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Annual Statistical Series 1 Finance Bulletin 1.01 Trade, Industry
Annual Statistical Series 1 Finance Bulletin 1.01 Trade, Industry & Contracts 2014 Statistical Bulletin Series 1 provides figures on the composition and scope Statistical Release of the Department’s expenditure, information on the impact of defence spending on the wider economy, and compares the MOD’s spending to Published 14 August 2014 that of other departments and other countries. (Revised 7 November 2014) (Revised 27 November 2014) Statistical Bulletin 1.01 presents information on MOD spending with industry and commerce, and sets out the numbers, types and values of contracts placed by MOD, major equipment projects and payments made by the MOD to its suppliers. Also included, is a focus on the top ten Issued by: companies by payments, as well as contracts placed and expenditure with Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Industry tables provide Defence Economics details of existing PFI contracts, and analysis of the impact of MOD (Defence Expenditure Analysis), spending on equipment and services in the UK. Trade data presents Ministry of Defence, information on defence export orders and payments made for services Oak 0W, consumed by MOD establishments overseas. Abbey Wood, Bristol, Key Points and Trends BS34 8SJ. • In 2012/13, the MOD spent just under £19.4 billion with UK industry, this represents a small decrease of £260 million from the 2011/12 figure. The Responsible Statistician for this Manufacturing attracted just under half of MOD expenditure with UK publication is the Defence Expenditure industry. Analysis Head of Branch. Tel: 030 679 34531 • In 2013/14 over 41 percent of total MOD procurement expenditure was Email: DefStrat-Econ-ESES-DEA- with 10 suppliers. -
Monthly Ranking of Brokerage Firms 01/09/2018 - 30/09/2018
Month: 2018-09 Monthly Ranking of Brokerage Firms 01/09/2018 - 30/09/2018 EGX Information Center - Monthly Ranking of Brokerage Firms Page 1 Issued on : 01/10/2018 01/09/2018 - 30/09/2018 Brokerage Firms in Terms of Value Traded (Main Market - OTC - NILEX) Volume Value Traded % of # of # Brokerage Firm Traded (LE) Total Trades (Share) 1 Financial Brokerage Group 6,722,889,142 17.7% 641,074,707 46,480 2 Commercial International Brokerage company (CIBC) 2,897,758,232 7.6% 446,497,430 58,700 3 Beltone Securities Brokerage 2,434,066,653 6.4% 382,741,289 32,793 4 Pharos Securities 2,360,244,245 6.2% 242,045,477 17,047 5 Arab African International Securities 2,344,724,462 6.2% 147,489,664 10,106 6 Hermes Securities Brokerage 2,154,876,769 5.7% 778,888,588 55,347 7 Arqaam Securities Brokerage 1,752,661,044 4.6% 143,967,772 27,418 8 Pioneers Securities 1,343,291,915 3.5% 534,035,101 57,215 9 Mubasher International For Securities 965,250,854 2.5% 362,095,597 41,397 10 Naeem Brokerage 945,885,668 2.5% 315,440,142 25,466 11 Sigma Securities Brokerage 934,307,496 2.5% 321,416,657 31,886 12 HSBC Securities Egypt S.A.E 859,787,800 2.3% 24,591,458 7,176 13 HC Brokerage 727,084,286 1.9% 120,338,782 19,027 14 Arabeya Online Securities 718,347,298 1.9% 335,448,129 33,686 15 Prime Securities Brokerage 602,869,331 1.6% 122,262,766 11,786 16 Shuaa securities 599,308,708 1.6% 180,864,539 15,334 17 Egyptian Arabian Company(Themar) 480,005,229 1.3% 183,291,230 20,275 18 Ifa Securities Brokerage 401,523,234 1.1% 221,943,955 8,319 19 Metro Co. -
Share Capital
SHARE CAPITAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE The table below sets out details relating to our share capital as at the Latest Practicable Date. Authorised share capital(1): 3,600,000,000. Common Shares 7,200,000,000. Class A Preferred Shares Issued, fully paid or credited as fully paid(2): 3,256,724,482. Common Shares in issue 2,108,579,606. Class A Preferred Shares in issue 12. Golden Shares in issue Notes: (1) The By-laws authorise the issue of shares forming part of the authorised share capital of the Common Shares and the Class A Preferred Shares by the Board without any further approval by Shareholders. (2) Including 47,375,394 Common Shares and 99,649,571 Class A Preferred Shares in treasury. TWO CLASSES OF SHARES Our share capital is currently divided into two classes of shares: (i) Common Shares and (ii) Preferred Shares. The two classes of Shares were first issued at the time of our incorporation on 11 January 1943. The Preferred Shares are further divided into Class A Preferred Shares and Golden Shares. All of the issued Shares are registered shares with no nominal value. In accordance with our privatisation deed, the Shareholders’ meeting held after the privatisation approved the introduction of the Golden Share to be exclusively owned by the Brazilian Government which carried special veto rights over certain matters specified in the By-laws. After subsequent share splits, there are now 12 Golden Shares in issue. All of the Golden Shares are owned by the Brazilian Government. For more information on the rights attached to the Golden Shares, please refer to “Voting rights” below. -
2021-2022 Biennial BUDGET 2021 - 2022 CITY of GOLDEN, COLORADO BUDGET and CAPITAL PROGRAMS
CITY OF GOLDEN 2021-2022 Biennial BUDGET 2021 - 2022 CITY OF GOLDEN, COLORADO BUDGET AND CAPITAL PROGRAMS 2021 – 2022 Golden Downtown General Improvement District Budget 2021-2022 Downtown Development Authority Budget 2021 Budget Adopted by Resolution of the Golden City Council on December 3, 2020 2019 GOLDEN CITY COUNCIL Laura Weinberg, Mayor Robert Reed, Ward I Paul Haseman, Ward II Jim Dale, Ward III Bill Fisher, Ward IV JJ Trout, District I Casey Brown, Mayor Pro-Tem District II Submitted by: Jason Slowinski City Manager 2021Ͳ2022CITYOFGOLDENBIENNIALBUDGET TABLEOFCONTENTS INTRODUCTION BudgetMessage...................................................................................................................1 BudgetCalendar..................................................................................................................15 CitizensBudgetAdvisoryCommitteeMessage...................................................................17 GFOADistinguishedBudgetPresentationAward................................................................19 ϮϬϮϭͲϮϬϮϮBudgetSummaryFundTypeDescriptions.........................................................20 ϮϬϮϭͲϮϬϮϮFundStructureChart.........................................................................................24 ϮϬϮϭBudgetSummaryRevenueandExpenditureChartofallFunds.................................25 ϮϬϮϮBudgetSummaryRevenueandExpenditureChartofallFunds.................................26 ϮϬϮϭBudgetSummary–ByFundType.............................................................................27 -
United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2010
UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE STATISTICS 2010 th Published: 29 September 2010 DASA (WDS) Tel: 020-7807-8792 Ministry of Defence Fax: 020-7218-0969 Floor 3 Zone K Mil: 9621 78792 Main Building, Whitehall E-mail: [email protected] London SW1A 2HB Web site: http://www.dasa.mod.uk INTRODUCTION Welcome to the 2010 edition of UK Defence Statistics, the annual statistical compendium published by the Ministry of Defence. Changes to UK Defence Statistics (UKDS) this year include a new section on Defence Inflation and an expanded International Defence section in Chapter 1, the restructuring of the Armed Forces Personnel section in Chapter 2, and a new section on Amputations in Chapter 3. UK Defence Statistics (UKDS) is a National Statistics publication, produced according to the standards of the Official Statistics Code of Practice. However some of the tables in UKDS do not have National Statistics status – some are produced by areas outside of the scope of the Government Statistical Service; some do not yet meet all the quality standards of the Official Statistics Code of Practice; and others have not gone through the required assessment process to be classed as National Statistics. All such tables are clearly marked with explanatory notes. This year UKDS is once again being issued as a web document only, due to financial constraints within the Ministry of Defence. Each table and chapter is available in pdf format which is suitable for printing. There is also a pdf version of the entire publication, and of the UKDS factsheet. We have ceased publication of the UKDS pocket cards this year, since they are of limited value in electronic format. -
Limited but Not Lost: a Comment on the ECJ's Golden Share Decisions
Fordham Law Review Volume 72 Issue 5 Article 35 2004 Limited But Not Lost: A Comment on the ECJ's Golden Share Decisions Christine O'Grady Putek Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Christine O'Grady Putek, Limited But Not Lost: A Comment on the ECJ's Golden Share Decisions, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2219 (2004). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/35 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COMMENT LIMITED BUT NOT LOST: A COMMENT ON THE ECJ'S GOLDEN SHARE DECISIONS Christine O'Grady Putek* INTRODUCTION Consider the following scenario:' Remo is a large industrialized nation with a widget manufacturer, Well-Known Co. ("WK") which has a strong international reputation, and is uniquely identified with Remo. WK is an important provider of jobs in southern Remo. Because of WK's importance to Remo, for both economic and national pride reasons, Remo has a special law (the "WK law"), which gives the government of southern Remo a degree of control over WK, all in the name of protection of the company from unwanted foreign takeovers and of other national interests, such as employment. The law caps the number of voting shares that any one investor may own, and gives the government of Southern Remo influence over key company decisions by allowing it to appoint half the board of directors. -
Assertions, the Golden Share Was Not a Condition Ofthe 1997 Enron/PGE Merger Transaction" and in Fact, PGE Did Not Create T
assertions, the golden share was not a condition ofthe 1997 Enron/PGE merger transaction" and in fact, PGE did not create this golden share mechanism until after Enron declared bankruptcy. Once Enron declared bankruptcy in 2001, PGE worked with S&P to develop a structure to avoid future downgrades ofPGE's bond ratings. PGE opted to issue one share with special voting rights with respect to any voluntary action by PGE regarding bankruptcy. PGE chose the holder ofthe share; neither the Oregon Public Utility Commission ("OPUC") nor its staff directly selected the shareholder. In 2002, OPUC approved PGE's application seeking authority to issue the single share of $1.00 par value Junior Preferred Stock in order to further insulate PGE from the effects of the Enron bankruptcy. 80 Thus, CPB is mistaken when it claims: "In fact ... as the DPS Staffs Policy Panel testified on cross-examination by the CPB, it was the existence of a golden share provision that was the entire reason why Portland was not dragged into the Enron bankruptcy" (CPB JB at 17). This misses the key point: because the so-called "golden share" provision in Oregon was not implemented until after Enron filed for bankruptcy protection. what the case actually shows is that state regulators have the means and ability, even after a holding company bankruptcy, to work cooperatively with a utility to protect itself from the effects of a parent's bankruptcy. Staff's third and final example claims that an LPE mechanism was required as a condition of the Mid-American Holding Company C'Mid-American") and PacitiCorp merger 79 In the merger order, POE was directed to maintain its own long-term debt ratings and preferred stock ratings for as long as it had preferred stock outstanding; to maintain the common equity portion of its capital structure at 48 G/o or higher unless a different level was approved; and to file information and disclosure notices for affiliated interest transactions. -
Investment in Air Transport Infrastructure
Guidance for developing private participation Infrastructure Transport Air Investment in Public Disclosure Authorized Investment in Air Transport Infrastructure Guidance for developing Public Disclosure Authorized private participation Mustafa Zakir Hussain, Editor With case studies prepared by Booz Allen Hamilton Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Investment in Air Transport Infrastructure Guidance for developing private participation Investment in Air Transport Infrastructure Guidance for developing private participation Mustafa Zakir Hussain, Editor With case studies prepared by Booz Allen Hamilton © 2010 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org E-mail: [email protected] All rights reserved The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Direc- tors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorse- ment or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of appli- cable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. -
Noise Action Plan
NOISE ACTION PLAN Noise Action Plan 2018-2023 NOISE ACTION PLAN 2018-2023 1 CONTENTS 1 Foreword 3 APPENDICES 2 Executive summary 4 Appendix A 28 Noise contour maps 3 Introduction 7 3.1 Purpose 7 Appendix B 31 3.2 Scope 7 Financial information 3.3 Airport description 7 3.4 Consultation 7 Appendix C 32 Schedule of consultees 4 Legal & policy framework 8 4.1 The ICAO and the ‘Balanced Approach’ 8 Appendix D 38 4.2 European Union 8 Summary of consultation responses 4.3 UK Government 8 4.4 Scottish Government 9 5 Aircraft noise & its effects 10 5.1 Introduction to aircraft noise 10 5.2 Measuring and assessing aircraft noise 10 6 Noise management at Glasgow Airport 12 6.1 Aircraft technology 12 6.2 Quieter operating procedures 12 6.3 Noise insulation and land-use planning 15 6.4 Operating restrictions 15 6.5 Working with local communities 15 7 Airspace change consultation 16 8 Results of 2017 noise mapping 18 9 Noise Action Plan 21 10 Monitoring & reporting on our progress 27 2 NOISE ACTION PLAN 2018-2023 1 FOREWORD Glasgow Airport is one of Scotland’s Operating such an important national asset comes with responsibilities, and in talking to our neighbouring communities primary infrastructure assets and and other stakeholders, I know that airport-related noise is an an integral part of the social and important issue for people. economic welfare of the West of Scotland, supporting over 7,000 Managing noise effects is an integral part of how we grow the airport responsibly in a manner which balances the positive jobs. -
Lack of Proportionality Between Ownership and Control: Overview and Issues for Discussion
LACK OF PROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION Issued by the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, December 2007 At its meeting on 14 November 2007 the Steering Group on Corporate Governance agreed on a common position based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance about the issue of whether there should be proportionality between ownership and control (also known as one-share-one-vote) in listed companies. Corporate Affairs Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2 rue André-Pascal, Paris 75116, France www.oecd.org/daf/corporate-affairs/ 2 Lack of proportionality between ownership and control TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 4 Summary of main findings ........................................................................................................................... 4 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................. 5 LACK OF PROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................... 6 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... -
Financial Market Trends 79
Recent Privatisation Trends* I. Introduction and summary Over the past two decades, privatisation has become a key ingredient in eco- nomic reform in many countries. In the last decade alone, close to one trillion US dollars (USD) worth of state-owned enterprises have been transferred to the private sector in the world as a whole. The bulk of privatisation proceeds have come from the sale of assets in the OECD member countries. Privatisation have affected a range of sectors such as manufacturing, banking, defence, energy, trans- portation and public utilities. The privatisation drive in the 1990s was fuelled by the need to reduce budgetary deficits, attract investment, improve corporate effi- ciency and liberalising markets in sectors such as energy and telecommunications. The second half of the 1990s brought an acceleration of privatisation activity espe- cially among the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU), as they started to meet the requirements of the convergence criteria of the Maastrich Treaty. After a decade of growth, global privatisation proceeds in 2000 stood at USD 100 billion,1 down by almost one third from the levels attained in 1999 (Table 1). Much of the decline took place in the OECD countries, which saw their traditionally high share of world privatisation proceeds reduced. Nevertheless, the OECD area continued to account for well over half of global proceeds (Figure 1), the bulk of which came from members of the European Union (EU). * This article was prepared by Ladan Mahboobi, Corporate Affairs Division. The data are from the OECD Privatisation Database and have been prepared by Ayse Bertrand of the Financial Statistics Unit. -
Reluctant Privatization
Reluctant privatization Bernardo Bortolotti 1 and Mara Faccio 2 Abstract We study the evolution of the control structure a large sample of privatized firms in OECD countries and find evidence broadly consistent with the concept of “reluctant privatization”, defined as the transfer of ownership rights in State-owned enterprises without a corresponding transfer of control rights. Indeed, as of 2000, governments are the largest shareholder or use special control powers to retain voting control of 62.4% of privatized firms. However, contrary to accepted theory, greater government control over privatized firms does not negatively affect market valuation. In fact, government stakes are positively and significantly related to peer-adjusted market-to-book ratios. Results are not driven by the choice of the benchmark, reverse causality or by agency costs associated with private ownership. Rather, it appears that the relationship documented reflects more frequent financial aid (bailouts) accruing to privatized firms that remain under government control. Keywords: Privatization, Corporate Governance JEL ns: L33, D72, G15, H6, K22 1 Università di Torino, Department of Economics and Finance, Corso Unione Sovietica, 218 bis, Torino 10134, Italy; Phone: (+39) 02 52036968; Fax: (+39) 02 52036946; email: [email protected]. 2 Vanderbilt University, Owen Graduate School of Management, 401 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203, U.S.A.; Phone: (+1) 615 322-4075; Fax: (+1) 615 343-7177; email: [email protected]. Utpal Bhattacharya played an