLebanese andMiddle is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Institute at the is aseniorresearchfellow is the author of Hezbollah: Mobilisationauthor ofHezbollah: isthe

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